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Preface

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-91 provides the Army and joint community additional guidance on the conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks by the division echelon. (Defense Support of Civil Authorities tasks are discussed in ADP/ADRP 3-28.) It describes tactics and techniques that have been tested in the conduct of actual operations. It expounds on the doctrinal fundamentals established in Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRP) 3-0, 3-07, and 3-90. These ADRPs must be read before reading ATP 3-91 since they establish doctrine for the conduct of decisive action and describe the operational art and the art and science of tactics. It is necessary to study ADRPs 1-02, 5-0, and 6-0 to understand the Army’s operational terms and military symbols that form the basis for the language of land operations, the Army’s operations process, and Army mission command. These documents provide the foundation on which this publication rests. It is also necessary to have studied the remaining ADRPs (2-0, 3-05, 3-09, 3-37, 4-0, 6-22, and 7-0) that provide information on the other elements of combat power and how to conduct effective training. It is desirable that readers have studied applicable joint doctrine, such as Joint Publications (JP) 1 and 3-0. They should also be familiar with the specific operational environment existing in the region where they will conduct operations.

The principle audience for ATP 3-91 is division commanders and staffs, and subordinate commanders and their staffs. These audiences should have a working knowledge of those field manuals (FMs) and ATPs that apply to their functional specialties. The focus of ATP 3-91 is the conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks by the division. It also serves as a guide for joint force, theater Army, corps, and supporting commanders regarding the employment of a U.S. Army division.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate according to the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

ATP 3-91 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-91 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ATP 3-91 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. These terms and their definitions will be included in the next revision of ADRP 1-02. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 3-91 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

The proponent for ATP 3-91 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and recommendations on a Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United Sates Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZLMCK-D (ATP 3-91), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2337; by email to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil: or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

Introduction

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-91, Division Operations, supports Doctrine 2015. ATP 3-91 expands on the doctrine and tactics contained in field manual (FM) 3-94.

ATP 3-91 makes numerous changes from the obsolete 1996 edition of FM 71-100. The most significant change is the introduction of unified land operations as the Army’s operational concept. The doctrine of unified land operations describes how the Army demonstrates its core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security through three elements of decisive action—offense, defense, and stability.

Additional major changes in ATP 3-91 from the obsolete 1996 edition of FM 71-100 include addressing the incorporation of modularity into the Army force structure and a revision of the doctrinal terminology to reflect changes over the almost two decades since this echelon manual was last published.

Divisions conducting operations in the territorial limits of the United States (U.S.) and its territories must be imminently familiar with the doctrine contained in ADP/ADRP 3-28. They must also constantly consult with the lawyers assigned to their judge advocate general staff section to ensure conformity of division actions with the situational constraints placed on the division due to the environment in which they are operating.

ATP 3-91 is consistent with FM 3-94 on key topics while adding additional information on division tactics and techniques as necessary.

ATP 3-91 contains eight chapters:

Chapter 1 briefly reviews the division’s four roles from FM 3-94. It reviews the division organization from that same FM. It reviews the organization and capabilities of those brigades and other support routinely available to the division and provides references to where detailed discussions of those organizations can be found. It discusses considerations for force tailoring the division and task organizing attached brigades. It refreshes the reader of the operational frameworks available to the division.

Chapter 2 briefly reviews the Army’s approach to mission command, discusses the division mission command system and then discusses the employment of the division’s command posts. It also does not discuss the internal cells and elements in the division headquarters and the headquarters and headquarters battalion which are addressed in FM 3-94. It does not discuss the generic commander and staff tasks and the five additional tasks residing in the mission command warfighting function. This is because they are addressed in ADRP 6-0, FM 6-0 and other publications. It also does not discuss the division headquarters and headquarters battalion which is addressed in FM 3-94.

Chapter 3 introduces a fictional scenario used in the following four chapters as a discussion vehicle for illustrating one of the many ways that a division might conduct decisive action. It is not intended to be prescriptive of how the division should conduct any particular operations. The scenario focuses on potential challenges confronting a division commander in accomplishing a mission.

Chapter 4 discusses a division being tailored by higher headquarters for the scenario introduced in the previous chapter. It highlights many of the deployment challenges facing a division stationed in the continental United States (CONUS) for a short-notice contingency operation.

Chapter 5 discusses different techniques that a defending Army division focused on the defeat of an attacking enemy can use. It addresses the conduct of different defense tasks in the previously introduced scenario.

Chapter 6 discusses different techniques that an attacking Army division focused on the defeat of a defending enemy can use. It addresses the conduct of different offensive tasks in the previously introduced scenario.

Chapter 7 discusses different techniques that an Army division focused on the conduct of stability tasks can use to accomplish its mission. It addresses all of the primary stability tasks and the techniques that a division might use to accomplish those subordinate stability tasks that a division might need to execute in the previously introduced scenario.

Chapter 8 addresses special topics which are not adequately address in this publication’s other chapters. These special topics are:

Division reconnaissance.

Division security.

Division mobility.

Division air support enablers.

Division counter-unmanned aerial system (UAS) operations.

Division cyber space operations.

Division as a regionally aligned force.

Based on current doctrinal changes, certain terms for which ATP 3-91 is proponent have been added or modified for purposes of this manual. The glossary contains acronyms and defined terms.

Introductory Table-1. New Army terms

Term | Remarks
cordon security | New term and definition.
convoy security | New term and definition.
Level I threat | New Army term and definition.
Level II threat | New Army term and definition.
Level III threat | New Army term and definition.

Chapter 1

The Division

This chapter discusses the four roles of the division. It also discusses considerations for force tailoring the division and task organizing attached brigades. This chapter reminds the reader of the operational frameworks established in ADRP 3-0 that are available to the division.

GENERAL

1-1. A division is an Army echelon of command above brigade and below corps. It is a tactical headquarters which employs a combination of brigade combat teams, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades in land operations (ADRP 3-90). As a tactical echelon of command, the division commander task-organizes subordinate units and specifies the command or support relationships of those subordinate units. The division headquarters is a self-contained organization with a command group and a fully functional staff that requires limited staff support from subordinate units to provide functional staff capabilities for its primary role as a tactical headquarters. The division headquarters provides a flexible base where the division commander exercises mission command.

THE FOUR ROLES OF THE DIVISION

1-2. A division headquarters can find itself conducting one of four roles. The primary role of the division headquarters is to be a tactical headquarters. The division commander shapes the operation for subordinate brigades, resources them for their missions, and coordinates, synchronizes and sequences their operations in time and space. The division headquarters helps the commander to employ land forces as part of a joint and multinational force during the conduct of decisive action—the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks (ADRP 3-0)—in an area of operations to establish specific conditions. The division commander exercises mission command (see ADP/ADRP 6-0) to conduct tactical tasks and operations in the appropriate operational framework to accomplish the mission.

1-3. In this tactical role the division commander, assisted by the staff, conducts operations and leaves the details of executing battles and engagements to the commanders of attached brigade combat teams (BCT) and supporting multifunctional and functional brigades. The division commander uses mission orders (see ADRP 6-0) to transmit directives to subordinates. The division headquarters staff helps the commander deconflict and synchronize the operations of subordinate units. The division commander is not responsible for controlling individual engagements, such as an aerial interdiction supported by long-range Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS) fires. These types of engagements are planned in the command posts of attached combat aviation and field artillery (FA) brigades and executed by their tactical elements. However the division headquarters may plan, prepare, execute, and assess these engagements when conditions require.

1-4. The division headquarters’ second role is to serve as the platform around which a joint and/or multinational land component headquarters can be formed. This headquarters functions under a joint task force in crisis response and limited contingency operations. When serving as a joint or multinational land force headquarters, the commander is primarily concerned with the conduct of joint land operational tasks instead of Army tactical tasks. (JP 3-31 provides joint doctrine on the operations of such a headquarters.)

1-5. The division headquarters third role is the platform around which a joint task force headquarters in a limited contingency operation is formed. This transformation requires extensive joint augmentation. When serving as a joint task force headquarters, the division headquarters organizes and operates according to joint doctrine. (JP 3-33 provides doctrine for the joint task force headquarters.) The discussion found in FM 3-94 on the transition of Army headquarters to either a joint task force or joint force land component (JFLC) headquarters applies to the division. JP 3-31 provides doctrine for the JFLC headquarters.

1-6. The final role of a division headquarters is that as an Army force headquarters for a small contingency. It is possible that a division headquarters may need to simultaneously serve in all four of these roles in a limited operation. Due to the potential to overburden the division staff, this circumstance should be avoided when possible. Army force operations are discussed in FM 3-94.

ORGANIZATION OF A DIVISION

1-7. Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organizing a division. ADRP 5-0 establishes the definitions for Army command and support relationships. These relationships establish clear responsibilities and authorities between subordinate and supporting units. Knowing the inherent responsibilities of each command and support relationship allows the division and subordinate commanders to effectively task-organize available forces to accomplish the mission and helps supporting commanders understand their unit’s role.

1-8. A commander determines if command relationships include administrative control (ADCON) as exceptions to the doctrinal definitions when establishing command relationships for subordinate organizations. This includes dealing with Human Resources Command to man the unit and obtaining funding to support operations and training before, during, and after an operational deployment.

1-9. The U.S. Army Forces Command, the Army Service component command, or the appropriate theater Army force tailors the division for deployment and employment publishes an order establishing each brigade’s or smaller unit’s command relationship to the division. That order states if the brigade’s parent unit retains all or some ADCON responsibilities for the brigade. This is especially important when the division headquarters and one or more of the brigades that make up the division come from different home stations. This may result in the division having different ADCON responsibilities for its brigades and smaller units.

1-10. The division headquarters is organized into a headquarters and headquarters battalion. That battalion provides administrative and sustainment support to the division commander and the division headquarters staff in garrison and when deployed for operations. The division’s headquarters and headquarters battalion has limited capabilities for providing sustainment support for company, platoon, and detachment size elements that may be attached or habitually aligned to the division. These attachments from U.S. Forces Command, the theater Army, or other organization are task-organized to the appropriate BCT or other brigades from where they can execute their mission. This preserves the division headquarters’ responsiveness, minimizes the headquarters footprint, and facilitates the headquarters’ deployability.

1-11. The division headquarters commands or is supported by a variable number of subordinate BCTs and multifunctional and functional brigades. This depends on its assigned role (see paragraphs 1-2 to 1-6) and the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Typically, a division commander directs the operations of between two and five BCTs, plus a tailored set of attached or supporting multifunctional brigades. These multifunctional brigades may include a FA Brigade and one or more combat aviation brigades, a battlefield surveillance brigade, and a maneuver enhancement brigade. Typical functional brigades from a corps or theater Army that may support the division are military police, engineer, and air and missile defense. A U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command theater military intelligence brigade may also support the division. The BCTs are attached or under operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) to the division commander. Supporting multifunctional and functional brigades have a command relationship with the division headquarters or have a support relationship (direct support or general support), or support all or some of the elements of the division on an area basis. Sustainment units supporting the division headquarters and the division’s subordinate units are assigned or attached to the theater sustainment command and provide support on an area basis. Likewise, medical units providing area support are assigned or attached to a medical command (deployment support). Under unusual circumstances, such as during the conduct of a pursuit, they are placed OPCON or TACON to the division headquarters when the mission variables of METT-TC make that command relationship more practical and effective.

1-12. The mission variables of METT-TC determine the optimal size and mix of capabilities of the forces task-organized under each division headquarters. The size, composition and capabilities of the forces task-organized under the division may vary between divisions involved in the same campaign, and may change from one phase of that campaign to another. Operations focused on destruction of a conventional enemy military force (offense and defense tasks) may require a mix of forces and capabilities different from those required for an operation focused on the protection of civil populations (stability tasks). At least one of each type of multifunctional brigade should be available to support the division during conventional combat operations.

1-13. All BCTs and supporting multifunctional brigades, except sustainment brigade(s), are attached or placed OPCON to a division headquarters during operations. In rare cases a TACON relationship may be used for BCTs. (The TACON relationship is most often employed between the division commander and joint and multinational forces.) The BCTs may receive attachment or OPCON of support battalions and companies from the other brigades under the control of the division. Any arrangement of command and support relationships is permissible under the discretion of the division commander’s prerogative and the requirements of the mission variables of METT-TC.

1-14. Divisions are tailored for operations by higher echelon commanders. New units placed in a command or support relationship to the division require integration into the division structure. This integration includes—

Receiving and introducing the commanders of these new units to the commanders and staffs with which they will be working.

Making the commanders and staffs aware of the limitations and opportunities made possible by the division’s projected operational environment.

Exchanging standard operating procedures.

Orienting all unit commanders and staffs on the places and roles these new units will have in the upcoming operation.

Conducting briefings and rehearsals to ensure mutual understanding to the roles and functions of these new units.

Establishing mission command system linkage and interoperability between the division and these new units by granting these new unit’s permissions and the necessary passwords to access each other’s information systems.

Training new unit commanders and staff on the division’s standard operating procedures and mission-essential tasks for the projected operation.

1-15. Each BCT contains a FA battalion while the division commander normally retains the FA brigade in general support. For a particular mission, the division commander may place the FA brigade or a subordinate FA Battalion in general support-reinforcing to the combat aviation brigade. The FA Battalion of one BCT may also be attached, OPCON, or placed in direct support to another brigade. Note, however, that since each BCT has organic artillery, the division’s FA Brigade’s subordinate artillery battalions normally reinforce the fires of the BCT’s organic artillery battalion. In some cases, the entire FA Brigade may support one BCT for a portion of the operation; the division will normally specify a priority of support to that BCT, rather than using a support relationship.

1-16. Some battalions of the maneuver enhancement brigade may be further attached or OPCON to the BCTs. This may include engineers; military police; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN); or other units. The maneuver enhancement brigade’s battalions and companies also may be attached or OPCON for area protection and CBRN support to the battlefield surveillance, fires, and combat aviation brigades as well as the supporting sustainment brigade.

1-17. The combat aviation brigade’s attack reconnaissance, utility, and cargo assets may be OPCON, TACON, general support (GS), or direct support to a BCT or the maneuver enhancement brigade. The combat aviation brigade provides assets OPCON, TACON, GS, or direct support to the FA or sustainment brigade. The use of aviation assets requires detailed planning and scheduling to maximize results. Aviation center of excellence publications describe the framework and imperatives of air-ground integration.

1-18. A sustainment brigade or a combat sustainment support battalion normally is in a support relationship to the division. Its actions reflect the priorities of support specified in division operations orders. The theater or expeditionary sustainment command articulates the exact support relationship.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

1-19. The division’s capability to conduct decisive action depends on the mix of its attached BCTs, and functional and multifunctional brigades. BCTs maneuver against, close with, and destroy the enemy. BCTs make permanent the otherwise temporary effects of other joint capabilities by seizing and occupying decisive terrain, exerting constant pressure, and breaking the enemy’s will to fight. They are the principal ground-maneuver unit of the division. Three standard BCT designs make up the ground maneuver power of the division: armored, infantry, and Stryker. These BCTs have organic combined arms capabilities, including battalion-sized maneuver, FA, reconnaissance, and sustainment units. Medical units are also organic to the BCTs. Maneuver within the division capitalizes on integrated joint capabilities to expand mutual support across expanded areas of operations and enables BCTs to conduct operations within contiguous or noncontiguous areas of operations.

1-20. The division assigns areas of operations and missions to its BCTs. The division commander uses mission orders with clear commander’s intent and concept of operations to allow BCTs to accomplish tasks with minimum need for detailed oversight from the division’s command posts. The BCT staff is designed to conduct decisive action. That does not mean that the BCT is ideally structured for every task or mission they can receive. Each BCT will normally be task-organized in some fashion for its missions. Attached BCTs may require task organization changes because they may not have all of the combat multipliers required for a situation. For example BCTs do not have organic air and missile defense capabilities beyond small arms and may not have enough bridging assets to cross gaps.

ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

1-21. The armored brigade combat team (ABCT) core mission is to disrupt or destroy enemy military forces, control land areas, including populations and resources, and be prepared to conduct combat operations to protect U.S. national interests. The ABCT commander exercises mission command and directs the operation of the brigade and attached units while conducting decisive action throughout the depth of the brigade’s area of operations. (See figure 1-1 on page 1-5 for the internal organization of an ABCT.)

1-22. The ABCT’s operational capabilities include—

Significantly greater firepower, tactical mobility, and protection compared to an infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) or Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT).

Rapid tactical movement, envelopment, and penetrations through speed and shock effect.

Conducting decisive action.

Conducting screen, guard, and cover missions. (The ABCT will require augmentation to conduct a cover mission.)

Combined arms integration down to battalion level.

Enhanced situational awareness, including providing the common operational picture down to the individual fighting vehicle.

Enhanced linkages to joint forces, fire support, and the intelligence enterprise.

Robust organic sustainment.

1-23. The ABCT’s operational limitations include—

Not rapidly deployable to a theater or area of operations unless deployed to prepositioned equipment sites.

A requirement for significant strategic airlift and sealift to deploy and sustain.

Reduced effectiveness in close terrain such as forests and urban areas, due to close engagement ranges and main gun elevation restrictions, when compared the brigade’s employment in more open terrain.

Restricted mobility in highly mountainous terrain or dense forests.

Vulnerability to mines and anti-tank weapons.

High usage rate of consumable supplies, particularly Class III, V, and IX.

No organic military police capability.

Limited organic gap crossing, extremely limited general engineering capability, and limited engineer staff expertise.

(See Maneuver center of excellence doctrine for additional information in the ABCT.)

INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

1-24. The IBCT mission is to fight and win engagements and battles to support operational and strategic objectives. It can perform complementary missions to ABCTs and SBCTs. The IBCT are missions such as reducing fortified areas, infiltrating and seizing objectives in the enemy‘s rear, eliminating enemy force remnants in restricted terrain, securing key facilities and activities, and conducting stability tasks in the wake of maneuvering forces. (See figure 1-2 for the internal organization of an IBCT.)

1-25. IBCTs are easily configured for area defense and as the fixing force component of a mobile defense. The IBCT’s lack of heavy combat vehicles reduces its logistic requirements. This gives higher commanders greater flexibility when adapting various transportation modes to move or maneuver the IBCT. Airborne IBCTs conduct airborne assault-specific missions during forcible entry operations. All IBCTs can conduct air assault operations. (Refer to Maneuver center of excellence publications for more information on airborne and air assault operations.)

1-26. The IBCT conducts offensive tasks against all types of enemy force in complex terrain. Their design allows them to defeat the enemy in mountain, wooded, and urban environments. IBCTs are better suited for operations in restrictive and severely restrictive terrain than the other two types of BCTs. The IBCT’s capabilities include:

Strategic and operational deployability.

Forcible entry operations, including airborne assault (using airborne IBCTs), air assault, and amphibious operations. (Refer to Maneuver center of excellence doctrine for more information on the conduct of airborne and air assault operations and JP 3-02 for more information on amphibious operations.)

Conducting screen, guard, and cover missions against similarly equipped enemy forces. (The IBCT requires augmentation to conduct a cover mission.)

Transportable by Army aviation brigades ([cargo helicopter] CH-47 and utility helicopter [UH]-60 helicopters).

Enhanced situational awareness, including a common operational picture down to company commander level (and platoon leaders assigned wheeled vehicles).

Sustainment from forward support companies of the brigade support battalion for the infantry, engineer and artillery battalions, and the cavalry squadron.

Less class III, V, and IX resupply requirements than ABCT and SBCT.

1-27. Limitations of the IBCT include the following:

The IBCT does not have the same level of organic firepower, tactical mobility, or protection of the ABCT and SBCT.

The IBCT does not have an organic gap crossing capability.

The IBCT has limited combat engineer capability.

No organic military police capability.

The IBCT‘s three infantry battalions move primarily by foot.

(See Maneuver center of excellence doctrine for additional information on the IBCT.)

STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

1-28. The SBCT participates in the conduct of unified land operations. It provides operational commanders with increased operational and tactical flexibility. This flexibility is enabled by the SBCTs rapid deployment capability and its significantly fewer sustainment requirements. The SBCTs key assets (in addition to its Soldiers) are the Stryker vehicles and digital information systems. Stryker vehicles provide operational and tactical mobility with added protection and firepower, and the SBCT’s information systems enhance situational awareness down to individual vehicles. (See figure 1-3 on page 1-8.)

1-29. SBCT infantry units can operate effectively in most terrain and weather conditions. They are useful in fast-breaking operations due to their rapid strategic deployment and mobility capability. In such cases, they can gain the initiative early, seize and hold ground, and mass fires to stop the enemy. Infantry units are particularly effective in urban terrain where they can infiltrate and move rapidly to the rear of enemy positions. SBCT capabilities include—

Increased strategic and operational deployment capability when compared to an ABCT.

Conducting screen, guard, and cover missions. (The SBCT requires augmentation to conduct a cover mission.)

Combined arms integration down to the company level.

Enhanced situational awareness, including a common operational picture, down to squad level.

Dismount strength for use in close and complex environments from its three infantry battalions.

Lower usage rate of Class III supplies than the ABCT, with nearly the same mobility.

Greater inherent protection than an IBCT.

1-30. Limitations of the SBCT include—

Significantly less firepower or inherent protection than ABCTs.

More intra-theater aircraft requirements to deploy than an IBCT.

Limited organic gap crossing capability.

Each maneuver battalion is assigned a medical platoon and is supported by a forward support company from the brigade support battalion.

No organic military police capability.

Lack of mobility in areas of high precipitation/wet areas of operation when compared to the mobility of the tracked vehicles of an ABCT.

(See Maneuver center of excellence doctrine for additional information on the SBCT.)

RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

1-31. The reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) BCT is an ABCT or SBCT assigned the mission during the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle as a reconnaissance and security formation. A corps normally has one of its ABCTs or SBCTs task organized and trained as an R&S BCT. The R&S BCT is trained and task-organized to accomplish four primary tasks:

Reconnaissance.

Surveillance.

Security.

Intelligence operations.

These tasks support a joint force, joint land force component, corps, or division commander.

1-32. An R&S BCT is tailored with additional assets to give it increased capabilities for information collection and sustainment. Typically those additional assets include:

A military intelligence collection and exploitation company from the corps expeditionary military intelligence brigade.

A long-range surveillance platoon and insertion and extraction section from the corps long-range surveillance company.

Two mobility augmentation companies.

Logistics task force from a combat sustainment support battalion.

Aviation task force from a combat aviation brigade.

These additional assets may be either under the R&S BCT’s OPCON or they may be attached to the R&S BCT. During operations the R&S BCT staff may also be augmented with a space team, civil affairs Soldiers, additional personnel for its air defense and airspace management and brigade aviation element, or other subject matter expertise as required.

1-33. The R&S BCT also has supporting enablers available to it once deployed. The corps or JFLC commander determines the exact number and types of this BCT’s supporting enabling assets during the planning phases of an operation during mission analysis. The R&S BCT has a training relationship with units that have the capabilities of fire support, short-range air defense, engineers, and extended range UASs. This allows the R&S BCT commander and staff to properly employ these capabilities. (See Maneuver center of excellence publications for additional information on the capabilities, limitations, and employment of the R&S BCT.)

MULTIFUNCTIONAL BRIGADES

1-34. The division’s multifunctional brigades are organized to support the BCTs and carry out tasks to support the division. These brigades add capabilities, such as attack and reconnaissance aviation and fire support, which complement the maneuver BCTs and make the division a more effective tactical fighting unit. U.S. Forces Command or the division’s higher headquarters—corps or theater Army—tailors the division with combinations of BCTs and multifunctional brigades based on the mission variables of METT-TC.

1-35. Normally these multifunctional brigades are attached or placed in a TACON or OPCON command relationship to a division headquarters (with the exception of the sustainment brigade). They can be placed in a support role, such as direct support, general support (GS), GS reinforcing, or area support. They can also be placed in a command or support relationship to a corps, theater-level command, joint functional component command, other Service headquarters, or a multinational headquarters. In any of these later cases, the commander of the appropriate theater Army or Army Service component command exercises ADCON over that support brigade.

1-36. These multifunctional brigades may occupy terrain in a BCT or maneuver enhancement brigade area of operations and can conduct operations to support that BCT or maneuver enhancement brigade. It can employ these multifunctional brigades to accomplish missions that occur in those portions of the division area of operations for with responsibility has not been assigned. This can occur if the areas of operations for the division’s subordinate BCTs and maneuver enhancement brigade are organized into a mix of nonlinear and noncontiguous areas of operations. For example, the FA brigade conducts fire missions and the combat aviation brigade conducts attacks in these unassigned areas when directed to do so by the division commander.

1-37. Types of multifunctional brigades available to support the division are the battlefield surveillance brigade, the combat aviation brigade, the FA brigade, the maneuver enhancement brigade, and the sustainment brigade. Divisions that conduct major operations are supported by at least one of each of these multifunctional brigades. These multifunctional brigades are organized as combined arms units that accomplish a broad function, such as protection, in the case of the maneuver enhancement brigade. Each multifunctional brigade includes a headquarters, brigade troops, and functional battalions. A mix of other functional battalions and companies is assigned, attached, or placed OPCON to these multifunctional brigades to match their capabilities to requirements. This causes differences in the internal organization and capabilities between two multifunctional brigades of the same type. During operations, the division commander can direct changes to the division task organization in the limits of established command relationships. This occurs because of the need to add additional capabilities or reinforce existing capabilities within one or more of the division’s brigades. The four types of multifunctional support brigades likely to be attached, TACON, or OPCON to the division are discussed in paragraphs 1-39 through 1-46.

1-38. According to the Army’s logistic concept, deployed sustainment brigades are attached to theater sustainment commands or expeditionary sustainment commands instead of the supported division. This support relationship is unlike the command relationship that other multifunctional brigades have with the division. These two commands—theater sustainment commands and expeditionary sustainment commands—establish a direct, general, or area support relationship between one or more sustainment brigades and the division. Paragraphs 1-47 to 1-50 introduce this brigade.

BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE

1-39. The battlefield surveillance brigade is a multifunctional support brigade with many capabilities. (See figure 1-4 on page 1-11 for the organization of a battlefield surveillance brigade). The brigade is a lightly armed organization and is not designed to conduct reconnaissance in force. It does not perform guard and cover tasks and as a rule, it will not fight for information. It provides division and higher-echelon commanders with long-duration surveillance, mobile reconnaissance, and a variety of technical and human intelligence collection capabilities. It conducts reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) tasks, including military intelligence discipline collection, to support division and higher-level formations. Its operations continue on a continuous basis regardless of the weather and other environmental conditions. It also provides assets, such as counterintelligence, human intelligence, signals intelligence, and UASs, as necessary to augment the capabilities of BCTs and other brigades with information collection platforms. The brigade staff performs information collection synchronization and integration to support the commander’s R&S mission. (See FM 3-55.1 for additional information.)

NOTE: Current plans call for the deactivation of all active component battlefield surveillance brigades in the force structure by the end of fiscal year 2016. However seven brigades remain in the Reserve Components. The Army is establishing new and separate brigade-level commands to enhance the intelligence capability in each of the Army’s three programmed corps. These commands are expeditionary military intelligence brigades. Their design allows them to conduct intelligence operations in the areas of counterintelligence collection and related activities, human intelligence collection, and signals intelligence collection. These new brigades augment corps, division, and BCT intelligence cells. This augmentation helps these echelons in the production, exploitation, and dissemination of national and theater signals and geospatial intelligence. These new intelligence units do not conduct reconnaissance. The division commander tasks available maneuver forces to conduct reconnaissance if the division is not tailored with a battlefield surveillance brigade. The division gets long-range surveillance support from the corps long range surveillance company. (See Intelligence center of excellence doctrine for more discussion on the expeditionary military intelligence brigade.)

COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE

1-40. The combat aviation brigade is a modular and tailorable force organized and equipped to synchronize operations of multiple aviation battalions simultaneously to support the division’s operations. Figure 1-5 on page 1-12 illustrates the organization of a heavy combat aviation brigade. There are two variations of the combat aviation brigade design—heavy and medium. Depending on the mission and the requirements of the area of operations, the combat aviation brigade operates as a maneuver headquarters and employs subordinate battalions and other augmenting forces to meet the division commander’s intent. It can provide tailored support to adjacent supported maneuver commanders at the BCT level and below. The combat aviation brigade commander is the senior Army aviation officer in the division’s structure and advises adjacent and higher commanders on manned and unmanned aviation system employment.

1-41. A combat aviation brigade attached to a division or under its OPCON conducts the following tasks:

Attack

Movement to contact.

Air assault.

Reconnaissance.

Security.

Mission command support.

Air movement.

Personnel recovery.

Air medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).

Aviation enabling and sustainment tasks

Air traffic services.

Airfield management.

Forward arm and refuel operations.

Aviation maintenance and recovery.

(See Aviation center of excellence publications for additional information on combat aviation brigade operations and how the brigade conducts these missions.)

FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE

1-42. In the near future, the four active component FA brigades are aligned with the Eighth U.S. Army and the three corps. Each Army National Guard division retains an aligned FA brigade. The FA brigade’s primary task is conducting strike operations. (See figure 1-6 for the organization of a FA brigade). The FA brigade is the primary executor of Army and Joint fires in any division unassigned areas. It is capable of employing Army and Joint fires and incorporating electronic warfare and airspace control elements. The FA brigade gives the division commander a headquarters to plan, prepare for, execute and assess close support fires, counterfires, and reinforcing fires across the division. This brigade can detect and attack targets using a mix of its organic target acquisition capabilities, the division’s information collection capabilities, and access to higher headquarters information collection capabilities provided by the intelligence enterprise. The FA brigade is capable of providing and coordinating Joint lethal and nonlethal effects. A FA brigade has the necessary fire support and targeting structure to execute the entire decide, detect, deliver, and assess process. The FA brigade provides the following:

Force FA headquarters for the division if so designated by the commander.

Fires and counterfires for the division.

Close reinforcing fires to support BCTs.

Fires, counterfire, UAS, and radar coverage for the combat aviation, battlefield surveillance, maneuver enhancement, and sustainment brigades.

A headquarters to control the full complement of Army and Joint fires capabilities.

(See FM 3-09 and ATP 3-09.24 for additional information on FA brigade operations and what is involved in the capabilities.)

1-43. In the near future, each active component division will have an aligned division artillery, which will ideally be stationed with the division headquarters. The division artillery is responsible for the integration and delivery of tactical fires to achieve division and subordinate echelon objectives. Each division artillery consists of a headquarters and headquarters battery, target acquisition platoon, and a signal platoon but does not contain organic firing units. The division artillery is tailored with a variety of FA battalions (rocket and cannon); UASs; and counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) and indirect fire protection capability units to support division operations based on the mission. The division artillery does not have a support battalion and relies on the concept of area support for its sustainment. The division artillery does not replace the division fire support element. This remains in the division headquarters and headquarters battalion. This division artillery headquarters plans, prepares, executes, and assesses combined arms operations to provide close support and precision strike for division and brigade employing joint and organic fires and capabilities. This achieves distributed effects to support the division commander’s objectives. Specific division artillery responsibilities include:

Integration and delivery of fires to support the division commander’s concept of operations.

Serve as the division force FA headquarters.

Synchronization of counterfire and radar employment operations in the division area of operations.

Detailed targeting, training, and professional development of FA personnel across the division.

Oversight of the training and certification of BCT FA battalions in close coordination and cooperation with the BCT commanders.

MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE

1-44. The maneuver enhancement brigade is a multifunctional headquarters designed to perform maneuver support operations for the echelon it supports. It is designed to simultaneously perform military police, engineer, and CBRN missions in addition to all of the doctrinal responsibilities associated with owning an area of operations. (See figure 1-7 on page 1-14 illustrates a possible task organization of a maneuver enhancement brigade). Task organization is based upon identified mission requirements for the echelon it is supporting. It may be placed to support an Army, joint, interagency, or multinational headquarters. The headquarters is staffed and optimized to conduct combined arms operations integrating a wide range of maneuver support related technical branches and combat forces. The maneuver enhancement brigade organizes, provides, or employs battalion task force and company team combined arms technical experts to conduct maneuver support tasks across all operational environments. The maneuver enhancement brigade may include a mix of CBRN; civil affairs; engineer; explosive ordnance disposal; military police; and potentially air and missile defense units in addition to a tactical combat force. The number and type of organizations placed under this brigade depends on the mission, threat, and number and type of battalions or companies operating in the brigade’s area of operations. The maneuver enhancement brigade provides staff planning for and control of the units required to conduct decisive action in a division support area as well as support area operations and maneuver support operations. When assigned or attached, the commander of this brigade is normally designated as the commander of the division support area. In the absence of a maneuver enhancement brigade, the division commander designates another assigned or attached brigade-level commander the additional responsibilities as the division support area commander.

1-45. The maneuver enhancement brigade main command post monitors activity in the division’s BCTs and adjacent areas of operations to prevent potential conflicts with the division’s sustainment operations. It monitors the conduct of the division’s decisive and shaping operations. With augmentation, it may become an alternate division command post if the division’s main and tactical command posts no longer function.

1-46. The following include supporting tasks for each maneuver enhancement brigade primary task.

Conduct maneuver support tasks including—

▪   Perform mobility.

▪   Perform protection.

▪   Perform sustainment.

Conduct support area tasks including—

▪   Conduct information collection.

▪   Conduct operational area security including tasks such as area damage control, terrain management, fire support coordination, airspace control, and other protection tasks including personnel recovery, coordination of base camp and based cluster defense, and response force operations.

Conduct stability tasks including—

▪   Establish civil security.

▪   Establish civil control.

▪   Restore essential civil services.

▪   Support to governance.

▪   Support to economic and infrastructure development.

Conduct defense support of civil authorities tasks including—

▪   Domestic disaster.

▪   Domestic CBRN incidents.

▪   Domestic civilian law enforcement agencies.

▪   Other support as required.

(See FM 3-81 for additional information on the operations of a maneuver enhancement brigade and how the brigade conducts these tasks.)

SUSTAINMENT BRIGADES

1-47. Sustainment brigades are normally assigned or attached to a theater sustainment command with a support relationship to the division. However, there are a limited number of situations, such as when the division conducts a pursuit, when a sustainment brigade or one of its subordinate combat sustainment support battalion may be placed in an OPCON or TACON command relationship to the division instead of the more normal general, direct, or area support relationship to the division. (See figure 1-8 for a notional sustainment brigade with a mix of multifunctional and functional battalions.

1-48. An expeditionary sustainment command headquarters is used by the theater sustainment command to extend its control in different joint operations areas in the combatant commander’s area of responsibility. Sustainment brigades control all subordinate units and provide sustainment in an area defined by their parent headquarters. One or more sustainment brigades supports the division based on where those support area boundaries are drawn by the theater sustainment command. Sustainment brigades plan and execute sustainment, distribution, theater opening and reception, staging, and onward movement of the Army as directed by their parent headquarters. Based upon priorities and missions, the sustainment brigade collaborates directly with the division and supported brigades for operational details of sustainment requirements.

1-49. Sustainment brigades include multifunctional combat sustainment support battalions and functional battalions tailored and task-organized to provide support for multiple brigade-sized or smaller units using their subordinate battalions, companies, platoons, and teams. These battalions perform sustainment functions. The sustainment brigade has a command relationship with its subordinate battalions. The brigade focuses on management and distribution of supplies, field services, human resources support, execution of financial management support, and allocation of field level maintenance in an assigned area. This support extends the operational reach of supported maneuver commanders.

1-50. The sustainment brigade must coordinate the movement of sustainment convoys when moving through division and brigade areas of operations. A movement control battalion may be collocated with the sustainment brigade. The movement control team from the movement control battalion coordinates with the assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4) division transportation officer element to plan and control sustainment and other convoy movement throughout the division’ area of operations. (See ATP 4-93 for additional information on how the sustainment brigade conducts these tasks.)

OTHER SUPPORTING FUNCTIONAL BRIGADES

1-51. The Army’s force structure has other functional brigades available to the division commander. Their availability depends on the role the division commander is assigned and the operational and mission variables prevailing in the division’s area of operations. These functional brigades include the air and missile defense brigade, the civil affairs brigade, the engineer brigade, and the military police brigade. Paragraphs 1-52 through 1-57 discuss the roles and organizational structure of these functional brigades.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE BRIGADE

1-52. An air and missile defense brigade supports the division only if the division headquarters is assigned the mission of a joint task force headquarters in an environment where there is a significant air or missile threat. The division receives early warnings of air and missile attack from the theater air and missile defense structure even if the division does not have an air and missile defense brigade attached or in direct support. Air and missile defense brigade missions include protection of operational level sustaining bases, military or political headquarters, and ports of debarkation. Air and missile defense brigades deploy early into theaters of operations or joint operational areas to protect aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, early arriving forces, and critical supplies according to the joint force commander’s defended asset list. As the lodgment expands, air and missile defense forces may reposition to better protect critical assets, communications, transportation, and maneuver forces such as the division. Air and missile defense brigades and any available joint and multinational air defense forces combine to form an integrated air and missile defense structure after completion of deployment operation. The division commander, with staff support, designates the division’s priority assets. Those division priority assets are taken into consideration by the joint force commander and staff in the development of the joint force defend asset list. Firing units and radars of air and missile defense brigades may be positioned in the division area of operations as tenants. Those tenant firing units and radars are integrated into the area defense plans of those divisional elements in whose areas of operations they are located. Those firing units and radars conform to local security measures. (See FM 3-01 for additional information on Army air and missile defense operations.)

CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE

1-53. The civil affairs brigade is an operational-level civil affairs capability that supports a corps or an equivalent other Service headquarters assigned the role of a joint task force or JFLC headquarters. The division is supported by a civil affairs brigade if the division headquarters is designated as either of these two roles. The mission of the civil affairs brigade is to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and conduct responsibilities normally performed by civil governments across the range of military operations. This is done by engaging and influencing the civil populace and authorities through the planning and conducting of civil affairs operations or enabling civil-military operations to shape the civil environment and set the conditions for military operations.

1-54. The brigade headquarters is modular and tailorable and provides a control structure and staff supervision of the operations of the brigade’s assigned civil affairs battalions or other attached units, such as a military information support element. Civil affairs force structure contains expertise in six functional specialty areas—rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. Within each functional specialty area, technically qualified and experienced individuals, known as civil affairs functional specialists, advise and help the commander and help or direct their civilian counterparts.

1-55. There are three different types of civil affairs brigades—special operations force (SOF), regular Army, and Army reserve. Each civil affairs brigade type provides distinct capabilities. (See FM 3-57 for additional information and detailed description of the capabilities of each of these types of brigades.)

ENGINEER BRIGADE

1-56. An engineer brigade provides an engineer headquarters to control engineer operations throughout a division or corps area of operations. The engineer brigade headquarters integrates combat engineering, general engineering, and geospatial engineering to enhance division mobility, protection, and sustainment. Engineers help build partner capacity and develop or repair civilian infrastructure. Normally an engineer brigade headquarters is allocated for each two to five engineer battalions attached to or supporting the division. Each engineer brigade headquarters controls the activities of joint and multinational engineer units with appropriate augmentation, such as joint engineer planners and interpreters. (See FM 3-34 and other Maneuver Support center of excellence doctrinal publications for additional information on engineer operations.)

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

1-57. A military police brigade is provided to a division when the magnitude of functional military police requirements exceeds the capability of the maneuver enhancement brigade to control military police activities. In these instances, military police brigade-level control capability is required to allocate, synchronize, control, and provide technical oversight for military police assets and to provide consistent application of military police capabilities across the area of operations. If requirements for military police capabilities in the division exceed two battalions, military police brigade control capability will be required. Some functional military police remain under the maneuver enhancement brigade even when a functional military police brigade is provided to the division. (See FM 3-39 for additional information on the military police brigade and military police operations.)

OTHER SUPPORT

1-58. Additional units may need to enhance the division’s capability to conduct operations. These will be determined during force tailoring. The most common additional capabilities are addressed in paragraphs 1-59–1-76.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR AND HIGH YIELD EXPLOSIVE SUPPORT

1-59. A division receives CBRN support from either the 20th CBRNE Command or a CBRN brigade when required. Outside the United States (U.S.), this support comes from a CBRN brigade. The CBRN brigade is one of the U.S. Army’s functional brigades. It has a stand-alone headquarters whose mission is to provide mission command for up to six CBRN battalions or equivalent elements conducting CBRN operations. The brigade supports a corps or echelons above corps at the theater Army or joint task force level. The CBRN brigade is also employed to provide mission command for critical theater sustainment operations or to employ tactical weapons of mass destruction elimination capabilities to support a CBRNE operational headquarters. One CBRN brigade allocated per two to six committed CBRN battalions (offset by any CBRN battalions assigned to the division’s maneuver enhancement brigade) or one per committed senior Army headquarters if no workload driven requirement exists. Key tasks performed by a CBRN brigade headquarters include:

Provide control for CBRN operations.

Coordinate sustainment for CBRN operations.

Provide intelligence to support CBRN operations.

Direct employment of subordinate battlefield obscuration assets.

The CBRN brigade depends on external sustainment organization for resupply of all classes of supply, maintenance, and field services. Additional information on these two organizations can be found in ATP 3-11.36.

ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM

1-60. The Army Health System includes all mission support services performed, provided, or arranged by the Army Medical Department to support health service support and force health protection mission requirements for the Army and as directed, for joint, intergovernmental agencies, and multinational forces. The medical command (deployment support) directs all theater Army medical elements within the supported geographic combatant commander’ area of responsibility in a manner similar to what the theater sustainment command does for logistics support. The theater Army surgeon provides policy and technical guidance to the medical command and all Army medical units in the area of responsibility.

1-61. The medical command (deployment support) develops plans, procedures, and programs for medical support in the theater Army. This includes medical functions of medical mission command, medical treatment (organic and area support), hospitalization, MEDEVAC (including medical regulation), dental services, preventive medicine services, combat and operational stress control, veterinary services, medical logistics (including blood management), and medical laboratory services. The medical command (deployment support) headquarters supports the joint force surgeon’s joint patient movement requirements center according to lead Service directives. It provides staff planning, supervision, training, and administrative support of subordinate medical brigades (support) engaged in operational-level medical support.

1-62. A medical command (deployment support) has one or more medical brigades. These medical brigades contain a mix of combat support hospitals and medical battalions (multifunctional) tailored according to requirements. A medical brigade (support) supports the division. The medical command (deployment support) maintains a technical channel with designated medical functions executed by its medical brigades. The division surgeon must ensure that the division current and future operations and plans are coordinated with the medical command (deployment support) and the supporting medical brigade (support).

1-63. Division Army Health System planning involves the division's staff and the division’s projected supporting medical brigade and next higher echelon Army or joint surgeon's staff section. This coordination focuses on how the medical command’s plans impact the provision of Army Health System support within the division. A series of planning conferences, coordination meetings, and rehearsals are required to tailor an Army Health System plan to sustain the division's anticipated operations. (See FM 4-02 and subordinate Medical Department publications for additional information on this topic.)

U.S. AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO THE DIVISION

1-64. The U.S. Air Force aligned an air support operations squadron (ASOS) to support each division. The ASOS is a variable sized organization that provides air support planning and execution capabilities. The ASOS provides tactical air control parties (made up of air liaison officers [ALOs] and joint terminal attack controllers [JTACs]) at Army echelons from the division headquarters down to the maneuver battalions. The ASOS provides the air support operations center (ASOC) function to the division headquarters. The ASOS is in direct support to the division but remains under the command and control of its U.S. Air Force chain of command. They form the division’s joint air ground integration center (JAGIC) when teamed with personnel from the division fires cell and the division’s airspace, Army air and missile defense, and Army aviation elements. (See ATP 3-91.1 for additional information on the JAGIC. See ATP 3-52.2 for additional details regarding U.S. Air Force support provided to the division.)

CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION

1-65. A civil affairs battalion is normally attached to a deployed division. The civil affairs battalion headquarters has a liaison team, a civil information management team, a communications element, a support element, and a functional specialty cell to help staff the division civil-military operations center (CMOC). The civil affairs battalion functional specialty cell contains elements responsible for four of six civil affairs functional specialties: rule of law, infrastructure, governance, and public health and welfare. It does not have Soldiers trained in the functional specialty areas of economic stability, public education, and information. A division faced with a need for specialists within these two functional specialty areas can have the division assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations (G-9) direct the supporting civil affairs organization to acquire this support.

1-66. The division CMOC is a coordination center established and directed by the division G-9. The CMOC facilitates the coordination of activities of military forces with other U.S. governmental agencies, regional and international organizations, local authorities, and multinational civilian agencies. If there is a host-nation government, it has the presumptive right to establish the mechanisms for civil-military coordination. The size, structure, and location of the CMOC depends on the mission variables of METT-TC. Protection is always a concern for the commander when considering where to locate the CMOC. While placing the CMOC “inside the wire” of the base formed by the division’s main command post complex enhances security, it also interferes with its ability to interact with nongovernmental organizations and other actors. Strong consideration should be given to co-locating the CMOC with any previously existing mechanisms, such as a humanitarian operations center established by the host nation or by the actions of various international and private volunteer organizations before the introduction of U.S. forces into the area of operations. This level of interaction supports unified action and helps with the transfer of any responsibilities to host nation or other authorities.

1-67. The CMOC, with the G-9, facilitates continuous coordination for civil affairs operations among the key participants from local to international levels within the area of operation to support the commander’s civil-military operations and mitigate or defeat threats to civil society. The CMOC and the G-9 provide civil considerations inputs to the division common operational picture. This facilitates situational understanding of the civil component of the mission variables of METT-TC. The CMOC is the operations and support element of the civil affairs unit and a mechanism for the coordination of civil affairs operations. Civil affairs elements at all levels plan and conduct civil affairs operations based upon their analysis of the civil considerations within the area of operation and the priorities of the supported commander.

1-68. The civil affairs battalion provides a civil affairs planning team to the division assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5) to help in planning for stability tasks. The division G-5 plans, the CMOC coordinates and assesses, and the current operations integrating cell executes civil affairs operations with oversight from the G-9 of all civil affairs operations within the division’s area of operations.

1-69. The civil affairs battalion’s subordinate companies, attached to BCT or other brigades with terrain management responsibilities, establish CMOCs for their brigades. The division will require additional augmentation or the division commander will have to prioritize civil affairs support to subordinate brigade if the division has more requirements than supporting civil affairs companies. These CMOCs are in locations determined by the brigade commander and with the advice and recommendations of the brigade S-9 and the civil affairs company commander. The division's CMOC and the brigade CMOCs serve as the primary coordination interfaces for the U.S. armed forces and indigenous populations and institutions, humanitarian organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other governmental agencies. (See ATP 3-57.60 for additional information on civil affairs planning and ATP 3-57.70 for more information on the CMOC.)

TACTICAL MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT BATTALION

1-70. The division will normally receive a tactical military information support battalion (MISB) headquarters to support its maneuver commanders. The division’s BCTs receive a tactical military information support company (TMC). This company provides these brigade commanders the ability to influence, either directly or indirectly, the behavior of neutral, friendly, and enemy target audiences. The MISB coordinates the approval and dissemination of military information support operations (MISO) products across the division area of operations. Simultaneously the individual TMCs develop, produce, and disseminate approved products within the guidance provided by the MISO program. The program, which originates from the joint staff down through the geographical combatant commander, provides the division commander with approval and dissemination authorities.

1-71. The MISB headquarters is located at the division main command post. The headquarters has print or broadcast assets attached or collocated with it. These print and broadcast assets require logistics support beyond what is normally provided by the division headquarters and headquarters battalion. (See FM 3-53 and subordinate MISO publications for additional information on MISO and the capabilities of this battalion headquarters and the various tactical detachments attached to the battalion.)

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL BATTALION/COMPANY

1-72. An explosive ordnance disposal element of some size may support the division. If present, it will normally be in direct support, attached, or OPCON to the maneuver enhancement brigade and may send an explosives hazards coordination element to the division headquarters to augment the division protection cell. The explosive ordnance disposal commander providing direct support to the division advises the division commander on all explosive ordnance disposal and counter improvised explosive device (IED) related matters. These matters include pattern analysis, IED strike analysis, and the designation of unexploded explosive ordnance hazard areas. (See Sustainment center of excellence publications for more information on explosive ordnance disposal.)

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (OTHER THAN CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS)

1-73. The division may have SOF under its control or operating in its area of operations. When this is the case, the division should receive one or more SOF representatives to synchronize SOF activities with division operations. These representatives may serve as liaison elements or planning elements. These SOF representatives are normally located at the main command post. See FM 3-05 for more information on Army SOF.

MILITARY HISTORY DETACHMENT

1-74. A military history detachment may be attached to the division headquarters and headquarters battalion to help preserve historical documentation and artifacts. Individuals of this detachment attend key briefings and meetings and interview key personnel to gather first-hand observations, facts, and impressions. Soldiers within the detachment keep a daily journal of their personal observations and key events. They help the division information management element in packaging and forwarding collected information to appropriate agencies. The information collected by this detachment help the division conduct after action reviews and document the division’s lessons learned. (See ATP 1-20 for more information on this detachment and military history operations.)

MOBILE PUBLIC AFFAIRS DETACHMENT

1-75. The mobile public affairs detachment (MPAD) provides direct public affairs support to Army and joint task force units deployed to support combined or joint operations and provide augmentation to a public affairs operations center. A MPAD is staffed, trained, and equipped with personnel and equipment to:

Conduct public affairs planning and analysis for the commander.

Develop information strategies and campaigns to support operations.

Support higher echelon public affairs requirements for information, media facilitation, planning and training.

Be technologically capable to serve as the base force to support media operations.

(See FM 3-61 for more information on other MPAD capabilities.)

DIGITAL LIAISON DETACHMENTS

1-76. Digital liaison detachments provide the division commander with an augmentation liaison element for major subordinate or parallel multinational headquarters. They consist of teams with expertise and equipment in intelligence, operations, fire support, air defense, and sustainment; capable of analyzing the situation, facilitating coordination between multinational forces, and helping cross-boundary information flow and operational support. These 30-Soldier detachments are essential for routine liaison and advising and helping multinational partners conduct and plan operations at intermediate tactical levels. These detachments operate as a single entity for liaison with a major multinational headquarters or provide two smaller teams for digital connectivity and liaison with smaller multinational headquarters or are tailored to match a given mission.

FORCE TAILORING THE DIVISION AND TASK ORGANIZING ATTACHED BRIGADES

1-77. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander (ADRP 3-0). Force tailoring may alter the command and support relationships for organizations aligned to the division. The joint force and theater Army commanders, working for the geographic combatant commander, determine the mix of forces and capabilities (including headquarters) required for a campaign. U.S. Forces Command and the employing theater Army tailor the division with the right mix of brigades or battalions to accomplish its missions. This happens as part of joint deliberate planning or because of crisis action planning. Based on the geographic combatant commander’s request for forces, U.S. Forces Command or another Army Service component command detaches the appropriate forces to the gaining theater Army. The gaining theater Army modifies the existing assignment relationships (when required) by attachment or OPCON of the Army to one of the following:

Theater-level command—such as a theater sustainment command or an Army air and missile defense command.

Division.

Brigade.

In unusual circumstances, brigades flowing into an area of responsibility can also be attached or placed OPCON to an available corps headquarters acting as an intermediate-level tactical headquarters.

1-78. Unless modified by a transfer of responsibility agreement, ADCON of the Army passes to the gaining theater Army, then to the headquarters of attachment during force tailoring. Figure 1-9 on page 1-22 uses a hypothetical situation to show how force tailoring might change the organization of a modular brigade. U.S. Army Pacific is the gaining theater Army in this example. U.S. Army Pacific receives the 53rd Division, which deploys with its attached FA brigade—the 575th FA Brigade—as part of a deployment expeditionary force. Before it deployed, the 575th FA Brigade consisted of two MLRS battalions, the 4-19th FA and the 3-34th FA, and one 155mm battalion, the 5-32d FA. For this campaign, the 53rd Division commander requires less MLRS capability, but more supporting cannon fire. Therefore, the U.S. Army Pacific commander requests additional cannon equipped field FA battalions and directs the detachment of the MLRS equipped FA battalion. The 1-32d FA (155 self-propelled) is attached to the 575th FA Brigade while simultaneously detaching the 4-19th FA (MLRS) to another FA brigade in the continental U.S. (CONUS). U.S. Forces Command decides which CONUS-based FA brigade will be assigned a command relationship with the detached MLRS unit. As tailored, the 575th FA Brigade has a command relationship over the 1-32d FA, 5-32d FA, and 3-34th FA battalions. The tailored 575th FA Brigade is in turn attached to the 53rd Division which has the doctrinal ADCON and operational authorities associated with that command relationship.

1-79. The division validates that it is tailored with enough forces to meet the requirements of the reserve, tactical combat force, command post security force, and account for additional ground reconnaissance requirements in addition to the mission. The division also makes recommendations for augmentation when force tailoring falls short of requirements. Force tailoring results in a division consisting of units that may not be located on the same installation. This process places a premium on the use of a common doctrine, Army standard operating procedures and early and continuous teamwork on determining deployment or alert cycle for the tailored division. Such teamwork, built through demanding and realistic training, helps build the cohesion essential for mission success.

1-80. Force tailoring continues throughout all phases of the operation. Before deployment, U.S. Forces Command and the employing Army Service component command tailor the division and recommend a deployment sequence to accomplish the joint force commander’s mission. After deployment, the Army Service component command tailors the division based on changing missions. For example, if the mission changes from a focus primarily on the conduct of offense tasks to a focus primarily on the conduct of stability tasks, the division is tailored with additional civil affairs, engineer, and military police units. One key component of force tailoring is force refinement.

1-81. The division and its tailored forces are refined to account for the multiple constraints of the projected operation. This refinement is repetitive. Force refinement involves making adjustments based on the mission variables of METT-TC, force sequencing, staff tailoring, and task organizing. Commanders analyze the deploying force using the mission variables of METT-TC to identify any changes necessary for the planned operation. Commanders can also refine the force based on other factors.

Force Sequencing. The joint force and the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) commanders assess the situation in the joint operations area against available strategic lift, to determine a supportable deployment sequence based on when and how the joint force commander plans to employ available forces. The joint force commander seeks a balance that provides protection, efficient deployment, and a range of options for responding to possible conditions. Lift availability is constrained by the numbers and types of transportation assets, weather, and access to ports, airfields, roads and railways. Planners consider the likelihood and impact of adjustments and build in sequencing options to fluidly respond to unforeseen changes.

Staff Tailoring. The modular division staff is capable of accepting staff augmentees to provide an expanded capability. If the division headquarters serves as a JFLC or joint task force headquarters, then it must be augmented with other Service military officers and noncommissioned officers as specified on an approved Joint manning document.

Task Organizing. Force tailoring is not synonymous with task organizing. While force tailoring matches capabilities needed to accomplish a mission, task organizing temporarily creates an organization from assigned, attached, or OPCON assets with command relationships to accomplish the task at hand. The division continuously task-organizes brigades throughout the phases of an operation. When task organizing, the division uses standard command and support relationships (see ADRP 5-0).

1-82. Task organization is a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission (ADRP 5-0). The Army is task-organized to accomplish a mission. Theater army, division, BCT, and multifunctional and functional brigade commanders change subordinate unit command relationships and specify support relationships as required. Attached or OPCON units are task-organized under different headquarters as necessary to accomplish assigned and implied missions. Deciding to task-organize formations may reflect previously approved contingency plans or result from current planning efforts. As these missions end, units return to their parent headquarters or are further task-organized by the controlling headquarters. The gaining headquarters has only the authority and responsibility toward the task-organized element inherent in that doctrinal authority.

1-83. Staff estimates and course of action analysis provide information that helps division commanders determine the best task organization for their units. An effective task organization—

Facilitates the division commander’s intent and concept of operations.

Retains flexibility within the concept of operations.

Weights the division’s decisive operation.

Adapts to conditions imposed by the mission variables of METT-TC.

Maintains or creates effective combined arms teams.

Provides mutual support between brigades.

Ensures flexibility to meet unforeseen events and support future operations.

Allocates resources with minimum restrictions on their employment.

Ensures unity of command and synchronization of effort through proper use of command and support relationships.

Offsets limitations and maximizes the potential of all available forces.

Exploits enemy vulnerabilities.

1-84. Creating an appropriate task organization requires understanding—

The mission, including the joint force commander’s intent and concept of operations.

The Army’s concept of unified land operations, decisive action, and tactical concepts. (See ADPs/ADRPs 3-0 and 3-90).

Events within the operational environment.

The roles and interrelations of the warfighting functions.

The status of available battalions within attached or OPCON brigades, including their morale, training, and equipment capabilities.

Specific brigade capabilities, limitations, strengths, and weaknesses.

The risks inherent in the plan.

Subordinate brigade commanders’ abilities, especially their ability to apply combined arms doctrine and work effectively with unified action partners.

