This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html).

To receive publishing updates, please subscribe at http://www.apd.army.mil/AdminPubs/new_subscribe.asp

Preface

FM 3-16 blends key points of Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 into its approach to ensure consideration by Army elements of a joint force and addresses the Army's roles and functions in a multinational operation. While North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies’ Program have achieved some levels of standardization in certain areas, no comprehensive common doctrine exists between the armies. This manual does not fill this gap. It will help the multinational commander understand and develop solutions to create an effective fighting force.

The principal audience for FM 3-16 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate according to the law of warfare and the rules of engagement (ROE). (See FM 27-10).

FM 3-16 implements standardization agreement STANAG 6025, Ed. 2.

FM 3-16 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-16 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which FM 3-16 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

FM 3-16 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of FM 3-16 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and recommendations on a Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to: Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-CD (FM 3-16), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337. Send comments and recommendations by e-mail to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil. Follow the DA Form 2028 format or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

Introduction

Whenever commonality of interest exists, nations enter into political, economic, and/or military partnerships. These partnerships occur in regional and worldwide patterns as nations seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real or perceived threats, gain international or bi-national influence, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and engage in peace or war operations. Cultural, diplomatic, information, military, economic, religious, psychological, technological, and political factors all influence the formation and conduct of multinational operations.

America's interests are global, but its focus is regional. Existing alliances and past coalitions reflect that focus. Alliance participants establish formal, standard agreements for operational objectives. As forces of these nations plan and train together, they develop mutual trust and respect. Alliance nations strive to field compatible military systems, structure common procedures, and develop contingency plans to meet potential threats. As examples only, the U.S. is currently a member of the following multilateral alliances and agreements:

United Nations (UN).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies’ Program.

Defense and cooperation treaties with the Republic of Korea and Japan.

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Multinational operations are conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken in the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an intergovernmental organization such as the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Commonly used terms under the multinational rubric include allied, bilateral, coalition, multinational, combined/coalition or multilateral. However, within this manual the preferred term multinational will be the term used to describe these actions and has replaced the older terms of combined in almost all usages except NATO:

An alliance forms the basis for responding to a variety of regional threats.

A multinational coalition is for limited purposes and for a limited length of time. It does not afford military planners the same political resolve and commonality of aim as alliances. Coalitions such as Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom have emerged to meet national strategic requirements.

Since ISAF included not only NATO Troop Contributing Nations but also 22 non-NATO participating nations at its peak, and lasted for over decade, this guide and its Army users would profit from Lessons Learned in that large multinational operation.

Thus, planners closely study the political goals of each participant as a precursor to detailed planning. Political considerations weigh more heavily with coalitions than with alliance operations.

The precise role of land forces in these operations will vary according to each political and military situation. Army participation is likely for three reasons:

Only land forces hold terrain and control populations.

Army structure contains s capabilities other Services do not have.

Soldiers on the ground are a clear demonstration of political resolve.

This field manual cannot provide all the answers, but its purpose is to prompt the user to ask the right questions for mission success.

This publication has undergone significant changes and improvements over the past two decades. It meets the growing and evolving multinational missions. The central idea of this publication reflects the Army’s role within a larger framework (unified action) and its focus on maximum flexibility through a philosophy of mission command and an operations approach. It links directly to the concepts and guidance laid out in ADP/ADRP 3-0 and JP 3-16.

Chapter 1 provides the fundamentals of multinational operations.

Chapter 2 discusses command and control in multinational operations.

Chapter 3 discusses the intelligence concerns for multinational operations.

Chapter 4 describes the ways intelligence should be collected and disseminated in the force.

Chapter 5 discusses the planning challenges for multinational operations.

Chapter 6 describes sustainment challenges in multinational operations.

Chapter 7 discusses inform and influence challenges in multinational operations.

Chapter 8 describes protection in a multinational environment.

Chapter 9 discusses civil affairs operations in the multinational force.

Chapter 10 describes resource management challenges in multinational operations.

Chapter 11 discusses medical support in multinational operations.

Chapter 12 discusses the operational considerations for the multinational forces.

Chapter 13 describes maritime operations in multinational operations.

Chapter 14 describes the air operations needed in multinational operations.

U.S. commanders expect to conduct military operations as part of a multinational force. These operations could span the range of military operations and require coordination with a variety of U.S. government agencies, military forces and government agencies of other nations, local authorities, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations and local, U.S. and multinational corporations. The move to a more comprehensive approach toward problem solving, particularly about counterinsurgency or stability tasks, increases the need for coordination and synchronization among military and non-military entities. It demands full staff integration into multinational activities and the understanding, intent, and execution of every Soldier or agency.

LESSONS LEARNED

Nations in multinational operations have inherent responsibility to share lessons and best practices. Multinational forces partners should take actions that will allow their information systems supporting the capture and delivery of lessons and best practices to interoperate. If this is not feasible, then coalitions may need to provide partners access to each other’s information systems. The United States Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) serves as the office of primary responsibility and action agent for the implementation of the United States Army Lessons Learned Program and is located at http://call.army.mil. The ABCA Armies’ Program coalition operations lessons learned database is located on its home page at www.abca-armies.org/. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) is located on its home page at https://www.pksoi.org/index.cfm. The PKSOI website allows access to the United States Military, United States Government agencies, multinational military and civilian organizations, and private sector organizations to engage in collaboration for collection, analysis, dissemination, and integration of lessons learned for peacekeeping and stability operations.

Chapter 1

Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by discussing the fundamentals and structure of multinational forces. Next, it discusses the nature of multinational operations and the importance of mutual confidence in multinational forces.

FUNDAMENTALS

1-1. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of the coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). The Army conducts decisive action or unified land operations across a range of military operations.

1-2. Army forces are the decisive component of land warfare in multinational operations. The United States may be a troop-contributing nation as part of a multinational command. The Army is part of a joint multinational command headquarters. Alternately, the Army leads a joint multinational land component command headquarters. (See JP 3-33 and JP 3-16).

1-3. Many Soldiers serve with foreign military partners or with civilian partners and have a clear understanding of this environment. This chapter discusses the environment that units face when conducting multinational operations.

1-4. Multinational military operations are not new. American commanders operated with multinational forces throughout history. An example is General George Washington and his partnership with French allies. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, Generals John Pershing, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight Eisenhower, Matthew Ridgway, William Westmoreland, Creighton Abrams, Norman Schwartzkopf, David Petraeus, and Stanley McCrystal have all operated in difficult multinational environments.

THE STRUCTURE OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES

1-5. Although the U.S. acts unilaterally in its national interests, it pursues its national interests through multinational operations when possible. Multinational operations occur within the structure of an alliance or a coalition.

ALLIANCES

1-6. An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members (JP 3-0). One of those broad, long-term objectives is standardization. Standardization is the process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable cooperation among the Services and Department of Defense agencies for the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility (JP 4-02). Alliances have standing headquarters and organizations. Examples for the Army include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Combined Forces Command (CFC), Korea.

COALITIONS

1-7. A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for a common action (JP 5-0). This action is a multinational action outside the bounds of an established alliance. It is based on a willing subset of alliance members. Nations create a coalition to fulfill goals of common interest.

1-8. Coalitions exist for a limited purpose and time. A coalition does not afford military planners the same political resolve and commonality of aim as an alliance. A coalition differs from alliances because its members have a weaker resolve and commitment. A coalition has defined aims and offers military planners more challenges than an alliance. Planners study each participant’s political goals before planning. Normally, political considerations weigh more heavily with coalitions than with alliances. Sovereignty issues are the most difficult issues for commanders of multinational forces. All national military commanders are responsible to their respective national leadership, which reduces the traditional authorities of the multinational commander. The multinational commanders accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus of leadership rather than by traditional command relationships. Unity of effort is essential. Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1). Commanders, along with subordinates, operate as diplomats and warriors in a coalition.

THE NATURE OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

1-9. Multinational operations are driven by—

Common agreement among the participating alliance or coalition partners.

Terms of an alliance.

A mandate or authorization provided by the United Nations (UN).

1-10. The character of multinational operations merits particular attention. National interests and organizational influence compete with doctrine and efficiency. Gaining consensus is difficult and solutions are national in character. Commanders expect contributing nations to adhere to national policies and priorities. This complicates the multinational effort.

1-11. A single commander employs a force in UN-sponsored multinational operations. The secretary general appoints the force commander with the consent of the UN Security Council. The force commander reports to the secretary general or a special representative and has wide discretionary powers over day-today operations. However, the force commander refers all policy matters to the secretary general or special representative to resolve.

1-12. The UN Security Council mandates NATO-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as part of the overall International Community effort. NATO-ISAF has operated in Afghanistan for over a decade. ISAF is divided into ISAF headquarters, joint command, and NATO training mission. U.S. General Officers command each one. ISAF is then divided into regional commands headed by U.S., Turkish, Italian, and German general officers (as of September 2012). The U.S. general officer heads the overall mission as NATO-ISAF commander. The British Ambassador supports the mission as a NATO senior civilian representative. Fifty troop-contributing nations participate in this exercise to accomplish common goals for the multinational operation.

THE IMPORTANCE OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE

1-13. The commander’s focus is the foundation of successful multinational operations. The commander focuses on the political objective, mission, patience, sensitivity to the needs of other force members, a willingness to compromise or come to a consensus when necessary, and mutual confidence. This mutual confidence stems from tangible actions and entities and intangible human factors. This manual addresses tangible considerations such as liaisons, cultures, religions, customs, and languages. The intangible considerations that guide the actions of all participants, especially the senior commander, are—

Rapport.

Respect.

Knowledge of partners.

Team building.

Patience.

Trust.

1-14. If a commander or staff ignores these considerations, multinational operations will fail.

RAPPORT

1-15. Commanders and staffs establish rapport with counterparts from other countries. This is a personal and direct relationship. Good rapport between multinational force members results in successful teamwork and unity of effort.

1-16. Commanders and staff establish rapport by understanding characteristics, customs, personalities, capabilities, ambitions, sensitivities, history, languages, religions, and cultural habits of multinational partners. Understanding these multinational partner elements helps commanders and staff understand each nation’s legal and policy constraints. Once this understanding exists, respect, trust, patience, and compromise develop and maintain rapport. The multinational force commander is visible to members of the multinational force and makes personal visits to all units to assess capabilities, readiness, and morale and to build rapport.

1-17. Commanders establish rapport when the nations combining forces share similar cultural backgrounds. When members come from diverse cultural backgrounds and do not respect each other or choose to violate cultural sensitivities, the partnership is fractured.

1-18. Commanders leverage preexisting relationships among U.S. and multinational commanders and staff a catalyst to rebuild rapport. Often U.S. and multinational commanders and staff have preexisting, personal, or professional relationships with multinational partners. Commanders use these relationships to rebuild rapport.

RESPECT

1-19. Respect exists among multinational partners. Without genuine respect of others, rapport and mutual confidence cannot exist. All nations accomplish the mission regardless of senior member rank or national force size. Respect for the partners’ cultures, languages, religions, customs, and values combined with understanding and consideration of their ideas solidifies a partnership. Lack of respect leads to friction and jeopardizes mission accomplishment. All members of the multinational force understand their partners’ national views and politically imposed limitations to minimize friction.

1-20. Commanders consider national honor and prestige as important as combat capability when assigning missions to multinational forces. Commanders include all partners in planning. The commanders seek the partners’ opinions in mission assignment. Understanding, considering, and accepting ideas from multinational force partners leads to a solidified multinational force and uses other perspectives to analyze problems.

KNOWLEDGE OF PARTNERS

1-21. Commanders know their multinational partners as well as they know their adversary. It is important that partners understand each other’s concerns and needs. Each partner in an operation has a distinct cultural identity. Although nations with similar cultures face fewer obstacles to interoperability than nations with divergent cultural outlooks, differences still exist. Commanders and staffs learn the capabilities of partner nations or organizations. These capabilities differ based on national and organizational interests and objectives, political guidance, limitations on the national force, doctrine, organization, rules of engagement (ROE), law of war, equipment, culture, religions, customs, history, and other factors.

TEAM BUILDING

1-22. Team building is essential in multinational operations. Differing national agendas are disruptive. On a more personal level, the natural competitiveness among Soldiers and nations becomes a serious problem. Such competitiveness is a motivating factor if properly managed. Left unchecked, it destroys force cohesion. Multinational force commanders at all levels reinforce that all forces are on the same team. Establishing an atmosphere of cooperation and trust at the highest levels is essential. When such an atmosphere is established, subordinate commands are positively influenced.

1-23. Commanders ensure all units are treated and exposed equally regardless of national background. Multinational partners perceive failure to do so as prejudice resulting in political repercussions. Partner nation commanders and staff must have fair representation on the planning staff to prevent allegations that any nation was excluded from decisionmaking. All participants perceive missions as appropriate, achievable, and equitable in burden and risk sharing. Unit capabilities are an obvious factor in assigning missions. However, national honor and prestige is as important to the partnership as battlefield capability. Partners are included in planning. Their opinions about the type of mission assignment for their units are important. The political impact of high casualties must be balanced against national honor and prestige. Commanders consider national caveats based on legal and policy constraints when assigning missions and tasks to members. Planning staff must ensure they understand all national caveats. These national caveats are articulated or left unstated, but still very much present. All plans and operations consider these caveats. Prior understanding, proper missions, and above all strong relationships avoid “national red cards.”

PATIENCE

1-24. It takes time and attention to develop effective partnerships. Diligent pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with multinational force partners requires untiring, even-handed patience.

1-25. American commanders demonstrated understanding and patience when working with the large and varied number of troop-contributing nations in NATO-ISAF from Eastern and Western Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Central America to accomplish the combined mission. More recently, multinational operations have included partnership with Afghan national security forces and support to the Afghan government and international community in security sector reform. Commanders and all personnel maintain cultural sensitivity during these operations and remain aware of questionable allegiances and possible retaliation for ISAF military actions.

TRUST

1-26. Trust is important in mutual confidence. Army professionals adhere to ethical principles in their actions to establish trust, maintain teamwork, and communicate respect to all multinational partners.

Chapter 2

Command and Control in Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by discussing the purpose of multinational operations and mission command. It then discusses command structure, command jurisdiction, unity of effort, national interests, and command authority. The chapter then discusses allied operations and multinational forces control. Lastly, the chapter discusses command and control interoperability, multinational force staffing, communication establishment, and national capabilities. A checklist is provided for commanders at the end of this chapter.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS PURPOSE

2-1. Commanders and staff build consensus between the partners in multinational operations. This consensus grows from compatibility at the political, military, and cultural levels. A successful multinational operation establishes unity of effort, if not unity of command. The success of a multinational operation begins with the authority to direct operations of all assigned or attached military forces.

2-2. The multinational force command directs the military effort to reach a common objective. Nations create a multinational force once those nations reach a common interest. Each multinational operation is specific. Each national commander that is part of a multinational force is responsible to the commander of the multinational force and the national chain of command. Troop-contributing nations maintain a direct line of communication to their national headquarters and their own national governments.

2-3. Experience shows that the multinational command’s responsibility for reestablishing, training, and equipping security forces for the indigenous population creates mission command challenges. Indigenous civilian governments responsible for national leadership are often in the formative stage. Commanders remain flexible with these units. Commanders fully understand all the elements of the command authority for these security forces.

MISSION COMMAND PURPOSE

2-4. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0). However, the joint and civilian communities still refer to command and control. (See ADP 6-0, ADRP 6-0, and JP 3-16 for more information.)

2-5. Multinational force commanders use a variety of behaviors to impart their intent and to influence subordinates and coalition partners. Command styles vary greatly. On the one end of this spectrum, these command styles are authoritarian or operate as centralized power. On the other end of the spectrum, the styles are laissez-faire and offer decentralized power. The command styles of mission command and micro management both fit at either end of this spectrum. The command style is a reflection of the relationship between the leader and the led. The national and military cultures of both styles shape the relationship. Multinational commanders vary their command style to harmonize with the particularities of those they lead. However, leadership is a reciprocal relationship and the leadership and the led are responsible for harmonization. Subordinate leaders appreciate the culture of their multinational superiors. Cultures with low power distance and low uncertainty avoidance accept, and in many cases demand, a mission command environment. Subordinates are comfortable dealing with less detailed direction and creating solutions on their own. Cultures with a higher power distance and uncertainty avoidance may be accustomed to centralized control with detailed, explicit direction. Commanders are less likely to delegate authority and expect frequent updates. Subordinates are less likely to question orders or seek clarification. Subordinates are less willing to operate only in the context of higher commander’s intent, and they see the exercise of initiative as overstepping their bounds. Paralysis due to lack of direction may result. On the other hand, many cultures will rail against the micro management of detailed orders. Multinational commanders tailor command styles so that each is appropriate for the subordinate’s national and military culture. Conflict occurs as some cultures are as offended by over-familiarity as by formality. As unity of command is all but impossible given parallel national chains of command, multinational commanders strive for unity of effort. In doing so, multinational commanders develop a high level of mutual trust and comfort with other national contingents. This mutual trust and comfort unleashes the complementary strengths within a multinational force. It is essential for multinational commanders to understand how other cultures perceive their command style and how it affects those cultures.

COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-6. All multinational operations have two chains of command regardless of structure or authority. The first is the multinational chain of command constructed by the UN, alliance, or coalition. The second is a national chain of command extending back to national capitals.

2-7. The United Nations (UN) is the focal point for maintaining peace and upholding human rights. The organization provides the mandate or authorization for the conduct of multinational operations. The UN charter serves as the basis for conducting these operations. Under the UN charter—

Chapter V addresses the security council, which directs the implementation of peace operations.

Chapter VI addresses peaceful means.

Chapter VII addresses enforcement actions.

Chapter VIII addresses regional means to maintain peace and security.

2-8. The UN has three types of operations:

Operations under the command of the UN reported to the secretary-general. The security council sets the mandate for these operations in a resolution. The secretary-general manages and supervises the execution of the mandate.

Operations conducted by a coalition of willing states authorized by the UN. The coalition remains under the command of a lead state or regional organization and reports to its national or alliance chain of command. The security council that allows the coalition to achieve its specified mission authorizes these operations.

Hybrid operations. The UN force operates with a force from another country without any formal command and control.

2-9. Multinational operations have two primary types of operations and two types of command and control structures:

The first type is UN led, sponsored, and mandated.

The second type is the “lead nation led” (or “regional organization led”) and is sanctioned and authorized by the UN.

2-10. Alliances, UN, and coalitions create a command structure that meets the needs, diplomatic realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations. Since no single command structure fits the needs of all alliances, UN and coalitions, several different command structures evolved. This chapter describes four types of command structures:

Lead nation.

Parallel.

Combination (discussed with reference to coalitions.)

Integrated (discussed with reference to alliances.)

2-11. Command structures of alliances and coalitions are organized along these lines. There are some situations when these structures do not apply. Coalitions normally form as a rapid response to unforeseen crises. The nature of the coalition (for example, whether or not it is based on a UN mandate or common agreement among countries) determines the type of command structure. Political agendas of each nation participating in the coalition influence the nature of the coalition itself. Some nations use the term framework nation for lead.

LEAD NATION COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-12. The lead nation concept recognizes that one nation has the lead role and its command and control dominates. Normally, the lead nation is the country that provides the largest number of forces and resources for that operation. A current example would be the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, where the U.S. deployed the largest number of forces, supplied the most resources, and is the lead nation among the 50 troop-contributing nations.

2-13. The lead nation determines the appropriate command and control procedures and works closely with the other national contingents. It provides specific equipment and software to national component headquarters of other nations whenever feasible. Other nations provide appropriate liaison personnel to the lead nation headquarters. Robust liaison is essential to develop and maintain unity of effort in coalition operations.

2-14. Staff augmentation from other national contingents supplements the lead nation staff depending on the size, complexity, and duration of the operation. This augmentation ensures that the lead nation headquarters represents the entire coalition. Such augmentation includes designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This facilitates planning by providing the coalition commander with a source of expertise on coalition members. Augmentation is required if a coalition partner possesses specific organizations or capabilities not found in the lead nation forces.

PARALLEL COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-15. The parallel command structure is an alternative to the lead nation concept. There is no single coalition commander under this structure. The multinational leadership coordinates among the participants to attain unity of effort. This is not the preferred structure because of the absence of a single coalition commander and lack of unity of command.

COMBINATION COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-16. The lead nation concept and a parallel command structure exist simultaneously in a coalition. This occurs when two or more nations are the controlling elements for a mix of international forces. This structure is more desirable than the parallel command structure, but an effort to achieve a total lead-nation concept for unity of command is preferred.

INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-17. In an alliance, a coalition or UN-mandated operation, the entire staff is an integrated command structure. The deputy commander and each primary staff officer could be a different nationality.

2-18. Using an integrated command structure in an alliance provides unity of command. The NATO command structure is a good example of an integrated command structure. In Europe, NATO has allied command operations, also known as supreme headquarters allied powers, Europe. It has a commander from one of the member nations. NATO nation members are a part of the supreme headquarters allied powers, Europe staff. This integration also occurs among the subordinate commands and staffs several levels below supreme headquarters allied powers, Europe.

2-19. An integrated alliance command structure has—

A single designated commander.

A staff composed of representatives from all member nations.

2-20. Subordinate commands and staffs are integrated to the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission. See figure 2-1 on page 2-4.

2-21. Another example of a standing integrated command structure is NATO's Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). However, ARRC has characteristics of a lead-nation command structure. The United Kingdom provides most of the framework of the headquarters structure and 60 percent of the overall staff. It is an integrated command structure because the primary staff members are different nationalities. (For example, the G-3 is a U.S. brigadier general.) The entire staff is integrated and 15 partner nations contribute the remaining personnel. The ARRC’s two subordinate divisions, the multinational division (central) and the multinational division (south), are also integrated. Other NATO nations provide forces for specific operations as the mission dictates. One U.S. division coordinates with the ARRC in peacetime for planning and training.

2-22. Another example of a standing integrated command structure is Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), Korea. This integrated command structure has evolved over years of cooperation between the U.S. and Korea. The CFC staff and the staff of its subordinate ground component command are fully integrated.

2-23. A coalition also has an integrated command structure. An integrated staff demonstrates greater burden sharing and commitment, but creates more friction than the other types of command structures. The staff forms and learns to operate as a team. At the same time, staff develops every aspect of command and control, planning, operations, and execution.

COMMAND JURISDICTION

2-24. Each participating nation in a multinational operation has its own national caveats. Each nation is responsible to its own national legal authority for the conduct of operations, viewing the conflict based on its own national interests. Multinational commanders consider both political and military issues during operations. These national caveats constrain commanders. They work with the national force commander and authority of each nation. Where these interests vary, commanders have the greatest latitude. Commanders understand these constraints and national caveats and include these when planning.

UNITY OF EFFORT

2-25. Unity of effort is achieved in multinational operations. The principle of unity of command also applies but is more difficult for commanders to attain. In stability tasks and NATO Article 5 Collective Defense, government agencies have the lead. For the first time in NATO’s history, the allies invoked the principle of Article 5 – a pact of mutual assistance in case any NATO member is the victim of an armed attack – after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States. Commanders report to a civilian chief and employ civilian agency resources. Command arrangements do not involve a command authority due to national and host nation interests. Commanders consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic, economic, and informational in nature. Small units conduct peace operations so all levels understand the military-civilian relationship to avoid unnecessary and counterproductive friction.

2-26. A command relationship is sound and effective for successful multinational operations. Multinational commanders seek assistance from governmental agencies to assess other countries’ capabilities. Commanders consider national sensitivities and differing norms of behavior among national militaries and civilian agencies. Multinational forces anticipate that some forces from member nations have direct and near immediate communication from the operational area to their respective national political leaderships. This capability eases coordination issues or becomes a source of frustration if external leaders issue guidance directly to deployed national forces.

NATIONAL INTERESTS

2-27. The political agendas of participating countries affect multinational operations. Many nations will not, or are reluctant to, relinquish command of their forces to other countries. On a case-by-case basis, each country’s national government places national forces under the multinational commander’s operational control. In such cases, parallel chains of command exist through the coalition force and national authority. The multinational force’s challenge is to arrange the best command relationships with its subordinate forces to ensure mission success.

2-28. The interests of nations regarding the operation are described in the terms of reference between the contributing nations and other multinational partners or the UN if it is involved. The multinational force develops a written document that outlines command relationships. This document could be an annex to an operation plan, an operation order, or a campaign plan.

2-29. The multinational forces transfer authority to the multinational commander’s control. This becomes an issue in command and control. Nations may not agree on when the transfer occurs. The earlier the multinational force gains control, the more flexibility it has to train and conduct the operations. Differences in national interests, objectives and policies at the national level, and the availability of forces based on concurrent commitments delay planning and agreement to subsequent decisions.

COMMAND AUTHORITY

2-30. The Army has doctrinal definitions for command relationships. Those are the same definitions used by the joint community (see JP 1-02). However, as a member of NATO, the U.S. agrees to NATO definitions for command relationships. The NATO definitions are not the same as the U.S. definitions. Additionally in Combined Forces Command (CFC), Korea and United States Forces, Korea definitions describe command relationships. Commanders understand how each nation defines command relationships to operate in multinational operations. Multinational force commanders understand what they can and cannot do with each troop-contributing nation’s forces. For a further explanation of the U.S. view of command authority, see JP 3-16.

2-31. To provide an understanding of some of the issues involved in the different aspects of command authority, see figure 2-2 on page 2-6. It provides a comparison of command authorities between U.S., NATO, and CFC, Korea definitions.

NATO OPERATIONS

2-32. NATO has defined five command relationships:

Ful command.

Operational command.

Operational control.

Tactical command.

Tactical control.

CFC, KOREA AND U.S. FORCE, KOREA OPERATIONS

2-33. Multinational operations currently employed in the Korean theater of operations use two specific control measures:

Combined operational control.

Command less operational control.

ALLIED OPERATIONS

2-34. Refer to Allied Joint Publication AJP-01 (C), Allied Joint Doctrine. Commanders and staffs use this publication at the operational level. Commanders and staffs can use it at any level as reference. Although NATO forces primarily use AJP-01 (C), the doctrine is instructive and provides a useful framework for operations conducted by a coalition of NATO, partners, non-NATO nations, and other organizations.

UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS

2-35. The missions deployed in Thakur and Schnabel or the ISAF operation in Afghanistan constitutes the NATO Alliance’s most significant operation to date. A UN mandate established ISAF in 2001 and it has been under NATO leadership since August 2003. ISAF has several distinguishing features:

Consent and cooperation of parties to the conflict.

International support and support of the UN Security Council.

UN command and control.

Multinational composition of operations.

No use of force.

Neutrality of UN military between rival armies.

Political impartiality of the UN in relationships with rival states.

2-36. Most national authorities that provide forces to multinational operations assign national forces under operational control of the multinational force commander. Smaller nations place their force’s operational control to a larger force. The larger force is then under the multinational force commander’s operational control. In the case of UN-mandated ISAF, there are regional commands in Afghanistan under the command of Turkey, Germany, and Italy in charge of multinational forces in that region. The national authorities assign national forces under operational control. Caveats qualify these forces from the respective nations according to national policies. The multinational force commander’s additional assignments to service component commanders in an operational control status are subject to approval by the respective national governments.

2-37. The parent national commander retains the command less operational control of the national forces. The designated national commander of the respective nations in the multinational force exercises this command less operational control. The multinational commander and national commanders discuss and clarify their mutual understanding of the command authorities they receive. This clarification ensures there is common understanding of those authorities. It also precludes potential misunderstandings.

2-38. For Army forces, the U.S. commander retains command over all assigned U.S. forces in multinational operations. The U.S. chain of command runs from the President through a combatant commander to the U.S. national commander. The chain of command, from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field, remains inviolate.

MULTINATIONAL FORCES CONTROL

2-39. Liaison networks and coordination centers improve control of multinational forces. Within ISAF, this includes liaison officers from the major troop-contributing nations, close allies who communicate closely with U.S. and other regional commanders, and the ISAF commander. These enhancements along with meetings, boards, and conferences help integrate operations across the multinational force.

LIAISON NETWORK

2-40. Regardless of the command structure, effective liaison is vital in any multinational force. Using a liaison is an invaluable confidence-building tool between the multinational force and subordinate commands. It also—

Fosters a better understanding of mission and tactics.

Facilitates the transfer of vital information.

Enhances mutual trust.

Develops an increased level of teamwork.

2-41. A liaison supplies significant information for the multinational force headquarters about subordinate force readiness, training, and other factors. Early establishment reduces the fog and friction caused by incompatible communications systems, doctrine, and operating procedures.

2-42. The command and its higher headquarters, adjacent units, supporting and attached forces, and other appropriate host nation and intergovernmental organizations establish its liaison early. For U.S. forces, liaison with the U.S. ambassador, if there is one, is essential.

2-43. The command identifies and requests liaison personnel early. The request includes specific qualifications. Differences in doctrine, organization, equipment, and training among the multinational nations demand a hardier liaison structure to facilitate operations than in a national force. Liaison teams cover many functions on a 24-hour basis. This requires more liaison personnel than a force normally has assigned. Liaison personnel must have equipment compatible with the multinational force.

2-44. Liaison personnel understand the capabilities and limitations of parent units and nations, including the structure, capabilities, weapon systems, logistics, and planning methods employed and their national interests. Whether personnel are language qualified or have interpreter support, they understand the language and culture of the multinational headquarters they are attached to. This ensures successful liaison operations. However, professional knowledge and functional expertise are far more important. Officers who have participated in schools and training with other multinational nations or have experience in multinational operations provide this expertise depending on their experience. Careful selection of fully qualified liaison officers, who are Army professionals in competence, character, and commitment, is important to mission success. The sending command provides liaison teams with knowledge of the language, organization, materiel, and doctrine of multinational partners and an understanding of appropriate regional information. The liaison officers assigned to the multinational force headquarters influence decisionmaking. These officers also possess the authority to answer routine multinational force queries on behalf of their commands.

2-45. Once liaison is established, liaison teams directly represent their respective commanders. They advise, help, coordinate, and monitor their commands. The liaison teams attend briefings and maintain close contact with the multinational operations center. However, the command they become a part of does not formally task their sending unit through the liaison officer. Formal tasking occurs through normal command and control channels.

2-46. The commander determines whether to integrate multinational liaison personnel into the staff of the multinational force. When integration creates a more effective organization, the multinational force establishes an orientation program for all liaison personnel. The multinational personnel reception center performs this requirement. The multinational force determines what staff officer or staff section is responsible for liaison personnel reporting to the headquarters.

2-47. Special operations forces are effective in multinational operations as liaison officers or liaison teams. Their language capabilities, cultural and customs training, and experience working and training with other country’s militaries allow them to improve coordination and communication.

2-48. Army digital liaison detachments are assigned to selected Army Service component commands. These detachments allow the Army commander to conduct liaison with subordinate, parallel, or higher joint and multinational headquarters in the operational area. These detachments have 30 functional staff experts in logistics, intelligence, airspace management, maneuver, and fires that provide advice and assistance to supported units and ensure rapid and accurate coordination between headquarters. Digital liaison detachments have organic transportation and Army computer systems. These detachments receive communications support from Army theater signal units. Digital liaison detachments are augmented qualified linguists and interpreters with specific language capabilities. In Korea, two digital liaison detachments coordinate the specific U.S. aspects of combat, information, protection, and logistical support in CFC, Korea.

COORDINATION CENTERS

2-49. A coordination center is a proven means to enhance stability and interaction. It also improves control in a multinational force. A multinational commander, especially one that operates under a parallel command structure, establishes a coordination center in the early stages of any effort and staffs it with skilled personnel. The coordination center is for command and control. It also organizes and controls functional areas including logistics and civil-military operations. Initially, a coordination center is the focal point for support issues such as force sustainment, medical support, infrastructure engineering, host nation support, and movement control. As a multinational force matures, the center’s role includes command activities such as force provision or force deployment. Member nations provide action officers who are familiar with its activities when a coordination center is activated. Multinational forces are encouraged to augment this staff with linguists and interpreters along with requisite communications capabilities to maintain contact with parent headquarters. An example of a successful coordination center is the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base to support operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.

COMMAND AND CONTROL INTEROPERABILITY

2-50. All multinational force troops understand the mission, goals, and objectives of the operation. The G-3/S-3 develops standard operating procedures whenever appropriate. These standard operating procedures should be easy to understand and address multinational procedures, not single-nation procedures. The lead nation uses its standard operating procedures for most purposes.

2-51. Even with standard operating procedures, the lead nation provides a forum for deconflicting and resolving misunderstandings. This requires more than a platform to express ideas. It includes commanders from multinational forces who do not have a working understanding of English. The multinational force must use some mechanism, such as sand tables, as a tool to overcome language deficiencies when describing operational requirements. Regardless of the mechanism used, the multinational force commander and staff need patience and detailed explanations to ensure understanding. A robust liaison team bridges command and control interoperability gaps.

2-52. Terminology is also a problem between multinational forces and other organizations. For example, using acronyms could pose a problem between organizations. Therefore, all military forces and the agencies they work with develop and distribute a lexicon of mutually agreed terms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine on command and control of joint or multinational forces. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. The glossary in this manual provides a common basis for understanding. Other terms and definitions are found in ADRP 1-02 and JP 1-02.

2-53. The multinational force headquarters location is important. The multinational force protects itself against various threats. However, it should be in a position to work with both the political and military sides of the operation.

2-54. The multinational force remembers that many countries are not staffed or equipped to offer full support. They do not possess a full array of warfighting functions assets, maps of the projected area of operations (AO), or the capability to obtain or use intelligence and imagery data of the type commonly used by other multinational forces. These military forces look to other nations for equipment and supplies. With regard specifically to UN operations, the agreements that exist between the UN and these militaries before arrival in the projected AO are very important for the multinational forces.

2-55. The multinational force commander will see what nations offer special capabilities such as airlift, special operations, information collection, communication, security, and logistics. These capabilities offset other countries’ shortfalls and enhance overall operational competence. Multinational force commanders have difficulty removing particular forces or individuals from the force unless these forces or individuals are from their own nation.

AGENCY COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

2-56. Multinational force commanders focus on cooperation and coordination rather than command and control when dealing with most nonmilitary agencies. These agencies have their own missions and goals. Coalition commanders have limited ability to influence these agencies’ actions. Commanders seek agency cooperation to ensure that they accomplish the mission and end state while allowing these agencies to do the same. It also requires that each agency and multinational force staff coordinate to prevent interference in one another’s missions. Additionally, these agencies help commanders accomplish the mission. A civil-military operations center is one way of achieving cooperation and coordination with nonmilitary agencies. The civil-military operations center, described in detail in Chapter 9, provides a single point of contact between these agencies and the commander.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE STAFFING

2-57. The multinational staff organization is based on what option is used to form the headquarters, either the lead-nation concept or a composite headquarters. The commander has a choice if the establishing authority designates an organization. If the establishing authority uses the lead-nation concept, the lead nation’s doctrine assigns the commander and staff’s duties. The doctrine is modified as necessary for the specific situation. If the establishing authority uses a composite headquarters, the commander and staff specify duties in more detail. The multinational functions’ names change based on sensitivities when working with organizations such as the UN.

2-58. Appropriate members in key positions from each country that provide forces are a part of the multinational staff. Each country represents and influences the force. These positions stem from the mission and type of operations conducted. Multinational commanders look at force composition as it applies to capabilities, limitations, and required support. The importance of knowing, trusting, and quickly reaching a comfort level with staff members makes it desirable for the multinational commander to choose members of the staff such as the chief of staff or G-3.

2-59. When mission requirements exceed staff capabilities, the commander requests the necessary personnel, facilities, and equipment from either the national chain of command or the multinational establishing authorities. These commands and authorities have a “cell” of experts prepared to augment a multinational force to provide assistance in the early stages of organization and planning. The staff includes experienced operators for the command and control information systems. Personnel nominated to fill multinational augmentation billets possess the following attributes:

Knowledge, confidence, and forcefulness.

Professionalism, character and commitment.

Preparedness to represent their nations and units.

Understanding that they are the de facto country “experts.”

Ability to work as part of a multinational team without country parochialism.

2-60. The command establishes a staff orientation program to ensure that all individuals joining the staff become familiar with their surroundings. Establishing a multinational personnel reception center under the G-1/S-1 accomplishes this. The “buddy system” is another program that the command establishes with the reception center or by itself. This system assigns an experienced staff member to a new staff member to help with familiarization.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER

2-61. The multinational force commander is responsible to the member nations to accomplish the mission. The following responsibilities are a guide. These responsibilities are adapted to the specific mission and forces assigned:

Make recommendations to the establishing authorities on the proper employment of assigned and attached forces for mission accomplishment. This includes identifying requirements for additional forces as needed.

Exercise control over assigned and attached forces. The commander determines when to transfer forces to the multinational force operational control or tactical control.

Develop an operation order or campaign plan in the planning guidelines as directed by the establishing authorities. The commander determines applicability of existing operation plans, if any, to maximize the benefits of prior deliberate planning.

Request supplemental rules of engagement (ROE) needed to accomplish the mission.

Establish combat identification measures.

Notify the establishing authorities when prepared to assume responsibility for the AO.

Ensure cross-nation support.

Ensure the force operates as an effective, mutually supporting multinational team.

Determine the requirement for and provide guidance on establishing the necessary boards, centers, and bureaus (such as multinational visitor’s bureau or multinational movement center). If a staff proposes creating an organization, the commander requires that the staff provide criteria, supporting rationale, and membership. The commander makes the final decision. If it is not required, the commander does not establish it.

Define the subordinate AOs for each subordinate force, including the special operations force. The commander—

Ensures accurate accountability of forces deployed.

Monitors the operational situation and maintains daily contact with the establishing authorities.

Coordinates with forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments, multinational nation agencies, nongovernmental organizations, or intergovernmental organizations as appropriate.

Builds a cohesive team, including nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and others.

DEPUTY MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER

2-62. Normally, the deputy commander is from a different country than the commander. The selection is based on the mission or the number and type of forces in the multinational force. The deputy usually is of equal or senior rank to the subordinate force commanders. The deputy possesses a broad understanding of the operation. The deputy performs special duties as directed by the commander. Examples of these duties include the following:

Chairing committees.

Coordinating with liaison personnel.

Coordinating for incoming and outgoing requirements.

Coordinating interagency requirements.

CHIEF OF STAFF

2-63. In most cases, the chief of staff comes from the same country or command as the commander. Because the staff has officers from different nations, the chief of staff places special emphasis on training, coordinating, and directing the staff’s work. The chief of staff establishes routine procedures to ensure necessary coordination and review staff actions for completeness and clarity.

G-1/S-1 HUMAN RESOURCES

2-64. See Chapter 3, Human Resources Challenges of Multinational Operations, for details. It discusses human resources, financial, legal, and religious support to the command.

G-2/S-2 INTELLIGENCE

2-65. See Chapter 4, Intelligence Concerns for Multinational Operations, for details.

G-3/S-3 OPERATIONS

2-66. See Chapter 5, Planning Challenges of Multinational Operations, for details.

G-4/S-4 SUSTAINMENT

2-67. See Chapter 6, Sustainment Challenges in Multinational Operations, for details. This chapter includes health service support and operational contract support.

G-5/S-5 PLANS

2-68. See Chapter 5, Planning Considerations for Multinational Operations, for details.

G-6/S-6 SIGNAL

2-69. See JP 3-16 [Multinational Operations], Chapter 2, “Command and Coordination Relationships,” for details of establishing communications.

G-7/S-7 INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

2-70. See Chapter 7, Inform and Influence Challenges in Multinational Operations, for details.

G-8 RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

2-71. See Chapter 10, Resource management Challenges in Multinational Operations, for details.

G-9 OR S-9, CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

2-72. See Chapter 9, Civil Affairs Operations, for details.

COMMANDER’S PERSONAL AND SPECIAL STAFF

2-73. The commander’s personal and special staff groups includes the following:

Political advisor.

Inspector general.

Command historian.

Engineer.

Public affairs officer.

Surgeon.

Chaplain.

Linguists and interpreters.

Others as directed.

2-74. Each member has specific tasks and responsibilities. In addition to the G-1, Chapter 3 covers the chaplain, chapter 11 covers the surgeon, and chapter 12 covers the engineer.

Political Advisor

2-75. Commanders routinely work directly with political authorities in the region. The commander establishes a close, efficient, and effective relationship with the political advisor. The political advisor—

Works with the commander and helps the national government create policies that meet multinational objectives and can be executed.

Acts as the principal contact with ambassadors and informs the appropriate diplomatic personnel of multinational force plans in the AO.

Supplies information about policy goals and objectives of the diplomatic agencies relevant to the operation.

Inspector General

2-76. The inspector general is a confidential advisor and fact finder for the commanding general. This individual is an extension of the commander's eyes, ears, voice, and conscience. The inspector general informs the commander of observations, findings, and impressions on all aspects of the command. When directed by the commanding general, the inspector general—

Assesses the operational and administrative effectiveness of the command.

Informs the commanding general on all matters affecting mission accomplishment.

Inquires into the reports on the state of the economy, efficiency, discipline, morale, esprit de corps, and quality of command management and leadership of all assigned and attached units and organizations.

Assists the commanding general in sustaining readiness by taking care of Soldiers, civilians, and family members.

Advises the commanding general on inspections policy and effectiveness of the organization’s inspections program.