If any task organization between BCT should occur.

The appropriate level where that task organization should occur—brigade, battalion, or company.

The tasks each BCT needs to accomplish.

The appropriate command or support relationships.

The required amount and type of augmentation and/or support each BCT needs in addition to its organic capabilities, such as civil affairs, engineers, and fire support.

The sustainment concept for any cross attachments between BCTs.

1-85. During course of action analysis, division commanders identify what combat power and other resources they need, and where, when, and how frequently they need it. They approve or modify their staff’s recommended task organization based on evaluation of the factors listed in paragraph 1-84 and information from estimates and course of action analysis.

1-86. Formal task organization and the change from generic to units begin after course of action analysis, when the division commanders assign missions to their subordinate brigade commanders. Division commanders assign missions to subordinate brigade headquarters and determine if those subordinate headquarters have enough combat power and other resources, adjusting the missions and areas of operations of their subordinate brigades and only changing the internal task organization of their attached BCTs and combat aviation brigades when necessary. They then define command and support relationships between their subordinate brigades and decide the priorities of support.

1-87. In allocating assets, the commander and staff consider the—

Task organization for the ongoing operation.

Potential adverse effect of breaking up the cohesive teams of the division’s BCTs and combat aviation brigades by changing their internal task organization.

Time necessary to realign the organization after receipt of the task organization.

Limits on control over supporting units provided by higher headquarters.

1-88. Normally gaining commanders task-organize forces by designating OPCON, attached, or support relationships to another unit or headquarters. Attached units in these brigades are task-organized between brigades as required by the division or higher headquarters commander. When required by tactical circumstance, higher commanders may detach or OPCON units of one brigade to another brigade to reinforce or complement their capabilities. When detaching units from a BCT or combat aviation brigade, commanders consider the balance of units and capabilities developed in these organizations against the need to adjust their organizations to tactical circumstance. (Note that in contrast to the other brigade types, all BCT and combat aviation brigade units are organic to the BCT or combat aviation brigade.)

1-89. Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental in task organization. Division commanders designate command and support relationships to weight their decisive operations and support their concepts of operations. Task organization also helps subordinate and supporting commanders understand their roles in the operation and support the division commander’s intent. Command and support relationships carry varying responsibilities to the subordinate unit by the parent and the gaining units (see ADRP 5-0). Commanders consider these responsibilities when establishing command and support relationships. Commanders consider two organizational principles when task organizing forces:

Maintain cohesive teams (applies to all types of units).

Do not exceed subordinates’ span of control capabilities.

1-90. Whenever possible, division commanders maintain the cohesive teams of their attached BCTs and combat aviation brigades. These brigades are combined arms organizations with standing headquarters and organic maneuver, intelligence, FA, sustainment, and protection capabilities. When the mission assigned to a particular BCT or combat aviation brigade requires more combat power than what is organic to that brigade, the division commander first varies the size of the subordinate brigade areas of operations so that the size of their area of operations mirrors the size of their area of influence. Alternatively the division commander splits the mission or distributes tactical tasks between two or more brigades.

1-91. Division commanders modify the organic structure of attached BCTs and combat aviation brigades as required by the mission variables of METT-TC when and where these two actions—reducing the size of brigade areas of operations and splitting the mission or distributing tactical tasks between two or more brigades—are not feasible. Division commanders allow time to train and establish functional working relationships and procedures whenever possible after directing the formation of these ad hoc organizations. This includes the need to revise digital databases. A division commander should not further change the task organization of these modified BCTs or combat aviation brigades after organizing and employing them unless the benefits of change clearly outweigh the disadvantages of such a change. This includes time involved in making such changes, loss of momentum, and the impact of change a change of the division’s tempo of operations. Considerations across the warfighting functions, especially for sustainment, may also preclude multiple reorganizations of attached BCT and combat aviation brigade internal structures.

1-92. Division commanders do not exceed the span of control capabilities of subordinates on those occasions when they modify the internal structure of their subordinate attached or OPCON brigades. Span of control refers to the number of subordinate units under a single commander. Allocating subordinates more units gives them greater flexibility and increases the number of tactical options available to the subordinate. However, subordinate commanders should not be given more units than they can effectively command. Although span of control varies with the situation, commanders can normally effectively command two to five BCTs. This number is situationally dependent but not a problem for BCTs and combat aviation brigades conducting decisive action with only their organic subordinates. It can be a problem when many additional types of organizations are needed, such as what occurs when attached or OPCON BCTs and combat aviation brigades conduct primarily either stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks.

1-93. As the number of subordinate units increase, commanders, at some point, lose the ability to consider each unit individually and begin to think of them as part of a single, inflexible mass. In these circumstances, a division commander feels the only way to reintroduce flexibility is to create another echelon of command by grouping elements into a smaller number of parts. This is a tension that occurs when the division’s attached maneuver enhancement brigade has two or more assigned engineer or military police battalions. The division commander determines if the benefits gained by the introduction of a functional engineer or military police brigade headquarters are worth more than the opportunity costs involved to introduce another brigade headquarters into the division’s task organization and area of operations.

1-94. The standard doctrinal command and support relationship definitions cannot cover every possible situation. Some circumstances require division commanders to establish nonstandard command or support relationships. When establishing nondoctrinal relationships, commanders state their deviations from doctrine and establish responsibility for who is doing what to whom in their published orders.

1-95. Within each brigade, the brigade commander task-organizes all organic, assigned, attached, or OPCON units. The commander uses a support relationship (direct support, reinforcing, or GS reinforcing) between units of the BCTs or brigade instead of a command relationship. Figure 1-10 on page 1-26 further develops figure 1-9 on page 1-22 by illustrating task organization in a hypothetical 53rd Division, a supporting FA brigade (575th), and the 4/53 ABCT.

1-96. In figure 1-10, the 53rd Division commander changes the task organization of forces within the 575th FA Brigade and 4/53 ABCT. The division directs the 75th FA Brigade to detach the 1-32d FA along with its support forward support company to the 4/53 ABCT. Note that the 53rd Division attaches the battalion, as opposed to simply assigning, the 1-32d FA the mission of reinforcing the 1-76th FA. Traditionally, the 53rd Division assigns a reinforcing mission to a FA battalion rather than attaching it. However in this case. The 575th FA Brigade has been assigned a nontraditional mission and a significant geographical distance divides the 575th FA Brigade’s area of operations and the 4/53 ABCT’s area of operations. The 4/53 ABCT commander uses the additional FA battalion to increase the fires capability available across the entire brigade area of operations by establishing a support relationship (reinforcing) between the organic FA battalion of the 4/53 ABCT (the 1-76th FA) and the attached 1-32d FA.

1-97. There is one further closing note regarding task organizing the division. Since the division does not have a command relationship with its supporting theater sustainment command, expeditionary sustainment command, or sustainment brigade(s) close coordination between the division G-4 and the sustainment organizations is critical. The division’s supporting sustainment brigade(s) is task-organized by the theater sustainment command or expeditionary sustainment command to support the division’s operations. The division may not have priority of sustainment support if the division’s operations are not the current main effort of the joint force commander. As a result, the division may be forced to reduce the scope of its projected operations to reflect the sustainment support available. This requires the division sustainment cell to coordinate closely with the theater sustainment command or expeditionary sustainment command and the supporting sustainment brigade to ensure that the support provided will enable the operation to occur on the desired scale and scope.

OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND THE DIVISION

1-98. Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their visualization of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. An established operational framework and associated vocabulary unifies the actions of the division’s major subordinate commands and the division staff through the provision of a common focus for their actions. The division commander’s operational framework describes the context in which the division conducts operations and helps develop of the intent. The division commander modifies the operational framework as needed, based on the mission variables of METT-TC. Army leaders are not bound by any framework for organizing operations, but three operational frameworks have proven valuable in the past. These three frameworks are:

Deep—close—security.

Decisive—shaping—sustaining.

Main and supporting efforts.

The higher headquarters directs the framework or frameworks the subordinate headquarters uses. The frameworks should be consistent throughout all echelons. (See ADRP 3-0 for a discussion of these three operational frameworks.)

1-99. The division operates in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. It integrates all available forces to synchronize their effects. The division commander arranges forces and resources in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other and the enemy or situation. If not already directed by a higher headquarters, the division commander selects the operational framework most appropriate to accomplish the mission. This framework helps the commander visualize the use of forces to accomplish a mission and to control the tempo of an operation.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

1-100. A key consideration for the division commander when selecting an operational framework is the area of operations assigned to the division. The higher commander defines the division’s area of operations. The division area of operations should be large enough for the commander to accomplish the mission and protect friendly forces. The division commander, after conducting an analysis of the division area of operations, finds that a change is warranted. The division commander in this case recommends an adjustment to that area of operations. This is because ideally, the area of operations assigned to the division is smaller than the division’s area of influence. If the division’s area of influence is smaller than the division’s area of operations, the division commander considers options for extending the size of the division’s area of influence. These options include:

Changing the geographical dispositions of current systems to increase the size of the area of influence and ensure coverage of key areas, installations, and system.

Requesting additional assets.

Requesting boundary adjustments to reduce the size of the division’s area of operations.

Accepting the increased risk associated with being unable to provide security throughout the area of operations.

Moving the division’s area of influence by phases to sequentially encompass the entire area of operations.

Airspace assigned by the airspace control authority (ACA) is included in the area of operations. The division assigned airspace is over the division area of operations up to the coordinating altitude and from the division rear boundary to the fire support coordination line (FSCL) between the division’s lateral boundaries. The area of operations is a key tactical concept discussed in depth in ADRP 3-90.

1-101. A division employing contiguous areas of operations is more likely to employ the deep—close—security framework because geographical references make more since in this situation. A division employing noncontiguous areas of operations or involved in situations where the area of influence of the division’s brigade are not contiguous is more likely to employ the decisive—shaping—sustaining framework. The main and support effort framework can be used in either situation. However, the framework used by the division’s higher headquarters will influence which framework is used by the division’s higher headquarters. Contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operations are introduced in ADRP 3-0.

1-102. The division assigns areas of operations to it subordinate brigades so they can accomplish their tasks. Normally all BCTs and a select few support brigades are areas of operations. Any brigade may be assigned an area of operation; however, the owning brigade is responsible for all the responsibilities associated with having an area of operations. These responsibilities include terrain management, security, clearance of fires, the conduct of stability tasks, movement control, airspace control, the development and maintenance of the common operational picture within that area of operations, information collection, personnel recovery, and environmental considerations. Any not staffed to accomplish each of these functions should either be augmented or not be assigned an area of operation. Those brigades assigned an area of operations also have airspace control responsibilities as specified in the division order. Any brigade assigned an area of operations has control over all Army airspace users with the division retaining airspace control over unified action partner airspace users. This later statement is true unless the division augments the brigade with additional airspace control capability. (See FM 3-52 for additional information on airspace control within the division.)

1-103. The maneuver enhancement brigade may be assigned an area of operations that includes the division support area and other brigades such as the sustainment brigade, FA brigade and the combat aviation brigade may occupy terrain in the maneuver enhancement brigade’s area of operations. The division may also position the main or tactical command post in the maneuver enhancement brigade’s area of operations.

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE

1-104. Another key consideration for a division commander in deciding which operational framework to deploy is the location of the FSCL. The FSCL is a permissive fire support coordination measure. It is established and adjusted by the appropriate land force commander (usually corps commander or JFLC commander) within that echelon’s boundaries in consultation with other affected commanders. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious attack of targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. (See JP 3-09 for additional details regarding the FSCL.)

1-105. The division will recommend placement or movement of the FSCL to the corps’ or the JFLC’s fires cell. The location and shape of the FSCL reflects the division commander’s concept of operations which is reflected in the operational framework selected. If possible, the FSCL follows well-defined terrain features to identify from the air. The division commander and the supporting air commanders must both have clearly defined responsibilities, selective targeting, and coordinated operations. If the FSCL is located within a portion of the division’s area of operations, the division commander, as the supported commander, provides the necessary guidance, such as target restrictions and weapons constraints for those portions of the division’s area of operations that extend beyond the FSCL. The effects that the joint force air component commander (JFACC) wants to impose beyond the FSCL may not be what the division commander wants. The division commander ensures that the commander’s concept of operations, intent, and guidance is communicated to subordinate units, higher headquarters, and ultimately meet the joint force commander’s overall objectives.

1-106. The decision on where to recommend placement or even whether to use an FSCL requires careful consideration. If used, it is located based on estimates of the situation and concept of operations. Location of enemy forces, anticipated rates of movement, weapons capabilities, and tempo of the operation are considered, as well as other factors deemed appropriate. General considerations for employment (the exact positioning depends on the situation) include the following:

The FSCL supports operational tempo. If the land force plan involves rapid maneuver and a focus on shaping operations at extended ranges to support maneuver, then the establishing headquarters considers placing the FSCL at greater depth from the forward line of own troops (FLOT).

The position of the FSCL in the offense supports the commander’s intent based on the anticipated rate of advance and the time needed to disseminate the new FSCL’s position to aircraft and firing units.

The FSCL is normally positioned closer to the forward line own troops in the defense than in the offense.

1-107. Timely coordination of attacks by the land force beyond the FSCL is critical to land commanders. Small elements of their forces may now be operating beyond the FSCL or plan to maneuver on that territory in the future. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so increases the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources.

1-108. The land force commander adjusts the location of the FSCL as required to keep pace with operations. In high-tempo maneuver operations, the FSCL may change frequently, such as every several hours. The establishing commander sends the change to higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting headquarters to ensure attacks are coordinated by the controlling agencies. Anticipated adjustments to the FSCL are sent to other elements of the joint force soon enough to reduce potential disruptions in their current and near-term operations.

1-109. The Army has an obligation to influence targeting throughout the joint operations area that may impact future unified land operations. Planned targets created during deliberate targeting are coordinated for joint force commander or designated representative approval on the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL). Those targets to be executed by air operations have scheduled missions against them on the air tasking order (ATO). Targets on JIPTL through the joint force commander’s targeting cycle, are collaborated with components and approved. Therefore those targets are coordinated with all other participating joint forces. Air interdiction missions are tasked to targets (normally on the JIPTL) on the ATO during the joint air tasking cycle in which the battlefield coordination detachment is participating as the Army’s representative.

1-110. Regardless of where the FSCL is placed, a technique to control air interdiction or facilitate other joint fires is for the ground commander to employ kill boxes inside the division’s area of operations. Employment of kill boxes improves coordination to fix targets and to integrate air-ground operations. When the ground forces commander emplaces kill boxes inside his or her assigned area of operations, it focuses collection efforts and fires on where to engage targets and reduces the possibility of inadvertently impacting ground force operations.

AIRSPACE CONTROL

1-111. Airspace over the division area of operation is not owned by division or by subordinate BCTs in the sense that an area of operations confers ownership of the ground. Airspace over an Army area of operations is the joint force commander’s responsibility. Other military and civilian organizations operating in the joint operations area have airspace requirements within the division’s airspace.

1-112. The division staff coordinates all supporting airspace users and division airspace requirements. This includes supporting close air support (CAS) missions and transitioning aircraft that use restrictive operating zones, air corridors, and routes within division airspace. Division airspace exists when the ACA delegates to the division the responsibility to control airspace over any portion of the division area of operations. For the purposes of this publication, division airspace is considered a volume of airspace where the ACA has delegated the responsibility for control of that volume, according to the airspace control plan and airspace control order, to the division.

1-113. During combat operations, the division area of operations may be small enough that the division’s organic fires can range the entire area of operations. As a result, the use of an FSCL may not be required. Division airspace may cover the entire area of operations up to the coordinating altitude. In other combat operations in which the division’s area of operations is so large that the division’s organic fires cannot range the entire area of operations, thus facilitating the use of a FSCL; division airspace may be the volume of airspace short of the FSCL and up to the coordinating altitude. During non-combat operations, division airspace refers to a collection of coordinating measures, such as a restricted operating zone or a high-density airspace control zone, under the control of the division. Regardless of the operational environment, the key enabler to this delegation of ACA responsibilities is the division’s ability to control the volume of airspace. This assignment of division-airspace does not include authorities vested in the area air defense commander.

1-114. The division airspace element leads the airspace control working group and is responsible for working with joint and other Army airspace elements to integrate airspace use over the division area of operations. The airspace element provides airspace requirements to the corps or JFLC headquarters’ airspace section for consolidation into the Army unit airspace plan and possible integration into the theater airspace control order. Within division current operations integration cell, the JAGIC facilitates collaboration between the Army airspace element and the U.S. Air Force ASOC. (See FM 3-52 for additional information on airspace control.)

Chapter 2

The Division Mission Command System

This chapter briefly reviews the Army’s approach to mission command, discusses the division mission command system and then discusses the employment of the division’s command posts. It also addresses command programs. It does not discuss the internal cells and elements within the division headquarters and the headquarters and headquarters battalion which are addressed in FM 3-94.

GENERAL

2-1. The commander is the focus of the division’s mission command system—the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment. Through the division mission command system, the division commander assesses the situation, makes decisions, and directs actions. The division commander must have an effective mission command system to conduct the division’s operations—plan, prepare, execute, and continually assess—and other processes.

2-2. To function effectively and have the greatest chance for mission accomplishment, commanders, supported by their staffs, exercise mission command throughout the conduct of operations. The exercise of mission command encompasses how Army commanders and staffs apply the foundational mission command philosophy together with the mission command warfighting function, guided by the principles of mission command.

2-3. Under the philosophy of mission command, commanders understand their leadership guides the actions of the force. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, use the guiding principles of mission command to balance the art of command with the science of control. They use the art of command to exercise authority, to provide leadership, and to make timely decisions. Commanders and staffs use the science of control to regulate forces and direct the execution of operations based on the commander’s intent.

2-4. Impediments to mission accomplishment that act before, during, and after operations create the requirement for control. These impediments include the enemy, the environment, and Clausewitz’s friction. Control allows commanders to direct the execution of operations to conform to their intent. Unlike command functions—which remain relatively similar, regardless of echelon, control functions increase in complexity at each higher echelon. As the commander drives the operations process, the staff, under the commander’s direction, exercises two control forms: procedural and positive. (NOTE: Joint publications references to procedural and positive control relate to airspace control methodology, and should not be confused.) Procedural control is the technique of regulating forces that relies on a combination of doctrine, regulations, policies, operational graphics, and tactics, techniques and procedures (See ADRP 3-0 for more information). Effective procedural control incorporates flexibility of implementation with a general understanding of the procedural control measures. Procedural control forms the practical boundaries within which the division operates. Procedural control is process oriented and frequently embedded in standard operating procedures and battle drills. It frees commanders from making routine decisions and enables them to exercise positive control.

2-5. Positive control is the technique of regulating forces that involves commanders and staff leaders actively assessing, deciding, and directing them (See ADRP 3-0 for more information). The key to positive control is the balanced application of the art of command with the science of control. Commander’s must understand the elements of risk within an operation The requires the commander to get out of the division’s command posts and conduct a personal assessment of the situation on the ground using the mobile command group and lead the division in accomplishing the mission. Positive controls are the most restrictive while affording the commander the most direct involvement. However, they entail significant elements of personal risk to the commander that can be somewhat mitigated with the use of the division’s information systems—especially the common operational picture. These systems allow the commander to maintain situational awareness so that the commander can apply personal leadership where needed. Positive control measures are most effective when the operation is complex or when the situation is so vague that the information systems will not provide the full picture. There is a fine balance between the commander over-controlling the situation to the detriment of subordinate commanders and letting an unacceptable situation grow out of control.

2-6. No single control option works best for all situations. The division commander is flexible in modifying standard arrangements and information systems architectures to meet the requirements of each situation and to promote unity of effort if unable to obtain unity of command.

2-7. The mission command warfighting function consists of the related tasks and a mission command system that support the exercise of authority and direction by the commander. The mission command warfighting function tasks define what commanders and staffs do to integrate the other warfighting functions. It includes those mutually supporting commander, staff, and additional tasks introduced in ADRP 3-0 and expanded on in ADRP 6-0. The commander leads the staff tasks, and the staff tasks help commander execute commander tasks. Commanders, with their staff’s help, integrate numerous processes and activities within the headquarters and across the force as they exercise mission command.

DIVISION MISSION COMMAND SYSTEM

2-8. The division commander needs support to exercise mission command effectively. At every echelon of command, including the division, each commander establishes a mission command system—the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations (ADP 6-0). The division commander has the flexibility to organize the five components of the division’s mission command system to support that individual’s ability to make decisions and facilitate communication within the division headquarters as well as with higher, subordinate, adjacent, and supporting commanders. This includes maintaining communications with other Services, other governmental agencies, host nation agencies (if present), and international organizations as applicable. The most important of these components is personnel.

PERSONNEL

2-9. The division commander’s mission command system begins with Soldiers. Educated and trained personnel are essential to and form the basis of an effective mission command system; the best technology cannot support mission command without them. The commanding general bases the division’s mission command system on the human characteristics—human skills, knowledge, and abilities—of available personnel more than on equipment and procedures. The division commander influences the personnel system as much as possible to ensure the assignment of those Soldiers possessing the appropriate human characteristics necessary to accomplish the division’s anticipated missions to important command and staff positions. After all it is division’s Soldiers and leaders responsible for the exercise of disciplined initiative to accomplish missions according to the commander’s intent, not technology. Division commanders must not underestimate the importance of providing education and training to their staffs. Such education and training of the staff is as important as training their attached brigades. Division commanders maintain standards and relieve those leaders and Soldiers that cannot be educated or trained to perform their duties to standard.

2-10. Division key personnel dedicated to mission command include the division’s two assistant division commanders, the division chief of staff, the division’s command sergeant major, and the division’s coordinating, special, and personal staff. The division commander publishes terms of reference that define the duties and authorities of the two assistant division commanders. These assistant division commanders extend the division commander’s control in their designated areas. The division commander can also assign them to temporary command of multiple brigades preparing for or conducting tasks that require close coordination, such as reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI); retrograde operations; and obstacle crossings. An assistant division commander assigned these types of missions use the division tactical command post to synchronize and control the conduct of these types of multi-brigade actions.

2-11. A division commander delegates executive management authority of the division staff to the division chief of staff. As the key staff integrator, the chief of staff frees the division commander from routine details of staff operations and the management of the headquarters. The secretary of the general staff, the division headquarters, and headquarters battalion commander helps the division chief of staff manage the division headquarters. This battalion commander acts as the headquarters commandant. The chief of staff is responsible for the conduct of efficient and prompt staff actions within the division headquarters. Specific duties of a chief of staff are outlined in FM 6-0 but special emphasis should be placed on the supervision of staff training and integration programs.

2-12. The division commander establishes terms of reference that outline the role and functions of the division command sergeant major. The division command sergeant major is the senior noncommissioned officer within the division. That individual carries out the division commander’s policies and enforcing division standards for the performance of individual Soldier training and the conduct of enlisted Soldiers. The division command sergeant major gives advice and initiates recommendations to the division commander and staff in matters pertaining to enlisted Soldiers. The commander employs the command sergeant major throughout the division’s area of operations to extend command influence, assess morale of the force, and help during critical events.

2-13. The duties and responsibilities of the division’s primary coordinating staff officers: the assistant chief of staff, personnel (G-1); assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2); assistant chief of staff, operations, (G-3); assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4); assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5); assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6); assistant chief of staff, financial management (G-8); and assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations (G-9); and the division’s deputy fire support coordinator, chief of protection, and chief of sustainment are discussed in FM 6-0. The duties and responsibilities of the division’s special and personal staff officers are also discussed in FM 6-0. These individuals manage the manning, training, equipping and professional development of division Soldiers and officers in their fields of expertise. With the removal of the military intelligence, signal, and air defense battalions from the divisional structure, the G-2, G-6 and air defense officer are now the senior representatives of their branch in the division. Their role as the senior branch officer is greatly expanded in terms of their overall supervision, professional development plan, slating and guidance for all Soldiers in their particular field of expertise.

2-14. The division chief of staff and staff principals integrate any individual and small team staff augmentees into the division’s existing staff structure to form the exact staff structure needed to support the division’s mission. These augmentees need to be present for predeployment training. Assimilating augmentees into the core staff is more than just meeting their life support needs. The chief of staff and staff principals ensure that augmenting officers, warrant officers, enlisted Soldiers, even if from another service, and supporting civilian employees and contractors are assimilated into their staff section in a posture that allows them to contribute effectively. They also prepare them to perform their roles in the upcoming operation. Integration includes—

Receiving and introducing new personnel to the division headquarters and the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic environments where the division conducts operations. This includes necessary physical and cultural acclimatization and education.

Determining or assessing each individual augmentee’s skills, knowledge, and ability to help in placing them in the right place within the staff.

Verifying security clearances.

Instructing them in the appropriate headquarters mission and organization, commander’s intent, staff standard operating procedures, publications, and any other appropriate directives.

Orienting them on their places and roles on the staff since their comfort level may be at lower echelons.

Conducting briefings and rehearsals to educate them in the proper performance of their new duties.

Establishing necessary command and support relationships over them. This includes making sure that the requisite information regarding them is entered into their servicing personnel, medical, finance, training, and supply systems. Any problems in these areas need to be resolved expeditiously before they can influence duty performance.

Providing them with the necessary communications links and tools, such as knowledge management procedures—proper naming conventions, portal access procedures, and file sharing techniques, computer workstations, passwords, and access, to allow them to do their jobs.

Training and certifying the operators and users of division mission command systems.

Training to standard on the headquarters mission essential tasks and individual common tasks.

Such training is continuous using scenario based daily battle drills based on building the common operational picture. These training exercises should initially focus on individuals and their cells and then graduate to command post wide exercises once competence is demonstrated.

2-15. A staff and facilities orientation program is established to ensure that all individuals joining the division headquarters staff is familiar with their surroundings, such as their new work area and the command post as a whole, the command post’s life support area, key division leadership, and division headquarters and headquarters battalion staff. This could be accomplished through establishment of a personnel reception center by the headquarters battalion manpower and personnel officer. Another program that could be established with the personnel reception center or by itself is a sponsor program—an experienced division staff member is assigned to a new staff member to help with familiarization. Whatever the program, it should improve the efficiency of the staff and lead to building a team.

2-16. Each staff officer establishes lines of communications and physically meets with counterparts at lower, higher, adjacent, and supporting headquarters whenever possible. The establishment and maintenance of these personal relationships are important to maintaining an accurate common operational picture within the staff.

2-17. As augmentees and assigned personnel flow in and out of the division headquarters during operations, the preparation of efficiency reports that accurately reflects their contribution needs to remain a high priority for the chief of staff and staff principals and the individuals concerned. A senior service or Department of Defense (DOD) civilian representative reviews the efficiency reports of any joint personnel or DOD civilians attached to or supporting the division, such as U.S. Navy electronic warfare officers or civilian intelligence analysts, before them leaving the headquarters to ensure that necessary service or component peculiar wording is included on those reports to avoid doing inadvertent harm. Likewise, these individuals should be consciously considered for some type of award that reflects their contributions.

NETWORKS

2-18. The Army is transitioning from the philosophy of connecting secure network autonomous enclaves in the different theaters to an interdependent security posture operating as a system of systems. LandWarNet is a mission command enabler, and the Army’s portion of the Department of Defense Information Networks (DODIN) upon which both the generating force and the operational Army depend on throughout all phases of operations and operational environments. FM 6-02 discusses the DODIN and LandWarNet. That publication also discusses Network Transport and Information Services capabilities that enable the commander to conduct mission command. Signal center of excellence publications discuss cyber threats that could impact on the conduct of the division’s operations.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

2-19. An information system consists of equipment that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. This includes computers—hardware and software—and communications, as well as policies and procedures for their use (ADP 6-0). The division staff uses their information systems to process, store, and disseminate information according to the commander’s information priorities. These capabilities relieve the staff of handling routine data. Information systems—especially when integrated into a coherent, reliable network—enable extensive information sharing, collaborative planning, execution, and assessment that promote shared understanding. That shared understanding is difficult to obtain in a multinational environment, especially in coalition operations where detailed techniques and procedures for clearing coalition partners and their information systems to connect with the U.S. secure internet protocol network and the U.S. non-secure internet protocol network have not been developed. The integration of multinational partner communications system operations, with diverse groups of security and information sharing domains must be planned and managed. (See JP 6-0 for additional information on this topic.)

2-20. All staff officers are responsible for knowledge management and ensure representation on the knowledge management working group for knowledge transfer and knowledge management procedures. The information systems used today increase staff proficiency if information is disseminated to those who need to know. Part of the solution is following the command information management plan which the G-6 has responsibility for technical execution but the plan itself is the responsibility of the G-3 and chief of staff.

2-21. There are two levels of information systems control: network and nodal. Network control provides management of area, regional, theater, or global networks. Its principle focus is in the management and configuration of long-haul transmission media and switching centers transporting and routing bulk data between nodal facilities. Nodal control is concerned with the management of local information systems. Its principal focus is switching systems and terminal devices supporting commanders at command posts or while they are on the move or at short halts.

2-22. Networks are formed when terminal devices and transmission media are interconnected with switching equipment to ensure that information (voice, imagery, data, or message) is transported to appropriate locations. The networks that result from open-system architectures are called information grids. The division network allows commanders and staffs to gain access to, process, and transport information in near real time to anyone else on the network. Information grids are computer-controlled networks that provide virtual connectivity on demand. They support local area and wide area network operations. They are also the components of larger grid networks that support regional and theater grids, and ultimately the Global Information Grid.

Information System Principles

2-23. The foundation of any information system is the continuous, uninterrupted flow and processing of information to support planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment. The division commander has information systems that are interoperable, flexible, responsive, mobile, disciplined, survivable, and sustainable. Information must be made accessible. In general, the value of information increases with the number of users.

2-24. Information system principles for a division engaged with unified action partners are complex and bring together diverse military and civilian organizations to operate as one force. Specific information systems principles associated with these operations are—

Establish liaison early including higher to lower, left to right, and supporting to supported. It is more important the liaison be established than the norms associated with liaison are followed.

Leverage available information systems resources which are generally limited.

Standardize operating procedures.

Agree on policy before operations wherever possible.

Use U.S. military interpreters whenever possible.

Use common cryptographic systems.

Information System Employment

2-25. The most important guiding principle for the division’s information systems to support employment is that they be designed to support the division to conduct decisive action across the full range of military operations. The division G-6 planners prioritize and choose from the individual joint and Service system capabilities that support the division’s participation in unified land operations and the conduct of decisive action. However, the division commander and staff communicate with their higher commander—corps, joint force land component (JFLC), or joint force—and that individual’s staff. This requires the division headquarters to be equipped with systems that interface with the supported commander’s information systems. The division also communicates with its attached and supporting brigades and other units. Conflict levels associated with the range of military operations pose different, and sometimes contentious, requirements on the division’s information systems. The division headquarters and its subordinate brigades conduct a wide variety of tasks simultaneously over a wide geographic area. Many of these tasks have different requirements on the division’s information systems.

Information System Configuration

2-26. The Army’s information systems—including the division’s information systems—are configured and operated generally to meet the requirements of interoperability and of the Army’s commands and service component commands. They meet the requirement to provide serviceable wartime capabilities that support existing forces logistically, create new forces, establish force readiness levels adequate to counter existing threats, and provide support for the national military command system (NMCS). The NMCS is the priority component of the Department of Defense information networks designed to support the President, Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their responsibilities. These systems provide the means through which the joint force commanders send and receive information and exercise command over their forces. They facilitate the coordination of the sustainment during the conduct of decisive action. The loss of space-based communications due to enemy activity remains a major concern for the division as it uses its tactical information systems during the conduct of operations outside the limits of the continental U.S. (CONUS). Whether the interruption of the communications is caused by enemy action against satellites or through the use of intermittent jamming and spoofing, the resulting blackout requires the division to adapt and adjust until the capability is restored. Short term losses of satellite communications are mitigated through the use of alternative communications methods and courier networks.

2-27. When division headquarters is assigned an operational role—Army force, JFLC, or joint force—the division’s existing information systems that are programs of record are configured and meet the interoperability requirements of those Joint information systems used by combatant and joint force commanders and their subordinate functional component commands. There are small Joint units capable of enhancing the division’s capability to conduct joint operations made available to support the division by the joint force commander. However, the priority requirement for these units will be to support the NMCS. (See JP 6-0 for further information on the NMCS.)

Information System Planning

2-28. The division commander determines information system deficiencies identified through the conduct of studies, operations, and exercises. Division signal planners work with the division future operations and plans cells once a division board, center, working group, staff section or cell anticipates the need for future connectivity to information sources and the use of nonstandard analytical tools to support of the division’s future operations. This occurs when the division expects to transition from an emphasis on conducting offensive tasks to an emphasis on conducting stability tasks. The division G-6 helps the division commander in the assessment of the capabilities of the division’s existing information systems to support current or projected higher commander missions. The G-6 compares current needs with current capabilities and planned needs with planned capabilities. (See FM 6-02 for additional information pertaining to techniques associated with LandWarNet network operations.)

2-29. The Air Force air support operations squadron (ASOS) supporting the division provides a significant amount of information services, technical expertise, and equipment that requires varying degrees of integration with division systems. Prior planning with the ASOS communications support personnel is required to maximize those resources and enable that force multiplying capability.

PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES

2-30. The division commander, helped by the division chief of staff, establishes and uses systematic processes and procedures to organize the activities within the division headquarters and throughout the division’s attached brigades and other forces. Adhering to processes and procedures minimizes confusion, misunderstanding, and hesitation when the commander makes necessary adjustment decisions in response to the evolving mission variables. Processes and procedures can increase organizational competence, for example, by improving a staff’s efficiency or by increasing the tempo. Processes and procedures can be especially useful in improving the coordination of individuals on the division staff who must cooperate to accomplish repetitive tasks, such as the internal functioning of either the division’s main or tactical command post. The division staff should take advantage of red team trained individuals on the staff to critically examine the division’s processes and procedures to avoid applying them blindly to the wrong tasks or the wrong situations, which can lead to ineffective, even counterproductive, performance.

2-31. Processes are a series of actions directed to an end state. There are six processes conducted by the division staff—the operations process, the military decisionmaking process, the targeting process, the intelligence process, the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process, and the knowledge management process. ADP/ADRP 5-0 describes the operations process. ADRP 5-0 describes the military decisionmaking process. FM 3-60 describes the targeting process. ADP/ADRP 2-0 describes the intelligence process. FM 2-01.3 discusses the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process. FM 6-01.1 provides techniques for effective knowledge management.

2-32. Procedures are standard, detailed steps, often used by staffs to describe how to perform tasks to achieve the desired end state. Procedures govern actions within the mission command system to make it more effective and efficient. Standard operating procedures serve two purposes. Internal standard operating procedures standardize each command post’s internal operations and administration. For example, the division’s internal standard operating procedures provide detailed instructions on how to configure common operational picture displays in the main command post. The division’s external standard operating procedures (sometimes referred to as the tactical standard operating procedures) standardize interactions between the main and tactical command posts and attached units, such as the timing and format of reports. Subordinate units adopt and implement standard operating procedures as directed when the division internal task organization changes. ATP 3-90.90 contains the shell of a division tactical standard operating procedure. For effective standard operating procedures, all Solders know their provisions and train to their standards. In addition to these standard operating procedures, each division command posts standardize procedures associated with—

Command post battle drills.

Shift-change briefings.

Operation update and assessment briefings.

Operations synchronization meetings.

Transferring control between command posts.

(See FM 6-0 for additional information.)

Information Management

2-33. Information management is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect knowledge products, data, and information (ADRP 6-0). Information management is the provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate situational understanding and decisionmaking. Information management disseminates timely and protected relevant information to commanders and staffs. Information management helps commanders develop situational understanding. It also helps them make and disseminate effective decisions faster than the situation can change. Among other aspects, information management includes lower level mechanical methods and procedures such as organizing, collating, plotting, and arranging to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate data and information. However, information management is more than technical control of data flowing across networks. It employs both staff management and automatic processes to focus a vast array of information and make relevant information available to the right person at the right time. Information management centers on commanders and the information they need to exercise mission command. Its two components: information systems and relevant information are discussed in ADRP 6-0.

2-34. Clarity and accuracy of information are critical, especially when involving multiple agencies in activities such as scheduling airlifts and processing resources. Information sharing is essential to establish ground truth which is a critical and sensitive process. Not all agencies agree on the nature or scope of support required or on the operation’s progress. To preempt false impressions, the division and its subordinate brigades share information with other agencies. Information sharing helps other agencies execute their missions. For example, providing overhead photography to international or private relief organization officials helps the design and construction of needed refugee camps or aid search efforts. Data on the quantity and type of relief aid moved by the division using available means and modes help the transportation planning of other agencies. Sharing information on previous use of cluster munitions and other ordnance is needed to help establish safe routes for returning refugees and to protect the local population along with the international and nongovernmental organizations operating within the division’s area of operations.

Knowledge Management

2-35. Knowledge management is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decisionmaking (ADRP 6-0). The knowledge management process (assess, design, develop, pilot and implement) aligns the people, process, and tools within the organizational structure and culture to increase collaboration and interaction between leaders and subordinates resulting in shared understanding. The four components are:

People—Knowledge managers focus on connecting people and building social networks to enable the transfer of knowledge. This includes the knowledge management representatives within each staff section.

Processes—The five step knowledge management process aligns the people, processes, and tools within the organizational structure and culture to create shared understanding.

Tools—Knowledge management tools are anything used to share and preserve knowledge. Tools can be non-digital, digital, or both and used in combination.

Organization—the matrix in which people, processes, and tools function to integrate individual and organizational learning strategies.

2-36. Knowledge management helps the division commander make informed, timely decisions despite the fog and friction inherent in the conduct of operations. It also enables effective collaboration by linking organizations internal and external to the division and Soldiers requiring knowledge. Knowledge management enhances rapid adaptation in dynamic operations. It applies analysis and evaluation to information to create knowledge. Since a wide range of knowledge affects the division’s operations, the division commander’s information requirements routinely extend beyond military matters. Defining these requirements is an important aspect of knowledge management. Establishing the commander’s critical information requirements is one way the division commanders define their information requirements. These commander’s critical information requirements focus on development of knowledge products. Defining the ground rules for sharing classified and unclassified information between the division, other U.S. military forces and foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations and international agencies will be an important function of the division knowledge management element and the foreign disclosure officer. The division G-6 is responsible for implementing those ground rules.

2-37. The division staff uses knowledge management create, organize, apply, and transfer knowledge. Identifying the patterns of knowledge flow necessary for the division’s operations is critical to making adjustments for effectiveness, efficiency, and outputs. Learning available to division commanders and staffs before operations include collaborative assistance, peer and subject matter expert assistance, virtual right-seat rides, lessons learned, and situated learning. The division current operations integrating cell conducts training in answering requests for information that minimize how much time spent researching them and causing the least disruption to subordinate units. FM 6-01.1 discusses how the division can exploit knowledge management.

2-38. Knowledge management is a critical consideration during all operations. In operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks, sharing of relevant information with nongovernmental organizations, local officials, police, and other nonmilitary agencies achieve effective coordination and unity of effort. Approaches to civilian organizations, including the media, for information is open and transparent, including a clear statement of the use of the information. This avoids undermining cooperative efforts with such agencies.

FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

2-39. The division commander arranges the facilities and equipment documented on the division headquarters and headquarters battalion’s table of organization and equipment into command posts. The commander maintains the prerogative at all times to organize the staff and command post structure as required to execute the mission and is not restricted to the documented structure. A facility is a structure or location that provides a work environment and shelter for the other components of the mission command system. Facilities range from a command post composed of vehicles and tentage, to command posts located in hardened buildings or bunkers. Examples of equipment needed to sustain a mission command system include vehicles, radio or signal equipment, generators, and lighting. Facilities and equipment do not include information systems. The division is resourced with a main command post, a tactical command post, and a mobile command group. These two command posts and the mobile command group are supported by a headquarters and headquarters battalion. Figure 2-1 on page 2-10 illustrates the internal organization of the division headquarters staff.

Command Posts

2-40. A command post is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities (FM 6-0). It groups headquarters personnel and equipment by warfighting function or by planning horizon to facilitate the exercise of mission command. A command post is the organization designed to help the commander exercising mission command. The staff is organized into functional and integrating cells and their subordinate elements within each of the division’s two command posts—main and tactical—to facilitate coordination and promote efficiency. (See FM 6-0 for detailed description of functional and integrating cells.) The table of organization and equipment for the division headquarters and headquarters battalion also contains a mobile command group. These two command posts and the mobile command group provide the division commander flexibility in arranging the division’s control nodes within the division’s area of operations. This flexible control structure allows the division commander to exert command presence where it is needed without losing sight of the larger picture of the division’s operations as a whole.

2-41. The commander determines the sequence of deployment, timing of moves, initial locations and task organization for all the division’s command posts based on the mission variables of METT-TC and the commander’s visualization. The commander task-organizes functional capabilities and personnel across the main and tactical command posts to match the commander’s concept for control of operations. The division’s two command posts deploy to separate locations or are consolidated based on those mission variables. Alternatively the division commander creates a command post tailored from these assets to control the actions of multiple brigades operating in close proximity to each other conducting a task or tasks, such as an early-entry command post (EECP). Each command post performs functions implied by its organizational design and those tasks assigned by the commander. In the mission command paragraph (paragraph 5) of the division operations order, the commander details any changes to the doctrinal authority; responsibilities; and task organization of the division’s command posts and any special instructions.

NOTE: An EECP is an ad hoc organization comprised of task-organized equipment and personnel from the main and tactical command posts. Normally the tactical command post provides the base from which staff officers and equipment are added or subtracted based on mission requirements to form the division’s early-entry command post. The EECP is staffed with a mix of current operations personnel, planners, and sustainers to coordinate the reception of the division and plan, control, and assess the division’s initial operations.

Main Command Post

2-42. The main command post is the focal command post of the division. It controls the execution of division operations. The division main command post is the primary command post responsible for the sustained conduct of current operations, future planning, analysis for current and future operations, sustainment coordination and other staff functions. It includes representation from all division integrating and functional cells, other special division staff sections, and coordinating elements. The division staff at the main command post operates under the general supervision of the division chief of staff. The main command post is capable of conducting the full array of coordination functions.

2-43. The division main command post is organized into a mix of warfighting function and integrating cells to facilitate staff communications and interaction. The main command post’s integrating cells are:

Current operations cell.

Future operations cell.

Plans integrating cell.

The planning horizons addressed by each of these integrating cells vary based on the division’s tempo of operations and the mission variables of METT-TC. For example, during the conduct of major operations the current operations integrating cell is involved with operations occurring in the next 24 hours. The future operations cell integrates operations occurring between 24 and 96 hours out with future plans integrating operations taking place beyond those compressed timeframes. During the conduct of prolonged stability-focused operations, the current operations integrating cell addresses all division operations occurring within the next seven days. In this case the future operations integrating cell addresses branches to current operations and operations taking place between the next seven to thirty days. In this case the division plans integrating cell would be addressing sequels and branches to current operations envisioned for execution in more than a month.

2-44. These integrating cells are scalable to accommodate staff augmentation when required, such as when the division is assigned the mission to perform the duties of an operational headquarters in a small scale contingency operation. (There are also several staff sections residing at the main command post not permanently folded into these integrating or functional cells. These staff sections operate under the general supervision of the division chief of staff.) (See FM 6-0 for a discussion of the functions of the integrating and functional cells and the functions of the division’s coordinating, special, and personal staff sections or elements.) The only element within the division main command post that will be specifically discussed is that of the division headquarters element and the joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC).

2-45. The division headquarters element provides administrative support for the division commander, serves as the focal point for liaisons, and synchronizes staff effort. The headquarters element consists of the division chief of staff, the secretary of the general staff, organic liaison officers, and supporting personnel. The secretary of the general staff helps the chief of staff by planning and supervising special conferences and meetings, directing preparation for, and monitoring execution of itineraries for distinguished visitors to the headquarters, and acting as the informal point of contact for liaison officers.

2-46. Receiving and dispatching liaison teams are critical functions of the headquarters element. Liaison officers provide and disseminate relevant information and represent adjacent, attached, operational control (OPCON), supporting, and in some cases supported units, at the main command post. (FM 6-0 discusses the duties and functions of liaison officers.) The division is also augmented with liaison officers from other governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and joint or multinational headquarters. These liaison officers will be located within the main command post as necessary to best facilitate operations.

2-47. The division main command post performs the following functions:

Controls all division operations.

Serves as the primary plans, analysis, and sustainment coordination command post.

Monitors and assesses operations for impact on future operations.

Conducts planning for major operations and battles.

Writes operations plans and contingency plans.

Integrates intelligence activities into both current and future operations.

Produces single source and all source intelligence.

Produces terrain products.

Integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes cyber electromagnetic activities, network, and network security operations.

Conducts information management and knowledge management.

Coordinates and manages force structure to including request for forces and equipment.

Synchronizes the division’s targeting process.

Coordinates the conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks within its area of operations.

Prepares and maintains division staff estimates, plans, and orders to support future operations.

Plans and synchronizes division sustainment operations with the supporting sustainment organization.

Plans and synchronizes division Army Health System support with the supporting medical organizations.

Prepares all reports required by higher headquarters.

2-48. The physical arrangement of the integrating and functional cells and personal staff sections within the main command post should facilitate work and security, smooth traffic flow, and take advantage of available cover and concealment. This means that once deployed, the division uses available buildings, such as warehouses, schools, and office buildings instead of standard field shelters to increase how much protection from the elements and enemy action afforded to the command post’s personnel and information systems.

2-49. An example of physically arranging the integrating and functional cells to facilitate work is the combining of the supporting U.S. Air Force air support operations center (ASOC) and tactical air control party (TACP) with selected division current operations personnel and fires and protection functional cell personnel to form a division JAGIC. The JAGIC is a staff organization designed to enhance joint collaborative efforts to deconflict joint air-ground assets operating within the division’s allocated airspace. (See paragraph 1-100 for a description of the division’s allocated airspace.) This occurs by co-locating decisionmaking authorities from the land and air component to support the division commander’s objectives and intent. This center is located within the current operations cell and works for the G-3. (ATP 3-91.1 discusses the operations of the JAGIC.

2-50. Normally, the main command post—less any individuals and equipment needed to augment the tactical command post to form the division’s EECP—remains at home station during the initial phases of deployment. Once the EECP is established within the joint operations area of the gaining joint force commander, the division commander deploys the main command post into the joint operations area. Normally the main command post deploys in at least two echelons.

2-51. The main command post has some organic transportation and signal support, but requires a much longer set-up and tear-down time than does the division’s tactical command post. The main command post does not have the organic equipment to conduct command on the move so it must operate in a stationary mode. The main command post, as currently resourced, is 50-percent mobile and requires two lifts to displace with organic transportation assets. Because of the longer time it requires for setup and its connectivity, the main command post deploys to and sets up in a preestablished hard-wired site or secure location. The main command post operates from home station, an intermediate staging area or from within the joint operational area, depending on the mission variables of METT-TC.

2-52. The main command post does not have to displace frequently to maintain control of subordinate brigade because of the extended ranges and broadband capabilities of the division’s communications systems. The division can use the tactical command post and the mobile command group to further reduced the need to displace the main command post. The main command post can be organized into many different configurations using those field shelters documented on the division headquarters and headquarters battalion table of organization and equipment. Alternatively the division uses any available commercially available tents or existing buildings. The main command post occupies a location in a given configuration on either a temporary or a long-term basis.

2-53. The primary considerations in positioning the main command post are communications, survivability, and accessibility. Elimination of the dependency on line of sight communications systems, with their inherent range limitations, allows the main command post to remain stationary while maintaining control over units conducting operations over extended distances. Support assets task-organized from the division headquarters and headquarters battalion co-locate with the main command post. When the division conducts conventional operations against an enemy, in addition to establishing a defensive perimeter, the command post’s organic tactical vehicles and communications equipment are dispersed and camouflaged to reduce their electronic and visual signature to enemy reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) assets. More consideration is given to other situationally appropriate security measures (see antiterrorism and protection publications) when the division conducts operations more focused on accomplishing stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. The division normally tasks at least a company-sized element to provide ground security to the main command post.

2-54. The division commander determines the main command posts location. The division headquarters and headquarters battalion commander, as headquarters commandant—in coordination with the division chief of staff, G-2, G-3, and G-6—recommends general locations to the commander. These are almost always secure locations, such as in a sanctuary location, intermediate staging base, or in a joint security area within the joint operations area. They should also be in close proximity to a fixed-wing air base and contain a helicopter landing zone. The main command post can also co-locate with one of the division’s subordinate brigades, usually a maneuver enhancement brigade or a combat aviation brigade if attached to the division. The division headquarters and headquarters battalion commander assigns locations to each staff integrating and functional cell and supporting headquarters battalion elements within the selected site.

Tactical Command Post

2-55. The tactical command post controls, as required, units assigned, attached, OPCON or tactical control (TACON) to the division for operations. It maintains continuous communication with subordinates, higher headquarters, the division main command posts, and supporting joint assets. It also controls the operations of the entire division for a limited time when the main command post is displacing or not available. However, the tactical command post requires augmentation from the main command post to control the entire division’s operations over a sustained time period. The tactical command post is task-organized with signal and life support from the division headquarters and headquarters battalion. It takes about 30 Soldiers (a platoon-sized force) to provide an adequate level of local ground security to the tactical command post.

2-56. The tactical command post controls forces committed to a specified operation, such as brigade sized air assaults, major wet gap (river) crossings, deliberate breaching operations, or passage of lines involving multiple subordinate units, or the conduct of large scale stability tasks. The tactical command post forms the headquarters of a special purpose task force with subordinate units under its control. However, it could also control complex sustaining operations such as reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) involving multiple subordinate brigades.

2-57. When the division employs the tactical command post to control the execution of the division’s overall operations, such as when the main command post is deploying into or displacing within the joint operations area, the tactical command post maintains the division’s common operating picture according to the division’s command information management plan. In this case, the tactical command post performs duties that may include the following—

Control units and activities conducting the decisive operation or shaping operations.

Maintain the current operations estimate.

Maintain and disseminate the common operating picture throughout the division.

Tailor the common operating picture to meet the commander’s requirements.

Monitor division-level sustaining operations.

Provide—

A forward location for issuing orders and conducting rehearsals.

A forward short-term planning facility when the main command post must displace.

The majority of the personnel and equipment to form an EECP.

Personnel for the mobile command group.

2-58. The tactical command post is designed to control the conduct of decisive action. It can perform functions essential to the control of current operations and immediate execution decisionmaking. The tactical command post is organized as single integrating cell. All warfighting functions are represented in the tactical command post by staff elements capable of conducting 24-hour operations.

2-59. The tactical command post is 100-percent mobile, which means it is capable of displacing with organic transportation assets in one lift. All equipment assigned to the division tactical command post may be transported by C-130 or sling-loaded by cargo helicopter (CH)-47 or utility helicopter (UH)-60 aircraft. Factors influencing the tactical command post’s movement include the flow of operations, the threat of enemy action, and the desires of the commander. Elimination of the dependency on line of sight communications systems, with their inherent range limitations, allows the tactical command post to remain stationary longer and maintain control over units conducting operations over extended distances. However, the tactical command post remains close enough to subordinate brigades for the staff to be cognizant of the operational environment in which the brigades are operating.

2-60. Tactical command post elements may be task-organized by the tactical command post’s chief of operations from the G-3 coordinating staff section to form working groups or other temporary matrix organizations to resolve a problem. For example, when unanticipated opportunities or threats arise, the chief of operations may form a future operations working group from the various functional elements in the tactical command post to develop branch plans and fragmentary orders to address them. This future operations function is a natural extension of the current operations function to an undetermined time in the near to mid-term planning/execution horizon, but within the scope of the current division mission and operations order. When directing subordinate actions at the tactical command post, the tactical command post chief of operations ensures synchronization with the efforts at the main command post. The current operations element at the main command post is the G-3’s link to synchronize this planning. The chief of operations considers the time horizons each command post is operating under and ensures that any overlap, such as in planning the Joint air tasking order (ATO) cycle and the shifting of information collection assets, is coordinated between both of the division’s command posts.

Mobile Command Group

2-61. The purpose of the mobile command group is to allow the commander to exercise personal leadership at a critical time and place during the conduct of the operation. It allows the division commander or an assistant division commander to decouple from the division main command post and maintain continuous access to information. The mobile command group allows the commander to—

Provide personal leadership, intent, and guidance at the critical place.

Make a personal assessment of the situation.

Maintain situational understanding while moving around the division’s area of operations by allowing continuous access to updated information.

Travel with those situationally appropriate staff officers necessary to provide information relevant to the current operation.

2-62. The mobile command group is the commanding general’s personal command node. The mobile command group’s mobility allows the division commander to move to the point of decision. The commander can assess the risks and make adjustment decisions by seeing, hearing, and understanding what is occurring. What the commander learns and sees helps him or her mentally visualize adjustments needed in current and future operations while moving about the division’s area of operations and interacting with subordinate commanders and their staffs. The mobile command group allows the commanding general to command from anywhere in the division area of operations and not become tied to the main or tactical command post. The mobile command group has a ground and an aerial component.

2-63. The division’s mobile command group ground component consists of vehicles with the capability to display each of the Army’s four mission command systems—tactical mission command, fire support command and control, sustainment system mission command, and strategic mission command—providing the commander with a limited capability to exercise mission command while on the move. It is anticipated that in the near future the current displays will be upgraded so that each one can display the information needed instead of just a single functional display. The vehicles mounting these systems will be network enabled through points of presence being fielded as part of the WIN-T increment II program.

2-64. The air component of the mobile command group consists of Army Airborne Command and Control System equipped utility helicopter (EUH)-60A/L helicopters found in the division’s attached or OPCON combat aviation brigade and are provided when required. These helicopters are equipped with one of two available systems. The AN/ASC-15E system provides a line of sight and beyond line of sight voice communications capability. Friendly unit positioning is supplied by Blue Force Tracker. It also has the capability to view imagery from UASs. The AN/ASC-38 system as similar capabilities but can also run upper-tactical internet mission command applications using broadband secure internet protocol router (SIPR)-net or NIPR-net data with some limitations. Both systems have a console capable of simultaneously receiving, processing and displaying tactical, joint operational area and global broadcasts for use by the division commander and staff. An aircraft configured to support these systems has five seats, each with a computer workstation. One workstation is manned by the system operator from the aviation unit. The other four workstations are for the commander and the staff officers selected to accompany the commander. All workstations can access any Army mission command system applications. Data links for connectivity to many ground and airborne platforms provide the commander with the flexibility to operate in all tactical environments without additional equipment. The aviation brigade provides attack aircraft as a flight security escort or utility aircraft to move a ground security element on a mission basis.

2-65. Ground and air components have communications capabilities to monitor the division command, higher command, and the division operations and intelligence nets. These communications capabilities is provided by the signal company within the division headquarters and headquarters battalion. Additionally, while the mobile command group takes advantage of its small signature, speed, and mobility for security, the mobile command group requires a tailored security force to escort the group as it moves across the division’s area of operations. The division tasks a subordinate unit to provide this escorting security force during movement. The mobile command group takes advantage of subordinate unit headquarters security forces whenever possible.

2-66. The information systems in both the ground and aerial platforms allow the commander to exercise command while moving, remaining in contact with the division’s main and tactical command posts, higher headquarters, and subordinate brigades. In some instances, the commander co-locates with a subordinate brigade command post, tying into the network through that unit’s information systems and disguising the signature of the mobile command group. In other cases, the commander uses the mobile command group and move between positions and units to sense the battle and exert personal influence with subordinates. The commander positions the mobile command group with the main or tactical command post.

2-67. The staff officers in the mobile command group are normally not the division’s primary coordinating staff officers. They are subordinate staff officers who operate multifunctional mission command display units. The division commander chooses the individual staff officers that staff the mobile command group. The personnel in the mobile command group are functional representatives of those functional staff cells that can immediately impact current operations. This includes maneuver, fires, and intelligence in addition to the U.S. Air Force air liaison officer (ALO), and when needed, a joint terminal attack controller (JTAC). The mission and staff available dictate its makeup. For example, during a deliberate breach, the division commander chooses including an engineer staff officer. When visiting a displaced civilian collection point, he or she may choose to replace the fires element staff officer and ALO with a G-9 or civil-affairs operations representative, a translator, and possibly a medical officer. The number of seats available for staff members is limited by the physical number of seats in the organic ground and air systems. If more staff members are required than seats available, additional transportation assets are task-organized to the mobile command group.

Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion

2-68. The division headquarters and headquarters battalion provides all administrative support, life support, communications, and transportation for the division’s two command posts and the mobile command group. This battalion is commanded by a lieutenant colonel with a complete battalion staff. The headquarters and headquarters battalion include four companies: A company, B company, the headquarters support company, and a signal company. The division headquarters also requires a security company not currently resourced. When the division has a band, it is attached to this battalion. Figure 2-2 on page 2-16 shows the internal organization of this battalion.

EMPLOYMENT OF THE DIVISION’S COMMAND POSTS

2-69. There are a variety of tactical command post employment options, including the following—

The tactical command post acts as the headquarters of a subordinate task force to the main command post. During the conduct of widespread offensive tasks, the commander may designate the tactical command post to control the operations of forces eliminating bypassed enemy forces within small cities along a line of operation while the main command post controls the conduct of the division’s decisive operation.

The division commander may distribute control of different parts of the operational framework used between the division’s two command posts during the conduct of complex operations. For example, whatever command post is controlling the decisive operation also controls the shaping operations that are setting conditions for the success of the division’s decisive operation. Alternatively one command post controls the division’s main effort while the other command post controls the conduct of division supporting operations. This ensures the controlling headquarters has visibility over both and synchronizes the entire operation.

In protracted operations, the commander combines the tactical and main command posts into a single co-located command post to increase the division’s capability to control the conduct of particularly complex tasks.

The division’s two command posts can employ and deploy forces simultaneously. For example, the tactical command post controls the deployment of forces into the division’s area of operations while the main command post controls the initial operations of the division’s attached, OPCON, or TACON brigades.

COMMAND PROGRAMS

2-70. Command programs are programs required by U.S. Code and Army regulations (AR). In some cases doctrine also addresses aspects of these programs. They include the following tasks:

Support commander’s leadership responsibilities for morale, welfare, and discipline.

Preserve historical documentation and artifacts.

Train subordinates and units.

Develop a command environmental program.

These programs play an important part during the conduct of division stability tasks just as they do when the division conducts primarily offensive and defensive tasks.

SUPPORT COMMANDER’S LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MORALE, WELFARE, AND DISCIPLINE

2-71. The commander is responsible for the morale, welfare, and discipline of subordinate units and individual Soldiers. The division staff helps the commander accomplish these responsibilities. The operational environment in which the division operates complicates the execution of this task, and in some cases, largely through the introduction of uncertainty.

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

2-72. Morale, the human dimension’s most important intangible element, is an emotional bond that impacts the quality of division cohesion in the accomplishment of missions. Operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks often require special consideration of Soldier morale factors. These types of operations involve long and repeated deployments to austere areas of operations with limited life support infrastructure. The division commander considers these factors when assigning missions to subordinate brigades and planning the rotations of those brigades into and within the division area of operations.

2-73. The morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) system supporting the division is a comprehensive network of support and leisure services designed to enhance the lives of the division’s Soldiers, their families, and other eligible participants. The MWR system supporting division operations—

Enables the division commander to provide Soldiers and civilian employees with recreational and fitness activities, goods, and services not available through appropriated funds.

Provides unit and individual recreation activities, sports programs, and rest areas for in-country rest and relaxation.

Conducted and operated by recreation specialists (a mixture of Soldiers, civilian employees, and contractor personnel).

2-74. These programs are outlets for Soldiers to counter stress—critical to sustaining force readiness—during the prolonged deployments often associated with the conduct of stability-focused operations. The system relies on force provider packages and uses cellular, e-mail, and video-teleconferencing technologies to provide links between Soldiers and their families. Soldiers are entertained through the latest in visual and audio entertainment by satellite, internet, and virtual reality technologies. Care must be taken to prevent the perception that not all division Soldiers are treated equally or that many of these programs and capabilities are not available to Soldiers occupying combat outposts and other austere locations. Additionally, the denial of these services at forward bases will be a source of concern to the families of all impacted Soldiers until the Army formal casualty notification process has had time to work.

2-75. MWR contributes to the division’s strength and readiness by offering services that reduce Soldier stress, build skills and self-confidence, and foster a strong esprit de corps. These services include unit recreation activities, sports programs, and rest areas in the base camps of each of the division’s attached brigades. The system relies on force provider packages to provide more comfortable living conditions for Soldiers during their stay in MWR facilities than what is normally available. MWR capitalizes on cell phone, e-mail, and video-teleconferencing technologies to provide links between Soldiers and their families. A mixture of individual and team games and sports provides entertainment to division Soldiers in addition to live performances. It also includes the latest in books, newspapers, and magazines and visual and audio entertainment provided by satellite, internet, and virtual reality technologies. Recreation specialists, both civilian employees and contractor personnel provide these activities and programs.

2-76. The MWR system supporting the division helps the commander to provide divisional Soldiers and civilian employees with services and goods not available through appropriated funds. These services include American Red Cross, family support, and the Army and Air Force Exchange Service. The American Red Cross provides emergency communication and case management services to support the health, welfare, and morale of Soldiers and their families throughout the division’s deployment. The mission of family support programs is to foster family readiness. Mission accomplishment by forward-deployed units hinges on Soldier confidence that their families are safe and capable of carrying on during their absence. The Army and Air Force Exchange Service provides health, hygiene, and personal care items to Soldiers and authorized deployed civilian employees. MWR is an immediate outlet for Soldiers to combat operational stress. This is critical to sustaining the readiness of the force as the speed and intensity of future operations escalates. Soldiers are entertained through the latest in visual and audio entertainment by satellite, worldwide Web, and virtual reality technologies.

2-77. Per current Department of the Army (DA) guidance, the combatant commander grants environmental morale leave for Soldiers deployed for more than 270 continuous days. Recent deployments have established 15 days as the standard mid-tour leave period. This program positively impacts Soldier and unit morale and is managed to ensure fair implementation and execution. In establishing and managing an environmental morale leave program, the division commander and G-1 consider the following:

Publish division leave policy so there is a standard for execution by subordinate brigades.

Provide guidance on developing order of merit list for apportioned leave slots within subordinate brigades.

Fairly distribute leave allocations.

Develop transportation policies to get Soldiers to and from airports in CONUS.

Develop an environmental morale leave briefing that explains how the program operates and outlines all the procedures

Reinforce leave procedures and ensure accountability of Soldiers is maintained.

Provide guidance on what government issued individual equipment, such as sleeping bags, helmets, and other common authorized clothing and individual equipment items remain with the unit while the Soldier is on leave and what standards will be used to secure and account for that equipment.

Provide billeting and mess support for in transit Soldiers depending on aerial ports and embarkation and debarkation and subordinate brigade locations. The support system established by the division’s supporting sustainment brigade for reception and replacement operations is resourced to handle Soldiers departing and returning from leave. This requires coordination between the division and the sustainment brigade.

Develop a division internal accounting system for Soldiers on leave from the time they depart their companies until their return. The theater Army personnel database does not account for Soldiers who have signed out of theater.

2-78. Equally important to the welfare of division Soldiers is ensuring that sick, accidently injured, and wounded Soldiers are properly treated. Many Soldiers are rapidly returned to duty from whatever medical treatment facilities support the division. Those Soldiers who are returned to duty after being wounded need to be recognized for their sacrifice in appropriate ceremonies hosted by their respective battalions and companies. The division maintains liaison with medical treatment facilities outside the division area of operations to ensure that division Soldiers moving through them and their families are treated with respect and dignity. This oversight includes the Warrior Transition Units to which medically evacuated Soldiers are transferred until they complete their treatment and rehabilitation and return to duty or are medically discharged.

2-79. Soldier welfare is an important component of Soldier morale. Ensuring Soldier welfare is a leadership challenge at all levels from the team leader to the division commander and above. Soldier welfare is more than just making sure that all Soldiers have the opportunity to eat regularly, have a place to sleep, regular showers, and mail. It is making sure that the division’s Soldiers are properly trained and equipped for the stability mission and have the appropriate resources to conduct the mission, have technically and tactically competent small-unit leaders, and have fairly and equitably enforced discipline.

Discipline

2-80. Lapses in discipline and misconduct by U.S. Soldiers, Department of Defense civilians, and contractors endanger a division’s stability-focused mission. Any deviation in the actions of the division’s Soldiers and its supporting civilians from the message that the division protects the civilians within its area of operations and secures them from further physical, mental, and economic harm endangers the success of the division mission. The division’s Soldiers and supporting civilian personnel are not all candidates for canonization. Some Soldiers and supporting civilian personnel may commit crimes against the civilian population.

2-81. There will also be lapses in judgment and tactical mistakes that occur during the course of executing operations that result in death, injury, mental, and economic damages inflicted on innocent civilians. This is true if the division’s operations are directed toward separating armed insurgents, terrorists, and criminals from the civilian population by killing or capturing these insurgent, terrorists, and criminals. There are civilians injured and killed and property damaged or destroyed because of accidents with the division’s combat and tactical vehicles.

2-82. It is important is how the division leadership deals with criminal activity by Soldiers, Department of Defense civilians, and civilian contractors supporting the division and lapses in judgment, tactical mistakes, and accidents. Leader reactions to these incidents are according to U.S. laws and regulations including the applicable status of force agreement in effect. For example, the rape of a civilian by a division Soldier results in the suspected Soldier’s courts martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Web site for the Uniform Code of Military Justice is in the references section. The commander holds the suspected Soldier in pretrial confinement in U.S. custody for trial in a host nation criminal court.

2-83. Subordinate commanders will probably have varied understandings of how the laws of armed conflict apply to situations if the operational environment is extremely volatile with lethal combat occurring periodically in the midst of normal civilian activities. Reporting and investigating alleged law of war violations should be prompt and transparent to the host nation population and civil authorities. All division leaders and Soldiers should understand the reasons for investigations and benefit from the lessons learned that result from law of war, escalation of force, and detainee abuse investigations. There are individual frustrations because some groups opposing the division’s presence and stability actions employ frivolous abuse allegations as part of their normal tactics and the division will invest significant time and effort investigating baseless allegations. A commander, after consulting with a judge advocate, may decide to use a commander’s inquiry to investigate apparently frivolous claims, rather than a formal AR 15-6 investigation. If however, the inquiry uncovers evidence that an allegation has merit, the inquiry will end and a formal AR 15-6 investigation is initiated. The results of any such inquiry or investigation are reported according to the policy developed in the legal portion of Annex F (Sustainment) to the division’s operations order or tactical standard operating procedure.

2-84. For Soldiers highly restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) can create uncertainty about when the use of deadly force is permissible, and this uncertainty can have a negative impact on morale. Likewise domestic and international political discussions questioning the division’s stability focused mission and the legality of the weapons, tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the division negatively impact Soldier morale. Staff judge advocate, information operations, and public affairs planners address these items early in planning and ensure that the appropriate command information is provided to the division’s Soldiers and their families before the division’s deployment into its area of operations. Reinforcement of that message throughout the division deployment is important to the maintenance of morale. Information operations and public affairs planners address how stories reinforcing the legitimacy of the division’s operations and showing the good that the division is doing will be provided to the press—domestics, host nation, and international.

2-85. Any failure of the division’s senior leaders to lead by example negatively impacts morale. It is important that the division’s Soldiers see their senior leaders sharing their life styles and dangers and not “gaming the system” for their personal advantage. There is more time and opportunities during the conduct of stability focused operations for Soldiers to detect senior character flaws. (See ADRP 6-22 for additional information on leading at the organizational and strategic levels.)

2-86. The cultural norms for responding to these types of incidents within the area in where the division operates must be honored in as much as they can without violating U.S. law. For example, the division conducts an open investigation of the accidental injury or death of an innocent civilian resulting from a combat action or vehicle accident. A qualified senior leader within the division briefs the results of that investigation to the family or civilian leadership of the village or tribe of the affected civilian and attempts to make monetary settlement of any claims.

2-87. The maintenance of discipline during the conduct of operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks is a complex topic with aspects that regulate the force to comply with command policies and directives, ensure a lawful and orderly environment, and suppress criminal behavior. It involves leading in such manner as to promote self-discipline and respect for authority in subordinates so that they internalize and practice Army values with minimum coercion. Discipline includes the enforcement of U.S. and military laws and regulations, the conduct of the military justice system, and confinement activities. Other discipline related activities performed at the direction of the commander or in the absence of host-nation agreements include criminal investigations, crime prevention measures, customs support, selective enforcement measures, courtesy patrols, drug suppression programs, and law enforcement raids. ADRP 6-22 addresses leadership challenges. FM 1-04 addresses legal support that a division receives. Military police doctrinal publications address ensuring a lawful and orderly environment and the suppression of criminal behavior including straggler movement control. ATP 3-39.12 addresses the conduct of law enforcement investigations. FM 3-63 addresses detainee operations.

2-88. Division planning addresses how the division deals with lapses in discipline and judgment, tactical mistakes, and accidents before they occur. There is not enough time to research policy and precedent once these incidents occur before a negative story about the division and its operations hits the internet and the media. While the division should not apologize in any way for the killing of insurgents, terrorists, or criminals; division actions to maintain discipline and make amends should be included in its information engagement plans for communication to division Soldiers, host nation civilians, the U.S. civilian population, and international audiences.

2-89. The division commander’s leadership responsibilities for morale, welfare, and discipline continue in the preparation phase. However, their focus changes to account for the situation faced by the division.

TRAIN SUBORDINATES AND UNITS

2-90. Under the Regional Aligned Force model, the division headquarters and its attached brigades train on their mission essential task list (METL) and any additional tasks directed by their geographic combatant commander. Once alerted for a mission the appropriate commander, such as their new joint force or corps commander, provides a directed task list addressing additional tasks on which the division must be trained. Each division headquarters shares the same METL. Each type of brigade has its own METL reflecting the capabilities of that type of brigade. Each METL provides a basis on which to report training readiness information. These METLs and their associated organizational Combined Arms Training Strategies provide the basis on which the division commander and staff plan the division’s training before being given a mission and any directed tasks on which they must train. The unit combined arms training strategy identifies the desired training standard for collective and individual tasks that support the METL tasks. The unit’s combined arms training strategy provides an effective way of achieving that readiness standard, assessing training proficiency, and provides a sequence of activities and the resources required to achieve the desired results. (See ADP and ADRP 7-0 for additional information on training.)

2-91. The Army command, Army Service component command, and corps commanders determine the focus, resources, and METL that maintain the required readiness posture for anticipated operations. For planned stability-focused operations, unit commanders adjust their METL focused training to a task list that reflects the specific aspects of the projected stability-focused mission and operational environment. For units deploying to primarily conduct stability tasks with little or no preparations, their METL competencies will need to sustain them as they adjust to the stability-focused nature of the operation.

2-92. Divisional commanders, staffs, and Soldiers receive cultural and language training and training to the province and duties they perform as part of their preparations. Although few gain proficiency in the native language of the projected area of operations before deploying, a benefit of language training is not to master the language; but to be able to communicate concepts and information. Each Soldier assigned to or attached to the division needs to meet indigenous civilians on their own level.

2-93. Division fires cell. Soldiers should attend U.S. Air Force Weapons and Tactics Analysis Center training before their deployment. Other beneficial training initiatives for FA personnel include the following courses: Joint Firepower Course at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, Joint Targeting School in Virginia, and Joint Air Operations Command and Control Course at Hurlburt Field in Florida.

Develop the Division’s Human Capital

2-94. The Army does not train all of its Soldiers to accomplish individually the full range of possible tasks. When preparing to conduct stability-focused tasks, selected Soldiers should be trained and educated within the limits of available funding and other resources to be experts in the skill sets of emotion and interest-based negotiations, social interaction, intuitive decisionmaking, mentoring, coaching, small-group teambuilding, and ambassador skills. Not all divisions will be able to educate and train all of their human capital because of differences in funding and other resources. Division preparations include efforts to develop a core of professionals skilled in interagency operations. These professionals ideally have three essential skill sets:

Familiarity with a number of diverse related disciplines, such as health care, law enforcement, immigration, and trade; practical experience in interagency operations; and practical experience working with the private-sector and international partners.

Competence in crisis action and long-term planning.

A sound understanding of market economics and international political science.

2-95. The division G-1 staff identifies division personnel that have professional certifications or life experience such as running a farm or a small business appropriate to the division’s projected mission and maintain a database with that information. However the G-1 cannot be expected to requisition and fill positions based on professional certifications and past duty assignments. Establishing a core of professionals requires the division to conduct a professional development program of education, assignment, and accreditation—

Education. The division explores how it can use training funds to pay tuition for approved semester-long courses at local colleges and universities appropriate to the division’s projected mission during the reset phase of ARFORGEN. These courses are available for subject ranging from language training, public order and safety, through agricultural development, to public services such as health and education. The division arranges for them to be taught at an accelerated rate, such as six weeks, instead of the traditional four months. At a minimum the chain of command establishes a program that allows selected Soldiers duty time to take designated courses that they individually pay for.

Assignment. Selected division personnel with the appropriate educational or life experience certifications are placed as interns in appropriate government and commercial institutions. This allows the selected Soldiers to practice and hone previously acquired skill sets. These assignments should be a level, at which leaders learn how to make things happen, not just set policies. Identifying the right organizations and assignments and ensuring that they are filled by promising leaders should be a priority. The division offers incentives to those governmental and commercial institutions to make it worth their while to accept the division’s Soldiers as interns and place them in learning situations.

Accreditation. The division should get grades from Soldier educational course and informal evaluation reports from the civil agencies and businesses where the Soldiers intern. This allows the division to see if it correctly identified the right Soldiers to address different situations once the division deploys.

2-96. These human capital development actions increase the division’s ability to integrate different lines of operations and determine nontraditional second and third-order effects. However, it has a substantial cost. This program impacts the number of leaders at multiple echelons available for more traditional military training. Thus it is most appropriate during the reset phase of the ARFORGEN cycle.

Mission Rehearsal or Combat Training Center Exercise

2-97. Predeployment training exercises are essential to form a cohesive team and improve staff competencies. The division training program consists of a series of command post and multi-echelon tactical field training exercises to maintain collective and individual tactical skills, but add more emphasis on conducting the directed or anticipated tasks required during deployment. Training replicates the deployed conditions, operational environment, mission, and equipment. If required, training employs the types of commercial off-the-shelf equipment the division will be using once deployed. The G-6 cell provides communications support to deploying divisional units and the fielding of new information systems while deployed. Key division staff leaders should be in position no later than six months before the division’s scheduled deployment for this process to be effective. Most of the Soldiers assigned to the division staff should are available at that time to participate in the staff’s training program. This allows the division’s mission rehearsal exercise or final internal command post exercise to occur roughly 90 days before deployment. This frees the staff to take care of last minute deployment responsibilities.

2-98. The mission rehearsal exercise or training scenario helps the division staff examine and understand the operational environment. A shared understanding of the interconnectivity of actions across all three elements of decisive action is the key objective of the mission rehearsal or combat training center exercise. Staff section should not have to split their focus between the mission rehearsal exercise, real-world deployment preparations, and external taskings. It is more important to challenge the staff with complex, ill-structured problems than it is to accurately anticipate and train a task or situation. This is especially true if the operational environment in the division’s projected area of operations is so fluid that anticipating tasks and situations is a futile effort. It is not best to conduct the mission rehearsal or combat training center exercise before the majority of the division staff is assembled.

2-99. The mission rehearsal or combat training center exercise replicates the scale of supplies and troop and distribution movements that the division executes once deployed. Sustainment constraints during these exercises are minimized to speed the exercise up. This is appropriate as long as the sustainment staff examines the causes of these sustainment constraints and takes action. There is interaction between the planners on the joint task force staff, operators at the theater sustainment command level, and the division sustainment staff. Commodity managers at the theater sustainment command level participate in these exercises. Replicating the requirements and the common logistics operating picture maintained by the operators is difficult but must be attempted during the mission rehearsal exercise and other training exercises.

Continued Training During Operations

2-100. The division commander will continue to train the division staff and attached brigades throughout the division’s conduct of operations. The training principles in ADP and ADRP 7-0 apply. The division’s METL guides the division’s collective and individual training just as it did while the division’s prepared for operations.

2-101. During the conduct of stability tasks, U.S. Special Forces and dedicated training organizations play an important role in training foreign security forces and security sector reform. However the division trains and mentors host nation and multinational partner security forces operating in the division’s area of operations. This training requires a personal orientation and motivation toward helping the host country and accomplishing the U.S. objectives on the part of division Soldiers tasked to provide that training. The division’s Soldier must understand the U.S. and their individual responsibility to a host nation government. Training and educational programs stress the importance of the individual's actions in influencing indigenous support of U.S. and host nation objectives. Tolerance of political, economic, social, religious, and cultural difference is required to ensure proper relationships between host nation and division personnel. Host nation goals, status of forces agreements, and ROE are included in a continuing orientation program.

2-102. Training of division Soldiers that interact with host nation security forces stresses the development of skills, concepts, and procedures taught to those host nation forces and the learning and teaching techniques required to impart these skills to individuals whose cultural background differs from U.S. Soldiers. Training emphasis on what and how to teach host nation forces will vary according to the host nation's requirements, force composition, and ongoing U.S. equipping programs. However, U.S. standards of training provide the guides for preparing division Soldiers to advise host nation authorities in the organization and employment of their security forces. Individual training for U.S. Soldiers include development of proficiency in their military occupational specialty skills, host nation country and cultural orientations, varying degrees of language skill, and physical conditioning. When feasible, maximum cross-training is given to members of mobile training teams and advisors. This training emphasizes instructor skills including techniques for teaching by demonstration with minimum use of language (voice) and proper techniques for use of interpreters.

PRESERVE HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION AND ARTIFACTS

2-103. The division information management element collects and safeguards paper, photographic images, electronic documentation, and artifacts of key events, decisions, and observations of the division’s operations. This documentation supports lessons learned analysis, public affairs efforts, doctrine development, and historical retention and writing. Other staff sections, cells, and elements within the division staff help the information management element with this task. The division secretary of the general staff prepares and submits the division’s historical reports. ATP 1-20 contains additional information on this subject.

2-104. An Army military history detachment should be attached to the division before its commitment to operations. This allows the team to become familiar with the division’s leaders and tactical standard operating procedures. It also allows the history detachment time to work with the knowledge management element to develop procedures by which historical documentation of division and subordinate unit plans and operations are captured and cataloged before the division’s deployment. Army regulatory guidance on the preservation of historical artifacts and the acquisition, transportation, and display of trophies are refined to match the situation facing the division during deployment. The division uses the military history detachment during this preparatory period to research open-source materials for additional information on the division’s projected area of operations.

2-105. The execution of a command history program is an important activity for a division during operations. Each of the division’s brigades has a history program. It is either a formally written plan or the acknowledged need to preserve the record of the unit. While traditionally an adjutant function in the absence of a military history detachment; the division’s program includes inputs from all integrating and functional cells. Division accounts of actions taken during implementation are mined by the division to develop its own lessons learned. The prolonged nature of some operations allows the division to determine trends that influence its own conduct of operations. This is important because institutional knowledge of the area of operations can be lost as units rotate in and out during the conduct of prolonged operations. The division’s historical record of its conduct of operations influences the development of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures once collected and made available to the larger Army. That record can also be used to refine leadership principles and justify other organizational, material, and training changes.

2-106. In addition to documents and records, many items are important to this process. These items include maps, map overlays, newspapers, and other items not covered in the Modern Army Recordkeeping System such as division Web page content on different days. Additionally, oral history interviews and a command chronology is collected. By keeping good notes on how and why these historical materials were collected, the division provides useful insights for historians and others looking through the division’s input for later review and publication.

DEVELOP A COMMAND ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM

2-107. Responsibility for planning the division’s environmental program belongs to the division engineer helped by other members of the protection working group. The protection working group identifies areas affected by environmental considerations during the planning phase. That working group determines the aspects of the division’s environment program as it applies to the area of operations where the division deploys. The working group incorporates environmental considerations into the division’s long and short range plans. FM 3-34.5 provides additional information on this program.

2-108. An environmental baseline survey of projected bases that the division will occupy during its deployment is part of the predeployment site survey. If the division is going to conduct a relief in place, it updates the previous division’s survey. Revisions to previous environmental risk assessments and plans are made to account for actual conditions on the ground. The division environmental compliance officer works with the G-9 staff section and appropriate host nation governmental agencies to determine those exact environmental procedures that divisional units need to perform once deployed. Once these procedures are determines, they are incorporated into division deployment training.

2-109. The relationship between the division’s operations and the environment within that division’s area of operations is a two-way street. On one hand, Soldiers and division operations impact the environment. On the other hand, the environment impacts the division’s operations and Soldiers. The presence of bases and fighting positions occupied for prolonged periods degrades the local environment if not well managed. Environmental degradation adversely affects the health and safety of Soldiers. The division commander accepts the integration of environmental considerations into the division’s ongoing operations. These considerations include:

Activities that result in unnecessary environment impacts.

Collateral damage.

Environmental modifications.

2-110. The presence of these environmental hazards impacts the execution of the division’s operations, positively or negatively. These environmental hazards include—but are not limited to—environmental conditions impacting Soldier health; and clean water, sewage, and other environmentally related infrastructures. They also include compliance with environmental laws, pollution prevention and environmental management, protection of historical and cultural sites, and the sustainability and management of agricultural and other natural resources.

2-111. Environmental risks to division’s Soldiers increase the longer that those Soldiers remain exposed to them. If insurgents target hazardous wastes that build up in storage areas at base camps, Soldier health is also endangered. In addition, morale falls when Soldiers perceive that the Army is not “doing the right thing” with regard to the environment or their health.

2-112. Environmentally related reconstruction projects and good environmental practices—including solutions to legacy environmental problems—can earn invaluable support from the local civilian population. Operation Iraqi Freedom offers many instances where unit efforts to provide clean water and electricity, manage sewage and trash, and preserve natural or cultural resources tipped the balance between the Iraqi populace backing the U.S. mission or the backing of insurgents and terrorists. Despite the degraded environmental conditions and rampant pollution often found in overseas theaters, host nation civilians care about their environment. Their concerns are driven by real needs: potable water for their families, sanitation for their villages, and viable farmland where they can grow food. Unintentional harm to the environment or environmental infrastructures damage host nation civilian relations with divisional elements and even the legitimacy of the host nation government.

2-113. As with other considerations, the importance of environmental considerations are clearly articulated in the guidance provided by the division’s higher headquarters. Restrictions on the use of combat power for reasons of environmental protection are included in many operations. The environmental protection principles outlined in FM 3-34.5 help the division commander weigh the importance of various environmental considerations and ensure that division Soldiers are appropriately protected.

2-114. If the division imposes U.S. or western pollution standards in a host nation, there may be negative impact on the host nation economy if it results in industry shutdowns without jobs for temporarily or permanently displaced workers. Workers unable to provide food, shelter, and clothing for their families because of division actions will not support other division operations. They will not support long-term initiatives designed to improve the quality of life of their families if they can’t survive in the short-term.

RAPID EQUIPMENT FIELDING AND RAPID FIELDING INITIATIVES

2-115. A division conducting operations can be supported by some sort of Rapid Equipment Fielding or the Rapid Fielding Initiative. These two programs leverage current commercial-off-the-shelf technology to give the division and its Soldiers increased survivability, lethality, and mobility capabilities. Items supporting the Rapid Fielding Initiative are specified on a list developed and reviewed by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA) on an annual basis. Rapid Fielding Initiative items are selected for inclusion on the list based on relevance to ongoing operational needs and recent lessons learned from operations. The list has two types of equipment: individual Soldier equipment, such as helmets, clothing items, and hydration systems; and unit equipment, such as weapons accessories and mobility equipment. The division and its Soldiers may receive both types of equipment before deployment, as part of the theater RSOI or while deployed in its area of operations.

2-116. Operational needs statements (ONS) are a method the division uses to increase its capabilities. The ONS program requires command support and interest for it to be successful. The division current operations integrating cell should develop a process for managing ONS once deployed. Recent experience shows that the number of ONS developed can overwhelm the capabilities of the single force modernization officer in the division plans cell. The division may need to work with different types of ONS—Army only, joint support, and multinational support. Weekly screenings for redundancy and validation or non-validation by the division staff affects the volume of ONS produced. Weekly ONS boards, chaired by the division Chief of Staff, forward each validated ONS to the division commander, return to the originator for further development, or disapprove in the case the it provides a redundant capability. If the division commander approves an ONS, then it is forwarded from the division to the next higher headquarters for action and eventually to Headquarters, DA for approval and funding. Once approved and funded, the ONS is assigned to a supporting organization for fielding.

Chapter 3

Scenario and Division Concept of Operations

This chapter introduces a fictional scenario as a discussion vehicle for illustrating one of many ways that a division conducts decisive action. It is not intended to be prescriptive of how the division performs any particular operation. The scenario focuses on potential challenges confronting a division commander in accomplishing a mission.

SECTION I – SCENARIO

3-1. The region used in this scenario has significant international importance in the year 2015. Its emergence from its former status as an international backwater is due to the discovery of significant petroleum reserves under the BLUE Sea and its surrounding countries. The newfound energy reserves have attracted extensive investment, primarily European, bringing with it the trappings of western culture. With this influx of international investments, the ports and resources of the region have expanded to become major commercial centers for oil and other products moving from Asia to Europe and vice versa.

ROAD TO WAR

3-2. GREENLAND is a multicultural federal republic formed from three largely ethnically based states between the BLUE and WHITE seas. See Figure 3-1 on page 3-2. The GREENLAND government, since its founding, has sought foreign investments to develop its economic infrastructure and exploit the natural resources of the area for the benefit of GREENLAND civilians. The political leadership of GREENLAND accepted the western social mores and practices that accompany major western financial investments.

3-3. REDLAND is a xenophobic theocracy on the southeast border of GREENLAND. REDLAND shares an ethnic minority, the Atropians, with GREENLAND and historically dominated that portion of GREENLAND containing the majority of GREENLAND’s Atropians, until the entire region’s forcible annexation into BROWNLAND in the late 1800s (see the cross-hatched area of GREENLAND on Figure 3-1 on page 3-2.) After the breakup of BROWNLAND in the late 1900s, the Atropians had their own country until the recent regional plebiscite authorized the founding of GREENLAND. REDLAND’s senior religious leadership has redemptionist’s goals to incorporate all historical Atropian lands into a greater REDLAND. The religious leadership’s analysis is that the economic benefits of incorporating the Atropian region of GREENLAND jump starts their economy suffering from a large and growing underemployed class and economic isolation resulting from their refusal to follow international trading norms. This ensures they are able to retain their hold on power.

ENEMY SITUATION

3-4. The REDLAND armed forces consist of five services: Army, Air Force (including national-level Air Defense Forces), Navy, Strategic Forces, and Internal Security Forces. The Army totals two tank, one mechanized infantry, six motorized infantry, and one infantry divisions. Before combat, these divisions are task-organized into division tactical groups (DTG) tailored for missions. In this process, the original division headquarters receives additional units allocated from echelons above division or reallocated from other divisions. A similar process occurs in the task organization of brigades into brigade tactical groups, although some brigades fight in their original structure. These divisions are supported by one separate mechanized infantry brigade, one separate motorized infantry brigade, two combat helicopter brigades, five surface-to-surface missile (SSM) brigades, one coastal defense, and two engineer brigades. The REDLAND Army also contains a special-purpose brigade suited for working with affiliated insurgents and terrorists. This brigade can also conduct reconnaissance, sabotage, or other direct action missions. The infantry division and coastal defense brigade at a minimum constitute REDLAND’s strategic reserve.

3-5. The REDLAND Air Force contains a mix of obsolete BROWNLAND and Western-developed fighter, bomber, transport, and command and control aircraft. The Air Force includes national-level Air Defense Forces, which supports a national strategic air defense system around population centers. The Air Defense Forces consist of regional air defense centers, radars, and firing batteries with a mix of BROWNLAND and western systems.

3-6. The Navy has four corvettes, twenty-one missile craft, a hundred plus remote-controlled fast attack craft. The Navy also has several hundred contact- and magnetically-fused moored and floating mines available to defend REDLAND territory along the BLUE Sea.

3-7. REDLAND’s Strategic Forces have 20 to 30 theater ballistic missiles organized into a strategic-level SSM brigade. These missiles are in addition to the shorter-range SSMs that belong to the Army.

3-8. The REDLAND Internal Security Forces comprise a variety of police and paramilitary organizations located throughout the country. They have the mission of backing up local police, providing emergency services, border control, and riot control. Elite elements of the Internal Security Forces are responsible for regime security and counterintelligence operations within the country. Units of the Internal Security Forces can be allocated to a DTG or brigade tactical group to control occupied territory. Alternatively they operate separately from military commands within REDLAND or on its land and sea borders. REDLAND also has a militia consisting of platoon- and company-sized forces in rural population areas backed up by battalion and brigade-sized forces based in mid- and large-sized cities. The level of training and equipment of these forces vary from place to place. The militia performs internal security missions if Internal Security Forces are not available but do not have the organic sustainment capability to operate far from their garrison locations.

3-9. REDLAND is suspected of having a weapons of mass destruction capability. REDLAND leadership converted existing “dual use” facilities to permit the manufacture of fertilizers and genetically enhanced agricultural products along with various chemical and biological agents. Its most dangerous threat is a suspected stockpile of low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons derived from former BROWNLAND stocks that they were able to acquire through criminal connections and through the reprocessing of nuclear power plant fuel. While these weapons have limited utility and reliability, they pose a threat against population centers within or external to the region. They are delivered by a variety of conventional air and missile platforms or in an unconventional manner, such as being smuggled into a country within a standard international shipping organization container.

3-10. REDLAND started acquiring unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to augment the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities of its armed forces. It has a limited number (less than 20) of Group 4 and 5 UASs that it uses to support strategic and operational missions. These UASs are operated by the REDLAND air force. REDLAND has an over 100 group 3 systems operational-strategic commands to use. Another ten to twenty Group 3 systems are employed by the REDLAND navy. Each REDLAND division has a company-sized unit with a mix of 15 to 20 Group 1 and 2 systems available for employment at the tactical level. REDLAND internal security forces has a limited number (less than ten) of Group 2 and 3 UASs for use in performing security patrolling of mountainous terrains along its YELLOWSLAND and GREENLAND borders. REDLAND also provides an undetermined number of Group 1 UASs to some of its sponsored insurgent and terrorist organizations based within GREENLAND. (See JP 3-30 for a discussion of what characterizes these different groups of UASs.)

3-11. REDLAND sponsors an internal insurgency within GREENLAND. That insurgency relies on a certain segment of the population concerned with GREENLAND’s current social, religious, political, and economic direction. The insurgency has political and military wings, with the military wing containing both local and main force elements. This insurgency is largely based in the rural areas of GREENLAND.

3-12. Terrorist training camps are an additional factor in this region. International terrorist organizations, driven from other portions of the globe, gravitated toward the GREENLAND-REDLAND border area where they establish training and operating bases under the covert sponsorship of REDLAND theologians. These expanded training camps are the number one area for groups preparing and executing strikes against the U.S. and Europe. Local tribal elders are willing to tolerate the presence of terrorist groups who cultivate their relationships with those local leaders through intermarriage and financial incentives.

3-13. REDLAND threatens to use force to “unite” all ethnically Atropian territory into a greater REDLAND. In the last month, it has greatly increased how much support provided to both the GREENLAND insurgent movement and terrorist organizations operating along the border region and taken steps to increase the readiness of its armed forces including calling up of reservists, performing large and small scale training exercises, and moving supplies to locations that support offensive action into GREENLAND.

3-14. During the training exercises and preparations for operations in GREENLAND, REDLAND appears to have task-organized its armed forces into three operational-strategic commands (OSCs) and a strategic reserve. The overall goal of REDLAND’s strategic campaign seems to be to occupy the ethnic-Atropian part of GREENLAND and to secure the mountain passes near the GREENLAND capital city THEB’SOL to prevent GREENLAND and/or coalition forces from maneuvering into the occupied territory. Operational strategic command north (consisting of the 20th and 52nd DTGs, two SSM brigades, one combat helicopter brigade, and one engineer brigade) has the mission to seize and then defend the major mountain pass northeast of THEB’SOL. Operational strategic command south (consisting of the 10th, 26th, 51st, and 53rd DTGs, three SSM brigades, one combat helicopter brigade, and one engineer brigade) has the mission to seize and then defend the major mountain pass southwest of THEB’SOL and controlling Highway 1 (including key road junctions and bridges near KILLEAN) and the mountainous area south of that highway (including the LUSK RESERVOIR). Operational strategic command south’s mission also includes securing the key road junction near THEB’SOL. Operational strategic command east (consisting of the 73rd and 77th DTGs, and the 98th Separate Motorized Infantry brigade tactical group, plus naval forces in the BLUE SEA) has the mission of controlling occupied territory farther to the east (including the cities of DIVKOVIC and KORNATI and the coastline). Two other DTGs (90th and 54th) located within REDLAND may be REDLAND’s strategic reserve, possibly with a mission of homeland defense. (Figure 3-2 shows REDLAND’s desired locations for these OSCs at the end of their attack.)

FRIENDLY SITUATION

3-15. The United States (U.S.) has friendly relationships with the three countries that federated to form GREENLAND in 2011 and that relationship continues. The U.S. has an advisory group co-located with the GREENLAND Ministry of Defense and a mix of uniformed military, DOD civilian, and contractor personnel providing training and logistical support to the GREENLAND armed forces. Additionally, U.S. SOF performs training exercises with GREENLAND forces. U.S. SOF on occasion, with the permission of the GREENLAND political leadership, performed counter-terrorism operations against selected targets in GREENLAND.

3-16. GREENLAND’s armed forces consist of three services: Army, Air Force, and Navy under the command of its Ministry of Defense. The GREENLAND Interior Ministry has a brigade-sized gendarmerie along with small arms equipped land and naval customs elements. Local police are under the control of the country’s provincial governors and city mayors.

3-17. The GREENLAND’s Army consists of nine mixed brigades organized territorially into three divisions. No two brigades are organized alike. The GREENLAND Army (GA) totals two tank, one mechanized infantry, six motorized infantry, one airlanded infantry, one mountain/ski infantry, and six infantry battalions. The Army also has one self-propelled and eight towed artillery battalions, three combat engineer battalions, one military police battalion, one chemical defense battalion, and three depot training battalions. All of these battalions contain a mix of active and reserve Soldiers. The Army activates a mountain commando battalion to conduct special operations.

3-18. The GREENLAND Air Force has a single large squadron of mixed obsolete fixed-wing transport, liaison, and command and control aircraft. It also contains two squadrons of old BROWNLAND developed rotary wing assault and attack aircraft. Selected GREENLAND aircraft have received recent overhauls and modernization modifications to make them more capable of working with U.S. and western European militaries. The GREENLAND Air Force ground establishment is limited with only three primary airfields. The U.S. is currently working to establish an effective air traffic control system and radar coverage within GREENLAND.

3-19. The GREENLAND Navy is a service with a customs enforcement focus. The navy’s flagship is an ex-U.S. Coast Guard 270 foot medium endurance cutter. The GREENLAND Navy also has a mix of seventeen 87 foot coastal patrol boats and 41 foot utility boats. These units are located in two bases on the shores of the WHITE Sea. The GREENLAND Navy also has a twelve 33 foot law enforcement special purpose craft equally split between the WHITE and BLUE Seas. These units are supported by a small shore establishment with most maintenance above the crew level being performed outside of GREENLAND.

3-20. As part of flexible deterrent operations designed to deter REDLAND aggression against GREENLAND, the secretary of defense authorized the European Command commander to deploy theater opening, communications, and protection assets into GREENLAND. The Department of State participates in unified action by helping the European Command staff in obtaining necessary transit, overflight, and landing rights for U.S. forces including the movement of maritime assets into the WHITE Sea.

3-21. Lastly, the situation in GREENLAND is not the only crisis situation facing the U.S.. The Pacific region is also experiencing significant tensions that preclude the U.S. from strictly focusing its military forces on GREENLAND. Much air and maritime combat power is being held in reserve to respond to political and military developments in the Pacific.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IMPACTING THE DIVISION

3-22. The degree of control that the division and subordinate commanders have over host nation authorities and the civilian population depends on the political conditions under which U.S. forces entered the area of operations. Generally, U.S. military presence occurs in one of two ways:

Entry by invitation of the host nation.

Forcible entry.

The extent of and limitations on military activities are prescribed by customary international law or by international agreements to which the U.S. is a party, or by both in either environment.

3-23. The division commander may encounter a range of situations extending from a host-guest relationship to total U.S. authority under conditions of transitional military authority. The commander may have no power over the host nation authorities and civilian population except what can be exerted through personal influence and coordination. Populace controls, mutual support between civilian and military resources, and the coordination of civilian and military security and damage control measures are of utmost importance to division support area security operations. Each commander must know and understand the relationship with host nation authorities and the civilian population. A clear understanding of the commander’s authority is essential in exercising that degree of control necessary to ensure security and safety to all friendly military forces and the civilian population located within the division’s area of operations.

ENTRY BY INVITATION OF THE HOST NATION (ASSISTED UNOPPOSED ENTRY)

3-24. Through legitimate agreement by the interested governments, a host nation requests U.S. forces to help the host nation for a mutually agreed reason. Liaison and coordination are the primary means of establishing acceptable military-civilian communications. The commander’s initial requirement is the provision of maximum civilian support for and the prevention of civil interference with the division’s operations. The division support area commander must also have the authority to protect and secure installations and protect resources traveling along lines of communications within that area of operations. Since this control affects the host nation governmental agencies and the civilian populace, the commander must not use that authority in a manner that alienates those audiences to the division’s mission and objectives. Host nation security forces may be an effective means of providing area security to divisional elements located within the division support area because of their knowledge of the area, its language, and customs. Military advice and assistance rendered according to applicable laws and regulations by the divisional units enhance their effectiveness.

3-25. Within the limits of the authority granted to them under local law, host nation civil officials may delegate political authority over local government to the military commanders of their own nation. The division support area commander coordinates support area operations with the host nation military area commander in conformance with U.S. policy directives and requirements when this condition exists. Otherwise, the division support area commander coordinates area security and other operations within the division support area with the appropriate host nation civilian agency.

3-26. Many times the end result of this coordination is that host nation military commanders have responsibility for reconnaissance and security outside the perimeter of the division’s bases. Each base commander provides for interior guard and control within the confines of the base and ensures the perimeter security of that base. The base commander may not have exclusive authority over local national civilian employees within the base. Authority to hire and fire, investigative jurisdiction in matters of sabotage or espionage, and other vital matters of mutual concern to both base commanders and host nation authorities are delineated and agreed on for effective operational area security. The division support area commander maintains authority to control access to the division’s bases when the situation warrants. Counterintelligence units investigate sabotage, espionage, and subversion. Military police criminal investigation teams help as needed. In response to events having significant high-level interest, other governmental agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, may participate in these investigations.

FORCIBLE ENTRY

3-27. Forcible entry entails the seizure of terrain and facilities from enemy forces. Depending on circumstances, the operation may require the removal of existing civil or martial governmental apparatus or the restoration of a suppressed government. In the absence of civil authority, the Army establishes measures to control the civilian population and provide minimal essential civil services. When divisional combat forces enter enemy territory to occupy it, initial disclosure of the nature and extent of U.S. authority include occupation directives according to the laws of land warfare and civil affairs doctrine. (See FMs 27-10 and 3-57.) These actions include issuing necessary proclamations concerning the authority of division commanders as it relates to the transitional military authority, curfew, movement control, public order, and similar matters. Civil affairs units initiate, coordinate, and supervise local compliance with these directives.

3-28. Base and base cluster defense is the cornerstone of the division’s successful support area and operational area security efforts. The application of effective area security for bases and base clusters and their tenant and transient units is achieved by developing a comprehensive plan linked to site selection, layout, and facility design. (See ATP 3-37.10 for a discussion of base site selection, base layouts, and facility design.) The following paragraphs outline the organization of forces, control measures, and considerations pertaining to planning, preparing, and executing base and base cluster defense.

COALITION TASK ORGANIZATION, MISSION, COMMANDER’S INTENT, AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

3-29. This is a major operation so the U.S. European Command commander commands the coalition assembled as the coalition force commander (CFC). The European Command commander designates two of European Command’s service component command headquarters: the U.S. Air Forces in Europe and the U.S. Navy Europe headquarters to provide the core around which the respective coalition functional command headquarters (coalition force air component and coalition force maritime component respectively) and air and naval forces assemble. The Xth U.S. Corps headquarters provides the core headquarters for the coalition force land component. U.S. Marine Forces Europe provides administrative control (ADCON) to Marine forces employed during this operation, but operational control (OPCON) of those forces belongs to the functional commands. Special Operations Command Europe has OPCON of the European Command’s SOF.

COALITION MISSION

3-30. The coalition mission is to deploy forces to the GREENLAND theater of operations and deters and, on order, defends GREENLAND territory against a REDLAND attack and, as required, conducts offensive tasks to restore the preconflict international border.

COALITION FORCE COMMANDER’S INTENT

3-31. The coalition deploys forces to support GREENLAND to defend their territory. The initial deployment is followed by the positioning of coalition ground combat forces forward into GREENLAND with the capability to directly confront hostile actions by REDLAND to send a clear signal of coalition resolve. End state has the REDLAND forces within GREENLAND destroyed, captured or expelled, the international border restored, and coalition forces conducting post-conflict operations within the joint operations area to support GREENLAND stability and reconstruction operations.

COALITION FORCE COMMANDER’S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

3-32. Priority for deployment is command and control, intelligence, counter-air, maritime forces to secure sea lines of communication, and coalition reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) capabilities that facilitate a rapid build-up of forces in GREENLAND and adjoining areas. Coalition SOF deploys to perform counterinsurgency training to GREENLAND armed forces. They perform strategic reconnaissance to support of future operations. Coalition ground forces combine with GREENLAND nation military forces to create a force with the capability to defeat any REDLAND invasion. If that invasion occurs, they attack to drive the enemy from GREENLAND territory while simultaneously rendering the enemy incapable of continued offensive hostile action.

3-33. Coalition forces conduct operations in four phases as necessary: (1) deter REDLAND aggression into GREENLAND, (2) deploy forces, (3) conduct decisive action to defeat REDLAND forces and restore the international border, and (4) conduct post-hostility and redeployment operations.

COALITION FORCE LAND COMPONENT TASK ORGANIZATION, MISSION, AND COMMANDER’S INTENT

3-34. The coalition force land component headquarters is organized around the X U.S. Corps headquarters. The ground forces envisioned for employment, once deployment is complete, includes GREENLAND’s field forces—three divisions with support slice; a Marine Expeditionary Brigade; and eight Army BCTs under the control of two Army division headquarters with appropriate supporting functional and multifunctional supporting brigade. (The 3/53 ABCT is tailored as the X Corps reconnaissance and security BCT.) Figure 3-3 on page 3-8 shows the brigade and larger-sized organizations assigned or under the OPCON to the coalition force land component commander. Not all units are located within the GREENLAND. These forces flow into GREENLAND as the coalition force commander’s campaign unfolds.

3-35. The coalition force land component commander uses the battlefield coordination detachment, co-located with the coalition air operations center to coordinate all air support (less strategic lift) during operations. In the initial stages of this contingency operation, airpower provides most of the firepower, maneuver, information collection, and tactical airlift capability the land component commander requires. The battlefield coordination detachment provides the essential linkage between the coalition force land and air component commanders.

COALITION FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER’S MISSION

3-36. When directed, the coalition force land component deploys forces into GREENLAND as part of flexible deterrent operations. On order it defends GREENLAND territory to defeat any REDLAND attack. On order, it attacks to restore the preconflict international borders of GREENLAND and REDLAND and helps GREENLAND civil authorities to alleviate the conditions that threaten the continuance of a democratic and free GREENLAND federation.

COALITION FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER’S INTENT

3-37. The purpose of the operation is to preserve or restore the territorial and political integrity of GREENLAND. If REDLAND attacks, the coalition defends to retain as much territory as possible without risking the destruction of defending land forces while retaining the use of available air and sea ports of debarkation. As soon as possible, we will attack to restore GREENLAND’s control of its territory.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-38. The operational environment in any region is far more extensive than the limited information provided in this chapter. Open-source information addressing diplomatic, informational, military, and economic aspects of the region as well as classified studies by the various members of the intelligence community should be consulted before and during deployments. The only information contained in this section applies directly to perform this publication’s vignettes. (See figure 3-4 for major movement corridors.)

TERRAIN

3-39. Most of the terrain within GREENLAND consists of two roughly parallel mountain chains. (Figure 3-4 shows the major movement corridors from REDLAND and from friendly air and surface ports of debarkation.) These two parallel mountain chains are split by the ALBA RIVER. The ALBA is a major river with few fording sites except on its upper reaches near the GREENLAND capital city of THEB’SOL.

3-40. The vegetation across the GREENLAND’s northern and southern valley slopes differ, but nature of ground above that, towards the snowline, is much the same and typically alpine. Northern valley slopes and lower levels contain deciduous forests. Above 1500m forests become coniferous with variable belts of mixed deciduous softwood trees. From 1800 to 2500m open alpine meadows are found. On the southern side of the range, at the 1200-1500m altitude, there are great forests of beech. The area also includes mixed and coniferous forests of fir and aspen. High pastures for grazing animals lie above these forests.

3-41. The WHITE Sea is GREENLAND’s window to the world as a whole since the BLUE Sea is landlocked. YELLOWLAND AND BROWNLAND have railroad connections to GREENLAND. However, BROWNLAND’s railroad uses a nonstandard broad gauge for its railroads which inhibits the transfer of goods and services between the two countries.

3-42. Highway 1 takes advantage of the natural east-west movement corridor within GREENLAND to bind the country’s economic system together. Highway 1 exits the narrow mountain passes west of THEB’SOL into the broad ALBA river valley. In recent years, the GREENLAND government and the federation’s previous governments spent a great deal of money and other resources with the help of GERMAN civil engineering firms to make it a hard surface, four-lane divided highway. The GREENLAND government developed an extensive system of farm-market roads within the country. These farm-market roads vary in quality from two-lane concrete or asphalt roads to one-lane gravel trails and provide a dense secondary road network, especially east of Theb’sol.

3-43. The LUSK RESERVOIR has three functions. It is the major source of hydroelectric power for GREENLAND. The reservoir is the major source of water for use in irrigation for the agricultural sector in the eastern half of the country. Lastly, it evens out the seasonal flow of water in the ALBA RIVER to prevent the flooding of downstream communities.

WEATHER

3-44. The main peculiarities of the GREENLAND region are related to the altitude zoning and exposition of the mountain systems to the prevailing western direction of winds. These winds reduce the utility of any REDLAND chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons employment because the agents or fallout will tend to be blown back toward REDLAND forces.

3-45. Below 2000m winter lasts from December to February. Above that altitude it lasts from October to April. Daytime temperatures on the lower slopes remain at about -2 degrees to -5 degrees centigrade, and higher up, -6 degrees to -16 degrees centigrade; at night, -7 degrees to -10 degrees and -10 degrees to -21 degrees centigrade, respectively. Snowfall is abundant and snow storms are frequent in the high mountains. Trafficability of all but cleared roads is limited and cross-country mobility is highly restricted. In winter, snows may be up to 3-meters deep in the valleys. Cloud cover marks half the winter season and severely restricts the utility of air support.

3-46. Summers are cool and isolated fog banks frequently occur. These fog banks restrict the utility of air support. In valley areas, summer lasts from May to September with temperatures from 16 degrees to 20 degrees centigrade. These high temperatures coupled with the altitude impact the carrying capability of cargo helicopters (CH). Nights are cold, sometimes with frost. Precipitation is mostly in the form of brief heavy showers, sometimes with thunderstorms.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS

3-47. Military commanders consider the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, peoples, and events (ASCOPE) indigenous to their areas of operations. GREENLAND political leaders have mixed support for the changes within their country and the pace those changes occur. However, they are fully supportive of coalition military efforts to expel REDLAND military units from GREENLAND. The U.S. and its coalition partners enjoy full domestic political support for the coalition’s military actions largely because its actions are internally and internationally perceived as a just response to unprovoked aggression by REDLAND. At this time, most national and international media support coalition goals and objectives. United Nations and European community support for military action is uncertain because of the economic ties of individual countries to REDLAND. BROWNLAND political leaders see continued ethnic tensions in the GREENLAND and surrounding countries as favoring its economic interests. YELLOWLAND civic leaders believe that the economic development of GREENLAND is in YELLOWLAND’s best long term interests. However, YELLOW-LAND has its own disgruntled ethnic minority which precludes it from having a military role in developments in GREENLAND.

3-48. The cultural perspective is that many different ethnic groups invaded or migrated into this area endowing GREENLAND with ethnic and linguistic complexity. More than 40 languages are still spoken by the ethnic groups within GREENLAND and its surrounding countries today. This diversity and persistence of languages is explained by geography and societies whose loyalties are to clan and family as much as to nation. The dips and depressions of the region’s mountain chains created near-isolated communities with relatively little contact between them even today. Most of these isolated societies have a high degree of ethnocentrism. Societal openness and legal penalties for violations of cultural, legal, or religious norms varies inversely with the distance of the each population from the major cities and major ground lines of communications. GREENLAND elites have superficially adopted Western culture. Western concepts such as democracy, equality, and rule of law have not yet taken extensive hold in the minds of the civilian population outside the major cities. Only minor adjustments to consider local cultural variances are made by most mid-career noncommissioned officers and officers because of prior experiences in similar tribal cultures in IRAQ and AFGHANISTAN. Junior Soldiers and officers need cultural awareness training on their initial deployments.

3-49. The religious structure of GREENLAND is heterogeneous. Most civilians follow Islam. The Atropians in eastern GREENLAND are Shi’a Muslims. Christianity is represented by the different Orthodox Church sects with scattered Catholic and Protestant groups and is confined to western GREENLAND. There are also small numbers of other religions traditions such as Judaism, Yezid, Krishnaism, and Bahaism scattered throughout the country. Most Sunni Muslims within GREENLAND are not inclined to impose their religious views on outsiders although scattered clerics are more militant.

3-50. The internal economy of GREENLAND is largely based of agriculture although its exports are dominated by petroleum products. Its annual gross domestic product is less than $50 billion. It is highly self-sufficient for goods and services and almost totally dependent on international imports in high-tech finished goods, machine tools, and technical expertise. Its transportation infrastructure is overdeveloped for its current needs because the infrastructure was developed in anticipation of future growth. Second wave industrial development is responsible for less than 20 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product. Many of GREENLAND’s industrial sites contain significant quantities of toxic-industrial materials. Electrical production capabilities exceed demand although electrical distribution systems are largely limited to towns and cities and do not extend widely into rural areas. Telecommunications infrastructure between GREENLAND towns and cities is a mixture of microwave and fiber-optic cable.

3-51. By international standards, GREENLAND has a small population with less than 25,000,000 people. Recently the rate of population growth has increased to a rate of almost two percent as western medical care becomes available. The general educational level of the GREENLAND population is poor with less than 60 percent of its citizens receiving a high school or technical education. The life expectancy of GREENLAND citizens is less than 60 years. At the start of this scenario, refugees fleeing REDLAND forces have a significant impact on military operations by severely congesting the major east-west roads and trails and occupying potential tactical assembly areas. (This congestion gradually reduces throughout the scenario as refugees are placed into camps operated by the GREENLAND government and various international and private volunteer organizations.)

3-52. Before its invasion by REDLAND, the GREENLAND military was very small and consisted of less than 100,000 Soldiers, airmen, and sailors. GREENLAND had limited indigenous armaments production capacity consisting of small arms weapons with associated ammunition.

SECTION II – DIVISION CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

MISSION

3-53. The 52nd Division deploys, conducts RSOI, and defends its area of operations to prevent further REDLAND advances into GREENLAND with the no penetration line being phase line (PL) DARLING. On order, it attacks to destroy REDLAND forces and affiliated insurgents and terrorist groups within its area of operations out to the limit of advance (PL HARRIS) to force the withdrawal of occupying enemy forces. Simultaneously, the division conducts stability tasks to ensure civil security, alleviate human suffering, and maintain or restore GREENLAND civil control and essential services to create a viable civil society and prevent insurgent or terrorist recruitment of the civilian population.

COMMANDER’S INTENT

3-54. The purpose of this operation is to return control of the land, people, and resources in country to the internationally recognized government of GREENLAND by destroying or forcing the withdrawal of REDLAND’s occupying forces and affiliated insurgents and terrorist groups. Key tasks include:

Rapid deployment of divisional forces and attachments sequenced first to perform an effective defense of the division’s initial lodgment area, followed by the deployment of significant additional combat power so that the division can, on order, attack as part of a joint offensive operations. This restores the international border while simultaneously performing the minimal necessary stability tasks required by international law.

Maximize the use of joint fires and limited attacks during the defense to reduce those portions of the REDLAND 10th tank and 51st motorized infantry DTGs located in the area of operations to less than 50 percent effectiveness before the attack begins.