Command Historian

2-77. All too often, historians, leadership, or other personnel do not record important events, important decisions, and lessons learned from an operation. These events, decisions, and lessons learned are not available for the multinational forces in future operations to use as learning tools. The commander establishes a staff section to collect historical information and lessons learned about the operation from initial planning to redeployment. A command historian leads this section. The historian—

Captures and records events for historical purposes (including photographs).

Collects lessons learned and ensures turnover files are properly developed.

Helps develop standard operating procedures.

2-78. Additionally, the historian records all daily events. Historians create records at the time of each event. It includes available sources and a synopsis of rationale for actions taken. This staff section is not part of decisionmaking.

Public Affairs and the Media

2-79. The modern battlefield and the media’s ability to report from the battlefield have changed dramatically in the last 20 years. Technological advances ensure that future operations unfold on a global stage before a worldwide audience. Tactical actions and the hardships of Soldiers and civilians alike have an increasing impact on strategic decisionmaking. Real-time visual images of operations, both positive and negative, continue to influence public understanding and support.

2-80. Media presence on the battlefield is a factor that commanders consider during mission planning. Commanders must understand and account for media capabilities and requirements. Failure will not prevent the media from covering multinational operations. It will ensure that the media uses alternate sources for information and multinational forces lose the ability to influence the outcome.

Information Environments

2-81. The global information environment has been present throughout history. It is often forgotten or thought of as a new phenomenon. This environment consists of physical dimension, information dimension, and cognitive dimension. The information environment has become more important for military planning, operations, and execution with the added availability of internet, wireless communication, and information technology. Any activities occurring by, through, or within means of the information environment have consequential effect on the operational environment and impact military operations, decisions, and outcomes. Commanders, staff, leaders, and Soldiers fully understand their operational environment. This understanding includes the information environment and the potential impacts it has on current, planned, or future operations. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13). Inform and influence activities are a key factor in the global information environment and essential in the military information environment for a commander to achieve success.

2-82. Commanders understand the pervasiveness and capability of the media, not only in its ability to report on an operation, but also on its ability to influence target audiences with respect to the legitimacy of that operation. Commanders anticipate how adversaries use the media to achieve their own version of inform and influence activities. Commanders counter these attempts at misinformation and propaganda to mitigate the effects on the morale of the troops.

Public Affairs Objectives

2-83. Public affairs is the principal contributor to inform line of effort in the commander’s inform and influence tasks. The public affairs office seizes the initiative with respect to media operations and puts programs in place to—

Protect Soldiers and local civilians from the effects of enemy propaganda, misinformation, and rumor.

Support open, independent reporting and access to units and Soldiers (within the limits of operations security).

Establish the conditions leading to confidence in the multinational force.

Provide a balanced, fair, and credible presentation of information that communicates the multinational force’s story and messages through an expedited flow of complete, accurate, and timely information.

Public Affairs Operations

2-84. Public affairs operations help the commander understand and operate in the global information environment. These operations support the commander’s efforts to meet the information requirements of internal and external audiences without compromising the mission.

2-85. The perception of an operation is as important as the execution of the operation. Public affairs staff supports the commander by monitoring media perceptions and reporting trends. The staff prepares and disseminates clear and objective messages about the operation to target audiences to address any instances of misinformation or imbalanced reporting.

2-86. Successful operations require an accurate public affairs assessment of the situation. The public affairs assessment is the continual analysis of the global information environment and its potential impact on the operation. This assessment provides the commander with a thorough examination of critical public affairs factors such as—

The number, types, and nationalities of news media representatives in theater.

The identification of media personalities and their respective reporting trends or biases.

Media needs and limitations.

Media transportation and communication capabilities or requirements.

The perception of past, current, or potential operations by internal and external audiences.

2-87. The chief challenge for the multinational public affairs staff is to develop a plan that supports the commander’s concept of operations and considers the public affairs requirements of the multinational partners.

2-88. The multinational forces are familiar with their own national media organizations and methods, but not necessarily with those of other nations. Commanders and public affairs consider these differences when developing working relationships to allow open and accurate reporting. Commanders and public affairs staff develop ground rules to ensure operations security. Public affairs develop policies on media accreditation and release or non-release of information at the multinational force headquarters level. All units in the command adhere to these policies, regardless of nationality.

2-89. Public affairs operations consist of planning, media operations, internal communications, and training.

Planning. Public affairs planning is important to operational planning. It is included at the very beginning of planning. Public affairs officers establish the conditions that lead to confidence in the multinational force. They expedite the flow of complete, accurate, and timely information that communicates the multinational force’s perspective. This ensures media understanding of the events covered and contributes to fair and balanced reporting. The requirement to provide issues management and crisis communications advice to the commander and senior staff on a wide range of issues, both operational and nonoperational, is included in this planning element.

Media operations. Commanders and their staffs accurately assess the level and intensity of media interest in their operation. Media operations advise the commander on the likely implications of media reporting on the chosen course of action. Media operations involve the following:

Facilitating media coverage of operations by anticipating and responding to the needs of the media. This includes providing access to official spokespersons and subject matter experts. In-theater media has additional requirements such as transportation, accommodation, and emergency medical treatment. Most media organizations are prepared with either the necessary logistic support or the money to buy it. However, whatever level of support is provided to the media, it is important to apply it.

Verifying media accreditation and assisting with accreditation, as required.

Discussing the “ground rules” of media coverage of ongoing operations. This includes written acknowledgement and enforcement, as required.

Establishing and operating an information bureau.

Internal communication. Public affairs has an essential and constant requirement to inform multinational troops on operational issues and national and international events. This is an important function because it contributes directly to morale. It also helps counter rumors and misinformation.

Training. There is a lot of media interest in military operations. All Soldiers learn how to deal effectively with the media on and off the battlefield. Soldiers of all ranks receive media awareness training before deployment. Leadership pays attention to individuals selected as “official” spokespersons. However, the potential exists for Soldiers to respond to media queries regarding their jobs and personal experiences.

Information Bureau

2-90. The multinational force establishes a multinational information bureau staffed by public affairs officers with necessary logistic support. It verifies media credentials and assists with accreditation. It also facilitates media coverage by communicating with media agencies outside the AO. The bureau expands its capability with deploying forces when using the principles of modularity and flexibility. It addresses the potential for a large number of media deployed throughout the AO. The bureau establishes subbureaus, if required.

2-91. Information is important to multinational force personnel and their families at home. The bureau ensures that the international media, including the national media of the multinational partners, receive information on multinational force activities. Family members influence a multinational force member’s morale when reporting what they have seen or heard on television and radio. Release authority for information is preestablished. It does not compromise operations security parameters and next of kin process or investigative procedures. The bureau addresses the language requirements of the various target audiences.

Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, and Military Information Support Operations

2-92. The common ground between public affairs, civil affairs, and military information support operations (MISO) is information. Civil affairs operations use information to inform the intratheater public on assistance programs and reconstruction projects in their area. Public affairs uses information to manage issues and inform the troops and the international media community. MISO uses information to change the perceptions, opinions, attitudes, behavior, and beliefs of a population to gain support for civil tasks, military activities, and partner nation governments.

2-93. MISO uses government or military means to produce and disseminate messages. MISO also uses information from the media to reinforce its messages. Public affairs is not used to disseminate MISO messages. Coordination is essential between civil affairs, public affairs, and MISO to ensure that no contradictions or divergences occur. The information operations coordination cell (chaired by the multinational J-39 or G-7) normally coordinates these activities.

Public Affairs Guidance

2-94. The media will want to talk to commanders and troops. Commanders must avoid a staged show because experienced media will recognize any scripted or staged information. The troops receive public affairs guidance and then talk to the media. The troops also talk to the media after the accredited media receives and understands the “ground rules” for reporting. Public affairs planners provide the ground rules and other guidance in the public affairs annex to the operations order. Public affairs guidance to Soldiers include the following:

The Soldier’s right to talk to the media.

Everything said is “on the record” and quoted by name.

Classified or sensitive information and comments on policy are off limits.

Always be honest.

If Soldiers do not know the answer, they say so.

Do not speculate and stay in the area of expertise.

Listen to the question carefully. If unsure of a question, ask the reporter to clarify it.

Treat the media as professionals and respect their deadlines.

Respect host nation sensitivities and speak slowly when necessary.

Keep your answers brief and to the point.

Always maintain eye contact with the interviewer.

Avoid military or technical jargon.

Relax and be friendly.

Linguists and Interpreters

2-95. Linguists and interpreters are critical to mission success. Communication with the local populace and multinational forces is hindered without them. Language barriers cause difficulties when working with other armies and the host nation. Language problems make it difficult to sustain a rapid decision cycle. Even common tasks, such as sharing intelligence, await translation before the command shares it. This slows the development of plans and execution. Language capability speeds command, reduces confusion, and contributes to mutual respect. Forces exchange commands and other information to work successfully together. Few linguists have the technical expertise and depth of understanding to be fully understood while crossing both language and doctrinal boundaries.

2-96. Planners consider liaison officers, foreign area officers, and language-capable personnel to fill these positions. Planners determine requirements for language-trained personnel early in the planning cycle. Planners are scarce and there is a long-lead time to deploy the requirements. These language-qualified personnel require a training period to become familiar with technical terms and procedures of the organization. Language is more than the direct translation of words. Word choice and mannerisms also convey information.

2-97. Linguistic or interpreter requirements do not exist only in liaison teams or headquarters elements. Stability tasks and logistics functions need linguists or interpreters to coordinate with local authorities, civilian transportation coordinators, refugee and relief centers, medical staffs, legal offices, and local police forces. A military linguist translates from a foreign language into English within a relatively static environment, while an interpreter interactively works to facilitate communication between a foreign party and a command representative.

2-98. Linguist training differs from interpreter training. The linguist translates into English (one-directional translation), whereas an interpreter fluently converts the communication into English from the foreign language and the reverse based on the interpreter’s linguistic capabilities (two-directional translation).

2-99. The time it takes to acquire enough linguists and interpreters has been a problem. This impacts both personnel tempo and multinational operations. The staff conducts its initial joint task force mission analysis and planning and identifies all linguist support requirements early in planning. Early planning ensures availability and timeliness for deployment. (See JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Operations, Chapter II - Forming and Organizing the Joint Task Force Headquarters.)

2-100. Host nation linguists and interpreters are important for multinational operations. While this is acceptable for many requirements, some sensitive positions require military linguists with appropriate security clearances. In cases of less common languages, multinational components require parent country or other country augmentation. Trust between host nation personnel and members of the multinational force is a consideration. Without a means of building trust, multinational forces are vulnerable.

COMMUNICATION ESTABLISHMENT

2-101. Communication is fundamental to successful multinational operations. It is important to prepare for communication during planning. Mission analysis and assessment provide the opportunity for the communications officer to identify communication requirements and evaluate in-country capability.

INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS

2-102. Many communication issues are resolved through equipment exchange and liaison teams. Continual liaison between communication planners helps alleviate interoperability issues. Communication requirements vary with the mission, composition, and geography of the AO. Interoperability is constrained by the least technologically advanced nation. The multinational force addresses the need for integrated communications among all forces early in the operation’s planning phase.

2-103. In a multinational force, a primary communication link is between the lead nation and the national contingent headquarters. The ability for commanders, staffs, and subordinates to communicate with civilian agencies across all operations is important. The lead nation and contingent headquarters consider the transition to subsequent units, commercial communications, or to agencies such as the UN early in the operation.

2-104. The multinational force plans for adequate communication to include using voice (secure and nonsecure), data, and video teleconferencing. The force needs a deployable communication capability and enough trained operators for sustained operations with multiple means of communication to avoid the possibility of a single point failure.

ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT

2-105. In addition to problems of compatibility and security, many units do not have enough communication equipment to meet mission requirements. During initial planning stages, planners identify required communications, issues of spectrum management, and controls on access to information. Liaison teams, with adequate communication gear, reduce the severity of some of these problems. Satellite communications provide communication between higher-level headquarters, whether Army, joint, or multinational. Other space-based services, such as weather reporting and use of global positioning systems, are also needed.

2-106. Communications planners anticipate these requirements during initial planning, evaluate host nation communication resources, and integrate the requirements into the communications plan. These means must satisfy operational requirements. Common user communications are used for operations if there is sufficient capacity to ensure acceptable reaction times. Although many combined communications doctrine and procedures exist, there are some differences in operating standards.

NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

2-107. The national capabilities include national representative involvement in planning and integration of each nation. Each one is discussed in detail in paragraphs 2-108–2-119.

NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE INVOLVEMENT IN PLANNING

2-108. Representatives of each nation are present during planning. If a unit has a mission it cannot accomplish, the plan will not work. National representatives ensure that taskings are appropriate to the force. If possible, national representatives are available in each staff element. They must thoroughly understand their nation’s capabilities and limitations.

INTEGRATION OF EACH NATION

2-109. Each of the multinational member nations provides its own distinct units and capabilities to a multinational force. These capabilities differ based on national interests, objectives, arms control limitations, doctrine, organization, training, leader development, equipment, history, defense budget, and domestic politics. To integrate these capabilities into multinational operations, the member understands the differences in organization, capabilities, and doctrine. The greater the number of nations involved, the greater these differences will be for the multinational force.

2-110. Understanding these differences determines if multinational operations succeed or fail. Units of the same type in one nation’s army may not perform the same functions as units in another army. An engineer unit in one army may have capabilities to build roads or buildings, while another may be limited to laying out minefields or building defensive positions.

2-111. The commander of the multinational force integrates force capabilities to achieve the desired end state. Selecting the right mix is a challenge. The multinational staff understands the capabilities and limitations of the nations in the multinational force.

2-112. Doctrine is another important issue. If a nation does not understand or train for a mission, it fails. National forces operate using their own doctrine internally, while externally their actions conform to the overall direction of the multinational force. To make this work, however, multinational commanders must know the differences in the other nation’s doctrine. Liaison officers or augmentees and/or supplemental staff officers help accomplish this. When U.S. forces operate with NATO or American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) countries as part of a multinational military command, they follow the doctrine and procedures embedded in U.S. field manuals from previously ratified standardization agreements and ABCA standards. If time permits, learning and understanding the doctrine of NATO and multinational partners is important to use for operations. Nonetheless, nothing replaces being sound in Army doctrine. It is a part of NATO and multinational doctrine in many instances. At a minimum, it is a framework to use at initiation of operations.

2-113. Conventional multinational force capabilities include the following assets and operations:

Air defense.

Armor.

Aviation.

Engineer.

Field artillery.

Infantry.

Intelligence.

Medical.

Military police.

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) defense.

Linguists.

Interpreters.

Ordnance.

Personnel.

Quartermaster.

Signal.

Transportation.

Aviation.

2-114. The following are aviation information requirements needed before deployment:

Determine the aviation assets, capabilities, and requirements of the multinational force.

Identify the aviation logistics capabilities of the multinational force.

Identify current and projected requirements for communication.

Determine aviation support required from multinational forces.

Identify the intended base of operations.

Identify the personnel recovery plan in the theater of operations. (Rotary-wing units execute organic personnel recovery or depending on capabilities, theater-wide recovery.)

Identify secure communications capabilities of the higher headquarters and supported units.

Engineers

2-115. Quadripartite Standardization Agreement 1175 covers engineer support capabilities, utilities requirements, and other information required before deployment. This quadripartite standardization agreement is equally applicable to phases during operations with little modification. In addition to Quadripartite Standardization Agreement 1175, information on obstacles; equipment capabilities; future engineer planning; engineer threat characteristics; and command, control, communications, and intelligence is required. The following engineer information is required before a deployment:

Identify terrain visualization requirements.

Determine types and capabilities of engineer units for the multinational and other Services.

Determine the facility support requirements, such as latrines and base camp construction, from the multinational force and its supported units.

Determine the condition of and requirements for infrastructure in the stability tasks such as roads, airfields, ports, and power generation facilities.

Identify the availability and type of engineer resources in the operating area.

Determine real estate support requirements.

Identify humanitarian and nation assistance engineering requirements.

Special Operations Forces

2-116. Special operations forces are valuable to a multinational force. These forces have capabilities to complement conventional capabilities. Selected special operations forces are regionally oriented and have personnel experienced and conversant in the languages and cultures of the AO. These forces help with liaison to facilitate interoperability with multinational forces. When using special operations forces is considered, it is very important to understand their capabilities and properly apply those capabilities.

2-117. The multinational force commander designates a joint special operations task force composed of forces from more than one Service to carry out a special operation or prosecute special operations to support a theater campaign or other operations in the AO. This commander commands with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control. The commander exercises day-to-day command and control of assigned or attached special operations forces and allocates forces against tasks to support the command. The command defines a special operations area for use by the special operations forces. Establishing a joint special operations area delineates and facilitates simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.

2-118. The commander determines where certain special operations forces best fit in the organization. The G-3 or S-3 integrates both civil affairs operations and MISO developed by the respective staff officers into the operation order. Due to the political sensitivity of these areas, the multinational establishing authorities approve authority for these operations.

2-119. At the earliest opportunity, the command’s higher headquarters identifies the requirement for civil affairs operations, MISO units, public affairs operations, and staff augmentation. These units require reserve component augmentation for full capability. This is considered when requesting these assets because of the lead-time necessary to obtain. Civil affairs operations, MISO, and public affairs actions dramatically affect the perceived legitimacy of peace operations. Civil affairs operations reinforce and are reinforced by MISO themes and actions. MISO themes and actions are coordinated with public affairs office initiatives to avoid creating a dichotomy, whether real or perceived.

CHECKLIST

2-120. Commanders participating in a multinational operation should answer the following questions about the force’s participation in the operation.

COMMAND

What is the command structure? Is it a lead nation, parallel command, combined, or integrated command structure?

What political motivations are responsible for each nation’s participation in the operation? What potential conflicts arise?

Have the implications of national and regional culture on contemplated multinational operations been assessed?

Have appropriate orientation briefings from civilian agencies been requested?

Have status-of-forces agreements (SOFA) been agreed to? If not, who should conduct negotiations? Is there an alternative (for example, technical agreements) that provide adequate protection?

What interoperability factors (for example, command, control, communications, or logistics) affect the mission?

Are there cultural barriers that prevent a harmonious relationship? What force structure minimizes friction between partners?

Have supported and supporting relationships been established or referred to higher authority to resolve inadequacies?

Have linguist and interpreter needs been identified?

What are the capabilities to obtain more linguists and interpreters as needed?

What specific capabilities does a national contingent bring to the multinational force?

What constraints are imposed on multinational forces by their national authorities?

Have standards for operational or logistic capabilities been established for certifying units to participate in the operation? Have nations with deficiencies indicated a method of resolution?

Have national caveats on use of multinational forces been identified and disseminated throughout the command?

Have deficiencies with multinational commanders been negotiated for resolution?

Have command and control arrangements been made including the multinational ambassadors, military attaches, and nonmilitary government officials in coordinating functions?

Are forces, logistic support, and command, control, and communications capabilities robust enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?

Have all multinational legal constraints been considered in planning for command and control?

Have the personnel for the multinational staff been chosen to reflect the required functional skills, training level, language skill, and avoidance of historic animosities?

Have minimum communications capabilities been established for each multinational member to enable successful 24-hour operations?

Has the command structure been designed to minimize the number of layers?

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Have command relationships for the control of forces been defined?

Is there an initiating directive that clearly articulates the command arrangements?

Have the command relationships been defined and analyzed for the following?

Feasibility of achieving unity of command or unity of effort.

Feasibility of accomplishing the mission under the command relationships.

Assistance required from the national government to negotiate unity of command or effort at the strategic level.

Clarity of relationships and understanding on the part of all multinational elements.

LIAISON

What liaison officers must be sent to multinational force headquarters and adjacent, supporting, and supported units?

Do liaison elements on the staff possess requisite authorities? Do the liaison elements have a full understanding of both national interest and multinational objectives?

Do liaison elements have appropriate communications, linguistic, logistics, and office support capabilities in place?

Have liaison officers been identified? Have key liaison officers been interviewed for suitability?

What are the requirements for interagency and multinational coordination? Does the force have adequate liaison officers or liaison officer teams to meet required coordination?

Have Army forces mobile liaison teams been requested?

LANGUAGE

What language will be used for force wide communication?

At what command level will each force resort to its national language? Are there sufficient interpreters for planning and execution?

COMMUNICATIONS

What areas come under multinational control and what areas remain national issues?

What is the requirement for portable communication devices such as cell phones?

Will commercial companies establish telephone service for use by multinational forces?

If the multinational force establishes a multinational visitor’s bureau, what communications capability is required?

Do national laws require agreements defining payments for using the information systems networks or military satellite communication assets?

Who is responsible for funding additional communications capability?

Will nations be expected to provide communications capabilities to other nations’ military forces or civilian agencies?

What are the plans for expanding the communication system if needed?

What is the policy on morale calls? Who supports them?

What steps have been taken to ensure procedural compatibility?

What is the common identification of friend or foe procedure?

What are the data-link protocols?

What is the communication equipment capability between forces?

Has coordination been accomplished regarding frequency assignment?

What command and control information systems are required to support diminishing multinational force presence?

Will command channels be used only for execution and national channels for reporting status and requesting support?

Are there a means and a plan to provide all forces with a common operational picture?

Do multinational partners with a lesser command and control capability have appropriate liaison officers, interpreters, operators, and maintainers to enable adequate command and control in the multinational force?

Is there a policy or plan for the control, release, and dissemination of sensitive information and cryptographic materials, especially to civilian agencies that require some access to classified material to accomplish their missions?

Has the language exchange point been determined?

Are there sufficient interpreters available for both planning and execution?

Has the terrain and environment been considered while planning for the command and control network?

Has the rapid dissemination of targeting materials been provided for?

Have arrangements been made for staff communication?

Have common databases been provided for?

Has the nation most capable of providing an integrated, interoperable command and control network been selected to serve as network manager for the multinational command and control infrastructure?

Have arrangements been made to allow contract host nation employees to work on command and control staffs without exposing them to automated data processing and classified information used in daily operations?

Has the multinational established a standard datum? Will all products be on that datum?

Is there a multinational force geospatial information and services plan that designates all mapping, charting, and geodesy products for use?

Have the command relationships, locations of headquarters and the type of services required such as tactical satellite, telephone, facsimile, amplitude modulation, and frequency modulation/modulated been determined?

What are the frequency requirements and planning ranges for equipment?

Has the multinational force communications coordinator requested frequencies?

How will the multinational force conduct spectrum management? This must account for frequencies already in use by civilian agencies.

How will the multinational force achieve automated data processing software compatibility to facilitate file transfers?

How will the multinational force achieve communication interoperability? Will the system satisfy communications requirements from the national authorities to the lowest information exchange requirement?

If civilian agencies have separate communications networks and the multinational force provides security for these agencies, how will they request assistance during emergencies?

How will the multinational ensure adequate redundancy? Multiple assets must be available and used during operations to ensure information flow.

How will the multinational handle incompatible communications equipment among organizations and multinational forces?

What communication support will be provided to civilian agencies? Will support be provided through the civil-military operations center?

How and when will the multinational force establish its communications architecture?

How will the multinational force account for and use communication networks established by civilian agencies? This includes commercially leased circuits, commercial satellite services, high frequency, and very high frequency radios.

How will the multinational force address the need for secure communications?

How will the command handle incidents when a person accidentally transmits classified data over the unclassified computer network?

What is the policy on implementing communications blackout periods to support multinational operations security?

Is there a multinational force standardized e-mail naming convention?

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

What areas come under multinational control and what areas remain national issues?

Has coordination been affected with other national public affairs officers or equivalents?

What is the plan for handling publicity, news correspondents, and journalists?

Does the public affairs plan include a list of capabilities (personnel by military occupational specialty, grade, or unit type and size) to execute the plan?

Does the capability requirements assessment include consideration of doctrinal employment of personnel and units?

Does the capabilities assessment include using units’ organic and theater-level assets?

What are the biographical backgrounds of multinational force senior leaders? What specific equipment do they have or require?

Has the senior public affairs officer met the multinational force senior leaders?

Who is the senior spokesperson for the multinational force?

Has the multinational force information bureau been established?

Has a coordinated media policy, including a system to provide credentials for the media, been established? This allows some control over who attends multinational force briefings.

Does the media understand the end state and how the force is progressing toward it?

Has the command aggressively countered inaccurate information with subject matter experts?

Has media awareness training been conducted before deployment? Has sustainment training been conducted in the AO?

Has the senior public affairs officer identified points of contact with agencies that operate in the AO to arrange referrals of media queries regarding their operations?

Has release of information authority for accidents or incidents and notification of next-of-kin and investigative procedures been established?

Will media be embedded in units? What are the procedures for dealing with this situation?

Has translation/interpretation support for media ground rules, as well as other documents, been established?

Does the command have a public affairs plan that includes crisis management? Is the senior public affairs officer a member of the crisis management team?

Does the public affairs plan reflect the cultural differences of all troop-contributing nations and the host nation?

Does the public affairs plan consider the impact of print, radio, televised, and internet media?

Does the command have a public affairs plan that does the following:

Provides a contingency statement to use in response to media queries before initial public release of information concerning the multinational force and its mission?

States who (which nation and when, or all nations simultaneously) makes the initial public release concerning the multinational force and its mission?

States agreed-upon procedures for the subsequent release of information concerning the multinational force and its national components?

States requirements for combat camera support, to include communicating the need for operational documentation to subordinate units?

Ensures full utilization of all assets available – television, radio, cell phone messaging, text messages, and fliers?

Establishes priority of usage of assets with canned messages prepared for events?

Chapter 3

Human Resource Challenges of Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by discussing human resources support. It then discusses legal considerations for commanders and ends with a discussion on environmental considerations. A checklist for commanders and staffs is included at the end of the chapter.

HUMAN RESOURCES SUPPORT

3-1. The G-1/S-1 is the principal staff assistant to the commander on human resources support. This individual provides guidance, oversight, and coordination of manpower and personnel issues. The G-1/S-1 coordinates finance support and manages the religious ministry and legal personnel support. The G-1 is responsible for human resources support for national contingents.

3-2. Multinational force human resources support assets are collocated for ease of coordination between the national elements of the multinational force. Human resources support is the system and functions of manning, human resource services, and personnel support.

Manning includes personnel readiness management, personnel, personnel information management, and personnel accountability, strength reporting, and retention operations.

Human resource services include casualty operations management, postal, and essential personnel services (promotions, awards, evaluations, and the like).

Human resources support includes morale, welfare and recreation; equal opportunity; band; and drug and alcohol. In addition to human resources support, the G-1/S-1 normally assumes staff coordinating responsibility of resource management, command information, and legal service support.

3-3. The multinational G-1 coordinates with the national contingents to recommend a tour length policy to the multinational force commander. A rotation policy is based on the multinational force’s mission, length of operation, operational environment, requirements to place skills in positions, and procedures for moving or removing personnel. A standard tour length for all personnel is equitable and impacts morale. This is not supportable from an operational aspect. The rotation policies of participating nations and Services preclude a standardized tour length. The multinational commander knows national contingent rotations and their status to account for all the forces in the area of operations (AO).

RECEPTION CENTER

3-4. In multinational operations, the G-1 establishes a multinational personnel reception center. The center familiarizes personnel with the multinational force, its mission, and the reason for multinational force formation. It also helps personnel acclimate to the host nation’s culture, religion, language, customs, and history. Each nation that contributes to troops is represented in the center. The multinational personnel reception center is the location of national personnel service support operations.

VISITOR’S BUREAU

3-5. The number of visitors to an AO is reason to establish a multinational visitor’s bureau. This bureau handles all visitors including distinguished visitors on a full-time basis. A senior officer with a protocol background and favorable people skills directs the bureau. The multinational visitor’s bureau is a separate entity and not part of the multinational information bureau or public affairs office. It includes representatives from all multinational force nations. The bureau possesses sufficient communications and transportation capabilities. Its personnel require training in executive protection and proper escorting of distinguished visitors.

RELIGIOUS MINISTRY

3-6. Religion influences military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Military planners identify religious differences among multinational forces and indigenous populations in the AO. Religion impacts multinational policy, strategy, and relationships. (See JP 1-05 for more information.)

3-7. National component commanders deliver religious ministry support to their forces in multinational operations. The multinational force assigns the senior national component chaplain to the multinational staff. The multinational staff chaplain (brigade and above) or unit ministry teams (brigade and below) promote religious support cooperation. The chaplain also promotes appropriate understanding for any host nation and national component religious sensitivities. The multinational force staff chaplain promotes religious support coverage among multinational force personnel (including faith group requirements). The multinational force staff chaplain—

Recommends deployment of religious ministry personnel by composition.

Advises the multinational force commander and staff on religion, morals, ethics, and morale from a religious standpoint only.

Provides and performs religious support according to the chaplain’s faith and country practices and standards.

Advocates that all nations’ religious support personnel receive professional support, worship space, logistics, transportation, and program funding from the multinational force or national component commander and staff. This support must be in accordance with national and Service policies and regulations through appropriate staff channels.

Establishes and coordinates a multinational force religious ministry support plan for all elements of the multinational force according to multinational force commander guidance.

Advises the multinational force commander on personnel replacement or rotational policies.

Advises the multinational force command and staff regarding humanitarian and disaster-relief programs.

Refers requests for humanitarian assistance by religious non-governmental organizations to multinational force civil-military operations center or equivalent.

Ensures detainees receive ministry and care appropriate to their needs.

Publishes multinational force religious support plan(s) for all phases of the operation with multinational force operation plan and operation order.

Provides confidential and privileged communication in counseling for multinational personnel to support stress management, morale, and early identification of critical personnel problems.

Executes engagements with religious leaders and other leaders as directed by the multinational force commander.

LEGAL ADVISOR

3-8. Legal support is essential to multinational operations. Operations, especially peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, involve a myriad of foreign and domestic statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations. A commander calls on the legal advisor as often as the operations officer. The legal advisor helps a commander understand the problems of multinational operations. The legal advisor is a vital part of the planning team before deployment. However, adherence to the law is the responsibility of command at all levels. Legal advisors will not be those called to account if the multinational force carries out an illegal act. This is important in areas of national fiscal restrictions on the expenditures of funds, equipment, and manpower. (See JP 1-04 for more information.)

3-9. Additionally, multinational operations and missions require subordinate commanders to be involved with local governments and conduct negotiations among competing factions. Commanders negotiate with governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other intergovernmental organizations to accomplish the mission. The command needs a legal advisor based on the situation to influence decisionmaking.

3-10. The legal advisor—

Advises the commander on operational law including the law of war, rules of engagement (ROE), law of the sea, air law, status-of-forces agreements (SOFA), and applicable international laws, military justice, claims, legal assistance, and administrative law encompassing environmental issues, contracts, and fiscal law.

Reviews operational plans for legal sufficiency and potential issues.

Drafts policy for the force regarding prohibited and permitted actions while deployed.

Serves as a member of the ROE planning cell and provides advice and counsel on the development and promulgation of ROE.

Negotiates with local governments concerning procurement, seizure of property for military purposes, and scope of foreign criminal jurisdiction in the absence of existing agreements.

Ensures that all adverse actions are properly administered.

Advises the commander on international directives and agreements that form the basis for the multinational operations. This includes host nation support, diplomatic status, foreign criminal jurisdiction, ROE, environmental matters, and medical treatment of civilians.

Provides legal advice on prisoners of war, refugees, displaced and detained civilians; military information support operations (MISO) and stability tasks or civil-military cooperation; local culture and customs; government, military, and political liaison; investigations; the legality of landing fees; and interpretation of transit agreements.

Establishes liaison early with multinational, international, and host nation legal officials and local police, authorities, and court officials who administer the judicial system.

Implements, interprets, or executes a system for payment of claims arising from personal injury or property damage from the operation.

Advises the force on legal and fiscal constraints involving logistics assistance to nonmilitary organizations and multinational forces.

Advises the command on issues affecting the detention of persons who attack or disrupt the force according to customary international law, applicable UN Security Council resolutions, alliance or multinational directives, and national policies. The force must be sensitive to apprehension and turnover procedures, especially where there are distinct cultural differences in the AO.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMANDERS

3-11. Commanders and planners of multinational forces understand the legal basis for all operations. These laws apply to all multinational forces. Even multinational forces conducting operations under UN mandates do not have immunity under the law.

JURISDICTION

3-12. Jurisdiction is based on the national laws of the country sending the troops, as far as they have extraterritorial application outside the country concerned. SOFAs for stability tasks grant exclusion of host state jurisdiction and provide a legal framework for the strictly international and neutral status of the multinational forces. The multinational force is more effective if it is not subject to the jurisdiction of any of the parties engaged in the conflict. To do so would lead to an undermining of impartiality. Additionally, the ability to arrest, detain, and try members of the multinational force or community influence the activities of the operation.

3-13. The consensual basis for the multinational force’s presence in the host country, its mandate, and the privileges and immunities of any civilians is established. In most cases, an intergovernmental organization, such as the UN, performs this task. When the operation is an exercise in regional peacekeeping, participating nations establish a legally sound basis for such an operation sustainable under international law.

3-14. A claims regime compensating for damages arising from such acts will be a feature of any SOFA or other agreement with the receiving state. In matters not related to official duties, multinational members are subject to local jurisdiction with only a few minor concessions in favor of the force. If Service members are involved in any incident while on leave, they may be liable for any damage they do or injury they cause.

3-15. International law applies to all operations. Multinational partners comply with obligations that arise from the treaties. Not all multinational members are party to the same treaties. This creates a marked disparity between partners as to what they can or cannot do. Some obligations under international law arise from customary international law bind states whether or not they have entered into a treaty on the subject. Commanders and staff remain aware of this complication and ensure plans and operations reflect this reality. Most rules relating to humane treatment of persons within the power of the force fit in this category.

3-16. The element of international law that applies is a complex issue that depends on several considerations. Commanders and staffs need to seek out expert legal advice. No multinational force will conduct operations in a legal vacuum. The international law requirement for humane treatment and respect for the life, rights, and property of noncombatants remains constant even if the treaty or customary basis for those protections differ.

USE OF FORCE LEGAL BASIS

3-17. There are a variety of internationally recognized legal basis for using force in multinational operations. The UN charter is the primary authority for using force under security council sanctions in the majority of multinational operations. (See Chapter VII of the UN charter and FM 1-04 for more information.)

3-18. Multinational force commanders and planners understand the legal basis for their involvement in the operation and coordinate with the multinational force legal advisor. Legal issues affecting use of force, detention, searches and seizures, foreign criminal jurisdiction, and adherence to international law impact mission accomplishment.

FOREIGN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

3-19. Multinational forces perform a variety of stability tasks. Criminal jurisdiction is one of the most important issues that affect commanders and their Soldiers’ ability to accomplish the mission in multinational operations. The multinational force is not subject to the jurisdiction of any of the parties engaged in the conflict. This would lead to an undermining of impartiality essential to mission success. Additionally, the ability to arrest, detain, and try members of the multinational force directly influences the activities of the operation. The consensual basis (mandate) for the multinational force’s presence in the host country and the privileges and immunities of any civilians are established.

3-20. In a best-case scenario, these protections are in a document with treaty status and, because of the nature of multinational operations, negotiated by an intergovernmental organization such as the UN. However, when the operation is an exercise in regional peacekeeping, the participating nations establish a legally sound basis sustainable under international law. Thus, during the initial mission analysis and planning, staff planners make the appropriate arrangements to have all multinational partners contribute to this legal documentation.

STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENT

3-21. International law recognizes that each sovereign nation has jurisdiction over all persons in its recognized borders. A receiving state consents to any limitations on this sovereign right before any foreign nation sending forces (sending state) into that host nation asserts jurisdiction over sending state personnel sent for military operations. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, military personnel participating in a multinational operation are subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. Because of the potential ramifications that result from a receiving state exercising jurisdiction over multinational deployed personnel, a SOFA is essential before a deployment. While a SOFA is in many procedural formats, it generally addresses three substantive areas of foreign criminal jurisdiction:

The first area includes cases where the sending state has exclusive jurisdiction. Under exclusive jurisdiction, the sending state retains sole jurisdiction over cases where its personnel have committed an offensive punishable under its laws, but not the laws of the receiving state. These offenses are primarily those characterized as purely “military” offenses (such as absent without leave or dereliction of duty) under the sending state’s military criminal code.

The second area includes cases where the receiving state exercises exclusive jurisdiction. These offenses are commonly receiving state traffic offenses. These offenses are punishable under the laws of the receiving state and not the sending state.

The third area includes cases where the sending and receiving states share jurisdiction. This is a concurrent jurisdiction. Under concurrent jurisdiction, either the sending or receiving state exercises a primary right of jurisdiction depending upon the negotiated offense. As is often the case, in those cases where the receiving state has a primary right of jurisdiction, the receiving state either waives its right, or, gives “sympathetic consideration” to requests by the sending state for jurisdiction.

3-22. In the absence of a SOFA, a sending state retains some criminal jurisdiction over its deployed forces. In those cases where military personnel participate in a United Nations (UN) mission, those military personnel have special protection. Further, (under Article VI of the convention on the privileges and immunities of the UN charter) the state grants deploying forces “expert on mission” status to provide a strong legal framework for the international and neutral status of the multinational force. In this case, complete immunity for crimes committed by members of the multinational force is granted. The UN negotiates a SOFA with the host nation. This is a status of mission agreement. This agreement has exclusive criminal jurisdiction in the sending states participating in the multinational mission.

3-23. In addition to criminal jurisdiction, civil liability for acts of omission by multinational personnel is also an important concern to commanders and planners. (This includes, for example, claims by receiving state civilians for damage during a deployment.) Most SOFAs allow members of the multinational force exemption from local jurisdiction in civil proceedings for acts “related to the official duties of the member.” For example, a claims procedure compensating for damages arising from such acts are a feature of any SOFA or other agreement with the receiving state. In matters not related to official duties, multinational members are subject to local jurisdiction with only a few minor concessions in favor of the force. If service members are involved in any incident not a part of their official duties, they could be liable in the courts of the receiving state for any damages or injuries they cause.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

3-24. International law applies to all operations. Multinational partners comply with obligations from the treaties to which they are party. Not all multinational members are party to the same treaties. This creates a marked disparity between partners as to what they can or cannot do. Some obligations under international law arise from “customary” international law and are binding on states whether or not they have entered into a treaty on the subject. For example, most of the internationally recognized rules relating to humane treatment of persons within the power of a military force fit in this category.

3-25. The law of war is binding on the multinational partners in any operation where a state of armed conflict exists to which the multinational members are a party. Some aspects of the law of war, such as prohibitions on using certain weapons, bind multinational partners even though no “state of war” exists. Even when not strictly applicable, the law of war provides guidance and applies as a part of a multinational member’s national policy. Within the scope of multinational operations, international human rights law is an issue. In particular, both treaty and customary international law prohibitions are binding on the multinational force and its members. These prohibitions include—

Genocide.

Slavery.

Torture.

Inhumane treatment.

Arbitrary detention.

Deprivation of civil rights.

PRISONERS OF WAR AND DETAINED PERSONS

3-26. Troops involved in peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate are in a special position. These troops respect the laws relating to using force, but are not parties to the conflict where they maintain peace. If any troops are taken prisoner, they are not prisoners of war. They are held illegally and must be immediately released.

3-27. Although not a party to the conflict, members of the multinational force complies with the spirit of all provisions of the law of war. In many operations, persons who are not entitled to prisoner of war status are detained by the force. Either the situation has not reached the threshold of international armed conflict or the individual is not a combatant or otherwise entitled to enjoy prisoner of war status under Geneva Convention III. The force also detains common criminals who pose a threat to the force or to law and order.

3-28. The status of a captured person is not immediately known. This occurs where opposing forces comprise or include irregular militia, where there are civilians accompanying the force or acting as unlawful combatants, or where a spontaneous uprising has occurred.

3-29. The law of war makes clear distinctions between armed and international armed conflict. The legal distinctions determine the status of any detainees a force takes. The law of war can have limitations. Detainees are taken in circumstances where law of war does not strictly apply, such as a UN or other peace operations. For these reasons, international law has evolved to ensure no person is detained without legal protection.

3-30. International rules of humane treatment apply to anyone who is captured, arrested, interned, retained, or otherwise detained by multinational personnel. It does not matter whether the persons are enemy prisoners of war, retained personnel, internees, or detainees. It does not matter whether captivity arises out of international armed conflict, armed conflict not of an international character, or during peace support operations. It is important to understand that different countries have different rules regarding the holding and transfer of enemy prisoners of war. These rules preclude the transfer of enemy prisoners of war between national contingents.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR NATIONS

3-31. Each nation’s respective chain of command in the multinational force provides its nation’s ROE. The force headquarters develops multinational force ROE during planning. Subsequently, subordinate formations from nations other than the force headquarters develop supporting ROE. Some subordinate ROE vary from the lead-nation’s ROE to comply with national legal requirements and the parameters of national ROE provided by national chains of command. Subordinate ROE for any given national contingent provides clear national guidance on other nations’ weapons usage prohibited by law or restricted in usage for that contingent. Commands know that using another nation’s capability prohibited by the command’s national ROE place the command at risk of national prosecution.

3-32. U.S. forces assigned operational control or tactical control to a multinational force follow the ROE of the multinational force to accomplish a mission if authorized by the President of the U.S. or secretary of defense. U.S. forces use necessary and proportional force for unit and individual self-defense to respond to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. When U.S. forces under U.S. operational control or tactical control operate with a multinational force, reasonable efforts are made to affect common ROE. If such ROE are not established, U.S. forces operate under standing ROE. To avoid misunderstanding, U.S. forces inform multinational forces before U.S. participation in the operation that U.S. forces intend to operate under these standing ROE. Varying national obligations derived from international agreements complicate participation in multinational operations. For example, other multinational force members may not be parties to treaties that bind the U.S. or treaties to which the U.S. is not a party may bind them. U.S. forces remain bound by U.S. international agreements even if the other members are not parties to these agreements and do not need to adhere to the terms.

3-33. ROE are the primary tools used by multinational forces to regulate using force. ROE provide operational constraints based on the mission the multinational force conducts. Numerous legal factors serve as a foundation for multinational ROE. This reflects both international law and the national laws of the various participating nations. Nonlegal issues, such as the political objectives of the multinational force and the individual troop-contributing nations combined with military mission limitations, are also important to create and apply ROE. Commanders and their legal advisors face the challenge of determining and implementing acceptable ROE between all nations involved in the multinational operation. The multinational force legal advisor helps commanders and staffs prepare, disseminate, and train ROE. However, ROE are the commander’s “rules” the force implements.

3-34. It is probable that some subordinate nation’s ROE differ from the lead nation’s ROE because of national legal requirements and the parameters of national ROE provided by their respective national chains of command. To prevent confusion that affects the multinational force’s ability to accomplish its mission, a subordinate command’s ROE provides clear national guidance on other participating nations’ ROE differences. The operational planning staff defines the ROE of weapons use (such as use of riot control agents and measures) prohibited by law or restricted in use for one nation for all other multinational participants. Participating nations do not adhere to ROE measures (whether multinational force or another troop-contributing nation) that violates their own national laws. Doing so places the command at risk of national prosecution. An example would be using landmines when their nation signed international treaties banning landmine use.

3-35. ROE are a control mechanism for use of force during military operations. Individual Soldier and collective unit training is essential. There is potential for varied differences between the national ROE that a contributing force regularly uses in training or operations and the ROE set by the multinational force headquarters. Therefore, the multinational headquarters coalition CJ-3 provides predeployment training information to any new multinational forces. The commander provides experienced personnel to help with predeployment training. Realistic and rigorous scenario- or vignette-driven training exercises are the best way to train ROE to help the command ensure that ROE is properly understood and applied under mission conditions.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-36. Force members are aware of host nation environmental considerations and participating nations’ environmental legislation during multinational operations, particularly stability tasks. Military materiel restrictions by one or more armies or the host nation—such as using depleted uranium rounds—limits the method forces conduct operations. Commanders consider the cultural and historical sensitivities as a factor in planning. They provide the appropriate guidance to the planning teams. The force headquarters produce environmental constraints and factors checklist for the force. This helps subordinate commands understand how operations impact the environment. Force planners also consider these as factors in operational planning.

CHECKLIST

3-37. Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should answer the following questions with respect to the personnel support portion of the operation.

PERSONNEL

What areas come under multinational control? What areas remain national issues?

What are the special skill requirements (unit or individual) of the command?

What are the requirements for reserve component units, individuals, or a combination of both?

What is the personnel replacement and rotation scheme?

What language-qualified personnel are needed for augmentation? What training is available?

Has the G-3 or S-3 been consulted on required augmentation?

What is the primary means of maintaining personnel accountability and strength management?

What is the primary means of processing awards and evaluations?

How is the G-1 tracking medical evacuations?

What national agreements relating to personnel policy or Service exist? If there are any constraints, what are they?

What communications capabilities exist to support the submission of personnel reports? (For example, automation nonsecure internet protocol, secure internet protocol, and combined enterprise regional information exchange voice networks.) At what echelon are the capabilities available? What are the theater and national reporting requirements?

What are the personnel service support capabilities of multinational force units to provide essential services? Where do units require capabilities augmentation to ensure minimum essential services? What liaison officer requirements exist? What translator requirements exist for the multinational force units?

What is the leave policy for force members? Which units are eligible to participate in the rest and recuperation leave and/or pass programs? Which are not eligible? Can a multinational or joint task force limit multinational force units’ leave programs to ensure personnel readiness?

What are the equivalent modified tables of organization and equipment for multinational force units? How can a multinational or joint task force headquarters perform personnel replacement and rotation to ensure unit personnel readiness levels?

Does the deployed theater accountability system or the joint personnel status report all personnel?

How do multinational force units track, process, and report casualties in the theater of operations and to national headquarters? What are the next-of-kin notification procedures? What is the theater feedback mechanism to the controlling headquarters?

What support agreements exist to facilitate postal operations for multinational force units? Do units have access to Army Post Office and free mail?

How are multinational force replacements requisitioned, processed, and delivered to their respective units?

What are the morale, welfare, and recreation capabilities of the multinational force units? What agreements exist to share morale, welfare, and recreation assets? Are there any special morale, welfare, and recreation considerations?

What national service and/or achievement awards are available to force personnel? What are the theater processing requirements? How does the theater awards policy ensure equity?

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

What areas come under multinational control and what areas remain national issues?

Do legal advisors understand national policies?

Has a SOFA or status of mission agreement been established with the receiving nations?

What are the key differences in SOFAs, if any, across the multinational force area of responsibility?

What are the environmental constraints and factors that affect the conduct of operations?

Is there a system to pay for claims arising from personal injury or property damage resulting from the operation?

What are the legal and fiscal constraints involving logistic assistance to nonmilitary organizations and other nations’ forces?

What are the multinational force’s obligations to war crimes’ investigations and indictment? Are these obligations consistent with the multinational force’s mandate?

What are the multinational force’s obligations to the host nation police forces, international police force, or both forces deployed in the multinational AO?

What are the host nation laws with respect to civil rights of its citizens?

Are host nation judicial infrastructures intact? If so, has liaison been affected? If not, what resources and procedures are required to establish them?

What is the legal status of enemy prisoners of war?

What is the legal status of displaced civilians?

What are the differing troop-contributing nation’s national policies for using antipersonnel mines? How does this affect the multinational force?

Who is responsible for interrogation of enemy prisoners of war or detainees?

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Are there multinational ROE that all nations have agreed to?

How does the ROE impact the troop-contributing nations?

How does each troop-contributing nation disseminate and train ROE to its Soldiers?

Have the ROE been distributed to the Soldiers? Has training been performed before deployment? Has the ROE training been effective?

What are the key differences in ROE across the multinational force? How does this impact upon the multinational force headquarters’ ability to accomplish its mission?

Are there national restrictions or points of contention concerning ROE that the commander must know?

Are there ROE on using indirect fire? Are there force guidelines on using indirect fire as a demonstration of intent? Is there a difference between the multinational force ROE on using indirect fire and national protection requirements?

Does each troop-contributing nation have a common or clear understanding of the terms used in the ROE?

Has the use of certain systems or equipment—such as defoliants, riot control agents, or landmines—been evaluated for its impact in relation to the ROE and upon the multinational force’s ability to accomplish its mission?

Is there joint targeting? Are there ROE for joint fires? Are there systems available to assess collateral damage from joint fires?

Chapter 4

Intelligence Concerns for Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by discussing multinational intelligence and multinational information sharing. It then discusses multinational forces operations planning. Next, the chapter discusses effective coordination for multinational operations, stability operations support, and information gathering importance. Lastly, this chapter discusses information versus intelligence and includes a checklist for commanders and staffs.

MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

4-1. The multinational forces synchronize its intelligence efforts with unified action partners to achieve unity of effort and to meet the multinational commander’s intent. Intelligence unity of effort is critical to accomplish the mission. Unified action partners are important to intelligence in all operations. Multinational and interagency partners provide cultural awareness and unique perspectives that reinforce and complement Army intelligence capabilities. Using appropriate procedures and established policy, multinational force intelligence leaders provide information and intelligence support to multinational forces. The G-2/S-2 staff leverages the intelligence enterprise to answer the commander’s requirements.

4-2. Intelligence leaders ensure that the intelligence warfighting function operates effectively and efficiently. They are the commander’s primary advisors on employing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and information collection assets. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function (JP 2-01). The ISR effort must be unified. Intelligence leaders drive ISR and information collection. Additionally, intelligence analysts support their commanders with analysis and production of timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive assessments and products tailored to the commander’s needs. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on intelligence and the intelligence warfighting function.)

MULTINATIONAL INFORMATION SHARING

4-3. Every multinational operation is different and so are the ways the force collects and disseminates intelligence. Classification presents a problem in releasing information, but keeping as much unclassified as possible improves interoperability, trust, and operational effectiveness in the multinational force. Intelligence sharing is the most contentious issue in multinational operations, and one that commanders fully address to ensure everyone understands national policy limitations. Commanders know other nation’s positions on intelligence sharing and assure that intelligence is shared to the degree possible, especially if required for mission accomplishment and force protection. Early information sharing during planning ensures that multinational force requirements are clearly stated, guidance supports the commander’s intent, and the multinational force uses procedures supportable by other nations.

4-4. The G-2/S-2 articulates the release instructions to analysts and planners who write for releasability to the members of a particular coalition. The G-2/S-2 consults the intelligence foreign disclosure officer early in an operation to facilitate lines of communication between Army elements and allied nations.

4-5. The national policies on intelligence affect intelligence. Each multinational force develops intelligence procedures tailored to the mission. These procedures are responsive to the commander and deliver timely intelligence products.

MULTINATIONAL FORCES OPERATIONS PLANNING

4-6. Centralized control is important but often unattainable in intelligence operations. As with command relationships, an organization evolves that has some national assets and intelligence at the multinational force’s disposal, while others are under national control. Due to the nature of many intelligence sources, it is unlikely that nations make all of their sources available for a multinational force to task. Those who plan multinational intelligence operations consider this during the planning phase. Many nations have a national intelligence cell at the multinational force headquarters. Taskings by, and support to, the multinational force flow through this cell. Integrating intelligence representatives and liaison personnel at each organizational level improves access to intelligence capabilities. Matching intelligence requirements with available assets in an area of operations (AO) is the basis of a collection plan.

4-7. The multinational force executes ISR through operations and intelligence (with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and leveraging the larger intelligence enterprise) and information collection. The commander provides the G-2/S-2 with a clear mission statement, commander’s intent, and commander’s critical information requirements. A multinational force’s ability to gather and process intelligence varies widely. The command’s synchronization manager accounts for this and tasks accordingly. The synchronization manager matches various sources with requirements to answer commander’s critical information requirements. Sharing and mutual support are key to integrating all resources into a unified system to best meet the command’s intelligence requirements. The G-2/S-2 prioritizes intelligence requirements to meet the commander’s needs.

MULTINATIONAL FORCES COMMUNICATIONS AND PROCESSING

4-8. The ability to collect, process, and disseminate information to many users requires effective lateral and vertical communication. The multinational force has a system and operating procedures to transmit critical intelligence rapidly to units. This system relies on the distribution of standardized equipment by the lead nation to ensure commonality. It includes liaison officers at major intelligence centers to provide redundant communication to their parent nation and to determine and obtain intelligence suited for that nation’s mission in time to exploit it.

4-9. Multinational intelligence operations cannot be conducted exclusively using U.S. systems. Multinational force members exchange intelligence information among each of the partners. As a result, intelligence staffs help develop an intelligence architecture that enables participating members to communicate effectively in the multinational force without compromising U.S. security interests. The establishment of a local area network using systems such as linked operations-intelligence centers Europe or Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System greatly enhance information sharing in the coalition. The Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System operational architecture framework is the same for all combatant commands and leverages existing networks, technology, and network centers. Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System services include e-mail, web, chat, and common operational picture capabilities and use controlled interfaces for two-way information flows among U.S. military commands and multinational partners.

EFFECTIVE COORDINATION FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

4-10. A multinational force compensates for the lack of standardization through coordination. The communications architecture is an essential element in this area. Areas requiring extensive coordination include—

Friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Use of space assets, location of intelligence assets, and location of intelligence collection targets.

Intelligence effort that is multinational and serves both the multinational and national needs.

4-11. The commander’s critical information requirements and priority information requirements are the focus of the intelligence effort. Commanders find answers by coordinating at all levels. Fusion centers improve dynamic operational support by integrating mission command with focused analysis in a single centralized entity. These centers are not intelligence-led organizations. These centers are an ad hoc collaborative effort between several units, organizations, or agencies that provide resources, expertise, information, and intelligence to a center with the goal of supporting the rapid execution of operations by contributing members. Fusion centers focus collection and promote information sharing across multiple participants in a specific geographic area or mission type. These centers are not operations centers, but enable multinational operations. Multinational commanders at various echelons create fusion centers to manage the flow of information and intelligence, focus information collection to satisfy information requirements, and process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate the resulting collection.

STABILITY OPERATIONS SUPPORT

4-12. There are no standard templates for intelligence support to stability operations. Commanders use the same approach for stability operations as for war. In stability tasks, the nature and intensity of a potential threat changes even more suddenly and dramatically than in other operations.

4-13. Stability operations demand greater attention to the political, social, economic, and cultural factors in an AO than conventional war. Stability operations expand intelligence preparation of the battlefield beyond geographical and force capability considerations. The centers of gravity frequently are not military forces or terrain. Cultural information is critical to gauge the potential reactions of the population to the operation, to avoid misunderstandings, and to improve the effectiveness of operations. Changes dependent on the situation in populace behavior suggest a needed change in multinational strategy. Biographic information and leadership analyses are key factors to understand adversaries, their methods of operation, and interaction with the environment. Knowledge of the ethnic and religious factions in the AO and the historical background of hostilities underlying the deployment are vital to mission accomplishment. Such information helps prevent unintentional mission creep and achieve the objectives of the operation.

4-14. The commander’s understanding of the local infrastructure improves situational understanding. Traditional reconnaissance elements still provide information, but local media, diplomatic mission personnel, and civilian agencies provide information not available elsewhere.

4-15. A commander’s approach to civilian organizations for information, including the media, is open and transparent. The commander states the information’s intended use to avoid undermining cooperative efforts with such agencies. Keep the media informed to maintain the willingness for information exchange.

INFORMATION GATHERING IMPORTANCE

4-16. The commander considers the intelligence and information role that all Soldiers have in stability operations. The primary source of intelligence in stability tasks come from human intelligence. Medical, transportation, civil affairs, military information support operations (MISO), military police, engineer personnel, patrols and advisors or observers are also sources of information. These personnel operate in the host nation environment and discern change in it. Interpreters, elicitations, debriefs of indigenous personnel, screening operations, and patrolling are primary sources to assess the economic and health needs, military capability, and political intent of those receiving assistance.

4-17. The commander emphasizes the importance of intelligence gathering to all personnel and provides guidelines to improve intelligence gathering. Multinational commanders know that each nation has a set of established legal norms that govern intelligence operations. These include all intelligence domains and counterintelligence. Achieving multinational intelligence operation requires coordination at the national level.

4-18. The intelligence community works with several government agencies in multinational operations. Synthesizing and leveraging intelligence information from the various agencies presents many challenges. To overcome this, agencies assign personnel to a multinational headquarters to improve interagency coordination. For example, during past operations—

Central Intelligence Agency analysts worked with military intelligence analysts.

Federal Bureau of Investigation agents worked with military members performing forensic analysis of explosions.

Department of the Treasury agents worked with military analysts on foreign funding of insurgency operations.

Drug Enforcement Administration agents worked with military analysts to determine linkage of drug trafficking and insurgent actions.

4-19. Agents serve as liaisons to a multinational corps or a multinational force to facilitate intelligence support and synchronize agency operations with military operations. Interagency players have access to many forms of specialized information that completes the intelligence picture. Multinational partners have similar interagency personnel assigned from their own countries whose role commanders and staff must understand.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

4-20. Intelligence operations are the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements (ADRP 2-0). These requirements are in the information collection plan. Intelligence operations collect information about the intent, activities, and capabilities of threats and relevant aspects of the operational environment to support multinational commanders’ decisionmaking. Data and information collected during the course of intelligence operations is essential to the development of timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored intelligence products. Intelligence operations use mission orders and standard command and support relationships. Intelligence operations are shaping operations used by the commander for decisive action. Flexibility and adaptability to changing situations are critical to conduct effective intelligence operations. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on intelligence operations and the intelligence disciplines.)

4-21. The multinational intelligence disciplines are as follows:

Counterintelligence is information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities (JP 2-01.2).

Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial intelligence (JP 2-03).

Human intelligence is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources (JP 2-0).

Measurement and signature intelligence is intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the emitter or sender, and to facilitate subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted (JP 2-0).

Open-source intelligence is information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public (JP 2-0).

Signals intelligence – a category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted (JP 2-0).

Technical intelligence is intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary’s technological advantages (JP 2-0).

COMPLIMENTARY INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

4-22. Complimentary intelligence capabilities contribute valuable information for all-source intelligence to conduct operations. The complimentary intelligence capabilities are specific to the unit and circumstances at each echelon and vary across the intelligence enterprise. See ADRP 2-0 for more information.

Biometrics-enabled intelligence is the information associated with and/or derived from biometric signatures and associated contextual information that positively identifies a specific person and/or matches an unknown identity to a place, activity, device, component, or weapon (ADRP 2-0).

Cyber-enabled intelligence – produced through the combination of intelligence analysis and the collaboration of information concerning activity in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.

Document and media exploitation is the processing, translation, analysis, and dissemination of collected hardcopy documents and electronic media that are under the U.S. government’s physical control and are not publicly available. (See TC 2-91.8 for more information.) Threat intent, capabilities, and limitations may be derived through the exploitation of captured materials.

Forensic-enabled intelligence – helps accurately identify networked and complex threats and attributes them to incidents and activities.

INFORMATION VERSUS INTELLIGENCE

4-23. National sensitivities exist about disseminating intelligence in multinational operations. These sensitivities extend to the term intelligence. Consider the ramifications of labeling information as intelligence, especially when dealing with civilian organizations. Many cultures view intelligence as information gathered on the nation’s citizens for use against them.

4-24. Attempts to exchange information with civilian agencies are stifled. Civilian agencies maintain neutrality by refusing to participate in any perceived intelligence programs. To enhance exchanging information, the command labels unclassified data as “information” rather than “intelligence.”

4-25. The following concepts guide multinational intelligence operations:

Adjust for national differences in intelligence concepts.

Create an integrated multinational staff and intelligence center with representatives from all participating nations in the national limits on intelligence sharing.

View the mission from a multinational and national perspective. Treat a threat to one member as a threat to all members.

Agree to and plan for multinational intelligence requirements in advance of the operation.

Plan complementary intelligence operations using all multinational intelligence resources, focusing on national strengths to enhance and overcome weaknesses in others.

Exchange liaison officers to help reduce problems of culture, language, doctrine, and intelligence requirements.

CHECKLIST

4-26. Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the intelligence portion of the operation.

WARNING/PLANNING PHASE

What are the commander’s critical information requirements? Have the commander’s critical information requirements been clearly stated to focus the collection effort?

Does the multinational force have an initial all-source and collection management working group? What are their positions in the deployment timetable?

Has the command performed initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield, including counterintelligence estimates?

Does the collection plan identify gaps in intelligence? Does the collection plan incorporate all collection assets available for tasking? Are there any specific cultural, historical, language, customs, or religious relationships between the multinational force partners and the adversary?

Have the cultural, social, political, religious, media, language, and economic factors in the AO been included in the intelligence estimate?

Have the adversary’s use of space assets been analyzed? Have requests for denying militarily useful space information to the adversary been considered?

What is the intelligence architecture?

Does the intelligence architecture meet mission requirements? Are there any gaps in coverage?

Has the command and control information system been established to disseminate the time-sensitive information for targeting or rapid reaction to all participants?

Do multinational forces obtain or use intelligence and imagery data type commonly used by other multinational forces?

Have sufficient intelligence collection resources been placed under the control of the multinational force? Are the national resources immediately responsive to the multinational force?

Have efforts been made to pool intelligence and battlefield information into multinational centralized processing and exploitation centers?

What are the commander’s requirements for intelligence briefings and products?

What is the counterintelligence plan?

Is there a single focus for asset management?

Are intelligence-gathering tasks assigned according to the commander’s critical information requirements and the capability of the multinational equipment under multinational force control?

Has theater reconnaissance been undertaken to use available assets?

What are the multinational force intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities and plans?

What are the procedures for sharing intelligence and information or releasing information policies? Are all multinational partners treated equally, considering compartmented and national sensitivities?

How is strategic intelligence shared among other forces?

What are the levels of interoperability between different intelligence information systems including database compatibility?

What are the staffing requirements for the G-2/S-2 staff including specialists, linguists, and liaison officers including a subordinate joint force intelligence directorate counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element staff? What support is available from the G-1/S-1?

What are the requirements for national intelligence centers?

What are the differences in availability and capability of national collection sources?

What are the requirements for rules of engagement (ROE) governing intelligence aspects of the operation such as human intelligence activities or reporting?

What are the contingency plans when normal communication channels fail?

What are the multinational or force security procedures?

What links should be established with civilian agencies including the media? Have efforts been made to pool information with applicable civilian agencies?

Have human intelligence and counterintelligence operations been deconflicted through the joint force intelligence directorate counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element?

Has using a counterintelligence coordinating authority and human intelligence operations chief been staffed?

Are resources available in the joint force intelligence directorate counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element to deconflict and synchronize collection, debriefing, and interrogation activities in the AO?

Do the subordinate forces have collection assets available? What type? What are their capabilities and limitations?

Is the analysis effort prioritized and have analytical production responsibilities been clearly laid out for coalition members?

Are intelligence liaison officers planned for in the operation?

Is the intelligence support package planned for with capabilities and limitations explained to supporting units?

Have intelligence staff attachments and detachments been planned?

Are training programs in place with a focus creating a common view of the enemy, enemy dispositions, threat characteristics, doctrine, capabilities, and intelligence systems?

Has intelligence daily cycle been established? Does it include reporting timelines and routine briefings and conferences? Have collection management timelines been defined?

Have intelligence-reporting formats been defined and rehearsed?

Does the deployment plan provide for early deployment of intelligence assets in the theater of operations?

Have routine and emergency “classified” destruction procedures been announced along with classified handling procedures?

What is the criminal threat? How is criminal intelligence incorporated into the commander’s critical information requirement?

THREATS

What enemy chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE), delivery means, and employment doctrine exists?

What enemy conventional, irregular, special operations forces, and/or asymmetric forces exist or may be introduced into AOs? What infrastructure (such as nuclear power plants, chemical industries, hospital radiotherapy sources) exists that could result in low-level radiation or toxic industrial chemical hazards?

What intelligence-gathering assets are available to monitor CBRNE threat changes?

The threat assessment should consider the following:

The adversary’s military intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance assets and capabilities. Can it detect and locate friendly activities?

The adversary’s espionage and covert intelligence capability. Does it have operatives in the AO?

The adversary’s capability to conduct information operations and command and control warfare activities, including those aimed at audiences or targets outside the AO.

The adversary’s early warning—including distant early warning—capability. Can it intercept, direction find, jam, or interfere with friendly transmissions? Does it possess distant early warning? Laser blinding weapons are currently available on the international market, and other weapon systems will be fielded in the near future.

The adversary’s weapons of mass destruction capability. This considers political intent, industrial infrastructure, delivery systems, and warheads. It also considers the impact of strikes in terms of degradation, casualties, loss of tempo, and their physical and psychological effect on allies and civil populace.

The adversary’s capability to conduct long-range operations, particularly with its longer-range strike assets. Can its main forces interfere with the multinational’s sustaining operations? The adversary’s weapons, logistics, doctrine, training, intent, and performance in recent conflicts should be considered. Factors include air, surface-to-surface missiles, air-delivered forces, naval and marine assets, special operations forces, operational level forward and raiding detachments, and operational maneuver groups.

The threat assessment also considers—

Adversary sympathizers, agents, and partisans in the AO. Will they perform information gathering, espionage, guerrilla acts, or a combination of activities?

Terrorist, criminal, and insurgent organizations. What are their aims, capabilities, and methods?

In stability tasks, the adversary’s antiair and antiarmor capability. Is additional protection (such as defensive aid suites) required? An antiair and antiarmor capability is assumed in war fighting.

The attitude of the civil population (by region if appropriate) to the force presence. Are they hostile, neutral, or favorably disposed towards forces? Could the population’s perceptions be altered by friendly or adversary actions, including information operations?

Sabotage, in the form of planned attacks by adversary special forces or other agents, or more spontaneous activities by locally employed civilians.

Subversion and hostile MISO. An adversary attempts to subvert friendly forces, either individually to gain leverage or collectively for political and military advantage.

Likelihood of theft. This is a significant problem in poorer countries.

Health risks. These include endemic and sexually transmitted diseases, climatic extremes, and environmental and pollution hazards that include residual weapons of mass destruction contamination and the prevalence of illegal drugs.

Mines. The presence and location of vehicle and antipersonnel mines in the AO. Current and earlier conflicts must be considered.

Road conditions and local driving patterns. In Bosnia, road deaths outnumber those killed by military action.

Fire hazards. Weather and vegetation create fire hazards. Living in makeshift accommodations presents a substantial fire risk, particularly in a cold climate.

Fratricide. The risk of fratricide increases in war fighting, but is present at all times. It is particularly likely in multinational operations.

Attack aviation. Adversary aviation attacks threaten our own sustaining operations. The most vulnerable area for a threat posed by an adversary’s attack is the sustaining operations area. Commanders consider and plan for this threat.

PREDEPLOYMENT PHASE

Have the commander and staff been briefed on the initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield?

Who are the host nation, civilian agency, and media contacts?

Have all intelligence systems, including communications and information systems, been rehearsed?

Do subordinate forces have sufficient personnel to handle the amount of intelligence available?

Has all familiarization training on deploying intelligence systems been completed?

How will national intelligence cells exchange intelligence between multinational nations?

DEPLOYMENT PHASE

Have staff and liaison officers at all levels established and tested the intelligence architecture, including communications and information systems and supporting liaison officers? Are links with the host nation, civilian agencies, and the media functioning?

Has the collection management plan been refined?

Have the commander’s briefing and intelligence product requirements been refined?

What additional specialist personnel or equipment is required?

What is the effectiveness of standard operating procedures for—

Handover by the in-country force?

Operations of all-source cell, collection, coordination and intelligence requirements management cell, and national intelligence cell?

Compatibility of intelligence communications and information systems?

Protocols for the handling human intelligence sources?

Was the process for the national intelligence cells to exchange intelligence between nations effective?

Have human and intelligence and counterintelligence operations been deconflicted?

Have national intelligence summaries, imagery, and threat assessments approved for dissemination been shared?

EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS THREAT

What are the explosive hazards (such as mine, unexploded explosive ordnance, booby trap, or improvised explosive device) in the AO?

What data is available on mines already in place or the types of booby traps/improvised explosive devices employed in the AO?

What types of friendly munitions have been employed in the AO and at what location? What is the likelihood of components of those becoming improvised explosive devices?

Are there indications that booby traps have been or will be emplaced by withdrawing forces or threat elements that stay behind?

REDEPLOYMENT PHASE

What are the handover procedures for intelligence and physical architecture to the United Nations (UN) or other agencies? Do the procedures include protocols for information exchange and handling, resettlement, or handover of human intelligence sources?

Are security procedures for the redeployment of personnel, equipment, and documentation adequate and properly supervised?

What are the requirements for briefings and have the various levels performed the necessary debriefings?

Chapter 5

Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by giving a multinational operations overview. It then discusses the importance of early and transition planning in multinational operations. Lastly, this chapter discusses the importance of training in multinational forces and then provides a checklist for commanders and staffs.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS OVERVIEW

5-1. Operations conducted by a multinational force require coordination among all entities. Coordination occurs in all phases of the operation from planning and deployment to redeployment. Multinational force commanders and their staff involve their multinational partners as much as needed. Exchanging information among multinational formations must occur as soon as possible.

EARLY PLANNING

5-2. Multinational planning starts before the actual operation and uses generic plans to build the plan around. Depending on the type and nature of operations conducted, planning includes governmental agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. Predeployment, deployment, sustainment, transition, roles, participation, and redeployment operations are addressed in the plans.

STRATEGIC SCHEME

5-3. Military advice to the President, state department, national security agency, and the secretary of defense or another nation’s authority is critical in multinational planning and execution. Commanders understand each national agency’s role to help shape multinational goals and objectives for an agreed upon end state. This determines the strategic end state, objectives, capabilities, force composition, and key command positions of the multinational force. Commanders ensure that political leaders understand the force’s abilities, limitations, and time required to plan and prepare for an operation. The multinational commander and staff know how the legitimizing authority intends to terminate the operation and ensure that its outcomes endure.

5-4. The mandate of a legitimizing authority, such as the UN or other multinational political organization, supports strategic planning. The mandate is expanded by terms of reference that establish the limits of the mission, operational parameters, standardization of all operational measures, and specified authorities to conduct operations for the military. (For example, the right to search civilians and seize property.) Nations supplement the terms of reference with national guidance for their own military force.

5-5. Whether in terms of reference or another form, all staff elements secure guidance because it is the starting point for the military appreciation, analysis, and estimate process. This is the first step in campaign planning and it establishes a common understanding of the mandate among multinational partners. Without a common understanding, agreement on the role of the military, required forces, acceptable risk, and rules of engagement (ROE) cannot be formed. A comprehensive approach for a joint or multinational operation or campaign is essential for the operation. Support from the international communities, contributing nations, and the involved parties including the civil community is crucial. The military strategic objectives for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other military forces in the area of operations (AO) help achieve the desired outcomes, both national and international, for the different key representatives involved with civilian organizations and agencies. In the framework of a NATO or alliance led operation, this includes, but is not limited to, extraction operations; tasks to support disaster relief and humanitarian operations; search and rescue or support to non-combatant evacuation operations; freedom of navigation and overflight enforcement; sanction and embargo enforcement; and counterinsurgency. At the tactical level, this possibility creates incentive-based opportunities to cooperate while carrying out certain tasks.

CAMPAIGN PREPARATION

5-6. The ability to alert, mobilize, and rapidly deploy forces in any region is critical to mission success. Understanding the limitations and capabilities of multinational forces’ contributions helps create a secure and stable environment. Planners review national military contingents and host nation assets. These considerations allow the necessary forces to deploy efficiently with the available lift assets. Understanding the current infrastructure and transportation limitations in the region and host nation helps the force allocate resources. Once resources are committed, national contingent units and liaison offices coordinate with the host nation for deployment in the AO. Multinational operations require planners to anticipate and coordinate requirements to maximize capabilities and minimize resources for the multinational force. This minimizes duplication of effort from the host nation.

5-7. Transition planning is integral to campaign planning. Transition happens simultaneously with the other elements. This helps the timely creation of the subsequent force and promotes a smooth transition. The mandate of the host nation and the nation’s agreement expresses political will. The terms of reference establish conditions for execution. The campaign plan translates these into military and political tasks, ways, and means.

FORCE PROJECTION FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCES

5-8. Force projection for a multinational force is critical to mission accomplishment. Participants know the multinational considerations from the beginning to deploy forces and use lift assets. Multinational operations duplicate effort and unit capabilities. For example, before the United Nations (UN) protection force deployed to the former Republic of Yugoslavia, each participating nation performed its own engineer reconnaissance of the infrastructure. This resulted in duplications and omissions. The multinational force coordinates and anticipates requirements during this phase to maximize capabilities and minimize resources. Planners review national military contingents and host nation assets. The host nation and multinational force planners agree on a division of labor.

5-9. Limited lift means maximizing efficiency during deployment. This requires coordination with the host nation so units do not deploy capabilities already available, such as port operations forces. In some cases, one multinational force transports another nation’s forces to the AO. Liaison officers from national contingents coordinate with the nation moving its forces or with the multinational force headquarters responsible for coordinating the movements with the nation providing lift. Chapter 6 provides additional information on sustainment.

MISSION FOCUS FOR THE COMMANDER

5-10. Political considerations and the military capabilities of the multinational force are the most important factors in multinational operations. The commander remains focused on the mission and understands the reason each national contingent participates. This determines the structure and resultant taskings of the multinational forces. Failure to understand causes the force to split into components operating under differing political directions. The commander recognizes that political considerations force the choice of an acceptable course of action, rather than the optimum military solution. The commander remains flexible to adjust to unforeseen political influences, keeps the multinational forces focused on the military objective, and avoids mission creep.

5-11. Leaders assign functions to a smaller group of partners to overcome differences in doctrine, training, or equipment. For example, the multinational force assigns the mission of support area security to home defense or police forces. Commanders entrust one member of the multinational force with air defense, coastal defense, or some special operation based on the threat’s special capabilities. Commanders recognize the strengths and differences of the forces’ cultures. Commanders’ decisions and military leadership on employment consider the capabilities of the forces. Subordinate commanders request control of forces that provide capabilities not organic to that nation’s forces. The guiding principle is to allocate assets, as needed, and maintain concentrated critical capabilities.

5-12. The commander’s ability to understand and integrate each nation’s capabilities into a cohesive force binds a multinational operation together. Commanders articulate their intent. This enables each nation to form the same picture of end state and the rules governing engagements. Given the language difficulties found in many multinational forces, commanders clearly and simply state their intent. The planning guidance emphasizes the following at minimum:

The purpose of the operation.

A mission statement for the multinational forces.

Broad objectives and tasks for the multinational forces.

Desired end states and guidance on termination or transition.

Participating nations and expected initial contributions.

Common security interests.

Specific national limitations, concerns, or sensitivities.

COMMANDER’S INTENT

5-13. A commander clearly and simply articulates intent to avoid language barriers among multinational forces. As a result, each nation forms the same picture of the end state and the rules governing engagements.

TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY

5-14. The designated multinational commander has authority over national units at some point. Planners accomplish transfer of authority as early as possible. The timing of the transfer is part of the initial negotiations that govern how the multinational force forms. Planners determine where the transfer of authority and the subsequent integration of units and headquarters occur. Early transfer of authority enables the multinational commander to plan and perform effective integration training.

5-15. The first option is to arrange transfer of authority to the multinational force before deploying a unit’s home station. Commanders control the unit arrival sequence to best suit operational requirements and facilitate reception area base operations. This option assumes clear political consensus, timely decisions on national participation, and a significant lead-time for planning and setting up the multinational force headquarters.

5-16. The second option is to have transfer of authority at an intermediate staging base en route to the operational area. Forces resolve problems in a secure area. Forces deploy only when fully ready and in the sequence required by the multinational force.

5-17. The third option is to have transfer of authority occur once forces arrive in the AO. This option leaves each nation responsible to deploy its contingent and prepare it for operations. It does not allow the multinational force positive control of deployment into the AO.

5-18. Centralized control of force flow provides the best support to the multinational force’s requirements and the best support to the forces. Whichever option the commander chooses for transfer of authority, central coordination of deploying forces is preferred so that reception operations are not done by repetitive crisis management.

5-19. Each multinational nation has a different way to plan operations. If a lead-nation commands the multinational force, then the lead-nations use their own planning. At national contingent headquarters, nations use their own planning.

PLANNING GROUPS FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCES

5-20. A multinational planning group facilitates multinational planning. The planning group includes the commander and representatives from appropriate multinational staff sections and national formations. These planning groups have a wide range of diversity and different perspectives to strategic and operational problems and solutions. When the multinational force is formed, the commander decides on the organization and functions of the planning group and how the group and the staff sections interact during planning and execution. This planning group should—

Perform crisis action planning.

Be the focal point for operation plan or operation order development.

Perform future planning.

Perform other tasks as directed.

5-21. Simultaneously, commanders conduct operations and understand their decisions and actions affect national and international decisions and the attitudes and actions of host nation citizens.

TRANSITION PLANNING

5-22. Transition looks like handing over security responsibility to rejuvenated or recently raised and trained forces. For security, responsibility is one line of effort in the campaign, and the military campaign is one strategy in a comprehensive national foreign policy.

5-23. Transition planning is an integral part of operational planning. Most multinational operations end in a transition from multinational control to UN, host nation military, or host nation civilian control. Transition planning extends throughout planning and into operations and redeployment. It must be as detailed as any other planning. The commander and staff plan with the organization taking control. The multinational force is most vulnerable during transition and redeployment if the multinational force draws down prematurely or if the security environment is not stable and permissive. Protecting the force is the most important consideration.

5-24. Staff sections highlight organization and function in the transition plan. Staff develops checklists to facilitate the transition. Staff sections recommend how to organize the incoming staff and develop turnover files. Staffs often forget these files in the haste to redeploy.

5-25. Planning links the departure of the force with the anticipated arrival of the organization taking charge. All levels of command and staffs must have knowledge of the incoming force or organization. Funding is a major obstacle, especially when working with the UN. Another concern in working with the UN is ensuring enough UN staff and officers are deployed for transition. The incoming headquarters co-locate with the multinational force headquarters. This enhances the assimilation of the incoming staff with the outgoing staff.

5-26. Transition as part of an exit strategy involves a number of stages. As with many coalition foreign policies, transition is complex and nonlinear. This depends on many variables. Military planners and commanders remain flexible throughout transition as each national government adjusts priorities.

5-27. Regardless of context, transition fulfills a political objective first. The timing, tempo, and nature of transition is inconsistent with other military activities. Transition is difficult to achieve with limited and decreasing resources. It is a transition of military operations only, with other national government strategies such as economic, governance, and development support, continuing in the future or involving a complete disengagement from area of interest.

5-28. The center of any transition includes two elements supporting and being supported. These relationships between the two are interdependent. Planners establish the degree of involvement and roles in early planning.

5-29. The multinational force does not impose the end state. It reflects local situations to local issues. It will always require compromises or mutually agreed standards “good enough” in a host nation context. Transition remains fragile for some time. Transition is not just a handover or a straightforward handback.

5-30. The area of interest has a multi-stakeholder environment. These stakeholders come from other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nonprofit organizations, private companies, and individuals. Stakeholders also include the UN, regional groupings, third party states and bilateral/multinational police forces, diplomatic staff, government agencies, multinational groups (in areas of health, religion, human rights, rights of children, agriculture, and engineering), intergovernmental organizations (the World Bank and World Health Organization), private contractors (security, logistics, construction, and health), private corporations, and well intentioned individuals. All units understand this web of assistance and incorporate it into transition.

5-31. Developing working knowledge and understanding key stakeholders, including what they provide for multinational forces, is vital to the overall success of the transition line of effort. The complexities of operating under different objectives, timelines, situational understanding, and funding streams add new challenges to help maintain momentum.

TYPES OF TRANSITIONS FROM MULTINATIONAL FORCES

5-32. The following describe the types of transitions. Some of the key planning aspects of transition operations are also included.

Multinational force military relief-in-place. This transition has normal military operation emphasis on mission and protecting the force. The relief-in-place would use doctrine from the lead-nation.

Multinational force military to civilian or UN authorities. This transition occurs with a normal UN civilian support type mission with emphasis on military support to the civilian and UN missions. Both the military and civilian authorities—

Identify the conditions suitable for handover.

Identify and agree on responsibilities for command and control of operation.

Identify the necessary phases of the operation.

UN chapter escalation or de-escalation or the ROE situation. The command places emphasis on ROE and protection. The command—

Confirms multinational members.

Identifies national differences of ROE.

Identifies protection issues.

Multinational force military handover to a national government. This transition is a withdrawal performed in peaceful conditions when redeploying elements and host nation control achieves the desired end state. The military places emphasis on fully handing over responsibilities and allowing the government to assume power and authority. The command identifies those capabilities that remain behind to ensure that a seamless handover of authority and support to the government occurs.

CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

5-33. The concept of using contractors on the battlefield as force multipliers has increased steadily since the middle 1990’s. Contractors will not replace multinational force structure but will augment the multinational force capabilities and provide additional options for meeting support requirements. This means commanders and staffs manage risk assessments based on current threat and the additional planning requirements. Commanders and staff include contractor needs when considering the unit’s life support, logistics, security, and mission requirements on deploying units. This impacts the availability of warfighters for the tactical missions.

5-34. There are two types of contractors on the battlefield: system and contingency.

System contractors are involved in the manufacture and life-cycle management of major systems including vehicles, weapons, and aircraft. They provide the technical and maintenance support for the systems they produce during peacetime and wartime. These contractors include host nation, third country, or U.S. contractors.

Contingency contractors provide support primarily during contingencies. Depending on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations (METT-TC), they provide supplies and Services to support the multinational forces during operations. These contractors include host nation, third country, or U.S. contractors.

5-35. Augmenting contractors to logistic support allows the multinational force to focus on its primary mission. Commanders and staff are familiar with selecting contractors and prepare to perform parallel contingency planning if contractors cannot perform. The commander ensures that a clear understanding between all members of a unified force on the use of and limitations of contractors is clear. All leaders anticipate and plan for potential impacts on their missions and their forces. Finally, commanders and staff must remember that civilian contractors are force multipliers only and avoid total dependence on them.

PRINCIPLES OF TRANSITION

5-36. Principles apply to all levels of transition, from short-term disaster relief to regime change after a major conflict. Planning considerations vary based on the conditions predicting transition. The bulleted list is a recommended starting point for staff.