Conduct stability tasks with the conduct of division offensive and defensive tasks. These stability tasks operations encompass a myriad of subordinate tasks designed to enable the GREENLAND government to provide civil security, establish civil control, and restore essential services to reinstate a viable civil society within GREENLAND borders. These subordinate tasks include, but are not limited to, providing foreign humanitarian assistance to the civilian population within the division’s area of operations; preventing the unnecessary destruction of civilian infrastructure; training and logistically supporting local GREENLAND security forces; and restoring essential public services disrupted by combat operations. Performing these tasks will be the division’s dominate mission after the division achieves its combat objective.

Seize OBJECTIVE DIANA, the road junctions and bridges located north and east of KILLEAN to isolate the REDLAND 20th tank and 52nd motorized infantry DTGs trying to secure the major mountain pass northwest of THEB’SOL that leads into the ALBA RIVER valley.

Destroy those parts of the REDLAND 10th Tank, 51st Motorized Infantry, and 26th Mechanized Infantry DTGs located in our area of operation up to the limit of advance (PL HARRIS).

Establish defensive positions along international boarder to deter and prevent REDLAND forces from invading GREENLAND or providing support to insurgents.

The desired end state is a secure and stable GREENLAND including the restoration of essential services.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

3-55. This operation will be performed in four phases:

Phase I—Deployment.

Phase II—Defense.

Phase III—Offense.

Phase IV—Stabilization and Enabling Civil Authority.

PHASE I – DEPLOYMENT

3-56. Deployment is ongoing and ends approximately C+65 when all divisional forces are scheduled to close into their tactical assembly areas. The main effort for this phase is to deploy the first deployment package (see figure 4-3 on page 4-17). This package contains the necessary control, maneuver, and sustainment capabilities for the division to establish a viable defense and perform shaping operations focused on setting conditions for civil security and the restoration of essential public services within the division area of operations.

3-57. The division’s shaping operations, those actions with respect to the enemy that facilitate the division deployment, are performed by coalition force land component assets. This includes creating an integrated air defense system and developing the intelligence estimate for GREENLAND and REDLAND. Units encountering insurgent or terrorist groups during deployment will attrit these groups within unit capabilities. These unit report the locations of these terrorist groups to the joint security area coordinator for later resolution according to joint security area plans. The division coordinates with host nation authorities and commits up to one battalion task force to augment GREENLAND authorities conducting area security operations designed to secure civilian population centers from insurgent and terrorist attacks. The division helps GREENLAND authorities restore disrupted essential public services within available capabilities. This task defuses the efforts of the engineer battalions assigned to the division’s attached BCTs until the 52nd Engineer Battalion completes its RSOI.

3-58. Home installations conduct sustaining operations and later deploying units of the division that conduct deployment related tasks to help the first deployment package in rapidly moving from fort-to-port and loading national transportation assets. The combined/joint force land component (JFLC) conducts shaping operations by providing assets to conduct RSOI of incoming forces. Once the 27th Sustainment Brigade and 48th Medical Brigade (Support) assets arrive in theater and complete their own RSOI, they provide general support (GS) to the conduct of the division’s sustaining and force health protection tasks.

PHASE II – DEFENSE

3-59. This phase begins on arrival and RSOI of Deployment Package 1 and ends on order when the division attacks. The main effort for this phase is preventing REDLAND forces from penetrating PL DARLING by the division’s committed forces. (See figure 5-2 on page 5-41.) This is a result of a successful area defense of the division’s area of operations.

3-60. Division shaping operations during this phase are the actions of the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade, 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, and 575th FA Brigade to set the conditions that allow the 52nd Division to transition to the offense. This includes identifying potential enemy attack forces and the determination, if possible, of enemy intentions. The delay or disruption of enemy offensive operations allows defending BCTs more time to prepare their defenses. They also include the successful preparation for offensive action by the 2/52 and 4/4th ABCTs. Insurgent and terrorist groups encountered during the defense are attrited within unit capabilities and tracked for later destruction or capture as required. The division conducts area security operations to protect division forces and civilian population concentrations from attack and mitigate the effects of these attacks. As appropriate, other stability tasks related to governance and administration, infrastructure recovery, and humanitarian relief and assistance are initiated during this phase. Division controlled assets conduct activities designed to explain the division’s presence in GREENLAND to local civilians and international audiences. These operations explain that the division is here at the request of the GREENLAND government to help GREENLAND resist REDLAND, insurgent, and terrorists forces that have committed numerous atrocities and caused damage and violated international law and will leave when GREENLAND is secure and free from extralegal coercion.

3-61. Division sustainment operations encompass the completion of RSOI by all division elements and the sustainment of divisional units in contact. They also include the efforts of the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade to provide area security; ground lines of communications maintenance; and complete CBRN reconnaissance within the division support area (area security includes both route and convoy security.)

PHASE III – OFFENSE

3-62. This phase begins on order and ends when enemy forces are expelled from GREENLAND. The main effort for this phase is the seizure of OBJECTIVE DIANA by the 2/52 ABCT which, together with the attack of the 53rd Division, seizes key terrain that isolates the majority of REDLAND combat power in GREENLAND from their support and sustainment bases.

3-63. The 52nd Division has three shaping operations during this phase. First is the 4/4 ABCT attack along Highway 1 to destroy enemy forces and seize OBJECTIVE JOHN and OBJECTIVE BEM to create the condition for the commitment of the 2/52 ABCT. The second is the 1/52 Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) attack to fix enemy forces to deny them the ability to counterattack into the flank of division forces advancing along Highway 1. Insurgent and terrorist groups encountered during the attack are fixed until sufficient combat power can be brought to bear to destroy them and capture or kill the personnel associated with these groups. The third accomplishes tasks to maintain or return GREENLAND governmental control, security, and essential public services over territory controlled by the division as it advances. This third shaping operation contains five lines of effort—restoring security and control to GREENLAND authorities, governance and administration, infrastructure recovery, perception management, and humanitarian relief and assistance. The division assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations (G-9) performs the stability tasks by divisional elements with appropriate GREENLAND civil and military authorities, other U.S. governmental agencies, and international organizations of various types. This is more important as the division recovers previously occupied GREENLAND territory containing significant numbers of civilians.

3-64. Division sustaining operations provide logistical and human resources support to the division’s brigade combat teams (BCT) and supporting brigades. The 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade ensures that division main supply routes within the division support area remain unobstructed and available to support the movement of the division’s combat forces and sustainment assets.

PHASE IV – STABILIZATION AND ENABLING CIVIL AUTHORITY

3-65. This phase begins after REDLAND Forces are expelled from GREELAND and ends with the redeployment of the 1st Division. Those stability activities along the five lines of effort initiated in the previous phase as a shaping operation continue during this phase. The security and control line of effort is the division’s decisive operation. All division brigades participate in this effort within their respective areas of operations. GREENLAND civil authorities cannot meet the legitimate needs of their civilian population without the existence of a secure environment in which to work. The division’s BCTs conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations and provide area security within their respective areas of operations. The 92nd Military Police Brigade has the mission of restoring the GREENLAND police force throughout the division area of operations.

3-66. The other four lines of effort—governance and administration, infrastructure recovery, perception management, and humanitarian relief and assistance are division shaping operations. The 555th Engineer Brigade is responsible for coordinating the infrastructure recovery line of effort within priorities and guidance established by the commander and the assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3). Likewise, the 548th Civil Affairs Battalion is responsible for coordinating the governance and administration line of effort within those same priorities and guidance. All the division’s brigades contribute to the accomplishment of these four lines of effort.

3-67. The division’s sustainment operations throughout this phase focus on the logistical and human resources support to the division’s BCTs and support brigades. The 27th Sustainment Brigade will have numerous challenges during this phase supplying CLASS X and other supply items not normally required by U.S. forces. The 48th Medical Brigade (Support) will have similar challenges dealing with medical-related humanitarian relief supplies.

Chapter 4

Division Deployment

This chapter discusses the basics of division deployment. It also discusses forcible entry, rear detachment operations, and continues with the scenario started in chapter 3.

SECTION I – BASICS OF DIVISION DEPLOYMENT

4-1. The employment concept is the starting point for deployment planning. Proper planning establishes what, where, and when forces are needed and sets the stage for a successful deployment. Consequently, how the geographic combatant commander intends to employ forces is the basis for orchestrating the deployment structure. All deployment possibilities are examined as they influence employment planning. Deployment directly impacts the timing and amount of combat power delivered to achieve the geographic combatant commander’s desired effects.

4-2. There are four principles that apply to the broad range of activities encompassing deployment. These principles are precision, synchronization, knowledge, and speed. (See JP 3-35 for a discussion of these principles.)

DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

4-3. The initial activity in creating a deployment plan uses military decisionmaking. The objective is to synchronize deployment activities to facilitate execution. The steps used in planning and preparing during predeployment activities include: analyze the mission, structure forces, refine deployment data, prepare the force, and schedule movement. Successful deployment planning requires knowledge of the unit’s deployment responsibilities, an understanding of deployment, and an appreciation of the link between deployment and employment. FM 3-35 discusses deployment phases and planning in greater detail.

4-4. Determining how the division’s mission command system will echelon into the division’s projected area of operations while maintaining a high fidelity common operational picture and the commander’s capability to influence ongoing operations is an important part of the preparation phase. Preparing the personnel and equipment for deployment and selecting, reconnoitering, and evaluating proposed command post locations within the division’s projected area of operations are key preparatory activities to any operation.

SUSTAINMENT PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

4-5. The operational variables are fundamental to develop a comprehensive understanding of an operational environment. Planners focus on identifying the resources currently available in the theater of operations for use by friendly forces and ensuring access to them. A detailed estimate of requirements allows planners to advise the commander of the most effective method of providing adequate, responsive support while minimizing the sustainment footprint. Sustainment preparation of the operational environment includes, but is not limited to, geography, supplies and services, facilities, maintenance, transportation, general skills, operational contract support, theater support contracts, external support contractors, and system support contracts.

GEOGRAPHY

4-6. Planners collect information on climate, terrain, and endemic diseases in the area of operations to determine when and what types of equipment are needed. For example, water information determines the need for such things as early deployment of well-digging assets and water production, purification, and distribution units.

SUPPLIES AND SERVICES

4-7. Planners collect information on supplies and services available in the area of operations. Supplies such as subsistence items, bulk petroleum, and barrier materials are most common. Commonly available services include bath and laundry, sanitation services, and water purification.

FACILITIES

4-8. Planners collect information on the availability of warehousing, cold-storage facilities, production and manufacturing plants, reservoirs, administrative facilities, hospitals, sanitation capabilities, and hotels. Availability of these facilities reduces the requirement for the deployment of U.S. assets. For example, a force provider company houses approximately 3,300 personnel. If space is available in a complex of hotels with the requisite support in the required location, deploying the force provider, with its significant strategic lift requirements, could be eliminated or deferred.

MAINTENANCE

4-9. Planners examine the availability of other Service, multinational and host nation maintenance capabilities. Planners identify a need and request contracted maintenance support when feasible and/or available. Units determine what items are included as part of the shop and bench stock of their combat repair and field maintenance teams and the types and numbers of on board spares. These determinations are based on:

The types and tempo of operations projected to occur.

The types and frequency of combat damage and maintenance failures.

The quantities needed to support not only their authorized table of organization and equipment but also common commercial off-the-shelf equipment used in the division’s projected area of operations based on the order-to-ship time in procurement.

For example, if insurgents in the division’s projected area of operations make extensive use of land mines, the maintenance units within the division stock complete assemblies of number one and two road wheel arms for both sides of all of different models of tracked vehicles authorized to the division’s subordinate brigades. If the terrain is sandy, then division units stock additional sprockets with the necessary hardware to mount them once excessive cupping occurs.

TRANSPORTATION

4-10. Planners collect information on road and rail nets, truck availability, bridges, ports, cargo handlers, petroleum pipelines, and material handling equipment. They examine traffic flow to identify potential choke points and control problems.

GENERAL SKILLS

4-11. Planners collect information on the general population of the area of operations. General skills include translators, skilled and unskilled laborers.

4-12. Negotiating host nation support and theater support contracting agreements may include prepositioning of supplies and equipment, civilian support contracts, overseas training programs, and humanitarian and civil assistance programs. Where possible these agreements enhance the internal development and cooperative solidarity of the host nation and provide necessary infrastructure should deployment of forces to the target country be required. The prearrangement of these agreements reduces planning times in relation to contingency plans and operations.

4-13. Negotiations and agreements enable access to host nation support resources identified in the requirements determination phase. Negotiation facilitates force tailoring by identifying available resources within the division’s projected area of operations, such as commercial pipeline construction and trucking companies and common supplies. This precludes the need to deploy U.S. military capabilities and ship dunnage and barrier materiel from the U.S. to support the division’s operations.

OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

4-14. Operational contract support is important in the sustainment of operations and helps obtain support for the division’s stability-focused operations. Contract support augments other support capabilities by providing an additional source for required supplies and services. This is true of nonstandard support requirements in stability-focused operations. Because of the importance and specific challenges of operational contract support, commanders and staffs understand their role in planning for and managing contract support in the area of operations. (See ATTP 4-10 for information regarding operational contract support roles and responsibilities.)

THEATER SUPPORT CONTRACTS

4-15. Theater support contracts are awarded by contingency contracting officers deployed to the joint operations area that provide the ability to rapidly contract for logistics support within a theater of operations. This is performed by contracting officers under the control of the U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) contracting support brigade. Theater-support contractors acquire goods, services, and minor construction support, usually from the local commercial sources, to meet the immediate needs of operational commanders. Theater support contracts are associated with contingency contracting. Sustainment brigades request theater support contracts through a supporting contracting office. When this support involves commodities and/or services support, the supported unit is required to provide contracting officer representatives and receiving officials for contracted logistic commodities and services provided in the affected area of operations.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT CONTRACTORS

4-16. External support contracts awarded by contracting organizations whose contracting authority does not derive directly from the theater support contracting head(s) of contracting activity or from systems support contracting authorities. External support service contracts provide a variety of logistics and other non-combat related services and supply support. The largest and most commonly known external support contract is the Army’s logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP provides supply services, such as storage, warehousing, and distribution, for the nine classes of supplies, but the Services source the actual commodities. Depending on the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), the theater sustainment command serves as the requiring activity for mission related LOGCAP support requirements. If designated by the Army force commander as the lead requiring activity for LOGCAP support, the theater sustainment command is augmented by an USAMC logistics support officer. In either contract support option, the requiring activity or supported unit required to provide contracting officer representatives and receiving officials for contracted logistic commodities and services provided in the affected area of operations.

SYSTEM SUPPORT CONTRACTS

4-17. System support contracts are prearranged contracts by the USAMC Life Cycle Management Command and separate Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology program executive and product and project management offices. Supported systems include, but are not limited to, newly fielded weapon systems and mission command system infrastructure, such as those managed by the USAMC Project Manager Mission Command’s four product offices. System contractors, made up mostly of U.S. citizens, provide support in garrison and may deploy with the force to both training and real-world operations. They provide either temporary support during the initial fielding of a system, called interim contracted support, or long-term support for selected materiel systems, often referred to as contractor logistics support. An Army field support brigade, normally under the operational control (OPCON) of the theater sustainment command, has the lead for planning and coordinating system support contract actions for the division.

4-18. Planning and preparation for Army pre-positioned sets of equipment is essential in facilitating strategic and operational reach. These reserve stocks are intended to provide support essential to sustain the division’s operations until resupply lines of communications are established. Pre-positioning stocks in potential theaters of operations provides the capability to rapidly resupply forces until one sea line of communications is established. Pre-positioned stocks are located at or near the point of planned use or at other designated locations to reduce reaction time. Alternatives include pre-positioning stocks:

Afloat, including port construction equipment and materiel.

At an intermediate staging base.

Assembling stocks in tailored packages for deployment with projected forces.

The four categories of Army pre-positioned stocks are: pre-positioned sets, Army operational project stocks, war reserve stocks, and war reserve stocks for allies. More information on these categories can be found in FM 3-35.1.

PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

4-19. An expeditionary Army requires units prepare for potential deployments or redeployments consistent with the Army force generation (ARFORGEN) model. During predeployment, units constantly plan for various contingencies and hone their deployment skills. When units train and exercise their predeployment activities, they become second nature and are accomplished efficiently. For example, brigade and battalion movements to gunnery and combat training center rotations are opportunities to verify and codify division and the appropriate Army force’s reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) processes and systems. Not only should units be trained, personnel must also comply to Soldier readiness processing that includes the administrative, medical, and dental checks required to prepare a Soldier for deployment. This level of readiness and training requires school-trained and dedicated mobility officers, unit movement officers, hazardous cargo certifiers, and load planners. Unit deployment requirements are documented in organizational equipment lists, unit deployment lists, and loaded into the transportation coordinator’s automated information for movement system II. In addition, units acquire movement expertise, knowledgeable deployment support teams, joint deployment process improvement tools, and an understanding of the joint Adaptive Planning and Execution System to enable seamless deployment operations. Chairman of the Joint chiefs of staff memorandum CJCSM 3130.03 establishes the planning formats and guidance for this system.

4-20. A challenge for a division and its brigades preparing for deployment is developing the time-phased force and deployment data that includes not only standard attachments but also all the nonstandard attachments, such as human terrain teams, required for the different operational environments that the division may operate within. The time-phased force and deployment data is critical to refine, validate, and coordinate the division’s movement requirements. Company movement officers prepare and submit time-phased force and deployment data through their higher headquarters for validation by the supported combatant commander. The supported combatant commander submits the requirement to the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) for scheduling once these movement requirements and priorities are validated and approved by the Secretary of Defense. (See JP 3-35 for additional information on the use of time-phased force and deployment data during deployment planning and execution.)

4-21. Movement requirements developed during deployment planning must be validated before deployment execution. Validation confirms the need for the movement requirement, shipment configuration, dimensions, and routing and ensures that all parties, including the chain of command, are cognizant of the requirement. Movement requirements are validated during execution planning by the supported geographic combatant commander who validates all joint force movement requirements for movement scheduling by the USTRANSCOM.

4-22. During this preparation phase, the division sustainment cell ensures that equipment readiness tracking information is passed to appropriate sustainment headquarters for rapid resolution of deficiencies. It also uses the Defense Transportation Recording and Control System, radio frequency identification tags, and the Joint Deployment Logistics Model to achieve in-transit visibility of division materiel during tactical road marches. These tasks improve the division's ability to track the buildup of combat power from its home station to its projected area of operations. Tracking readiness and movements simultaneously is a tremendous challenge for the division movement control element and the maintenance and supply elements of the division's sustainment cell and supporting sustainment brigade’s materiel management center during preparation and execution. The sustainment cell feeds deployment related information to the current operations integrating cell for further distribution throughout the headquarters. The division takes advantage of the preparatory phase to establish and fine tune the activities of its rear detachments and family readiness groups.

4-23. If the division participates in a relief-in-place then it should request that the outgoing division provide its recommended training topics. The division verifies and validates reception stations pre-deployment training to ensure that Soldiers augmenting the division receive the proper training.

MOVEMENT

4-24. Movement occurs :

Fort-to-port.

Port-to-port.

FORT-TO-PORT

4-25. The receipt of the U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command air tasking order (ATO) and Army surface deployment and distribution command (SDDC) port call message initiates port of embarkation operations and specifies the dates when units arrive at the port. At the installation staging areas, unit movement data is verified and equipment is inspected and configured for movement. Unit vehicles and cargo is moved to the ports of embarkation by convoy or commercial surface transport. The installation coordinates and/or provides support to help the deploying force by using non-deploying units, installation resources, or contracted support. Support includes load teams, materials handling equipment, maintenance teams, arrival/departure airfield control groups (A/DACGs), and deployment support teams. Other support is identified during deployment exercises and written into installation deployment support plans. The mission support element is a table of distribution and allowance augmentation capability used by the mission commander to develop and maintain the deployment support plan.

4-26. Deploying units configure for deployment, reduce/prepare vehicles and aircraft for movement, properly stow and tie down secondary loads, construct 463L pallets, and prepare the required documentation. The air and sea ports of embarkation initiate operations. Materials handling equipment must be on hand, and procedures for joint inspection at the aerial terminal commences. Units assemble equipment for air movement and chalks are staged awaiting sortie allocation. Each air and sea port of embarkation offers staging and inclement weather facilities. ATP 4-16 describes the process associated with surface movement control. ATP 4-14 addresses Army rail operations. ATTP 4-15 addresses Army water transport operations.

PORT-TO-PORT

4-27. U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) operates the Defense Transportation System and provides common user strategic transportation to support the geographic combatant commander for deployment. The port to port phase begins with strategic lift departures from ports of embarkation and ends with lift asset arrival in the designated theater ports of debarkation. The geographic combatant commander synchronizes the arrival of airlift and sealift force packages so that vessels are brought to a berth or offloaded in-stream with minimal delay. This is fundamental to successful port-to-port movement and ensures cargo is received and cleared from the port in a timely manner.

4-28. Port operations begin the strategic leg of the division’s deployment pipeline. Essential actions are accomplished at the port of embarkation to complete and finalize all unit movement responsibilities. The result is the load and launch of the strategic lift system used by the division in its deployment. Critical information, such as movement schedules, manifests, and load lists are provided to control nodes and forward support elements to facilitate efficient onward movement of the division’s deploying headquarters, brigades, and battalions to their respective ports of debarkation.

PROTECTION DURING TRANSIT

4-29. During the division’s predeployment activities through the “fort to port” phase, the U.S. Army Installation Management Command is a critical protection enabler. This command manages most Army installations and its garrison commanders ensure the division headquarters and headquarters battalion and the division’s brigades are protected as they deploy. Installation provost marshals, with military police and civilian Department of the Army (DA) security forces, protect divisional unit assets as they prepare to deploy. Installation sustainment personnel enable force projection. In addition, installation safety personnel, medical personnel, and information management personnel protect the division’s Soldiers and information. The division protection cell coordinates closely with installation staff personnel to identify information and assets that need protection and apply appropriate protection and security measures consistent with their collective threat analysis.

4-30. Domestic and foreign groups may try to impede or prevent the division’s deployment. Coordination for the physical security of division assets is required when they move to ports of embarkation. Physical security is required for those assets while they await transport at those ports of embarkation, during their strategic movement, and once they arrive at their ports of debarkation. Physical security remains a concern while those assets are matched with division Soldiers in unit tactical assembly areas, and while units and supplies move along routes used by the division to displace to its area of operations. This coordination occurs between the division and domestic law enforcement agencies, with port security personnel, with the organization providing the strategic lift, and with the combatant or joint force commander. This coordination may also need to involve host nation security forces.

4-31. Before arriving overseas, the division commander submits protection plans through the respective Army force and Army Service component command or theater Army headquarters to the geographic combatant commander responsible to protect all military forces in an area of responsibility. The division’s plan matches the guidance developed by the geographic combatant commander, who coordinates and approves the division’s various protection plans.

4-32. The division protection cell ensures that the division’s headquarters and headquarters battalion and subordinate brigades are trained on the technology used to protect the division’s various bases once deployed. This includes whatever cameras, sensors, robotics, communications, and their related maintenance management requirements. Typically, subordinate brigades need assistance in determining the best methods to perform vulnerability assessments while the protection cell needs training in the management of division protection working groups.

4-33. Some continental U.S. (CONUS) based transportation agencies may provide limited organic protection. However, the division commander retains responsibility for planning protection measures for all of the division’s rail and highway movements. The protection cell assesses, in coordination with the SDDC, the assets and carriers and provides additional protection measures consistent with the threat and sensitive cargo requirements. These include the use of contract security personnel or unit guards to safeguard unit assets. The division commander makes the final determination based on security requirements and the protection cell’s recommendations. The protection cell coordinates with the installation transportation officer in CONUS or the movement control team outside CONUS and authorized railroad or commercial truck carriers on guard and escort matters.

4-34. Protection cell staff coordinates with the port readiness committees at each port used by the division. These committees provide the deploying commander a common coordination structure for the Department of Defense, the U.S. Coast Guard, and other federal, state, and local agencies at the port level. These committees are also the principle interface between the Department of Defense and other officials at the ports during the movement of military equipment.

4-35. In coordination with other Department of Defense activities and port authorities USTRANSCOM and SDDC administers a defense transportation security program to provide standardized transportation security measures and procedures, constant oversight, and central direction. Commanders plan for protection measures for their units and equipment to the port in CONUS, while SDDC coordinates for security within the port. The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command helps to protect the division’s deployment by detecting, investigating, and preventing logistical supply diversion and other criminal acts that adversely impact the process.

4-36. Depending on the threat assessment, equipment is guarded while being staged at the installation, at railheads, or en route to ports of embarkation. Units consider assigning supercargoes to accompany the equipment; during transit from the sea port of embarkation to the sea port of debarkation. A potential problem addressed is that during some phases of a deployment, the division transfers custody of its military equipment to entities not part of the U.S. Department of Defense; including foreign-owned ships crewed by non-U.S. citizens. The protection cell ensures that all contract processes for transportation movements meet Department of Defense security requirements.

4-37. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 4500.09E establishes the governing requirements for moving sensitive military cargo. It establishes various levels of required protection and monitoring to material based on categories of risk. Measures of protection and monitoring range from continuous surveillance to simple seals used in shipping. The defense transportation regulation establishes protection requirements for air, rail, water, and motor transport and outlines the transportation protective service means available in the transportation community to meet them.

4-38. The tasks of the U.S. Coast Guard—in peacetime part of the Department of Homeland Security—encompass critical elements of maritime operations in littoral regions, including port security and safety, military environmental response, maritime interdiction, coastal sea control, and anti-terrorism. This includes harbors, channels, approaches, and vessels in these areas. The Coast Guard’s physical security plan integrates with the port commander’s physical security plan to develop and maintain comprehensive physical security and antiterrorism plans. In addition to waterside physical security, the Coast Guard’s other duties include—

Regulating the shipping, handling, and pier side storage of hazardous cargo.

Interfacing with military authorities as the senior port safety agent for the Department of Defense.

Issuing hazardous cargo permits.

Supervising vessel fire prevention programs.

4-39. Supercargoes are unit personnel designated on orders to accompany, secure, and maintain unit cargo onboard ships. Supercargoes are the deploying unit commander’s representative during movement of unit equipment on a ship. They perform liaison during cargo reception at the sea port of embarkation, shipload and discharge operations, and sea port of debarkation port clearance operations. The deploying unit provides any supercargoes accompanying cargo aboard ships. As a minimum, equipment should be protected against theft and pilferage.

4-40. The size of the supercargo teams dedicated to each ship are consistent with the team’s role in guarding and maintaining equipment on board, the resources available on the ship, and the additional costs required to equip and maintain the team during the voyage. The division transportation officer coordinates the use of supercargo teams with the SDDC, commercial carriers, and port facilities to prevent any unnecessary commitment of personnel and resources.

RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

4-41. RSOI delivers combat power to the joint force commander in a theater of operations or a joint operations area. Seizing the initiative demands expeditious processing of personnel and equipment throughout the deployment pipeline. Consequently, facilities are available on or near ports of debarkation for personnel reception and equipment staging and preparation (including refueling). One of the essential requirements at the aerial port of debarkation is adequate parking and operational areas to sustain the required number of aircraft to meet the throughput requirements. RSOI support, whether provided by theater support contracts, external support contracts (primarily LOGCAP), or regionally available commercial host nation support, and/or military assets, are sufficient to immediately support the arrival of deploying units. Effective RSOI matches personnel with their equipment, minimizes staging and sustainment requirements while transiting the PODs, and begins onward movement as quickly as possible. A plan to accomplish integration and maintain combat readiness must be understood, trained, and ready to implement upon arrival. Chapter 3 discusses the deployment of a division within a scenario. JP 3-35 and FM 3-35 discuss factors and considerations associated with the conduct of RSOI.

RECEPTION

4-42. As the initial step in introducing combat power, reception determines success or failure of the RSOI operation. Reception from strategic lift is implemented at or near designated air and seaports of debarkation, normally under control of the combatant commander. While the reception plan for each theater varies, reception capacity should at least equal planned strategic lift delivery capability. At a minimum, joint command and control, movement control, and port operations are considered during military decisionmaking.

STAGING

4-43. Staging is that part of the RSOI operation that reassembles and reunites unit personnel with their equipment and schedules unit movement to the tactical assembly area, secures or uploads unit basic loads, and provides life support to personnel (FM 3-35). Divisional elements practice performing battle drills for various contingencies that may occur during their onward movement from their respective theater staging areas sites to their respective areas of operations. These drills are essential to successful movement and include: reaction to mines, booby traps, and improvised explosive devices, reaction near and far ambushes, refuel on the move, casualty evacuation from different types of vehicles, and preparation of vehicles for immediate recovery. Also the dissemination of daily intelligence and route summaries derived from the experiences of previous convoys transiting those same routes is critical to the success of that onward movement and integration. This information is pushed down to the individual Soldier through the use of a situational strip map that provides a visualization of critical points and named areas of interest along the route. It offers a short synopsis of recent enemy and civilian activity in the vicinity of each named area of interest. This information allows Soldiers to prepare mentally and anticipate the actions they are required to take.

ONWARD MOVEMENT

4-44. Many factors external to the division influence the commander during the division’s deployment planning. These include the availability of strategic lift assets and the requirements of the division’s future higher headquarters. These factors determine the sequence in which divisional units move from the tactical assembly areas, where they completed reception and staging operations, to their respective areas of operation. Units integrate into the forces available to a joint force commander on completing their onward movement. The plans for the movement of the division headquarters and its attached and support brigades into the area of operations maintain a balance between security and flexibility.

4-45. The division commander relies heavily on the division transportation staff and the integrating cells to finish coordinating the division’s movement plans within its projected area of operations with all necessary military and civilian agencies during this preparatory period. The division completes movement requests and applies for march credits if the area where the division deploys has an established movement control system. That movement control system may be operated by the U.S. military, the host nation, or represent a melding of military and civilian agencies. The appropriate division staff cells and elements consider the number of suitable routes and lift assets available to meet the movement requirements of divisional units. Other considerations include—

Road and route improvement and maintenance.

Construction of routes.

Clearance of obstacles including mines and booby traps.

Repair of bridges and culverts.

Bridging rivers or dry gaps.

Establishment of security along routes.

Traffic control to permit freedom of or restriction of civilian movements along routes.

Communications architecture.

INTEGRATION

4-46. When a deploying unit replaces another unit, a relief in place must occur during integration. Combat-ready units are transferred to the operational commander and merged into the tactical plan. The transfer requires interaction and familiarization among units and that arriving units meet certain standards before being completely integrated into the combat plan. Consequently, requirements for integration planning and coordination occur early in force projection and are modified according to the mission variables of METT-TC until force closure is achieved. Integration is complete when the combatant commander establishes positive command and control over the arriving unit, usually at tactical assembly areas, and units are capable of performing missions.

4-47. If the division is the first U.S. force into an area of operations there may be a need to deploy an advance party heavy with security, protection, and logistical and engineering support capabilities as part of the division’s movement preparations. That advance party is resourced from the division’s attached and supporting assets or is provided by outside units such as explosive ordnance disposal. This is particularly true if the predeployment survey determines that the area of operations does not have the infrastructure to support division operations. In other circumstances, it is necessary for an assistant division commander and a small group of specialized key personnel, such as attached civil affairs, public affairs, or the staff judge advocate, to lead an advance party. These personnel will set the groundwork for the rest of the division by performing face-to-face coordination with local civilian or military leaders.

4-48. Division deployment operations end when all deploying elements of the division complete their RSOI within the joint operations area of the joint force commander for which the division is working. The specifics of RSOI will reflect the specific circumstances of the mission variables of METT-TC prevailing in that joint operations area. JP 3-35 outlines joint RSOI doctrinal requirements.

SECTION II – FORCIBLE ENTRY

4-49. Circumstance may dictate that some or all of the division’s brigades conduct joint forcible entry operations directly from departure airfields and marshalling locations within CONUS, its territories, or intermediate staging bases. Forcible entry is seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition (JP 3-18). A lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations (JP 3-18). A lodgment may be an airhead, a beachhead, or a combination thereof. Lodgment requirements depend on the objective(s) of the overall operation or larger campaign. A lodgment has established facilities and infrastructure.

4-50. Forcible entry planning includes the political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure realities as rapidly as possible to enable the conduct of follow-on operations or conduct a singular operation. JP 3-18 addresses the conduct of joint forcible entry at the strategic and operational levels. Maneuver center of excellence doctrinal manuals and supporting publications address the conduct of airborne and air assault operations by the Army. This manual does not address forcible entry operations because of the existence of these joint and Army publications.

SECTION III – REAR DETACHMENT OPERATIONS

4-51. Rear detachment operations are an important aspect of deployment operations. The division does not assume that the division headquarters is relieved of all responsibilities for home station activities once deployed if the division headquarters is the senior headquarters on an installation. Instead there is the normal steady state of garrison related activities as seen before deployment and an increase of duties to the staff of the rear detachment as non-deploying units assume missions from deployed brigades. This is a major consideration in determining the size and composition of the rear detachment staff, especially the identification of key leaders in the division rear detachment. It is important that the division identify its rear detachment commander and personnel make up during the preparation phase. This is especially true if the commander is selected from outside the headquarters and requires time to integrate into the new organization.

4-52. A clear delineation of responsibilities between the rear detachment and forward deployed unit enhances rear detachment operations. Responsibilities are divided between the division’s forward deployed headquarters and rear detachment. There is a clear division of responsibilities between the rear detachment and any table of distribution and allowances mission support element established at the home station. Historically, many of these mission support elements have been staffed by Army civilians and contractors. The division commander identifies priorities and set responsibilities before the division’s deployment. The commander entrusts the rear detachment to make routine decisions and provide the appropriate commander’s critical information requirements to guide reporting and coordination requirements. The negative effect of increased missions on reduced staff is mitigated by implementing a flat organizational structure within the rear detachment that delegates decisionmaking to lower echelons. The exact structure and functions of the individual sections within the division rear detachment varies with the specific situation faced by the rear detachment. A key factor in that variance is the presence and organization of any table of distribution and allowances mission support element.

4-53. The division rear detachment picks up the daily workload at the division’s home installation within its capabilities and provides home-station support for the deployed division. The division rear detachment commander is responsible for the administrative operations of the rear detachment including maintaining control, accounting for unit property and equipment, and managing personnel. That individual is also responsible for the training of rear detachment and newly assigned Soldiers. In short, the rear detachment commander and the rear detachment personnel keep the division functional at its home station.

4-54. The rear detachment commander provides resources and assistance for families to resolve issues at the lowest level to protect deployed Soldiers and their chain of command from unnecessary distractions to mission accomplishment to support safe mission completion. The responsibilities of the division rear detachment commander are listed in paragraphs 4-54 to 4-61 by general function with an emphasis on family readiness group matters.

COMMAND OF REAR DETACHMENT

4-55. As the division headquarters deploys forward, the division rear detachment takes responsibility for all operations at the division headquarters’ garrison location. The rear detachment commander assumes the same role and responsibilities at the garrison location as the division commander would have if that individual was not deployed. The rear detachment commander assumes command of the division’s subordinate brigades that do not deploy and the rear detachments of those brigades that do deploy unless otherwise directed by competent authority, such as U.S. Forces Command or the appropriate Army Service component commander. In this case, the rear detachment commander trains, supervises, and supports those remaining units just as the division commander does when not deployed. In some cases, the rear division commander assumes the role of a senior mission commander for a post. Understanding this is critical and the division establishes a rear detachment with leaders and staff to accomplish these tasks.

4-56. The division rear detachment is the information source for families and is a conduit between the division and the families of the division’s Soldiers. One of its most important functions is handling casualty notification when appointed to do so by the division commander. Numerous forms of communication and media facilitate communication between the deployed division and its home station. Recent observations prove that communicating to the rear is not the issue; doing it incorrectly, however, can be an issue. Not only does the high-tech environment make operations security more difficult, it also interferes with notifying a division rear detachment performs. There have been instances where a Soldier’s family has been notified of an injury to the Soldier by a family readiness group associate who received information from a Soldier who called from theater via cell phone. Education for the Soldier and family is the only answer to this difficult issue. The division trains Soldiers to train their families on disclosure of sensitive information as related to casualty notification. The division establishes rules that provide adequate communication between parties without causing undue stress to the casualty notification process or cause violations of operations security.

4-57. Other responsibilities of the division rear detachment commander include—

Performing information briefings, preparing postings for the division’s family readiness group Web site, and reviewing division family readiness group newsletters.

Ensuring that division-level deployment-related information and subordinate brigade family readiness group newsletters are published on regular basis.

Maintaining regular connection with the families of division headquarters battalion Soldiers and the family readiness groups associated with each attached brigade.

Assisting with family assistance center operations as requested by division’s home installation, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve.

Coordinating with the division family readiness group steering committee with that group’s leaders, the division chain of command, and installation and community resources to support the families of the division’s Soldiers.

Submitting required reports.

Controlling rumors.

Developing plans to prepare family members and community to receive redeploying units and personnel.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

4-58. The division rear detachment commander is responsible for developing the staffing plan for that detachment. The detachment commander develops the detachment battle rhythm taking into account the time zone at the home station as well as the time zone where the division is conducting its operations. As with all units, it performs or coordinates mandatory training events and maintains the physical security of division real and unit property remaining at the home station. This includes securing Soldier personal property stored at their home installation, such as privately owned vehicles. Rear detachment and staff duty personnel are trained and sensitive to family member calls and understand how to refer families to the appropriate agency for assistance while maintaining operations security. The division rear detachment commander coordinates and supports the training of division family readiness group volunteers and family members.

4-59. The division rear detachment commander provides support to the division’s forward deployed early entry command post (EECP) in the event if division main command post does not deploy to support an operation. The nondeployed portions of the division main command post and the need to provide support to the headquarters’ forward deployment elements from the division’s home station results from a mix of several factors. Among those factors are imposed manpower caps on the number of Soldiers deployed, those capabilities provided by those portions of the headquarters left behind not being needed—such as fires in a defense support of civil authorities scenario and limited availability of strategic lift or limited throughput capacity of ports of debarkation.

SUSTAINMENT

4-60. The rear detachment commander accounts for and maintains real and unit property and equipment left at the home station. This requires the rear detachment to perform regular equipment and supply inventories.

4-61. In the area of personnel services the rear detachment commander ensures that family members have opportunities to maintain contact with their deployed Soldiers including establishing or providing information on mail operations, cell phone, video teleconference, and internet connection. The rear detachment provides division family readiness groups with access to government facilities, equipment, and government vehicles for official activities. Other rear detachment administrative tasks include—

Validating and maintaining a copy of family care plans for deployed Soldiers and Department of Defense civilian personnel and contractor personnel authorized to accompany the force, preparing to deploy.

Performing counseling as required, including behavioral health, religious, alcohol and drug, consumer awareness, and educational advice.

Maintaining a consolidated division roster including augmentees during deployments. This roster is available to the division family readiness group for use by their key callers to ensure these families receive communications and support.

Coordinating with American Red Cross regarding emergency information on unit Soldiers and family members. This includes logging, tracking, and processing American Red Cross emergency messages and notifying deployed units of impending Red Cross messages.

Reviewing rear detachment and family readiness group standard operating procedures and revising them as necessary. (See AR 608-1, Appendix J.)

Overseeing the division family readiness group informal fund, per AR 608-1, Appendix J.

Approving family readiness group requests for appropriated funds and supplemental mission funds intended for family readiness group use. (See AR 608-1, Appendix J.)

Approving donations and family readiness group fundraising requests after consultation with the division or home station ethics counselor.

Maintaining records of contacts, actions taken, and follow-ups with families.

Carrying out other necessary personnel actions, such as Soldier readiness program, Uniformed Code of Military Justice, awards, and leaves.

FAMILY SUPPORT

4-62. The division rear detachment ensures that the family readiness groups of the division headquarters and its attached brigades maintain contact with division families. This includes keeping in touch with families that return to their home of record or otherwise leave the area around the home station during their sponsor’s deployment. The rear detachment maintains regular contact with family readiness group leaders and furnishes important information to them. It ensures that communication between family readiness group leaders and unit family members occurs regularly. Members of the division rear detachment attend and support family readiness group meetings and other activities.

4-63. As the rear detachment becomes aware of changes, it provides that information to the appropriate individuals so that the phone trees of division family readiness groups are kept up to date. The division rear detachment coordinates its plans with division family readiness group leaders for family readiness group social or recreational activities designed to build and sustain Soldier family morale and camaraderie. The division rear detachment does its best to answer questions and concerns from family readiness group leaders and families in a timely manner. The detachment tries to help resolve family issues by referring families to appropriate military or community agencies.

SECTION IV – SCENARIO CONTINUED

4-64. The 52nd Division is a division stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas. The division has training and readiness oversight responsibilities for a mix of BCTs and support brigades including two ABCTs (2/52 ABCT and 4/52 ABCT) from Fort Riley, one ABCT from Fort Bliss, TX, (1/1AD ABCT), and one infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) from Fort Knox, KY (1/52 IBCT). In addition to these four BCTs, U.S. Forces Command assigned four support brigades to the division—the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade (Heavy), Fort Riley; 575th Field Artillery (FA) Brigade, Fort Sill; 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, Fort Huachuca; and the Mississippi Army National Guard 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade. Having training and readiness oversight responsibilities over these BCTs and supporting brigades does not necessarily mean that they will be assigned to the division for deployment. For the past sixteen months, these brigades and the 52nd Division headquarters are designated as a ready expeditionary force package and part of the ready force pool. This mix of brigades was assigned by U.S. Forces Command based on strategic requirements and force availability. Because 52nd Division forces within the ready expeditionary force package did not have a contingency or overseas commitment while they were in the ready force pool, they train to the DA approved mission essential task list (METL) for each brigade type. This training included collective training center rotations for the BCTs, exportable training center exercises, and one mission command training seminar and warfighter exercise.

4-65. At the beginning of the fiscal year, U.S. Forces Command moved the 52nd Division and its brigades into the “available” force pool and designated them as a contingency expeditionary force package with priority for planning toward Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Figure 4-1 illustrates the makeup of the package built around the 52nd Division. (Units organic to multifunctional brigades are not depicted.) The U.S. Air Force designated its 10th air support operations squadron (ASOS) to support the division, resulting in the 10th expeditionary air support operations squadron (EASOS) designated to deploy if the division deployed.

4-66. Because of its orientation to the Northeast Asia region, the 52nd Division continued to focus its training and preparation on conducting combat operations against Northeast Asian threat forces. The division participated in a virtual training exercise with the Eighth U.S. Army and refined its part in contingency plans for that region. Assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5) personnel from the division main command post participated in several U.S. Pacific Command deployment planning conferences. (See figure 4-1 on page 4-13 to see the 52nd Division configured).

4-67. Five weeks into its contingency expeditionary force rotation, the GREENLAND crisis prompts deployment of U.S. forces to the region. The 52nd and 53rd Division packages are alerted and begin planning for deployment to GREENLAND. The U.S. European Command, after consultation with the U.S. Army Europe and X Corps staff (which will form the basis for the coalition force land component headquarters), recommends that the 52nd Division package deploy as it has trained, with the following additions—

One unmanned aerial system (UAS) battalion attached to the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade.

One explosive ordnance disposal company attached to the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.

One CBRN battalion attached to the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.

One additional ground cavalry squadron attached to the 56th Battlefield Surveillance brigade.

U.S. Army Europe coordinates with Forces Command to attach a civil affairs battalion to the division.

4-68. U.S. Forces Command concurs and provides the necessary assets from the force pool. (See figure 4-2 on page 4-14 to see the results of U.S. Forces Command and U.S. European Command force tailoring of the 52nd Division. Units organic to the multifunctional brigades are not shown). The U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) deploys two tailored combat sustainment support battalions (CSSB) under the command of the 27th Sustainment Brigade to provide general support (GS) to the 52nd Division. The 27th Sustainment Brigade is attached to the 21st Theater Sustainment Command. (The 103rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command supports X Corps.) In a similar manner the 48th Medical Brigade (Support) deploys to support the 52nd Division and is attached to 7th Medical Command.

4-69. Simultaneously the division directs its units to begin predeployment activities including—

Reviewing and updating database information regarding on-hand equipment and containers.

Identifying equipment shortages and inventories of unit basic loads.

Reviewing unit training status including—

Collective training status.

Individual and crew-serve weapons qualifications.

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear defense training status.

Driver certification.

Rail, sea, and air loading team training and certification.

Personnel shortfall identification and prioritizing the fills.

Performing required joint force commander training, such as rules of engagement (ROE) and cultural awareness.

Conducting final individual preparations for overseas movement, such as updating inoculations, deoxyribonucleic acid samples, wills, dental records, powers of attorney, and more.

Identifying the unit rear detachment.

4-70. The 52nd Division depends on the installations where its units are stationed or mobilized to coordinate the movement of those forces with the USTRANSCOM to aerial and sea ports of embarkation. The division staff coordinates requirements with the installation management activity of the installations supporting the division’s deployment. The home station operations centers at each affected Army installation conducts 24-hour operations. The division has limited control of the deployment because its units deploy from multiple installations, but should actively monitor and coordinate to set priorities and resolve conflicts. The 53rd Division completes its deployment before the 52nd Division begins its deployment.

4-71. The coalition joint force land component (JFLC) headquarters and echelon above division units provide the majority of communications, intelligence, protection, and sustainment support to the division’s deployed units until adequate division resources are deployed to provide these functions. Initially, the 21st Theater Sustainment Command’s 292nd Sustainment Brigade (organized to conduct the theater opening), the 5th Signal Command, the 555th Engineer Brigade, and the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command provide this support. The coalition force land component commander authorizes the 52nd Division to perform direct liaison with these units for support during the division’s deployment.

4-72. REDLAND special purpose forces, terrorists, and GREENLAND insurgent elements attempt to interdict or disrupt the division’s deployment. Among other enemy means, man portable air defense systems and naval mines threat delay the flow of forces into and throughout theater deployment bases.

MISSION

4-73. On order the division deploys to its area of operations and completes RSOI to prepare for decisive action. Divisional elements assume defensive positions as soon as possible, protect deployment, and begin coordinating and preparing to conduct offensive tasks within their areas of operations. Divisional elements conduct those stability tasks necessary to alleviate human suffering.

COMMANDER’S INTENT

4-74. The purpose of this operation is to return control of the land, people, and resources to the internationally recognized government of GREENLAND by destroying or forcing the withdrawal of occupying REDLAND forces, reestablishing the international border, and restoring a stable environment for the nation of GREENLAND. The key tasks in the deployment phase of this operation are:

Rapidly deploy all divisional forces and attachments to the joint operations area.

Monitor the status of the joint RSOI of all division forces moving into the joint operations area.

Perform defensive tasks immediately upon arriving within the joint operations area.

Begin working with existing GREENLAND and interagency assets to prepare to restore a stable environment in those areas occupied or affected by REDLAND, insurgent, or terrorist forces.

4-75. The desired end state is that the division EECP and division deployment package one have completed RSOI within GREENLAND, are at 95% or more of authorized combat power, and have assumed defensive positions within the division area of operations. The rest of the division continues to deploy according to deployment orders.

COMMANDER’S PLANNING GUIDANCE

4-76. Organize the division into deployment packages that provides the correct mix of forces to match the anticipated missions. Brigade combat team (BCT) sustainment units deploy early to receive combat units and expedite the buildup of capabilities to prepare for the conduct of defensive and offensive tasks. The division deploys an EECP built around the tactical command post early to conduct required coordination and planning with the coalition force land component main command post and the 21st Theater Sustainment Command conducting RSOI.

4-77. This means that the tactical command post is augmented with additional planners, transporters, and protection personnel with their associated information systems. The division coordinates with and uses coalition force land component control nodes, protection assets, intelligence capabilities, and sustainment assets in the joint operations area before the division’s arrival to expedite the division’s deployment. Units focus first on protection during deployment, then preparation for the defense, and then begin planning the division’s transition to the offense. Simultaneously the division conducts those stability tasks necessary to alleviate the immediate suffering of the GREENLAND civilian population until GREENLAND authorities assume responsibility for those actions.

52ND DIVISION CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT

4-78. The division uses the force-sequencing information developed with the coalition force land component headquarters and organizes units into deployment packages that match available USTRANSCOM assets according to time-phased force deployment data. These deployment packages match the request for forces packages submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval by the coalition force land component commander and staff in their X Corps personas. (See JP 3-35 for deployment procedures.) All units prepare personnel and equipment to meet the deployment timeline in the deployment directives and orders.

4-79. The decisions on the composition of the deployment packages are made by analyzing the required capabilities in the area of operations using the mission variables of METT-TC. The deployment package compositions used in this scenario are one of many possible ways to organize the division’s forces for deployment.

4-80. The concept of Phase I (Deployment) is to deploy the division’s task-organized EECP (with U.S. Air Force representatives) by air, followed by deployment package one, consisting of—

The division’s mobile command group. (The U.S. Air Force manages the deployment of the 10th U.S. Air Force expeditionary air support operations squadron (EASOS) with USTRANSCOM. The division must ensure that the rest of the 10th EASOS arrive in joint operations area at roughly the same time as the rest of deployment package one.)

3/1AD ABCT

1/52 IBCT.

56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade including the additional attached ground cavalry squadron but not including the 3rd UAS Battalion.

11th Combat Aviation Brigade headquarters with one attack/reconnaissance squadron and one assault battalion task forces.

39th Military Police Battalion from the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.

548th Civil Affairs Battalion.

Most of the equipment in these packages deploy via sealift. Each ship used by the division will has a limited number of accompanying division Soldiers as supercargo. The division deploys most of its Soldiers using aircraft. Only critical mission command systems deploy by air. Simultaneously with the flow of divisional elements into the joint operations area two CSSBs from the 27th Sustainment Brigade and the 48th Medical Brigade (Support) early entry module and elements of a multifunctional medical battalion deploy into the joint operations area.

4-81. Deployment package two, consists of—

4/52 ABCT.

575th FA Brigade headquarters with two missile battalions.

Remainder of the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade including a second attack/reconnaissance squadron, the remainder of the aviation support battalion, and the GS battalion.

3rd UAS Battalion (part of the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade).

34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade headquarters.

4-82. Deployment package three delivers the remainder of the tailored division including the main command post. This sequencing of forces allows the division to accomplish the commander’s intent by placing critical capabilities required in the area of operations first and increasing the division’s capabilities over time. The division relies on theater-level assets to provide warfighting functions not included in its initial force package. This requires there to be a degree of trust between the X Corps/coalition force land component commander and the division commander that the necessary intelligence, control, sustainment, and protection assets will be available to support the division during its RSOI. (See figure 4-3 for the division’s illustrative deployment packages used in this scenario).

4-83. An important consideration during early entry operations is deployment of an air support operations squadron (ASOS)—which provides the division’s air support operations center (ASOC) and the tactical air control party (TACP) capabilities. In the initial stages, airpower provides the only significant fires, maneuver, information collection, and airlift capability required to support the division. Both an ASOC and the TACP are critical to the division’s ability to coordinate, request, and control these operations. The U.S. Air Force aligned the 10th ASOS with the 52nd Division to provide ASOC and TACP support to the division. However, the unit type code for the ASOC and TACP functions are requested through force generation and considered for deployment during phase I. Once requested, it is likely that the 10th ASOS deploys with the 52nd Division. However, based on the mission variables of METT-TC, it is also possible that a provisional unit (an expeditionary unit) is built to fulfill this task. This would mean an EASOS deploys with the 52nd Division and made up of personnel from across the Air Force. (See ATP 3-91.1 for additional information about the joint air-ground integration center [JAGIC].)

4-84. The division plans for convoy security with U.S. local police agencies and other available commercial, state and federal agencies responsible for security, such as port and railroad security authorities, during their movement from their garrison location to the ports of embarkation. The division coordinates with the various installations and monitors the movement of forces not assigned to the same installation as the division headquarters (Fort Riley). The coalition force land component headquarters arranges for protection over and above the division’s local security efforts throughout the division’s conduct of RSOI within the joint operations area. These protection efforts are in addition to the self protection measures accomplished by individual deploying units.

DIVISION MISSION COMMAND SYSTEM DURING DEPLOYMENT

4-85. Once the division is alerted for deployment, the entire staff contributes to the military decisionmaking process to alert all assigned or attached division units, mobilize those reserve component units, perform necessary individual and collective training, accomplish necessary activities to prepare the division’s equipment for deployment and then deploy division personnel and equipment into the joint operations area. The staff also develops a base plan and various branches and sequels to guide its actions once it initiates operations. The entire staff will also be involved in the dispatch of liaison officers to appropriate headquarters. Intelligence, engineer, and civil-military operations staff sections collect available information about REDLAND forces and the joint operations area and submit requests for information to appropriate agencies.

EARLY-ENTRY COMMAND POST

4-86. As introduced in Chapter 1, the division’s EECP establishes control of deployed elements of the division until the division main command post is able to close within the area of operations. The EECP is task organized to reflect the prevailing mission variables of METT-TC. For this scenario the equipment forming the EECP largely comes from the division’s tactical command post base and will eventually revert back to the parent command post once the division main command post closes into the division area of operations. However, the individuals assigned to the EECP are individually selected by the division chief of staff based on competence and expertise required by the mission variables of METT-TC. The EECP has a designated acting chief of staff to facilitate continuous and efficient staff support to operations.

4-87. For scenario purposes the 52nd Division EECP deployed with 14 high mobility multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWV)–including 1 U.S. Air Force HMMWV, and 78 personnel (65 Army, 8 U.S. Air Force, 2 from the Special Operations Command-Europe, and 3 personnel from other U.S. governmental departments and agencies) to perform critical control functions on a continuous basis for the 7 to 14 days it takes the division to deploy into the joint operations area. These totals do not include the commander or the division mobile command group with its associated equipment. The three non-military individuals have at least secret security clearances so their presence does not disrupt ongoing EECP activities. This EECP configuration is approximately 75% mobile with its organic vehicles. The HMMWVs contain all communications and computer equipment that can be used either in the HMMWV, remoted to the EECP’s field shelters or a building selected to house the EECP, or in a combination of both. The HMMWVs have associated trailers for additional cargo capability and generator support. Once deployed to GREENLAND, the EECP becomes a tenant unit on a base where it can take advantage of security provided by other units.

4-88. For this scenario the EECP requires a civil-military operations element consisting of four Soldiers with one HMMWV, with three other U.S. governmental department and agencies liaison officers—one each from the Department of State, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Justice. Most of this element’s communications equipment is dismounted from the vehicle so that element personnel uses that vehicle to drive to the offices of GREENLAND authorities and other necessary locations. The presence of these other governmental agencies allows for the early coordination of stability activities with interested agencies.

Command Group Support Element

4-89. The command group support element provides a private workplace for the commanding general or assistant division commander. The command group support element in this scenario consists of one HMMWV and four Soldiers—the EECP chief of staff, a driver, and two clerks. The EECP chief of staff alternates with the EECP chief of operations to provide continuous supervision of EECP activities. The two clerks provide records management support to the entire EECP and support the commander or assistant division commanders’ needs. This includes physically preparing fragmentary orders issued by the EECP. This element contains mission command systems that display the common operating picture updated in real time with friendly and enemy unit locations and other information such as future plans, force flow information, and national and international media feeds.

Movement and Maneuver Cell

4-90. The movement and maneuver cell controls all deployed division units. It is the information hub of the EECP. It is the focal point where all EECP cells provide information to enable the commander to see the area of operations and answer the commander’s critical information requirements. Additional special operations force (SOF) liaison officers are located in the movement and maneuver cell if required by operational needs. The movement and maneuver cell is the net control station for the EECP and receives, logs, and posts information received from tactical reports. Once the need for an adjustment decision is identified and the commander makes a decision, the movement and maneuver cell, helped by the clerks from the command group support element, issues warning orders and fragmentary orders to control current operations. It maintains the combat capability status of all committed forces down to the battalion or separate company level.

4-91. Two staff judge advocate officers are located in the cell to inform the commander on legal ramifications of operations and courses of action. This includes the ROE. These officers are knowledgeable of the GREENLAND legal system, procedures, and laws. The staff judge advocate function is a critical element in the EECP during the early stages of the deployment. These two individuals also participate in targeting meetings.

4-92. The division airspace element, together with the eight U.S. Air Force personnel and other personnel from within the JAGIC, coordinates and deconflicts the use of airspace, until the remainder of the JAGIC arrives to take control of the Division Assigned Airspace. This element is responsible for airspace control to facilitate Army helicopter operations, joint fires, UASs, and U.S. Air Force transport flights into and out of division airfield(s). The airspace element works closely with the air and missile defense element.

Intelligence Cell

4-93. The assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) cell in the EECP performs similar functions to those performed by the same cell in the tactical command post mode. It consists of one HMMWV and four personnel. Battlefield weather services are provided to the intelligence cell by U.S. Air Force expeditionary weather squadron forces including space environment and atmospheric weather to aid commanders to meet their objectives and plans at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The intelligence cell is manned by intelligence personnel from the tactical command post. They receive, post, and analyze intelligence data and reports received from the division’s committed units and provide them to the rest of the EECP, the division main command post, and higher, subordinate, supporting, and adjacent headquarters. They also receive information and intelligence from higher intelligence assets and pass that information down to maneuver BCTs, supporting brigades, and independent battalion S-2s for their use. They maintain that information from intelligence assets that support the commander’s critical information requirements to see current and future enemy and civil capabilities and courses of action and assess friendly intelligence asset capabilities.

Fires Cell

4-94. This cell is responsible for planning and assessing the employment of Army and joint fires to support the deploying division’s operations until the division main command post closes within the division’s area of operations. It consists of one HMMWV and four personnel. These personnel are normally augmented by a U.S. Air Force TACP personnel and equipment.

4-95. The fire support cell will perform the targeting functions—including the coordination and synchronization of information-related capabilities and cyber electromagnetic activities (see paragraph 5-35)—within the EECP using deployed BCT fire support assets or joint assets for attack. It works closely with the 575th FA Brigade EECP and U.S. Air Force TACP including sharing targeting and planning duties until the closure of the division’s main command post and the 575th FA Brigade’s main command post. It also monitors the arrival and progress of additional division and joint fire support assets through the RSOI process. It maintains information to support the commander’s critical fire support information requirements and assesses the combat capability of committed units. The information operations representative in the cell coordinates the division’s information-related capabilities until this function is assumed by the information operations officer in the division main command post.

Sustainment Cell

4-96. The sustainment cell consists of two HMMWVs and six personnel supported by two U.S. Air Force air mobility liaison officer personnel. The assistant chief of staff, personnel (G-1) representative maintains contact with subordinate brigade manpower and personnel staff officers to have an accurate picture of the personnel strength of arriving divisional units, divisional units undergoing RSOI, and committed units. It advises the commander and assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) on the arrival of individual personnel and replacements into the area of operations. The G-1 receives and maintains reports that support casualty and other personnel information requirements.

4-97. The assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4) element within the sustainment cell of the EECP has two functions. The first is to monitor the division’s deployment flow into the area of operations, influencing the process where and when possible to support the commander’s concept of operations. This function is primarily the responsibility of the division transportation officer helped by the U.S. Air Force air mobility liaison officer. These two individuals perform any necessary coordination associated with incoming flights and their reception with USTRANSCOM, X Corps/coalition force land component, and 21st Theater Support Command/103rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command agencies. They also input the division commander’s desires regarding the disposition of personnel and cargo offloading into the RSOI system and keep the rest of the EECP and the division’s main command post aware of the division’s current deployment status. They maintain contact with aircraft on the ground, inbound to the joint operations area, and at the departure airfield. They advise the commander on the status of deployment and arrival of division units. The division transportation officer is involved in the onward movement of divisional units after they finish reception and staging. The division transportation officer and the U.S. Air Force air mobility liaison officer use automated systems, such as global command and control system-Army and transportation coordinator-automated command and control information system, to help with this process. The second primary function of the G-4 is the status of committed unit Class I, III, and V. The G-4 maintains an accurate status of the quantity and location of critical logistics supplies as they arrive in the division’s support area and recommends their allocation to the G-3, the chief of staff, and the commander.

4-98. The sustainment cell is the home base for a contingency contracting team from the supporting contracting support brigade. This team is not included in the manpower and vehicles figures of the 1st Division’s EECP. The team is responsible for contracting goods and services to support division operations until sufficient contracting resources can flow into the joint operations area to establish a more formal competitive bidding process. This contracting team may be absent from the EECP’s location, but will receive direction as far as what goods and services are needed by the division and life support from the EECP.

Protection Cell

4-99. The protection cell in the EECP is responsible for coordinating the division’s operations process as it applies to all protection tasks until the closure of the division main command post. However it tends to concentrate on the following tasks: operational area security, CBRN operations, coordinating air and missile defense, personnel recovery, explosive ordnance disposal, and detainee operations. It consists of one HMMWV and eight personnel. In coordination with the assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6) representatives, it also coordinates the division’s information protection efforts. The senior military police officer within this cell is responsible for division detainee operations until the division provost marshal is able to assume those responsibilities.

4-100. The air and missile defense element within the EECP maintains positive control of any air and missile defense assets attached or OPCON to the division. This element maintains airspace situational awareness via their ABCS systems and provides that information as appropriate to the other cells and elements within the EECP.

G-6 Element

4-101. This element is responsible for establishing internal and external communications nets for the EECP. It consists of two HMMWVs and eight personnel. This includes the command post’s intranet, long-haul communications, and internet connections. It provides the Webmaster for the EECP and provides troubleshooting support to EECP elements as necessary.

Security and Life Support Element

4-102. This element from the 52nd Division’s headquarters and headquarters battalion tactical command post support platoon provides minimal life support to those Soldiers comprising the EECP. It consists of two HMMWVs and eight personnel. This element has a burner unit capable of heating meals, ready-to-eat and providing hot water for beverages. One of the Soldiers is a medic. The noncommissioned officer in charge of this element oversees EECP field sanitation. This element provides the minimum force necessary to control access to the EECP. On detection of a threat to the EECP, this element notifies the EECP chief of staff or chief of operations of the threat and receive the necessary additional manpower to man previously established positions forming a defensive perimeter around the EECP.

MAIN COMMAND POST

4-103. The primary role of the 52nd Division’s main command post in this scenario is to coordinate with the installations (Fort Riley, Fort Bliss, Fort Knox, Fort Sill, Fort Leonard Wood, and the Mississippi State Area Command [STARC]) providing the deployment platforms for the division’s BCTs, supporting brigades, and other divisional elements. This includes the conduct of individual and collective training in preparation for the deployment or projected future missions. It also must coordinate through U.S. Forces Command with USTRANSCOM and its major subordinate commands, such as the SDDC, for movement from unit locations, to mobilization sites (for the division’s reserve component units), to air and sea ports of embarkation as required to meet strategic lift systems as they become available. The main command post makes extensive use of liaison officers to various organizations throughout deployment. Until the main command post deploys from Fort Riley, it remains a fully functioning command post working at home station, performing planning and analysis, and tracking the deployment and in-theater status of divisional units throughout RSOI.

4-104. The 52nd Division’s main command post continues to collect information from its home station at Fort Riley. The information is provided forward initially to the EECP and the division’s deployed brigades. The main command post’s equipment is deployed in deployment package three in this scenario and the personnel continue to perform their mission from the division headquarters building’s operations center until the commander decides that the conditions are right to deploy main command post personnel. As soon as the division is alerted, the division intelligence cell, using the intelligence enterprise, begins compiling the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations data files necessary to support planning, deployment, and subsequent operations. This collection effort continues as the main command post’s personnel deploy to the area of operations. While at Fort Riley, the division’s intelligence cell has access to joint and national agencies and organizations through the intelligence enterprise. The ability to access information may be degraded when the main command post personnel arrive in joint operations area depending on the status of theater information networks. The main command post’s plans cell continues to conduct planning for upcoming operations. In this scenario, the plans cell continuously coordinates with the 52nd Division’s higher headquarters (X U.S. Corps), its subordinate and supporting brigades and the EECP, once it deploys.

4-105. While the divisional units are deploying from different installations, the division main command post monitors the status of the deployment, exchange standard operating procedures with newly attached units, and plan and perform virtual exercises with the attached subordinate units. Since this may be the first time some of the attached units have worked for this division, it is important to perform exercises to integrate the attached units into the command climate of the division. The division commander meets and coordinates with the attached unit commanders and informs them of his concept, intent, and command philosophy. It is important during this stage to develop personal relationships between the division commander, the division staff, and the commanders and staffs of the newly attached brigades.

4-106. As mentioned in the paragraphs discussing the EECP, the52nd Division and assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations (G-9) deploys early as part of the EECP and, with any civil affairs units already in the joint operations area and liaison officers from other governmental agencies, begins initial assessments of the division’s planned area of operations and establishes contact with other U.S. governmental agencies, GREENLAND local authorities, and international and nongovernmental organizations present within the joint operations area. The G-9’s planning capabilities increase as additional civil affairs organizations deploy into the joint operations area and a civil affairs planning team is available to augment the G-9 staff section.

4-107. The division commander deploys following the arrival of the second BCT. Once the division has two BCTs in the area of operations that have completed RSOI, it is capable of conducting division-level operations. The division commander may decide to deploy earlier to develop a relationship with the X U.S. Corps/coalition force land component commander, multinational commanders, and other key personnel or to assemble a group of brigade commanders and key staff to conduct an initial leader’s reconnaissance. In this later case, the commanding general travels within the joint operations area using the division’s mobile command group, with a security detachment from the 52nd Division headquarters and headquarters battalion. In this scenario the commander planned to spend time in the 3/52 Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) and 1/52 IBCT areas of operations to observe their defensive preparations and at the EECP ensuring that future operations planning and coordination is consistent with the commander’s visualization and intent.

TACTICAL COMMAND POST

4-108. The division deploys the EECP, comprised of personnel and equipment mainly from the tactical command post. The EECP coordinates and monitors RSOI for division organizations as the division’s initial headquarters in GREENLAND. It also coordinates protection requirements with the X Corps headquarters, conducts initial tactical planning, and refines existing plans based on changes to the mission, command guidance, or increased understanding of the operational environment.

4-109. One of the assistant division commanders deploys with the EECP. In this scenario, the EECP deploys to GREENLAND and co-locates with the deployable command post of the 21st Theater Sustainment Command performing theater-opening functions. Once the division finishes RSOI, the division’s tactical and main command posts co-locate and oversee the division’s attached BCTs’ preparations for the attack including conducting rehearsals with those subordinate staffs that can be made available and liaison officers from committed divisional units.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

4-110. The division headquarters and headquarters battalion task-organizes to deploy appropriate assets with the division’s command posts as they deploy. The equipment of the ground mobile command group is deployed so it will arrive in the joint operations area before the anticipated arrival of the commander.

1/52 INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 2/52 ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 4/52 ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, AND 1/1AD ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

4-111. The 1/1AD ABCT and 1/52 IBCT deploy as entire organizations in the first deployment package. As they complete RSOI, they are attached to 53rd Division to strengthen the X Corps/coalition force land component defense. The units not deploying in the first deployment package perform deployment related tasks to help the units in the first deployment package to facilitate rapid movement. After equipment is loaded on transportation assets, the Soldiers continue predeployment training until time for air transport to the joint operations area. The 4/52 ABCT deploys in the second deployment package and the 2/52 ABCT deploys in the third deployment package.

11TH COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE

4-112. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade deploys its headquarters with an aviation task force containing elements of attack reconnaissance, assault, heavy lift, GS, the aviation support battalion, and aerial medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) in deployment package one. This allows the brigade to conduct attack and reconnaissance, aerial sustainment, air movement, aerial MEDEVAC, and long-range surveillance insertion missions soon after arrival in the joint operations area. Deployment packages two and three included further tailored aviation task forces according to anticipated mission requirements. This sequencing provides for aviation capabilities to be available as their requirement is anticipated. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade operates from an airfield in the division support area until after the start of the counterattack. Elements of the aviation brigade move forward to remain within supporting distance of the division’s BCTs as suitable sites to establish forward area refuel and rearming points are cleared and secured during the division’s advance.

34TH MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE

4-113. The 59th Military Police Battalion’s capabilities are required early and are in deployment package one. The 59th Military Police battalion deploys early to facilitate maneuver and mobility support operations along the routes leading from the staging areas to the division area of operations. It also provides area security to support units operating along these routes. Such operations include establishing mobility corridors within the division area of operations to help protect and security of critical division assets along potential high threat areas. In addition, the 59th Military Police Battalion prepares for the conduct of detainee operations. The 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade headquarters is in deployment package two. The 527th Engineer Battalion and the 325th CBRN Battalion capabilities are not required initially since X Corps/coalition force land component assets, such as the 555th Engineer Brigade, provide those functions and are in deployment package three.

56TH BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE

4-114. The 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade’s mission requires it to deploy early in the troop flow to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) to support of the division’s operations. As the preponderance of the 52nd Division’s area of operations is under division control in this phase, it is the 56th Brigade’s mission to gather information, answer the commander’s critical information requirements, and help develop the division common operational picture. On arrival and completion of RSOI, the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade establishes connectivity with the full range of information collection assets including national, joint, and interagency systems, host nation assets, and assets organic to the division’s subordinate organization. These assets answer information requirements. The X Corps long range surveillance company helps the brigade locate REDLAND weapons of mass destruction. The 56th Brigade conducts R&S to answer information requirements for the division’s current and follow-on operations.

4-115. The reinforced 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade is in deployment package one. This sequencing allows the division to begin collecting information with organic resources as soon as possible. Initially located close to the EECP, the brigade headquarters displaces to the vicinity of the division main command post after that command post completes its RSOI. This takes place as the division begins its defensive preparations. The 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade manages all assets by integrating and synchronizing technical and manned information collection assets and dynamically tasking and re-tasking available assets to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements and other information requirements to support the division information collection plan. Soon after arrival, the 56th Brigade conducts R&S to answer the 52nd Division commander’s critical information requirements related to decision points in the defense.

4-116. The 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade conducts RSOI to build its capability to conduct information collection tasks to facilitate 52nd Division operations to force the withdrawal of REDLAND forces from GREENLAND. On order, the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade conducts R&S operations that support the division’s current and future operations to enable the precise employment of division and joint combat power. A division employs this type of unit in an economy force role in those portions of the division’s area of operations not assigned to subordinate units, the division’s unassigned areas. This is appropriate when those unassigned areas are largely unpopulated, not occupied by enemy forces, and contain limited mobility corridors. Key tasks for this brigade during this phase are—

Conduct RSOI.

Identify potential enemy attack forces threatening 52nd Division forces.

Locate and identify REDLAND units, attack positions, and C2 nodes.

Establish all required links to unified action partners (including host nation) information collection assets.

Locate key infrastructure and symbols of GREENLAND/REDLAND national pride.

Identify key leaders and powerbrokers within the 52nd Division areas of operations and interest.

Locate REDLAND, insurgent, or terrorist CBRN weapons before their employment.

4-117. The 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade staff continuously interacts and collaborates with the division staff, particularly the G-2 and G-3. The G-3 prioritizes these requirements and tasks 52nd Division units to collect the required information using mission orders once the division commander approves the proposed list of commander’s critical and other information requirements. These mission orders focus on answering the commander’s critical information requirements. The brigade develops its own information collection plan based on the information requirements and priorities established in the division information collection plan. The techniques used to develop this plan are discussed in FM 3-55 and FM 3-55.1.

4-118. As the division commander’s primary information collection agent, the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade is tasked to satisfy information requirements linked to commander’s critical information requirements in the division’s unassigned areas. The brigade receives specialized technical assistance from functional experts in other divisional units when tasked to collect against specialized information requirements. The 52nd Division G-3 tasks other divisional units to provide the necessary specialized technical assistance. The G-2 and G-3 have a series of decision points linked to trafficability and conditions of key bridge and river crossing sites. The commander is interested in the readiness and morale of the REDLAND forces in the division’s area of operations. The presence of REDLAND multiple rocket launchers capable of delivering CBRN weapons gives REDLAND the ability to shape the battlefield in its favor. Lastly, the division is interested in the location of key REDLAND command and control nodes. All of the information requirements in the 52nd Division area are identified and prioritized. The 56th Brigade is assigned those information requirements that fall within the division’s unassigned areas or beyond the capabilities of the other brigades to collect against. If a requirement cannot be answered by division assets the divisions sends a request for information to its higher headquarters, the X Corps/coalition force land component headquarters.

4-119. As part of planning, the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade determines what information is being collected by X Corps and unified action partner assets. It allocates its own assets to fill in the gaps. The BFSB conducts R&S using UASs, ground reconnaissance troops, and long-range surveillance teams operating forward of division subordinate BCT’s areas of operations to identify potential REDLAND attack preparations and identify or confirm the REDLAND Army’s unit positions and intentions. Once REDLAND forces have been located, the brigade’s reconnaissance troops and long range surveillance teams deploy to conduct surveillance of specified REDLAND units and named or target areas of interest to provide early warning of an attack. The ground R&S assets work in concert with UASs and other technical surveillance systems found in the brigade’s military intelligence battalion to provide the required information.

4-120. The 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade has its attached 3rd UAS battalion equipped with extended range/multipurpose UAS to conduct reconnaissance deep in the division’s area of operations to locate REDLAND rocket launchers capable of employing CBRN weapons. The UAS battalion launches the UAS and passes control to the 56th Brigade using the brigade’s organic ground control station. Once an extended range UAS locates a suitable target, that information is passed to the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade and 575th FA Brigade for further target development and possible attack.

4-121. The 52nd Division G-3 tasks the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade to conduct surveillance of named areas of interest to identify and locate key REDLAND command and control nodes. One means of accomplishing the mission is through the use of the brigade’s organic signals intelligence assets. These are employed with one or more of the brigade’s ground reconnaissance troops. They may also be employed in one of the division’s attached BCT’s area of operations with local security provided by that BCT. This requires coordination between the 56th Brigade and the BCT in whose area of operations those signals intelligence assets need to be positioned to collect the required data. As REDLAND command and control nodes are located, the information is distributed both vertically and horizontally. The information collected is sent vertically to the division’s main command post intelligence cell to help answer the division commander’s critical information requirements and to be analyzed to provide intelligence to support the division’s defensive and other future operations. It also distributes the information horizontally to the other brigades within the division.

4-122. The 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade provides assets from its organic collection and an exploitation company in GS to the 52nd Division Detainee holding area. There, those human intelligence assets come under the command of the division detainee facility commander. This facilitates document exploitation, counterintelligence, and human intelligence operations.

575TH FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE

4-123. The 575th FA Brigade deploys an EECP from the brigade headquarters as part of Deployment Package 1. This EECP is the force FA headquarters for the division during RSOI and coordinates radar coverage across the BCTs, establishes common survey across the division, and establishes FA common operational picture and database. The remainder of the 575th FA Brigade headquarters along with two of the rocket battalions and one cannon equipped FA battalion is in deployment package two. The third rocket equipped FA battalion and the second cannon equipped FA battalion are in deployment package three. The assets of the brigade support battalion and network support company are phased throughout all three deployment packages to provide the required capabilities. This sequencing allows the FA brigade to conduct operations at the expected time of assumption of the defense and before the start of the ground offensive phase of the operation.

548TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION

4-124. The 548th Civil Affairs Battalion deploys early to conduct an initial assessment of the area of operations. After completion of RSOI, its various civil-military operations centers (CMOC) either start or continue previous coordination with local authorities, other governmental agencies, and international and nongovernmental organizations to support the division’s operations. The battalion conducts civil reconnaissance to identify potential threats to civil society. This includes identifying critical civilian infrastructure within GREELAND so steps can be taken to protect it or quickly restore functionality even before the conclusion of combat operations.

4-125. This is based on the civil considerations of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) within or capable of influencing events in the division’s area of operations. Engineer reconnaissance and other assets help the 548th Civil Affairs Battalion to conduct a multifunctional infrastructure reconnaissance. That accomplishes first an assessment and then a survey to determine the status of the infrastructure and provide recommendations for infrastructure support based on the capabilities, or the “C” in ASCOPE, of sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, security, and other considerations. The G-9 coordinates for augmented reach back, assessment, and analysis capability from civil-sector sources if functional expertise is not immediately available. The G-9 and the battalion’s civil affairs Soldiers assesses the ability of local police and security forces to retain control of the civilian population centers still in occupied areas once the division transitions to the offensive phase of the operation.

27TH SUSTAINMENT AND 48TH MEDICAL BRIGADE (SUPPORT)

4-126. While these two units support the 52nd Division, they do not have a command relationship with the division. The 27th Sustainment Brigade deploys simultaneously with 52nd Division deployment package one with its two combat sustainment support battalions. The 48th Medical Brigade (Support) Early Entry Module deploys with deployment package one with an appropriate slice of the brigade’s two multifunctional medical battalions and designated assets, such as a forward surgical team. The rest of the 48th Medical Brigade (Support) deploys simultaneously with the division’s deployment package two.

4-127. This sequencing allows sustainment capabilities to arrive with or before the majority of the division’s units. The 27th Sustainment Brigade is responsible for movement control throughout all phases of the operation. During the deployment phase, the majority of movement is from theater staging areas forward to the unit areas of operations.

Chapter 5

The Division in the Defense

This chapter discusses how Army divisions defeat an attacking enemy through the conduct of defensive tasks and continues with the scenario started in chapter 3.

SECTION I - DIVISION DEFENSIVE FUNDAMENTALS

5-1. While the offense is the most decisive type of combat operation, the defense is the stronger type. At times, a division conducts defensive tasks as part of major operations and campaigns while simultaneously conducting offensive and stability tasks as part of decisive action outside the United States (U.S.). This section briefly reviews the defensive fundamentals addressed in ADRP 3-90.

PURPOSES OF THE DEFENSE

5-2. Commanders choose to defend to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows the Army to regain the initiative. The defender does not wait passively to be attacked. The division aggressively conducts information collection and security tasks to find enemy forces and deny them information. Friendly forces engage the enemy with fires, spoiling attacks, and security operations to weaken them before engaging in close combat. Commanders use combined arms and joint capabilities to attack enemy vulnerabilities and seize the initiative. Other reasons for conducting a defense include:

Retaining decisive terrain or deny a vital area to the enemy

Attriting or fixing the enemy as a prelude to the offense

Responding to surprise action by the enemy

Increasing the enemy’s vulnerability by forcing the enemy to concentrate forces.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSE

5-3. A feature of defensive battle is a striving to regain the initiative from the attacking enemy. A division commander uses the characteristics of the defense—disruption, flexibility, maneuver, mass and concentration, operations in depth, preparation, and security—to accomplish that task. (See ADRP 3-90 for a discussion of these characteristics of the defense.)

DEFENSIVE TASKS

5-4. A division can conduct all three defensive tasks—area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde. The area defense is a defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADRP 3-90). A division conducting an area defenses seeks to retain terrain and absorb the enemy in an interlocking series of positions and attriting the enemy largely by fires. The mobile defense is a defensive task that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (ADRP 3-90). A division conducting or participating in a mobile defense orients on the destruction of the attacking enemy force by permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes the enemy to counterattack by the division or corps striking force. The retrograde is a defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy (ADRP 3-90).

5-5. The three forms of the retrograde are delay, withdrawal, and retirement. Joint doctrine defines a delaying operation as an operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged (JP 3-04). In delays, units yield ground to gain time while retaining flexibility and freedom of action to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy. A withdrawal operation is a planned retrograde operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force and moves in a direction away from the enemy (JP 1-02). Withdrawing units, whether all or part of a committed force, voluntarily disengage from the enemy to preserve the force or release it for a new mission. A retirement is a form of retrograde in which a force out of contact moves away from the enemy (ADRP 3-90). In each form of the retrograde, a force moves to another location—normally by a tactical road march. In all retrograde operations, firm control of friendly maneuver elements is a prerequisite for success.

5-6. Although these descriptions convey the general pattern of each defensive task, all three tasks employ a mix of static and dynamic elements. When conducting an area defense, the division commander integrates information collection means and reserve forces to cover the gaps between defensive positions. The division commander repositions forces and reinforces those defensive positions threatened by the enemy. The division and its subordinate echelons counterattack when necessary. In a mobile defense, the division commander takes advantage of a fixing force fighting from a mix of static defensive positions. The fixing force repositions as necessary and conducts local counterattacks to control the depth and breadth of an enemy penetration and ensure the retention of ground from which the striking force can launch the decisive counterattack. In the retrograde, the division commander likewise maneuvers the division’s security forces to protect the division main body from any enemy offensive actions. Defending commanders conducting all three tasks use static elements to delay, canalize, and ultimately halt the attacker and dynamic elements (spoiling attacks and counterattacks) to strike at and destroy enemy forces. The balance among these tasks depends on the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

COMMON DEFENSE CONTROL MEASURES

5-7. The division commander controls the defense by using control measures to provide the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the situation and enable the rapid concentration of combat power at the decisive point. Control measures that a division commander conducting a defense employs include designating the areas of operations for subordinate brigades, the division security area, the division main battle area with its associated forward edge of the battle area and the division support area. The commander uses battle positions and additional direct fire control and fire support coordination measures to synchronize the employment of combat power. The commander designates disengagement lines to trigger the displacement of subordinate forces. These common defensive control measures are defined in ADRP 1-02 and their use is discussed in ADRP 3-90.

FORMS OF THE DEFENSE

5-8. Subordinate forms of the defense have special purposes and have their own specific planning considerations. The Army recognizes three forms of the defense—

Defense of a linear obstacle.

Perimeter defense.

Reverse slope defense.

(See FM 3-90-1 for more information on these forms of the defense.)

SECTION II – DIVISION DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATION OF FORCES CONSIDERATIONS

5-9. The organization of subordinate forces for a division conducting defensive tasks is based on the mission variables of METT-TC. The division commander alters the command and support relationships of their attached or operational control (OPCON) BCTs and supporting brigades to better allocate assets to their subordinate commanders according to those mission variables. The division commander cannot alter the internal organization of tactical control (TACON) forces.

5-10. The commander conducting a defense combines static and dynamic actions to accomplish the mission. Static actions include fires from prepared positions. Dynamic actions include using the fires provided by units in prepared positions as a base for counterattacks and repositioning units between defensive positions. The commander uses the reserve and uncommitted forces to conduct counterattacks and spoiling attacks to desynchronize enemy efforts and prevent the enemy from massing combat power against isolated friendly forces.

AREA DEFENSE

5-11. The division commander seeks to limit the enemy’s freedom of maneuver and channeling enemy forces into engagement areas. The division retains that terrain that the attacking enemy must control to advance. The division draws the enemy into a series of mutually supporting defensive positions (forward and/or in-depth) and destroys the enemy largely by the employment of fires. The division commander might direct the construction of a battalion- or company-sized strongpoint depending on the mission variables of METT-TC.

5-12. The commander organizes the division’s BCTs and supporting brigades to accomplish reconnaissance, security, main battle area, reserve, and sustaining tasks. The division’s attached battlefield surveillance and combat aviation brigades provide the majority of division controlled reconnaissance forces. Joint assets provide reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) information according to the division’s information collection plan. The reconnaissance units of attached BCTs are tasked to conduct reconnaissance as long as provisions are made to return them to BCT control before the commitment of their parent BCT. From slightly more than half to roughly two-thirds of the division’s BCTs will be committed to conducting security and main battle area tasks. The rest of the division’s BCTs form the division reserve. The division reserve preserves the integrity of the defense through reinforcement of threatened defensive positions or conduct of counterattacks. A division reserve in an area defense is an armored or SBCT supported by the combat aviation, field artillery (FA), and maneuver enhancement brigades upon its commitment. However, the reserve may also consist of an infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) air assault forces supported by attack helicopters and joint close air support (CAS) if the concept for their employment calls only for a relatively short operation, a quick linkup by heavy forces, or an extraction. (See chapter 7 of FM 3-90-1 for more information on the organization of forces to conduct an area defense.)

MOBILE DEFENSE

5-13. A division is the smallest unit that can conduct, versus participate in, a mobile defense. This is because of its ability to fight multiple engagements throughout the width, depth, and height of the division area of operations, while simultaneously resourcing striking, fixing, and reserve forces.

5-14. The division commander allocates only an absolute minimum amount of combat power to the forces conducting an area defense or delay within the division area of operations. For a typical division with four to six attached BCTs this may be as small as a single BCT or two BCTs at the most. The reserve of a division conducting a mobile defense may consist of a single Stryker or combined arms battalion task force or may be a reinforced armored or SBCT.

5-15. The division commander allocates the maximum available combat power at the time of attack to the striking force. The striking force’s mission is to destroy or defeat an enemy who’s attack has reached or is about to reach culmination. The mobile striking force conducts the decisive attack against a penetrating enemy force. The mobile striking force should possess greater combat power than that of the enemy force it seeks to defeat or destroy and be capable of equal or greater mobility. At the division level this translates into two or more BCTs supported by the FA brigade, combat aviation brigade, and joint fires. The mobile striking force generally uses an indirect approach to move to where it can strike the rear or an exposed flank of the enemy force, bringing to bear the effects of overwhelming combat power. (See chapter 8 of FM 3-90-1 for more information on the organization of forces for a mobile defense.)

RETROGRADE

5-16. Retrograde operations gain time, preserve forces, place the enemy in unfavorable positions, avoid combat under undesirable conditions, or permit the use of a portion of the force elsewhere. The enemy forces these operations or a commander executes them voluntarily. In either case, the higher commander of the force executing the operation must approve the retrograde. Retrograde operations are transitional operations; they are not considered in isolation. Each form of retrograde—delay, withdrawal, and retirement—has its own specific organization of forces.

5-17. A division commander conducting a delay organizes the division into a main body, a security force, and a reserve. The security force conducts a screen forward of the initial delay positions. This may be a combination of each committed BCT’s cavalry squadron (in the case of an ABCT, SBCT, or IBCT and elements of the division’s attached or OPCON combat aviation brigade. Alternatively the division security force could consist of a single BCT task-organized into a reconnaissance and security BCT by augmentation with additional combat multipliers from the supporting combat aviation, FA, and maneuver enhancement brigades. The division main body, containing the majority of the division’s combat power, uses alternate or subsequent positions to conduct the delay. Usually each BCT within the main body conducts delay operations within its own area of operations. The division commander retains a reserve to contain enemy penetrations between delay positions, to reinforce fires into an engagement area, or to help a portion of the security force or main body disengage from the enemy. That reserve consists of a BCT. All of these missions require that the reserve has the mobility and strength to strike with such force that an enemy has no option but to face the immediate threat of the reserve once it is committed.

5-18. The commander of a division conducting a withdrawal organizes the division into a security force, a main body, and a reserve. Alternatively, and more likely, the division commander allows each subordinate brigade to conduct withdrawal operations within their own BCT area of operations without the existence of a division controlled security force. It is easier for the BCT to organize a detachment left in contact at the brigade level than for the division to organize a detachment left in contact at the division level. If the commander employs a division-level security force that force also consists of a single BCT augmented with additional combat multipliers. The size of the division reserve in a withdrawal can range from a single reinforced battalion task force to a complete BCT.

5-19. The division organizes for combat but does not anticipate interference by enemy ground forces when conducting a retirement. Typically, for a division-level retirement, security forces of another division cover the movement of the division’s subordinate brigades. However, mobile enemy forces, unconventional or irregular forces, air strikes, air assaults, or long-range fires may attempt to interdict the movement of a retiring division. The commander plans for enemy actions and organizes the division to defend itself. The commander conducts a division retirement operation to reposition the division for future operations or to accommodate the joint force commander’s current concept of operations. A division commander conducting a retirement designates security elements and a main body. (See chapter 9 of FM 3-90-1 for more information on the organization of forces for the conduct of all three retrograde tasks.)

SECTION III – DIVISION DEFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

5-20. The joint task force, joint force land component (JFLC), or Army force commander sets the stage for planning the conduct of division defense-focused operations. One of these operational commanders provides the division commander a mission, the operational commander’s intent, and a concept of operations. Likewise, the division commander provides the division’s attached, OPCON, or TACON brigade commanders a clear mission, intent, and the division’s concept of operation including the defensive tasks the division will conduct. This guidance is how the division commander initiates the exercise of the elements of mission command and operational art which are described in detail in ADRP 3-0. The exercise of mission command and elements of operational art provide the division’s brigade commanders the flexibility and agility to respond to rapid changes in the situation and allows them to exploit opportunities within the division’s area of operations.

5-21. The division commander’s concept of operations will normally reflect the operational framework used by the higher commander. See ADRP 3-0 for a discussion of three operational frameworks: deep-close-security, decisive-shaping-sustaining, and main and supporting efforts. Division and brigade commanders organize their defensive plans based on the mission variables of METT-TC and the orders of their higher commanders. They identify and war-game possible enemy reactions for inclusion in those plans. Contingency plans to the defensive plan enable commanders and staffs to remain proactive and ready for possible future situations.

5-22. The key to a successful division defense is the integration and synchronization of all available assets to maximize combat power. The division commander visualizes how and when the capabilities of the division are best applied to accomplish the mission. FM 3-90-1 expands on the defensive planning discussion found in ADRP 3-90.

MISSION COMMAND

5-23. The division ensures that the operations and actions of joint and multinational forces attached to or supporting the division are synchronized for the most combat power. Normally, the division assigns specific areas of operations to define geographic responsibility to subordinate units based on the size of their area of influence. Based on the nature of the threat and the mission, these subordinate areas of operations may be noncontiguous.

5-24. The division commander and the mobile command group position themselves where they can see and sense the battle once it is joined. It is important that the division commander locate in a position where the division’s most important defensive effort takes place so that the commander senses the flow of the fight and makes timely decisions. As a rule, they locate initially near the decisive operation or main effort. All division mission command nodes—main and tactical command posts and the mobile command group—have associated forces dedicated to their local security. Whenever possible they should be located in hardened facilities, such as bunkers, or protective terrain. Their electronic signature is reduced to absolute minimums to avoid detection by enemy signals intelligence assets.

COMMAND POST OPERATIONS

5-25. The division main command post controls the division’s current defensive efforts and ensures committed units act on commander decisions. It synchronizes planning efforts for the upcoming defensive battles and future counterattacks. This includes conducting operations directed against uncommitted enemy forces designed to attrit them and control their introduction into the main battle area of subordinate BCTs. The main command post is also heavily committed to coordinating and facilitating the sustainment effort. Additionally, the main command post synchronizes the maintenance of division main supply routes; the evacuation of casualties, inoperable equipment, and detainee’s from brigade areas of operations; the establishment of echelon support areas; and the conduct of division security operations.

5-26. A division in the defense employs its tactical command post to control operations involving multiple brigades conducting one or more shaping operations that operate in close interaction with each other. Controlling a retrograde river crossing is an example of how the tactical command post could be employed in the defense. When employed, the division tactical command post must be austere enough to rapidly and constantly relocate to survive.

SIGNAL

5-27. The division assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6) in coordination with counterparts at higher headquarters and the senior signal organization within the supported geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility plans the employment of available communications assets. This includes ensuring communications and computer support within the division’s command posts between the division headquarters and its subordinate and supporting brigades and between the division’s mission command systems and appropriate higher Army and joint headquarters. The division G-6 requests additional satellite bandwidth or other assets as necessary to support the division’s planned operations.

5-28. Messengers and secure digital data reduce the requirement for voice radio transmissions and provide a high degree of signal security. Radio communications are not used if other communications means are available. Radio nets remain open but on listening silence. Digital data and wire communications are the primary means used.

OPERATIONS PROCESS

5-29. The plan for the division’s defense documents the commander’s visualization of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. It explains how the commander intends to sequence divisional units into the fight and what contribution each unit is expected to make during the course of the operation. This helps subordinate brigade commanders visualize what their units need to accomplish. That plan also addresses the division’s task organization of subordinate units through allocating assets and the establishment of command and support relationships and priorities of support. The commander uses an established operational framework and associated vocabulary to help in this articulation. This publication uses the decisive-shaping-sustaining framework. (See ADRP 3-0 for a discussion of operational frameworks.) The division staff structures the division’s area of operations to reflect the commander’s chosen operational framework by the use of those common defensive control measures mentioned in paragraph 5-7. These measures are defined in ADRP 1-02. ADRP 3-90 and FM 3-90-1 illustrate how they are used in the defense.

5-30. The plan specifies how much time that each BCT retains each set of defensive positions. The division commander uses backbriefs from the brigade commanders and the division staff to review subordinate brigade plans to ensure that those plans are compatible with the division commander’s visualization and synchronized with each other.

5-31. Division defensive plans require extensive movement control annexes that establish priorities of movement and preclude congestion on division controlled routes for all division units. The division prepares a detailed traffic control plan for the movement of subordinate brigades and requires each brigade do the same for its area of operations and subordinate battalions. While these traffic control plans are centrally designed, their execution is decentralized. (See ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0 for more information on the operations process. See FM 6-0 for a discussion of orders format.)

Decisive Operation

5-32. The division’s decisive operation is the operation that directly accomplishes the division’s mission. That mission reflects any of the primary purposes of the defense mentioned in paragraph 5-2. The nature of the division’s decisive operation will vary depending on the defensive task being accomplished.

Shaping Operations

5-33. Division shaping operations are operations that establish conditions for the division’s decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain. For example the division’s conduct of security tasks are almost always shaping operations. (See chapter 9 for a discussion of the division’s conduct of security tasks in the defense.) Shaping operations occur throughout the division’s area of operations and may involve almost any conceivable combination of divisional units and capabilities. The division conducts shaping operations to preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operations.

Sustaining Operations

5-34. The division’s sustaining operations involve activities by a division subordinate echelon and the division’s supporting sustainment units that enable the conduct of the division’s decisive operation or shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power. The conduct of division sustaining operations in the defense is discussed under the sustainment warfighting function discussions later in this chapter.

CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES

5-35. Cyber electromagnetic activities are activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system (ADRP 3-0). Cyber electromagnetic activities combine lethal and nonlethal actions. These actions degrade or destroy enemy information and the enemy’s ability to collect and use that information. The division leverages cyber electromagnetic activities to build, operate, and defend the network. It can use joint assets to attack and exploit enemy information systems; gain situational understanding; and protect Soldiers and mission command systems. These capabilities are synchronized by the division cyber electromagnetic staff element with other elements of combined arms using the operations process. For example, the division synchronizes physical attack with cyber electromagnetic activities targeted against the enemy and adversary command and control system.

5-36. Division planners provide host nation or multinational partners with information concerning U.S. cyber electromagnetic capabilities. These partners may request that the division coordinate to provide them with U.S. cyber electromagnetic support for their operations. The planning of multinational cyber electromagnetic operations is made more difficult because of ill-defined security issues, incompatible crypto equipment, differences in the level of training of involved forces, and language barriers. Higher echelon commanders provide the division with guidance on the release of classified material to host nation and/or multinational forces. However, the division cyber electromagnetic staff determines the need to know of these multinational forces and the procedures by which they can release classified or sensitive cyber electromagnetic information essential to multinational force mission accomplishment at the earliest stages of planning.

5-37. Recent operations have shown the ability of an enemy to use commercial electronic communications in nontraditional ways. These range from ad hoc cueing networks to detonation means for improvised explosive devices (IED). The division plans how it uses its cyber electromagnetic activities to counter these efforts. One consideration the division cyber electromagnetic planners addresses is the integration of U.S. cyber electromagnetic capabilities into an overall multinational cyber electromagnetic plan. The division will most likely be operating inside a sovereign host nation. It coordinates its jamming action with appropriate host nation authorities. For example, the division may not legally jam host nation cell phone frequencies to preclude them from being the triggering mechanism for various command detonated mines during operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks. (See FM 3-13 and FM 3-38 for more information on the functions that cyber electromagnetic activities play in operations.)

INFORMATION RELATED CAPABILITIES

5-38. The division plans how it will use available information related capabilities to inform the civilian population within its area of operations and external audiences on why the division is currently focused on the conduct of defensive tasks. The division’s leadership must maintain public support and active assistance for the division’s defensive efforts while maintaining operations security and military deception. This active support includes voluntarily help construct defensive positions or reporting the location of enemy special purpose forces. The efforts in this area must at least be effective enough that the local civilians do not interfere with the division’s defensive efforts with uncontrolled movements along division main supply routes or by shielding the approach of enemy formation by their movements. The division information operations special staff officer has staff responsibility for the division’s efforts in this area. (See FM 3-13 for more information.)

MILITARY DECEPTION

5-39. Military deception includes all actions performed to deliberately mislead an enemy commander as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations. Division deception planners develop a deception story as a part of the overall deception plan. The deception story portrays a logical, situational, and doctrinally correct scheme of maneuver that is not only believable to enemy commanders, but supports the true friendly scheme of maneuver. It should cause the enemy to perform some action or nonaction favorable to the division’s adopted course of action. The division assistant chiefs of staff, operations and plans (G-3 and G-5) share coordinating staff responsibility for the division’s military deception efforts. The hand-off between plans and current operations are coordinated. (See JP 3-13.4 for more information on the conduct of military deception.)

MOVEMENT AND MANEVUER

5-40. Division commanders conducting defensive tasks plan their maneuver to avoid attacking enemy strengths and to create opportunities to increase the effects of friendly fire. They seek to retain the initiative by making unexpected maneuvers, rapidly changing the tempo of ongoing operations, avoiding observation, employing obstacles, and using military deception techniques and procedures.

5-41. As a prerequisite to detailed planning for the defense, subordinate BCT and supporting brigades must know the mission assigned to their unit by the division commander. This includes the starting time of the operations, projected task organization, any special requirements, their respective areas of operations, the enemy situation, and the defensive tasks they are required to accomplish.

MAIN BATTLE AREA OPERATIONS

5-42. Division defensive planning normally calls for the defensive fight to culminate in the main battle area. Division main battle area BCTs fight the division’s decisive operation. The plan allows the division to shift and synchronize its combat power where necessary to reinforce its BCTs. Spoiling attacks and counterattacks designed to disrupt the enemy and to prevent the enemy from massing or exploiting success are developed as branch plans executed as part of the main battle area fight. The future operations and plans integrating cells conduct contingency planning to counter assumed enemy penetrations of forward defenses within the main battle area.

Area Defense

5-43. The division plans to conduct an area defense to deny the enemy designated terrain for a specified time. In planning an area defense, the division commander allocates sufficient combat power against enemy avenues of approach to achieve a reasonable chance of success, even without the commitment of the reserve. The commander plans to assume risk in less threatened areas by allocating less force in these areas. Planned maneuvers within an area defense usually consist of repositioning between battle positions and counterattacks.

5-44. Ultimately, the mission of BCTs located within the division main battle area is to defeat the enemy attack or to destroy the attacking enemy force. These BCTs perform many different tasks—defending, delaying, attacking, or performing in an economy of force role—to accomplish this mission. BCTs plan to the conduct of forward and rearward passages of lines. However, they normally plan to avoid being bypassed during the fight unless it fits within the division commander’s intent.

5-45. During planning to conduct contiguous operations within the division area of operations, planners require the right and left flank BCTs within the main battle area to provide their own flank security forces. However, the division tasks a BCT or combat aviation brigade to provide security if one division flank is particularly vulnerable. The missions assigned to a division flank security force in the defense are either screen or guard. Plans for noncontiguous operation require additional attention to security operations to prevent the enemy from suppressing the division as to regards to enemy intentions or capabilities.

Mobile Defense

5-46. A division staff planning the conduct of a mobile defense orients on the enemy force as opposed to retaining terrain. The mission variables of METT-TC favor a division conducting a mobile defense in two instances: when defending a large area of operations against a mobile enemy force or when defending against an enemy force with greater combat power but less mobility. A mobile defense incurs great risk, but also stands a greater chance of inflicting a decisive defeat and even destroying the enemy force.

5-47. When the division plans to conduct a mobile defense according to the commander’s visualization, subordinate BCTs conduct either an area defense or a delay to shape the penetration of the enemy attack as part of the division fixing force. Commanders do not assign the mission of a mobile defense to subordinate units except in an economy of force role.

5-48. The division commander may plan to shape the battlefield by defending in one area, to deny terrain to the enemy while delaying in another area to create the illusion of success. The idea is that perceived enemy success in the area of operations of the BCT conducting the delay creates an opportunity for the striking force to attack. The division may also plan to entice the advancing enemy into an engagement area by appearing to uncover or weakly defend an area into which the enemy desires to move.

5-49. The division plans the conduct of spoiling attacks to break up the enemy’s momentum, disrupt the enemy’s timetable, cause the enemy to shift forces, or just buy time for friendly forces to complete their preparations. In the plan, the striking force’s components include the maximum combat power available to the commander at the projected time of their attack. At a minimum, it has equal or greater combat power than the force it is designed to defeat or destroy. Fire assets can offset maneuver force shortfalls.

5-50. The division plan incorporates obstacle-restricted zones that allow subordinate brigades flexibility in positioning. The division geospatial information support team provides needed terrain products to support the planning process. Specific terrain analysis products help maneuver planning and in designing obstacle systems to complement maneuver plans.

RESERVE OPERATIONS

5-51. The division plan retains a divisional reserve regardless of the defensive task assigned. The reserve is an uncommitted force available for commitment at the decisive moment. It provides flexibility for the commander through offensive action. The reserve is more difficult to resource in the mobile defense because so much of the division’s combat power is allocated to the striking force. The BCT tasked to provide the division security force should not also be designated as the division reserve on completion of security force operations. This is because the security force BCT may not be able to be reconstituted to the desired level before its commitment.

5-52. The division commander specifies whether the reserve is to counterattack by fire or assault the objective or enemy force. The reserve must remain agile to respond to a penetration that has occurred earlier than, or at a different location than, that visualized by the senior commander.

5-53. The commander designates planning priorities for commitment of the division reserve. The commander plans the movement of the division reserve from its assembly area to likely commitment locations. This is because of the need to deconflict the reserve’s movement with other movements within the division support area and main battle area such as sustainment convoys, artillery repositioning, and the movement of BCTs within their area of operations.

5-54. The reserve can be as large as one-third of the combat power, but normally not smaller than a BCT-sized element. If needed, the reserve is the division commander’s principal means of influencing the close fight. It is supported with additional assets such as artillery; CAS; attack helicopters; electronic warfare; engineer; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense; and sustainment, on its commitment.

5-55. In difficult terrain lacking routes for movement, the plan may call for the subordinate battalion task forces of the BCT forming the division reserve to be positioned within the areas of operations of those BCTs assigned to the main battle area to react more quickly to the results of that BCT’s close combat. Lateral and forward high-speed deployment routes should be available. In more open terrain, a division positions its reserve BCT at considerable depth.

RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

5-56. The situation may require the division staff to plan for the conduct of retrograde tasks in combination, sequentially, or subsequent to an offensive or defensive mission. The complexity and fluidity of retrograde operations and the need to synchronize the entire division operation dictates the need for detailed, centralized planning and coordination with decentralized execution. A retrograde may be forced or voluntary. In either event, the higher commander must approve it.

5-57. Division defensive plans address the conduct of more than one form of retrograde operations. A combination of these forms is necessary either simultaneously by adjacent units or by one form of retrograde operation developing into another. For instance, a withdrawal from action may precede a retirement, or a BCT may execute delaying actions to cover the retirement of the rest of the division. The division plan addresses the constitution and location of the division reserve throughout the conduct of all three retrograde tasks. Division planning addresses the command and support relationships of division brigades if their retrograde movements take them outside of the division’s area of operations.

5-58. As in other operations, the commander’s concept of operations and intent drive planning for the retrograde. The nature of the retrograde involves an inherent risk of degrading the morale of the troops attached to the division. Commanders at every level can minimize this risk by—

Thorough planning, efficient control, and aggressive leadership at all levels.

Maintaining an aggressive attitude throughout the division.

Orienting the entire division on the purpose of the operation.

Ensuring a constant flow of information between all attached, OPCON, TACON, and supporting brigades and the division headquarters.

5-59. The larger the difference in tactical movement capabilities between a division conducting a retrograde and an advancing enemy force, the greater the chance of the division’s ability to conduct the retrograde successfully. The division and subordinate commanders enhance the ability of their units to move by—

Conducting key leader reconnaissance of potential routes and battle positions.

Improving existing road networks and controlling the flow of traffic along those routes.

Executing well-rehearsed unit movement standard operating procedures and battle drills.

Positioning security forces at critical choke points.

Evacuating civilian personnel or restricting their movements to nondivision-used routes.

Evacuating casualties, recoverable supplies, and unnecessary stocks early.

Displacing nonessential command posts and sustainment activities early.

Delay Operations

5-60. When the division conducts a delay, the division plan specifies certain parameters to the BCTs conducting the delay. First, it directs one of two alternatives: delay within their BCT area of operations or delay forward of a specified line or terrain feature for a specified time. The second parameter is that the order specifies the acceptable risk. The division commander prescribes the delaying force’s mission, composition, and initial location. The delay force accomplishes its mission by delay on successive positions, by delay on alternate positions, or by a combination of the two. It also attacks, defends, feints, or demonstrates. (See chapter 9 of FM 3-90-1 for additional planning, preparation, and execution considerations for conducting a delay.)

Withdrawal Operations

5-61. Withdrawal planning begins with preparation of the plan for the next mission. Once the new plan is drawn up, the division and brigade staffs make plans for the withdrawal, including—

The location, composition, and mission of division security forces.

The organization of the division for combat.

Control measures, including routes, traffic control points, and phase lines (PL).

Fire support plans.

Sustainment priorities.

Military deception operations to preserve the force.

5-62. Normally, the division plan employs a covering force during the withdrawal to preserve the command’s integrity. Therefore, when planning to conduct a withdrawal under pressure, provision is taken to resource a strong covering force. The capabilities of ABCTs and SBCTs make them most suitable for a division to use as a covering force during the conduct of a withdrawal. This is because an IBCT needs reinforcement by additional fires, anti-armor, engineer, aviation, and transportation assets before it serves as a covering force.

Retirement Operations

5-63. These operations are administrative in nature. However, the staff considers security throughout the planning process. As in all tactical movements, all-round security of the main body is necessary using advance, flank, and rear security forces. Branches to the plan address enemy capabilities to employ Level I, II, and III threats against division units during movement. Level I threat considerations address terrorist attacks along the division movement routes. (See chapter 9 for a discussion of these threat levels.)

MOBILITY AND COUNTERMOBILITY

5-64. Countermobility planning is the division engineer’s primary concern during the conduct of both area and mobile defense planning. The plan addresses how security and main battle area units reinforce the natural defensive characteristics of the terrain to block, disrupt, fix, or turn attacking enemy forces into friendly engagement areas and prevent the enemy from closing with defending units. Planning to maintain the mobility of the division’s BCTs and supporting brigades is slightly less important. The division must plan to augment the limited engineer mobility and countermobility assets found within the BCTs from external assets. BCTs and supporting brigades reposition as necessary both within their designated defensive positions and to subsequent and alternative defensive positions as the battle unfolds. During a mobile defense, the striking force maneuvers rapidly from its hide positions to locations where it destroys a designated enemy force.

5-65. During the planning of retrograde operations, the mobility and countermobility planning priorities are reversed. Priority of planning efforts goes toward enhancing and maintaining the mobility of the division with a smaller effort going toward degrading or countering the enemy’s mobility.

Note: U.S. forces are no longer authorized the use of persistent land mines. Current U.S. land mine policy acknowledges the importance of protecting noncombatants while enabling legitimate countermobility and protection requirements.

INTELLIGENCE

5-66. Before the division and subordinate brigade commanders and staffs can plan for the conduct of defensive tasks they require information about—

Terrain characteristics, such as observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment.

Projected weather and its effects on the terrain within the area of operations and the conduct of the defense.

Location of known and projected explosive hazards.

The composition, equipment, strengths, and weaknesses of the enemy force.

The location, direction, and movement speed of enemy reconnaissance elements.

The location, capabilities, and activities of enemy brigade tactical groups and larger formations including enemy reserve forces.

The composition of the enemy’s command and control system, such as command post locations, command radio nets, and supporting signal node locations and vulnerabilities.

The capabilities and vulnerabilities of the enemy sustainment system as they apply to the continued support of their offensive operations.

The location, capabilities, and activities of enemy fire support and air defense systems.

How civil considerations—areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events—impact on the division’s conduct of defensive tasks.

5-67. The geospatial intelligence element within the division intelligence cell provides detailed terrain analysis that can help answer some of these information requirements. The assistant chief of staff, civil affairs (G-9) contacts higher civil affairs headquarters, then the civil affairs proponent at the Special Operations center of excellence to answer other information requirements.

5-68. Additional intelligence planning considerations are found in the appropriate chapters of FM 3-90-1. (See Intelligence center of excellence publications for a detailed discussion of division-level intelligence activities.) (See FM 2-01.3 for more information on the intelligence preparation of the battlefield.)

FIRES

5-69. A division commander employs available massed fires to neutralize, suppress, or destroy enemy forces. Fires delay or disrupt a targeted enemy force’s capability to execute a given course of action.

INTEGRATE ARMY INDIRECT AND JOINT FIRES

5-70. The division fires cell plans the employment of available Army and Joint fires to achieve depth and simultaneity and secure advantages for future operations. This is one of the primary means by which the division shapes the operational environment for its subordinate BCTs. The division integrates indirect and joint fires in its defensive plan. This allows them to degrade the combat capabilities of advancing enemy forces before they reach the areas of operations of the division’s subordinate BCTs. This includes disrupting the enemy’s approach to and movement within the main battle area, destroying high-payoff targets, denying or interrupting vital components of enemy operating systems, and using obscurants to cover friendly movement. Some key high-payoff targets are the enemy’s trailing or reserve units, air defense sites, key enemy command and control nodes, and key infrastructure such as a bridge over major rivers.

5-71. The division commander’s intent and concept of operations may be to use available fires to defeat, deter, or delay an enemy before major enemy forces come into direct fire range of the BCTs located within the main battle area. Alternatively the commander’s concept may be for division directed fires executed by the FA and combat aviation brigades coupled with joint fires to delay or disrupt the approach of enemy second echelon or reserve forces. This allows those main battle area BCTs to complete their defeat of the enemy’s initial attack with their organic assets before enemy second echelon or reserve forces interfere with that defeat. Division directed fires establish the conditions necessary for the conduct of a successful division counterattack. In either case the division commander requests that the fire support coordination lines (FSCL) are closer to the division’s forward edge of the battle area than normal to better facilitate the employment of joint fires. BCT commanders establish coordinated fire lines to facilitate the employment of surface-to-surface fires.

5-72. When planning mobile defense operations where the striking force is to attack beyond conventional artillery range, the commander addresses the forward displacement of FA and combat aviation brigade assets separately or incorporates them into the striking force’s movement columns. Army and joint fire assets are critical in off-setting any potential lack of maneuver assets in the striking force.

5-73. Additional planning considerations for fires in the defense can be found in FM 3-90-1. FM 3-09 provides a detailed discussion of planning considerations for lethal fires and nonlethal effects. JP 3-09 discusses the employment of joint fire support.

DELIVER FIRES

5-74. Complementary and reinforcing joint and multinational fire capabilities provide redundancy to mitigate environmental and operational restrictions, resource shortfalls, as well as identify gaps in coverage from a particular asset. Supporting the scheme of fires during the defense involves acquiring, discriminating, and engaging targets throughout the area of operations with massed and precision fires including joint and electronic warfare assets. Planning considerations for supporting the scheme of maneuver during the defense include:

Weight the main effort.

Consider positioning fires assets to exploit weapons ranges and preclude untimely displacement when fires are needed the most.

Provide counterfire.

Provide early warning and dissemination.

Provide wide area surveillance.

Provide fires to protect forces preparing for and assets critical to the division’s defensive actions.

Disrupt enemy attacks by attacking enemy forces massing to attack.

Interdict enemy indirect fires and sustainment efforts.

Plan fires to defeat or disrupt enemy attempts to breach friendly obstacles.

Plan fires to deny enemy observation or screen friendly movements from one defensive position to another.

Allocate responsive fires to support the decisive operation.

Allocate fires for the neutralization of bypassed enemy combat forces during the conduct of counterattacks.

Plan for target acquisition and sensors to provide coverage of named areas of interest, target areas of interest, and critical assets.

(See FA doctrinal publications for the specifics of each of these bullets.)

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

5-75. The commander or the Army Air and Missile Defense Command or air defense artillery brigade supporting the area air defense commander normally centrally controls the fires of most Army air and missile defense units within the joint operations area. However, the division staff coordinates to ensure that as much of the division’s defended asset list as is possible is located within the range fan of these air and missile defense systems. The division’s efforts to counter enemy unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are discussed as a special topic in chapter 9.

5-76. Air and missile defense forces use both positive and procedural means of fire control. Close integration between division airspace control nodes, other airspace users, and air and missile defense mission command nodes is imperative to ensure safe, unencumbered passage of friendly aircraft while denying access to enemy aircraft and missiles. (See FM 3-01 for more information.)