Transition is condition and not time based. Transition is a process rather than an event and sits in the context of other environmental factors. National decisionmakers determine the political imperatives to exit theater. Commanders and planners understand that these political imperatives, whether host nation, UN, multinational force, alliances, or coalition are likely to shape any conditions-based approach.

Start at the bottom. Building a solid foundation at local levels with the start of transferring ownership, authority, and responsibilities across all lines of effort builds a baseline to continue transition.

Thin out and do not hand-off. As another party assumes responsibilities for functions or area of interest, a gradual confidence process is required. Thinning out assistance gives the impression that there is still support, supports confidence building, and allows the other party to assume greater but graduated control. A well-publicized and ceremonial departure degrades the level of confidence and undermines the plan.

Maintain situational awareness and points of influence. A great challenge through transition is maintaining situational understanding.

Transition institutions, functions, and geographic areas. The functions of a host nation are not limited to control of operational environments or geographic areas. It is accountable for national institutions, public services, and fields of expertise. The challenge is for host nation and multinational forces to identify how much the multinational forces are doing, where they have control, what they are doing, and how much impact they have. This cannot be shown on a map. Consideration goes to everything multinational forces do and the impact the transition has on overall host nation capacity. A few examples are delivery of tactical information, aerial casualty evacuation provisions, search and rescue service, organization of waste disposal, and employment of locals and third country nationals.

Ensure enduring resources are not diverted simply to pursue transition. This shows a multinational force commitment to the mission as a whole and sends a clear signal concerning multinational force intent to complete the mission to local and regional audiences. Multinational force accepts and focuses on countering insurgency while neutralizing any insurgent elements through transition.

Always retain a headquarters. Retaining a headquarters with the appropriate level of command provides direction and discipline for transition. A headquarters is a focal point for external stakeholders. Decisions at an operational or strategic level is made during transition. As a result, the transition tempo alters with little notice.

Reinvest the dividends. During transition, some resources and assets become available. These resources and assets in the time between the release and its extraction from theater are reinvested elsewhere in AOs to help other parts of the transition. Reinvesting these resources and assets helps maintain momentum and efficiency. This occurs if this opportunity is identified in time to permit the resource and asset to reorganize, retrain, and eventually redeploy.

Own and protect the influence campaign. The narrative or transition is centrally coordinated, coherent across the whole force, and spread across all lines of effort. All involved stakeholders deliver the narrative. There are numerous targeted audiences for this campaign and it requires a variety of information operations and associated means to achieve success. However, the successes of the host nation is one of the main themes for the campaign. This process occurs in harmonization with the overall plan.

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS IN PLANNING

5-37. Care must be taken against over reliance on unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) at the expense of other collections assets by the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3. An unmanned aircraft system is that system whose components include the necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft (JP 3-52). This results in an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) or information collection plan that is neither comprehensive nor integrated. All intelligence-gathering assets require equal consideration and emphasis when developing a focused ISR or information collection plan that meets the multinational force commander’s critical information requirements. All tactical UAS units directly support the brigade combat team for maximum collection efforts.

5-38. The UAS contribute to the overall ISR/information collection effort. Their range and endurance provide commanders with a bird’s-eye perspective, when and where they need it, without risking manned aircraft. Unmanned aircraft fly deep into the AO and are flexible enough for dynamic retasking to provide timely information on other areas.

5-39. The intelligence staff section G-2/S-2 reviews, validates, and prioritizes collection requirements for multinational force UAS operations. The G-3/S-3 coordinates with the G-2/S-2 to forward these requirements to the commander and exercise tactical control over theater reconnaissance and surveillance assets. The component commander then tasks the assets to satisfy the multinational force requirement. Normally, the multinational force air component commander in the air tasking order according to multinational force priorities tasks airborne reconnaissance and surveillance assets.

TRAINING MULTINATIONAL FORCES

5-40. Training is the best way to develop an effective multinational force formed from national units. It is continual for personnel and units. The operation’s success depends on training the command has before and during the operation. Most components of the force have likely not trained together and is limited if they have. Leadership stresses the importance of training together to participating nations. The benefits of early relationships help develop standardized procedures, determine caveats, and identify strengths and weaknesses. These are some of the key issues in mission accomplishment.

5-41. Commanders are flexible and adaptable. The predeployment and in theater training programs are based on assessments of the mission and AO. This is a key to a commander’s plans development. A high level of training allows more integrated plans while low level of training requires more independent operations for nations so mission difficulty is tailored to the training level of each nation. The command deals with national contingents from different cultural backgrounds at different states of training. The more that multinational forces and civilian agencies participate in the training, the more the command learns about how these organizations think and operate. This participation enhances team building and staff member’s perceptions of one another. Multinational force commanders receive, train, and integrate multinational contingents during the course of operations.

IDENTIFY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

5-42. Training occurs at all levels of command and includes all staffs. Training teaches participants about the multinational partners’ strengths and weaknesses and how to integrate those into an effective force. Before deployment, command post exercise simulations are used for staff training and solving problems in the multinational force command structure.

5-43. Training continues once the command arrives in the AO. Training is based on requirements and functions. Training includes exercises to rehearse operational tasks, the operation order, or new missions. Training advertises the command’s capabilities and serves as a deterrent.

5-44. Command post and field training exercises are used with simulations. Distributed simulation enhances training between remotely separated forces. A comprehensive training program helps commanders identify weaknesses and helps build troop cohesion. Whenever possible, commanders arrange seminars to develop or stress standard operating procedures and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Protection requirements affect areas available for training. Some training, such as live-fire exercises, requires host nation approval.

IDENTIFY CAPABILITIES

5-45. Some nations have doctrine to address strategic, operational, and tactical issues. Other nations focus at the tactical level. Some nations prepare for highly mobile, mechanized operations. Others focus on counterinsurgency or infantry operations. A few nations stress rapid, agile operations—emphasizing ingenuity, creativity, and improvisation within the commander’s intent. Some nations regard this approach as too risky. Because of these variations, multinational commanders consider which units are best suited for particular missions. Multinational commanders determine the available forces by collecting and analyzing data and information about internal capabilities, external factors, and long-term sustainability with the host nation.

5-46. When the situation permits, commanders seek to improve the contributions of national forces by providing training assistance and sharing resources such as radios, vehicles, or weapons. The importance of training assistance and dedicated liaison teams is important when working between a force with digital warfighting capability and a force that works with analog means. Multinational exercises are essential to training and doctrine refinement. Multinational exercises use logistic support mechanisms and identify possible problems in providing logistic support with forces from other nations.

5-47. The last decade of conflict has seen integration of multinational forces at the company and battalion level. To achieve synchronization in tactical operations, units have a solid understanding of the differences in equipment, doctrine, communications, and national caveats that affect the operation. For example, many potential partners require different fuel grades than NATO forces, operate in different frequency bands, and employ combat support units such as artillery and engineers in doctrinal ways very different from NATO forces. Effective integration in combat operations requires training beforehand through multinational command post exercises or through the conduct of full-scale multinational exercises at combined training centers such as the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany.

USE PROPER CONDUCT

5-48. It only takes one Soldier or small unit acting improperly to undo weeks of effort building goodwill in an AO. Inappropriate individual statements and actions offend forces from other nations or civilians in the AO. This creates negative perceptions. Individuals do not assume that others do not understand derogatory statements made in their own language, slang, or gestures. Training on proper personal conduct and its continued emphasis prevent this.

5-49. Leadership distributes instruction to all personnel. These instructions help personnel understand the methods of operating in a multinational environment. Commanders do the following:

Ensure that all augments’ participate in their host formation training events.

Provide training to all units or individuals that receive equipment from other nations.

Evaluate training opportunities offered by each nation. This includes training offered by the Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany, the UN Operational Training and Advisory Group in the United Kingdom, and the Swedish Armed Forces International Center. These all have extensive experience in training units and individuals for operations.

FOCUS ON PREDEPLOYMENT

5-50. Predeployment training includes the following areas:

Individual military skills.

Individual and collective preventive medicine procedures and practice.

First aid, both individual and “buddy.”

Terrorism awareness and prevention.

Ethical conduct.

Education lessons in the multinational structure, mandate, chain of command, and division of responsibilities including nongovernmental organizations and international agency structures.

Unit training (rehearsals should be mandatory) based on projected operations.

Team building and staff training to include training with multinational forces and nonmilitary organizations.

Liaison officer training to ensure that personnel are knowledgeable representatives.

Information on the customs, cultures, languages, religious practices, political situations, geographies, and the economic and historical backgrounds of the situation and the population of the AO.

Capabilities of the adversary.

Effective communication to the public through the news media.

Negotiation and mediation.

Language training including key phrases. Although American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) armies all speak English, not all operational terms have the same meaning to each army.

Customs and language phrases.

Vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, weapon, uniform, and insignia identification.

Marksmanship (includes foreign weapons training).

Stress management.

Sling load operations.

Mounted and dismounted patrolling.

Patrolling in urban terrain.

Identification of mines and handling procedures.

Situational understanding including mine, booby trap awareness, and weapons recognition.

ROE.

Law of war.

Crowd control and the use and employment of nonlethal riot control agents.

Employment and use of nonlethal weapons capabilities.

Training drivers and vehicle commanders on in theater driving conditions and skills.

Training service members to accommodate environmental constraints.

Detainee handling operations.

Fratricide prevention.

Medical evacuation procedures.

PERFORM IN-COUNTRY TRAINING

5-51. The multinational commander evaluates the level of training of each troop-contributing nation to determine if the nation is ready to commit to the AO or if additional training is necessary before commitment. This training relates to cultures, languages, religions, or other issues related to the host nation.

CHECKLIST

5-52. Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the operations and planning portion of the operation.

OPERATIONS

What areas come under multinational control? What areas remain national issues?

Does the command have a capabilities brief and description or organizational chart of its own force and the multinational forces?

What is the effect of national ROE and objectives on force composition and mission assignment? (See chapters 1, 3, and 13 for additional information on ROE.)

Does ROE support protection?

Does the force have a mechanism to identify potential threats to the force?

What nonlethal technology is available? How is the force trained to use it? Do the ROE authorize its employment?

What is the current situation in the AO?

Has the mission, including commander’s intent, been disseminated? Do elements two echelons down understand it?

Has planning begun for the transition to UN or other organizations that will take over from the multinational force? (See transition in this checklist.)

What is the logistic situation?

What are the language and interpreter requirements?

What are the security screening procedures and limitations relating to contracted interpreters?

How does ROE apply to contracted civilians?

Have personnel recovery plans and assets been coordinated with multinational partners?

What are the special customs and courtesies of the population in the AO or among multinational forces?

Does the command have standard operating procedures that include reporting requirements and procedures?

What units are available to the command and when are they available?

How will the command coordinate ground and air reconnaissance?

Has G-3/S-3 established the common map database?

Have staff visits been coordinated?

Have visits by the unit commander to higher headquarters been coordinated?

What forces remain to support multinational and how long are they required when redeploying or moving?

What national forces interface with the joint movement control center?

What training is required before deployment?

What training is required once deployed?

Has a military information support operations (MISO) program been developed to support the operation?

Have MISO assets been requested?

Has a civil affairs operations or stability tasks civil-military operations plan been developed to support the operation?

Have civil affairs or civil-military cooperation assets been requested?

Has an information operations plan been developed and synchronized with other multinational force contributors to defense support of civil authorities?

Have information operations assets been requested?

Has a search been performed to determine if extant documents are available to defense support of civil authorities or on a given capability? This includes military and nonmilitary agencies.

Is there a mine or unexploded explosive ordnance threat in the AO?

Is there an existing mine or unexploded explosive ordnance action center?

What is the status of law enforcement capabilities in the current environment?

Is there additional training required for law enforcement personnel in the current environment to maintain security and stability?

Are there measures of merit for tasks and subtasks?

What force structure is required for potential intervention to support the host nation?

What is the long-term plan for further development of host nation capacity?

What forces are needed to support the host nation post transition?

PLANNING

Has the deployment sequence been completed and validated?

Have members of the multinational force been included on the operational planning team?

Has the political advisor, a representative from the Secretary of Defense, Department of State, National Security Agency, and a representative from the host nation been included on the operational planning team?

What are the planning principles for transition?

What are ways to improve the population’s faith in host nation civil and military security?

What are ways to support the restoration of services and other essential infrastructure?

What is needed to help local government establish procedures to resolve community disputes?

What are the operation security constraints to ensure proper information dissemination?

What procedures are needed to implement identification programs to vet host nation personnel, encourage participation in representative government, and validate professional credentials?

Who prepares to provide assistance to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts by host nation authorities and intergovernmental organizations?

What are ways to enhance relationships with local stakeholders and publicize multinational force respect for key stakeholders and institutions, deference for host nation successes, and increasing host nation security force in joint missions?

What are ways to improve economic development programs such as local business and agriculture?

Has the inclusion of logistic planners from the outset for planning and execution been established?

Has a process for notification and approval of transition been established?

How will transition affect the requirements to support the force with regard to logistics and force enablers?

What are proactive measures to guard against loss of situational understanding as multinational force assets decease?

What structures can be established to maintain linkage at the key levels of host nation command and the ability to plug in multinational force assets as required?

Has an influence plan been established to support the transition plan?

Does the influence plan address host nation, UN, and multinational force target audiences at the appropriate levels?

What is the plan to increase visibility on host nation successes during transition?

What are the combat propaganda campaigns?

What assets are available for immediate release of information within hours of the targeted audience (the opposing force, host nation, UN, or multinational force)?

What are ways to improve outcomes for host nation economic initiatives?

What are ways to counter rumors and negative publicity?

What is the plan to alert the population to programs, services, and incentives?

Have the forces relying on strategic mobility for deployment and redeployment from other multinational members been included in the supporting nation’s deployment sequence?

Has the deployment plan deconflicted civilian agency and contractor transportation requirements to avoid competition for limited transportation infrastructure?

Has a risk assessment been accomplished as appropriate?

To what standard have multinational forces been trained?

Does the multinational force have a standard of training? Is a standard provided by an outside agency?

Have all multinational forces received the proper predeployment training?

What type of predeployment training have multinational forces received?

AVIATION PLANNING GUIDE

Force Structure

What is the multinational aviation force structure?

What is the desired aviation organization for operations for early entry forces?

What is the desired order of arrival of aviation assets?

What types of readiness are multinational aviation forces and supporting elements, including strategic air and shipping for deployment, ordered to maintain? How long can they sustain this readiness?

What are the phases and flow of aviation units, capabilities, and materiel to the AO? Is this flow reflected in the multinational time-phased force and deployment list?

Command and Control

What is the commander’s intent?

What is the multinational command and control structure for aviation?

Has a multinational aviation commander been appointed? What is the commander’s command, control, and coordination authority?

What airspace control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) use?

Have other nations’ navigational equipment performance (input requirements, accuracy and susceptibility to attack) been ascertained? Will relative performance affect control and use of operational environment? Will it affect control, direction, and coordination of fires and ROE?

Are nations’ target designators interoperable? If not, what effect will this have and what can be done to avoid or mitigate these designators?

Where are the aviation coordination interfaces?

When will any changes of status of command and coordination measures take effect?

Is there a requirement for a multinational operational environment management cell?

What will be the multinational command relationships—for example, operational control versus tactical control—for aviation assets?

What are the command arrangements for the conduct of multinational longer range operations?

What national aviation command arrangements are required to support the multinational command structure?

What are the national requirements for aviation liaison officers?

How will national communications and information systems be integrated?

What multinational bearer communications system will be used?

Mission and Tasks

What is the multinational aviation mission?

What are the multinational aviation specified tasks?

Are there any multinational aviation implied tasks?

What is the multinational command and control warfare plan? Can aviation enhance its effectiveness?

Are multinational aviation assets for communications and information systems protected against possible attacks?

What is the multinational CBRNE weapons threat assessment? What can aviation forces do to identify and monitor hazards, including contamination?

What is the multinational plan for recovery of critical aviation equipment, facilities, and resources?

Constraints and Freedom of Action

Has the multinational headquarters established constraints on aviation output and technical media activity or effect? Do these constraints include legal factors, acceptance of risk, financial factors, and human factors such as physical, moral, and cultural?

Is the nations’ capability confirmed for night movement and finding, fixing, and striking the enemy?

Do intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, and stability tasks activities affect the aviation plan?

Have the multinational headquarters established environmental and AO characteristics (such as terrain, altitude, and climate) likely to impact on aviation equipment and multinational interoperability? Subsequently, has the multinational headquarters reviewed participating nations’ capabilities and aircraft performance (weapons, payload, and radius of action) in light of environmental conditions?

Has the multinational headquarters established the mapping, global positioning system, and geodetic datum to be used? Has it ascertained consequent implications for multinational interoperability and coordination of fires?

Control of the Electromagnetic Spectrum

Has a multinational aviation electronic preparation of the battlefield been prepared? Is the electronic preparation of the battlefield continuously reviewed, developed, and disseminated throughout the multinational aviation chain of command?

Is there a multinational aviation electronic warfare targeting process or surveillance and target acquisition plan and battle damage assessment process? What countersurveillance control measures are in force?

What factors will frustrate multinational control of the electromagnetic spectrum? Are all nations’ cryptographic driven systems interoperable?

What multinational electronic warfare assets are available to support aviation maneuver?

Information and Intelligence

Has a multinational aviation intelligence preparation of the environment been prepared? Is the intelligence preparation of the environment being reviewed or developed and disseminated continuously throughout the multinational aviation chain of command?

What is the multinational ISR/information collection plan? How is this information collected from and disseminated to aviation?

What foreign disclosure rules must be waived if there are nontraditional multinational partners participating in operations?

Protection

What are the multinational aviation protection requirements?

Is there a multinational aviation electronic warfare targeting process or surveillance and target acquisition plan? What countersurveillance control measures are in force? Have limitations been placed on using white illumination to facilitate aviation night-vision goggle operations?

Have the national and individual aircraft electronic warfare and defensive aid capabilities been compared against threat and aircrew individual protective equipment? Have they been compared against laser and CBRNE hazards? Is the multinational command and control structure capable of delivering threat information and essential codes and preflight messages? Are means and media to move and load codes and fills interoperable? Are fills and threat library information for the following available?

Identification, friend, or foe systems.

Missile approach warning equipment.

Infrared or radar jammers.

Are combat identification systems available to all allies? If not, can these systems become available and embodied to enhance allied freedom of action? Are nations’ combat identification systems interoperable? If not, what multinational joint antifraticide measures are in place?

Are multinational plans, procedures, and training (scale, radius of action, quality, quantity, and timeliness) suitable for likely combat search and rescue as well as recovery of encircled forces?

What CBRNE protection measures (individual and collective) are afforded to other nations’ air crew, ground crew, and technical personnel? What effect will adopting protective measures or using protective equipment have on multinational aviation operations (quality, quantity, and sustainability)? Are nations able to decontaminate aircraft? To what standards and what effect will residual CBRNE contamination or hazards have on operational output?

Has the multinational headquarters established differing national approaches to risk management? How have these approaches affected multinational operational output? What is the impact on the planning cycle and operations procedure?

Weapons Effects and Rules of Engagement

Has the multinational headquarters established contributing nations’ aircraft weapons’ capabilities and performance? What are their effects on ROE?

What systems will be used for collateral damage assessment?

Doctrine

What level of aviation doctrine standardization has been achieved in the multinational force? What does the lack of standardization for multinational aviation operational output imply?

Is there a multinational aviation mechanism for capturing lessons learned and informing nations to ease continuous review of equipment performance; doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and other vital information?

What multinational agreements or standards are available to enhance operational output? What scope is there to exploit existing agreements or standards or to develop new ones?

G-1 or G-4

What aircraft are multinational partners bringing to the theater of operations?

Has the nations’ aircraft performance, given ambient conditions in the AO (payload and radius of action), been confirmed?

Has a multinational, host nation, or theater facilities survey been performed and coordinated at the multinational headquarters aviation level?

What is the logistic structure?

What arrangements will be in place for multinational resupply of common user items? If fuel and munitions are included, is the system appropriate for the planned operational activity level?

Does the lead nation’s criterion for fuel quality and fuel system icing inhibitor meet national equipment requirements?

What will be the intratheater repair policy? What mutual support is planned for common equipment?

Has the multinational headquarters established the support capabilities and levels of service—including national environmental restrictions—that nation’s aviation forces offer each other?

Has the multinational headquarters established national aircrew duty time specifications? What impact will this have on planned multinational aviation surge and continuous operational output?

Are there national fleet management issues that will reduce expected multinational operational output?

Are there multinational support issues that affect the nations’ efficient aircraft fleet management resulting in reduced operational output?

Finance and Budget

What are the multinational funding arrangements for aviation mission or tasks?

Are procedures in place to capture costing and expenditure information?

Are multinational and national funding authorities clearly understood throughout the multinational force?

Training and Collective Performance

What scope is there for multinational aviation mission rehearsal and war gaming? Is appropriate simulation equipment available? Can it be made available? Can an appropriate environmental database be developed?

Are there any multinational mission-specific training requirements and training responsibilities?

What scope exists for multinational forces using multinational, national, or host nation facilities, particularly simulation and live-firing training space?

Host Nation Issues

Has the multinational headquarters coordinated the host nation provision of aviation services?

Has the multinational headquarters anticipated and considered host nation cultural issues that will likely impact multinational aviation operations.

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives Defense

What is the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) warning and reporting structure intratheater? What communication nets will be used to pass CBRNE information?

How are the high-value assets such as biological detectors allocated and deployed intratheater? Are there enough assets to available to be allocated among multinational partners?

What national caveats exist for deploying biological detection assets?

Have armies adopted a standardized individual CBRNE protective dress state?

Has an operation exposure guide been established to manage radiation exposures?

Have armies adopted standard guidance for interpreting hazards identified by chemical detectors?

Are sampling standard and identification protocols in place to verify first use of weapons of mass destruction?

Which national laboratories will be used to analyze collected samples for first use and treaty violations?

What medical pretreatment or prophylaxis do multinational partners have for CBRNE protection such as vaccinations, auto-injectors, and anti-emetics? What are national policies for their use?

How will the psychological impact of potential enemy weapons of mass destruction use be countered?

TRANSITION

What are the issues and key multinational force events (past and present) that lead to the current situation?

What work is required to accomplish the transition?

What force or agency is taking control of the operation?

Has contact been made with counterpart planning staffs?

Who will determine when the transition begins or is completed?

Who will fund the transition?

What is required for contractor and host nation capabilities?

Who are the stakeholders for the area of interest? Who are the potential promoters and detractors? How can these be leveraged or mitigated respectively?

What are ways to leverage the stakeholder’s capabilities?

What are the stakeholder’s complexities including objectives, timelines, situation appreciation, and funding streams?

What key cultural or religious milestones and events could affect transition? Why is identifying this important?

What are logistic support requirements for multinational force entities throughout the process?

What are the key engagements between stakeholders at all levels to ensure unity of purpose?

When and with whom are liaison officers embedded in relevant stakeholders’ headquarters?

What is the multinational force policy for transition and redeployment?

What issues exist before the transition? What potential issues exist for the transition force once the transition is completed? Have these been provided to the incoming transition force?

Has the multinational force’s end state been accomplished? If not, will this have a bearing on the incoming force?

If there is a new mission, can the multinational force help the incoming force in preparing for it?

What multinational forces, equipment, or supplies will remain behind?

What is the disposal plan to facilitate disposal of commodities?

What will be the command relationship for the multinational force during the transition and for those multinational forces remaining behind?

Who will support the multinational force remaining behind?

What will be the communications requirement for the multinational force remaining behind?

Will the multinational force provide communications capability to the incoming force?

Has the security transition been coordinated as a compete function? Which are best done incrementally?

Has the security transition been coordinated with the other lines of effort?

What are the dependencies within the security and other lines of operation that could be affected by transition or could affect transition?

Can information be shared with the incoming transition force or organization?

Will new ROE be established for the transition?

Will ongoing operations be discontinued or interrupted?

Will the incoming force use the same headquarters facility as the multinational force?

What agreements have been developed with civilian agencies that impact the incoming force?

Have points of contact been developed for the incoming force?

What will be the requirement for liaison personnel?

Will sufficient security be available to provide protection? Who will provide it?

How will the turnover be accomplished?

Who will handle public affairs for the transition?

What command and control arrangements are for departure?

What are the customs, immigration, and quarantine implications for the incoming and outgoing forces?

What are the identities of all stakeholders and their level of involvement in the transition operation?

What are the outgoing multinational forces’ obligations with respect to employed local labors and contractors?

What are the incoming multinational forces’ obligations with respect to employed local labors and contractors?

What are the functions and appointments that the outgoing force should maintain during the handover period?

Is it the intention to proceed with the transition upon achieving military end state or not?

What ongoing obligations has the outgoing force left to the incoming force?

What effects does transition have on the local economy and security situation?

TRAINING

What predeployment training has the troop-contributing nations performed?

Have designated troops from the various participating nations previously trained with each other?

What predeployment or intracountry training will be necessary before the commitment or deployment of troops into the AO?

What level of training is posed by each of the troop-contributing nations?

Does each of the nations have some form of training for liaison officers or will the coalition headquarters need to establish a program?

Chapter 6

Sustainment Challenges in Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by giving an overview of multinational logistics and discusses the importance of unity of effort between nations and agencies. It then discusses responsibility for logistics, planning for logistics, and host nation support. Lastly, this chapter discusses operational contract support, waste and disposal plans, and gives an overview of the United Nations system and movement in multinational force operations. A checklist is available for commanders and staffs at the end of the chapter.

MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS OVERVIEW

6-1. A coordinated logistic effort within a multinational force is needed to accomplish its mission. The multinational commander considers how to coordinate the logistic effort. If nations compete for host nation resources to provide logistical support to troop-contributing units, it hampers the multinational force’s efforts to accomplish its mission, and causes harmful inflation in the host nation economy. The multinational commander strives to achieve unity of effort in the logistic effort.

UNITY OF EFFORT BETWEEN NATIONS AND AGENCIES

6-2. Unity of effort is essential to multinational logistic operations. Unity of effort requires contributing nations and civilian agencies in the area of operations (AO) to coordinate. The multinational force is responsible to execute multinational logistics. When possible, the assistant chief of staff, logistics/battalion or brigade logstics staff officer (G-4/S-4) develops mutual logistic support for economy of effort. Multinational logistics are flexible, responsive, and predictive and provide timely sustainment throughout the entire multinational force. The multinational logistic plan incorporates the logistic requirements of all contributing forces to execute the plan.

6-3. Consensus on multinational logistic issues and requirements are formed early. Commanders comprehend multinational forces’ doctrine and have good relations with subordinate commanders and civilian leaders. All elements providing logistics support and operational elements cooperate and coordinate. This begins during the initial planning phase and continues through the operation’s termination and redeployment of forces back to their countries of origin.

6-4. Commanders handle logistics on a multinational basis. They control logistics as interoperability permits. Under certain conditions, creating a single multinational logistics command provides economy of assets and system efficiency. Even if multinational participants (for national command reasons) maintain a national logistics structure, assigning a lead for logistics responsibility precludes duplication of effort. The G-4/S-4 establishes a planning group with members from all participating nations to define the extent of interoperability that exists between multinational forces. Commanders identify the funding authority early to support multinational forces and develop procedures to prevent an adverse impact on operations.

6-5. Multinational operations complicate logistic support and reduce the degree of flexibility inherent in a national logistic system. Although responsible for logistic support of its national forces, not all nations have deployable logistic capabilities. Such nations depend on other nations for all or part of their support. In these cases, the multinational force provides deployment and sustainment to military and civilian organizations. For deployment, close liaison with theater airlift command and control helps coordinate approval and facilitate airlift once approved. When support is required, close liaison ensures clear funding lines.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOGISTICS

6-6. Logistics is a national responsibility in multinational operations. Some nations do not want to relinquish authority over logistics assets. However, relations between NATO and the U.S. have evolved enough that logistics is a collective responsibility with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support agency oversight. The multinational commander needs the authority and control mechanisms for logistics to achieve the mission. Each nation performing logistic functions separately would be inefficient and expensive. The multinational logistics staff handles mutual logistic support among multinational partners. The planning staff designs the plans to complement partner nations’ capabilities and minimize weaknesses. The multinational force staff evaluates the degree of interoperability among the participating nations. After which, the participating nations discuss which nations provide support functions for the multinational force and the procedures and methods of how those nations provide that support. For additional information on multinational logistics, see JP 4-08, AJP-4, ADRP 4-0, and applicable NATO Standardization Agreements.

6-7. The multinational force exercises control over the national logistic units or acts as the coordinating authority. The degree of authority depends on existing agreements and arrangements negotiated with contributing nations. The multinational force commander delegates the level of authority granted by the individual nations to subordinate commanders. The multinational force commander establishes logistics coordination or the control center headed by a senior logistic coordinator or commander to coordinate common logistic support in the AO.

6-8. The G-4 coordinates with the multinational force J-4 to determine what logistic authority for a common support capability the national authorities have delegated to the multinational force. The G-4/S-4 also determines whether that authority meets multinational requirements. The multinational force’s delegated or directed authority does not negate national responsibilities for logistic support or discourage coordination. Also, it is not meant to disrupt effective procedures and the efficient use of facilities or organizations.

6-9. Three methods of executing cooperative logistics exist in a multinational force. Each method is used by itself or combined with the other methods. Regardless of the method used, national decisions and commitments lead or participate in these arrangements early during the planning cycle. The three methods are:

The lead nation concept. For this method, one nation provides the framework for one or more logistics functions to support the multinational force.

A role-specialization agreement. Under this method, one nation provides a particular class of supply or service for all or most of the multinational force.

Pooled assets and resources. For this method, two or more nations form an integrated logistic support structure to provide supply or support functions to the multinational force.

PLANNING FOR LOGISTICS

6-10. It is critical that the logistics staff plans concurrent logistics and operations early. This ensures that sustainment requirements balance with capabilities. The staff identifies personnel and provides their availability early to facilitate planning. Staffs develop plans with all participating nations to achieve logistic efficiencies. The multinational headquarters determines the logistic support needed to uphold the commander’s plan and provide estimates of these requirements to national units. Planners share partial planning data with prospective partner nations to facilitate parallel planning. Staffs—

Evaluate the level of standardization and interoperability among participating nations.

Determine differences in logistics doctrine, capabilities, methods for computing requirements, stockage levels, organizations, and communications and information systems.

Account for these differences in the plan.

Account for differences in language, values, religious and moral beliefs, economic infrastructure, nutritional standards, and social outlooks that impacts logistic support to multinational forces.

Determine protection of civilians.

Determine what level of civilian casualties constitutes mass atrocity. Determine the response.

6-11. The logistics planners assign responsibilities and procedures to provide logistic support in the multinational force and the task organization of multinational logistics units. Nongovernmental organizations support the local population. However, in some circumstances when military support is required, the logistics planners address the requirements of the local population as a part of the logistics plan of the operations order.

6-12. Logistics personnel prepare logistics of the theater of operations for a flexible operational support plan. Logistics personnel perform actions at all echelons to optimize the means (force structure, multinational and host nation resources, and strategic lift) to support the multinational force commander’s plan. Personnel identify resources available in the theater of operations for use by multinational forces and ensure access to those resources. (See ADRP 4-0 for more information on logistic preparation of the theater of operations.) These actions include—

Identifying and preparing intermediate staging base and forward logistics bases/forward logistics elements.

Selecting and improving lines of communication.

Projecting and preparing forward logistics bases.

Coordinating multinational logistic support.

Forecasting and building operational stock assets forward and afloat.

6-13. The plan ensures all appropriate environmental reviews meet environmental laws, policies, and regulations. The plan must be in accordance with national, international, and host nation agreements. The G-4/S-4 coordinates with legal and other appropriate staff officers to ensure that current environmental conditions—such as water and soil contamination—epidemiological surveys, and disease risk assessments comply with legal requirements. The G-4/S-4 also records data for future remediation.

6-14. When planning to acquire real property and lease facilities, planners determine what facilities and land they need and whether those exist in the AO. Planners establish priorities for property acquisition and consider the property they need.

6-15. Logistics planners determine the multinational force resupply requirements and recommend the best method and type of servicing to the commander. Also, advance coordination must be made with Army Material Command and the Theater Sustainment Command so material and support requirements are known and resourcing can begin.

HOST NATION SUPPORT

6-16. The command analyzes the physical infrastructure in the host nation to determine what facilities and services are available to support the command and how the command minimizes the logistic footprint. The command understands the culture, business practices and laws, religious implications, and political and social structure of the host nation. Evaluation includes location and what the command uses. AOs without a functioning government provide limited support. Commanders integrate host nation support into the logistic structure of the command to ensure effective use. The command allocates this support based on command priorities. Nations agree on whether a multinational force has the authority to conclude host nation support arrangements on behalf of participating nations or whether prior national approval is required.

6-17. Host nation support expertise (legal, financial, acquisition, medical, and administrative) is centralized within the logistic staff to identify and procure host nation support. This ensures the command’s requirements and prevents competition between partners.

6-18. While local procurement efforts are beneficial to the host nation, these efforts sometimes undermine important command goals. Local suppliers have important political connections. An otherwise innocent procurement decision has significant political meaning in the host nation. Procurement actions inflate local prices with negative impacts on local groups or civilian agencies. These effects influence the attainment of the end state and the timing of withdrawal. Stability tasks and civil affairs personnel identify and coordinate host nation support and provide valuable assistance to the logistics staff in this area.

6-19. The command obtains authorization from national authorities to negotiate for host nation support. Agreements with the host nation include the authority for the command to deal directly with the host nation for support. The command develops a list of current host nation agreements. The command legal advisor and Department of State or Ministry of Foreign Affairs political advisor negotiates host nation support agreements. Agreements are negotiated for local contracting, currency exchange rates, local hire wage scales, and customs regulations.

6-20. The logistics staff evaluates the effectiveness of current host nation contracts between the host nation and civilian agencies in the AO. Then, the staff determines the best lead agency (military or civilian) to negotiate and contract for host nation support. Table 6-1 provides host nation considerations for support.

6-21. Multinational forces perform background checks on host nation support personnel and contractors and periodically check host nation support personnel and contractors against intelligence databases. Based on experiences from Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation New Dawn, host nation support personnel and contractors often have family, social, organizational, or financial ties or routine contact with insurgents.

Table 6-1. Host nation considerations

Items and Considerations

Accommodations

Billeting

Offices

Stores and warehouses

Workshops, vehicle parks, gun parks

Medical

Hardstands

Fuel

Weapons and ammunition storage

Transportation, including aircraft

Firing ranges

Training areas and facilities

Recreation areas and facilities

Laundry and dry cleaning facilities

Postal facility

Weapons and Ammunition

Security

Storage

Collection or delivery

Communication

Local

International

Security

Finance
Payment for—

Accommodations, supplies, communications, equipment, local labor maintenance, medical, and movement facilities

Emergency facilities

Personal facilities

Fuel

Aircraft

Vehicles

Ships

Method of Delivery

Storage

Interoperability of refueling equipment

Common use of refueling installations

Local Labor

Method of hiring

Method of payment

Administration

Rations

Fresh

Pack

Potable water

Medical

Normal facilities

Emergency facilities

Reciprocal national health agreements

Evacuation of causalities

Medical and blood supply system

Translation

Interpreters/language specialists

Translation of documents

Supplies and Equipment (other than ammunition, fuel, or rations)

Common use items

Maintenance

Accommodations

Vehicles

Ships

Equipment

Roads (including snow clearance)

Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft

Provision of assembly areas

Damage control

Emergency facilities for visitors’ vehicles and equipment

Recovery and transportation of disabled vehicles and equipment

Waste and disposal

Water

Production/purification capability

Municipal

Other water treatment systems

Distribution capability

Trucks

Pipeline

Hoseline

Storage capability

Receipt and issue capability

Available water sources

Wells

Surface

Subsurface

Host nation water quality standards

Movement

Airheads

Alternates

Facilities

Ships

Equipment

Refueling

Ports

Alternates

Draft

Bunkering/fueling

Repair

Road and rail movement

Personnel

Equipment

Security

Traffic control

Pipeline movement

Transportation Equipment

Host nation military vehicles, equipment, ships, aircraft

Locally hired vehicles and equipment, ships, aircraft

Policy on drivers and handlers for above

Other services

Electricity: locally procured or generator

Trash pick-up

6-22. The national government handles agreements for transferring defense goods and services between nations. This is cumbersome and time consuming. Support provided and received in multinational operations comply with existing legal authorities. Under an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, national authorities enter into agreements for acquiring or cross-servicing logistic support, supplies, and services on a reimbursable, replacement-in-kind, or exchange for equal value basis. The acquisition and cross-servicing agreement is a broad overall agreement, generally supplemented by an implementing arrangement. The J-4 and the Department of State with the country involved performs the agreement in the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the country involved provides the approval and signs the agreement. Major commands in country negotiate the details with their counterparts and document the services (whether used or not) on a statement of requirements for exchange of support and services. The implementing arrangement contains details on orders for logistic support. G-4/S-4 documents receipt of agreed upon services to prevent fraudulent payment for services not provided. The acquisition and cross-servicing agreement includes—

Food.

Billeting.

Transportation.

Petroleum, oils, and lubricants.

Clothing.

Communications.

Army health system (AHS) support.

Ammunition.

Base operations support including construction.

Storage.

Use of facilities.

Training.

Spare parts.

Repair and maintenance.

Calibration.

Port services.

Generators.

HAZMAT response and disposal.

Medical waste disposal.

Heating oil/gas.

Local electricity consumption.

Trash removal.

Satellite service.

Road clearance and snow removal.

Railhead operations.

Cranes and forklifts.

6-23. Items not included are—

Weapons systems.

Major end items.

Guided missiles.

Nuclear and chemical munitions other than riot control agents.

Cartridge and aircrew escape propulsion system components.

Chaff and chaff dispensers.

Guidance kits for bombs and other ammunition.

OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

6-24. Multinational militaries, including the U.S. military, rely on contracted support to perform a multitude of support functions and tasks. Factors that have led to this increased reliance include—

Reductions in the size of military forces (especially in the combat support and sustainment areas).

Increases in tempo and missions undertaken by the military.

Increased complexity and sophistication of weapon systems.

A continued push to gain efficiencies and reduce costs through outsourcing or privatizing commercially adaptable functions.

6-25. The logistic directorate of a multinational staff oversees operational contract support and contractor personnel providing support to the multinational force in a designated operational area.

6-26. Centralized coordination of contracting efforts is essential to provide the necessary management of limited resources. This ensures the multinational force contracts operational priorities and supports each one. Through centralized coordination of contracting efforts, maximum benefits are derived from volume procurements, competition is optimized, price escalation is avoided, and the opportunities for local black market operations are minimized.

6-27. Early planning is critical for effective and efficient operational contract support in multinational operations. From an operational planning point of view, there are a number of considerations influencing when to use contractor support in multinational operations. Common contract support considerations include—

Type of operation. Operations with higher risk of combat, such as initial entry operations, are less suitable for outsourcing than lower risk operations such as peacekeeping and stabilization operations.

Phase of the operation. In the early stages of an operation, military units support military functions because of high risk, efficiency, operational effectiveness, and security. As the environment stabilizes and risk reduces, selected support functions transfer to lead nation or role specialist nations provided there is contract support.

Protection of contractor personnel. Although contractors are mostly self-sufficient, they are not combatants and the force is generally responsible for the security of contractor employees accompanying for force.

Protection from contractor personnel. Using contracted support instead of military support entails additional risks to the force. This risk is heighted when using third country national and especially local national contractor employees.

6-28. Multinational partners have a collective responsibility for planning and implementing contracted support. This responsibility encourages partner nations to identify support requirements that could be met by contracted services and supplies and create contractual arrangements. These nations share the provision and use of contractor capabilities and resources through prior arrangements to support the force.

6-29. Planning and preparation for providing contracted support in multinational operations begins with support planning. Multinational partners use existing common user logistics role specialists and lead nation agreements and other available Service, joint, and/or allied contracting support agencies that provide contracting services on a reimbursable basis. Properly prepared and funded, contracted support enhances support to operations, releases military resources for higher priority tasks elsewhere, overcomes identified sustainment shortfalls, and provides endurance where needed with less impact on military assets than would be the case without it. Contract support applies to a wide range of logistics and other support functions including—

Base camp services (billeting, food, and local labor).

Firefighting.

Linguists.

Interpreters.

Trucking services.

Base camp construction and maintenance.

Strategic transport.

Fuel storage and distribution.

Strategic aeromedical evacuation.

Elements of deployed healthcare.

Food and water.

Bulk petroleum.

Port clearance.

Signal communications.

6-30. As a matter of policy, U.S. contract support to multinational partners is limited to supplies and services planned and procured for support of the U.S. force. Additionally, standards of support for contracted services are the same standard established by the national support element providing the support. Finally, proper funding approval must be in accordance with national laws and policies of all parties prior before receiving or providing contract support. More specifically, U.S. policy and law requires an approved acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, and when appropriate, an implementation agreement before the U.S. force provides contracted supplies and services to any multinational partner.

6-31. Determining the appropriate contract support arrangements is a critical step in multinational contract support planning. Based on recent insights from multinational operations and approved NATO doctrine, there are three generally acceptable contract support sharing arrangements:

Lead nation. This is the most common form of multinational contract support arrangement where one nation is designated the lead common contract support provider.

Role specialist nation. Similar to lead nation arrangement, but where one or several nations arrange for contracted support for a single service such as fuel, medical evacuation, security, force protection, food, and maintenance.