SUSTAINMENT

5-77. Division sustainment planning in a defense addresses operations in the security area and the main battle area. The sustainment cell plans for the positioning forward of only those sustainment assets immediately essential to the success of division security operations, such as fuel, barrier material, ammunition, and medical stocks and limited maintenance support. Division sustainment planning addresses resupply of these stocks in the BCT brigade support battalions since these assets are now organic to the BCT or BCTs providing those security forces. The division must plan for and coordinate transportation support for its subordinate BCTs since BCTs, especially the IBCT, under current force design changes, are not 100% mobile with organic transportation. The division plans to supplement the limited recovery assets of BCT brigade support battalion with additional heavy equipment transporters from supporting combat sustainment support battalions. This helps prevent unnecessary losses of weapon systems that experience maintenance failures or combat damage during operations in the security area. The plan addresses the extraction of these transporters and any supply stocks beyond the capacity of the brigade support battalions to evacuate if their locations in the security area are compromised because of enemy advances.

5-78. The amount of material planned to deploy forward depends on the division concept of operations. The division assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4) provides forecasts of supply requirements to the supporting sustainment brigade. For example, if the plan calls for division security forces to conduct a guard or cover mission over a prolonged period, then the sustainment cell plans how to provide significantly larger sustainment requirements than if the plan calls for security forces to conduct a screen. Likewise depending on how long the division concept of operations calls for the security fight to last, that replenishment planning addresses the BCT brigade support battalions located in the security area or in subsequent positions elsewhere in the division area of operations. In a similar manner, the division assistant chief of staff, personnel (G-1) and the division surgeon are responsible for providing forecasts of the division’s requirements during the defense to the appropriate agencies for personnel services and health service support.

5-79. Sustained defensive combat in the main battle area normally generates the largest requirement for supplies and field services. In a protracted defense, the ability of the sustainment brigade supporting the division to sustain the division’s attached brigades significantly influences the battle’s outcome. The emphasis is on planning the best way of maintaining the division at the highest level of combat power possible given the mission variables of METT-TC. Planning considerations and operational techniques to improve sustainment support to defending BCTs in the main battle area include—

Pre-positioning supplies at subsequent defensive lines or positions while maintaining security of these stocks. This includes selecting positions for ammunition transfer and holding points.

Displacing from the division support area, on a scheduled basis, push packages of certain critical items, such as ammunition; CBRN defense supplies; petroleum, oil, and lubricants; and selected repair parts, so interruptions in communications do not disrupt the flow of supplies.

Prepackaging obstacle material (normally requisitioned items) into BCT-sized push packages to expedite delivery.

Conducting resupply operations during periods of limited visibility to reduce chances of enemy interference. The division employs close-in security and mobility assets to support sustainment convoys if the enemy employs mines in an attempt to interdict the movement of those convoys. If the enemy has extensive limited visibility capabilities, then the division employs multispectral obscurants to provide the concealment needed to conduct resupply operations without extensive enemy interference.

Ensuring that the supporting sustainment brigade’s combat sustainment support battalions are echeloned behind the BCT brigade support battalions to provide in-depth sustainment throughout the defensive area. This allows for orderly withdrawal or advance in response to the tactical situation, such as a particular sustainment location targeted by the enemy, without loss of support.

Rapid evacuation of wounded and response to mass casualty situations.

Employing and dispatching maintenance support teams as far forward as possible to reduce unit evacuation requirements to a minimum.

5-80. In a mobile defense, the division assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4) and surgeon staff sections coordinate with the supporting sustainment brigade and medical unit to ensure the division’s sustainment plan synchronizes these considerations:

Due to the greater distances involved in a mobile defense, a greater than normal amount of supplies and support need to accompany each BCT.

The fixing force requires large amounts of Class IV and V.

The striking force requires large amounts of Class III, Class V, and maintenance support.

Planned routes to support all counterattack plans. Consider route security due to the large area of operations and potential for enemy interdiction.

Planned refueling operations to support counterattacks and delaying actions. Ensure refueling operations are anticipated, planned, and synchronized with maneuver plans.

Planned barrier materials to develop the defense and necessary breaching materials to assure the mobility of the force.

Developed triggers to support the movement of sustainment units and functions based on the scheme of maneuver, counterattack options, and anticipated enemy situation.

Identified units with potential for high casualty density.

Ensured status of evacuation routes is disseminated to medical elements, and that triggers for opening or using alternate routes are established.

Established ambulance exchange points with triggers for their displacement to reduce ambulance turn-around time.

Pre-positioned treatment teams based on the mission variables of METT-TC and casualty density estimates.

Planned heaviest patient workloads, including those produced by enemy artillery, CBRN weapons, and mines and preparation to implement a mass casualty plan.

Integrated air ambulances from the combat aviation brigade (with G-3 air planners) including the use of nonstandard air platforms (when available) for mass casualty operations into the BCT health service support plans for clearing the battlefield of casualties and reducing evacuation time.

5-81. Prioritization of sustainment support during retrograde operations depends of the mission variables of METT-TC and varies from one form of retrograde to another. For example, sustainment operations during the conduct of a retirement normally reflect increased fuel consumption but decreased ammunition consumption. However, sustainment planning addresses the art of moving substantial quantities of fuel, ammunition, and barrier material toward the enemy while simultaneously orchestrating the movement of the division’s brigades away from the enemy and recovering and evacuating wounded Soldiers and inoperative weapon systems. It also incorporates the need for the early displacement of division sustainment facilities. Any planned movement of sustainment assets outside the division area of operations is coordinated to ensure support relationships remain clear once those assets displace.

5-82. The prioritization of controlling movement throughout the division’s defense, as well as the means of movement, are key to movement planning. Within the context of the commander’s concept of operations and intent, the division prioritizes the following:

What is to be moved, such as dismounted personnel versus sustainment stocks.

The limited ground and air movement means available to the division.

The routes over which movements occur.

5-83. Complicating this requirement is the necessity for the division to coordinate all division movements with the commander of the area of operations through which the division controlled movement takes place. This includes the area of operations owned by subordinate brigades and the area of operations of adjacent and any higher echelon units.

5-84. A division involved major operations focused on the conduct of defensive tasks will not require a lot of contract support. During this phase of the campaign, selected staff officers start planning for contracts required once the focus turns to the conduct of stability tasks. Likewise general engineering support planned during this phase supports the division in sequels to the current operation. Additional planning considerations for defensive sustainment are found in FM 3-90-1. ATP 4-93 provides a detailed discussion of the sustainment brigade and its subordinate battalions.

PROTECTION

5-85. Protection preserves divisional units so that the commander applies maximum combat power at the desired times and places. Division-specific protection planning considerations during the defense are addressed in paragraphs 5-86 to 5-117.

OPERATIONAL AREA SECURITY

5-86. The success of the division defense hinges on its success in protecting the division support area from enemy attacks. Division defensive planning addresses the early detection and immediate destruction of enemy forces attempting to operate in the division support area. Enemy attacks in the division support area range from individual saboteurs to enemy airborne or air assault insertions into the division support area targeted against the division’s key facilities and capabilities. These enemy activities, especially at smaller unit levels, may even precede the onset of large-scale hostilities and will be almost indistinguishable from terrorist acts.

5-87. During planning, the division defines responsibilities for the security of units within the division support area. The maneuver enhancement brigade commander’s area of operations is the division support area. Therefore, the maneuver enhancement brigade commander is responsible for area security operations within that area of operations. The maneuver enhancement brigade commander has the authority to designate the commanders of tenant units within the division support area (less medical corps officers) as base and base cluster commanders. Those base and base cluster commanders are responsible for the local security of their respective bases and base clusters. The maneuver enhancement brigade commander designates protection standards and defensive readiness conditions for tenant units and units transiting through the division support area. The maneuver enhancement brigade commander coordinates with the division main command post to mitigate the effects of security operations on the primary functions of units located within the division support area.

5-88. The degree of risk to the division support area accepted during defensive planning invariably passes to the division’s attached maneuver enhancement brigade commander. This risk increases the threat to the division’s supporting sustainment brigade and medical unit and impacts the ability of these two organizations to support the division’s continued operations at the anticipated level.

5-89. Where possible, the division’s maneuver enhancement brigade uses its military police and other available security forces to screen friendly command post facilities and critical sites from enemy forces. The division assigns the brigade the mission of developing security plans for bases, base clusters, and designated security corridors within the division support area. These plans address unit and base and convoy defense against Level I threats. These plans address maneuver enhancement brigade response force operations directed against Level II threats. These security operations will be more important as the division’s advance uncovers areas previously occupied by enemy elements without those same areas being cleared by the division’s BCTs.

5-90. The maneuver enhancement brigade is augmented according to the mission variables of METT-TC with a tactical combat force to counter any projected Level III threats. Limited reaction times and extended distances require the tactical combat force to be tactically mobile and capable of moving by air and/or by ground. The most likely Level III threat to the division support area and its mobility corridors during the conduct of offensive tasks are large, mobile enemy forces or bypassed units intent on—

Severing or disrupting the division’s mission command system.

Disrupting or destroying sustainment elements and stocks being brought forward to committed units and sustainment sites.

Interdicting main supply routes and supply points.

Destroying command post facilities, airfields, aviation assembly areas, and arming and refueling points.

Interfering with the commitment of the division reserve.

5-91. The division’s tactical combat force destroys armor protected vehicles and dismounted infantry and suppresses the enemy’s integrated air defense system. Consequently, the tactical combat force consists of a mix of infantry, attack helicopter, and attack reconnaissance Army aviation elements with its own engineer and artillery support. The tactical combat force possesses armored, mechanized, or motorized infantry units if the situation dictates.

5-92. The division anticipates the possibility of a counterattack impacting its support area and mobility corridors by a ground maneuver force from an adjacent enemy unit not located within the areas impacted by the division’s shaping or decisive operations. This is likely if the division’s axis of advance overlaps the lateral boundaries of two defending enemy units. Given this situation, a brigade-sized tactical combat force may only be able to contain or block such a force’s attack. It may then be necessary to defeat or destroy the force by either diverting assets from a committed BCT or obtaining joint fire assets.

5-93. The key consideration before diverting any division assets from its decisive operation is whether the division accomplishes its mission given the threat to its sustainment capabilities. Although the division may sustains the temporary loss of sustainment from its support area, it cannot sustain the loss of its decisive operation. (See chapter 9 for additional discussion of division support area security.)

SAFETY AND FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE

5-94. The division commander and staff exercise safety techniques to identify and assess hazards to the force and recommend ways to mitigate those hazards. The division staff understands and factors into their analysis how their execution recommendations could adversely affect Soldiers. The division normally has a table of distribution and allowances safety office to help plan, prepare, execute, and assess this task. This office directly helps the division commander in evaluating and maintaining awareness of safety-related issues. The safety office maintains a close, day-to-day working relationship with the protection cell and attends protection working group meetings as a voting member. This office provides recommendations during the development of fragmentary orders, operation orders, and unit standard operating procedures. If for some reason this table of distribution and allowances office is not resourced, the protection cell is responsible for assuming its functions.

5-95. Reduction of fratricide risk begins during the planning phase of division operations and continues through preparation and execution. Commanders, subordinate leaders, and individual Soldiers conduct risk identification at all levels during each phase. The division protection cell is charged with reviewing division, higher echelon, adjacent (if applicable), and subordinate brigade plans and orders to ensure they help minimize fratricide risk. Thoroughly developed, clearly communicated, and completely understood plans helps minimize fratricide risk. The following factors affect the potential for fratricide in a given operation:

Clarity of the enemy situation.

Clarity of the friendly situation.

Clarity of the commander's intent.

Complexity of the operation.

Planning time available at each level.

5-96. Tactical mission task graphics are a tool that commanders at all levels use to clarify their intent, add precision to their concept, and communicate their plan to subordinates. These graphics and control measures are a useful tool in reducing the risk of fratricide.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

5-97. Operations security identifies critical information and evaluates the risk of compromise if an enemy obtains that information. This analysis compares the capabilities of hostile intelligence systems with the activities and communications of friendly forces and friendly information vulnerabilities. The analysis focuses on critical information that an enemy could interpret or piece together in time to be useful. Once identified, operations security experts prioritize friendly vulnerabilities and recommend countermeasures and other means of reducing the vulnerability. In some cases, the countermeasure cannot eliminate the risk, but it may reduce it to an acceptable level. Operations security is supported by physical security and counterintelligence. Physical security safeguards personnel, equipment, and information by preventing unauthorized access to equipment, installations, materiel, and documents while safeguarding them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. Counterintelligence uses a wide range of information collection and activities to protect against espionage, combat other intelligence activities, protect against sabotage, and prevent assassinations. (See JP 3-13.3 and ADRP 3-37 for more information on operations security doctrine.)

5-98. The division commander establishes the division’s routine operations security measures in the division’s standard operating procedures. The division operations security officer (an additional duty within the protection cell) coordinates additional operations security measures of performance and effectiveness with the G-2, G-3, and other staff and command elements. The division operations security officer develops measures of performance and effectiveness for this task during military decisionmaking. The division assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) assists the division operations security by comparing friendly operations security indicators with the enemy intelligence collection capabilities. The protection cell staff integrates operations security into the conduct of all division operations.

5-99. The division operations security officer identifies and recommends essential elements of friendly information or questions about critical information. This officer analyzes adversaries and enemies and division vulnerabilities as part of intelligence preparation of the battlefield; assesses operations security risk; and develops, coordinates, and applies operations security measures across the staff. In addition, this officer:

Writes the division operations security estimate and appendix to the protection annex.

Monitors, assesses, and adjusts operations security measures.

Reviews internal division staff documents, information systems logs, and news releases for sensitive information and possibly compromised essential elements of friendly information.

Searches news sources, Web logs (blogs), and other Web sites for sensitive information and compromised essential elements of friendly information.

ANTITERRORISM AND PHYSICAL SECURITY

5-100. The division commander’s antiterrorism and physical security programs represent integrated, comprehensive approaches within the division to counter the terrorist and other threats to military installations, bases, facilities, equipment, and personnel. The chief of the protection cell develops the division’s antiterrorism plan. The division provost marshal develops the division’s physical security plan. These plans take advantage of many of the features of the division’s area security plan. The antiterrorism plan has two phases: proactive and reactive. The proactive phase encompasses the planning and resourcing of preventive measures, preparation, awareness education, and training that occur before a terrorist incident. The reactive phase includes the crisis management actions to resolve a terrorist incident.

5-101. The division’s antiterrorism and physical security programs stress deterrence of terrorist incidents through preventive measures common to all Army units. Considerations included in the plan are:

Threat analysis.

Installation or unit criticality and vulnerability assessments.

Creation of a threat assessment based on the threat analysis and friendly vulnerabilities.

Information-related capabilities directed against terrorist organizations and criminal elements to deter their activities or reduce the effectiveness of their activities directed against the division.

Personnel security.

Physical security.

Crisis management planning.

Employment of tactical measures to contain or resolve terrorist incidents.

Continuous training and education of personnel.

5-102. The resulting division antiterrorism defensive and physical security plans include a combination of law enforcement and security assets, fortifications, sensors, obstacles, local-hire security forces (if applicable), unit guards, military deception, and on-call support from reaction forces. Each defensive situation requires its own combination of abilities based on available resources and perceived need.

CONDUCT POLICE OPERATIONS

5-103. Military police doctrine addresses the conduct of police operations. Police operations encompass the associated law enforcements activities to control and protect populations and resources to facilitate the existence of a lawful and orderly environment. This includes conducting law enforcement, traffic management and enforcement, criminal investigations, customs, support to border control, support to host nation police training and development, support to civil law enforcement, police engagement, evidence collection, straggler movement control, military working dog support, and the integration of police intelligence operations.

5-104. Leaders are the key to order and discipline. From on-the-spot corrections to referrals for action under the Manual for Courts-Martial, leaders execute their responsibilities through the chain of command. To help the chain of command, the division’s military police are empowered by the commander to exercise control over Soldiers who violate military laws, orders, and regulations. Military police at all levels support the commander by ensuring that division directives are complied with.

5-105. Sometimes it is not in the commander’s best interest to employ military police assets specifically to conduct police operations. Yet even then military police efforts continue to reduce the opportunity for crime. All military police missions contribute to the preservation of law and order. Policing is an implied factor in all military police operations. During any operation conducted by military police, they operate in a manner and with intent to encourage support and to enforce the commander’s discipline and military law.

SURVIVABILITY

5-106. Survivability includes all aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and supplies while simultaneously deceiving the enemy (JP 3-34). Survivability tactics include building a good defense; employing frequent movement; using camouflage, concealment, and military deception; and constructing fighting and protective positions for both individuals and equipment. Survivability combines technology and methods that afford the maximum protection to the Army, especially to those items on the defended asset list. Survivability, as a component of combat engineering, provides cover and mitigates effects of enemy weapons on personnel, equipment, and supplies. Survivability operations range from ensuring that all divisional elements remain within supporting distance of each other, employing camouflage, concealment, and military deception to the hardening of key mission command and sustainment facilities and critical infrastructure. The engineer element in the division protection cell plans division survivability measures and staff supervision of their execution. Identification of the division’s critical assets is important to this effort as are the incorporation of vulnerability analysis and the development of countermeasures into division plans.

5-107. The priority of engineer survivability planning effort during the conduct of defensive tasks is on determining the most appropriate locations and standards for the construction of survivability positions. This includes such things as determining overhead cover standards, such as capable of resisting penetration by 82mm mortar or 152 mm howitzer shells. The division engineer helps the G-5 in planning military deception. The division engineer recommends camouflage and concealment measures for the division to employ as part of its operations security measures during the preparation and execution phases. (See ATP 3-37.34 for additional information on survivability operations.)

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

5-108. Force health protection encompasses preventive medicine services, veterinary services, area medical laboratory services and support, and the preventive aspects of dental services and combat and operational stress control. The health threat consists of diseases, occupational and environmental health hazards, poisonous or toxic flora and fauna, medical effects of weapons, and physiological and psychological stressors. To counter the health threat, comprehensive medical surveillance activities, occupational and environmental health surveillance activities, personal protective measures, preventive medicine measures, inspection of potable water and field feeding facilities, and field hygiene and sanitation are instituted and receive command emphasis.

5-109. Preventive medicine measures include immunizations, pretreatments, chemoprophylaxis, and barrier creams. Field hygiene and sanitation combines with personal protective measures, including correctly wearing the uniform and using insect repellent, sunscreen, and insect netting. Soldiers practice these activities during force projection and post deployment operations. (See FM 4-02 and subordinate medical department publications for more information on force health protection.)

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

5-110. Throughout defensive planning, the division plans to counter any enemy use of CBRN weapons. The G-3 and the division CBRN officer analyze the division’s plan and the plans and dispositions of subordinate units to determine their vulnerability to CBRN hazards. The division commander establishes the degree of acceptable risk. The division CBRN officer recommends changes to the defensive concept of operations if that concept exposes divisional elements to unacceptable risks from the employment of enemy CBRN weapons.

5-111. The division has multiple means to contain, mitigate, and manage the consequences of identified risks and control hazards to preserve combat power and minimize casualties. Such means include planning for branches and sequels in operations plans, eliminating nodes, assuring that multiple units are prepared to assume vital missions, and training and exercising to facilitate shifting missions and responsibilities to counter unanticipated CBRN attacks. This element recommends general division decontamination sites. Supporting CBRN unit commanders refines these locations based on a physical reconnaissance and the mission variables of METT-TC during their preparations. These refined locations will be submitted for approval to the G-3 and published in division fragmentary orders.

5-112. This risk and vulnerability assessments address the dangers posed by toxic industrial materials, including contamination from chemical, biological, and radiological materials used for industrial, commercial, medical, military, or domestic operations within the division’s area of operations. The protection cell takes particular care in identifying the nature of such hazards, because in many cases standard military CBRN individual protective equipment (IPE) will not provide the necessary protection. In some instances, avoiding the hazard may be the most effective course of action. In all circumstances, the CBRN element makes recommendations designed to minimize immediate and long-term effects of toxic hazards of the health of division personnel to the division commander.

5-113. The division CBRNE element plans how the division helps the appropriate military and civil authorities to protect against, mitigate, and manage the consequences of CBRN attacks. However the combatant or joint force commander must give the division permission to work with civil authorities. Of particular concern to the division commander in this regard are CBRNE risks to civilian areas that may affect the execution of the division’s attack.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

5-114. The division explosive ordnance disposal element within the protection cell provides staff planning for Army explosive ordnance disposal operations throughout the division area of operations and is the explosive ordnance disposal special staff to the division commander. The division explosive ordnance disposal special staff coordinates with the division’s supporting explosive ordnance disposal battalion or company for explosive ordnance disposal support to the division. This division explosive ordnance disposal staff capability ensures that supporting explosive ordnance disposal forces understand and support the division commander’s operations and provides protection throughout the division area of operations. The explosive ordnance disposal unit supporting the division may provide a liaison officer to the division and/or maneuver enhancement brigade’s main command post as determined by the mission variables of METT-TC.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

5-115. Personnel recovery planning is an integral part of all division operations planning. The division’s personnel recovery appendix to the operations order addresses all potential isolated, missing, detained, and captured personnel and not just air crews. The personnel recovery element in the division locates itself in the current operations integrating cell but remains responsive to the chief of the protection cell. Planning considerations for Army personnel recovery are addressed in FM 3-50.

DETENTION OPERATIONS

5-116. The division conducts detention operations during the defense although the scale of those operations is historically smaller in the defense than in the offense. The safe and humane treatment of detainees is required by international laws. The number and physical and emotional conditions of these detainees varies in any situation depending on the scope of the operation and the elements involved. Detainee refers to any person captured or otherwise detained by the divisional units. Detainees may include enemy combatants (personnel engaged in hostilities against the U.S. or its coalition partners during an armed conflict), retained personnel (enemy medical personnel, enemy medical staff administrators, and others defined in JP 3-63), and civilian internees (civilians who are interned during an armed conflict, occupation, or other military operation for security reasons, for protection, or because the internee has committed an offense against the detaining power). The presence of detainees places a burden on the division’s maneuver and other units. Military police units performing the detention operations preserve the combat effectiveness of the capturing unit by removing these detainees rapidly and safely.

5-117. Detainee operations include all the actions taken by the division’s Soldiers, beginning at the point of capture or detainment; through movement to a detainee collection point (usually located in the brigade support area), to a detainee holding area, or theater detention facility, until their transfer, release, or repatriation. All Soldiers participating in military operations must be prepared to process detainees. Actions at the point of capture or detainment—the point where a Soldier has custody of, and is responsible for safeguarding, a detainee—can directly affect the mission success and could have a lasting impact. (See AR 190-8 for additional information on Army detainee operations.) (See ATP 4-02.46 for more information on detainee health care.)

SECTION IV – DIVISION DEFENSIVE PREPARATION CONSIDERATIONS

5-118. Preparation consists of those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation (ADP 5-0). The division and its subordinate brigades take full advantage of all the time available to prepare the defense. The division commander and subordinate commanders and staffs conduct simultaneous preparations. FM 3-90-1 discusses generic defensive preparation considerations for all three types of defensive tasks. The following are areas of special interest to divisions preparing to conduct a defense.

MISSION COMMAND

5-119. The division commander ensures that subordinate and supporting brigade commanders understand the division’s defensive concept of operations. This occurs through conducting different types of rehearsals throughout this phase. If possible, the commander physically or virtually takes subordinate and supporting brigade commanders to a vantage point where the commander’s intent and common control measures are transmitted and any necessary commander coordination occurs.

OPERATIONS PROCESS

5-120. The division performs continuous assessment throughout this phase to evaluate progress toward the desired end state, determine variances from expectations, and determine the significance—threat or opportunity—of those variances. Throughout this preparation period, necessary adjustments to the plan occur as these variances occur—planning assumptions are disproven or circumstances change on the ground. As necessary, the division adjusts previously selected measures of performance or effectiveness to be better capable of assessing the progress the division is making on preparing to defend the area of operations and the enemy is making toward preparing to attack.

COMMAND POST OPERATIONS

5-121. The division main command post locates where it can best perform its synchronization and planning activities while denying the enemy intelligence information. This may be in a sanctuary location or somewhere within the division support area. The division main command post should be out of the range of most enemy artillery cannon and multiple rocket launcher systems. Locating the main command post in or near other bases and base clusters increases security against Level I threats. The division adapts its plan to the division’s actual troop list during this phase.

5-122. If the plan calls for the division tactical command post to control one or more activities, such as the division security fight or the commitment of the striking force, the tactical command post displaces to the appropriate location where it can best control that activity. If the enemy has a significant signals intelligence capability the tactical command post may not always locate with the unit scheduled to conduct the division main effort or decisive operation.

INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES

5-123. The division employs its available information related capabilities, nested within the operations of the division’s higher headquarters, during this phase of the operations cycle. The division uses these capabilities to cause targeted audiences to react in ways favorable to the division and other joint forces by influencing that audience’s emotions, motives, and reasoning, and most of all, their actions.

INFORMATION PROTECTION

5-124. The G-6 refines the division information protection plan during the preparatory phase of defensive tasks. The G-6 staff section works with the protection cell to provide staff supervision of the implementation of intrusion and attack detection. This is accomplished by monitoring perimeter protection tools and devices to identify activities that constitute violations of the information protection plan and security policy. Selected events or occurrences, such as numerous log-on attempts within a period, are monitored to detect unauthorized access and inadvertent, malicious, or non-malicious modification or destruction of data.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

5-125. A detailed reconnaissance of the area of operations helps the division commander and staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate and supporting brigades refine the defensive plan and determine the most effective way to use the terrain and available resources. These refinements impact division security forces, division main battle area forces, the division reserve, and operations in the division support area.

TACTICAL TROOP MOVEMENTS

5-126. During the preparatory phase, the division’s BCTs and supporting brigades move into their defensive areas of operations or bases and make necessary adjustments to the defensive scheme based on the current situation. They finish conducting any remaining reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) tasks not yet accomplished. They also complete any necessary task organization actions and finish exchanging liaison officers. Adjacent units make contact when the division employs contiguous areas of operations. FM 3-90-1 addresses considerations for occupying defensive positions in both the security area and the main battle area.

5-127. When preparing to conduct a mobile defense, the striking force withdraws to attack positions and conducts the decisive attack. It deploys all or some of its elements to:

Deceive the enemy as to the force’s purpose.

Occupy dummy battle positions.

Create a false impression of unit boundaries (especially when operating with armored-infantry forces or multinational forces).

5-128. Military police units from the maneuver enhancement brigade and the military police platoons found within the BCTs contribute to division mobility capabilities by conducting battlefield circulation control to help conduct tactical troop movements during the preparation and execution phases of all three defensive tasks.

OCCUPY AN AREA

5-129. Occupation of an area involves the use of the terrain’s natural defensive qualities and maximum improvement of the natural terrain with the personnel, materiel, and time available. In addition to the preparation of the initial defensive and blocking positions, occupation of the area includes installing command detonated anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields, preparing and executing demolitions and other artificial obstacles, including pre-chambering for conventional demolition munitions, installing camouflage, construction of fighting and survivability positions, and improvement of observation and fields of fire. Priority of work suggestions are addressed in FM 3-90-1. Detailed coordination is necessary to ensure that plans for the organization of the ground are integrated with detailed fire plans and plans for the maneuver of forces, particularly the division reserve.

5-130. Barriers are integrated into the defensive scheme to hold the enemy under fire or to divert the enemy into areas to be destroyed by fires and offensive maneuver. The designation of division obstacle zones takes maximum advantage of natural obstacles. BCTs use barriers and command detonated minefields to create or extend existing barriers and obstacles and to block defiles to further impede enemy movement and canalize the enemy’s advance.

5-131. Infantry task forces construct strong points during the preparation phase if the division commander identifies key terrain that must be retained to maintain the integrity of the division’s defense. IBCTs anticipating contact with enemy armor use this period to construct defensive positions capable of surviving that encounter. These defensive positions incorporate significant numbers of obstacles designed to prevent enemy armor from closing with and penetrating brigade defenses. This is because IBCTs possess only a limited capability to conduct counterattacks to restore a position or to repel a penetrating enemy armored force.

MOBILITY AND COUNTERMOBILITY

5-132. When preparing to conduct an area defense, the priority of effort for engineer units within a BCT participating in an area defense is to survivability and then to countermobility. Engineer units within the division’s flank BCTs focus on conducting countermobility operations to impede potential enemy counterattacks into those flanks after they complete their preparation of fighting and survivability positions within BCT defensive positions. When necessary, the division tasks the supporting sustainment brigade to help with the forward staging of barrier and obstacle material, mines, and demolitions. The division engineer tasks the maneuver enhancement brigade, through the current operations cell, for engineer assets to provide any additional mobility support required in the division support area once the division occupies its area of operations.

5-133. When preparing to conduct a mobile defense, the priority of effort for engineer units within each BCT and the maneuver enhancement brigade is to ensure the striking force’s mobility and then to the countermobility efforts of the BCTs in the division fixing force. However, a division conducting a mobile defense places restrictions on obstacle emplacement by its BCTs in the fixing force during the preparation phase so that the actions of the striking force on its commitment are not inadvertently hindered. As part of their preparations, BCT commanders within the striking force task-organize engineer units with elements of their reconnaissance battalion. Highly mobile engineer forces capable of conducting in-stride breaches of obstacles and gaps are well-forward and integrated into each BCT’s lead maneuver formations within the striking force.

5-134. When preparing to conduct a retrograde, the priority of effort for engineer units within each BCT and the maneuver enhancement brigade is the mobility of the main body. A secondary priority is to the mobility of any detachments left in contact and then to countermobility effort designed to impede the advance of enemy forces.

CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

5-135. The division uses the attached, OPCON, or TACON battlefield surveillance brigade to gain information about the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in targeted locations. The division tasks other subordinate units to conduct information collection if the division is not supported by a battlefield surveillance brigade or if that brigade cannot meet all of the division’s information collection requirements. The division may also be able to exploit information collected by the corps R&S brigade to answer some of its priority intelligence requirements. The brigade conducts reconnaissance and surveillance of named and target areas of interest according to the published information collection plan. These areas are within the areas of operations of the division’s BCTs. Alternatively, the brigade may be given an area of operations in which to conduct R&S of named and target areas of interest during this phase. The assignment of an area of operations to this brigade reduces the brigade’s coordination requirements. A battlefield surveillance brigade given an area of operations requires some type of augmentation before conducting R&S. This is because the brigade’s cavalry squadron has limited combat capabilities. Also, the organizational design of this brigade’s headquarters does not provide the staff expertise necessary to conduct all the doctrinal requirements associated with owning an area of operations.

5-136. The battlefield surveillance brigade uses its cavalry squadron assets with either the brigade’s organic UASs or employing combat aviation brigade augmenting assets as unmanned and manned aerial reconnaissance platforms. Teaming air and ground assets provides greater fidelity and timeliness when collecting information. Aerial assets can cue ground assets to possible enemy locations either to avoid them or get into a better position to observe them. Ground assets can also cue aerial assets to enemy locations so the aerial asset can track enemy forces when they move. These forces provide information that allows the FA and combat aviation brigades to refine plans for strike and Army aviation interdiction attack missions. If necessary, they can act as observers during strikes and provide battle damage assessments afterwards. Augmenting the battlefield surveillance brigade with manned aerial reconnaissance and additional ground reconnaissance units enhances its area and route reconnaissance capabilities.

5-137. The brigade’s cavalry squadron contains a long-range surveillance company. However the brigade has limited means of inserting, supporting, and extracting—including emergency extraction if compromised—of its long-range surveillance teams. Employment of these teams, especially at extended ranges, requires the use of either Army aviation or U.S. Air Force capabilities. The division staff helps the squadron and brigade in coordinating the use of those Army aviation and U.S. Air Force capabilities. The division staff also coordinates for the long-range surveillance company supporting the corps to answer some of the division’s information requirements. (See FM 3-55.93 for more information on the employment of long-range surveillance assets.)

5-138. These augmenting forces let the battlefield surveillance brigade conduct R&S between the BCT areas of operations in much greater detail and depth when the division employs noncontiguous BCT areas of operations. The division commander concentrates forces along probable enemy avenues of approach. Ground reconnaissance units, such as the cavalry squadron, provide local security for the brigade’s signals intelligence systems. This lets the brigade push these signals intelligence systems further into the BCT’s area of operation and allows them to gather signals intelligence originating further beyond the forward line of own troops (FLOT).

5-139. Counterintelligence and human intelligence teams from the battlefield surveillance brigade military intelligence battalion are attached to the BCTs during the defense. The corps expeditionary military intelligence battalion provides these teams when the division does not have a supporting battlefield surveillance brigade. These teams provide the BCTs with a greater capability to simultaneously conduct stability and defensive tasks within their areas of operations. The brigade collection and an exploitation company collects information from detainees and the local population.

OBSCURATION

5-140. Obscuration factors include the presence of man-made conditions which impact the conduct of the defense. This includes such things as obscurants and the dust raised by moving vehicles and the natural atmosphere, such as fog, rain, and snow. The division staff uses available preparation time to obtain sufficient types and quantities of obscurants if planning determined that divisional units need to routinely employ obscurants to counter threat electro-optical sensors during their conduct of operations. These obscurants may be provided from a wide-variety of sources, such as smoke pots, smoke generators, smoke grenades, and smoke shells. Divisional units use available preparation time to perform checks on their electro-optical sensors, fixing inoperative ones, and obtaining sufficient stocks of batteries to cover the order to ship time projected for their deployment area. These obscuration preparation considerations apply to the conduct of the other elements of decisive action.

INTELLIGENCE

5-141. Before the battle, the division and brigade commanders require information about:

The composition, equipment, strengths, and weaknesses of the attacking enemy force.

The location, direction, and speed of enemy reconnaissance elements.

The location and activities of enemy units and reserves.

Enemy command, control, and communications facilities.

The location of enemy fire support and air defense systems with their associated command and control nets.

SUPPORT TO SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

5-142. The division G-2 uses the preparation phase to complete information collection integration and synchronization. The division relies on joint, and some national systems down linked to the division’s headquarters to detect and track targets beyond its organic capabilities. The division relies on joint and national information collection systems during the early stages of force projection operations to develop an accurate common operational picture of the division area of operations. The division uses its information collection assets to refine its knowledge of the terrain and civil considerations within its area of operations throughout this phase. Information collection assets are used during the preparatory phase to identify friendly vulnerabilities and key defensible terrain. The division conducts periodic information collection of any division’s unassigned areas during this phase to prevent the enemy from exploiting these areas to achieve surprise.

INFORMATION COLLECTION

5-143. Information collection is important in the defense. Constant surveillance of the division’s area of operations and effective reconnaissance are necessary to obtain early and continuous information about the enemy, to acquire targets, and to verify and evaluate potential enemy courses of action and capabilities.

5-144. The division information collection efforts focus on identifying when, where, and with what strength the enemy will attack during the preparation and execution phases of the defense. This allows the division commander to identify the most opportune times to conduct offensive actions, such as spoiling attacks and counterattacks, designed to wrest the initiative from the enemy or exploit enemy vulnerabilities. Division information collection systems identify, locate, and track the enemy’s main attack.

5-145. In an area defense, this provides the commander time to allocate sufficient combat power to strengthen the defense at the point of attack or shape the defensive battle to increase the effectiveness of the division counterattack once launched. In a mobile defense, answers to these intelligence requirements allow the division commander to properly array the fixing forces in an economy of force role to defend or delay and shape the battlefield for the counterattack by the strike force. The division commander must have this determination in a timely enough fashion that it provides the time necessary to commit the striking force at precisely the right place. The striking force commander receive near real time updates during the conduct of the striking force’s movement to contact to ensure the striking force engages the enemy force at the desired time and place.

FIRES

5-146. Division controlled fires initially focus on any of the following during the preparatory phase:

Selecting high-payoff targets.

Isolating approaching enemy forces from its higher headquarters.

Supporting the actions of friendly forces.

Employing rapidly emplaced, remotely controlled munitions to selectively deny areas or interdict movement choke points.

Attrition of enemy combat power, including the counter-fire fight.

5-147. Whether in an area defense or mobile defense, fires weight the division decisive operation. In an area defense, the decisive operation is where the defense is responsible for covering the enemy’s main avenue of approach. The attack of the striking force is the division’s decisive operation in a mobile defense. During preparations for a mobile defense, the division ensures that its Army fire assets and combat aviation helicopters are positioned where they can best survive the enemy’s attack while providing continuous and massed fires to support the striking force once the division commits the later organization.

5-148. All units employ a mix of passive and active air and missile defense measures to protect their defensive preparation from enemy aerial observation and attack. The division JAGIC synchronizes the use of joint air and ground fires to engage enemy air and ground systems while precluding the division from engaging friendly aviation assets.

SUSTAINMENT

5-149. The brigades participating in a defense require significant quantities of barrier material and ammunition. The division ensures that the supporting sustainment brigade provides those stocks in times and locations that expedite the conduct of defensive preparations. The BCTs constituting the division security force or striking force require a greater amount of Class III and maintenance support than their main battle area counterparts. In both cases, the more distance the security force and striking force must cover to accomplish their missions, the greater the amount of supplies they will need. When these two forces are located at a significant distance from the division support area, part of the division’s preparations may be establishing a forward base or logistics support area to support the planned employment of these two forces. The preparation phase is a good time to inject replacements into divisional units.

5-150. Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) from the security or striking force area poses significant challenges because of rapid changes in the tactical situation. The nonlinear nature of combat in the areas where these two forces conduct operations and the probability that movement routes may be temporarily interdicted makes it imperative that the common operational picture available to ground and air ambulances be as accurate as possible and updated as frequently as possible.

5-151. The division’s supporting maneuver enhancement brigade’s engineers initiate any required general engineering tasks in the division support area during this phase. These tasks include the establishing temporary camps designed to hold displaced and detained persons.

PROTECTION

5-152. The division’s brigades occupy their areas of operations as soon as possible during this phase so they have as much time as possible to prepare defensive positions and enhance the defensive characteristics of the terrain within those areas. This includes the construction of fighting and survivability positions. Those protective activities outlined in FM 3-90-1 for the preparation phase apply to division operations. What follows in paragraphs 5-153 to 5-169 are additional protective considerations not addressed in that manual.

OPERATIONAL AREA SECURITY AND ANTITERRORISM

5-153. The operational area security and antiterrorism activities of the division during the preparatory phase are discussed in ADRP 3-37. Preparations for these protection functions similar to those discussed in ADRP 3-90. The division protection cell provides staff oversight of the maneuver enhancement brigade as that brigade organizes the division support area and prepares units located within that area to conduct these activities. BCT and other support brigades conduct local security activities in their defensive positions, assembly areas, and attack positions that provide security and antiterrorism protection to those units.

5-154. Military police units from the maneuver enhancement brigade enhance division protection capabilities by conducting reconnaissance within the division support area. These units perform response-force operations to defeat Level II threats against bases and base clusters located in that support area. They maintain contact with Level III threats in the division support area until the division tactical combat force can respond.

5-155. Division engineer units operating in the division support area (usually conducting general engineering or survivability tasks) have the potential to serve as a response force to Level II threats within that support area. These engineer units require time to assemble because they are normally dispersed when conducting engineer missions on an area basis. They require augmentation in the areas of fire support and antitank capabilities before commitment.

SAFETY AND FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE

5-156. Divisional units implement the division’s safety plan during this phase. The division safety officer observes safety-related issues and ensures units translate the plan into action by traveling throughout the division area of operations.

5-157. Confirmation briefs and rehearsals are primary tools for identifying and reducing fratricide risk during the preparation phase. The following are considerations for their use:

Confirmation briefs and rehearsals ensure subordinates know where fratricide risks exist and what to do to reduce or eliminate them.

Backbriefs ensure subordinates understand the commander's intent. They often reveal areas of confusion or complexity, or planning errors.

The types of risks identified depend on the type of rehearsal conducted.

Rehearsals extend to all levels of command and involve all key players.

5-158. The following factors may reveal fratricide risks during rehearsals:

Number and type of rehearsals.

Training and proficiency levels of units and individuals.

The habitual relationships between units conducting the operation.

The physical readiness (endurance) of the troops conducting the operation.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

5-159. During the preparatory and execution phases, the division protection cell has two primary functions. The first is to closely monitor critical information and the execution of the division operations security program to determine if the enemy has a chance to detect the selected course of action. The second is to determine if the division military deception plan is being supported by the actions of divisional units. This is done with the current operations integrating cell The protection cell recommends changes to operations security measures due to their assessments during these phases.

SURVIVABILITY

5-160. While survivability is considered an engineer task, all division units have an inherent responsibility to improve their positions, whether they are located in fighting positions or in a base in the division support area. Survivability consists of four areas designed to focus efforts in mitigating friendly losses to hostile actions or environments: mobility; situational understanding; hardening; and camouflage, concealment, and military deception. Division units have time during this phase to improve their positions in these matters.

5-161. The division’s BCTs and supporting brigades occupy their areas of operations and bases as soon as possible during this phase so they can have time to prepare defensive positions and enhance the defensive characteristics of the terrain within those areas of operations. This includes the construction of fighting and survivability positions

5-162. When preparing both area and mobile defenses, the engineers within the division help units prepare fighting and survivability positions. These positions are located throughout the division area of operations from the security area, through the main battle area, to the division support area. Requirements beyond the capabilities of BCT engineer units are passed by the division current operations cell to the division’s maneuver enhancement brigade or any functional engineer brigade supporting the division. These engineers also help prepare any strong points required by the division concept of operations.

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

5-163. The division surgeon refines the division’s medical support plan during the preparatory phase of defensive tasks. The surgeon staff section works with the protection cell to provide staff supervision of the implementation of force health protection actions by the division’s subordinate units. Medical personnel monitor the division’s area of operations for disease; they conduct preventive services—such as immunizations and prophylaxes; and help when Soldiers get exposed to hazards. Medical personnel establish medical and occupational and environmental health screening as required. Through field sanitation team training and water assessments, medical personnel educate Soldiers and noncombatants on disease and nonbattle injury prevention.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

5-164. Chemical reconnaissance units orient on locations identified during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process to the best of their abilities during this phase. The division refines its plans for the maneuver enhancement brigade to position available decontamination assets to support the division scheme of maneuver and supporting obscuration units to counter likely enemy sensors.

5-165. CBRN personnel contribute to the protection of division units by the performance of vulnerability assessments as units occupying their defensive positions. These assessments provide a list of recommended corrective actions for brigade commanders to consider. These corrective actions range from emplacing smoke pots and generators to provide obscurants to defeat threat sensors to the establishing collective protective shelters and personnel and equipment decontamination sites.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

5-166. Explosive ordnance disposal units supporting the division provide the capability to render safe and dispose of all explosive ordnance, including improvised explosive devices and weapons of mass destruction that present a threat to operations, installations, personnel, and/or material. During the preparatory and execution phases of the operations cycle, they may dispose of hazardous foreign or U.S. ammunition, unexploded explosive ordnance, individual mines (including those equipped with anti-handling features), and chemical mines. Breaching and clearance of foreign or U.S. minefields is primarily an engineer responsibility. The explosive ordnance disposal force serves as a combat multiplier by rendering safe munitions that restrict freedom of movement and deny access to or threaten supplies, facilities, and other critical assets to divisional elements.

COORDINATE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

5-167. The protection cell refines division plans to take advantage of available echelon above division air and missile defense coverage. When preparing to conduct an area defense, the commander places an air defense umbrella over the command with emphasis on division critical nodes. When preparing to conduct a mobile defense, the movement of the striking force complicates its coverage by air and missile defense assets outside division control. Based on enemy capabilities, the division commander prioritizes between protecting both the fixing force and the striking force.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

5-168. Unit commanders ensure that assigned and attached personnel are familiar with joint and Army personnel recovery doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures. They conduct refresher survival, escape, resistance, and evasion training as necessary. They should also be familiar with the division’s personnel recovery standard operating procedures and any division techniques and procedures that have been developed. Unit commanders also ensure that assigned and attached personnel are familiar with the evasion procedures. This refresher training normally can only be conducted in unit assembly areas.

5-169. During this phase, the combat aviation brigade’s aviation unit commanders prepare to conduct rotary-wing combat search and rescue to support their own operations and provide mutual support to other aviation units based on their unit’s inherent capabilities. Such combat search and rescue support is planned concurrently with their ongoing operations and considers the capabilities of adjacent and supporting units. Ground commanders adjust their personnel recovery standard operating procedures and plans to incorporate the current mission variables of METT-TC. If the plan designates the establishment of a division-level personnel recovery task force to search for, locate, identify, and recover isolated personnel; that task force organizes, trains, and conducts rehearsals during this phase. This task force includes not only search and rescue elements, but also security forces designed to protect search and rescue teams from enemy attack.

SECTION V – EXECUTING DIVISION DEFENSIVE TASKS

5-170. All defenses use terrain, depth, and mutual supporting fires as force multipliers. Proper use of terrain helps to mass the effects of the division’s combat power at decisive points. Terrain influences the tempo of enemy attacks and provides the defender with cover and concealment. The depth of the division’s area of operations provides the commander with operational flexibility and allows subordinate brigades to disperse as necessary to take full advantage of the terrain. Depth reduces the defender’s risk. Mutual support results from the division’s integration of the fires and movement of its attached brigades. Mutual support allows the division commander to focus the effects of the division’s combined arms team at decisive points to defeat enemy forces.

5-171. Normally the defensive battle culminates in the main battle area. The simultaneous application of the division’s fires and movement and maneuver warfighting functional capabilities, guided, supported and protected by the other warfighting functions defeats the attacking enemy force. While the actual main battle area fight is taking place, the focus of the division staff is on shaping operations or supporting efforts designed to set the conditions necessary for the BCTs to conduct the division’s decisive operations or main effort in the next phase of the campaign or major operation. The focus of the division’s BCTs is on conducting a series of successful defensive battles and engagements according to the division commander’s intent within the current phase of the campaign or major operation.

5-172. In the division’s defense, one set of BCTs conducts the division’s decisive operation, the success of which determines the success or failure of the division defense. The division’s other BCTs and supporting brigades conduct division shaping operations and are resourced with the minimal combat power necessary to accomplish their missions. All of the division’s attached brigades conduct sustainment operations. ADRP 3-90 and FM 3-90-1 discuss defensive execution considerations. What follows by warfighting function are execution considerations specific to the conduct of a division defense or considerations that require special emphasis.

MISSION COMMAND

5-173. The division commander’s leadership synchronizes the effects of the division’s warfighting functions during the execution of the defense. These effects occur in the three interrelated parts of the division’s area of operations. These parts are:

Security force area.

Main battle area.

Division support area.

5-174. The effects of the division’s warfighting functions are what defeats attacking enemy forces. Throughout execution, the division commander’s intent, coupled with their missions, directs brigade commanders toward mission accomplishment, especially when current orders no longer fit the situation and those brigade commanders decide how to deviate from them. The commander conducts decisive operations by capitalizing on available intelligence to maneuver forces, setting the tempo of operations, and weighting the decisive operation by allocating and reallocating resources and adjusting priorities of support.

COMMAND POST OPERATIONS

5-175. The current operations cells within the main command post shifts and synchronizes combat power where and when necessary to ensure the success of the division’s decisive operation according to the division commander’s directions. The division may employ the division tactical command post to control the shaping activities of the division security force. This is most appropriate if the security force is comprised of units from more than one BCT or supporting brigades.

5-176. During the conduct of an area defense, the subordinate BCT commanders should be allowed to fight their engagements within their areas of operations without a great deal of division commander interference as long as their actions remain within the commander’s intent. Collectively, the BCTs may directly control the bulk of the division’s reserves depending on the mission variables of METT-TC. For example, if each BCT area of operations is fairly large, favors a forward defense, and the correlation of forces is fairly even, the division retains a small, such as a battalion-sized, reserve to address uncertainty. A division commander conducting an area defense accepts less risk because subordinate BCT area of operations and task organizations were designed so that each BCT had adequate forces to defend its area of operations with reasonable chances of defeating the enemy, even without the commitment of the division reserve. This might force the division commander to accept greater risk in less critical areas of the division area of operations.

5-177. When conducting a mobile defense, the division main command post retains control of the attack by the striking force to ensure synchronization and unity of effort. The BCT commander(s) within the fixing force conduct battles and engagement according to the commander’s intent. The division commander provides the striking force BCT commanders with the anticipated size and composition of the targeted enemy force within their respective areas of operations and complete supporting graphic control measures—especially obstacle emplacements—as part of the operation order for the striking force’s attack.

5-178. As the penetrating enemy force approaches the decision point to commit the striking force, the commander updates the common operational picture so that BCT commanders and staffs within the striking force are aware of situational changes to the plan and understand any adjustment decision they make because of those changes. This continues even as the striking force attacks the penetrating enemy force. The ability of the division mission command system to operate beyond line of sight maintains a constantly updated operational picture.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

5-179. The division’s public affairs activities continue to nest within the public affairs plans of the division’s higher headquarters during this phase of the operations cycle. The division’s public affairs activities inform internal and external publics about ongoing division operations.

5-180. In today’s environment, there are few military operations where media are not present with the ability of immediately transmitting what can be seen and heard. The images and words they project are powerful and can affect national policy. In our form of government, the media has the right to cover the division’s operations and the public has a right to know what the media has to say. The division cannot and should not try to control media messages or stories. The commander has direct impact on the effectiveness of the division’s public affairs activities by using available public affairs to engage the media. Many in the media lack military knowledge, but they are the key to transmitting information about the division and its operations to the American and international public. There are many good things about the division and its Soldiers that are unknown to the members of the public, and division commanders at all echelons and the division’s public affairs personnel have a responsibility to tell the division’s story.

5-181. The objective of the division commander in dealing with the media is to ensure that division operations are presented to the American and international publics accurately and without bias. Long-term embedded reporters are very effective in getting out that information. Some members of the press genuinely want the Soldier’s perspective and may or may not seek official approval to accompany Soldiers on missions. That does not mean they will not report military misconduct and mistakes. Other members seek only to confirm their previously held opinions and twist the facts to match their story line. The division public affairs officer helps commanders and staff officers know any bias held by individual members of the media. The public affairs officer is both a special and personal staff officer with direct access to the commander. Public affairs activities, however, require close coordination and synchronization. For this reason, the division public affairs staff works closely with the G-3 and G-9.

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

5-182. The division’s common operational picture, commander observations, and staff running estimates are the primary tools for assessing the conduct of the division’s defense against the commander’s intent, division mission, and concept for the operation. Once variances from the plan are identified using previously determined measures of performance or effectiveness, the division commander makes any necessary adjustment decisions, including any changes in support priorities, to change the plan to reflect the ongoing reality.

CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES

5-183. The division conducts cyber electromagnetic activities to disrupt the enemy’s command and control while protecting friendly command capabilities to support the division commander’s scheme of maneuver. This includes targeting the enemy command and control system, weapons systems, and jammers according to the division commander’s established priorities while preventing the enemy from doing the same. The division conducts cyber electromagnetic activities to achieve a broad range of effects from disruption to deception. Joint cyber assets augment the division cyber electromagnetic capability in the division security area to provide continuous cyber electromagnetic coverage.

INFORMATION PROTECTION, OPERATIONS SECURITY, AND MILITARY DECEPTION

5-184. The division employs information protection, operations security, and military deception to disrupt enemy target acquisition and intelligence gathering while protecting the division’s own intelligence and mission command systems from similar enemy activities. The objects of these information tasks allow divisional units to multiply the effects of their combat power and synchronize the employment of landpower with other joint capabilities during the conduct of the defense. This occurs by securing an uninterrupted flow of data and information between divisional units by employing cybersecurity, computer network defense, and electronic protection. They also help create ambiguity in the mind of enemy decisionmakers and interrupt the ability of enemy commanders to make decisions not prejudicial to the enemy’s interests.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

5-185. A division conducting defensive tasks uses a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures to accomplish the mission. At one end of the defensive continuum is a static defense oriented on terrain retention. This defense depends on the use of firepower from fixed positions to deny the enemy terrain. At the other end is a dynamic defense focused on the enemy. That defense depends on maneuver to disrupt and destroy the enemy force.

SECURITY FORCE AREA

5-186. The operations of the division security force are not preliminary activities before the main battle area fight. Security activities are directly tied to the future fight in the main battle area as part of one operation and one scheme of maneuver. The division commander understands how the security force affects the division’s main battle area fight. The division security force—when conducting a guard or cover—causes the enemy’s lead brigade tactical groups to become decisively engaged when they attempt to penetrate the security force area. This may reveal the intended location of the enemy main attack and alter the rate at which enemy forces close on the main battle area. Division security forces may also cause the commitment of enemy follow-on forces by defeating or destroying the enemy’s leading tactical units.

5-187. Security forces target elements of the attacking enemy’s formations as they traverse the division security area. This disrupts the enemy force’s combined arms integrity and slows the enemy’s ability to react to friendly forces before they arrive in the main battle area. Specifically, high-payoff targets for the covering force include enemy reconnaissance units, air defense systems, enemy command vehicles, obstacle breaching equipment, and CBRN-capable delivery systems. Destroying accompanying enemy air defense systems in the security area improves the capability of Army attack helicopters and joint fixed-wing aircraft to attack the enemy throughout the depth of the division area of operations. Destruction of enemy air defense radars denies an enemy the capability to conduct effective air defense with other than short range systems. Destruction of enemy obstacle clearing assets reduces the enemy force’s breaching capability before the force’s arrival in the main battle area. Both the physical destruction of enemy command equipment and cyber electromagnetic attacks against enemy command and control disrupt the enemy’s capability to synchronize current and future operations.

5-188. Each BCT commander in the main battle area controls the ground forward of the BCT’s main defensive positions out to the battle handover line. Each BCT places BCT-controlled security forces and obstacles and employs fires in this area to canalize the enemy and facilitate the rearward passage of lines of that portion of the division-controlled security forces retrograding within the BCT area of operations.

5-189. After battle handover and completion of their reward passage, the division security force withdraws to a designated position and prepares for future operations. This normally will be a position deeper in the main battle area or in the division support area where there is time to rearm, refuel, or reconstitute, as necessary. The security force passes through main battle area units as quickly as possible to minimize their vulnerability to indirect fires. (See FM 3-90-2 for more information on battle handover considerations and rearward passage of lines.)

MAIN BATTLE AREA

5-190. BCTs positioned in the main battle area conduct an area or mobile defense according to the division’s published operations order or verbal orders of the commander. They take full advantage of all available time and other available resources to prepare and improve their defensive positions. This includes making necessary repairs and improvements during comparative lulls in their defensive efforts.

Area Defense

5-191. In the execution of an area defense, BCTs in the main battle area direct and control the close combat activities of their subordinate and supporting elements using direct and indirect fires and movement against the assaulting enemy forces. Defending BCTs fight mainly from prepared, protected positions to concentrate combat power effects against attempted enemy breakthroughs and flanking movements. BCT commanders closely integrate mobile patrols, local security forces, sensors, and BCT reserves to cover gaps among defensive positions. They use mobile forces to cover gaps between defensive positions, reinforce those positions as necessary, and counterattack to seal local penetrations, block enemy attempts at flanking movements, or take advantage of enemy vulnerabilities exposed during the course of combat actions. Subordinate battalion commanders also retain reserves to rapidly contain, defeat, or block enemy forces before they can consolidate any gains. BCTs also conduct spoiling attacks to disrupt the enemy whenever possible. The division does not normally directly control the internal operations of its attached, OPCON, or TACON BCTs.

5-192. Ideally, BCTs and battalions launch local counterattacks immediately after attacking forces enter friendly defensive positions before the enemy has had time to reorganize and establish themselves or maintain the tempo that allowed the enemy to penetrate. Since this period is relatively short, these echelon reserves must judiciously deliver counterattacks based on the local commander’s initiative and judgment. The object is to block the enemy penetration, defeat the enemy attack, eject the enemy force, and restore conditions necessary to support the division commander’s concept and intent.

Mobile Defense

5-193. In a mobile defense, the commander may yields ground quickly in some areas to allow the enemy commander to think the attack has been successful or to entice the enemy force to move toward a point where they are vulnerable to the striking force’s attack. The fixing force conducts either an area defense or a delay structured to establish the conditions necessary for the successful conduct of the striking force’s attack. The division commander establishes an engagement area at the point where the enemy’s destruction is desired. This and other graphic control measures help the division commander direct the division’s BCTs and supporting brigades throughout the execution portion of a mobile defense.

5-194. The attack by the striking force in the engagement area isolates the targeted penetrating enemy force and defeats or destroys that enemy force, if possible. When facing large enemy penetrating forces, the division’s shaping operations or supporting efforts repeatedly isolate portions of the enemy force that are then attacked by the striking force and defeat the enemy in detail.