Multinational support capability. Normally only executed for large scale and long term operations and based on a formal alliance capability such as the NATO real life support agreement in Afghanistan. This type of direct contract support arrangement is very complex and takes significant time to put in place. It is referred to as the Theater Allied Contracting Office per NATO doctrine. (See NATO documents: STANAG 6025 Ed. 2 and AJP-4.5.)

6-32. In the lead and role specialist nation support arrangements, the operational command logistic staff and national support element planners determine common support arrangements to include contracting processes and procedures.

6-33. For the Army, contracting support provided to designated multinational partners is executed via the supporting contracting support brigade contracts or a logistics civil augmentation program task order. In this process, the supported multinational units process their support request directly with the designated providing unit, not the supporting contracting support brigade or logistics civil augmentation program-forward office. Accordingly, each designated providing unit incorporates the multinational support requirements into their contract support requirements development. The providing unit identifies changes to requirements and provides receiving and quality assurance reports to the supporting contracting office as required by national law and policy.

6-34. The supporting contracting office, with support for the providing unit, negotiates changes to the contract, evaluates the performance of the contractor, assesses penalties for non-performance, and certifies payment for delivery of services. The contracting officer administers contractual instruments to ensure the contractual obligations of the contractor and partner forces are correctly and promptly fulfilled. It is important to note U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation requires a DOD civilian or uniformed U.S. military member sign receiving reports (for supply request) and to serve as contracting officer representatives (for service contracts). Again, the designated Army providing unit must arrange receiving official and contracting officer representative’s support for their supported multinational units.

6-35. In NATO operations, it is possible to stand up a theater allied contracting office to contract for selected goods and services in limited supply in the operational area or are commonly needed by the entire force. To coordinate theater allied contracting office activities, the multinational force contracts may publish a restricted items list that identifies critical, limited supplies and services in the operational area. This procurement is coordinated with the contracting coordination center. The theater allied contracting office negotiates base ordering agreements for use by all participating nations. These base ordering agreements would normally include information identified in table 6-2.

Table 6-2. Standard base ordering agreement information

Agreement title/number | Unit of issue/quantity (for a supply item)
Implementing arrangement title/number (if applicable) | Unit price (for supply item)
Date of request | Overall price
Providing unit/nationality | Delivery location (for a supply)
Receiving unit/nationality | Location of performance (for a contracted service)
Fund citation | Description of service (for contracted service)
Method of payment | Period of performance (for contracted service)
Requesting unit signature block | Implementing agreement officer signature block
Receiving unit signature block | Providing unit signature block

6-36. Contractor personnel management integrates, manages, and within limits, controls contractors supporting the multinational force in the designated operational area. The multinational force contract’s authority over contractors is limited. Accordingly, the multinational force contract coordinates contractor management policy and procedures between the major multinational partners including movement control, minimum government furnished support arrangements, legal jurisdiction, and VISA requirements. (See JP 4-08 for more information on logistic support of multinational operations.) The multinational logistic procurement support board helps with the multinational force contracts to ensure these policies and procedures are incorporated into contributing nation’s contracts and included in their national contract oversight. For further guidance on operational contract support in multinational operations, see JP 4-10, ATTP 4-10, and the NATO Logistics Handbook.

6-37. Commanders integrate the strategic and theater of operations movement requirements to prevent congestion at seaports and airports. Establishing intratheater hubs maximizes cargo throughput and improves theater distribution. Nations provide movement data to the multinational force theater movement control system. This data provides information for the direct delivery or transloading of passengers and cargo. It deconflicts strategic movements with other theater of operations movements.

6-38. Civilian agencies, in an effort to help by shipping relief supplies, will likely cause transportation “choke points” en route to and in the theater of operations. A G-4/S-4 link with the civil-military operations center provides a solution to this type of circumstance.

6-39. The multinational force designates a director of mobility forces. The director is normally a senior officer familiar with the AO with an extensive background in airlift operations. The director is the designated agent for all airlift issues in the AO and for other duties as directed.

WASTE AND DISPOSAL PLANS

6-40. Inadequate waste disposal plans cause conflicts with public and international law and increases costs. Waste and disposal are in the operation plan or operation order from initial planning to redeployment. When cost becomes paramount during redeployment, waste and disposal are important. These commodities require disposal:

Usable property and scrap.

Munitions list and strategic list items.

Captured and confiscated weapons.

Hazardous materiel and hazardous waste.

Rations and food.

Ammunition, explosives, and dangerous articles.

Radioactive materiel.

Medical waste.

Classified items.

Drugs, biological substances, and controlled substances.

UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

6-41. The United Nations (UN) logistic system requires member states to be self-sufficient at the unit level for 60 to 120 days. This allows the UN to organize a logistic structure, acquire real estate and facilities, and establish contracts and local memorandums of understanding and letters of assist to provide support for the multinational force. Once established, the UN logistic structure provides continuing support through a system of lead nations, civilian contracts, a UN force logistic support group, or a combination of the three.

6-42. A UN survey and assessment team evaluates operational requirements and develops planning data for sustainment. When participating in UN missions, the command sends a logistics representative with the UN survey team if possible. The multinational force coordinates with UN forces to improve the unity of effort and reduce potential conflicts.

LEAD NATION CONCEPT

6-43. A lead nation is a nation with the will, capability, competence, and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a multinational operation (JP 3-16). Supported nations then rely on the lead nation for the agreed level of support. National contingents have representatives in the lead nation’s logistic organization. See JP 4-0 for additional information.

FORCE LOGISTIC SUPPORT CENTER

6-44. In most cases, the UN will ask a member state, or states, to form a force logistic support group. The group incorporates logistic units from participating nations. A state accepting the group role and the chief logistic officer at the force headquarters establish local contracts to support the force. Even with a force logistic support group, member states are responsible for specific national elements of resupply—such as repair parts, clothing, food, and major end item replacements—unless nations establish an agreement to provide this support. This would be on a reimbursable basis under either a wet or dry lease arrangement that the UN and contributing nation’s government agree to before deployment.

CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR CONCEPT

6-45. The UN economizes logistic support by using civilian contractors. The goal is to achieve the most economical logistic organization that meets the demands of the force and releases military manpower for redeployment. Force headquarters coordinate the process. UN contracting does not fall under the logistic division. It falls under the purchasing and transport services division. UN procurement is bureaucratic and slow. It is decentralized and each agency uses its own procedures. The interagency procurement services office of the UN development program creates a standard procurement system.

6-46. The UN chief administrative officer does not work for the force commander, but reports to the special representative of the secretary general. The civilian logistic infrastructure, including the budget officer, reports to the chief administrative officer. Logistics problems will not be resolved unless the chief administrative officer is involved. Maximum liaison between military and civilian counterparts is required to allow synchronization of effort.

6-47. The UN normally coordinates logistic areas such as bulk supplies and services. National standards such as consumption rates, space requirements, and safety levels exceed UN standards. Sophisticated multinational military equipment requires different standards of support than what the UN has agreed to provide or fund. The G-4/S-4 understands UN standards concerning level and quality of support provided and funded. Logistic support that extends beyond what is outlined in the UN agreement is not reimbursable. The multinational force must be prepared to bring its own support in the areas where the UN-provided support is deficient.

MOVEMENT IN MULTINATIONAL FORCE OPERATIONS

6-48. Movement is critical to multinational force operations. A multinational force headquarters, or its supporting combatant command, plans and executes all intertheater movement. However, it remains a national responsibility to move forces into the operating area. The multinational force headquarters coordinates these deployments to support the commander’s plan and plans and controls intratheater movement through reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.

INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE

6-49. Nations participating in the multinational operation consult with the multinational force commander to determine if the force needs an intermediate staging base. If established, the intermediate staging base will be outside the operating area. The commander balances numerous requirements, including greater lift requirements against better efficiency. Multinational forces assemble and stage in an intermediate staging base, especially if combat is imminent. The intermediate staging base provides a secure area to assemble, train, equip, and bond the multinational force into a cohesive one. It is better to solve problems and correct deficiencies in a non-hostile environment. The multinational force headquarters staff assembles first and works together, followed by the rest of the multinational force. The international staging base has sufficient billeting and training capacity to support the entire multinational force at once. Access to airports and seaports for smooth reception of the force and its subsequent deployment is critical. If the multinational operation is a lesser regional contingency or a second major regional contingency, an intermediate staging base is not possible.

6-50. Planners anticipate disruptions from many factors, ranging from weather to political decisions. This alters the planned flow of personnel, units, and equipment. The Army Service component commander, or a supporting combatant command, operates the intermediate staging base and deploys fully ready forces into the operating area. When the lodgment is well established, the intermediate staging base shifts into the operating area if it will not drain additional resources. Larger areas, such as Europe or Korea, allow for a reception center or intermediate staging base in the theater of operations from the beginning. In the Korean War, UN forces operated the UN reception center where incoming contingents were equipped, trained, and linked up with U.S. liaison elements.

THEATER OF OPERATIONS RECEPTION

6-51. At ports of debarkation, units work with host nation, contracted host nation support, and multiservice personnel to secure the port, discharge equipment, process equipment and personnel and move units to marshaling areas. Host nation forces perform and help with many of these functions. The multinational force headquarters assigns a troop-contributing nation to oversee and help the host nation perform these functions. If host nation support forces are not available, national units perform those functions. The multinational task force commander plans for all units in the strategic flow. Some national forces have limited capability so the commander, based on planning staff recommendations, specifies functions for these units.

THEATER OF OPERATIONS STAGING

6-52. Staging is that part of the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration operation where several key activities occur in controlled areas of combat power. During this phase, the following occurs:

Units are reassembled and united with their equipment and scheduled for movement toward the tactical assembly area.

Materiel is segregated, prioritized, and prepared for transport.

Class V supplies are uploaded.

Life support is provided to personnel.

THEATER OF OPERATIONS ONWARD MOVEMENT

6-53. This phase begins when units move to their final destination. Such movement is accomplished through a carefully devised movement program that employs convoy, rail, and host nation contract assets (such as heavy equipment transporters and other trucks) to ensure the forward and concurrent movement of troops and supplies. Centralized control of transportation assets is required. Real estate management is a problem unless a multinational counterpart to the U.S. joint force utilization board (usually controlled by engineers) has authority to allocate terrain to all forces and agencies.

6-54. Movement planning accounts for differences in how nations perform road marches or similar administrative movements. These differences lead to confusion and disorganization. For example, one multinational force contingent considers any movement made by a tactical unit to be a tactical movement. Terminology must be coordinated through the movement control center to avoid confusion.

6-55. When planning the movement of a multinational force, planners know the details of the organization, equipment, capabilities, and limitations of the forces. Planners know how to request intratheater movement of multinational operational forces consistent with the operational commander’s operation plan. The movement should complement sequencing of operations and time-phased force deployment. Movement planners should consider all assets (joint, multinational, nongovernmental, governmental, host nation, and third country) and modes (air, land, or sea) of transport. During execution of these movements, movement control personnel locate where they validate actual movements.

THEATER OF OPERATIONS INTEGRATION

6-56. This phase covers both the effective management of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration movement of units and the table of allowance of units to the tactical commander.

CHECKLIST

6-57. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the logistic portion of the operation.

SUPPORT AND CAPABILITIES

What areas come under multinational control? What areas remain national issues?

What logistic service and support is available?

Does the unit have sufficient assets (such as maintenance, communications, transportation) to perform its movement and/or mission? Will it require support?

What are the specific logistic capabilities of each nation of the multinational force? Understanding these capabilities is essential to effective and efficient logistic planning and support.

What mortuary affairs capabilities does the command have?

What legal restrictions do national laws impose on logistic support?

Do national legal authorities permit the provision of logistic support among multinational nations?

Are mutual logistic support agreements in accordance with existing legal authorities?

What is the system for property accountability?

What are the special clothing and equipment requirements that have a long lead-time to obtain? (For example, nonmilitary supplies or riot control gear.)

What are the procedures to provide support such as transportation, housing, and meals to diplomats and distinguished visitors? What coordination is there with the joint visitor’s bureau on this?

What is the system for preventing fraud, waste, and abuse?

How does the command assess logistic requests, requirements, and actions to ensure that they are valid with respect to the operation and authority given to the command?

How does the command adequately secure logistic assets?

Will the command establish a common retail store at some point during operations? A well-stocked retail store provides personnel support items and serves as a morale booster.

How will the intelligence staff gather information from logistic sources such as truck drivers and engineers?

What are the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement procedures to account for and reimburse nations for services and supplies exchanged between nations?

What are the common supplies and services that one nation or a multinational organization might provide?

Is there an agreement that authorizes forces to exchange mutual logistic support of goods and services and that accounts for the amounts received?

Will there be, and if so when and how, a transfer of authority of national logistic assets to the multinational force?

What is the multinational force’s authority to redistribute or cross-level logistic assets and services under routine and emergency conditions?

How will the command maintain national asset accountability from the national sustaining base to the front-line units?

How will the command ensure compatibility and interoperability of communications and information systems, including automated data processing interfaces between the multinational and national support systems?

How will the command prioritize, allocate, and use common infrastructure capabilities (ports, airfields, roads) to support military and civil operations?

What are the existing standardization agreements that facilitate multinational logistic support?

What is the logistic support structure? How will it identify capabilities and responsibilities of contributing nations?

Does the multinational force have an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement among multinational nations?

Does the logistic structure have one officer in charge or a main point of contact for command and control of contract personnel?

Have contractor procedures been established to allow total multinational participation in contracts led by national personnel and used by multinational personnel?

Is there a need to establish a multinational logistic command or element? If so, has its staffing been determined?

Has the relationship between the multinational and national logistic elements been clearly defined?

Have lead nations been designated where appropriate?

Have logistic reporting procedures been established throughout the force?

Do all forces know and comply with the infrastructure repair plan?

Is there duplication of effort in the support plan for the operation?

If there is a need, what is the composition of the multinational logistics command or element? Have coordinating centers been established for movements, medical support, contracting, infrastructure engineering, and logistics operations?

What is the transitional plan for operational assumption of in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agency or alliance?

Are multinational legal representatives available to provide council on international law and legal agreements?

Have customs clearance procedures been established at ports of embarkation?

Has certification been established?

Have standards been identified for logistic support? Is there a plan to perform, inspect, and ascertain compliance with these standards before deployment?

What is the division of responsibilities between multinational, national, and host nation logistic support?

How will each class of supply be handled?

What are the multinational force’s capabilities to receive, store, and issue dry cargo, fuel, and water including water production and purification capability?

Does the multinational force have the means to communicate requirements to the multinational logistics management center?

What materiel handling equipment is available in the multinational force and host nation?

Does the multinational force have a load of ammunition? What are the ammunition procedures?

What are the multinational force’s special requirements including tents, cots, reverse osmosis water purification units, laundry, latrines, and batteries?

What are the military assistance program requirements for multinational forces?

What is the best method for providing potable water? Have the engineers, medical personnel, and other staff officers been consulted about this issue? Using bottled water has an added advantage of enhancing troop morale.

What is available in lessons learned databases for specific requirements, planning factors, and potential problem areas?

Has liaison been established with other multinational nations and civilian agencies to obtain the most up-to-date logistic information on the AO?

What are the personnel augmentation requirements and equipment needed for mission support?

Have basing rights and diplomatic clearances critical to mobility been secured?

What are intratheater capabilities and resources of civilian agencies in the AO?

What current agreements exist with other participating nations that provide for logistic support? Does this include agreements governing logistic support with representatives of other nations?

What quality controls have been established for all services and supplies such as petroleum, oils, and lubricants, water, and food? How will those controls be monitored?

What are the procedures to ensure in-transit visibility at all transportation nodes? Lack of intransit visibility causes loss of confidence in the supply system and leads to unnecessary reordering, further clogging the supply lines.

For UN operations, what standards are followed concerning support?

What is the support plan for redeployment of forces, materiel, and equipment?

What logistics infrastructure, materiel, capabilities, and equipment remain in-country for use by subsequent forces or organizations?

FUNDING

Has it been determined if, or to what extent, operational-related expenses are reimbursed from common funding or sources external to national funding by the participating nations?

Has funding been identified to defense support of civil authorities or reimbursement expenditures? What are the limits on funding authority?

What is the availability of common funding for contracting, multinational headquarters establishment, and general or common support? What are the procedures for common funding for contracting, multinational headquarters establishment, and general or common support?

What are the accounting and reimbursement procedures for services and supplies exchanged between nations? Are replacement-in-kind procedures included?

Has the probable cost of the multinational operations been determined? Is the probable cost acceptable?

What are the funding requirements for renting facilities to defense support of civil authorities?

Does the command have funding codes from all multinational nations? What methods and documentation are required to record all expenditures?

How will the command capture costs associated with supporting the multinational forces?

HOST NATION SUPPORT

Has host nation support been evaluated to determine the logistic support available? Are law enforcement, sanitation, medical services, facilities, storage, and materiel included?

What are the capabilities of existing infrastructure? Do they include water treatment plants, power stations, reservoirs, and bulk and retail fuel storage? Engineers or facility managers provide critical information on the availability of existing facilities.

Have negotiations to secure support either been established or completed?

What is the impact of obtaining host nation support on the host nation’s economy?

What are the possible environmental impacts on the host nation providing this support?

What technical agreements—such as environmental clean-up; customs duties and taxes; and hazardous material and waste storage, transit, and disposal—must be developed to augment host nation support agreements?

MAINTENANCE

Do the multinational forces have maintenance support?

Do the multinational forces have the means to order and receive repair parts?

Do the multinational forces have wreckers, stake and platform trailers, or heavy equipment transporters?

Do the multinational forces have communications repair facilities?

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE

What infrastructure exists for assisting multinational forces to counter low-level radiation or toxic industrial chemical hazards such as medical treatment facilities or detection equipment supply houses? (Are U.S. policy and guidelines acceptable to other nations if none exist?)

Is the necessary CBRNE protection, detection, and reconnaissance equipment available to troops to counter the threat?

Are adequate theater stocks of chemical overgarments available?

What plans exist to protect and train locally hired civilians against weapons of mass destruction threats?

TRANSPORTATION

What is the multinational transportation command structure?

What are the available multinational air and sea lines of communication?

What are assigned airlift and sealift capabilities and allocations? Are the requirements to support both military and civilian agencies included?

What are the requirements for and capabilities, limitations, and availability of airfields, seaports, and inland transportation systems in the departure, intermediate staging, and objective areas? What resources are required for new construction or necessary improvements to existing facilities?

What is the multinational reception, staging, onward movement, and integration process?

What is the ability of the host nation to receive personnel and equipment at ports and airfields?

What are the access rights in the AO? The command must coordinate diplomatic efforts to arrange for—

Support, country, and diplomatic clearances.

Over-flight rights.

Basing for forces in transit from one locality to another.

What is the capability of transportation systems to move forces once they arrive in the theater of operations?

Do multinational forces have tactical rotary- and fixed-wing assets for intratheater supply?

Who supplies transportation supply throughput from the multinational logistics center for multinational forces?

Do multinational forces have transportation assets for moving troops?

How will the command control movement into and out of airfields and seaports?

How will transportation facilities be shared with civilian agencies and contractors?

Is rail a feasible transportation method? If so, can rail cars transport tactical equipment (tanks)?

Are the railhead facilities usable?

Are there sufficient on/off load capabilities?

What are the security requirements for rail transport by the multinational force or host nation?

Will non-tactical vehicles be needed for the operations? If so, how many and what types (SUVs, vans, sedans, buses)?

Will non-tactical vehicles be contracted or provided by the host nation or other multinational force?

Will there be other transportation requirements based on mission location, weather, or lack of transportation infrastructure?

MANNING AND EQUIPPING

Have deploying units provided planning numbers of deploying forces?

Have deploying units provided planning numbers of deploying equipment, types of containers, and number of containers?

Chapter 7

Inform and Influence Challenges in Multinational Operations

This chapter discusses the information environment in multinational operations. A checklist is available for commanders and staffs at the end of the chapter.

INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

7-1. The information environment consists of three interrelated dimensions, which interact with individuals, organizations, and systems. These dimensions are physical, informational, and cognitive. The physical dimension includes command and control systems, key decisionmakers, and supporting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to create effects. The informational dimension specifies where and how information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and protected. The cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of those who transmit, receive, and respond to or act on information. (See JP 3-13 for more information.)

7-2. In multinational operations, the information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13). The information environment evolves with the information and revolution that includes the Internet and mobile telephone and has ushered in the age of computer-based decisionmaking. The evolving information revolution includes information, actors, and systems that enable using information. The actors include leaders, decisionmakers, individuals, and organizations. Information systems include the materials and systems employed to collect, apply, or disseminate information. Information operations is the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13). North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines information operations as a military function to provide advice and coordinate military information activities to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other North Atlantic Council approved parties to support alliance mission objectives. The joint and multinational communities continue to use the term information operations.

7-3. The joint construct for conducting information operations is the information-influence relational framework. The framework describes the application, integration, and synchronization of information-related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decisionmaking of target audiences to create a desired effect to support achievement of an objective. An information-related capability is a tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions (JP 3-13). These tools are applied through three interrelated activity areas. These activity areas are—

Information activities that focus on changing, influencing, or reinforcing perceptions and attitudes of adversaries and other North Atlantic Council approved parties.

Information activities that focus on preserving and protecting alliance freedom of maneuver in the information environment by defending the data and information that supports alliance decisionmakers and decisionmaking.

Information activities that focus on countering command functions and capabilities by affecting the data and information that support adversaries and other North Atlantic Council approved parties and are used in command and control, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition and weapons systems.

7-4. Information-related capabilities (as described in JP 3-13 and FM 3-13) are similar to the capabilities, tools, and techniques in allied joint doctrine:

Psychological operations.

Presence, posture, and profile.

Operations security.

Information security.

Deception.

Electronic warfare.

Physical destruction.

Key leader engagement.

Computer network operations (computer network attack, a computer network exploitation, or computer network defense).

CIVIL MILITARY COOPERATION

7-5. Multinational force commanders know that each member state has diverse concepts, doctrine, procedures, and capabilities on information operations. The multinational force commander resolves potential conflicts and integrates an achievable information operations strategy. (See JP 3-13 for more information.) Multinational partners augment the joint force staff with information operations planners and information-related capabilities subject matter experts to accommodate their information operations requirements.

INFORMATION COORDINATION PROCESS

7-6. The Joint staff coordinates U.S. positions on information operations matters delegated to them as a matter of law or policy and discusses them bilaterally, or in multinational organizations, to achieve interoperability and compatibility in fulfilling common requirements. Direct discussions regarding multinational information operations planning in specific theaters are the responsibility of the geographic combatant commander. (See JP 3-13 for more information.)

7-7. To achieve success and meet the commanders’ objectives, information operations must be fully integrated and coordinated with all other joint force actions. To create the desired effects, a coherent and synchronized approach among headquarters, adjacent and subordinate commands, and the strategic-political level must be achieved. One of the keys to success is through coordination of information objectives and related military actions from the strategic to the tactical level. Commanders ensure that any information activities likely to affect their areas is implemented with prior coordination and notification. (See AJP 3-10 for more information.) Information operations is effective through the headquarters coordination processes using an information operations coordination board. (See AJP 3-10 for more information on the information coordination board.)

7-8. When the staff prepares the plans, it includes Army information tasks. The staff plans consider the impact public opinion has on policymakers. Public affairs is considered a function that promotes military aims and objectives to audiences that enhance awareness and understanding of military aspects of the alliance. The public affairs and information operations staff work closely together to deliver a coordinated message to the intended audiences. (See AJP 3-10 for more information.) Public affairs is considered a related function of information operations.

CHECKLIST

7-9. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to Army information tasks.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

How is information released among the multinational partners?

How does each multinational nation view population, neutrals, adversaries, and civilians?

What is the multinational members’ understanding of information in the global security environment?

What is the multinational members’ understanding of the national information environment? Is it accessible to the other multinational members?

What do multinational members understand about the information environment?

What is the multinational member’s definition of information operations?

How does each of the multinational members manage information? Is the process open to other multinational members?

What threats to information operations are common to all the multinational members? What threats to information operations are specific to any one army?

What common solutions are applied across armies to negate the threats to information operations?

What mission essential task lists must be modified to accommodate multinational Army information operations?

What is the guidance (for example, types of information, level of detail, and approved audience) on releasing information to multinational partners?

What is the process for obtaining authorization to release information to multinational partners?

COMMANDER

How do commanders examine the vulnerability of their Soldiers and systems to an exploitation or attack by an adversary capable of employing electronic warfare, physical destruction, military deception, and propaganda?

Does the commander’s intent and concept of the operations provide sufficient guidance for information operations planning?

Are assessments continuously monitoring and evaluating current situations towards the desired end state?

STAFF ORGANIZATION

Does the information operations cell or some other staff element contribute to planning, preparing, and executing the inform and influence activities portion of the plan?

How does the commander provide guidance concerning information operations during planning?

Are the elements of information operations deconflicted?

Are inform and influence activities annexes reviewed for compliance with rules of engagement (ROE) and other legal restrictions?

How are the commander’s critical information requirements integrated into the collection plan?

What are the roles and responsibilities of the information operations element staff members in planning and conducting information operations?

Do information operations cell personnel understand planning? Do they employ effective and efficient models and tools?

Do multinational members use an information operations coordinator?

Does the table of organization and equipment of multinational members require augmentation to perform its information operations mission?

Does the G-7 inform and influence cell accomplish the following tasks?

Focus the commander’s intent to inform and influence.

Establish information operations priorities to accomplish planned objectives.

Determine the availability of information operation resources to carry out information operation actions.

Synchronize, coordinate, and deconflict information operations.

Integrate information operations into the operation plan.

Recommend tasking to the G-3 for the assets needed to execute information operations.

Nominate targets (lethal/non-lethal) for physical destruction to the targeting meeting.

Publish the inform and influence appendix to an operation plan or operation order.

Coordinate information operations input into an operation plan or operation order.

Coordinate intelligence support from the all source intelligence cell.

Ensure that a solution is provided to the command to reverse information operation vulnerabilities.

Chapter 8

Protection in a Multinational Environment

This chapter begins by providing a multinational force protection overview and discussing asymmetric threats and the potential for fratricide. It then discusses the protection principles for commanders, concept for protection, and constituents of protection. Lastly, the chapter discusses protection and mission command and provides a checklist for commanders and staffs.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE PROTECTION OVERVIEW

8-1. In a multinational environment, philosophies of protection vary and national policies dictate the degree of risk that a contingent assumes. The nations coordinate at the earliest opportunity to ensure cohesion. The multinational commander develops and coordinates protection guidelines for the force as a whole. Effective protection makes the command more credible as a multinational force. Within each national unit, national commanders conduct protection for some nations according to their own national concepts and multinational guidelines.

ASYMMETRIC THREATS

8-2. Protection minimizes, as far as is practical, the threat from information operations components overhead attack systems, weapons of mass destruction, and environmental hazards to sustaining operations. In addition to attacks by conventional forces, irregular forces frequently threaten to attack. This is indigenous or from a third party. It could manifest itself in a number of ways—from guerrilla and terrorist action to civil disturbance. Such activity is the main threat in stability tasks. Protection keeps the force from these attacks. Protection also reduces the civil population’s interference with operations. This minimizes casualties and reduces the loss of materiel. It also allows the commander to concentrate on the mission. Using information tasks provides valuable security and aids protection activities.

POTENTIAL FOR FRATRICIDE

8-3. A significant problem facing multinational force commanders is the potential for fratricide. Different operational procedures and languages compound this risk. Commanders make every effort to reduce fratricide. They know what situations increase the risk of fratricide and work with other multinational forces to institute appropriate preventative measures. The measures include—

Command emphasis.

Awareness.

Target identification.

Disciplined operations.

Close coordination with multinational operational staff.

Rehearsals.

Enhanced situational understanding.

Liaison officers to assess the fratricide risk and recommend potential solutions.

8-4. Antifratricide measures are included in the command’s standard operating procedures and other directives. The command coordinates these measures with other multinational forces to ensure that all forces understand and follow these measures.

PROTECTION PRINCIPLES FOR COMMANDERS

8-5. Five protection principles are common for national, multinational, and subordinate commanders:

Threat assessment.

Risk management.

Joint and multinational focus.

Prioritization.

Flexibility.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

8-6. A threat assessment, in antiterrorism, is examining the capabilities, intentions, and activities, past and present, of terrorist organizations as well as the security environment within which friendly forces operate to determine the level of threat (JP 3-07.2). A threat assessment based on accurate and timely all-source intelligence must be conducted as the basis for selecting protection measures.

RISK MANAGEMENT

8-7. Risk management is important to mission command. It provides leaders at all levels the freedom of action to seize the initiative and operate in a well-defined parameter consistent with commander’s intent. As the central figure in mission command, the commander uses risk management to identify threats, hazards and risk levels. This allows commanders to make informed decisions on risk acceptance and mitigation, and the level of risk they can allow subordinate leaders to accept. Risk management allows leaders to react to situational changes while managing chaos and uncertainty. Ultimately, the authority to accept risk lies with the commander. Risk management is a compatible decisionmaking process. Risk management provides the standardized means to identify, assess, and control hazards and their potential impact on operations. Risk management further provides a standard to define and communicate the potential impact of hazards in terms of potential loss compared to potential gain. (See FM 5-19 for additional information.) The multinational commander ensures all nations are involved.

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL FOCUS

8-8. Protection embraces all force components, joint and multinational, in the area of operations (AO). It addresses all aspects of the threat.

PRIORITIZATION

8-9. Although protection embraces the whole force, protecting all elements to the same degree probably will not exist. Priority is given to centers of gravity. These centers of gravity are tangible and include intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance assets or sustainment. Multinational cohesion or political will as influenced by public opinion is intangible.

FLEXIBILITY

8-10. The protection policy and measures must be flexible and capable of responding to a rapidly changing threat.

CONCEPT OF PROTECTION

8-11. Protection is not an issue addressed separately or in isolation. It is important to operations and incorporated into the multinational force commander’s plan from the beginning. Commanders stress the importance of protection in their estimate and directive to subordinates. The lead nation headquarters negotiates with national command elements to arrive at protection measures that satisfy national political imperatives, the multinational commander’s intent, and the ability of the force to act cohesively. Mission analysis by subordinates includes protection and incorporates the guidance given in the multinational force commander’s directive.

8-12. Protection is a risk management process as shown in figure 8-1. By producing an accurate and comprehensive threat assessment and covering all the principles covered in the principles for commanders, the staff produces an initial set of measures that address the actual threat. Protection measures are offensive or defensive. The proposed measures balance against the commander’s mission and operational requirements. The measures are tempered in application by risk management. For example, measures that perceived as aggressive, such as patrolling in armored vehicles or hard targeting, impairs a force’s mission in many peace operations environments.

8-13. The lead nation headquarters distributes the final selection of protection measures in an annex to the operation order. Implementing some measures are not force wide. The threat, particularly in stability tasks, is not uniform and is subject to frequent review and change. Subordinate commanders, in consultation with the multinational force commander, implements additional local measures.

8-14. The threat assessment is continual. As the situation changes or new intelligence is received, the staff reviews protection measures and adapts them to the new situation. As part of mission command, subordinate commanders perform local reviews. The lead nation headquarters continue to coordinate protection.

NONMILITARY AGENCIES AND REQUEST FOR PROTECTION

8-15. Nonmilitary agencies request some form of protection from the military, contractors, or host nations. Threats are not always transparent, so these agencies help identify them. The protection afforded to these agencies enhances military credibility and provides the multinational force with an opportunity to advance a cooperative environment. However, the protection provided must be in proportion to mission requirements.

CONSTITUENTS OF PROTECTION

8-16. There are two constituents of protection—balanced threat assessment and derived protection measures. Together these two constituents provide collective security of the multinational force.

BALANCED THREAT ASSESSMENT

8-17. Protection is based on the threat assessment. The results of the assessment determine the measures that address collective protection, security, and health and safety. Overprotection, to counter an improbable threat, diverts scarce resources from accomplishing the mission. As part of planning, the national authorities perform a threat assessment. The national authorities provide political guidance on the priority that avoids casualties. Varying intents, threats, and capabilities are in the threat assessment where multiple adversaries exist. An overall assessment of protection requirements based on this threat assessment is incorporated into the national military directive. The checklist in chapter 2 gives examples of the content for a threat assessment. It includes the following:

The lead nation’s national assessment. This provides the basis for the multinational force commander’s visualization and directive. It also provides a start point for negotiations with the other troop-contributing nations.

National or local assessments. These reveal a threat to the civilian population of troop-contributing nations or their forces in other theaters of operation. These assessments include nonviolent activities such as military information support operations (MISO) and other associated tactics aimed at influencing international perceptions. Countering such threats is a national responsibility.

DERIVED PROTECTION MEASURES

8-18. Following the threat assessment, commanders decide on appropriate protective measures. The threat assessment also informs targeting. Attack is the only form of defense against certain threats. Protection includes those elements, normally the responsibility of the lead nation headquarters, which protect the whole force. Responsibility for this is delegated to subordinate commanders. Protection measures fall under several broad categories:

Theater of operations missile defense.

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) defense.

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).

Air defense.

Information operations.

Countersurveillance.

Sustainment protection.

Physical protection (equipment and standards).

Traffic regulation.

Counterfratricide.

Security.

Space control.

8-19. Within an American-led multinational force, the U.S. provides theater of operations missile defense. Multinationals without U.S. coverage rely on destroying surface-to-surface missiles and ground launchers and prevent the enemy from neutralizing or destroying their associated command and control structures.

8-20. The threat assessment determines the need to deploy specialist CBRNE assets and additional medical resources.

8-21. The multinational force air component commander, who also serves as the area air defense command and airspace control authority, coordinates air defense including offensive and defensive operations for the multinational force. The functions and responsibilities of this commander, the airspace control authority, and the area air defense commander must be integrated to unite joint air operations, airspace control, missile detection and warning, and air defense operations to support the multinational plan.

8-22. Information operations must be related to protecting the integrity and capability of the force. These operations must also physically protect the headquarters and communications assets, particularly isolated communications outstations. There are measures in the nation or the multinational force. These measures include—

Physical destruction.

Electronic warfare.

MISO, operations security, and deception that falls in an information operations or mission command warfare plan.

Computer network operations.

8-23. Effective countersurveillance protects all force elements by making it harder to target the location and friendly forces. Countersurveillance measures are part of each formation’s standard operating procedures, but direction comes from the lead nation headquarters via the subordinate commanders. All direction is based on the adversary’s intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance capability from the threat assessment.

8-24. Sustainment units require protection in warfighting. Units lack a self-defense capability against anything other than small-scale infantry attacks. The threat assessment determines the likely level, scale, and warning time for attacks on sustainment units. This determines allocation of additional forces to the sustainment area commander, multinational force logistics commander, or both. Sustainment units have to decrement mission assets (such as converting cargo-carrying trucks to gun trucks) to augment protection forces.

8-25. The physical protection of the force has three aspects—structures, vehicles, and individuals. Engineers are responsible for field defenses. National authorities make decisions on additional armor protection and other vehicle modifications. The commander’s decisions are implemented before deployment or arrival in the theater of operations. The subordinate commanders control some personal equipment, such as general-purpose laser goggles and fragmentation vests, in lead nation headquarters guidelines. The commander delegates decisions on protective dress policy to subordinate commanders.

8-26. Military police provide a wide array of functions and capabilities during multinational operations. Military police are specifically trained to—

Interact with local police authorities where appropriate.

Advise on, implement, and enforce main supply route regulations.

Provide a visible protection presence in built-up areas.

Provide vital information on criminal and threat forces.

Conduct dislocated civilian and refugee operations with assistance from civil affairs and MISO units.

8-27. A counterfratricide policy covers operational awareness at all levels, weapons-tight zones, use of liaison, coordination between adjacent units, and combat identification. The lead nation headquarters formulates and coordinates this policy.

8-28. Security covers the physical and procedural measures, directed at lead nation headquarters level and integrated into the overall plan, but mainly applied at the local level. Security minimizes direct and indirect attacks on personnel, equipment, installations, and line of communication by other than the adversary’s main forces. In stability tasks, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Article 5 Collective Defense, and peace operations, where the adversary does not possess an air, surface-to-surface missile, and CBRNE capability, security is the main constituent of protection. Some security measures affect the civilian population. Such measures are subject to appropriate legal advice that incorporates the requirements of international law, host nation law, and any extant status of force agreements or memorandums of understanding. Security incorporates the following:

Personnel security—to include standing physical and procedural measures to protect personnel.

Positional or installation security—including physical and procedural measures to protect positions or installations from attack, sabotage, and theft.

Line of communication defense—including patrols, mine clearance, overwatch, and bridge guards that ensure safe and secure lines of communication.

Security of information—including physical and procedural barriers to protect friendly information.

Liaison with host nation security forces. The host nation security forces retain some operational capability and liaison is vital to coordinate actions. In some cases, host nation security forces have primacy. In nearly all cases, they provide intelligence and other related information about conditions in the theater of operations.

Individual national EOD protection support provides different capabilities; therefore, a single combined joint EOD cell must be established in the top level headquarters of combined joint task force headquarters. The combined joint EOD cell is the focal point for the combined joint task force headquarters for all EOD matters. While the combined joint EOD cell does not have a tasking function for EOD tasks, it is responsible for coordinating EOD matters with troop-contributing nations and other organizations. An example is the United Nations (UN). The broad roles of the combined joint EOD cell are to—

Develop, implement, and maintain the policies that define EOD operations.

Coordinate the passage of all forms of relevant EOD intelligence and information.

Coordinate EOD effort in the AO.

Write and continually revise and publish theater specific operating standards and procedures.

Population controls—including curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of villagers.

Prisoners of war and detainees—to include providing secure accommodations and guard forces to contain prisoners of war and detainees.

Health defense that aims to minimize casualties from disease and environmental hazards. Some examples are pollution, poor sanitation, and climatic extremes. The health defense incorporates the following:

Proactive measures—including vaccination against endemic and biological warfare pathogens, acclimatization, medical surveillance, and clinical presentations.

Health education—to include advising personnel on prevalence of, and measures to prevent, endemic and sexually transmitted diseases; measures to prevent casualties from climatic extremes; and measures to prevent transmission of biological warfare agents and persistent or residual chemical and radioactive agents.

Local environment advice—including dangerous wildlife, hazardous terrain, and industrial and other pollution hazards.

Mine defense—including mine, unexploded explosive ordnance, improvised explosive device, and booby traps marking; clearing and awareness; and out of bounds areas. This requires the establishment of a mine and unexploded explosive ordnance action center. These centers track mine, unexploded explosive ordnance, and booby trap hazards resulting from previous combat.

PROTECTION AND MISSION COMMAND

8-29. Protection is cyclical. It assesses the threat and prescribes appropriate measures to reduce the vulnerabilities at risk from elements of that threat. It is not a separate staff function, but an implicit part of the operation plan. Multinational force construction addresses the required elements or components of protection and their mission command functions to implement the plan. All these elements are brought together for single coordination at senior J-3 staff level with joint coherence. As with all other aspects of military operations, responsibility for protection rests with the multinational force commander. Nevertheless, the chief of staff coordinates with the J-3 to exercise day-to-day responsibility for protection. The multinational commander establishes a multinational operational protection coordination center under the staff supervision of chief of staff to coordinate protection issues for the multinational force and with the host government.

8-30. If the threat to sustaining operations is anything other than low, and particularly if adversary main forces threaten sustaining operations, then the multinational force commander appoints a sustaining operations coordinator separate from the force logistics headquarters.

CHECKLIST

8-31. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following question with respect to the protection portion of the operation.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

Has a threat assessment been carried out?

Has the lead nation headquarters coordinated protection measures for the multinational force?

Has the mission, including the commander’s intent, been disseminated? Do elements two echelons down understand it?

Who is the designated staff officer for protection at the lead nation headquarters and subordinate headquarters?

What does protection mean to each nation in the multinational operations?

Do the rules of engagement (ROE) support protection?

What are the force’s antifratricide measures?

Do commanders at all levels understand how to apply risk management?

Will any formation be needed to carry out a local threat assessment?

Are countersurveillance measures included in formation standard operating procedures?

What nonlethal technology is available? How is the force trained to use it? Do the ROE authorize its employment?

What controls exist on using personal equipment?

What units are available to the command and when are they available?

What are the multinational airspace control measures?

What training is required once deployed?

Has a MISO program been developed to support the operation?

Have MISO assets been requested?

What multinational space control assets are available?

Has a computer network operations plan been developed to support the operation?

Have computer network operations assets been requested?

Has a vulnerability assessment been made of friendly high value facilities?

Has a multinational operation protection coordination center been established?

Are there sufficient military police or similar forces available for area and route security in the AO?

GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE FORCE PLANNING

8-32. The Army air defense artillery protects the force from enemy interference from the air. This checklist assumes that the multinational air force has not neutralized a credible air threat.

Stability tasks and peace operations may not have a credible air threat. If that is the case, is there a real need for ground-based air defense?

Which ground-based air defense package does the war fighting, low to high intensity conflict, require?

What is the multinational force structure?

What maritime and air assets will support the multinational force?

What is the desired ground-based air defense coverage for early entry forces?

What is the desired order of arrival of ground-based air defense assets?

What is the commander’s intent?