5-195. In a mobile defense, IBCTs attached to the division are normally part of the fixing force. An IBCT or a subordinate infantry battalion task force can garrison a strongpoint used by the division to shape the enemy’s penetration. The division uses infantry to vertically envelop the targeted enemy forces by air assaulting into locations that complete the isolation of a targeted enemy force. This requires local air superiority and the suppression of most enemy air defense systems during the time the unit is in moving along air movement corridors to their respective landing zones. An air assaulting force also needs support by direct and indirect fires capable of defeating counterattacking enemy armor systems. Those fires are provided by a situationally appropriate mixture of dismounted anti-armor systems, attack helicopters, CAS aircraft, and precision guided munitions delivered by cannon, rocket, and aircraft. (See Maneuver center of excellence doctrine for more information on the conduct of an air assault.)

Retrograde

5-196. Terrain management becomes critical during the conduct of retrograde operations. The division identifies successive rear boundaries for committed maneuver units when conducting contiguous operations. When conducting retrograde operations in a noncontiguous environment, the size and shape of BCTs is adjusted to reflect the current tactical situation. To clearly identify the area of operations of a division conducting retrograde operations, coordination between the division and the operational land and joint commanders is essential. These higher commanders resolve and make known to all affected commanders, not just the division commander, problems concerning the responsibility for the protection, relocation, and evacuation of sustainment facilities and other installations, and the destruction (less medical) of sustainment stockpiles including identifying who has authority to direct such action.

5-197. Early in the withdrawal, units in the forward defense area, except delaying or security elements, disengage from contact with enemy forces. When operating on an extended front, the division commander requires available supporting FA units from the FA brigade to reinforce the artillery units organic to the division’s attached, OPCON, or TACON BCTs. The division commander establishes appropriate command and support relationships between elements of the supporting FA brigade and the covering force. Control of these units reverts to FA brigade when possible.

5-198. The division transitions from a retirement to a movement to contact if the division moves to a new area. The combined arms nature of the BCTs coupled with the information collection capabilities of the division’s battlefield surveillance brigade and combat aviation brigade enables and eases the division’s transition as it moves along its retirement routes toward a new area of operations where it conducts its next operation.

Reserve

5-199. The division reserve’s commitment must be consistent with and integrated into the division commander’s scheme of maneuver and intent. The division commander may not be able to wait until favorable conditions are created to commit the reserve. Movement times or unexpected enemy actions could affect the reserve force. Once the division commander commits the division reserve, it generally is the division’s main effort.

5-200. With substantial reserves, the division commander permits or directs subordinate commanders to commit all forces. If the division cannot resource a reserve of sufficient combat power, the commander requires subordinates to obtain permission before employing their reserves and specifies the location of subordinate echelon reserve battle positions, tactical assembly areas, and hide positions.

5-201. When conducting a mobile defense, the division commander may need to commit some or all of the division reserve to help the fixing force conduct shaping operations or prevent its destruction. The commander must not commit the striking force except to conduct the division’s decisive operation. The division may have to employ some or all of the division reserve as a tactical combat force in the event the division encounters a serious irregular threat to the division support area.

5-202. Once their designated reserve forces are committed, division and brigade commanders reorganize or designate other units as their reserve. The forces most easily designated are the division tactical combat force and the reserves of subordinate BCTs, depending on their level of commitment. FA assets earmarked to support the division reserve on its commitment are positioned where they can provide support on short-notice throughout the scheme of maneuver. Until the division commits its reserve, these designated fire support assets support the division units in the security force and main battle areas, usually in a GS or GS-reinforcing role.

5-203. Attack helicopters from the division’s combat aviation brigade may be held initially in division reserve or temporarily designated as the reserve during the defense when other division reserves are committed. Because of their mobility and firepower, attack helicopters are the quickest and most effective means of stopping enemy armor penetrations. They are given missions with or without other maneuver elements but are most effective when used with ground combined arms forces.

5-204. The division commander uses decision points positioned throughout the division area of operations to trigger early decisions on the commitment of the reserve and/or striking force. Enemy arrival at decision points is tied to the time and space considerations needed for employment of these forces. This information is graphically portrayed on the decision support template. The commander determines which units attack, where they are positioned after the attack, and what interdiction is needed to isolate the enemy. Success of the reserve depends on its timely commitment, mass, surprise, speed, and boldness.

MOBILITY AND COUNTERMOBILITY

5-205. Rapidly emplaced, remotely controlled, networked munitions are critical to completing the obstacle plan in shaping the battlefield in front of an attacking enemy force. Before the reserve BCT’s or striking force’s commitment, engineer units attached, OPCON, or TACON to the division are assigned mobility and countermobility tasks that support multiple potential movement routes. OPCON or TACON of engineer units task-organized to support these forces pass to these two force commanders in time for the supporting engineer unit to link up with the appropriate force, resupply, reorganize, and rehearse any activities needed to support the missions of these forces. For example, the striking force may need to attack through a friendly short duration, self-destructing and self-deactivating minefield immediately after the munitions constituting this obstacle are neutralized. The supporting engineer must be able to ensure the axis of advance is clear or conduct in-stride breach operations as necessary. Follow-on engineers from the maneuver enhancement brigade or a functional engineer brigade conduct route improvements and clearance, replace assault bridges with other bridges, and expand obstacle breaches to follow up on the conduct of a successful counterattack attack.

INTELLIGENCE

5-206. The division’s search for intelligence must be unremitting. All division subordinates ensure that the division commander is informed during the defense. Similarly, the division commander ensures that pertinent information is habitually exchanged between all divisional units regardless of whether such a request has been made. Negative information is frequently important; likewise confirmation that the situation during a period of time has remained unchanged may be important. First contact with the enemy and new identifications are always reported by the most rapid means available. The best intelligence will be of no use if it arrives too late at the headquarters for which it is intended.

SUPPORT SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

5-207. The intelligence system, guided by the division G-2, is aggressive in the access, acquisition, and dissemination of current intelligence. It provides the division and brigade commanders and their staff with the enemy, terrain, and weather aspects of the common operational picture and timely combat information necessary for their situation awareness and understanding. The division intelligence cell provides early and accurate intelligence assessments, information, and best running estimates that expedite the division’s commander’s decision cycle.

INFORMATION COLLECTION

5-208. The division’s information collection operations allow its subordinate attached brigades and the division staff to provide combat information and produce intelligence products on the enemy and the environment—including forensics, weather, terrain, and civil considerations—necessary to make decisions. Together, this information answers the division commander’s critical information requirements and other intelligence and information requirements developed throughout the operations process. Timely and accurate intelligence encourages audacious decisionmaking and facilitates the rapid taking of actions that negate an enemy or potential adversary’s normal superior knowledge of their local operational environment. That timely and accurate intelligence depends on the execution of aggressive and continuous R&S by all divisional units.

5-209. The synchronization and integration of information collection into ongoing division operations are fundamental to the division’s ability to obtain information and intelligence when and where necessary. Thoroughly synchronized and integrated information collection operations adds many collection sources by addressing the contributions made by all available assets—both internal and external to the division—and deconflicting their operations. The G-2 recommends which assets are tasked when planning information collection requirements and assessing the collection of information. The actual tasking and direction of information collection by the G-3 eliminates unit and functional stovepipes in the planning, reporting, and processing of information and the producing of intelligence products. Together they enable the division to conduct information collection operations in a coordinated way.

5-210. A division commander’s critical information requirements in the defense address confirming the enemy’s main avenue of approach and the location and composition of enemy follow-on forces. Collection efforts focus on answering these requirements, ideally before becoming engaged and at least before the security force fight culminates. This provides time to shift defending forces to where they can take advantage of enemy weaknesses and counter enemy strengths. The defending commander decides how and where the division maneuvers to shape the battlefield with the concept of operations and intent.

5-211. Conducting information collection is a vital and continuous part of the division’s defensive efforts. The division employs the information collection capabilities of its subordinate BCTs and supporting brigades coupled with intelligence from joint and national agencies, which helps the division gain and maintain contact with the enemy while conducting defense. The division tracks and assesses the situation as the enemy maneuvers into the division area of operations and through the division security area and into the main battle area using the capabilities of these assets.

SUPPORT TO TARGETING

5-212. The division commander makes demands on the intelligence function to focus the division’s information collection efforts to support employment of division fires. As the attacking enemy formations approach, the commander employs joint and Army systems to monitor their movement even before entering the division’s area of operations to help identify the enemy’s main effort, high payoff and value targets, and time sensitive targets.

FIRES

5-213. In the defense, the division commander synchronizes the employment of fires that bring the enemy under effective fires as early as practicable unless the situation requires that fire be withheld to obtain surprise. Normally, the intensity of the fires that the enemy is subjected to progressively becomes heavier as that enemy approaches the defensive positions of the division’s subordinate BCTs. Division controlled fires are concentrated on critical localities and on targets beyond the range of those systems found in subordinate units. Coordination between division fires and the fire plans of subordinate BCTs is essential. In a like matter, the division defensive fire plan is synchronized with that of the higher operational level ground commander and adjacent units.

INTEGRATE FIRES

5-214. To ensure unity of effort, the execution of division fires complements the fires of higher tactical and operational echelons. The division commander recommends a FSCL location within the division area of operations to the next higher echelon. This expedites the employment of available joint fire assets to shape the battlefield and establishes the conditions for main battle area BCTs to conduct successful defenses.

EMPLOY FIRES

5-215. The division directs the initiation of fires before the enemy closes into direct fire engagement areas in either the security area or the main battle area. The division’s area of interest and area of operations extends far enough beyond the FLOT that the commander has the time and resources to identify approaching enemy forces, asses options, and recommend targets for attack. This attack may be conducted by joint fire assets or through the provision of mission orders to the division’s FA and combat aviation brigades. However these orders must be issued in sufficient time for Army and joint fire assets to engage them.

5-216. The division commander employs available fire support assets in the defense to destroy, delay, disrupt, or divert critical elements of the attacking enemy force. The commander employs fires to strike at enemy critical functional nodes, such as command posts, artillery positions, sustainment sites, troop concentrations, and air defenses. These enemy systems are most vulnerable from the moment they come within range of the division’s supporting fire systems until they complete their tactical deployment. The effects of these strikes create windows of opportunity that the division commander can exploit.

5-217. The destruction and defeat of complete enemy formations by fires alone is difficult to achieve because destruction normally requires the expenditure of massive resources even with the use of precision guided munitions. Disruption of enemy movements and timings through the destruction of key assets is a more feasible effect. Disruption reduces the enemy’s correlation of forces and is accomplished through a variety of means.

INTEGRATION OF AIR-GROUND FIRES

5-218. The division fires cell and the air support operations center (ASOC) and portions of the tactical air control party (TACP) (both from the division’s supporting U.S. Air Force air support operations squadron) normally form a JAGIC within the division’s current operations integrating cell. The JAGIC integrates and synchronizes fires and airspace control within the current operations integrating cell under the division commander’s authority. A portion of the division’s airspace element in the JAGIC coordinates with the division’s combat aviation brigade while the fires element coordinates with supporting FA units to ensure that aerial maneuver, division fires, and joint fires are used efficiently and directly contribute to the division’s overall defensive efforts. The JAGIC ensures that high payoff targets not engaged by the division’s controlled or joint fires are forwarded to the JFLC or joint task force targeting board. (See chapter 9 for additional information on the JAGIC.)

5-219. The division commander identifies requirements for fires from other components, such as air interdiction, CAS, and naval surface fire support. This helps achieve objectives and support the ground concept of operations. The division commander, as a supported commander, ensures that the joint force air and maritime component commanders, the supporting commanders, understand the assistance required. The Army uses air support requests to identify air support requirements and ensures the supporting air component understands those requirements. A digital air support request created by the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is the preferred method of requesting air support through fires channels. AFATDS uses the format established by DD Form 1972 (Joint Tactical Air Strike Request) to send both preplanned and immediate air support requests for CAS, interdiction, and electronic warfare. Detailed preplanned requests that retain a high precedence or priority and approved by the JFLC commander are sent to the Army battlefield coordination detachment at the joint air operations center. Those air support requests received by the joint air operations center in sufficient time to process through the planning stages of the joint air tasking cycle will likely result in a mission line on the air tasking order (ATO). Immediate air support requests sent during ATO execution are resourced from those missions already on the ATO.

5-220. The division commander employs fires with decisive effects once the striking force initiates contact with the targeted enemy force during the execution of a mobile defense. Employing CAS, artillery, and attack helicopters in close time and space proximity to support the striking force’s maneuver is complex. In addition, both the striking force and the enemy move towards the point of engagement. Therefore, determining precise target locations is more difficult than in an area defense where the friendly force is more static and target locations are planned well in advance and registered. Artillery and rocket systems may have to displace before they can range the enemy. The terrain and gun-target line geometry may make it difficult to engage the enemy without increasing the risk to friendly forces. Commanders and their staffs must plan to provide the most effective fires resources and mitigate the risk of fratricide as the striking force nears the designated engagement area while supporting air conducts CAS and close combat attacks.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

5-221. Echelon above division air and missile defense units will not normally be positioned to provide air and missile defense support to division security forces in the division security area. These units may be able to range portions of the main battle area to provide some GS. Generally, divisional units depend on offensive and defensive counter air operations conducted by the joint force air component and area air defense commander controlled fixed-wing aircraft for defense against enemy aircraft and missiles.

5-222. Available air defense assets are employed in mass and mix to support the defensive maneuver scheme. The division air and missile defense element is responsible for providing early warning of enemy aerial threats to the division’s subordinate units. Any echelon above division short-range air defense systems that support forces in the division’s forward security area transitions into the main battle area’s air and missile defense scheme as the security forces that they supported rejoin the division main body. Divisional units employ small arms air defense against enemy aircraft attacking their positions and enemy UAS. Units also employ camouflage and concealment techniques to avoid detection by enemy aircraft.

SUSTAINMENT

5-223. The division’s endurance is a function of sustainment. The support and services provided to the division ensures its freedom of action during the conduct of defensive tasks and prolongs its ability to conduct those defensive tasks. Rotating companies, battalions, and even BCTs into and out of their respective echelon reserve on a regular basis is one technique to provide more minimal sustainment to those divisional elements.

LOGISTICS

5-224. During the conduct of the defense, logistics elements within and supporting the division return combat damaged systems and maintenance failures to limited mission capable status for use by divisional units as quickly as possible. Those systems unable to be repaired within established guidelines are evacuated from the division where and when possible. The G-3 may direct that newly restored mission capable systems are provided to other than the originally owning unit if needed to build combat power in the new unit. In this case the G-4 coordinates unit property books adjustments. Subcomponents of combat and tactical vehicles are switched from one vehicle to another as necessary in a controlled cannibalization process to restore as many systems as possible. Those systems unable to be recovered and evacuated are destroyed to the maximum extent that available resources, time, and the enemy situation makes possible.

5-225. The ability of the division’s sustainment organization to continue the distribution of supplies and services to where they are needed throughout the division’s area of operations in the face of an attacking enemy determines the success of the division’s defensive efforts. The division’s movement control efforts react to combat and environmental impacts on the transportation network and available transportation assets within the division’s area of operations. The division transportation officer makes adjustments the division’s battlefield circulation and control plan and has those adjustments authenticated by the G-3 and transmitted to all echelons.

5-226. Conducting defensive tasks involves the expenditure of large amounts of Class V and the use of Class IV material. Counterattacking forces expends considerable quantities of Class III depending of the distance traveled and other mission variables of METT-TC. The G-4 provides forecasts of supply expenditures to the supporting material management center and reports expenditures. Defending divisions use caches of supplies to ensure the uninterrupted support of front lines units. Maintaining security of those caches is difficult as is the displacement of unexpended supplies in response to enemy advances. Commanders at all echelons are responsible, within their capabilities, for the prompt recovery and evacuation of casualties, non-mission capable equipment, and detainees.

5-227. The provision of field services to divisional units by the supporting sustainment brigade during the defense is curtailed to committed units with the exception of graves registration and possibly the aerial delivery of supplies. Commanders are responsible for the recovery, tentative identification, and care of remains and their effects, and their evacuation to the nearest collection point according to ARs and established policy. Temporary burial of remains is only approved when evacuation of those remains is not possible. Uncommitted units continue to receive hot meals, shower, laundry, and clothing repair services as the tactical situation allows. Tactical field exchanges continue to operate. Operational contracting and general engineering support to the division provided during the conduct of the defense is focused on supporting division operations in subsequent phases.

PERSONNEL SERVICES

5-228. Personnel services are sustainment functions that man and fund the force, maintain Soldier and Family readiness, promote the moral and ethical values of the nation, and enable the fighting qualities of the Army (ADP 4-0). The division staff provides personnel services to support the division’s operations and division Soldiers. Personnel services include the following:

Human resources support which is addressed in FM 1-0.

Financial management operations which are addressed in FM 1-06.

Legal support which is addressed in FM 1-04.

Religious support which is addressed in FM 1-05.

Band support which is addressed in ATTP 1-19.

All of these functions continue during defense. Some specific personnel services considerations are addressed in paragraphs 5-229 to 5-233.

5-229. Replacement Soldiers are incorporated into their new units when those units are in reserve or not conducting active operations whenever the tactical situation allows. In some cases, this requires them to remain in the unit field trains for an extra day or two. The units conduct necessary orientation, training, and evaluation of those new Soldiers so they make the greatest possible immediate contribution to the unit’s combat power.

5-230. Personnel accountability, strength reporting, awards and decorations, postal operations, and casualty reporting are the primary focus of the division’s adjutant general and subordinate brigade and battalion manpower and personnel staff sections during the conduct of the defense. This does not imply that financial management (including military pay), legal, religious, and band support by the appropriate division staff elements does not occur during the conduct of defensive tasks. The by-name management of the location and duty status of every person assigned or attached to division units is difficult to accomplish in an environment where units are being rapidly tasked organized and maneuvered over vast distances in reaction to battlefield events. Strength reporting is important to determine the combat power of the division’s units and needs to reflect the results of combat engagements and battles in near real time accuracy.

5-231. Awards and decorations are important morale builders that provide the division’s Soldiers and their next of kin tangible recognition for valor, meritorious service, and achievements. The chaos of battle should not be allowed to impede official recognition of heroic acts. Emphasis on the prompt reporting of heroic actions from the command level is necessary because it is possible that witnesses will become casualties in the near future given the lethality of modern combat. Division standards favor recognition of combat Soldiers instead of individuals in staff and support assignments whose actions are visible to the division commander.

5-232. Mail is also important to the morale of the division’s Soldiers. Every effort is made to ensure prompt delivery of personal mail. This is difficult given the need to redirect mail to the gaining units of those Soldiers cross attached in response to the current tactical situation. Accurate personnel accountability redirects effort. Mail addressed to Soldiers who are casualties requires special handling.

5-233. It is the casualty’s unit duty to submit casualty reports, conduct AR 15-6 investigations, and provide the casualty’s personal effects to the supporting mortuary affairs unit. For heavy casualties during high intensity operations, the division commander, with assistance from the division staff judge advocate, seeks a waiver of the requirement in AR 600-8-1 to conduct an AR 15-6 investigation. The Department of the Army (DA) Form 1156 (Casualty Feeder Card) is a required template or tool Soldiers and units use to gather and report information on all casualties as they occur. AR 600-8-1 explains the use of that form. Accurate and timely casualty reporting is paramount. Use the DA Form 1156 template as a prompter to transmit essential elements of the casualty report by voice or electronically through subordinate personnel channels to the division G-1 soon after the casualty occurs. All division personnel are sensitized to the confidentiality of casualty information. Every effort should be taken to avoid premature notification of the casualty’s next of kin and family before the casualty notification team performs that task. Steps should also be taken to avoid providing inaccurate and conflicting information to the next of kin and family.

ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM

5-234. The thrust of division Army Health System support while conducting defensive tasks is to clear the battlefield of casualties, provide immediate medical care to maximize the return to duty rate, or to stabilize patients requiring further evacuation to a higher role of care. This includes the provision of prompt medical treatment consisting of those measures necessary to locate, recover, resuscitate, stabilize, and prepare patients for evacuation to the next level of care and/or return to duty. The division surgeon section coordinates the prompt evacuation of casualties from the division’s role I and role II medical treatment facilities to supporting role III and role IV facilities provided by the division’s supporting medical unit. This evacuation employs a mixture of ground and aerial ambulances. Patient tracking is performed in coordination with G-1 accountability personnel. The surgeon section restocks medical supplies available to division medical personnel.

PROTECTION

5-235. Protection is a continuing function. Protection during this phase safeguards division critical nodes, secures routes within the division area of operations, preserves the combat capabilities of divisional units, and protects military and noncombatant personnel from the effects of enemy offensive operations. Those protection activities initiated during the preparation phase continue in this phase.

5-236. As the division conducts defensive actions, there is an increased risk that individuals and small units become isolated, missing, or captured. This is true if the division establishes a battlefield framework that includes noncontiguous areas of operations. The division uses combinations of immediate and deliberate military recoveries to regain control of these personnel. The division contributes resources to or requests joint support for an externally supported recovery operation if an immediate or deliberate military recovery operation is unsuccessful. If the ground situation is chaotic, it may be possible for the isolated, missing, or captured personnel to conduct their own unassisted recovery operation. (See FM 3-50 for more information on conducting these four types of personnel recovery operations.)

5-237. The division personnel recovery element forwards any personnel recovery support requirements beyond the division’s capabilities to the Army force recovery coordination center. This includes requirements for additional personnel recovery capable forces, planning information, and requests for evasion aids.

SECTION VI – ASSESSMENT

5-238. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. The division commander and staff base their assessments on their situational understanding. Assessment of the conduct of operations focused on the conduct of defensive tasks is simple, unlike the assessment of the conduct of operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks. The applicable measures of performance are if the purpose of the defense were accomplished. These purposes are referenced in paragraph 5-2 of this chapter. For example, a measure of effectiveness could be: “Was the desired amount of time gained by the division’s defensive actions so that some other action could occur?”

5-239. Measures of performance in the defense are equally simple and commonly understood. These include the ratio of friendly and enemy losses of personnel (including prisoners of war and line crossers) and combat systems of various types and how much terrain is seized by the enemy. Another measure of performance might be if the division’s information collection effort determined the enemy’s chosen course of action in time for the division to initiate effective countermeasures.

5-240. The division commander’s evaluation of the division’s defensive efforts allows the identification of variances from the defensive plan. These variances may be opportunities to accomplish the defensive mission more effectively or as threats to mission accomplishment or survival of the force. The division staff incorporates their assessments based on their evaluations into running estimates that present adjustment recommendations to the commander. The commander considers these recommendations, makes a decision, and directs actions to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. (See chapter 5 of ADRP 5-0 for additional information on assessment.)

SECTION VII – TRANSITIONS

5-241. A transition occurs when the commander makes the assessment that the unit changes its focus from one element of military operations to another. (See FM 3-90-1 for more information on transitions.)

SECTION VIII – SCENARIO CONTINUED

5-242. REDLAND initiated a conventional ground invasion of GREENLAND before the 52nd Division deployed into that country. The objective of REDLAND forces was to defeat coalition forces in the theater of operations, secure those portions of GREENLAND inhabited by Atropians and seize positions controlling the mountain passes west of THEB’SOL. These passes provide access to the ALBA river valley and to those areas of GREENLAND now under REDLAND control. Their possession by REDLAND greatly facilitates the conduct of a successful defense. (See figure 5-1 on page 5-40 for the 52nd Division’s task organization for this phase of the operation).

5-243. REDLAND forces initially overwhelmed the outnumbered and scattered GREENLAND forces. They occupied those GREENLAND areas inhabited by Atropians and pushed on toward their goal of securing the mountain passes in the vicinity of THEB’SOL. In a coordinated manner, the GREENLAND insurgency delayed the onward movement and integration of the 53rd Division by attacking X Corps/coalition force land component surface lines of communications and main supply routes from ports located along the WHITE SEA. Nevertheless, the U.S. European Command commander employed joint air interdiction to delay, disrupt, and attrit REDLAND forces long enough for the 53rd Division to arrive to bolster coalition defensive efforts. Coalition airpower gained air superiority rapidly after the deployment of Combined Joint Force Air Component fighter assets. However, their rapid deployment into the joint operations area restricted the throughput of ground forces until their deployment was completed due to crowding at the air ports of debarkation. This forced the European Command commander to deploy the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to secure main supply routes and use the BCTs in the 52nd Division deployment package 1 to provide sufficient forces to enable the 53rd Division to conduct a successful defense.

5-244. Joint intelligence determined that the REDLAND assault force, the 26th mechanized division tactical group (DTG), was attrited to less than 50-percent effectiveness. However, the actions of the 26th mechanized DTG created favorable conditions for the commitment of the REDLAND exploitation force, the 10th tank DTG, in an attempt to secure the mountain pass southwest of the city of THEB’SOL and the vital road node formed by that city, while the 20th Tank DTG secures the pass to the city’s northwest. Coalition joint fires continue to attrit REDLAND ground forces. In reaction REDLAND forces dispersed into smaller platoon and company-sized groups that can more easily conceal themselves. This is especially effective for those REDLAND motorized infantry forces operating in the more mountainous parts of the joint operations area.

5-245. At the beginning of this vignette, the X Corps/coalition force land component is defending along PL MAMMEL with the one U.S. division (the 53rd) and three GREENLAND divisions. The 52nd Division completed RSOI for two of its three deployment packages. (See figure 5-2 for the battlefield arrangement of forces for this defensive vignette). The box in the lower-left portion of the figure indicates the relative proportion of division assets devoted to that element of decisive action.

5-246. On order the 52nd Division assumed command of the 2/25 SBCT and the 1/52 IBCT. These two BCTs were previously committed under the control of 53rd Division with the mission of conducting an area defense within their respective areas of operations along PL MAMMEL to prevent REDLAND penetration of PL DARLING. The division early entry command post (EECP) coordinates with the 21st Theater Sustainment Command, the 103rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command and X Corps headquarters during the reception, staging, and onward movement of 52nd Division forces, controlling the integration of these forces into the division, and controlling the defense. The division’s main command post is just now starting to flow into joint operations area and is occupying a fixed facility in the vicinity of the division’s air and sea ports of debarkation. It remains in that location throughout the defense because of the advantages that location has in available communications infrastructure and available security. From that location, it continues its planning and analysis functions while using the common operational picture using available strategic communications.

5-247. The division conducts an area defense by assigning contiguous area of operations within the division area to its two committed BCTs. Since the 2/25 SBCT and the 1/52 IBCT were already involved in combat operations and integrated into the X Corps/coalition force land component defensive scheme, the X Corps/coalition force land component commander assigned the division responsibility for their combined areas of operations and an additional area sufficient to allow the division to assemble the remainder of its units. This allows the division to conduct shaping operations that set the conditions for transitioning to a focus on the offense and allowing the continuation of divisional sustainment operations. In this scenario, the 2/25 SBCT and the 1/52 IBCT continue to conduct defensive tasks while the rest of the division assembles to support their defense or in preparation for the offense.

MISSION

5-248. On order, the 52nd Division defends along PL MAMMEL to prevent further loss of GREENLAND territory to allow the buildup of combat power in anticipation of a transition to the offense.

COMMANDER’S INTENT

5-249. The purpose of this operation is to stop the advance of REDLAND forces to set the conditions for transitioning to the offense. Key tasks are stopping the advance of REDLAND forces and completing the RSOI of 52nd Division forces. End state is REDLAND forces halted between PLs MAMMEL and DARLING, civilian control retained by local authorities insofar as possible, and the division ready to assume the offensive.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

5-250. Each of the following is discussed in detail for this operation:

Decisive operation.

Shaping operations.

Sustaining operations.

DECISIVE OPERATION

5-251. The 52nd Division continues to defend along PL MAMMEL with the 2/25 SBCT and the 1/52 IBCT to prevent REDLAND forces from penetrating PL DARLING. The 2/25 SBCT, with an additional armor company from the 4/52 ABCT and a cannon equipped FA battalion GS-reinforcing (GS-R) from the 575th FA Brigade, initially is the division main effort and has the priority of support for this phase. It is located in the maneuver corridor in the north of the division’s area of operations (see Table 5-1). Priority of support then goes to the 1/52 IBCT and the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade in that order. The 575th FA Brigade (-) is in a GS-reinforcing relationship to the 2/25 SBCT and in GS to the rest of the division. The 4/52 ABCT (-) is the division reserve.

SHAPING OPERATIONS

5-252. The 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade uses its assets to collect information in the division area of operations forward of the defending BCTs. Missions include surveillance of named areas of interest, conducting route reconnaissance along Route 1 and confirming the location and disposition of the motorized infantry brigade tactical group operating to the 1/52 IBCT’s front. Target identification priorities are REDLAND units preparing to attack followed by REDLAND battalion or higher command and control nodes. Locating enemy infantry units and the small concentrations of armored combat vehicles that are tactically significant in this terrain will be difficult. When and where appropriate, the division commander establishes a temporary area of operations within which the 56th Brigade can accomplish its missions. The 56th Brigade staff coordinates the placement and movement of the brigade’s assets within the areas of operations of the 2/25 SBCT and 1/52 IBCT. The brigade’s operations help to identify those enemy forces, locations, strengths, and capabilities that can influence the division’s operations.

5-253. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade conducts spoiling attacks to delay and disrupt REDLAND units preparing to attack with priority to engaging REDLAND uncommitted and follow-on forces. The commander assigns the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade the mission of delaying the approach of these enemy forces to PL MAMMAL and disrupting their combined arms cohesion. The brigade works with the division and the appropriate BCTs to coordinate airspace requirements inside each ground commander’s assigned area of operations. The 11th Brigade’s operations disrupt the tempo of the enemy attack, unhinge enemy combined arms formations, contribute to the culmination of REDLAND forces, and help shift the initiative to friendly coalition forces.

5-254. The division airspace element and various BCT air defense and airspace management and brigade aviation elements integrate the airspace requirements of supporting aircraft with other organic airspace user requirements and coordinate as required with joint force airspace users. The division JAGIC and the brigade air defense and airspace management and brigade aviation elements will also address air and missile defense efforts. This will involve the use of cyber electromagnetic activities and other efforts to hinder the REDLAND ability to employ fires (aerial and ground launched) and conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.

5-255. The 575th FA Brigade engages targets, with priority to the REDLAND air defense, fire support, and command and control functions to block REDLAND combined arms formations from penetrating PL MAMMEL. (The 575th Brigade staff during their military decisionmaking process and associated targeting processes will identify fire support tasks, targets, target acquisition plans, and coordination requirements to accomplish this mission.) The division commander requested and the X Corps/coalition force land component commander established a purple kill box in the area of the REDLAND tank brigade tactical group in the northeast part of the division’s area of operations (see figure 5-3). (See ATP 3-09.34 for a multi-service discussion of kill boxes.) The 575th Brigade’s operations help disrupt the tempo of the enemy attack, unhinge enemy combined arms formations, and contribute to the culmination of REDLAND forces. All of which helps shift the initiative to friendly forces.

5-256. All divisional units provide humanitarian assistance as required to alleviate the immediate suffering of GREENLAND civilians affected by combat operations and move them—in cooperation with GREENLAND civil and military authorities—to areas where the probability that they will be exposed to future combat operations is significantly reduced. Priority is on keeping division main supply routes open. The 52nd Division's civil-military operations centers (CMOC) coordinate with GREENLAND civil and military authorities, international organizations, and private volunteer organizations to ensure humanitarian relief efforts do not conflict with planned division military operations. The 52nd Division CMOC is operated by the 548th Civil Affairs Battalion and the BCT CMOCs are operated by the 548th Battalion’s companies. The 52nd Division CMOC and BCT CMOCs coordinate movement of displaced civilians through the 52nd Division’s defensive positions and into GREENLAND established displaced civilian camps with GREENLAND authorities. These actions convince the GREENLAND civilian populace to help coalition forces. This has the effect of requiring less divisional elements to control and secure the local civilian populace in the long term.

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

5-257. The division’s EECP supervises the RSOI of division units. As soon as the division main command post closes, it prepares for offensive action. The 27th Sustainment Brigade and 48th Medical Brigade (Support) priority is the BCTs in the defense, followed by the 575th FA Brigade and 11th Combat Aviation Brigade, and lastly other division units in preparation for the conduct of offensive tasks. The 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade ensures main supply routes in its area of operations stay open and provides a reaction force for Level II threats operating within the division support area. The 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade commander is the 52nd Division support area commander. As the support area commander, the brigade commander positions those elements of the division’s supporting brigades not positioned in the area of operations of the division’s BCTs. Within the 34th’s area of operations, the brigade commander is responsible for all doctrinal responsibilities associated with terrain ownership: (See ADRP 3-90 for a discussion of those responsibilities.)

MISSION COMMAND OF THE DEFENSE

5-258. Like maneuver forces, the division’s control nodes are task-organized to meet mission requirements. The mobile command group co-locates with the tactical command post or the tactical command post co-locates with the division’s main command post as necessary to provide the division commander the necessary capabilities to control the division’s conduct of this defensive mission.

DIVISION MAIN COMMAND POST

5-259. The division’s main command post is primarily responsible for controlling current operations and planning (sequels and branches to the current defense). This includes conducting intelligence analysis, staff estimates, and providing support to the mobile command group and tactical command post as required. Through the operations process, units are task-organized, missions assigned, and priorities set for fires, information collection, and sustainment and protection functions. The main command post’s all-source analysis element analyzes of all information collected. The fire support planners recommend target priorities for the commander’s approval. Likewise, the requirements manager develops collection priorities to develop the 56th Battlefield Surveillance and other divisional brigades. In this scenario, the main command post fulfills its role from a base in the theater joint security area—after it finishes its deployment—using strategic communications and digital mission command systems to send and receive information. Staff elements located at the main command post coordinate information with corresponding elements at the tactical command post, X Corps/coalition force land component, adjacent units, and supported unit headquarters through multi-user voice and data networks augmented by liaison officers. The 548th Civil Affairs Battalion’s Civil Affairs Planning Team augments the division G-9 staff section to support the division’s three integrating cells.

5-260. After all 52nd Division units close; the main command post prepares for the offense by issuing fragmentary orders and conducting rehearsals for the offense. It is almost impossible for the commander and staffs of the committed brigades—2/25 SBCT and 1/52 IBCT—to participate in ongoing preparations for the offense since they are involved in ongoing conduct of the defense. Their liaison officers represent them for planning purposes and during rehearsals. These fragmentary orders are issued by the main command post since the tactical command post is currently in charge of the division’s current defensive efforts. During operations, staff cells and elements located at the main command post exchange information with corresponding staff cells and elements at the BCTs and supporting brigade command posts and maintain the common operational picture for the division so that all division leaders and staffs can develop their own situational understand of current and future operations.

DIVISION TACTICAL COMMAND POST

5-261. The division commander uses the division’s tactical command post to control a part of the division’s operations, which are separated by geography, phase of operation, or other logical dividing points from the division primary operations. Care is taken to ensure that the principal of unity of command is not violated.

5-262. In this scenario, the division EECP (built around a base provided by the tactical command post) was the 52nd Division’s initial control element in the joint operations area and began coordinating the RSOI of the remaining 52nd Division forces. It also gained situational awareness of ongoing diplomatic, information, military, and economic regional activities within and external to GREENLAND that have the potential of impacting the division’s operations. The main command post assumed those functions once it closed within the theater of operations. After the division’s main command post began arriving in country, the X Corps/coalition force land component commander task-organized two of the BCTs that previously were under the control of the 53rd Division to the 52nd Division and assigned the 52nd Division an area of operations to defend. This was done in anticipation of the arrival in GREENLAND of additional BCTs and other brigades. The division’s tactical command post took control of the defense while the division’s main command post continued with its own RSOI process and controlled the RSOI of the remaining division elements. The tactical command post was augmented with personnel and equipment to conduct the division’s defense. This augmentation was primarily from the division main command post but also came from the division’s other brigades.

5-263. The commander task-organizes the division by placing those brigades currently actively supporting the defense under the control of division tactical command post while the remaining division forces—largely the 2/52 and 4/52 ABCTs—remained under the control of the division’s main command post until completion of their respective RSOI processes. While controlling the defense, the division’s tactical command post may co-locate with a BCT main command post or position itself elsewhere within one of the BCT’s area of operations. The division tactical command post controls the conduct of the division’s current defensive tasks, inputting current operations information into the division’s common operational picture until the division main command post completes its internal RSOI activities. This allowed the entire division staff to develop their understanding of the situation, maintain their running estimates, and develop appropriate plans. The fire support element in tactical command post coordinates the artillery and mortar radar coverage of the division until the 575th FA Brigade headquarters can assume this function.

DIVISION MOBILE COMMAND GROUP

5-264. The division mobile command group gives the division commander flexibility to move the commander and a small staff element to critical positions. The commander splits time between the main and tactical command posts. Most of the time, the commander is at the tactical command post involved in directing the division’s defensive actions. From there the commander uses the mobile command group to displace forward into BCT area of operations to directly influence critical actions. The commander also uses the mobile command group to move to the main command post for the conduct of offensive rehearsals; the X Corps/coalition force land component operational command post; and to conduct battlefield circulation including visits to divisional units, civilian agencies, and work sites. At times trusted individuals, such as the division command sergeant major or division primary staff officers, are directed by the commander to use the mobile command group to visit units as the commander’s representative and collect information about friendly units and get their own sense of how operations unfold.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

5-265. The division headquarters and headquarters battalion provides assets for the movement of the division’s command posts as required. It continues to task-organize to support all division command posts with life support, communications, and security.

2/25 STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 1/52 INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 2/52 ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, AND 4/52 ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM IN THE DEFENSE

5-266. BCTs are areas of operations in the defense. Each BCT staff reports and coordinates through the controlling command post. In this scenario, 52nd Division assumed control of two BCTs, which had areas of operations assigned. The 2/25 SBCT has the northern area of operations consisting of the most open terrain, while 1/52 IBCT has the southern area of operations consisting of highly restricted terrain. The division's no-penetration line is PL DARLING, which is 2/25 SBCT and 1/52 IBCT common rear boundary. The 2/25 SBCT is the division’s main effort. The area defense conducted by these two BCTs consists of a mixture of static and dynamic actions and requires the assistance of the division’s supporting brigades to accomplish. These BCTs may establish coordinated fire lines in their respective areas of operation to facilitate the use of surface-to-surface fires, particularly across unit boundaries. These BCTs report to the tactical command post, which is initially controlling the defense, until the division main command post is able to assume that responsibility.

5-267. The 4/52 ABCT plans and prepares to respond to REDLAND attacks as the division reserve. The 4/52 ABCT and the division develop protection plans that mask the probable location of its assembly area and probable points of commitment. It maintains an aggressive local security to detect and destroy REDLAND reconnaissance assets. The 4/52 ABCT’s potential movement routes are planned due to vulnerability to indirect fires and missile and rockets. The 4/52 ABCT, along with the 2/52 ABCT (after the later unit finishes closing on the division area of operations), plans and prepares for offensive actions in their respective assembly areas.

56TH BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE

5-268. This brigade conducts R&S operations to enable the 52nd Division commander to shape the battlefield by focusing organic and joint combat power with precision that simultaneously supports the 52nd Division’s defense and sets the conditions for transitioning to the offense to restore the territorial integrity of GREENLAND. During this phase, the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade receives the cavalry squadron (2nd Squadron-165th Cavalry) from the 2/2 SBCT and the 3rd UAS Battalion to conduct R&S in division controlled areas. Its key tasks during this phase are to—

Identify and locate REDLAND reserves.

Identify and locate insurgent forces and terrorist groups operating within the division’s area of interest, along with their associated base areas. (This is a difficult task and requires the counterintelligence and human intelligence teams within the brigade and division military intelligence analysts to work closely with GREENLAND intelligence agencies—both civil and military, other coalition partners, the X Corps/coalition land component human intelligence office, the theater joint intelligence center, DA and Department of Defense intelligence agencies, and other governmental agencies, such as the Department of State, Department of Justice, and Central Intelligence Agency. Division intelligence analysts may need to contact selected offices within the National Intelligence Council on matters.)

Identify and locate enemy multiple rocket launchers capable of influencing division operations.

Conduct surveillance of key bridges along the division’s projected avenue of approach to support the commander’s decision point to use existing bridges or conduct river crossing operations.

Conduct reconnaissance of key fording sites.

Conduct surveillance of the Lusk Reservoir Dam.

Conduct route reconnaissance of key, secondary, and alternate routes along the 52nd Division’s projected avenue of approach. This involves an extensive list of named areas of interest and may require that the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade request that the division main command post task other divisional assets to examine some of the named areas of interest to provide required information in time to influence the division commander’s decisions.

5-269. The 56th’s mission during the defense is multifaceted. The brigade continues to collect information that support the commander’s decisions that maintain the continuity of the division’s defense, while simultaneously conducting information collection activities to satisfy information requirements for planning future operations. The 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade focuses its collection assets on the area between the BCTs forward boundary and the division’s forward boundary (after the BCTs assume control of their areas of operations and the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade assumes control of the 52nd Division support area). The brigade conducts R&S of intermediate objectives (named areas of interest) tied to the division commander’s decision points and the final objective. The brigade supports the current defensive fight primarily with human intelligence and counterintelligence assets, and secondly with technical collection assets (with tactical UASs) to fulfill 52nd Division information requirements inside subordinate BCT areas of operations (after appropriate airspace control coordination).

5-270. The 56th Brigade’s headquarters shifts its collaborative planning effort from the tactical command post to the main command post as the latter becomes fully functional to support offensive planning and preparations for the offense at the appropriate time during the defense. The brigade staff continues parallel and collaborative planning with the division and BCT’s staffs and the coordination to support R&S activities. Information received from the brigade controlled sensor is assessed by the staff and passed to the division G-2 for analysis, fusion, and further dissemination. Information related to the commander’s critical information requirements is reported through command channels as required.

5-271. The division G-3 tasks the battlefield surveillance brigade to conduct surveillance of two key bridges over the Alba River. These two named areas of interest are tied to a division decision point to use the bridges for crossing the Alba River or conduct river crossing operations in the event the bridges are not trafficable. A second tasking directs surveillance of the Lusk Reservoir Dam, which is a major source of hydro-electrical power for GREENLAND, irrigation for the entire eastern portion of the country, and a flood-control element of the Alba River. (The division commander is concerned about the possibility that REDLAND forces will destroy the dam or the generators to negatively affect the civilian population due to a lack of electricity to support daily activities, including farmland irrigation.)

5-272. These two G-3 taskings require the brigade staff to task its long range surveillance assets to conduct surveillance of the two key bridges and the Lusk Reservoir Dam. Each of these named areas of interest requires continuous all-weather coverage that the division’s technical collection assets cannot always provide. Additionally, the brigade employs the 2nd Squadron-165th Cavalry—assisted by engineer subject-matter experts—to conduct route reconnaissance along Highway One to provide detailed information about the route, location, and suitability of alternate and secondary routes. The squadron also conducts assessments of possible Alba River fording sites in the event key bridges over the river are not trafficable.

5-273. The task organization change providing OPCON of the 3rd UAS Battalion to the 56th Brigade facilitates the execution of information collection throughout those parts of the division area of operations not assigned to its major subordinate commands—division unassigned areas—to support information requirements for future operations. The 3rd Battalion’s extended range multipurpose UASs conducts reconnaissance to locate and identify REDLAND logistical activities for targeting. Additionally, they conduct reconnaissance to locate and identify the REDLAND reserves. Finally, the additional UASs complement the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade’s organic tactical UASs by providing additional information on REDLAND troop positions on the two intermediate objectives (JOHN and BEM) and final objective (DIANA), which is outside of the range of the brigade’s tactical UASs.

5-274. The brigade also conducts counterintelligence operations to protect against espionage, sabotage, or other terrorist activities. This is especially important as battalion-sized components of deployment package 3 begin moving from theater staging areas to assembly areas located within the division area of operations. Human intelligence teams continue identifying friendly civilians and vital infrastructure.

575TH FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE

5-275. Fire support is key to success in the defense. The execution and support of strike operations throughout the enemy’s depth helps defeat, attrite, or deter the enemy before reaching the main battle area. Shaping fires reduce REDLAND artillery, separate enemy echelons, and defeat maneuver elements as they move forward. Fires can be critical to offsetting a lack of maneuver assets for defense of large areas, such as found in this scenario. The general tasks of a FA brigade in the defense are to—

Execute Army and coordinate with the division JAGIC for joint fires to separate enemy echelons and reduce the enemy’s available options.

Execute fires at maximum range to disrupt enemy command and control and desynchronize the attack.

Provide massed fires to help BCTs in breaking the momentum of attacking enemy forces.

Prevent enemy indirect fires from reducing the division defense—execute counterfire to destroy or neutralize enemy fires systems.

Provide redundant communications networks to ensure uninterrupted fires to the force.

Support BCT survey sections in meeting target area survey requirements. (The conduct of defensive tasks does not place any unusual requirements on the 575th FA Brigade.)

Provide metrological support to FA brigade units and those BCT units beyond the valid range of their organic metrological stations.

5-276. The fires cell in the main command post, through targeting, determines target sets and fire support priorities taking into account planned division future operations. Initially these target set priorities are the destruction of REDLAND air defense, fire support (counterstrike), and command and control capabilities. While in the defense, priority of support is initially to the 2/25 SBCT, then the 1/52 IBCT, the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, and then to the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade. Priority of fires shifts on order to the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade to fire suppression of enemy air defense missions as part of its attack operations against the identified enemy tank brigade tactical group once preparatory fires for that mission begin.

5-277. The 575th FA Brigade executes operations designed to prevent REDLAND combined arms formations from penetrating PL MAMMEL. The brigade accomplishes this through strike operations forward of PL CLARK, support of aviation mobile strikes, and close support of 2/25 SBCT and 1/52 IBCT. Additionally, the division has been tasked with providing long-range fires to support the coalition land and air components. The 575th FA Brigade has two Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS) equipped FA battalions, one cannon equipped FA battalion, a target acquisition battery, and a tactical unmanned aerial surveillance company, and large portions of the signal company and support battalion closed in the area of operations. One MLRS equipped artillery battalion and one cannon equipped artillery battalion arrive and conduct RSOI while the rest of the division is conducting this operation.

5-278. The 575th FA Brigade organizes for the defense with more centralized control of fires and effects. This allows its commander maximum flexibility in supporting all BCTs based on enemy actions and allows massed fires to deliver support to decisive operations when that time comes. Specific FA brigade actions are—

Provides the one cannon-equipped FA battalion (1-5th FA) GS-reinforcing to the 2/25 SBCT’s organic FA battalion.

Provides adequate support forward of the BCTs by keeping two MLRS battalions in GS of the division. If the division employed a BCT in the covering force, a large portion of the FA brigade may occupy positions within the forward security area and it is possible that the FA brigade may serve as the force fires headquarters for the BCT executing the covering force mission.

Establishes support and communications links with the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade to respond to penetrations of division support areas by small attacking enemy forces.

5-279. Brigade assets are positioned in the 1/52 IBCT and 2/25 SBCT areas of operations during the defense. The division’s main command post provides position and security tasks related to the fires assets to these BCTs as appropriate. Close coordination between the 575th Brigade operations officer and these BCT operations officers ensures the FA brigade assets are positioned to execute their missions without interfering with BCT movement and maneuver. If the division conducted non-contiguous operations, the FA brigade could be assigned its own area of operations within which to position its assets. This requires the division to assign security and other assets to the 575th FA Brigade to give the brigade a capability to respond to localized threats and accomplish are the responsibilities associated with being assigned an area of operations. Specific FA Brigade positioning actions include—

Placing sufficient assets forward in 1/52 IBCT and 2/25 SBCT areas of operations to execute division shaping operations.

Placing target acquisition radars to augment the 1/52 IBCT and 2/25 SBCT target acquisition assets while also providing protection of any 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade assets positioned forward of the BCT’s forward boundaries.

5-280. The 575th FA Brigade asset movement during the defense is generally limited to lateral repositioning for survivability. If the 52nd Division employed a covering force, the brigade’s movement includes the collapse of the covering force area. During a mobile defense, the FA brigade supports the striking force once it was committed.

5-281. The 575th FA Brigade’s target acquisition assets are focused on location of REDLAND indirect fire systems and uncommitted ground maneuver forces. Specific FA brigade target acquisition considerations include—

Target radars are positioned as far forward as possible in the 1/52 IBCT and 2/25 SBCT areas of operations to maximize their range and to better acquire enemy long range preparatory fires.

Lightweight counter mortar radars are positioned where they cover infantry defiles and strong points in 1/52 IBCT’s area of operations.

Allocated extended range multipurpose UASs and organic tactical UASs develop the situation for brigade strike and division shaping operations forward of PL CLARK.

How targeting information from aerial platforms are transmitted to the 56th Brigade’s common ground stations for eventual handover to extended range UASs so the brigade can begin conducting shaping operations out to PL FARHNI.

5-282. During the defense, those extended range UASs supporting the 575th FA Brigade focus their efforts well beyond the BCT forward boundaries to support the brigade’s strike operations directed against advancing enemy formations. Division allocates the 575th FA Brigade six extend range UAS missions per 24-hour period. This allocation gives the FA brigade commander a persistent target acquisition capability against enemy high priority targets which allow attack at extreme ranges by Army and joint assets. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade will launch and hand control of these extended range unmanned aerial assets over to the 575th FA Brigade at an established handover point. The brigade executes the mission with these extended range assets using their organic ground control stations. Upon completion of the mission, the FA brigade hands back control of these extended range UASs to the aviation brigade at another coordinated handover point. The combat aviation brigade will refit these systems and prepare them for their next mission. Specific brigade actions focused on its UASs include—

Focusing its armed UASs to conduct shaping operations forward of PL CLARK.

Planning for the continuous cycling of tactical UAS through the brigade’s launch/recovery area.

Supporting the attack operations of the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade with tactical UAS supported attacks against enemy air defense weapons, radars, and command and control system.

Maintaining two of the six allocated armed UAS in reserve to respond to enemy penetrations and to support area precision fires requests.

5-283. The 575th provides the following close support to the division’s committed BCTs—

Provide massed lethal fires to the BCT to break the momentum of an enemy attack between PL MAMMEL and PL CLARK.

Provide counterfire support to the BCT as the enemy crosses PL CLARK allowing the BCTs’ FA battalions to execute close support fires against maneuver.

Provide lethal fires to disrupt follow-on echelons in the BCT area of operations.

Provide armed UAS fires to help secure the division sustainment area.

5-284. The 575th FA Brigade conducts the following actions to support division shaping operations—

Provides FA assets to conduct strike operations designed to delay, disrupt, and attrit attacking REDLAND forces between PL CLARK and PL FAHRNI.

Conducts suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations to support the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade attacks by locating and neutralizing enemy air defense systems using lethal and nonlethal means.

Provides lethal fires to support the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade attacks.

Employs joint fires against enemy command and control nodes and infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and tunnels, to shape the approach of attacking enemy forces. (Some of these potential transportation-related infrastructure targets may be reserved because of their importance in future division attacks.)

5-285. The 575th conducts the following actions to support division counterstrike operations—

Aggressively seek and attack enemy long-range indirect fires systems well forward of PL CLARK and before enemy preparatory fires against the BCTs.

Employ all allocated joint air assets against enemy indirect fires systems; continually cycle CAS against targets.

5-286. The 575th FA Brigade also supports the X Corps commander and CFACC shaping operations. The brigade receives all missions through the division, though sensor to shooter links can be established for theater time sensitive targets, as specifically designated by the CFC. For example, CFACC and national airborne sensors acquire REDLAND long-range air defense launchers (assuming these are on the CFC’s list of time sensitive targets) emplaced in Atropia near the REDLAND border. The CFACC sends the target to the X Corps commander for execution. The X Corps fires cell sends the target information either to the division fires cell or, if it is a fleeting target, directly to a FA brigade, with orders to destroy the air defense systems and any associated radars. In this case the 575th FA Brigade command post selects an Army Tactical Missile System Block IA rocket to attack the targets and sends the fire mission to a MLRS battalion for action. Concurrently, the brigade fires and air defense and airspace management cells coordinate airspace requirements with the division JAGIC, who coordinate with the X Corps fires cell. An immediate airspace request is sent to the battlefield coordination detachment. The MLRS battalion moves and orders a battery to halt one platoon in the next location adequate to fire the designated number of Army Tactical Missile System Block 1A missiles. At the same time, the 575th FA Brigade main command post redirects an extended range UAS to the target area to provide battle damage assessment. The MLRS platoon pulls onto a secondary paved road and awaits the order to fire. The division JAGIC coordinates use of the airspace, outside of the division’s airspace, with the CFACC Coalition Air Operations Center and gets approval to fire the mission. The MLRS platoon fires the mission. The UAS later reports three enemy launchers and a radar system destroyed as a battle damage assessment.

11TH COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE

5-287. Initially the primary task of the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade is to provide R&S assets to the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade to develop an accurate common operational picture of the division’s area of operations. The brigade’s secondary task is to conduct spoiling attacks to delay and disrupt REDLAND units preparing to attack with priority to engaging REDLAND uncommitted and follow-on forces. To support this later task the brigade has the mission of delaying these REDLAND forces approach to PL MAMMAL and disrupting their combined arms cohesion.

5-288. The current operations cell within the main command post determines target sets and support priorities for 11th Combat Aviation Brigade assets remaining under brigade control. The current operations integrating cell takes into considers planned division future operations when determining those target sets and support priorities. The aviation liaison in the JAGIC is the main representative to help battlefield information flow to and from the division main command post’s current operations integrating cell. However, once the division command post establishes target sets and support priorities for the brigade, the brigade staff conducts its own military decisionmaking process. Important factors for consideration during military decisionmaking include, but are not limited to—

Airspace control coordination.

Airspace control order, ATO, and special instructions.

Forward arming and refueling point movement, composition, and emplacement.

Weather checks and analysis.

Air defense status.

Communications planning.

Identification friend or foe procedures and Mode 4 settings.

5-289. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade commander prioritizes and allocates the brigade’s remaining assets including the operational cycle to which each unit adheres. The commander chooses to form aviation task forces, which include one or more attack reconnaissance companies and assault companies, to support different division-directed efforts. In this scenario, the brigade commander task-organizes available aviation resources into two mission packages. One package is designed to be placed under the control of one of the division’s two committed BCTs to conduct close combat attack missions to support their maneuver efforts. The other package remains under brigade control. (See figure 5-4 to see how the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade conducts a mobile strike operation directed against an enemy tank brigade tactical group in the division's area of operations). This action relieves enemy pressure on the 2/25 SBCT and helps set conditions for transition to the offense. See Aviation center of excellence publications for more information on aviation brigade planning, preparations, execution, and assessment. In addition, the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade coordinates air ambulance support operations with the division and the 48th Medical Brigade (Support).

5-290. Division allocates the 575th FA Brigade six extended range UAS missions per 24-hour period. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade launches and hands over control of these systems to the 575th FA Brigade per 24-hour period at an established handover point. Upon completion of the mission, the 575th hands back control of these UASs to the aviation brigade at a handover point. The aviation brigade will refit these systems to prepare them for their next mission.

27TH SUSTAINMENT AND 48TH MEDICAL BRIGADE (SUPPORT)

5-291. These two brigades provide a full suite of sustainment services and force health protection to the division and forces attached to it. The 27th Sustainment Brigade provides a headquarters for specialized teams coming from the theater-level organizations, in addition to its normal supply, transportation, field service, and maintenance functions. It coordinates the distribution-based replenishment of the division’s brigades with the 21st Theater Sustainment Command and monitors the execution of those sustainment activities. Priority of support is provided first to the 2/25 SBCT, second to the 1/52 IBCT, third the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade and 575th FA Brigade, and fourth to other units assigned to the division. The 48th Medical Brigade (Support) commander provides direction for Army Health Service activities. The 48th Medical Brigade (Support) is capable of—

Providing a rapidly responsive command post that can quickly integrates into the early entry deployment sequence for crisis management.

Providing medical mission command system support of all Army divisions/corps and joint (when augmented with joint medical detachment) forces.

Providing operational medical plugs augmentation to Role 2 medical treatment facilities supporting brigade/BCT medical companies.

Advising division/corps commanders on the medical capabilities of their operations.

Providing medical staff planning, operational and technical supervision, and administrative assistance for multifunctional medical battalions and combat support hospitals tasked organized under the 48th Medical Brigade (Support).

Coordinating with the supporting theater patient movement requirements center for medical regulating and MEDEVAC from multifunctional medical battalions and hospitals to supporting Joint, theater, and continental U.S. (CONUS) medical treatment facilities.

Providing medical consultation services and technical advice in the following areas:

Preventive medicine (medical surveillance, occupational environmental health, sanitary engineering, and medical entomology).

Nursing services.

Dental services.

Behavioral health, including combat operational stress control and neuropsychiatric care.

Veterinary services, including food safety and inspection, animal medicine, and preventative medical services.

Nutrition care and medical food service.

Providing a joint-capable mission command system capability when augmented with appropriate joint assets (joint manning document).