What is the multinational command structure for ground-based air defense?

What airspace control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and UAS use?

Is there a requirement for a multinational airspace management cell at division or force level?

What will be the command relationships for ground-based air defense assets in operational control versus tactical control situations?

What national sensitivities exist concerning the use of national ground-based air defense assets?

What international procedures will apply during the operations—for example, NATO or American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies’ Program?

What national ground-based air defense command arrangements are required to support the multinational command structure?

What are the national requirements for liaison officers?

Will there be a multinational ground-based air defense command and control information system? If not, how will national systems such as forward area air defense; command, control, communications, and intelligence; and air defense communication and information systems be integrated?

What multinational bearer communications system will be used? (Examples include mobile subscriber equipment.)

Will the low-level air picture interface be used?

What are the multinational real estate procedures for ground-based air defense assets?

What battlefield coordination detachment requirements are available to coordinate land component commander requirements in the air operations center?

Intelligence

Has a multinational intelligence preparation of the operational environment, including air intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and estimate process been performed? What factors were deduced by the multinational force headquarters?

Is there a multinational geospatial database to help define likely air avenues of approach and, consequently, the ground-based air defense deployment plan?

What multinational force assets will need protection—seaport of disembarkation, aerial port of disembarkation, lines of communication, force logistic areas, force concentration area, forward operations area, or a combination of these?

AIRSPACE CONTROL SYSTEM

Will the joint force air component commander concept be employed by the multinational force? If so, who is the multinational air component commander and where is this individual located?

Will the multinational air component commander produce the airspace control plan, the airspace coordination order, and the air tasking order and act as the airspace control authority for the operation? If not, who will?

What interface will there be with the host nation civil aviation authority before the commencement of hostilities?

Where will the combined air operations center for the force be located?

Will the airspace control system aim for positive control or will national ground-based air defense mission command limitations force it back to procedural control?

SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

What type of recognized air picture and local air picture system is available?

Will there be a recognized air picture?

How will maritime, land, air, and space units contribute to it?

What tactical data link system will be used?

Who will be the identification authority for the recognized air picture (multinational air operations center or sector operations center)?

Who will be the identification authority for situational understanding?

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

What will be the multinational ROE before hostilities and after committing the first hostile act?

Will the policy on preemptive air strikes be contained in the multinational ROE?

Who will define weapon control statuses such as weapons free, weapons tight, and weapons hold?

What mechanism will exist to update ROE during the operation?

IDENTIFICATION, FRIEND OR FOE

What identification, friend or foe systems will be used?

What identification, friend or foe types are fitted to ground-based air defense systems?

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

What electronic countermeasure policy will be put in place by the force J6?

Does the electronic countermeasure policy minimize potential suppression of enemy air defenses against the force ground-based air defense assets?

LOGISTICS

What major equipment will multinational partners bring to the theater of operations?

What is the logistic structure?

What arrangements will be in place for multinational resupply of common ammunition?

What is the multinational policy on the scale of war reserve ground-based air defense systems by equipment type?

What is the intratheater repair policy? What mutual support is planned for common equipment?

TRAINING

Where will training occur—at home, en route to operation, or in concentration area? When will training occur?

Will intratheater ranges be available?

What will be the policy on test firing weapon systems intratheater?

What part will simulators play in the transition to war training strategy?

What collective training will occur?

EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS

What types of explosive hazards have been used in the AO?

Are there existing mine field maps and/or assessments of the types of mines and patterns used?

What types of cluster munitions were used and what are their locations?

What types of booby traps and improvised explosive devices have been or are anticipated to be used in the AO?

Is there an ongoing humanitarian demining program in the AO?

What EOD assets are available in the AO to respond to these threats?

What engineer area clearance assets are available in the AO?

Chapter 9

Civil Affairs Operations

This chapter begins by discussing civil-military cooperation and the purpose of civil affairs operations; the cooperation, functions, and guidelines of civil affairs operations; and principles in civil affairs operations. It also discusses civil affairs operations’ legal parameters and key factors. The chapter then discusses key civil affairs operations and principles of humanitarian action; civil organizations, government, and military relationships; and organizational structure. Lastly, it discusses the military support to the civilian community and military planning in civil affairs operations. This chapter also provides a checklist for commanders and staffs.

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

9-1. As with many areas discussed in this manual, civil affairs operations, stability tasks, or civil-military cooperation does not have a single doctrinal focus that all the nations share. (Civil-military cooperation is the more commonly used term in the multinational community.) For example, some nations see civil affairs operations as supporting the commander’s mission. Others believe that civil military cooperation has a wider scope because it supports the commander’s mission as it helps the military troops play their part in a wider response to a crisis. For those latter nations, civil affairs operations funding comes from other government departments rather than from their defense establishment. Therefore, civil affairs operations for those nations does not support the military mission alone.

9-2. Civil affairs operations allow the commander to interface effectively with all parts of the civilian environment in the joint operations area. Civil affairs operations include performance by military forces of activities and functions that are the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities and functions also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.

9-3. Civil affairs operations is a function of operations performed by staffs fully integrated into headquarters at every level. Civil military cooperation activity begins at the highest political levels, becomes integrated into the campaign plan, and remains coherent at all operational levels. Civil military cooperation contributes to achieving the overall political mission and the commander’s mission.

9-4. The campaign plan, as agreed by all multinational partners, will—

Direct the commander on the legal obligations to the civilian sector.

Prioritize the major tasks.

Provide the necessary funding.

Ensure consistency across zones of national responsibility in the joint operations area.

Outline the relationships with the strategic decisionmakers.

9-5. Commanders consider the civil affairs operations dimension of the operation early in planning.

PURPOSE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

9-6. The purpose of civil affairs operations is to—

Minimize civilian interference with military operations.

Maximize support for operations.

Meet the commander’s legal responsibilities and moral obligations to civilian populations in the commander’s area of control.

9-7. When possible, a second purpose is to reduce military interference with the civilian populace. This helps create civil-military conditions that maximize advantages for commanders to accomplish their missions. The long-term purpose of civil affairs operations is to accomplish the mission and create and sustain the conditions to support a lasting solution to a crisis. Civil affairs operations is the interface between military and civil authorities, agencies, and populations. It is integral to any military operation.

DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

9-8. Many multinational armies adopted different terminology as this area has developed. The Army uses civil affairs operations while NATO and American, British, Canadian, and Australian and New Zealand Armies Program use civil-military cooperation. The following explains the relationship between U.S. and NATO terminology:

The U.S. term civil affairs is most closely related to the NATO term civil-military cooperation groups.

The U.S. term civil affairs operations refers to the actions of civil affairs personnel. It is related to the NATO term civil-military cooperation.

The U.S. term civil-military operations center is related to the NATO term civil-military cooperation center.

COOPERATION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

9-9. Establishing and maintaining working relationships with organizations operating in the civil sector is fundamental to successful multinational civil affairs operations. These relationships range from high-level interorganizational to less formal relations that stem from ongoing working interactions. These relationships form effective cooperation with interorganization.

9-10. It is not practicable or necessary for all civil agencies to have the same degree of cooperation. Many mechanisms and activities support this process. These include general liaison, regular meetings, and standing for an agency collaboratively staffed by both civil and military representatives. These mechanisms and activities facilitate various levels of cooperation ranging from information sharing to integrated planning.

FUNCTIONS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

9-11. The headquarters of civil affairs operations staff carry out the following core functions:

Civil-military liaison.

Support to the civil environment.

Support to the force.

CIVIL-MILITARY LIAISON

9-12. This liaison facilitates and supports the planning and conduct of operations. Such liaison early in planning and immediately following the deployment of forces provides the basis for the other two core civil affairs operations functions.

SUPPORT TO CIVIL ENVIRONMENT

9-13. Support to the civil environment involves a wide range of military resources: information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communication facilities, specialist expertise, or training. Staff at the highest level make decisions on depth, duration, and extent of this support. Decisions include political, military, and civil factors. Nations have different national agendas as to their extent, type, and purpose of support to the civil environment. The multinational commander understands these positions.

SUPPORT TO THE FORCE

9-14. Commanders, depending on the circumstances at the time, require significant civilian support in the joint operations area. They also require coordination of efforts to minimize disruption to military operations such as population and resources control operations. The force is partially dependent on civilian resources and information from civilian sources. Commanders seek tacit civilian support for operations.

GUIDELINES OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

9-15. Civil affairs operations implies neither military control of civilian organizations or agencies. It recognizes that—

The military is only responsible for security related tasks and limited logistics, communication, or other support. It is possible to support the appropriate civil authority for implementing civil tasks. However, this is possible only if the mandated civil authorities, if applicable, and the appropriate military commander agrees according to the campaign plan.

In exceptional circumstances subject to political sanction by the governments of troop-contributing nations, the force takes on tasks normally the responsibility of a mandated civil authority. This involves civil administration operations.

These tasks are only accepted where the appropriate civil body is not present or is unable to carry out its mandate.

The military undertakes tasks necessary to maintain momentum towards a lasting solution to a crisis until the mandated civil authority or agency is prepared and able to assume them.

Responsibility for civil related tasks are handed over to the appropriate civil authority, organization, or agency as soon as is practical. Responsibility is handed over as smooth as possible.

PRINCIPLES IN CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

9-16. The following principles help multinational forces in conducting civil affairs operations:

Coordination.

Unity of effort.

Impact minimizing.

Impartiality.

Transparency.

Common goals identification.

Primacy of the military mission.

Economy of effort.

Relationships.

COORDINATION

9-17. Civil affairs operations is a key strand of the overall operational plan and not an activity apart. It requires close coordination with other military capabilities and actions. It creates interfaces with the civil environment necessary for the performance of other functions such as host nation support or engineering activities.

UNITY OF EFFORT

9-18. Unity of effort is essential to achieve effective civil affairs operations. Activities in the theater of operations have central direction, are closely coordinated, and are deconflicted without prejudicing the needs of lower levels of command where necessary. Commanders establish explicit policies and procedures to specify what subordinate commanders can do and what must first be coordinated with higher headquarters.

IMPACT MINIMIZING

9-19. Commanders minimize the military impact on the civil environment and minimize the civil environment impact on military operations. The military requires access to local civilian resources. In such circumstances, commanders avoid adversely impacting local populations, economies, or infrastructure.

9-20. The military takes on civil tasks only—

Where no other practical solution exists.

Where an otherwise unacceptable vacuum would arise.

Where it has the available resources.

9-21. Creating a “dependency culture” is likely to prejudice the successful achievement of the overall mission. Responsibility for civil related tasks goes to the civil sector as quickly as possible. Likewise, every effort is made to reduce the civil environment impact on military operations. An example of this includes how dislocated civilians impact the main routes to provide supply and relief aid. This requires careful planning.

IMPARTIALITY

9-22. Neutrality is a principle for nongovernmental organizations, not military forces seeking a specific outcome. Supportive or compliant populations are favored and non-compliant populations are not rewarded. Every practical effort is made to avoid compromising the neutrality of civil humanitarian agencies. This is often difficult, but commanders and staffs are sensitive to the issue and exercise their professional judgment. The ethical behavior and the appearance of ethical decisions by U.S. forces demonstrate impartiality.

TRANSPERENCY

9-23. Transparency in all civil affairs operations activities is the best way to minimize potential tension. Tension in a civil military relationship is detrimental to the overall goal.

COMMON GOALS IDENTIFICATION

9-24. Military and civilian organizations identify and share common goals to maximize the effectiveness of civil affairs operations. Organizations establish these goals early in planning and incorporate political guidance.

PRIMACY OF THE MILITARY MISSION

9-25. Ideally, no conflict exists between military objectives and those of most of the civilian organizations working in the joint operations area. Only the commander decides how much to commit military resources to civil affairs operations tasks. Additional tasks are not assumed without assessing the resources in coordination with civilian agencies and prioritizing military tasks.

ECONOMY OF EFFORT

9-26. Commanders minimize the use of military assets in civil tasks and encourage maximum use of civil resources. Equally, commanders do not create long-term civilian dependence on military resources by the local population, government, intergovernmental organizations, or nongovernmental organizations. Once provided, withdrawing or reducing resources strains civil relations or slows the growth of civil-military relations. Also, withdrawing or reducing resources causes lasting damage to public confidence in the military force.

RELATIONSHIPS

9-27. Commanders establish close working relationships between the key military and civilian decisionmakers. These relationships help decisionmakers develop mutual respect and understanding. As the operation matures, commanders recognize the impact made with the turnover of civilian and military staff.

LEGAL PARAMETERS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

9-28. One of the key aspects of civil affairs operations is the role it plays to win the battle for moral authority and legitimacy. In this respect, military elements use legal parameters and frameworks that form the basis for civil affairs operations elements of the overall plan to win the operations for moral authority. In addition, there are significant legal issues that affect various planning factors, particularly logistics. In civil affairs operations, operations are integral to meeting the obligations that arise from the legal principle of command responsibility.

9-29. Legal parameters vary according to the type of operation and its position in unified land operations. The domestic legal restrictions that apply to coalition partners vary in the extent and nature of their involvement in civil affairs operations. Multinational partners interpret international laws applicable to all the partners differently. It is critical to continue discussions to find these differences and resolve or provide for them in operational planning where possible. Legal staffs of coalition partners develop civil affairs operations plans at the earliest opportunity.

KEY FACTORS IN CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

9-30. If an operation takes place under a United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution, then the terms of the resolution bind all UN members. Where the terms of the resolution authorize civil affairs operations activity or initiatives, the resolution takes precedence over impediments that existed arising from the law of the affected nation where operations occur. This occurs in Chapter VII (of the UN charter) operations where “all necessary means” are authorized to achieve such tasks as securing humanitarian relief activities or restoring peace and order.

9-31. Host nation laws, such as those related to customs and contracting, affect an operation to varying degrees. G-2/S-2 identifies these issues in the intelligence preparation of the operational environment when developing the civil affairs operations plan. As part of dealing with the host nation or with states hosting forward operating bases, status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) clarify issues relating to logistic activity and jurisdiction. Civil affairs operations planners know the terms of the SOFA significantly impact stability tasks center planning.

9-32. Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements among multinational partners affect logistics of civil affairs operations. These agreements materially facilitate procurement and supply standardization and streamlining. Chapter 6 discusses sustainment in detail.

9-33. Domestic law considerations for multinational partners greatly affect the activities that a particular contingent or national personnel undertakes. For example, the National Foreign Assistance Act contains certain provisions that govern national involvement in issues such as raising and training foreign police forces. These provisions affect activities that coalition partners undertake. Civil affairs planners and subordinate commanders understand these provisions before beginning an operation.

9-34. The most significant legal factor to consider in civil affairs operations is the possible application of international humanitarian law.

ADMINISTRATION IN HOSTILE OR OCCUPIED TERRITORY

9-35. Multinational, alliances, coalition forces, or nations perform civil administration activities across the range of military operations but particularly in the collapsed state context. They act on the authority of a nation, alliance, coalition of nations, or the UN. The military controls the territory under administration. In this situation, the civil affairs personnel along with the Department of State personnel, executes the functions of military or occupational government until transitioning to a viable civilian government. The occupying force has rights and obligations under international humanitarian law to ensure public order and safety and the just and effective administration of and support to a hostile or occupied territory.

9-36. The occupying force maintains an orderly administration and hands over an effective civilian administration or government as soon as possible. This occurs within its capabilities and is subject to the principle of military necessity arising from any ongoing combat or security operations. The multinational force commander analyzes military activities likely to increase tensions and those likely to facilitate and accelerate a return to civil administration or government subject to the requirements of the military situation. The commander’s analysis is important in multiethnic or multicultural environments where one or more of the parties to a conflict view the course of action as partisan.

9-37. Multinational partners have different opinions about when international humanitarian law applies. The multinational force commander centrally coordinates and monitors policy applying to civil affairs operations action under an international humanitarian law regime. Action should be taken at the outset of the operation environment to find common ground on such issues.

KEY CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS ORGANIZATIONS

9-38. Civilian organizations perform a wide range of activities encompassing humanitarian aid to include—

Human rights.

Protection of minorities, refugees, and displaced persons.

Legal assistance.

Medical care.

Reconstruction.

Agriculture.

Education, arts, and sciences.

General project funding.

9-39. Civil affairs operations staff and personnel understand the mandate, role, structure, methods, and principles of civilian organizations. Collectively, with local populations and their representatives, these staff and personnel represent the other half of the civil affairs operations equation. It is impossible to establish an effective relationship with them without this understanding.

PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION

9-40. Commanders understand the four humanitarian principles to understand the civil-military relationship. This is separate from the commanders’ requirement to understand the different roles and mandates of the various civilian organizations. The international community adopted these four principles. Most civil aid organizations base operation and humanitarian action on these principles, which include—

Humanity. Human suffering must be relieved and the dignity and other human rights of individuals and groups must be respected.

Impartiality. Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discrimination. Relief is given without regard to nationality, political or ideological beliefs, race, religion, sex, or ethnicity, but only if needs are urgent.

Neutrality. Humanitarian participants do not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious, cultural, or ideological nature at any time.

Independence. Humanitarian participants maintain the right to independence of their own actions and resist any attempts to place conditions on their actions or movements in return for cooperation with military authorities.

LEAD AGENCIES

9-41. A lead agency is the U.S. Government agency designed to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation (JP 3-08).The international community mandates a lead agency to coordinate civilian organization activities. These civilian organizations volunteer for an operation. It is normally a major UN agency such as UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Children’s Fund, or the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which is part of the UN secretariat. Specific responsibilities of a lead agency include—

Acting as a point of contact for other agencies, particularly in the areas of planning and information sharing.

Coordinating field activities to avoid duplicating effort and wasting resources.

Acting as an interface with the military at the theater level.

9-42. Often the lead agencies coordinate field activities through field offices of another agency or organization. Although the latter is from UN High Commissioner for Refugees or the World Food Programme, nongovernmental organizations such as Save the Children have filled this role in the past. Lead agencies have also contracted other intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations to implement health, food, or transportation programs or to operate refugee camps. The International Organization for Migration has assisted in these areas. The International Committee of the Red Cross performed its activities with the other agencies in this field. In such situations, nongovernmental organizations operate under legal agreements involving them as partners with the host nation government and a UN agency. The relationship between the coalition and the lead agency is critical. A memorandum of understanding between the multinational force and the lead agency is a useful to make the relationship work.

TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS

9-43. Three principal types of civilian organizations operate outside formal national government structures: intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and international and national donor organizations. Paragraphs 9-44 – 9-50 explain each type and their roles and mandates.

Intergovernmental Organizations

9-44. Intergovernmental agreements establish intergovernmental organizations and operate at the international level such as the various UN organizations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The major UN organizations involved in humanitarian relief are the—

UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

World Food Programme.

UN’s Children Fund.

International Organization for Migration.

9-45. Intergovernmental agreement did not establish the International Committee of the Red Cross. This organization is impartial, neutral, and independent. Its humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities performed by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in situations of conflict and the aftermath. The International Committee of the Red Cross has a distinct status. It fulfills a role conferred upon it by international treaties such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (and the additional protocols of 1977) to which virtually all countries in the world are party, and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement adopted by the states party to the Geneva Conventions in 1986.

Nongovernmental Organizations

9-46. Governments do not always fund nongovernmental organizations because those organizations are voluntary. Nongovernmental organizations are primarily nonprofit organizations independent of government, intergovernmental organizations, or commercial interests. While many nongovernmental organizations come to the area of operations (AO) from foreign nations, local nongovernmental organizations may also operate. A nongovernmental organization legally differs from UN agencies and other intergovernmental organizations because each writes its own charter and mission. Nongovernmental organizations fall into one of two categories:

Mandated. The lead intergovernmental organization has officially recognized mandated nongovernmental organizations in a crisis and authorized these mandated organizations to work in the affected area.

Nonmandated. A nonmandated nongovernmental organization has no official recognition or authorization and works as a private concern. An intergovernmental organization or a mandated nongovernmental organization could contract or subcontract these nongovernmental organizations. In other cases, these nonmandated nongovernmental organizations obtain funds from private enterprises and donors.

9-47. An implementing partner denotes a nongovernmental organization, local or international, mandated and contracted by a UN lead organization or other donor or intergovernmental organization to carry out work on its behalf.

9-48. The number of nongovernmental organizations and levels of sophistication are increasing. In any potential AO, there are hundreds of these organizations. A nongovernmental organization generally remains strongly independent from political control to preserve its independence and effectiveness. In many cases, the nongovernmental organization’s impartiality is a great benefit, forming the only available means of rebuilding relations when political dialogue has broken down. A nongovernmental organization is often highly professional in its field, extremely well motivated, and prepared to take physical risks in appalling conditions. Host nations will usually accredit a nongovernmental organization before it is authorized to operate in the country. However, when a nongovernmental organization is not accredited by its host nation it can create local tensions.

International and National Donor Organizations

9-49. The following international and national donor organizations are responsible for funding, monitoring, and evaluating development programs:

U.S. State Office of Population, Refugees, and Migration.

U.S. Agency for International Development.

Department for International Development (UK).

Canadian International Development Agency.

Australian Agency for International Development.

European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office.

World Bank.

9-50. These donors are present during humanitarian emergencies and work with the lead agency or with the civil administration or government.

ADDITIONAL AGENCIES

9-51. Civilian development and human rights agencies are also important.

Civilian Development Agencies

9-52. Some civilian organizations are concerned mainly with reconstruction. The civilian organizations provide technical assistance to developing countries. The United Nations Development Programme administers and coordinates most development technical assistance provided through the UN system. These agencies spend a longer time in the affected area than the military. In these cases, the civil affairs operations staff identifies any need for military involvement in reconstruction with the local government and lead agencies to enable the organizations to begin work and continue under the most favorable conditions. The reconstruction agencies allocate resources to plan and develop projects throughout the affected area based on need.

Human Rights and Democratization Agencies

9-53. The primary agencies in this area are the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, although the latter only operates in Europe. These agencies protect human rights in states where abuses are rampant. These agencies seek to instill democratic values and the rule of law at all levels of government. Additionally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has the ability to arrange for and monitor elections and coordinate programs instilling democratic institutional values.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS, GOVERNMENTS, AND THE MILITARY

9-54. Governments handle humanitarian needs in their own countries. Civil organizations establish contacts with government and local authorities to develop their activities. The military works closely with the civil organizations, national governments, local authorities, or a combination of these organizations in civil affairs operations. In some cases, the military only plays a supporting role. In other situations, civil affairs operations participation and coordination is the main focal point to establish and develop the necessary initial contacts. This type of situation occurs when no civil authority is in place, which is a common occurrence.

9-55. Military forces, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, government donors, and the UN contain their own organizational cultures characterized by national, professional, and institutional differences. The degree of involvement, liaison, and influence of each organization vary greatly depending on the situation. The various organizations have difficulty achieving cooperation and consensus due to the requirement for each one to maintain relationships on three levels:

In the field, relationships are maintained at the tactical level.

Between national parties (host government or authorized governmental body), relationships are maintained at the operational level.

For the international community and supporting donors, relationships are maintained at the strategic level.

9-56. The military commander has a legal responsibility for matters relating to the relief activities in the joint operations area where the law of occupation applies. With this responsibility comes the legal authority to regulate the activities of relief and civil agencies. A commander has this authority in operations performed under Chapter VII of the UN charter where “all necessary measures” are authorized and humanitarian assistance is part of the mandate. At all times however, the civil affairs teams conduct civil affairs operations as consultative and cooperative as far as possible.

UNDERSTANDING NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

9-57. Nongovernmental organizations are concerned with protecting civilians during conflict. These organizations become frustrated when the military cannot afford adequate protection to all civilians, particularly if there is a perception that force is being applied selectively. At times, nongovernmental organizations also feel that the military uses inappropriate tactics, techniques, or procedures to support the humanitarian mission. This compromises the organization by association.

9-58. Common problems shared by both the military and nongovernmental organizations include the following:

Working in an environment with limited or no overarching international political or strategic direction.

Operating in a very crowded operational theater where little or no infrastructure exists to support operations.

Making difficult moral choices.

Experiencing frustration over an inability to fix serious problems.

Ensuring the safety of their personnel.

Competing for local resources.

9-59. The military and nongovernmental organizations often see each other from their own perspectives. They have been distilled from expert commentators who state that relationships between the parties are based on mutual respect and understanding. Many nongovernmental organizations have considerable resources that support the mission and avoid creating any long-term dependency on the military forces.

9-60. The military views itself as a structured and well-resourced organization with a good understanding of the large political picture. The military also believes its presence is the only means of stopping the violence and this sets the conditions for ending the crisis. The nongovernmental organization sees the military as politically compromised and not neutral, deployed on a basis of strategic interests rather than humanitarian need with hidden political and economic interests, and using mandates viewed as restrictive or narrowly interpreted. The military views protection as the first priority and does not develop the competence of the local public security structures. The nongovernmental organization believes the military is unable to understand the local cultural context and can be confrontational. The civil-military operations center is a one-way communication, military to civilian, peripheral to military decisionmaking, and has limited information to share. The presence of the military in an area brings with it the perception of corruption, trafficking, and prostitution with the potential to compromise humanitarian aid.

9-61. The nongovernmental organization community emphasizes its self-mandating and idealistic view. Nongovernmental organizations believe they are efficient and close to the civilians and represent them. The military attitude toward nongovernmental organizations may be that some are highly competitive and self interested and unable to speak with one voice or through one forum. Nongovernmental organizations are viewed as lacking discipline with no understanding of the broader issues. They are also seen as opportunistic rather than principled, sometimes wasteful and amateurish, playing with danger, and lacking in cultural sensitivity applying what is perceived as simplistic (inadequate) fixes to complex problems. The mere presence of nongovernmental organizations also involves them in a conflict, notwithstanding a self-view or mandate of impartiality and neutrality.

SECURITY

9-62. Security adds complexity to the military-civil relationships in peace operations. There are many nongovernmental organization players and no one speaks for them all. Nongovernmental organizations believe that the military should not be seen as the sole authority in security management. Most nongovernmental organizations have security plans and processes. The military characterizes these plans and processes as poor quality and lacking drill and discipline. In certain circumstances, nongovernmental organizations use the military for emergency rescues on an opportunistic basis. Nongovernmental organizations develop more competence in security management due to the rapid increase in security incidents in the 1990s. As a result of these security incidents, there were casualties in most danger zones where aid workers were present. However, the cause of most incidents is crime. Using armed protection by peacekeeping forces is controversial in the aid community. Nongovernmental organizations see the need for security information sharing valuable for threat and incident analysis. Contemporary challenges in security management for the nongovernmental organization community include field training and headquarters expertise.

9-63. In relations to the military, there are three possible security strategies for nongovernmental organizations:

Developing security plans and accepting risk on their own. This the preferred option. Most nongovernmental organizations offer this as a long-term solution that helps them remain close to civilians.

Relying on local security forces for protection.

Asking the multinational force to provide protection.

9-64. These latter two strategies do not reduce the threat and have the risk of disrupting relationships with the local population. Military deterrence as a strategy poses a risk to the image of humanitarian aid and increases the risk to aid workers.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

9-65. There is a perception of increased competition among nongovernmental organizations due to the need for funding. This perception accentuates the idea of a lack of structure in the nongovernmental organization community. Nongovernmental organizations cooperate at the local level and civil affairs teams need to develop this further. Civil affairs teams persuade nongovernmental organizations by reason and not by authority with an emphasis on networking and building multinational relationships.

9-66. Intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations that operate in the multinational force’s area of responsibility and influence are integral players in these initiatives. These organizations have long-standing relationships in the area of responsibility, have conducted their operations well before multinational operations began, and continue during and remain after coalition operations conclude.

9-67. Intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations either support the multinational force’s mission or are neutral or hostile. Their disposition towards the mission and initiatives may be inconsistent or fluid. Organization structure, management, and finances drive these attitudes.

9-68. Intergovernmental organizations have the following characteristics:

Large with vertical management structures.

Well established and long standing managerial chains of command and corporate institutional social structures.

Personnel who started with the organization at an entry-level position and worked up a progressive chain of responsibility with an increased loyalty to the principles and practices of the intergovernmental organization corporate culture.

Larger budgets and resources than nongovernmental organizations.

Less flexibility and responsiveness to fluid and dynamic situations than a nongovernmental organization due to institutional size and procedures.

Less susceptibility to fluctuations or shifts in public opinion and financial support due to size, structure, and institutional systems.

9-69. Nongovernmental organizations have the following characteristics:

Horizontal management structures.

Smaller with less established managerial chains of command and corporate institutional social structures.

Staffs that are generally more independent.

Smaller budgets and fewer resources than the intergovernmental organizations.

Flexibility and responsiveness to fluid and dynamic situations due to size and independence.

Sensitivity to the attitudes of financial contributors. Due to not having smaller reserve assets, contributors have more influence on allocating contributions.

9-70. Commanders consider these capabilities, limitations, and influences of organizational structures when working alongside or with intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations. Commanders and civilians on the battlefield remember that regardless of the person or organization, commanders provide protection. Commanders and planners know that there may not be nongovernmental organizations to fill significant gaps in civil affairs operations with regard to assisting the host nation in restructuring or rebuilding. There are aspects for which no voluntary donor base exists such as rehabilitating prisons and reestablishing police forces and judiciaries. There are issues involved in a particular environment that cause the nongovernmental organization relief to focus its effort towards one set of victims or party to a conflict. These gaps fall to the military element to fill on an interim basis.

UNITED NATIONS

9-71. For more information on the UN, go to the United Nations website. For UN information dealing with civil affairs operations, go to Relief Web website. For further details on multinational operations and peace operations, see JP 3-07.3 and JP 3-16.

LOCAL AUTHORITIES

9-72. Local authorities are important to the civil affairs operations effort. They coordinate civilian support to military operations and provide military support directly to the local civilian community. The role of local authorities is factored into the relationship between the military and the humanitarian participants in the joint operations area.

MILITARY CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES

9-73. Military forces bring capabilities to the civil affairs operations effort that are the main resource for the implementation of the commander’s civil affairs operations plan. These forces include civil affairs operations staffs and civil affairs troops.

9-74. Each headquarters should have a civil affairs operations staff cell that plans and executes the commander’s civil affairs operations plan. The staff cell includes the following:

Civil affairs units that are part of a national organization. Civil affairs units are likely to contain or call upon expertise in the following areas:

Civil administration (including security and law and order).

Civil infrastructure.

Humanitarian aid.

Economic and commercial structures.

Cultural affairs.

Functional specialists. Functional specialists carry out tasks identified through assessment. Again, their number and area of expertise vary according to both need and availability. These specialists are employed for the duration of the specified task and are either military or civilian. The legal requirements of the donor nation determine the terms under which the latter are employed. However, they must be under readiness states that enable them to deploy when required. Civil affairs units contain many military personnel capable of carrying out civil affairs operations functional activities. Nations have sources of functional specialists who together provide a pool of expertise.

Commanders also task units (general troops) under their command to carry out civil affairs operations tasks.

MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY

9-75. The military supports the civilian community in several ways. This is discussed in paragraphs 9-76–9-83.

CAPABILITIES

9-76. Multinational forces have a wide range of protection, mobility, and survivability capabilities that enable the force to carry out its mission. These include fighting troops for protection and survivability tasks; naval and air assets for protection tasks; transportation of civilians and vital stores; and using engineers to provide essential services such as water, electrical power, sanitation, and shelter and mobility tasks. U.S. forces are prohibited by law from performing humanitarian demining operations; however, special operations forces, engineers, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel may be involved with training others to perform these critical missions. The military forces of other nations are not constrained in this fashion. Additional capabilities include—

Medical elements for saving lives and limiting the spread of disease.

Logistics units to provide road transport and vital stores such as food and medical supplies.

Communication units to enable the passage of information.

Military police and legal elements enforce the rule of law according to international law, rules, and conventions.

9-77. Some of these capabilities could be employed on civil affairs operations tasks.

TASKS

9-78. Depending on the nature of the military activity, civilian agencies require any of the capabilities in paragraph 9-75 for civilian affairs operations activities. However, the military is only responsible for providing security related tasks and emergency relief to support the appropriate civil authority—and only within the available military capacity. In the first instance, military support tasks could include, but are not limited to—

Protection of helpless population.

Transport to safe havens.

Provision of essential services such as clean water, sanitation, and shelter.

Provision of limited medical life-saving support.

9-79. The military provides support when the resources to do so are available and its provision is in concert with the military commander’s overall plan. This support should not be at the expense of achieving the overall military objectives for which the multinational forces deployed. The responsibility for civil-related tasks are handed over to the appropriate civil authority or agency as soon as practical.

9-80. Demand for military services exceed the resources available based on experience. The military applies limited resources to the highest priorities. Agencies that seek military support must understand and apply the agreed mutual guidelines for the provision of support to ensure that scarce resources are applied to the higher priority tasks. These agencies give early warning to allow the necessary planning to occur in a timely and efficient manner.

GUIDELINES

9-81. Military assets support military missions, but under certain circumstances, these assets are deployed to support other missions when there is a need consistent with accomplishing the military mission. This includes saving lives and providing essential infrastructure.

9-82. The civil population depends on the military. Nongovernmental organizations depend on the resources provided by the multinational forces, particularly security and logistics resources. Multinational forces discourage this dependency. Multinational forces provide advice and technical assistance rather than taking ownership of the problem. Multinational forces achieve this by acting primarily as coordinators and channeling military support as a last resort through a civil affairs operations organization such as civil-military cooperation centers, civil-military operations centers, or liaison officers.

9-83. Military resources are available with early notice. Multinational forces are less flexible than other providers because resources must be redirected from their primary tasks to provide civil affairs operations support. Civil affairs operations staffs anticipate requests and know the concept of operations to ensure that required resources are available without detriment to other aspects of the mission.

MILITARY PLANNING IN CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

9-84. Civil affairs operations planning occurs in the preoperational, operational, and transitional stages of any multinational operation. These planning phases are concurrent. Transition phase consideration occurs during the preoperational stage. Early engagement of the transitional authority is imperative. The commander includes the civil affairs operations staff in both the operation planning staff and the initial reconnaissance.

PREOPERATIONAL STAGE

9-85. At the earliest opportunity, civil affairs operations staff prepares the coalition force for civil dimension. This includes planning, advice and education, and training. Civil affairs operations staff analyze the courses of action and produce a civil affairs operations/civil-military operations annex. This provides civil affairs operations input to the main operation plan. Inputs are based on reconnaissance and detailed assessment where possible. Planning factors for civil affairs operations include the following:

Food and water.

Public health.

Shelter.

Movement of civil population (such as displaced persons and refugees).

Detainee handling.

Public security.

Infrastructure support and rehabilitation.

Interim administrative support and action.

9-86. Coordination and information exchange occurs with the following specialist areas. The order of the following starts with the essential elements and moves to the least essential. For example:

Information operations.

Public relations and public affairs.

Engineers.

Health.

Logistics.

Intelligence.

Legal.

Police.

Chaplains.

Relevant government departments.

OPERATIONAL PHASE

9-87. The core civil affairs operations task throughout operations is to secure effective civil-military cooperation to support the commander’s mission. To do this, relations with a wide range of civil bodies are established and maintained. These relationships, along with numerous stability tasks, are identified through continuous assessment. Centralized coordination of civil-military operations tasks through the J-3 across the AO ensure that relationships do not conflict with the commander’s mission.

TRANSITION PHASE

9-88. The overarching objective of civil affairs operations is to achieve civil primacy. In the transition stage, civil affairs operations/civil-military operations help the civil authorities to function without coalition forces in the AO. As the military force reduces the number and scope of its responsibilities, civil affairs operations help transfer any civilian responsibilities that the force assumed. Transition is either an international (UN) or local civil authority. The effective transfer of responsibilities depends on the deployment of an international capability or standing up a local capability.

PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING

9-89. Before deploying to the AO, troop-contributing nations must be trained in civil affairs operations, especially in assessing their country’s capability requirements. These requirements include—

Troop awareness. All Soldiers know the multinational force stability tasks policy to ensure they provide assistance according to that policy.

Staff capability. This is an enhanced level of training. Staffs are trained to plan and coordinate stability tasks.

Tactical capability. This involves using dedicated units at the tactical level to execute stability tasks.

Training level. This will vary between nations and regular (active duty) and reserve forces within nations.

9-90. If there is a perceived need for a stability tasks capability, commanders do not train all personnel. Commanders focus on jobs in coordination, planning, and executing stability tasks. Training begins with the higher levels headquarters and proceeds to lower levels as the need and the resources become available. Resources are expanded by having personnel trained to educate others.

SUPPORT TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND TARGETING

9-91. Civil affairs operations personnel support both information operations and targeting. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Each of the civil-military operations players is a source of information sharing. Each player is reluctant to share information with the other players. The military is concerned about compromising sources and information. The other players are concerned about compromising their neutrality. Players share information when they perceive a common interest. Stability tasks personnel build on these common interests and ensure that information sharing is receiving and giving. Each group’s concerns need to be addressed and respected. Properly executed, information sharing is a force multiplier for operations. Chapter 7 discusses information operations.

9-92. The stability tasks staff helps targeting by ensuring that targeting does not create additional problems. The stability tasks staff notifies the commander of the locations of all the civil-military projects, personnel, and nongovernmental or private volunteer organizations operating in the AO and participating in the intelligence preparation of environmental process. The stability tasks staff interacts with other stability tasks players and the civilian community to maintain the moral authority of the commander in relation to targeting. The stability tasks staff gauges the moral impact of targeting on these groups. Additionally, the civil-military operations staff provides areas of cultural and religious significance that must not be targeted except under extreme circumstances because of the negative moral impact.

CHECKLIST

9-93. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to civil affairs operations.

Is there a comprehensive campaign plan? Does it address civil affairs operations issues?

Have civil affairs operations planners been included in the assessment team for the operation?

What areas of civil affairs operations come under multinational force control? What areas remain national issues?

What are the political and civil implications of the desired strategic and operational end states?

What are the civil end states implied by the military end states?

What are the civil centers of gravity that need to be addressed? What are the associated decisive points?

What are the civil affairs operations culminating points?

Have measures been established to synchronize the civil-military cooperation activities with the campaign plan’s line of operation?

What are the required civil and military resources to achieve the operational objectives?

What key civil organizations will be operating in the AO? Has an analysis been performed on their respective end states, cultures, languages, customs, religious, objectives, and methods? How will these organizations affect military operation?

What structures, reinforcements, policies, committees, and liaison are needed at the strategic level to support the operational commander?

Are sufficient resources available to sustain the force where the operational commander is reliant on host nation support? Are memorandum of understandings and technical agreements for this support in place? How will this impact the local economy as human and personnel resources are drawn to military host nation support?

Is the national civil-military plan coordinated with the other governmental departments?

Have national civil-military plans been coordinated with multinational force headquarters?

Has the multinational force headquarters established a relationship with multinational ambassadors and, if a UN operation, the special representative of the secretary-general?

Is the civil administration sound or will one be established? If the latter, what resources are required?

What are the requirements for restoring or rebuilding the local infrastructure?

What are the requirements for restoring or providing essential services in the short-, medium-, and long-term? The short-term tasks (such as urgent provision of shelter, water, sanitation, and power) may become military tasks. The military will need to plan accordingly.

What support is required to help or establish the host nation civilian law and order system?

Has a civil affairs operations operational estimate been performed?

Are there adequate civil affairs operations personnel available to help planners?

Has a civil-military operations center been established at the appropriate level to coordinate civil affairs operations?

Is there a lead agency or lead agencies for humanitarian assistance such as UN or International Committee of the Red Cross?

What intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and international and national donor agencies operate in the joint operations area?

Is there a process in place for the commander to address “rogue” nongovernmental organizations? Is it linked to a lead agency?

What is the policy for dealing with intergovernmental organizations or nongovernmental organizations that are political or economic fronts to corporations, political action groups, rogue nations, allies of the combatants, criminal organizations, or terrorist groups?

What legal authority does the commander have to take a more prescriptive approach to civil affairs operations if this should be necessary?

Is there a synchronization plan that articulates a common operational effect across boundaries (such as military, social, political, cultural, religious, media, security or economic boundaries)?

What areas of civil affairs operations support can nations provide and what areas can nations not provide?

Do all participating nations understand civil affairs operations or civil-military cooperation?

Do all nongovernmental organizations subscribe to the code of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and nongovernmental organizations in disaster relief?

Is there a need for mine awareness and unexploded explosive ordnance training for civilians in the AO?

What other civil affairs operations engineering requirements exist in the theater of operations?

Is there separate funding to support these requirements?

Chapter 10

Resource Management Challenges in Multinational Operations

This chapter discusses the importance and challenges of resource management in multinational operations and interorganizational resource guidance. It then discusses interagency funding and control processes and reimbursement procedures. Lastly, the chapter provides a checklist for commanders and staffs.

MULTINATIONAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

10-1. Resource management focuses on supporting local procurement efforts, funding and tracking operations costs, and providing military pay support. Finance elements help access host nation and other support by—

Paying for contracts.

Providing cash to agents making local purchases.

Providing military pay support.

Providing limited support to other services such as cashing checks and currency exchange for individuals.

Preparing and instructing paying agents to disburse funds for purchases and or services.

Identifying funding sources external to national funding of participating nations.

Determining policy and procedures for operationally related funding.

10-2. Resource managers obtain obligation and expenditure authority. They also focus on tracking the costs of the operation. Finance elements provide essential input into the accounting systems to support cost capturing. Accurate, detailed costs are needed to report dealings with multinational partners to determine how costs have been or should be apportioned.

MULTINATIONAL RESOURCE MANAGER

10-3. The multinational force develops a policy for funding the operation. Commanders understand the importance of integrating resource management with mission needs to execute multinational operations. A variety of funding sources and authorities are required to accomplish every mission to include peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuations, and foreign humanitarian relief efforts. The G-8 is the special staff officer responsible for leveraging resources to support the multinational operation. The G-8 is the commander’s principal resource advisor who is responsible for—

Coordinating with other staff sections to develop resource requirements.

Providing guidance, determining requirements, identifying sources of funding, distributing and controlling funds, determining and tracking costs, determining cost capturing procedures, and establishing management control.

Serving as multinational force principal resource management advisor.

Representing the commander in identifying multinational resources and financing country needs to the national authorities, national components, and others as required.

Establishing resource management responsibilities for the area of operations (AO). This includes designating lead agents for resource management functions or special support requirements.

Providing estimates of resource requirements to the national authorities, national component commands, and others as required.

Establishing positive controls over resources and funding authority received.

Coordinating with adjacent staff for managerial controls to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.

Coordinating with the staff judge advocate on funding authority issues.

Handling reimbursement for nations providing services to multinational forces and others.

Preparing finance and disbursing policies, procedures, and guidelines for the personnel annex of the operation plan or operation order.

10-4. For more information on G-8 responsibilities, see FM 1-06.

10-5. Each level of resource management develops resource requirements. The G-8 uses the same process to receive guidance, determine total resource requirements, apply available resources to those requirements, and identify unresourced requirements. All levels of resource management determine what resources are required and available to support the mission and meet the commander’s intent.

INTERORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCE GUIDANCE

10-6. Resourcing guidance comes from multiple sources. It is the G-8’s responsibility to—

Provide consistent resource management guidance to defense support of civil authorities. This includes G-8 involvement in running estimates, development of the operation plan or operation order and, when necessary, performing an economic analysis of the area of operations (AO).

Ensure consistency of financial service support. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services financial managers coordinate with the G-8 to ensure that consistent financial services are provided to all personnel assigned to the joint force commander. This includes making appropriate provisions for military pay and services, payment of travel entitlements, and cash operations to support service member requirements.

Ensure the most efficient use of all available resources. At some level and to some degree, resources are always limited. The commander considers limitations on available resources when prioritizing and allocating resources, but not to the detriment of mission accomplishment.

FINANCIAL ADVICE AND REQUIREMENTS

10-7. The G-8, together with the legal advisor, provides the commander with advice and recommendations on all legal aspects of resource management. This requirement is derived from fiscal law. Preventing shortfalls during operations presents specific challenges. Every mission requires use of a variety of funding sources, authorities, assistance, host nation support, and extraordinary reimbursement procedures. The G-8 performs two key functions for the commander:

Ensures that resources are available when and where they are needed.

Aids the commander in maintaining fiscal responsibilities.

10-8. The staffs and elements or units under the commander determine requirements based on the commander’s guidance, operation plans, and input from the adjacent staff and subordinate units. The G-8 focuses on the detailed resource requirements for each mission or task (who, what, when, where, why, and how). Armed with these details, the G-8 uses cost factors—UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or multinational approved—to verify and validate event and task costs.

FUNDING

10-9. The commander has numerous sources of appropriated funds available for multinational operations. These sources include DOD and other federal agency appropriations, as well as UN or multinational funding authorities. It is critical that the G-8 understands the time, purpose, and amount of each funding authority. The G-8 understands the prescribed method of obligating funds, tracking costs, and reporting requirements. The G-8 considers all sources of available funds, with their restrictions and variations, to effectively and efficiently resource the mission. Doing so reduces the immediate impact on the commander’s internal funds and maximizes the commander’s flexibility. The G-8 understands the multiple funding sources or agreements and their numerous national, international, or coalition specific purposes, availability, and constraints to keep the commander informed. In short, G-8s must understand funding sources to—

Accomplish the missions.

Maximize all resource options.

Avoid violations of fraud, waste, or abuse.

Determine costs.

10-10. G-8s are responsible to their commander when determining and validating costs to accomplish the mission. Accurate and detailed determination of costs (by type) enables the G-8 to—

Determine a baseline for future planning.

Estimate future costs.

Properly allocate resources.

Develop a baseline for monitoring execution.

Report costs.

Seek proper reimbursement.

10-11. Preparing budget cost estimates to support the commander’s intent is the same as developing an operation plan. The G-8 delineates the specified, implied, and essential tasks associated with resources and understands the mission and commander’s intent two echelons above. The G-8 makes assumptions concerning a variety of factors (such as the operation’s duration, logistic support, force size, environmental conditions, transportation, special pay and allowances, multinational participants, and so forth). Additionally, the G-8 considers the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations (METT-TC) when developing assumptions and cost estimates. Several methods are available to determine costs for requirements. The G-8 estimates costs using standard cost factors or models, historical data, or the best judgment if no standard cost factors exist.

INTERAGENCY (FUNDING AND CONTROL) PROCESSES

10-12. Multinational commands receive their operating budget in various ways and through numerous channels such as DOD, Department of State, or UN. Often the responsible executive agency or government provides coalition operations with internal funds and seeks reimbursement for all appropriate and agreed upon costs after the initial phases of the operation. Methods of reimbursement vary, but the agencies or governments require a manual receipt, an approved automated accounting system, and evidence that the goods or services are used for the intended purpose of the mission. The G-8 must have accurate cost capturing methods to depict the costs by type for reimbursement.

10-13. Commanders determine how the G-8 distributes and controls funds. However, certain staff elements direct the G-8 on the use, release, or flow of funds to support the commander’s guidance and intent. As the commander’s executive agent, the G-8 distributes, controls, and monitors the execution of resources. The G-8 controls funds by centralized or decentralized methods. Regardless of the method, the G-8 must have effective and efficient fund certification and control to maintain accuracy, ensure proper fiscal use, and capture costs.

10-14. Accounting systems track costs (by event, program, unit) based on a fiscal code. G-8s—who must keep their commanders informed of all aspects of resource management on a daily basis—use the fiscal code for two main purposes:

First, the fiscal code helps track expenditures at a detailed level.

Second, the fiscal code helps prepare and present fiscal information to the command and staff, including the status of funds, mission or event cost, and obligation rates.

10-15. The G-8 establishes cost-capturing procedures for both internal and external reporting requirements. This provides visibility of estimated and/or actual commitments, obligations, and reimbursable and future costs. Reporting procedures provide accurate information and remain simple and flexible.

10-16. In accordance with AR 11-2, all commanders establish and maintain effective management controls and assess areas of risk. They also identify and correct weaknesses in those controls and keep their superiors informed. The G-8 coordinates management controls throughout the unit. Management control provides reasonable assurance that accountability and control procedures comply with applicable laws and regulations. As it pertains to resource management, the management control program provides reasonable assurance that obligations and costs comply with international/multinational agreements, that funds are protected, and that proper accounting is kept of all expenditures. The G-8 establishes management control as soon as possible, but not at the expense of operational or tactical considerations.

REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURES

10-17. Reimbursable costs occur during multinational operations because of provided support to other nations, organizations, units, and other Services or agencies. At the strategic level, reimbursement is coordinated from the UN, NATO, foreign nations, nongovernmental organizations, or private volunteer organizations. Usually, costs reimbursed only cover incremental costs to organizations (the percentage over and above normal operating costs).

10-18. For U.S. forces, Congress authorizes provisions of certain support and legal reviews. Throughout operations, careful consideration is given to funding, monitoring expenditure authority (see DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, Volume 15), maintaining accountability, tracking costs, and tracking support received from or provided to the foreign nation, UN, or other designated agencies. This information determines the detailed costs of an operation or event and supports billing for reimbursement at all levels. Congress requires detailed reports on the projected and actual costs of operations. Accurate, detailed cost reports determine what types of goods or services to charge. G-8s capture these costs and provide the required reports and detailed billings.

10-19. When the commander establishes support agreements, the G-8 ensures the requesting units and agencies understand what assistance is rendered. If a current agreement exists, the G-8—with legal advice, if necessary—reviews the agreement for proper procedures and support. If an agreement does not exist, the G-8 coordinates with the logistics and legal staff counterparts for required support.

CHECKLIST

10-20. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to resource management.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

What are the arrangements to provide or receive multinational support to local procurement?

Who is providing check-cashing funding for finance elements of other nations?

What are the limitations on the amounts of cash payments (including check cashing) that Soldiers receive in the AO? Who imposes the limitations?

How will the multinational force finance support provide currency exchange?

Will contracted subsistence support to the command affect entitlements to personnel?

What financial support weapon bounties and claims are needed?

G-8

Have support agreements been analyzed for resource management implications?

Has an executive agent been designated?

Has the resource management appendix to the operation plan been prepared?

Have cost capturing mechanisms been established?

Will resource management support be required for other agencies (such as morale, welfare, recreation; International Committee of the Red Cross; nongovernmental organizations; private volunteer organizations; and public affairs)?

If necessary, are specific reimbursement procedures through the UN required to capture incremental costs?

If required, have special appropriations been requested?

Have procedures been implemented to track multinational support costs and review billing procedures?

Chapter 11

Medical Support in Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by discussing the role and principles of Army health system (AHS) support and continues on to medical staff, command surgeon responsibilities, command relationships in medical support, medical planning, and health threat assessment. This chapter then discusses medical support policies and issues, countermeasures, standards of care, and health service support functional areas. Lastly, this chapter provides a checklist for commanders and staffs.

ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM ROLE

11-1. The AHS support develops and maintains combat power and is a major factor in achieving strategic goals. The medical mission is to promote health, prevent casualties, and provide medical units capable of responding to the challenging worldwide deployments in multinational operations. How AHS support is delivered in the field is a factor in a particular nation’s decision to participate. Differences in medical standards, customs, and training require careful coordination and planning.

11-2. The multinational forces commander ensures that forces deliver medical care rapidly, effectively, and efficiently without interfering with the multinational force’s mission. Medical care is a national responsibility. The command assesses AHS support requirements and capabilities both quantitatively and qualitatively and provides guidance to enhance the effectiveness of AHS support through shared use of assets. Any medical services that a nation cannot provide must be covered by agreements between national governments of the nations making up the multinational force. This requires coordinating all AHS support assets, providing a detailed health plan, and performing effective liaison between the senior medical officers of each nation. The multinational command surgeon plans, coordinates, and synchronizes the AHS support plan based on actual capabilities of contributing nations with standing medical agreements between the contributing nations. The concept of one nation’s forces being treated by another nation’s medical personnel or in another nation’s treatment facilities should be achievable.

ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM PRINCIPLES

11-3. For effective and efficient multinational medical support, personnel must adhere to long established AHS principles. The following AHS principles should be the focus of each nation’s health service:

Conformity with operations and administrative plans.

Proximity to forces supported.

Flexibility to change with the tactical picture.

Mobility to maintain contact with supported units.

Continuity of treatment through the casualty management system.

Protection and prevention to minimize avoidable casualties.

Command and control of health assets clearly defined at an appropriate level.

MEDICAL STAFF

11-4. It is necessary to identify a command surgeon early to oversee and coordinate medical support activities and to advise the multinational forces commander. This surgeon is involved in planning and provides a representative to the assessment team.

11-5. The multinational forces surgeon’s office, staffed with representatives from participating nations, develops the medical plan.

11-6. Specific responsibilities of the multinational forces surgeon during force generation include:

Identifying the medical support assets (ground and air) to support the planned operation.

Determining the disease and nonbattle injury rate for planning purposes.

Obtaining the casualty rates from the operations officer.

Identifying medical evacuation processes.

Developing the multinational forces medical plan.

Exploiting medical intelligence data and information derived from national and other service sources.

Advising the multinational forces commander on health risks relevant to the operation.

COMMAND SURGEON RESPONSIBILITIES

11-7. The command surgeon is responsible to the commander for medical support in the area of operations (AO). The surgeon has direct access to the commander as chief medical advisor. The surgeon understands the medical capacities and capabilities of all multinational nations. The surgeon deploys medical personnel early to establish, monitor, and evaluate medical support. The surgeon’s staff has representatives from all nations.

11-8. The surgeon prepares the medical plan and medical annex to the operation plan or operation order. This plan—

Defines the scope of medical care in detail.

Allocates resources.

Determines the number of medical personnel required to staff the multinational surgeon’s office.

Details the medical resources required to support the operation.

11-9. The surgeon coordinates medical support provided to or received from multinational forces and the appropriate reimbursements. The surgeon also advises the commander on the following:

Medical support to the operation.

Intratheater rest, rotation, and reconstitution.

Preventive medicine.

Dental and veterinary medicine requirements.

Other medical factors that affect operations.

11-10. In addition, the surgeon performs the following:

Informs the commander on the status of medical support units and assistance required by and provided to the civilian populace and multinational nationals.

Reviews health programs of civilian agencies in the AO to determine the feasibility for emergency usage.

Advises on foreign humanitarian assistance and defense support civil authorities activities in the AO.

Establishes and coordinates a comprehensive medical logistic system for medical materiel, biomedical maintenance, blood, and vaccines.

Supervises the activities of any medical cells, boards, and centers established by the multinational forces. For example, the surgeon supervises a patient movement center to identify bed space requirements and the movement of patients in and out of the AO.

Coordinates medical intelligence support for medical support organizations.

Develops a preventive medicine program that—

Includes pre and postsurveillance programs.

Evaluates infectious disease risks.

Determines the requirements for an entomologist for vector control.

Provides technical assistance and advice to the civil-military operations center.

Establishes liaison with each nation’s surgeon.

Resolves the multinational medical equipment and supply requirement and sustainability due to the expense, long lead-times, and special handling in procuring CL VIII.

Identifies and coordinates appropriate medical treatment facility accreditation and medical professional certification requirements.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN MEDICAL SUPPORT

11-11. As a multinational force matures, the members centralize their efforts by establishing a lead nation command structure. Subordinate national commands maintain national integrity. The lead nation command establishes integrated staff sections. Leadership determines the composition. A national commander commands all elements including the supporting medical support system. For command purposes, the commanders normally delegate command of their assigned medical support resources to their medical support officer located in the national support element. At each level of command, the medical support officer must possess the right of direct access to the commander on matters affecting the health of the command.

11-12. The command relationships in medical support must be clearly defined in the multinational forces. These relationships are embodied in the command directives. The authority creating the multinational force issues these directives to each national component commander. Operational (technical) control of national medical support resources are delegated by the national component commander to the senior medical officer to facilitate overall coordination of resources in the theater of operations. It may not be possible to establish mission command over all participants. Some nations have requirements that limit how much command authority the multinational or national commanders exercise over their forces. Command in its formal sense does not exist and a system of cooperation exists in its place.

11-13. During operations, the responsibilities of the senior health service support officer at each level include—

Advising the commander on the health of the command.

Informing the commander and staff on matters affecting the delivery of healthcare.

Developing, preparing, coordinating, and monitoring medical support policy and procedures with commanders of National Health Service units.

Exploiting medical intelligence data and information derived from national and other Service sources.

Monitoring the activities of medical support assets assigned to their command.

11-14. The commander and the senior medical officer of each nation must understand the legal limits of using non-national medical treatment facilities and supplies, especially blood, by their nations’ forces. Exchanging blood between nations is a sensitive issue and must be coordinated early. Mutual medical support complies with existing legal directives. Coordination for any lead nation, role specialization, or the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement authority must be addressed during multinational planning. Casualty evacuation, especially outside the AO, and using non-national medical treatment facilities requires careful planning and an agreement.

MEDICAL PLANNING

11-15. Medical planning occurs at all levels. Medical planning develops a system that provides the best possible use of medical support resources in a given situation. Details of medical planning are contained in American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies’ Program Publication 256. Considerations include the operational situation (commander’s overall mission) and medical threat information including endemic diseases and climate appropriate to the theater of operations. Planners and commanders identify issues specific to the operation and consider these issues in planning.

11-16. The following factors are critical aspects of medical planning:

Mission and type of operation.

Operation concept or plan.

Anticipated duration of the operation.

Evacuation policy from the theater of operations to role 4, definite care.

Selection and consideration of the AHS support aim.

Health threat assessment, including medical countermeasures.

Health surveillance.

Provision of casualty estimate by the staff and effects on health care delivery.

Availability of and restrictions on resources.

Availability and access to host nation facilities.

Mission command requirements and limitations.

HEALTH THREAT ASSESSMENT

11-17. The health threat assessment is a composite of ongoing or potential enemy actions; adverse environmental, occupational, and geographic and meteorological conditions; endemic diseases; and employment of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (including weapons of mass destruction) that have the potential to affect the short- or long-term health (including psychological impact) of personnel. This can reduce the effectiveness of the multinational forces through wounds, injuries, diseases, or psychological stressors.

11-18. The medical threat is a composite of—

Infectious disease.

Environmental conditions.

Occupational health threats.

Conventional and irregular warfare.

Biological warfare.

Chemical warfare agents.

Directed-energy weapons.

Blast effect weapons.

Combat and operational stress.

Flame and incendiary weapons.

Nuclear warfare.

Radiological agents.

Accidents.

MEDICAL SUPPORT POLICIES AND ISSUES

11-19. The medical section establishes force medical support policies to cover medical support in multinational operations. The multinational forces surgeon establishes policies with medical officers of contributing nations.

11-20. Subject areas for multinational force policy and coordination include—

Medical care eligibility for noncombatants, contractors, dislocated persons, refugees, and host nation civilians plus appropriate reimbursement for nations.

Medical support coordination provided to or received from the multinational forces or other friendly nations including using host nation facilities.

Mass casualty response plan.

Liaison establishment with each nation’s surgeon.

Medical regulating, to include evacuating casualties to non-national medical treatment facilities.

Policies on medical countermeasures and vaccinations.

Policies on the exchange of medical equipment accompanying patients.

Policies on transferring a patient from one nation’s evacuation system to another.

Mechanism for returning patients to their parent nations after medical treatment in another nation’s medical treatment facility.

Medical support to detainee/enemy prisoner of war operations and facilities.

Evacuation system establishment for the theater of operations, including definition of the theater’s holding and evacuation policy, mission responsibility, and evacuation control system.

Medical support reports and returns required, including format, content, and frequency.

Clinical documentation, policy format, and the exchange of clinical records that include the following:

Medical records of the clinical condition with treatment of each patient so that continuing treatment is related to past events and post-deployment actions.

Information to notify the patient’s next-of-kin.

Information to units for preparing personnel strength returns.

Statistical data for planning purposes and historical records.

Materials for medical research.

Information to track patients whose whereabouts are unknown.

Policies on blood supply source, screening standards, storage, and use.

Policies on pharmaceutical source, acceptance standards, storage, and use.

Policies on sharing and exchange of occupational and environmental health surveillance data. Data includes—

Air, soil, and water sampling.

Individual or group exposure results.

Any other environmental sampling.

COUNTERMEASURES

11-21. Historically, disease and nonbattle injuries have rendered more Soldiers combat ineffective than actual operations casualties. Countermeasures reduce disease and nonbattle injuries. The capability to assess the Soldier’s health continuously and improve Soldier sustainability is required to protect the force.

11-22. The following countermeasures ensure effective force medical protection:

A comprehensive medical intelligence system.

Continuous health surveillance.

Countermeasures, prophylaxis, and immunization policies approved by the multinational forces commander and implemented by all contributing nations.

STANDARDS OF CARE

11-23. The multinational medical support ensures continuity of patient management at a standard acceptable to all nations. Achieving the desired degree of patient management depends on the successful interoperability of treatment principles and clinical policies. As a national responsibility executed under national standards of care and practice, each nation sets medical policy for its Soldiers. As such, multinational commanders cannot direct a sovereign nation’s armed forces to adopt a different standard for sake of uniformity across their command. Patient management is a continuous part of medical care, increasing in complexity by roles of capability to work with the clinical needs of the patient. While optimal patient management is never compromised unless dictated by the operational situation, it is also a balance between many conflicting factors. These factors include the following:

Treatment.

Evacuation.

Resources.

Environmental and operational conditions.

11-24. Dental support is arranged in levels, reflecting an increase in capability at each succeeding level. The functions of each lower level of dental support are contained within the capabilities of each higher level. A preventive dentistry program is provided in the theater of operations.

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT FUNCTIONAL AREAS

11-25. The medical plan will address the following health service support functional areas, as described in ABCA Publication 256:

Preventive medicine.

Combat casualty care.

Hospital and surgical services.

Dental services.

Ground and air evacuation.

Stress management.

Outpatient services.

Veterinary services.

Medical nuclear, biological, and chemical considerations.

Health surveillance.

Medical logistics.

Blood.

CHECKLIST

11-26. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to medical support.

MEDICAL STAFF

Has a command surgeon been appointed?

Are there health services representatives on the assessment team?

Have contributing nations provided staff or liaison to the multinational forces surgeon?

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Have national elements appointed senior medical officers?

Are the command relationships of medical assets clearly defined?

Are there adequate arrangements for coordination and liaison between medical elements?

SUPPORT PLAN

Does the health service support plan conform to the operation and administrative plans?

Are all forces in reasonable proximity to medical support?

What flexibility is there in the medical support plan? Are there medical assets available for surge situations?

Are the medical support assets sufficiently mobile to provide support to the force?

Will a casualty receive continuous treatment while in the medical system?

Have the following medical protection issues been addressed?

Health threat assessment.

Medical countermeasures and vaccination.

Health surveillance system.

Who is entitled to treatment? Are cross-servicing provisions in place?

What responsibilities do the multinational forces medical support assets have to noncombatants?

What is the response to a mass casualty?

How will casualty evacuation be coordinated?

Are there sufficient evacuation assets?

How will medical regulations, both in and out of theater of operations, be affected?

What are the multinational forces obligations and responsibilities under the Geneva conventions?

What medical support reports and returns will be available to the commander multinational forces?

What are the arrangements for preventive medicine measures?

Are there adequate dental services available?

What provisions are there for combat and operational stress management?

Who will inspect foodstuffs from a medical perspective?

How will units obtain class VIII supplies?

How will medical equipment be repaired?

What is the blood supply system?

Does the support plan include provision of, or access to, limited critical medical equipment such as magnetic resonance imagery?

Does the support plan identify any unusual Soldier physical screening standards necessary for this operation?

What are the medical support requirements for detainee operations and facilities?

MEDICAL

What does the status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) with the host nation state in using host nation medical treatment facilities for the treatment of U.S. personnel?

What is U.S. policy on using host nation medical treatment facilities for this operational period?

Are medical treatment facilities identified to support the operation?

Are chemical weapon threats known?

Are troops and medical treatment facilities prepared to cope with their possible use?

Are procedures in place to service multinational casualties to include recognizing cultural differences in dealing with casualties and procedures and policies for local civilians? Have procedures been coordinated with national commands?

What are the other multinational element capabilities and procedures for medical evacuation? Do they include air and ground capabilities, both intratheater and intertheater, that multinational forces will be supported by or required to support?

What are the sources of medical supply and payment options?

What are the procedures for tracking patients?

What are the coordination requirements for return-to-duty transportation?

What forces have organic role 1, 2, or 3 combat medical support? For those that do not have this support, what level will other multinational forces provide?

What are the policies and procedures for medical personnel to use on role 2 through 4 medical treatment facilities to provide medical treatment for multinational forces?

Who is eligible for medical care, both routine and emergency, and under what conditions? This must be coordinated with other staff sections.

What is the blood policy and distribution system?

What is U.S. policy for emergency use of blood from other than U.S. sources, such as host nation, for this operational period?

What is the mass casualty response plan?

Is there a medical surveillance program to follow disease trends and detect disease outbreaks?

What is the public health policy?

Chapter 12

Operational Considerations for Multinational Forces

This chapter discusses fire support and engineer support. It then discusses interoperability and standardization in the multinational forces. Lastly, this chapter provides a checklist for commanders and staffs.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

12-1. Military capabilities differ based on national interests and objectives, national character, doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, and materiel. Some doctrine emphasizes offensive operations while others emphasize defensive operations. Some nations prepare for highly mobile, mechanized operations. Other nations are concerned with counterinsurgency operations. The multinational force commander considers these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. This chapter provides operational considerations to improve the effectiveness of U.S. forces when operating with the multinational force.

12-2. A variety of functions help commanders build and sustain combat power. These are the six warfighting functions described fully in ADRP 3-0. Army commanders and staffs translate the elements of combat power into operational functions when conducting missions and tactical operations. The three operational-level functions discussed in this chapter are firepower, engineer tasks and responsibilities and engineer support, and interoperability and standardization.

CRITICAL OPPONENTS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

12-3. At the operational level, mission command, intelligence, and support are critical to build an effective multinational force. A major weakness in one of these areas is a far greater threat than one in other systems. All other elements hinge on the effective integration of these three systems. Major differences, real or perceived among alliance or coalition partners cannot be tolerated. Within these operating systems, effective liaison and language capabilities make effective operations possible and alleviate friction and confusion.

FIRE SUPPORT

12-4. The multinational force commander ensures that the force develops good fire support coordination. This optimizes the effects of fires and minimizes the possibility of fratricide, collateral damage, and disruption to the civilian populace. Fire support coordination in multinational operations demands special arrangements with multinational force members and local authorities. These special arrangements include communications and language requirements, liaison personnel, and interoperability procedures. A standard operating procedure should be established for fire support to achieve the most effective results for its use by the multinational force.

12-5. Effective control of multinational force firepower is the key to its use. The staff judges whether resources and requirements are balanced over the course of a multinational campaign or operation and ensures the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities exist. Effective joint fire support contributes to multinational success. Joint detailed integration of joint fire support with maneuver of the multinational force is critical. See JP 3-09 and ADRP 3-09 for more information.

12-6. The multinational force commander understands the Army relies on space-based capabilities and systems, such as global positioning system for precision, navigation and timing, communication, weather satellites, and intelligence collection platforms for success in multinational operations. These systems are critical enablers for U.S., collation, and multinational forces to plan, communicate, navigate and maneuver, maintain area of operations (AO) situational awareness, engage the enemy, provide missile warning, and protect and sustain forces. Operations are enabled by space-assisted tactical planning and support, expertise, and advice regarding available space capabilities and limitations. Space support planning and coordination with multinational resources occurs with Army space professionals attached at the corps and division levels. These professionals provide expertise, advice, and planning to the commander on space related issues that directly affect multinational operations. Space capabilities provide the accuracy status for positioning, navigation, and timing for planning operations, capabilities and limitations impacts of space-based surveillance and reconnaissance, weather, and communications systems. These capabilities notify of deliberate enemy interference activities such as attempts to jam or spoof friendly communication.

12-7. Space enabled capabilities are ubiquitous and widely used to maintain environment situational awareness. Space-based systems enable multinational operations during combat and the subsequent stages of force projection operations by—

Providing unclassified, commercial imagery products releasable to multinational forces to support targeting, fires, and geospatial engineering efforts.

Rapid communications that enable a commander to gain and maintain the initiative by developing the situation faster than the enemy consists of the following:

Visualizing the AO and sharing a common operational picture, retaining the ability to recognize and protect their own and friendly forces, synchronizing and protecting their own and friendly forces, synchronizing force actions with adjacent and supporting units, and maintaining contact and coordination critical to multinational operations.

Providing update of solar environment and the impact to both terrestrial and space-based segments of friendly communications systems.

Monitoring terrestrial areas of interest through information collection assets to help reveal the enemy’s location and disposition, reveal route, area, zone, and force reconnaissance, and attempt to identify the enemy’s intent.

Providing global positioning system status and accuracy of positioning, navigation, and timing for planning and conducting mission and maneuver operations to support fires and targeting effects.

Providing meteorological, oceanographic, and space environmental information which is processed, analyzed, and leveraged to produce timely and accurate weather effects and impacts on operations.

ENGINEER TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

12-8. Multinational forces require multinational-level engineers to defense support of civil authorities. These engineers are responsible for a broad range of technical and dispersed, operational, and tactical tasks. These tasks are included in the engineer operational environment functions of—

Combat engineering (mobility, countermobility, and survivability).

General engineering.

Geospatial engineering. (This is referred to as geomatic by some multinational forces.)

12-9. See FM 3-34 and JP 3-34 for a further discussion of the engineer operational environment functions and engineer operations.

12-10. The tasks associated with the three engineer operational environment functions include—

Providing a full range of operational and tactical level combat engineering (mobility, countermobility, and survivability) support.

Providing a full range of general engineering support (including protection construction, diving, firefighting, facilities engineering, infrastructure, sustainment support, power generation and distribution, and in some Services or multinational forces this includes explosive ordnance disposal [EOD] and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives [CBRNE] as well).

Providing a full range of operational and tactical-level geospatial engineering support.

12-11. To ensure efficient and effective engineer effort, the multinational headquarters require both a senior engineer and a supporting engineer staff to plan and coordinate engineer effort to support the multinational commander’s plan. The senior engineer and associated staff controls force-level designated engineer units on behalf of the multinational commander. This control includes—

Planning.

Setting engineer standards.

Supervising and coordinating.

Controlling engineer support to the force and, when necessary, to the local population.

Potentially performing mission command for other nonengineer capabilities and assets.

12-12. Engineers are also responsible for managing civilian engineer contractors who complete tasks in the AO. Control of engineer support will be in accordance with the multinational commander’s priorities and intent. For further operational considerations and details on the employment of engineer assets in a multinational environment, refer to the American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies’ Program (ABCA) Multinational Engineer Handbook.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

12-13. All multinational commanders consider several general principles when employing engineers. Of these principles, a force engineer commander adheres to centralized control and early warning to give engineer operations the best opportunity to succeed.

Centralized Versus Decentralized

12-14. When employing engineers, an important principle is centralized command with decentralized execution of tasks. Force engineer assets are optimized against the multinational commander’s priority of tasks. These tasks are applied to all units and include missions and tasks as combined arms breaching operations; gap crossings and other mobility support; support to demining operations; construction of bridges, roads, base camps, hospitals, or other sites; or other tasks performed directly for the multinational commander.

Early Warning

12-15. Due to the long lead times necessary to plan, coordinate, purchase, and assemble the necessary engineer assets and specialized personnel, engineer planning has an early and well-informed warning. Since much of the necessary information is unavailable, contingency engineer planning is essential for critical issues and items. Therefore, commanders and staff provide as much guidance as possible. The engineer commander and staff is proactive and seeks guidance regularly. This results in iterative planning with engineer estimates initially at plus 50 percent and aiming to reduce to plus five percent as more reliable information becomes available. For example, engineers consider redeployment issues early—before deployment takes place—to ensure that critical-path items are considered in a timely manner and that the necessary engineer assets will be in the AO when required, to include those associated with transitions. Planners are mindful of the significant difference in the doctrinal traditions between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and former Warsaw Pact militaries, particularly when it comes to the role of engineer assets in traditional combat engineering functions. While NATO battalion and brigade combat team commanders are accustomed to the de-centralized integration of engineer operations at the tactical level, former Warsaw Pact nations have traditionally employed these assets in a much more centralized manner at the division and corps level. As a result, tactical commanders from engineering tasks associated with building integrated obstacles and mutually supporting engagement areas at the battalion and brigade level. An understanding of these tasks and many other differing doctrinal traditions manage expectations and result in greater integration of multinational forces.

Priority of Work

12-16. Since it is seldom possible to execute all the required engineer tasks simultaneously, the force commander outlines a clear priority of work after receiving staff and engineer advice. Engineers plan appropriately and avoid wasting scarce resources on low priority tasks.

Economy

12-17. Engineers carry out technical tasks. It is costly to employ them on tasks that carried out by other arms. Similarly, it is also costly to apply more engineer effort than necessary to complete tasks in the required time or to use engineer labor on the unskilled aspects of engineer tasks. Economy of force is facilitated by a good priority of work.

Continuity

12-18. As handovers between engineer units increase the time to complete a task and result oversight, the unit that performs the task should complete it where possible. This continuity or momentum must be retained to optimize using engineer assets.

Protection

12-19. Engineers cannot work effectively and protect themselves at the same time. Where possible and when necessary, engineers need protection.

ENGINEER SUPPORT

12-20. Engineers provide support across the engineer operational environment functions (combat, general, and geospatial engineering) to support the multinational force. This includes aviation and naval forces. The following paragraphs provide a summary of the typical tasks performed by engineers in a theater of operations. All ABCA armies have differences with regard to the responsibilities of their engineers. Liaison with the multinational force engineer staff is important.

COMBAT ENGINEERING

12-21. Combat engineering includes mobility, countermobility, and survivability and focuses on supporting combat maneuver forces at the tactical and operational levels of war. It is an integral part of a combined arms unit’s ability to maneuver. Combat engineering focuses on the support of land component forces engaged in close combat. Combat engineers support combat engineering tasks. In some cases, these tasks are performed by general engineering.

GENERAL ENGINEERING

12-22. General engineering, the most diverse of the engineer operational environment functions, are performed throughout the area of responsibility. General engineering is closely linked to the operational and strategic levels of war. As one of the areas of logistic support, general engineering is a critical component of logistic planning and operations. General engineering support—

Provides broad mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment support to the multinational force.

Enhances the combat capability of the multinational force in all phases of a combat operation.

Encompasses those engineer tasks that establish and maintain the infrastructure. These engineering tasks include the construction and repair of lines of communication, main supply routes, railroads, roads, bridges, ports, airfields, utility systems, logistic facilities, bed down or base camp facilities, and the provision of environmental services.

Includes critical enablers such as firefighting, engineer dive operations, power generation and distribution, and other specialized capabilities. It also includes support to camouflage, concealment, and deception at the operational level.

12-23. In some Services and multinational forces, these include aspects of EOD and CBRNE support.

12-24. General engineering tasks are resource and time-intensive, demanding a high degree of preplanning to meet operational requirements. While general engineering directly supports combat operations, those engineer tasks performed by general engineering support combat maneuver forces at the tactical level are often combat engineering tasks. The joint commander depends on a combination of multinational engineer units, civilian contractors, and host nation capabilities to accomplish general engineering requirements.

12-25. General engineering units perform general engineering tasks. Combat engineer units also perform these tasks in some cases. All engineer units need to execute elements of general engineering tasks consisting of repair and construction tasks. These operations include both horizontal and vertical construction and the use of both expedient repair methods and more deliberate construction methods characterized by the application of design criteria, planning, and preparation depending on the mission requirements.

GEOSPATIAL SUPPORT

12-26. Engineers provide specialized advice on the effects of terrain, climate, and weather. The successful conduct of land operations relies on commanders at all levels appreciating the terrain where operations are conducted. The better the appreciation of this terrain, the greater the degree of certainty of successful prosecution of operations. Up-to-date and accurate geospatial information enhances geospatial knowledge and situational understanding. It also helps commanders gain a better appreciation for the influence of terrain on operations.

12-27. Multinational force operations are characterized by a level of geospatial information available to commanders and their staffs. This information comes from the host nation, one or more multinational partners, or a combination of sources. Potential adversaries likely have access to the same level of geospatial information plus a far more intimate knowledge of the AO. This information minimizes the adversary’s advantage gained by local knowledge. These decision support aids help the force commander to visualize, operate on, and exploit the operational environment. Timely and relevant topographic support has the potential to be a significant combat multiplier in multinational operations.

12-28. A specialist has the capabilities to quickly acquire and provide appropriate and relevant geospatial information. This is generally a resource intensive undertaking. Topographic support relies on availability of a fundamental layer of geospatial information. The nations provide topographic support to its national component forces, but efficiencies and synergies come from this support. This is particularly true with acquiring and providing the geospatial data set. As a guiding principle, one nation has lead responsibility to acquire and provide geospatial information with other nations assigned supporting roles. This division of responsibilities is a high priority requirement addressed early in the planning.

12-29. The highest level possible coordinates geospatial information because of the complexities involved with acquiring and providing it. The multinational force engineer commander coordinates geospatial information. Longer-term information densification and maintenance responsibilities also need to be addressed early in planning. The multinational force engineer commander has access to an appropriate level of topographic advice in the engineer staff to assign responsibilities.

12-30. The Army Strategic Forces Command Commercial Imagery Team performs a complimentary geospatial information and support mission providing commercial imagery data and products to customers in any multinational environment. This team consists of space experts, satellite communications control technician, terrain data experts, topographic analysts, and an information systems specialist who produces a number of different imagery products depending on customer needs that includes image maps, change detection, terrain categorization, and multispectral analysis. This team coordinates with geospatial support teams, synchronization managers, and commercial imagery vendors to provide multinational forces with releasable commercial satellite geospatial product they need.

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS SUPPORT

12-31. Engineers are important to supporting civil affairs operations. This support involves the following:

Bridging and demining critical civilian areas or routes to enhance mobility.

Providing essential services such as power, water, sewage, and decontamination.

Firefighting.

Providing shelter.

12-32. Engineers satisfy the needs of the force as a priority before offering any residual capacity to civilian authorities. Engineers are limited to only providing advice to the civilian authorities and population on works completed.

INTEROPERABILITY AND STANDARDIZATION IN MULTINATIONAL FORCES

12-33. For Army units involved in multinational operations, one of the major operational considerations is the ability to operate with units of the other nations. Interoperability is the ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks (JP 3-0). Historically, the problems of interoperability have been solved primarily through trial and error during actual conduct of operations over an extended period of time. To avoid the problems associated with this method of interoperability, the Army participates in multinational and bilateral standardization programs.

12-34. The Department of Defense (DOD) achieves the closest practicable cooperation among the Services and DOD agencies for the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis using common or compatible procedures, criteria, corresponding organizational compatibility, sustainment, and logistics.

12-35. The Army participates in two multinational programs that work towards standardization. Those two programs are NATO and the ABCA. The result of this standardization work is NATO standardization agreements and ABCA standards.

12-36. Implementation of standardization agreements, either NATO or ABCA, are transparent to U.S. units. In the case of doctrine, implementation occurs when the content of the standardization agreement is incorporated into Army field manuals. Additionally, Soldiers of each NATO or ABCA nation use their own national doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures. To them, the interoperability is also transparent. For example, the NATO and ABCA nations agree to use the same military symbols. (See STANAG 2019.) This way, participating units passing graphic operational information, such as overlays, understand the symbols. The Army finds these military symbols in ADRP 1-02. When the nations operate together, there is no need to develop a common set of military symbols to conduct operations in NATO or ABCA forces. There are standardization agreements for the five-paragraph operation order, close-air support procedures, call-for-fire procedures, CBRNE reporting procedures, and numerous other areas.

12-37. Within a coalition, standardization agreements provide a baseline for cooperation. Additionally, in many parts of the world, there are bilateral interoperability agreements among potential coalition members in place before the formation of the coalition. Students who attend professional military development courses in other nations are additional sources for interoperability. However, in most ad hoc coalitions, not all participants are familiar with such agreements. The multinational commander relies on lead nation or designated standard operating procedures; good liaison officers; and clearly written, uncomplicated operation orders.

BIOMETRICS SUPPORT

12-38. Biometrics is the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics (JP 2-0). It is the enabling technology which cross-cuts many mission and functions, and can be particularly valuable in stability operations. Intelligence-related functions that biometrics can support or enhance include intelligence analysis, interrogation and detention tasks, high value target confirmation, and source vetting. Other missions’ biometrics can support include—

Cordon and search operations.

Raids.

Base access, checkpoints, and protection of critical sites.

Area security operations.

Border control and ports of entry.

Site exploitation.

Internment and resettlement operations.

Population census or mapping the civil considerations.

Tracking medical records and financial transactions.

12-39. Traditional U.S allies and partner nations employ biometrics in multinational operations with increasing intensity and improve results to identify known threats, disrupt the threat’s freedom of movement in the populace, link civilians to events, and verify local and third-country nationals accessing multinational forces bases and facilities.

12-40. The ability to accurately identify or verify an individual is a critical component of force protection. Biometrics enhances force protection by positively identifying persons of interest, insurgents, terrorists, criminals, and others who harm multinational forces and facilities. Regardless of disguises, aliases, or falsified paper documents, biometrics positively identify the person.

12-41. In traditional conflicts, the identity of individual combatants did not matter as their uniforms easily identified them as the enemy. However, in counterinsurgency conflicts where combatants and noncombatants dress the same and live and work together, the positive identification of individual combatants assumes much greater importance. Future conflicts can be increasingly multidimensional and complex. Threats will be a hybrid of regular forces, irregular forces, criminal elements, and terrorists operating among neutral and friendly individuals. The likelihood of future population-centric conflicts, for adversaries’ blending into the population and employing unconventional means to attack multinational forces, bears out the need for employing biometrics to increase multinational forces security by denying anonymity to enemies.

12-42. There is benefit to sharing biometric information with multinational partners, however it can be constrained by national data protection legislation and requirements data control requirements. In a multinational forces environment, forces from individual countries collect, process, store, and disseminate biometric data on separate national systems. To conform to each nation’s legislation, data sharing is performed at a national level, often to master repositories in host nations, and then disseminated among nations for use in the operational and tactical environments. Using ratified standards and common functionality by nations make interoperability between partner nations systems achievable.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

12-43. Special operations forces, together with conventional forces, integrate multinational forces. Their language capabilities, regional expertise, cultural awareness, and experience in working and training with other countries’ militaries allow the forces to improve coordination and minimize misunderstanding during multinational force operations. Specifically, special operations forces help the multinational force commander by—

Facilitating the transfer of U.S. defense articles and services under the security assistance program to eligible foreign government military units engaged in internal defense and development operations.

Assessing foreign military force capabilities and providing direction.

Providing recommendations to improve the host nation air/land/sea special operations employment and sustainment methods.

Educating foreign military force senior officers and civilians to use special operations military power.

Training foreign military forces to operate and sustain indigenous air/land/sea special operations resources and capabilities.

Advising foreign military forces and governmental agencies how to employ air/land/sea forces in operation situations.

Facilitating force integration for multinational operations.

Providing direct support to host nations by using air/land/sea resources for intelligence, communications capability, and air or aviation support.

CHECKLIST

12-44. To help commanders and staff in planning operations, the following checklist for fire support and engineer support is provided.

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

What is the nature of the multinational operation? For example, is it littoral or land and air phases?

Where does the operation lie in the range of military operations?

What is the likely scale of effort?

What are the development and dissemination of surface-to-surface and air-to-surface rules of engagement (ROE)?

Are the ROE agreed upon and understood by multinational forces according to national caveats?

Are request procedures streamlined and tested?

What is the likely duration of the operation? What are the issues of rotation and sustainability?

Are there contingency measures to meet the requirement for increased force levels? Will it be from national backfilling or fall under a call-up of reserves policy?

What is the intended end state and exit strategy?

What is the commander’s intent?

Is the national asset authority understood and agreed upon by multinational forces?

Where is the AO? Consider the climatic, terrain, cultural, political, languages, and socioeconomic issues.

What is the overall multinational force structure?

What capabilities are at the multinational level? Which will provide national support only?

What fire support assets are the multinational forces providing? What are their capabilities and command status?

What is the desired fire support organization for early entry forces?

What is the deployment timeframe?

How will the deployment be carried out (land, air, or sea)?

Surveillance Target Acquisition

What situational understandings will the multinational force have?

Will there be a common operational picture? How will intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance for maritime, land, and air units contribute to it?

How will intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance assets be coordinated and tasked? What are the combat assessment requirements?

Is there a policy for unmanned aircraft over-flights of opposing forces before hostilities?

Delivery Systems

What is the desired order of arrival of fire support assets?

What are the characteristics, capability, and quantity of fire support assets, including range, tactical, and operational mobility and authorized munitions?

What is the multinational policy for survey, meteorology, and calibration?

Weapons

What is the capability and interoperability of multinational munitions to include proofing compatibility and ballistic data contained in fire control computers?

What are the planned ammunition stocks and expenditure rates?

What are the key interoperability constraints?

Are there any special ammunition handling, storage, and environmental considerations or limitations?

Are the weapons dependent upon global positioning system signals for accuracy?

What is the status/accuracy of the global positioning system signal predicted to be during operations?

Are there any occupational health and safety constraints?

Are volumetric (blast) munitions available? If so, what are the constraints on their employment?

What nonlethal weapons are available?

Command

What are the multinational levels of command?

What will be the command relationships for fire support assets?

What is the command arrangement for conducting multinational decisive and shaping operations in longer range areas?

What are the intercomponent liaison arrangements?

Control

Will real estate requirements to support offensive operations be considered in the overall deconfliction of real estate by the G-3/S-3?

What is the requirement for liaison officers on a 24-hours per day basis?

What operational environment control procedures deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and unmanned aircraft system (UAS) assets?

What operational management requirements exist in relation to electronic warfare?

What are the multinational ROE before beginning hostilities and after committing the first hostile act?

What is the policy for using indirect fire systems using nonprecision munitions in the ROE?

What is the policy for using obscurants and illumination in the ROE?

Communications and Information Systems

How will national communications and information systems be integrated?

What multinational bearer communications systems are used?

If automatic interfaces are unworkable, what will be the liaison officer requirements? How will digitized and nondigitized forces operate together?

Logistics

What is the multinational policy on battle casualty replacement?

Based on identified operations winning equipment, what is the priority for repair of fire support assets?

What will be the intratheater repair policy?

How will ammunition be tracked around the operations?

What are the national integrated logistics systems?

What key integrated logistics systems classify as a multinational system or capability?

Are there any commercial or national constraints on employing equipment?

Doctrine

Is there a common multinational fire support doctrine, including definitions and fire support coordination procedures?

If no common multinational doctrine exists, what is the lead nation’s fire support doctrine?

What are the applicable ABCA armies standards and other standardization agreements?

What is the availability of doctrinal publications?

Organization

What is the multinational structure and staffing?

What limitations are there on the national contingent structure?

Training

When will training occur? At home, en route to operation, or in a concentration area?

Will intratheater ranges be available?

What will be the policy on test firing weapon systems intratheater?

What part will simulators play in the transition to war training strategy?

What collective training will occur?

ENGINEER PLANNING

What are the engineer multinational tasks and the division of responsibilities to achieve those tasks?

What is the engineer command structure for the mission?

Has a force engineer been appointed? What is the command, control, and coordination authority?

What are the mission-specific training requirements and responsibilities?

What are the engineer coordination interfaces?

When will these coordination measures take effect?

What are the capabilities of the allies’ engineer forces? Have these capabilities been passed on to other multinational forces?

Who is the lead nation and what force engineer capabilities are they providing?

What capabilities is the host nation providing?

What multinational documents and agreements apply to the mission, such as ABCA standards?

What are the technical standards for the mission and who is the technical authority?

What are the specific AO characteristics that affect interoperability, such as severe climatic conditions?

Who is the lead nation for mapping? Who is maintaining the common map database?

What is the threat assessment for the enemy engineer force?

Are engineers involved in targeting to assess or estimate the work required to repair infrastructure and utilities? Are engineers involved in clearing the area and route of mines and unexploded explosive ordnance at the end of the hostilities?

What are the phases and flow of engineer units, capabilities, and materiel to the mission area to support the plan?

Is this flow reflected in the multinational time-phased force and deployment list?

Are there any specific multinational engineer capabilities that could facilitate deployment?

Is there a clear multinational engineer control structure to facilitate force deployment and reception?

What are the protection requirements?

Has a common multinational facilities survey been conducted and coordinated at the force engineer level?

Is an engineer materiel management system in place?

What is the agreed command critical engineer resources list?

What are the multinational funding arrangements for multinational engineer tasks?

Are there engineer contracts with the host nation or other contractors?

What is the host nation actually providing in terms of engineer services?

How is engineer effort coordinated in the theater of operations?

What is the multinational engineer priority of work?

What are the control mechanisms to affect common engineer tasks in the multinational force?

Execution

Have the engineer mission, tasks, or both changed?

Have there been any modifications to the engineer command structure?

What are the ongoing new engineer support agreements?

What multinational documents and agreements apply to the mission, such as standardization agreements and ABCA standards?

What are the engineer requirements in the information collection plan?

What, if anything, is the impact of nongovernmental organizations and civil affairs operations activity in the theater of operations on the engineer plan?

What are the interoperability disconnects between multinational engineer partners? Are they being addressed?

What are the intratheater engineer coordination mechanisms? Are these mechanisms capturing lessons learned and informing all nations to allow intratheater adaptations to doctrine and new problems?

Are there any host nation cultural constraints and restrictions that could impact multinational engineer operations?

Redeployment

What are the environmental considerations?

What is the remediation plan?

How do engineers plan to hand over projects, facilities, and resources?

What host nation support or nongovernmental organizations will receive projects and facilities?

Is there any change to engineer command or control?

Is mission creep occurring in terms of engineer reconstruction tasks?

What engineer tasks are needed to facilitate redeployment?

What are the legal considerations for facilities and structures handover, taking cognizance of international agreements, and protocol?

What are the civil affairs operations considerations?

What is the plan for phasing engineer redeployment?

Have the engineer lessons learned been captured, documented, and recorded?

Biometrics Planning

What are the national policies on collection, analysis, fusion, and dissemination of biometrics information? What are the national caveats on data sharing, internally in the multinational force, and externally with the host nation?

Have the biometrics communication and information systems requirements been made known to the multinational forces planners?

Who will be responsible for managing AO biometric-enabled intelligence and production of biometric-enabled watch lists?

What are the standards, profiles, concept of operations, standard operating procedures, intelligence reports, and area operation standing orders for biometrics? If not present, who can provide?

What type of biometrics training/education, at various administrative levels, exists within the military formation?

Will theater of operations biometric information/data be available to support predeployment training?

Who will provide the authoritative source for biometrics data?

Chapter 13

Maritime Operations in Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by discussing the characteristics of maritime forces. It then discusses the employment of maritime forces, maritime constabulary functions, and operations in wartime. Lastly, the chapter provides a checklist for commanders and staffs.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MARITIME FORCES

13-1. Multinational maritime operations cover a range of military activities undertaken by multinational forces, in peacetime or in time of war, to exercise sea control or project power ashore. Maritime forces are primarily navies. However, these forces also include maritime-focused air forces, amphibious forces, Army watercraft and port terminal detachments, or other government agencies charged with sovereignty, security, or constabulary functions at sea. When a situation requires that maritime, land, air, space, or a combination of forces operate together, the operation is joint.

13-2. The qualities that characterize maritime forces as political and military instruments that support government policies are readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility. Maritime forces reassure or support allies and friends, deter aggression, influence unstable situations, or respond to aggression.

MARITIME FORCE READINESS

13-3. One of the strengths of maritime forces lies in their availability to respond to contingencies. Maritime forces provide a wide range of services to support peacetime operations by maintaining proficiency in the capabilities necessary to resolve major conflicts.

MARITIME FORCE FLEXIBILITY

13-4. Maritime forces resolved many international crises since the end of World War II. The inherent flexibility of maritime forces permits political leaders and commanders to shift focus on, reconfigure, and realign forces quickly to handle various contingencies. Maritime forces provide a wide range of weapons systems, military options, and logistics or administrative skills. Maritime forces control the seas and provide diplomatic leverage in peace or times of crisis. They perform tasks ranging from forcible entry and strike operations to noncombatant evacuation operations, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance. The excellent strategic and tactical command, control, and communications capabilities of maritime forces provide for a distinctly controlled force that complements diplomatic efforts. Maritime forces offer presence without occupation and deterrence without commitment. They represent a worldwide, balanced, and autonomous intervention capability that employ nationally or multinationally.

MARITIME FORCE SELF SUSTAINABILITY

13-5. Although the nature of the operation and the types of units committed by the participants determine the degree of self-sustainment achievable by a multinational force, maritime forces operate in forward areas at the end of long supply lines without significant land-based supply structure. With replenishment-at-sea, on-station replacement of personnel and ships, and the resilience of ships (their ability to sustain damage and continue the mission), maritime operations may continue indefinitely.

MARITIME FORCE MOBILITY

13-6. Maritime forces are less constrained by political boundaries than air or ground forces. Maritime forces deploy virtually anywhere in the world and transit the seas according to international law. With their strategic, operational, and tactical mobility, maritime forces—

Monitor a situation passively.

Remain on station for a sustained period.

Respond to a crisis rapidly.

Deploy in combat with authority.

13-7. Mobility enables maritime forces to respond from over the horizon, becoming selectively visible and threatening to adversaries as needed. If diplomatic, political, or economic measures succeed, maritime forces withdraw without further action ashore. Maritime forces respond to indications of pending crises by relocating rapidly from one end of the theater of operations to another or from one theater of operations to another, usually independent of fixed logistics. In combat, the ability to position maritime forces quickly provides commanders with a significant tactical and operational advantage.

EMPLOYMENT OF MARITIME FORCES

13-8. Maritime forces are forces that operate on, under, or above the sea to gain or exploit command of the sea, sea control, or sea denial and/or to project power from the sea. These forces ensure continued, unhindered, and unrestricted use of the sea to further national or shared interests and objectives. The following paragraphs discuss the nature of maritime force employment in peace and war. The distinctions drawn between peacetime and wartime operations are not clear-cut in many instances.

OPERATIONS IN PEACETIME

13-9. Maritime forces lend themselves well to various peacetime operations, which differ from wartime operations in some respects. Although in some situations, peacetime operations influence governments and military forces (presence and deterrence), these operations influence nonnational entities, such as criminal organizations and transnational groups. Nongovernmental and nonmilitary organizations have experience and finances to conduct certain operations and are involved in peacetime operations to varying degrees. Maritime forces recognize the contributions they bring to an operation. In some contingencies, maritime forces operate more in a supporting or enabling role, contributing a supply of well-trained and equipped personnel who adapt and sustain themselves. Peacetime operations have a varying mix of security, humanitarian, and environmental components and are grouped under the following headings.

Presence and Deterrence

13-10. The presence of maritime forces avoids confrontation and supports political aims without necessarily violating national sovereignty. Maritime forces strengthen diplomatic efforts by “showing the flag” (presence) in a benign fashion. This shows interest and latent capability and prevents emerging conflicts. Alternately, maritime forces deter against specific actions. Maritime forces “shield” states at their request by establishing an at-sea presence in territorial seas. This provides a “trip-wire” function in threatened areas. These operations are fraught with danger because not all parties cooperate with or refrain from challenging such deployments. Nevertheless, using maritime forces is less intrusive than using land-based forces.

Peace Operations

13-11. Peace operations cover a range of activities including conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building. Using maritime forces in peace operations complement land forces and involve a considerable range of tasks. These tasks include the following:

Monitoring or observing cease-fires.

Interpositioning between the maritime forces of belligerents.

Establishing disengagement zones.

Providing a neutral venue for supervised negotiations.

Preventing forces of the belligerent parties from violating agreements.

Providing humanitarian operations.

13-12. Maritime forces support humanitarian aid efforts that relieve or reduce the suffering, loss of life, and damage to property caused by natural or man-made disasters. Maritime forces provide a secure environment to allow the humanitarian relief efforts of other organizations to progress as directed by cognizant legal authority. Short notice readiness, flexibility, and mobility allow maritime forces to respond quickly to a disaster, particularly if the forces have Marines or other troops embarked. Maritime forces supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation, civil authorities, or nongovernmental organizations. Maritime forces provide personnel, equipment, supply, medical and dental care, security, limited construction and engineering, communication, and transportation support.

Protection of Shipping and Freedom of Navigation

13-13. When nations make claims over contested waters, challenges to freedom of navigation arise. In such instances, maritime forces exercise freedom of navigation by traversing or exercising in the contested waters (according to recognized international law). Maritime forces also protect merchant shipping with flag-state consent that could be threatened.

MARITIME CONSTABULARY FUNCTIONS

13-14. In the last three decades, developments in international maritime law, particularly the extension of national authority further from shore, has resulted in various low-intensity constabulary functions. These functions involve naval forces and coast guards, civilian maritime agencies, or both. Specific functions include the following:

Enforcement of fisheries regulations and exclusive economic zone arrangements.

Operations against piracy.

Counterterrorism.

Interdiction of drugs and other contraband trade.

Interdiction of the slave trade or illegal migration.

Enforcement of environmental regulations.

Control of traffic separation schemes and other maritime traffic management tasks.

ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATIONS

13-15. Maritime forces respond to oil spills and other environmental disasters. In these cases, maritime forces are a valuable source of trained and disciplined personnel with necessary equipment. These operations support other governmental, international, or private agencies whose missions include disaster response.

EMBARGOES AND MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

13-16. Maritime forces enforce internationally imposed sanctions. Effectively enforcing sanctions require sophisticated coordinating military operations at sea with those in the air. This is especially true in areas of armed conflict or high tension, where the absence of commonly understood and accepted ROE greatly increase the risks to enforcement units. Tasks include—

Stopping, inspecting, seizing, and diverting suspect ships and aircraft.

Establishing and enforcing a maritime exclusion zone for the maritime vessels of one or more parties to a conflict.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION

13-17. Forces conduct noncombatant evacuation operation to move personnel from an area where deteriorating security conditions place lives at risk. This type of operation is similar to an amphibious raid, involving swift incursion, temporary occupation of an objective, and fast withdrawal after the mission is completed. During noncombatant evacuation operation, rules of engagement (ROE) limits using force required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. Maritime forces have an integral capability to accomplish noncombatant evacuation without assistance from other forces. If not, ships stationed at sea provide lift capability and the close, secure staging areas for other forces. By evacuating directly from a secure site to ships outside territorial seas, a very low political profile is maintained. The evacuation force commander handles the political sensitivity of the monitored situation, if not controlled, from the highest level.

OPERATIONS IN WARTIME

13-18. In wartime, the activities of the maritime force achieve sea control and projecting power ashore.

SEA CONTROL

13-19. Use of the sea requires a degree of control. Total sea control is rarely possible as long as an adversary continues to threaten forces in the area. Therefore, a degree of sea control is established in a designated area for a defined time. Sea control provides security for forces, facilities, and sea lines of communication. Large maritime forces using an area for their own purposes achieve and maintain sufficient sea control. Smaller specialist forces and civilian shipping requires sea control by other forces or escorts. Sea denial is a subset of sea control. Maritime forces achieve sea denial when those forces prevent an opposing force from using the sea for its own purposes. Forces exercise sea denial in a given area and for a limited time.

POWER PROJECTION

13-20. Conflicts at sea are rarely isolated from a land campaign or the pursuit of territorial objectives. Even when the maritime component is operationally dominant, the outcome in the theater of operations depends on success ashore. Maritime forces operate in the littoral environment to project force ashore as part of joint operations involving naval, air, and land forces. Naval forces are normally the first forces into a crisis area and comprise the enabling force that allows a joint force access to the region. Naval forces contribute to operations ashore by conducting operations in direct or indirect support of those land operations. A maritime commander responsible for sea control plans and executes power projection actions—such as a maritime air attack of a littoral enemy air field—to achieve, maintain, or achieve and maintain sea control.

CHECKLIST

13-21. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the maritime portion of the operation.

Has liaison been established with the maritime headquarters?

Has a maritime component commander been named?

Has the staff identified the supported and supporting relationships with the maritime element?

Chapter 14

Air Operations in Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by discussing the principles in multinational air operations. It then discusses air defense, the Army Air and Missile Defense Command, airfield operations, and unmanned aircraft systems. Lastly, the chapter provides a checklist for commanders and staffs.

MULTINATIONAL AIR OPERATIONS PRINCIPLES

14-1. Multinational air operations gain and maintain sufficient control of the air for exploiting air power to achieve the multinational commander’s objectives or achieve strategic goals through a multinational campaign. Unified action is important for air power. To achieve its greatest effects, air power is concentrated at a decisive point in time and space.

14-2. Air operations are based on two principles:

Attain the strength of unified air action.

Ensure that the capabilities of air power are used efficiently as the overall situation demands.

14-3. The first principle is that unity of command facilitates the ability to meet air power needs in obtaining the multinational objectives. This occurs by designating a multinational air component commander. The second principle is that centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space power provides theater-wide focus and allows operational flexibility to meet theater of operations objectives.

MULTINATIONAL AND COMPONENT COMMANDER

14-4. The multinational commander designates a multinational air component commander to control the capabilities of air operations. The multinational commander establishes the authority and command relationships of the multinational air component commander and assigns responsibilities. Responsibilities include planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking joint air operations based on the multinational commander’s concept of operations and air apportionment decision. These activities rely on the full representation and expertise of all elements of the multinational force contributing to the air operation plan. At the tactical level of operations, the multinational air component commander’s authority includes exercising tactical command over assigned and attached forces and tactical control over other military capabilities or forces available for tasking.

14-5. The multinational commander establishes supporting and supported relationships between components to facilitate operations. The commander retains the option of controlling air operations directly using the multinational headquarters staff. The multinational commander vests authority in a component commander to carry out the duties of the airspace control authority and air defense commander. Because the multinational air component commander is responsible for air operations and airspace control measures and air defense operations have an integrated relationship, the multinational air component commander is the most likely choice for appointment as the airspace control authority and area air defense commander. Any division of these responsibilities require detailed coordination for safe and effective air operations.

AIR OPERATIONS PLANNING AND TASKING

14-6. Air operations planning involves—

Identifying air objectives that contribute to the multinational campaign objectives.

Determining the air strategy to exploit multinational air assets to support the multinational objectives.

Identifying centers of gravity to satisfy the multinational force’s strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.

14-7. Air operations planning develops the concept of operations that describes the best course of action and produces the air operation plan. This plan articulates and communicates multinational air component commander’s strategy for achieving the multinational commander’s operational plan.

14-8. The air tasking cycle promotes efficient and effective use of the available multinational air capabilities and assets. It begins with the multinational commander’s air apportionment and culminates with the combat assessment of previous missions and sorties. The cycle provides repetition for planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking air missions and sorties while following the multinational commander’s guidance. The cycle accommodates changes in the operational situation or to the commander’s guidance. It also accommodates late notice requests for support from other commanders. The air tasking cycle is an analytical, systematic approach that focuses targeting efforts on supporting operational requirements to produce an air tasking order. A timely multinational air tasking order is critical. Other commanders conduct planning and operations based on the content and scheduling in the air tasking order and depend on its accuracy.

AIRSPACE CONTROL

14-9. Airspace control complements and supports the multinational commander’s campaign plan without adding undue restrictions and with minimal adverse impact on the capabilities of any multinational forces. Each commander uses the airspace with maximum freedom consistent with the degree of operational risk directed by the multinational commander. Airspace control procedures—

Prevent mutual interference.

Facilitate air defense identification.

Accommodate and expedite the safe flow of all air traffic.

Enhance combat effectiveness to support the multinational objectives.

Prevent fratricide.

14-10. When designated by the multinational commander, the airspace control authority must—

Establish an airspace control system.

Prepare the airspace control plan.

Promulgate the relevant airspace control orders.

Implement airspace control means.

Harmonize regional airspace control plans.

14-11. Rapidly distributing the airspace control orders and updates to all commanders within the force in the area of responsibility is important while operating an airspace control system. The airspace coordination center supports the airspace control authority. The airspace coordination center represents all component commanders with air assets. All component commanders comply with the airspace control plan. However, the multinational commander provides procedures to adjudicate differences that the airspace control authority and the component commanders cannot resolve. Centralized direction by the airspace control authority does not imply that it assumes operational control or tactical control over any air assets.

AIR DEFENSE

14-12. Air defense is a multinational force responsibility. Multinational air defense integrates the capabilities of all component air defense assets to protect and influence the operational environment associated with the multinational campaign plan. If area air defense commanders are not airspace control authorities, they must coordinate with the airspace control authority to ensure that the air defense plan and airspace control order are synchronized to support air defense operations. Area air defense commanders plan and direct the multinational air defense assets that the component commanders execute. Air defense commanders—

Protect the force from hostile air activity.

Integrate and coordinate the force’s air defense assets into a multinational air defense plan (including the host nation air defense systems).

Promulgate and employ common procedures for air operation management and the reduction of mutual interference.

Control and coordinate all air defense operations by the component commanders.

Coordinate with the air component authority to ensure that the airspace control plan supports air defense operations.

ARMY AIR AND COMMAND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND

14-13. The US Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) is the Army’s operational lead for Army theater air and missile defense. In wartime, the AAMDC deploys into the theater of operations to support the Army commander or, if designated, the joint force land component commander. The joint force air component commander ensures that Army theater air and missile defense operations are properly coordinated and integrated with those of joint and multinational forces.

14-14. Also, based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations (METT-TC) and augmentation with Army and joint, interagency, and multinational personnel, it serves as an operational protection integrator for the Army forces or the joint force. In peacetime, the AAMDC ensures Army echelons above corps air defense forces are properly trained and ready to support theater air and missile defense operations. The AAMDC plans and executes a variety of training activities, exercises, and simulations to ensure force readiness. It also coordinates with joint and multinational partners to develop procedures for combined theater air and missile defense operations, interoperability, and training. The AAMDC also supports homeland defense operations.

AIRFIELD OPERATIONS

14-15. Airfield operations battalions with augmentation of weather support, firefighting capability, airfield lighting, cargo handling, and navigational aid systems support the joint operations of intertheater and intratheater transport and movement.

14-16. Airfield operations battalions’ support to maritime operations includes airfield operations in close proximity to seaports of debarkation. These airfields increase the responsiveness and versatility of naval operations such as resupply, troops, and equipment movement.

14-17. Well-established airfields that are maintained contribute to aviation tactical sustainment operations including air movement and aerial sustainment to support special operations, infantry, airborne, air assault, and heavy forces. These airfields also support high priority resupply and air movement throughout the theater of operations.

14-18. Airfield operations battalions support special operations forces and interagency elements including aviation missions launched and recovered from Army airfields. Compatible communications, synchronization, and dissemination of airspace and airfield procedures challenge the airfield operations battalion.

14-19. Multinational operations parallel joint and interagency support. The airfield operations battalions resolve language and cultural challenges to support these types of operations.

14-20. The airfield planning principles and services are based on the types of aircraft using the airfield and the tasks associated with the airfield’s mission depending on METT-TC.

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

14-21. An unmanned aircraft system (UAS) significantly increases situational understanding and the ability to influence current and future operations when employed as a tactical reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition platform. UAS provides near real time environment information, precision engagement, and increased command and control capabilities to prosecute the fight and shape the environment for future operations. UAS capabilities are maximized when employed as part of an integrated and synchronized effort. Similar to rotary wing Army Aviation, UAS are limited by environmental conditions. Examples of environmental conditions that affect UAS operations are visibility restrictions, ceilings, and thunderstorms. Army UAS are restricted to visual flight rules.

14-22. The Army UAS helps accomplish the following warfighting functions:

Movement and maneuver.

Intelligence.

Fires.

Sustainment.

Mission command.

Protection.

14-23. Army UASs are organized and developed to provide three echelons of operations:

Battalion and below–characterized by close-range (less than 25 kilometers), short-duration missions (one to two hours), below coordinating altitude, and integrated with ground forces as an organic asset supporting operations.

Brigade level with brigade combat team and the battlefield surveillance brigade – characterized by medium-range (less than 125 kilometers), medium duration missions, through integration with ground forces and other aviation assets.

Division and above –characterized by extended-range (200 kilometers), long duration (16 hours or more), direct support, and general support mission.

14-24. This stratification of UAS maximizes operations and provides a combat enabler to maneuver forces.

14-25. UAS organizations have the ability to operate under the following conditions, but are not limited to—

A subordinate unit assigned, attached, or operationally controlled or tactically controlled to another Service.

Near ground forces.

Day or night.

Controlled and uncontrolled airspace.

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (to avoid intentional contamination).

Complex terrain and urban environments.

CHECKLIST

14-26. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the air portion of the operation.

Has the multinational commander designated a multinational air component commander?

Has the multinational commander designated an airspace control authority?

Has the multinational commander designated an area air defense commander?

Has the multinational air operations center and the other appropriate headquarters established liaison?

What are the capabilities and limitations of multinational airpower? Have commanders and staffs been briefed?

Have planners considered all elements of airpower in the employment of multinational fires?

What is the desired air defense organization for early entry forces?

Has the multinational air component commander published special instructions? Are they consistent with the rules of engagement (ROE)?

Has an airfield operations manual been published?

Who are the organizations controlling the UAS?

Are command priorities clear for UAS effort?

Does the command, control, and communication of UAS support commander’s intent?

What are the plans to conduct strategic deployment of UAS?

Have administrative and tactical movements been performed?

Have supported maneuver units been coordinated with?

Have precision direct-fire engagements been performed?

Do UAS gather information supporting intelligence preparation of the battlefield?

Do UAS organizations use the full communication capabilities to distribute combat information?

Is the UAS mission planning is the manned aviation?

What are the types of UAS available for deployment?

Is there a good knowledge of functions/capabilities for available UAS?

What are the recognized aural signatures?

What are the UAS vulnerabilities?

What are the UAS weapons employment capabilities?

What is the unmanned aircraft’s organization training programs? (For example, attack operations, call for fire operations, operational area security, mission command, emergency procedures, intelligence operations, reconnaissance and security operations, airspace control, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) exposure avoidance, and surveys and decontamination.)

Glossary

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAMDC | US Army Air and Missile Defense Command
ABCA | American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies’ Program
ADP | Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP | Army Doctrine Reference Publication
AHS | Army health system
AJP | Allied Joint Publication
AR | Army Regulation
ATTP | Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
AO | area of operations
ARRC | Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps
CJ-3 | coalition operations directorate of a joint staff; operations staff section
CALL | Center for Army Lessons Learned
CFC | Combined Forces Command
CBRNE | chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives
DA | Department of the Army
DOD | Department of Defense
EOD | explosive ordnance disposal
FM | field manual
G-1 | assistant chief of staff, personnel
G-2 | assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 | assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4 | assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-5 | assistant chief of staff, plans
G-6 | assistant chief of staff, signal
G-7 | assistant chief of staff, inform and influence activities
G-8 | assistant chief of staff, financial management
G-9 | assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
ISAF | International Security Assistance Force
ISR | intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J-4 | logistics directorate of a joint staff; logistics staff section
JP | joint publication
METT-TC | mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations
MISO | military information support operations
NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PKSOI | Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
ROE | rules of engagement
S-1 | battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
S-2 | batallion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 | battalion or brigade operations, staff officer
S-4 | battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-5 | battalion or brigade plans staff officer
S-6 | battalion or brigade signal staff officer
S-7 | battalion or brigade inform and influence activities staff officer
S-9 | battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
SOFA | status-of-forces agreement
SOLLIMS | Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System
STANAG | standardization agreement
TC | Training Circular
UAS | unmanned aircraft systems
UN | United Nations
USCENTCOM | U.S. Central Command

SECTION II – TERMS

alliance

The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 3-0)

biometrics

The process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics. (JP 2-0)

biometrics-enabled intelligence

The information associated with and/or derived from biometric signatures and associated contextual information that positively identifies a specific person and/or matches an unknown identity to a place, activity, device, component, or weapon. (ADRP 2-0)

coalition

A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 5-0)

counterintelligence

Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. (JP 2-01.2)

geospatial intelligence

The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial intelligence. (JP 2-03)

human intelligence

A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (JP 2-0)

information environment

The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (JP 3-13)

information operations

The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. (JP 3-13)

information-related capability

A tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions. (JP 3-13)

intelligence operations

The tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements. (ADRP 2-0)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. (JP 2-01)

interoperability

The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. (JP 3-0)

lead agency

The U.S. Government agency designed to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. (JP 3-08)

measurement and signature intelligence

Intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the emitter or sender, and to facilitate subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted.(JP 2-0)

mission command

The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0)

multinational operations

A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of the coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16)

open-source intelligence

Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. (JP 2-0)

signals intelligence

A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. (JP 2-0)

standardization

The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable cooperation among the Services and Department of Defense agencies for the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility. (JP 4-02)

targeting

The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0)

technical intelligence

Intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary’s technological advantages. (JP 2-0)

threat assessment

In antiterrorism, examining the capabilities, intentions, and activities, past and present, of terrorist organizations as well as the security environment within which friendly forces operate to determine the level of threat. (JP 3-07.2)

unity of effort

Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

unmanned aircraft system

That system whose components include the necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft. (JP 3-52)

References

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 24 September 2013.

JP 1-02. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010 (as amended through 15 September 2013).

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm

JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013.

JP 1-04. Legal Support to Military Operations. 17 August 2011.

JP 1-05. Religious Affairs in Joint Operations. 20 November 2013.

JP 1-06. Financial Management Support in Joint Operations. 2 March 2012.

JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013.

JP 2-01. Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 5 January 2012.

JP 2-01.2. Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations. 26 August 2011.

JP 2-03. Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations. 31 October 2012.

JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011.

JP 3-07.2. Antiterrorism. 24 November 2010.

JP 3-07.3 Peace Operations. 01 August 2012.

JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011.

JP 3-09. Joint Fire Support. 30 June 2010.

JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012.

JP 3-16. Multinational Operations. 16 July 2013.

JP 3-33. Joint Task Force Headquarters. 30 July 2012.

JP 3-34. Joint Engineer Operations. 30 June 2011.

JP 3-52. Joint Airspace Control. 20 May 2010.

JP 4-0. Joint Logistics. 16 October 2013.

JP 4-02. Health Service Support. 26 July 2012.

JP 4-08. Logistics in support of Multinational Operations. 21 February 2013.

JP 4-10. Operational Contract Support. 17 October 2008.

JP 5-0. Joint Operation Planning.11 August 2011.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: http://www.apd.army.mil/

Army regulations are produced only in electronic media. Most are available online: http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/index.html.

ADP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 10 October 2011.

ADP 6-0 (FM 6-0). Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-0 (FM 3-0). Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.

ADRP 3-09. Fires. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2012.

ADRP 6-0 (FM 6-0). Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

AR 11-2. Managers’ Internal Control Program. 4 January 2010.

ATTP 4-10. Operational Contract Support Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 20 June 2011.

FM 1-04. Legal Support to the Operational Army. 18 March 2013.

FM 1-06. Financial Management Operations. 4 April 2011.

FM 3-13. Inform and Influence Activities. 25 January 2013.

FM 3-34. Engineer Operations. 4 August 2011.

FM 5-19. Composite Risk Management. 21 August 2006.

TC 2-91.8. Document and Media Exploitation. 8 June 2010.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Most ABCA publications are available online: http://www.abca-armies.org.

Multinational Engineer Handbook

ABCA Publication 256. Coalition Health Interoperability Handbook.15 July 2009.

Most NATO publications are available online: http://nsa.nato.int/nsa

AJP-01 (D). Allied Joint Publication - Allied Joint Doctrine. 21 December 2010.

AJP 3-10. Joint Security Operations in Theater.

AJP-4. Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine. December 2003.

AJP 4.5. Allied Joint Doctrine for Host Nations Support. 6 May 2013.

NATO Logistics Handbook.

STANAG 2019. NATO Joint Military Symbology. 24 May 2011.

STANAG 6025 Ed. 2. Financial Principles and Procedures for the provision of support & the establishment of multinational arrangements. 23 January 2013.

WEB SITES

Web sites were accessed October 2013.

American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies’ Program (ABCA). www.abca-armies.org/

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). http://call.army.mil

DOD Financial Management Reg 7000. 14-R, v 15. http://comptroller.defense.gov/fmr/

Relief Web. www.reliefweb.int

Stability Operations Lessons Learned & Information Management Systems (SOLLIMS). https://www.pksoi.org/index.cfm

United Nations (UN). http://www.un.org/en

PRESCRIBED FORMS

None.

REFERENCED FORMS

Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing

Directorate (APD) Web site (http://www.apd.army.mil).

DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

Index

Entries are by paragraph number unless indicated otherwise.

A

air defense, 14-12

airfield operations, 14-15–14-20

airspace coordination center, 14-11

Army health system

principles, 11-3

role, 11-1–11-2

alliance, 1-6, 2-10-2-11, 2-17-2-19, 5-5, 6-31, 7-2-7-3, 7-8, 9-35, 12-3

C

campaign preparation, 5-6–5-7

civil affairs operations

cooperation, 9-9–9-10

definitions and terminology, 9-8

functions of, 9-11–9-14

guidelines of, 9-15

key factors, 9-30–9-34

key organizations, 9-38–9-39

legal parameters, 9-28–9-29

military planning in, 9-84–9-92

principles in, 9-16–9-27

purpose, 9-6–9-7

civilian community, military support, 9-75–9-83

capabilities, 9-76–9-77

guidelines, 9-81–9-83

tasks, 9-78–9-80

civilian contractor concept, 6-45–6-47

civilian development agencies, 9-52

civil-military cooperation, 9-1–9-5

coalition, 1-1,1-5,1-7-1-8, 2-5-2-6, 2-8, 2-10-2-11, 2-14-2-17, 2-23, 2-27, 2-34, 2-56, 4-4, 4-9, 5-26, 9-29, 9-33, 9-35, 9-42, 9-66, 9-85, 9-88, 10-9, 10-12, 12-3, 12-37

combat engineering, 12-21

command and control interoperability, 2-50–2-55

command authority, 2-30–2-31

illustrated, figure 2-2

command historian, 2-77

command jurisdiction, 2-24

command structure, 2-6–2-23

combination, 2-16

integrated, 2-17-2-23

lead nation, 2-12-2-14

parallel, 2-15

types, 2-10

command surgeon

responsibilities, 11-7–11-10

commander's intent, 5-13

common goals identification, 9-24

communication

establishment, 2-101–2-106

contractors, 5-33–5-35

coordination, 9-17

coordination centers, 2-49

E

economy of effort, 9-26

engineer,

support, 12-20–12-32

tasks and responsibilities, 12-8–12-19

environmental considerations, 3-36

F

fire support, 12-4–12-7

flexibility, 8-10

force logistic support center, 6-44

force projection, 5-8–5-9

foreign criminal jurisdiction, 3-19–3-20

G

G-1, 2-64

G-2, 2-65

G-3, 2-66

G-4, 2-67

G-5, 2-68

G-6, 2-69

G-7, 2-70

G-8, 2-71

G-9, 2-72

geospatial intelligence, 4-21

H

health service support, 11-25

health threat assessment, 11-17–11-18

host nation, 6-16–6-23

human resources

legal advisor, 3-8–3-10

reception center, 3-4

religious ministry, 3-6–3-7

support, 3-1–3-3

visitor's bureau, 3-5

human rights agencies, 9-51

humanitarian action, 9-40–9-53

I

information coordination, 7-6–7-8

information environment, 7-1–7-4

information gathering, 4-16–4-19

intelligence, 4-23–4-24

intelligence capabilities, complementary, 4-22

intelligence operations, 4-20–4-21

interagency processes, 10-12–10-16

intermediate staging base, 6-49–6-50

international law, 3-24–3-25

intergovernmental organizations, 9-44–9-50

interorganizational resource guidance, 10-6–10-11

financial advice and requirements, 10-7–10-8

funding, 10-9–10-11

interpreters, 2-95–2-100

J

joint and multinational focus, 8-8

jurisdiction, 3-12–3-16,

K

knowledge of partners, 1-21

L

lead agencies, 9-41–9-42

lead nation concept, 6-43

legal considerations, 3-11–3-35

liaison network, 2-40–2-48

linguists, 2-95–2-100

local authorities, 9-72

logistics

planning, 6-10–6-15

responsibility for, 6-6–6-9

M

maritime constabulary functions, 13-14–13-17

maritime force, 13-1–13-2

characteristics, 13-1–13-2

employment of, 13-8–13-13

flexibility, 13-4

mobility, 13-6

readiness, 13-3

self sustainability, 13-5

medical planning, 11-15–11-16

medical staff, 11-4–11-6

medical support

countermeasures, 11-21–11-22

policies and issues, 11-19–11-20

METT-TC, 5-34, 10-11, 14-14, 14-20

military capabilities, 12-1–12-2

military civil affairs forces, 9-73–9-74

military mission, primacy, 9-25

mission command, 2-4

mission focus, 5-10–5-12

multinational force operations, movement, 6-48

multinational forces communications and processing, 4-8–4-9

multinational forces control, 2-39–2-49

multinational forces interoperability and standardization, 12-33–12-43

multinational forces operations planning, 4-6–4-7

multinational forces planning groups, 5-20–5-21

multinational force staffing, 2-57–2-100

multinational forces training, 5-40–5-51

multinational information sharing, 4-3–4-5

multinational intelligence, 4-1–4-2

multinational air operations

airspace control, 14-9–14-11

multinational and component commander, 14-4–14-5

planning and tasking, 14-6–14-8

principles, 14-1–14-3

multinational operations

effective coordination, 4-10–4-11

fundamentals, 1-1-1-4

nature of, 1-9-1-12

purpose, 2-1-2-3

structure, 1-5

multinational resource management, 10-1–10-2

multinational resource manager, 10-3–10-5

mutual confidence, 1-13-1-26

N

national capabilities, 2-107–2-119

national donor organizations, 9-49–9-50

nongovernmental organizations, 9-46–9-48

organizational structure, 9-65–9-74

understanding, 9-57–9-61

O

operational contract support, 6-24–6-39

operations in wartime, 13-18–13-20

P

patience, 1-24-1-25

planning

early, 5-2

political advisor, 2-75

prisoners of war, 3-26–3-30

predeployment, 4-26, 5-2, 5-41, 5-50

training, 9-89

prioritization, 8-9

protection

concept for, 8-11–8-14

constituents of, 8-16–8-28

mission command, 8-29–8-30

principles, 8-5–8-10

request for, 8-15

public affairs, 2-79–2-94

R

rapport, 1-15-1-18

relationships, 9-27

respect, 1-19-1-20

risk management, 8-7

ROE, 3-31–3-35

S

security, 9-62–9-64

SOFA, 3-21

stability operations support, 4-12–4-15

standards of care, 11-23–11-24

strategic scheme, 5-3–5-5

support to civil environment, 9-13

support to the force, 9-14

T

team building, 1-13, 1-22, 5-41

theater of operations

integration, 6-56

onward movement, 6-53–6-55

reception, 6-51

staging, 6-52

threat assessment, 8-6

balanced, 8-17

transfer of authority, 5-14–5-19

transition planning, 5-22–5-36

transparency, 9-23

trust, 1-26

transition

principles, 5-36

U

UAS, 14-21–14-25

UN, 6-41–6-42, 9-71

unity of effort, 6-2–6-5, 9-18

use of force, 3-17–3-18

FM 3-16

8 April 2014

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE

Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

1405702

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number (IDN) 115743, requirements for FM 3-16.