Providing advice and recommendations for the conduct of civil-military operations.

Coordinating Army support to other services for the ship-to-shore/shore-to-ship MEDEVAC mission in coordination with the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade and the rest of the division staff.

Providing prompt treatment consisting of those measures necessary to locate, acquire, resuscitate, stabilize, and prepare patients for evacuation to the next role of care and/or return to duty.

Employing standardized ground MEDEVAC units/resources. The use of air ambulances is the preferred means of MEDEVAC. Their use, however, is driven by the mission variables of METT-TC and air superiority issues.

Providing a flexible, responsive, and deployable medical support designed and structured to support a Force Projection Army and its varied missions. This capability includes hospitalization resources to provide essential care to all patients who cannot recover within the theater evacuation policy and are stabilized and evacuated out of the theater of operations and definitive care to those Soldiers capable of returning to duty.

Providing a medical logistics system (including blood management) anticipatory and tailored to support missions throughout unified land operations.

Establishing force health protection programs to prevent disease and non-battle injury casualties through medical and occupational environment health surveillance, behavioral surveillance, health assessments, behavioral health, and personal protective measures.

Providing veterinary services to protect the health of the command through food inspection services, animal medical care, and veterinary preventative medicine.

Providing operational dental services to maintain dental readiness and maximize the return to duty rate.

Providing combat operational stress control and mental health services to enhance unit and Soldier effectiveness through increased stress tolerance and positive coping behaviors.

Providing medical laboratory functions in force health protection operations to—

Assess disease processes (diagnosis).

Conduct occupational environmental health surveillance laboratory support.

Monitor the efficacy of medical treatment.

Identify and confirm enemy use of suspect biological warfare and chemical warfare agents.

Deploy medical headquarters units capable of providing the requisite control to enhance split-base operations capability.

Ensure maximum use of emerging technology to improve battlefield survivability.

34TH MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE

5-292. The 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade executes shaping and sustaining operations to prevent or mitigate the effects of hostile action against the division. The brigade is responsible for protection of locations, facilities, and capabilities in its area of operations and other locations designated by the division commander. In this scenario, the brigade—when deployment is complete—includes military police, engineers, and CBRN elements, civil affairs, and explosive ordnance disposal units. During the defense, the brigade is responsible for area security within its area of operations and ground lines of communications security and maintenance.

5-293. The division staff positions the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade to provide support to the 52nd Division’s BCTs and supporting brigades. Like the other supporting brigades within the division, the current operations cell within the division’s main command post determines the missions, tasks, and support priorities for the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade. Initially, these are—

The construction of survivability positions for the 575th FA, 11th Combat Aviation, and 27th Sustainment and 48th Medical Brigade (Support) (in that priority). (This is because these brigades have limited organic engineer assets.)

Provision of area security to units within the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade area of operations, including response forces constituted from brigade assets and a tactical combat force if so designated at a later time.

The maintenance and security of division main supply routes within the 34th’s area of operations.

The construction and operation of a division detainee holding area including the designation of its commander. The brigade staff engineer section will supervises the engineer battalions in the BCTs as the conduct their initial detainee holding facilities.

The detection and identification of REDLAND use of CBRN weapons within the division area of operations.

Conducting an inventory of toxic industrial materials within the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade area of operations designed to mitigate environmental damage within the area of operations.

The construction and operation of camps for GREENLAND civilian displaced persons.

Provide local security against ground threats to any air and missile defense units positioned within its area of operations. This is accomplished by placing the air and missile defense unit within or adjacent to a previously established base or base cluster.)

Survey of existing GREENLAND infrastructure and its capacities including water treatment and distribution systems, electrical generation and distribution systems, ground transportation networks—road, rail, and pipeline, sewer collection and treatment systems, and habitability and structure soundness of civilian facilities used by the division. This survey is performed in coordination with GREENLAND authorities and functional experts from the civil affairs community, other governmental agencies, and a wide variety of civilian commercial and international organizations.

5-294. The controlling division current operations cell takes into account the 34th Brigade’s capabilities and planned division future operations when determining the missions and tasks assigned to the brigade. Once the division assigns those missions and tasks, the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade staff conducts its own military decisionmaking process to determine situationally appropriate and feasible courses of action.

5-295. As part of the selected a course of action, the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade commander allocates forces to accomplish the brigade’s divergent missions. In this scenario, the lack of additional task-organized engineers in each of the division’s BCTs means that the 52nd Engineer Battalion provides mobility, countermobility, and survivability engineer support to the BCTs in contact. This is addition to the 52nd Engineers providing mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering support to the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade and other divisional units operations in the 34th’s area of operations. This includes creating or improving roads, repairing or maintenance of bridges and other improvements to existing division main supply routes. The engineer battalion has only a limited capability to conduct local or area damage control operations necessitated by enemy action or accidents.

5-296. The 59th Military Police Battalion and its three companies provide first, security and mobility support and then detainee operations within the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade area of operations in the priority in which they are listed. The battalion protects critical functions, facilities, and forces within the brigade’s area of operations. The 59th provides support to enhance the movement of BCT and supporting brigade units and the flow of supplies through the brigade area of operations. The battalion exercises positive control over all persons captured, detained, confined, or evacuated by divisional forces. This could cause the 59th Military Police Battalion to establish one or more mobility corridors within the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade area of operations. When mobility corridors are designated the battalion works with movement control teams from the 27th Sustainment Brigade to control division main supply routes and provide circulation control. It also works with the GREENLAND government through the 548th Civil Affairs Battalion to control the GREENLAND civilian population including the collection and evacuation of civilian detainees. The battalion integrates engineer support as required, including conducting route clearing operations. Lastly, the 59th provides response forces to help bases and base clusters located within the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade’s area of operations to respond to Level I and II attacks.

5-297. The 325th CBRN Battalion and the 802nd Ordnance Company explosive ordnance disposal detects, identifies, and mitigates threats within and external to the brigade’s area of operations. This requires the battalion and 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade staffs to work closely with division, BCT, and supporting brigade staff to coordinate the tasking, movement, and sustainment support of CBRN teams transiting the division area of operations to accomplish their missions.

548TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION

5-298. The battalion headquarters establishes a division-level CMOC within the division area. That center is located where it best influences those individuals and organizations that affect civil considerations throughout the division area of operations. In this scenario, at this time, this is within the 52nd Division tactical assembly area. A CMOC may be forced to move frequently to interact with different parties, which may distance it from the division main or tactical command post. This impacts life support needs and requires additional security. The battalion’s subordinate companies establish four brigade-level CMOC within the area of operations of the brigades they support. The 548th provides a civil affair planning team to the division headquarters to help the G-9 integrate civil-military activities into the division’s operations.

5-299. Civil affairs functional specialty cells from the global forces pool—in cooperation with functional experts from engineer organizations, other governmental agencies, international organizations, and civilian contractors—help with civil reconnaissance within the division’s area of operations. The results of civil reconnaissance identify threats to stability in civil society and determine the requirement and suitability for reconstruction planning by divisional forces and higher headquarters.

5-300. The security situation and protection posture dictate the general location of each 52nd Division CMOC. Normally, each center locates itself within the support area of the supported echelon to prevent nonmilitary traffic in and around the center from interrupting military operations. Also, the echelon support area is more suitable for transition operations when the responsibility for civil-military activities within a given area is transferred from one agency to another.

Chapter 6

The Division in the Offense

This chapter discusses division offensive fundamentals and organization of forces considerations. It then discusses offense planning considerations and offensive tasks. The chapter ends with a continuation of the scenario in chapter 3.

SECTION I - DIVISION OFFENSIVE FUNDAMENTALS

6-1. All commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative when conducting offensive tasks. Specific tasks may orient on a enemy force or terrain feature as a means of affecting the enemy. Even when conducting primarily defensive actions, wresting the initiative from the enemy requires offensive actions.

PURPOSES OF THE OFFENSE

6-2. The main purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force. Additionally, commanders conduct offensive tasks to secure decisive terrain, to deprive the enemy of resources, to gain information, to deceive and divert the enemy, to hold the enemy in position, to disrupt the enemy’s attack, and to set up the conditions for future successful operations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE

6-3. Characteristics of the offense include audacity, concentration, surprise, and rapid tempo. Effective offensive actions capitalize on accurate and timely intelligence and other relevant information regarding enemy forces, weather, and terrain. A commander maneuvers (movement in combination with fires) available forces to advantageous positions before making contact. Protection tasks, such as security operations and operations security keep or inhibit the enemy from acquiring accurate information about friendly forces. Contact with enemy forces before initiation of the decisive operation is deliberate, designed to shape the optimum situation for the decisive operation. The decisive operation conclusively determines the outcome of the major operation, battle, or engagement and capitalizes on subordinate initiative and a common operational picture to exploit success throughout the area of operations (AO). Subordinate commanders violently execute maneuver—within their higher commander’s intent—to break the enemy’s will or to destroy targeted enemy forces once the decisive operation is initiated.

OFFENSIVE TASKS

6-4. An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers (ADRP 3-0). The four primary offensive tasks are:

A movement to contact is an offensive task designed to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact (ADRP 3-90).

An attack is an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both (ADRP 3-90).

Exploitation is an offensive task that usually follows the conduct of a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth (ADRP 3-90).

A pursuit is an offensive task designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (ADRP 3-90).

(See FM 3-90-1for more information on conducting each of these offensive tasks.)

COMMON OFFENSIVE CONTROL MEASURES

6-5. The commander controls the offensive actions of this division by using control measures that provide the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the situation and enable the rapid concentration of combat power effects at decisive points. The commander uses the minimum control measures required to successfully complete the mission and provides subordinates the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the situation. Those common offensive control measures are in table 6-1.

Table 6-1. Common offensive control measures

Airspace coordinating measures such as air corridor and air control points | Limit of advance
Areas of operations and boundaries | Line of contact
Assembly areas | Line of departure
Attack position | Linkup point
Axis of advance | Named area of interest
Boundaries | Objective
Check points | Obstacle control measures
Contact points | Phase lines (PL)
Coordinated fire lines | Point of departure
Critical friendly zones | Position areas for artillery
Direction of attack | Rally point
Engagement areas | Routes
Fire support coordination measures | Target areas of interest
Fire support targets | Target reference points
Forward line of own troops (FLOT) | Time of attack

6-6. Other control measures that come into play depending on the type of offensive tasks conducted include pickup zones, landing zones, airheads, movement control measures, and infiltration lanes. The division commander uses the minimum control measures required to successfully complete the mission while providing the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the situation. ADRP 3-90 and FM 3-90-1 define common control measures that a commander uses to synchronize combat power effects.

FORMS OF MANEUVER

6-7. The forms of maneuver are envelopment, flank attack, frontal attack, infiltration, penetration, and turning movement. Divisions that accomplish their mission synchronize the contributions of each warfighting function execute these forms of maneuver. A division or brigade combat team (BCT) commander executing offensive tasks chooses one form on which to build a course of action. The division commander rarely specifies the form of offensive maneuver for subordinate BCTs. However, the division commander’s guidance and intent, along with the mission that includes implied tasks, imposes constraints such as time, security, and direction of attack that narrow the forms of offensive maneuver to one alternative for a BCT. Additionally, the areas of operations’ characteristics and the enemy's dispositions help determine the form of offensive maneuver selected. A single operation may contain several forms of offensive maneuver, such as a frontal attack to clear a security area followed by a penetration to create a gap in enemy defenses. An envelopment could then be used to destroy the enemy's first line of defense. (See FM 3-90-1 for a discussion of each of these forms of maneuver.)

SECTION II – DIVISION OFFENSIVE ORGANIZATION OF FORCES CONSIDERATIONS

6-8. The organization of forces for a division conducting offensive tasks differs based on the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). The division is tailored with a mix of ABCTs, infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) (up to six), and multifunctional and functional brigades to the division’s mission. As divisions are always tailored for their missions, there is no general template for each offensive task. (See chapter 1 for more information on force tailoring and the capabilities of BCTs and multifunctional brigades.)

6-9. Whenever possible, the division commander maintains the cohesive mission teams of attached BCTs and combat aviation brigades. These brigades are combined arms organizations with standing headquarters and organic mission command, maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection capabilities. When the mission assigned to a particular BCT or combat aviation brigade requires more combat power than what is organic to that unit, the division commander first varies the size of the subordinate brigade areas of operations so that the size of their area of operations more closely mirrors the size of their area of influence. Alternatively the division commander splits the mission or distributes tactical tasks between two or more brigades. Only if these alternatives are not sufficient does the division commander task-organize attached or operational control (OPCON) brigades. (See chapter 1 for more information on considerations impacting the task organizing of brigades with these command relationships.) Armored, Stryker, and infantry forces can all be attached to each other. However, no BCT should be so overburdened with augmentation that it loses its capabilities.

6-10. The preferred employment option at the division level is to employ BCTs as designed under division control. The division should ensure that each BCT’s mission capitalizes on the capabilities of each types of BCT. If the division commander decides to task-organize or change the internal organization of the division’s attached BCTs, then the division sustainment concept must ensure that the losing BCTs retain their capabilities to support their remaining forces. This is particularly true in the case of IBCTs since the IBCT brigade support battalion is an austere organization. (See Maneuver center of excellence doctrine for the capabilities of each type of BCT.)

SECTION III – OFFENSE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

6-11. The corps or joint force commander assigns the division offensive missions in broad terms that leave the division commander the greatest possible freedom of action. The division commander plans for the synchronization of all elements of combat power as divisional units close with and destroy the enemy and exploit success.

6-12. The commander conducts a more deliberate attack when the division develops thorough and timely enemy intelligence and the mission variables of METT-TC allow more than normal planning and preparation time. In this case the division’s subordinate BCTs and supporting brigade attack orders are detailed. However, the division plan must retain flexibility to facilitate branches and sequels.

6-13. Division commanders use their staffs to synchronize the effects of each warfighting function with the other warfighting functions as part of the operations process. Many of these offensive considerations apply to conducting defensive and stability tasks and are not repeated in those chapters of this manual.

6-14. The division considers five complementary elements when planning offensive tasks—

How will it conduct reconnaissance and security operations forward and to the flanks and rear of the division’s decisive and shaping operations?

How will the division conduct shaping operations directed against vital enemy elements regardless of their location in the area of operations?

What conditions must be reached before the division’s decisive operation can be initiated?

What degree of risk should be taken in the division reserve’s composition, size, and location?

What activities by the other elements of combat power are necessary to maintain offensive momentum?

These elements are a useful vehicle when formulating the division concept of operations and synchronizing of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations or whatever other operational framework the division commander chooses to use. The enemy forces and support systems targeted as part of the division offense depend on the factors of METT-TC. The rest of this section addresses organization of forces, offensive control measures, and each warfighting function.

MISSION COMMAND

6-15. During planning, the commander begins the process by developing planning guidance. That guidance states the commander’s intent, refines the staff-developed suggestions for the commander’s critical information requirements, and directs the staff planning effort. The staff prepares division orders and establishes the control measures necessary to conduct the division’s decisive operations.

6-16. The division commander’s visualization allows for the issue of the commander’s initial guidance to the staff as to how the commander wants to conduct offensive tasks. One key factor is the area of operations assigned to the division by a higher headquarters. The division commander structures this area of operations by assigning objectives, boundaries, phase lines (PL), and other control measures to ensure the successful synchronization of subordinate BCT and other brigades operations.

COMMAND POST OPERATIONS

6-17. The main command post synchronizes the division’s conduct of offensive tasks within the selected operational framework. This includes establishing sustainment priorities and requirements and coordinating and facilitating the sustainment effort. Additionally, the main command post designates the division’s main supply routes and oversees activities along those routes including route maintenance and casualty, equipment, and detainee evacuation. The main command post designates new division support areas in coordination with the supporting sustainment brigade and combat sustainment support battalions and the maneuver enhancement brigade as the division advances. The main command post is also responsible for the conduct of area security operations in those portions of the division area of operations that have not been assigned to subordinate brigades.

6-18. The division assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6) in coordination with the counterparts at higher headquarters and the senior signal organization within the geographic combat commander’s area of responsibility plans the employment of available communications assets to ensure continuous linkage of voice and data networks throughout the conduct of the division’s offensive actions. This includes ensuring communications and computer support within the division’s command posts, between the division headquarters and its subordinate and supporting brigades, and between the division’s control nodes and appropriate higher Army and joint headquarters. The G-6 requests additional satellite bandwidth or other assets as necessary to support the division’s planned operations.

6-19. The division commander uses the tactical command post to control and finite aspects during operations focused on conducting offensive tasks, such as a gap crossing. The division tactical command post’s functions vary in relation to that specified mission. It may be employed as an alternative control node if the threat situation requires that capability based on a high probability that the enemy can disrupt, damage, or destroy the division main command post. In this case, the one assistant division commander displaces with the tactical command post from the main command post. The tactical command post stays in contact with the division commander and the main command post but minimizes its electronic signature as much as possible.

OPERATIONS PROCESS

6-20. The division staff prepares plans that allow the division to shift from one offensive task or from one form of maneuver to another with minimal delay. These are called branches to the current operations. The division’s future operations integrating cell generally develops branch plans. The division plans integrating cell develops sequels, the next major division operation. Both types of plans are refined as intelligence confirms or denies the location and composition of defending enemy units. This information could require modifying the task organization and support priorities. (See ADP/ADRP 5-0 and FM 6-0 for more information on planning operations and staff roles during planning.)

INFORMATION PROTECTION

6-21. Information protection includes the subordinate tasks of cybersecurity, computer network defense, and electronic protection. All three are related. The division G-6 has coordinating staff responsibility for planning division information protection. The G-6 keeps the chief of the division’s protection cell informed of information protection plans to ensure their synchronization with other division protection efforts.

6-22. Division concept of operations, operations plans, and operations orders specify the priorities of protection measures for network and information systems. The division’s information protection measures consist of firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and software that harden these systems against intruders. Protection plans are imperfect and resources to protect network and information systems are limited and costly. However, every effort is made to improve the protection of information stored on United States (U.S.) computers and flowing through the division’s information systems and networks.

6-23. The division’s network and system managers devise and implement comprehensive plans for using a full range of security means. The plan includes external and internal perimeter protection. External perimeter protection consists of communications security procedures, router filtering and access control lists, security guards, and, where necessary, physical isolation serving as a barrier to outside networks, such as the non-secure internet protocol router (SIPR) network. Internal perimeter protection consists of firewalls and/or router filtering. These serve as barriers between echelons of interconnected networks and information systems. Internal communications security barriers are also required. Local workstation protection consists of individual access controls, configuration audit capability, protection and intrusion detection tools, and security procedures.

MILITARY DECEPTION

6-24. Divisions develop their own military deception plans or execute operations as part of a higher headquarters’ deception plan. In either case, the deception operations must be coordinated with the higher headquarters and adjacent and supporting units to ensure unity of effort. Planners design division actions to mislead enemy commanders, prompting them to plan and conduct their activities in a manner that serves the division commander’s objectives. Techniques, such as feints, demonstrations, displays, and ruses; combined with a variety of military deception related means and measures, such as camouflage, decoys, obscurants, and electronic means; are synchronized to portray a military deceptive picture. Military deception allows the division to surprise an enemy on the timing, location, and strength of the pending attack. A good military deception story reinforces the enemy commander’s perceptions about the disposition and intentions of the division until it is too late for the enemy to react effectively to the offensive actions of the division. The division assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) integrates this task into offensive planning although the assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5) plans military deception.

CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES

6-25. The division focuses its cyber electromagnetic activities situation awareness, defense of the network, and the attack and an exploitation of the enemy command and control system. For example, the deception and the disruption of enemy command and control in the offense. This includes targeting the enemy command and control system, weapons systems, and jammers according to the division commander’s established priorities while preventing the enemy from doing the same to friendly systems. The division leverages joint cyber assets to achieve the desired effect to support the division scheme of maneuver, synchronized by the division cyber electromagnetic staff element. (See FM 3-38 for more information on this topic.)

INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES

6-26. Commanders conducting offensive tasks use information-related capabilities, shaped by intelligence products, to persuade the local populace within limits prescribed by U.S. law. They integrate these activities with the division’s conduct of stability tasks to enhance the division’s conduct of offensive tasks by gaining the acceptance of the civilian population within the division’s area of operations and to counter false and distorted information and enemy propaganda. The division information operations special staff officer has staff responsibility for planning the employment of these capabilities. (See FM 3-13 for additional information.)

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

6-27. The division’s attached, OPCON, or tactical control (TACON) BCTs and combat aviation brigade are employed to take advantage of their strengths. Infantry forces are effective in built up areas, mountains, and thickly wooded or jungle environments. Their ability to air assault provides the division commander a rapidly deployable force to seize the initiative in the area of operations. Armored and Stryker forces concentrate their lethality, survivability, ground mobility, speed, and offensive shock effects directly to defeat or destroy enemy forces. Armored and Stryker units conduct mobile combat against enemy forces in open terrain. Finally, division aviation units are conduct attacks, air assaults, and reconnaissance and security tasks. Attack aviation is most effective at night against exposed threat forces on the move, and least effective against threat forces in prepared defensive positions. During the conduct of offensive tasks, aviation units integrate into the scheme of maneuver and given missions similar to those of other maneuver units. Attack aviation assets are used as interdiction assets, security forces, or the division’s reserve. Army aviation becomes extremely effective during exploitation and pursuit tasks. As the enemy evacuates their defensive positions and displaces, the enemy unprotected formations are ideal for helicopter attacks. Detailed planning is necessary to effectively synchronize ground force elements with aviation assets. (See chapter 3 of ADRP 3-90 for more information on common offensive planning considerations.)

6-28. Commanders conduct maneuver to avoid enemy strengths and to create opportunities to increase the effects of friendly fire. They secure surprise by making unexpected maneuvers, rapidly changing the tempo of ongoing operations, avoiding observation, and using deceptive techniques and procedures. They seek to overwhelm the enemy with one or more unexpected blows before the enemy has time to react in an organized fashion. This occurs when they are able to engage the defending enemy force from positions that place the attacking force in a position of advantage with respect to the defending enemy force, such as engaging the enemy from a flanking position. Division security forces prevent the enemy from discovering friendly dispositions, capabilities, and intentions, or interfering with the preparations for the attack. Finally, the division’s subordinate BCTs maneuver to close with and destroy the enemy by close combat and shock action.

CONDUCT TACTICAL MANEUVER

6-29. Commanders want to overwhelm an enemy by directing one or more of their subordinate BCTs to seize and retain key and decisive terrain that provides dominating observation, cover and concealment, and better fields of fire to facilitate the maneuver of the rest of the division early in the offense. The division must control decisive terrain within its area of operations to successfully accomplish its mission. If decisive terrain is present, commanders designate it to communicate its importance in their concept of operations, first to their staffs and later to subordinate commanders.

6-30. Division commanders seek to surprise their enemies by choosing unexpected directions, times, types, or strengths for the conduct of offensive tasks and by exploiting the success of their division and supporting cyber operations. Surprise delays enemy reactions, overloads and confuses enemy command and control nodes, induces psychological shock in the enemy, and reduces the coherence of enemy defenses. Commanders achieve tactical surprise by attacking in bad weather and over seemingly impassible terrain, conducting feints and demonstrations, maintaining a high tempo, destroying enemy forces, employing sound operations security, and using military deception. They plan different attack times for their decisive and shaping operations to mislead the enemy and allow the shifting of the effects of supporting fires to successive targets. However, simultaneous attacks provide a means to maximize the effects of mass in the initial assault. These simultaneous attacks prevent the enemy force from concentrating its fires against each successive friendly attack.

6-31. During the division’s conduct of a movement to contact, march dispositions of the main body allow flexibility for maneuvers during the movement and when contact with the main enemy force is established. The movement to contact is characterized by high consumption of petroleum, oils, and lubricants; high vehicular maintenance requirements; and low ammunition expenditure. The speed of the operation and the Class III products consumed require careful sustainment planning to sustain the division’s uninterrupted movement.

6-32. Commanders plan how their divisions attack targets throughout the depth of the enemy's defense to keep the enemy off balance and limit the enemy’s freedom of action. However, at some point in their decisive operations, commanders want to concentrate the effects of overwhelming combat power against their enemies to shatter the cohesion of enemy defenses. Commanders plan to accomplish this by applying combat power against the enemy at a level of violence and in a manner that the enemy cannot match or survive as a cohesive force.

6-33. A division commander can reasonably expect 24 to 48 hour advance notice before the commitment of the division to an attack. With this much warning, the division commander directs the forward deployment of the command posts of the division’s subordinate BCTs. The division’s field artillery (FA) brigade and other crucial engineer, combat aviation, and sustainment can be pre-positioned before initiating the movement of the BCTs. Multiple routes are necessary to move an attacking division from an assembly area to its attack positions with acceptable speed and security. In planning the move from attack positions to the line of departure, operations officers consider travel time from assembly areas to attack positions, numbers of routes required per battalion, deployment times, and movement times from attack positions to the line of departure. Instructions for BCT and other movements from assembly areas through attack positions to the line of departure or attack positions are specific. The division movement order includes the location of all division march objectives, routes, contact points, passage lanes, and friendly units. The division staff supplies information about the support that the units through which the division is conducting a forward passage of lines will provide. BCT, FA brigade, and combat aviation brigade staffs refine this initial coordination further, arranging the final details of their movement from attack positions to the line of departure and battle handover line with the stationary unit.

6-34. Because road space and support areas are usually limited around the line of departure, the division can access only the minimal routes necessary for movement. Everyone in the division moves in strict accordance with published march tables. This requires a strong organization and a high level of training and discipline in small units.

6-35. When rerouting units becomes necessary, suitable alternate routes must be available. Rerouting may be unavoidable, but it usually affects arrival times in forward areas and can also change the order of march into attack positions or forward assembly areas. Alteration of the movement plan will be of immediate interest to the commander since he or she may have to reconsider timing or dispositions.

SEQUENCE OF ATTACK

6-36. The division staff helps the commander determine how the division’s BCTs will attack through the division area of operations during each phase of the operation. This includes determining how to stage subordinate brigades through forward assembly areas and attack positions to the objective. A normal maneuver plan sequence requires the division’s BCTs—

To move from rearward to forward assembly areas (or from staging areas to tactical assembly areas).

To deploy from their movement formation and initiate their attacks from either attack positions or by conducting a forward passage of lines through defending friendly units.

To fight through their own areas of operations between the line of departure and objective areas.

6-37. When conducting offensive tasks, ABCTs lose their ability to maneuver when confronted by enemy forces dominating key and restricted terrain along friendly routes of advance. However, IBCTs and SBCTs can conduct dismounted attacks through restricted terrain to close with and destroy enemy forces and seize the desired terrain. They can also air assault to secure terrain necessary to aid the movement of the division main body. The division staff considers several factors beyond those normally addressed when planning air assault operations. The factors include the provision of—

Transportation assets to rapidly move infantry elements into forward assembly areas and from those assembly areas to designated pickup zones.

Additional fire assets—artillery, attack helicopters, and close air support (CAS)—to enhance subordinate BCTs’ organic artillery battalion’s capability to engage the enemy with indirect fires and to execute counterfires.

Detailed intelligence products of the air corridors to be used, landing zones, and objectives.

Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) assets necessary to screen approach routes into the air assault objective to preclude the air assault force from being surprised.

Additional antiarmor assets to protect against any armored threats.

SBCTs also need to plan how they will linkup their vehicles with their dismounted elements on completion of the air assault.

DECISIVE OPERATIONS

6-38. The division staff structures the division’s area of operations to enable the division to strike the decisive blow according to the division commander’s vision. When attacking an enemy in prepared defensive positions, the division attempts an envelopment to fix enemy forces in their main defensive positions and then defeat the enemy piecemeal. This enveloping force would be the division’s decisive operation. If the enveloping force cannot bypass the main defensive positions, the division’s initial main effort is a shaping operation focused on penetrating a point in the enemy’s main defensive position while the division employs other shaping operations to fix any adjacent enemy forces or mobile counterattack forces that could react to the penetration. The penetrating force should consist of at least two BCTs in a column formation. The division assigns the following BCT a follow and assume mission so that it is prepared to assume penetration mission and exploit success in case that the lead BCT’s combat power is attrited to the point where this becomes necessary. The BCT with the follow and assume mission would become the division’s decisive operation once committed. The division staff plans the most likely times and locations associated with the commitment of this BCT. Assignment of a follow and support mission to the following BCT would allow the lead BCT the freedom to bypass units which might otherwise divert its combat power, passing the requirement to contain or reduce bypassed enemy forces to the support force. This is preferable when the lead BCT’s speed of movement is of greater concern.

6-39. Typically the operations of the division reserve become the division’s decisive operation once it is committed. During planning, the division should make prior provisions for designating another reserve once the commander commits the initial reserve force. This is important if the division commander envisions the reserve’s commitment as occurring during the early stages of the battle and the reserve becomes decisively engaged.

SHAPING OPERATIONS

6-40. The division’s shaping operations establish conditions for the division’s decisive operation through effects on the enemy, population, and terrain. The division’s shaping operations may occur throughout the division’s area of operations; before, during, or after the decisive operation begins; and involve any combination of forces and capabilities. In some cases, the division directs its combat aviation and FA brigades to conduct shaping operations designed to isolate selected enemy forces, thus setting the conditions for the decisive operations of one or more of its BCTs through the employment of close combat. In other instances, a division could use the actions of one or two of its BCTs in a shaping operation designed to penetrate the enemy’s initial defensive positions only as a means to maneuver other BCTs deep into the depth of the enemy’s defenses to conduct its decisive operation against enemy forces arrayed in depth. The division’s security operations are almost always shaping operations. (See chapter 9 for a discussion of division offensive security operations.)

6-41. A contingency for the use of the reserve is part of the division plan. Planning priorities are given to the reserve to aid planning and execution. Planners consider the aspects of time and space when positioning these forces.

6-42. The presence of noncombatants within the division’s area of operations means that the division conducts stability tasks while conducting offensive tasks. As its offensive actions clear areas of enemy forces, the division tasks subordinate brigades to secure critical infrastructure and populated areas. Establishing civil security and civil control of seized territory along with ensuring the provision of essential services to noncombatants impacted by military operations are implied tasks for a division conducting any offensive tasks. Division commanders are legally obligated to minimize and relieve civilian suffering within their areas of operations through the provision of emergency medical care and food, water, and emergency shelter when and where necessary. However, if the division is decisively engaged in combat operations, it should not divert significant resources from its mission to perform stability tasks as they are shaping operations and not the division’s decisive operation at this point in time. Divisions focus on civil security, civil control, and the restoration of essential services until responsibility for these noncombatants can be transferred to another agency, preferably the host nation government.

COMBAT FORMATIONS

6-43. A combat formation is an ordered arrangement of forces for a purpose and describes the general configuration of a unit on the ground (FM 3-90-1). A division commander can use seven different combat formations depending on the mission variables of METT-TC:

Column.

Line.

Echelon (left or right).

Box.

Diamond.

Wedge.

Vee.

Divisions normally deploy in a standard formation for an attack. The division commander prescribes the initial formation and designates the march order of each division unit. Initial dispositions usually change during an attack as forces are committed and plans modified. Terrain characteristics and the locations and capabilities of enemy forces determine the actual arrangement and location of the division’s brigades within a given formation.

6-44. The division uses combat formations to move in a posture suited to the division commander's intent and mission. Attacks are aimed at weak points in the enemy defense. If no weak point can be found, the division creates one. The commander’s use of standard formations allows a rapid shift of the division from one formation to another and gives additional flexibility when adjusting to changes in the mission variables of METT-TC. Attacking division and its subordinate BCTs want to maintain their offensive momentum; therefore, they do not attempt to preserve the unit alignment within the selected combat formation at the expense of additional time. By designating a combat formation, the commander—

Establishes the geographic relationship between units.

Indicates how subordinate should plans to react once the enemy makes contact with the formation.

Indicates the level of security desired.

Postures forces for the attack.

6-45. A division employs a series of combat formations during the course of its offensive actions; each has its advantages and disadvantages. The commander considers the advantages and disadvantages of each formation in the areas of maintenance of control, ability to mass fires, and flexibility when determining the appropriate formation for a given situation. Units must adhere more closely to their plan of attack under limited visibility conditions than they do during daylight. The division’s attached, OPCON, TACON, and supporting functional and multifunctional brigades also employ their own combat formations consistent with their particular situation.

6-46. A division uses a column of brigades in narrow or restrictive areas and against geographically deep objectives. Brigades in column provide the division with great depth, flexibility, and ease of control. Although brigades in column do not require the battalions in each brigade to likewise march on a single route or to move along a single avenue, it provides poor initial combat power to the front and is easily interdicted. Additionally, deployment of brigades from the second and third positions in the column is time-consuming and normally involves passage through support artillery. Bringing the trail brigade abreast of the leading brigade when brigades are in column takes several hours even if the division moves on multiple parallel routes.

6-47. A division box formation puts additional combat power to the front compared to a column of brigade while providing a high degree of flank security. A division may find the brigades on line formation useful when a division is attacking along a wide front against accurately located resistance, or it conducts frontal attacks against shallow objectives. This formation permits a division to put two or more brigades on line and still keep one as the division reserve. Alternatively all brigades could be committed. The line formation exploits available avenues of approach, puts combat power to the front, and is fairly secure and flexible when the division retains at least one brigade is reserve. However, it provides poor flank security when all brigades are committed on lines. Additionally, this formation is difficult to reorient.

6-48. The advantages of a division employing an echelon, vee, or wedge combat formation are the same as described in the FM 3-90-1 discussion of combat formations. That manual also provides additional information on the conduct of offensive maneuver under limited visibility conditions. Enemy resistance, maneuver space, and avenues of approach, road net, weather, and time available all affect the choice of combat formation employed by the division.

FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

6-49. A division not in contact with the enemy may have to conduct a forward passage of lines through another unit before beginning offensive actions. A passage of lines is an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force’s combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy (ADRP 3-90).

6-50. As with any operation involving hand-off of combat responsibility from one force to another, passage of lines are extremely complex operations and involve a degree of risk. To minimize risk and to ensure synchronization of the operation, a successful passage of lines requires the division to conduct detailed, centralized planning and decentralized execution. (See FM 3-90-1 for additional information on planning considerations related to the conduct of a passage of lines.)

CONDUCT TACTICAL MOVEMENT

6-51. The division launches its attack from an assembly area, a lodgment, its currently area of operations where it is primarily conducting defensive tasks, or from the march. All require a concerted planning effort. When attacking from an assembly area, the commander considers—

Movement times.

Road networks.

March orders (sequencing).

Passage of lines.

6-52. Attacking from an area of operations where it is currently primarily conducting defensive tasks may require the division to thin its forces from forward positions to mass attack formations. If this cannot be done, division units move directly from their defensive positions into the attack. Attacking from a march formation requires a responsive and flexible mission command system to respond rapidly and aggressively through battle drills without losing momentum.

6-53. An aspect of concentration addressed during planning is the ability of the division to rapidly concentrate force effects such as fires and electronic attack during movement. This is especially critical when crossing linear obstacles, such as major rivers or mountain ranges, when subordinate BCTs tend to move out independently after completing passage through the choke point. This independent movement detracts from the ability of the division to rapidly develop combat power on the obstacle’s far side.

6-54. During planning, the division commander and subordinate brigade commanders focus on the routes, formations, and navigational aids they will use to traverse the terrain from the line of departure to their different objectives. Some terrain features require the division or subordinate BCTs to change their combat formations, direction of movement, or movement technique when they reach those locations.

6-55. The capability to conduct tactical movement and maneuver at night and under limited-visibility conditions is an important aspect of conducting offensive tasks. Commanders assume that the enemy force possesses the same limited-visibility observation capabilities as their own units when conducting offensive tasks in limited-visibility conditions. The division plans consider the use of terrain by subordinate BCTs to mask their movement and deployment. This is important because limited visibility may create a false sense of protection from enemy observation.

MOBILITY AND COUNTERMOBILITY

6-56. The division commander provides the division engineer guidance and priorities for the division engineer effort. The division engineer consults with the G-3, the heads of the division’s integrating and functional cells, and situationally appropriate division coordinating, special, and personal staff officers when planning the division’s mobility and countermobility efforts. The division engineer must balance available engineer assets to support the commander’s priorities. The division engineer is the link between engineer planning at echelons above division and the execution of engineer tasks throughout the division’s area of operations.

6-57. The division engineer plans how to weight the division’s decisive operation with engineer capabilities and allocate the minimal essential engineer assets to the division’s shaping operations. The division engineer plans the task organization of engineer assets from the supporting maneuver enhancement brigade and any available functional engineer brigades to augment the limited engineer assets organic to the division’s BCTs. This allows the BCTs to breach obstacles—including mines and booby traps encountered while moving, maintain forward momentum, and ensure routes are open for sustainment support. When primarily conducting offensive task, priority of engineer support planning is normally on mobility first and then on countermobility missions. Keys to effective mobility operations are contingency planning, well-rehearsed breaching operations, and trained engineers familiar with unit standard operating procedures who are integrated into the attack formation. Division planners anticipate breaching requirements in time to provide breaching units with additional engineer assets, such as plows, rakes, and supplementary artillery for obscurants and counterfire.

6-58. Countermobility planning includes the coordination of obstacle employment between the division current and future operations and the plans integrating cells. The division engineer coordinates with the intelligence and sustainment functional cells, the division assistant chief of staff, civil affairs (G-9) staff section, and Judge Advocate General representatives for consideration of the best places to employ point obstacles and obstacle belts with the minimal impact on future division operations and the local civilian population according to the rules of engagement (ROE). Typically in the offense, obstacles will be used to block potential flank avenues of approach while artillery and air delivered munitions fix enemy counterattack forces in their current locations, and close enemy retreat routes.

INTELLIGENCE

6-59. The primary tasks of the intelligence cell are: support to force generation, support to situational understanding, provide intelligence support to targeting and information capabilities, and collect information. (Support to force generation was introduced in chapter 4 and discussed in more detail in FM 2-0.) In the offense, intelligence helps the division commander decide when and where to concentrate combat power to overwhelming the enemy and accomplish missions. Other general information collection planning considerations related to the conduct of the offense can be found in Chapter 3 of ADRP 3-90.

SUPPORT TO SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

6-60. This task involves providing information and intelligence to the commander to achieve a clear understanding of the division’s current state in relation to the enemy and other relevant aspects of the operational environment, such as the options, challenges, and opportunities it presents to friendly and enemy forces and other actors within and external to the division’s area of operations. A key part of this task is the conduct of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is a systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of threat/adversary, terrain and weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission (FM 2-01.3). This involves the entire division staff, not just the intelligence cell. The running estimate provided by this process is the basis on which most of the division planning effort rests. (See FM 2-01.3 for more information on the conduct of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process.)

6-61. Up-to-date digital and printed geospatial coverage of a division area of operations is a significant challenge in any operation, but are a vital part of developing situational understanding. Standardized map coverage helps plan, prepare, and conduct operations because the division coordinates its activities with those of other participating joint forces, U.S. governmental agencies, multinational forces, and international organizations. The accuracy, scale, and currency of foreign maps and geospatial information may vary widely from U.S. products. Consideration should be given to releasing U.S. geospatial data to other agencies and organizations as soon as possible to ensure everyone operates off the same reference documents. Release of U.S. geospatial materials to multinational partners requires foreign disclosure approval.

SUPPORT TO TARGETING AND INFORMATION CAPABILITIES

6-62. Through the current operations integrating cell the division assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) tasks the division’s information collection assets—attached, OPCON, TACON, or those in a support relationship to the division—as part of the division’s targeting (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) according to the division commander’s priorities. These information collection assets locate and track the location and activities of high-value and high-payoff targets. They pass targeting data to the division fires cell and the appropriate Army or joint fires organization to expedite the engagement of these targets. The division analysis and control element employs different intelligence disciplines to ensure the proper identification and tracking of these targets, thereby countering enemy attempts at military deception and operations security.

6-63. Targeting guidance requires developing targeting data on numerous targets that may not be attacked but remain valid targets. This class of targets may be ones located where the collateral effects of attacking the target make such an attack counterproductive. Alternatively, they are valuable sources of information and intelligence. The requirement to continuously monitor targets and update targeting data can create large databases requiring a major effort on the part of the division and brigade fire coordination elements to properly manage and update. Assessment of the impact of the division’s operations is an important part of this task. (See ADRP 5-0 for additional information on assessment.)

COLLECT INFORMATION

6-64. Information collection assets focus on gathering real time information on the location, identification, size, and composition of enemy units, and the timely dissemination of combat information and intelligence products to maneuver and FA units. Priority information collection efforts focus on enemy units most likely to influence the division’s decisive operation. The division commander is particularly concerned with the location of uncommitted enemy forces and enemy air defense units, command posts, artillery, mortars, and rocket forces. In the offense, the information collection effort helps the commander decide when and where to concentrate combat power.

6-65. Collection assets answer the division commander’s critical information requirements and other information requirements, which flow from the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and wargaming. Information required may include—

Key terrain, avenues of approach (ground, air, and maritime), likely engagement areas, and obstacles.

Determination of the enemy’s operational center of gravity and decisive points.

Location, orientation, and strength of enemy defensive positions.

Location and capability of a wide variety of enemy assets, including tactical and operational reserves, command and control nodes, intelligence systems, fire support systems, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and countermobility assets supporting the enemy’s defense.

Aspects of the civil population within the division’s area of operations that will impact on the conduct of the division’s offensive and stability tasks.

The division intelligence cell continually monitors the progress of the division’s offensive actions against the development of a significant enemy threat by reinforcing enemy formations.

6-66. G-2 synchronization managers plan how they synchronize their collection efforts with a broad range of collection assets operating in the division area of operation over which they have no direct control, such as joint, multinational, and national collection assets. These assets include counterintelligence and human intelligence collection teams under control of another agency; signals intelligence and geospatial intelligence collectors under control of a joint task force; and collectors under the control of friendly elements, such as host nation intelligence agencies. This is in addition to synchronizing the activities of their organic information collection assets during planning. A focused approach in allocating collection assets maximizes the capability of the limited number of assets available to the division. (See FM 3-55 for more information on information collection synchronization and integration.)

6-67. The division intelligence cell information collection planning addresses the detection and identification of threats to the division’s support area, such as enemy SOF and insurgent or terrorist asymmetric warfare activities that may interfere with the conduct of the division’s mission command and sustainment warfighting function tasks. Intelligence cell battle captains working in the current operations integrating cell help synchronizes intelligence activities with the division’s other offensive actions to ensure all division information collection means provide timely information to support the current offensive actions. The division G-2 recommends information collection tasks be assigned to the division’s subordinate BCTs and supporting brigades to the division G-3 chief of operations realizing they may also task these units to conduct other priority missions to support security or offensive missions.

FIRES

6-68. The division fires cell is responsible for developing the division’s fire support plan. That plan lays out how the division commander intends to integrate all fire support assets into the operation. Typically the design of the division fire support plan attempts to isolate the area selected for attack by the division’s maneuver forces by disrupting and/or severing the enemy’s command and control, fires, and sustainment systems. To do so, initial division fires focus is on—

Enemy units arrayed in depth behind the enemy main defensive positions, particularly air defense and artillery systems.

Mobile reserve formations, including helicopter units, capable of impeding the attack.

Higher echelon enemy command and control system/facilities.

Key support facilities or infrastructure.

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) delivery systems.

DELIVER FIRES

6-69. Additional, complementary and reinforcing joint and multinational capabilities provide redundancy to mitigate environmental and operational restrictions, resource shortfalls, and gaps in coverage from a particular asset. The delivery of the effects of available fires must support the four characteristics of offensive action—audacity, concentrations, surprise, and tempo—to help enable the division to seize and maintain the initiative for fires. Supporting the concept of operations during the offense involves acquiring, discriminating, and engaging targets throughout the area of operations with massed and precision fires including joint and electronic warfare assets. Planning considerations for supporting the scheme of maneuver during the offense include are very similar to those planning considerations for the defense discussed in chapter 5.

INTEGRATE FIRES

6-70. A division conducting primarily offensive tasks integrates Army indirect fires to support its operations. The division’s fires combined the use of air and ground fires, electronic attack, and offensive cyberspace operations with the capabilities of the division’s other Army warfighting functions to help seize the initiative. This provides the division with scalable capabilities that provide a range of nonlethal to lethal actions commensurate with the commander’s intent. The division and its brigades plan for, integrate, coordinate, and synchronize the scalable fires capabilities of all available sensors and weapon systems into the concept of operations to achieve desired effects. This creates synergy between the actions of these different units, develop a common operational picture, and enable joint interdependence.

6-71. The fire support plan is a mission order to the division’s attached or supporting fires and joint fires assets expressing desired results for—

Counterfire.

Direct support.

Covering fires.

Preparatory fires.

Interdiction.

Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).

Electronic attack.

Offensive cyberspace operations.

6-72. Joint fires are a source of considerable combat power for the division commander. Air support to the division during the offense consists of CAS, air interdiction, tactical intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, tactical airlift, and indirectly, counterair operations. Counterair operations gain and maintain air superiority and protect ground forces and their freedom to maneuver. CAS and air interdiction support are with the division’s subordinate BCT organic and any attached FA brigade assets. The fires cell works with the current and future operations integrating cells and plans cell to ensure the synchronization of available and projected joint fire assets into division operations.

6-73. During the offense, the division’s decisive operation receives priority of fires once initiated. Until that time the division’s main effort has priority of fires. If the division is conducting the corps, JFLC, or joint task force main effort, the higher headquarters commander’s CAS distribution decision is normally weighted to the main effort. The corps commander prioritizes the division target nominations or mission-type air requests and sends those to the next higher headquarters for validation. Priority for CAS sorties normally goes to the BCTs conducting the decisive operation. BCTs conducting division shaping operations, such as follow and support, reserve, and supporting attacks must be prepared to accept and employ CAS sorties as if they become the division’s main effort. The division commander typically retains CAS sorties to influence the battle at decisive times.

6-74. It is imperative for unit commanders to send air support requests as soon as requirements are identified. Preplanned air support requests are sent in sufficient time to be resourced on the air tasking order (ATO). The concept of pushing CAS aircraft to CAS stacks (known as “Push CAS”) in anticipation of future requirements was used during Operation Iraqi Freedom to make up for the lack of Army air support requests (known as “Pull CAS”) received in the coalition air operations center. However, “Push CAS” holding in the vicinity of the supported unit is a luxury that may not be feasible in future major operations. Army units identify their air support requirements and send air support requests/JTARs to the supporting air component in sufficient time to be published on the ATO.

CONDUCT TARGETING

6-75. The enemy’s counterattack forces are usually high value targets. As part of planning the division intelligence cell identifies potential enemy formations possessing significant firepower and the mobility to easily influence the outcome of the division attack if they are not countered. That information is given to the fires cell during targeting meetings and incorporated into the division fire support plan.

6-76. The plan for the division’s preparatory fires target known enemy attack helicopter units, ideally in their assembly areas because of their ability to mass and maneuver to support main defensive positions. The division’s interdiction efforts must disrupt or preclude enemy counterattack forces from interfering with the division’s efforts to penetrate and/or envelopment of static enemy positions in their main defensive positions. The division fire support plan will also address augmenting BCT counterbattery operations with combinations of fires assets including using attack helicopters, lethal unmanned aerial systems (UAS), Army tactical missile systems, and joint fires.

6-77. CAS and air interdiction are planned against enemy forces whose destruction or delay would have the greatest potential to unhinge the enemy commander’s plan or tempo. Priority targets for CAS and air interdiction are high-payoff targets identified throughout targeting. Planning targets to be prosecuted with air interdiction are processed in sufficient time to be approved by the joint force commander or designated targeting oversight authority and normally prioritized on the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL). Air interdiction adds depth and shape the battlefield. It can help isolate the battle by interdicting avenues of approach and lines of communications that lead to the division’s axis of advance and objectives.

6-78. While the U.S. Air Force tactical air control party (TACP) advises and assists in fire support planning as part of the joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC), preplanned air support requests for CAS and air interdiction missions are submitted by the division fires cell to the division’s higher headquarters according to established timelines. The division’s supporting TACP and ASOC submits immediate CAS requests, and if delegated the authority, the ASOC can scramble, retask, or rerole other joint air missions supporting the division to fulfill higher priority division requirements (see chapter 9). The division JAGIC plans and coordinates joint fires, SEAD, airspace coordination areas, ingress and egress routes, and other airspace requirements to deliver aerial and surface-delivered fires simultaneously into a given engagement area or target area.

6-79. Planned targets for CAS missions require less fidelity than targets for air interdiction due to the fact that CAS mission uses a certified and qualified individual to perform terminal attack control (who is responsible for locating and marking ground targets during execution and directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in CAS). Whereas, air interdiction missions do not require or use terminal attack controllers to execute the mission. Detailed integration into the ground scheme of maneuver is not necessary to prevent fratricide during air interdiction missions, so pilots have the responsibility to find and engage their targets. However, both air interdiction and CAS missions require the requester to provide periodic target updates (as available) to the supporting air component to ensure the target remains valid and that the supporting air mission is required.

6-80. The division fires cell planning addressing the electronic attack or physical destruction of the enemy command and control system, air defense radars, and the disruption of enemy intelligence-collection efforts to preclude and/or disrupt the flow of enemy information. The division plan addresses the destruction of identified enemy command posts to disrupt the enemy’s capability to provide direction and control. These actions degrade the cohesion of enemy defenses and limit the enemy commander’s flexibility to altering or execute the enemy’s defensive scheme. Such actions are a priority division effort unless selective the enemy command and control system or intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition sensors are necessary to support friendly military deception operations.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

6-81. The division will not normally have air and missile defense assets attached to or in direct support of the division. Portions of the division area of operations may fall within the range fan of Army Patriot batteries OPCON to the area air defense commander. The division’s air defense and airspace management element manages the division’s airspace and air and missile defense. It provides air defense early warning, third dimension common operational picture, and airspace management capabilities to the division commander and staff. To accomplish these tasks, the air defense and airspace management element connects to the vast network of sensors, communications, computers, and information collection assets available on the digital battlefield. The air defense and airspace management element tracks the current fight and plans for the future fight while keeping the commander and staff appraised of friendly and enemy air situations. The air defense and airspace management element assesses the air, missile, and aviation situation and determines if the division has enough air defense or aviation assets to handle the current and future threat. It coordinates airspace control requirements with higher headquarters.

6-82. The air defense and airspace management element develops the division’s defended asset list in coordination with the division G-3 for approval by the commander and submission to higher headquarters for protection by joint force air component defensive counter air. Establishment of air defense priorities is an important part of coordinating air and missile defense. The division’s priority of protection is normally to its attached BCTs, the combat aviation brigade, and FA Brigade and those portions of the supporting sustainment brigade located in the division support area. The division protection cell will coordinate with the appropriate integrating cell (depending on the time frame for the offense) and the intelligence and fires cells to nominate enemy air and missile targets for attack by joint force air component offensive counterair through the appropriate Army force or joint force land component (JFLC) headquarters. This coordination occurs within the division’s JAGIC workspace.

6-83. The division’s Sentinel radars provide an air picture and situational data to the division air defense and airspace management element and from there to the division main and tactical command posts. Sentinel contributes to the digital battlefield by automatically detecting, tracking, classifying, identifying, and reporting friendly aircraft and targets infiltrating below the umbrella provided by long and medium air defense sensors. Division planning addresses the positioning of and the provision of local security for these radars.

6-84. The division protection cell is also responsible for ensuring that division elements employ passive air defense to provide individual and collective protection of friendly forces and critical assets. Passive air defense measures includes such things as: camouflage, concealment, hardening, reconstruction, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense equipment and facilities, redundancy, detection and warning systems, mobility, and dispersal. These passive air defense measures are largely matters addressed in division and brigade tactical standard operating procedures. Commanders at all levels enforce these standard operating procedures at all times, not just in the offense. The air defense and airspace management element works with the division plans cell to integrate air and missile defense considerations into division military deception plans.

SUSTAINMENT

6-85. Well planned and executed sustainment support at the right time on the battlefield enables maneuver units to maintain the momentum of the attack. In the attack, the division coordinates with the theater sustainment command, expeditionary sustainment command, and the supporting sustainment brigade to position elements of the brigade’s functional and multifunctional battalions forward to weight the division’s decisive operation and sustain all of the division’s units. Offensive sustainment planning emphasizes classes III and V resupply; maintenance of weapon systems; medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), casualty, and replacement operations. The division’s integrating cells and the sustainment cell pay particular attention to the division’s mobility corridors, lines of communications, and supply routes during branch and sequel planning designed to exploit offensive success. They plan with the protection cell and the division’s supporting maneuver enhancement brigade how these routes can be secured over extended distances and what route maintenance and improvements must be made in them to support the division’s offensive actions. (See chapter 3 of ADRP 4-0 for more information on sustainment planning considerations.)

6-86. The division can use supplies and materiel captured from the enemy during the offense, with the exception of Class VIII, or obtained from civilian businesses within the division’s area of operations to supplement division stocks and to increase the division’ operating and safety levels. Planning should address how to resolve potential quality control problems associated with exploiting these irregular supply sources. The division Judge Advocate General staff, supporting contracting office, and assistant chief of staff, financial management (G-8), along with the division’s supporting financial management support unit, should review proposed civilian requisitioning methods, approval authorities, and cost controls for conformance to the laws of war and appropriate acquisition regulations.

LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT

6-87. The Army’s concept for sustainment is a comprehensive, integrated, and joint-capable concept that leverages the Army’s joint and strategic partners from the national sustainment base to the point of delivery and moves the Army further along the path to joint interdependency. It provides the geographical combatant or joint force commander a single Army point of contact for sustainment operations.

6-88. This concept for sustainment support is enabled by total visibility of the distribution system, its content, and theater infrastructure. This includes visibility of main supply routes in concert with multi-nodal and multi-modal operations that form the backbone of the logistics system. Logistics planners are provided the capability to identify, prioritize, and modify support moving throughout the distribution system. Sustainment commanders and staffs combine visibility of the distribution system with clear lines of command to channel assets as they move throughout the operational environment.

6-89. A theater sustainment command and its subordinate units supports the division with logistics and personnel services. The theater sustainment command controls all echelons-above-brigade logistics operations within the supported geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility. This achieves unity of command and operational flexibility to ensure the uninterrupted flow of personnel, equipment, supplies, and capabilities. It optimizes area of responsibility-wide sustainment capabilities. Area of responsibility-wide situational awareness is essential to maintaining the intra-theater segment of the distribution pipeline in balance and operating in harmony with the global distribution system. This is accomplished through collaboration and coordination with Army and joint partners at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

6-90. The division sustainment cell conducts continuous coordination with the designated theater or expeditionary sustainment command headquarters and the sustainment brigade providing logistics and personnel services support to the division’s subordinate BCTs to ensure that the division’s sustainment needs are adequately addressed. Proper forecasting of division requirements for these two tasks by the division’s sustainment cell is vital. This coordination goes from the division through the sustainment staff organization of the Army force headquarters unless direct liaison is authorized. The Army force headquarters authorizes the division to conduct direct liaison with its supporting sustainment brigade.

6-91. The sustainment brigades supporting the division can be adjusted in size by the assignment of additional logistics and personnel services units to support a combination of up to ten BCTs and supporting brigades. This means that a single sustainment brigade might support more than a single division. The sustainment brigade(s) supporting the division contain a mix of functional and multifunctional battalions. These combat sustainment support battalions and the sustainment brigade’s logistics automation systems give the sustainment brigade the capability to manage the flow of logistics support to the division. Units attached to sustainment brigades provide field services, human resources, postal, and financial management support to the division.

ARMY HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT TO THE OFFENSE

6-92. Medical planners consider many factors when developing the medical appendix to the sustainment annex to support of division offensive actions. The offensive tasks conducted, the enemy’s capabilities, the health threats within the operational environment in which the offense occurs, and the capabilities of the medical structure supporting the division are some of these factors. The medical planner understands how these factors interact to influence the character of the patient workload and its time and space distribution. The analysis of this workload determines the allocation of medical resources and the location or relocation of medical treatment facilities and their associated medical units.

6-93. Division medical support in the offense is responsive to several essential characteristics. As operations achieve success, the areas of casualty density move away from supporting medical treatment facilities. This causes MEDEVAC routes to lengthen. Heaviest patient workloads occur during disruption of the enemy's main defenses, at terrain or tactical barriers, during subordinate unit assaults on their objectives, and during enemy counterattacks. The accurate prediction of these workload points by medical planners is essential to the success of the MEDEVAC effort.

6-94. As the division’s advancing BCTs extend their control of their respective areas of operation, supporting medical elements clear the battlefield. This facilitates the acquisition of the wounded and injured and reduces the vital time elapsed between wounding and treatment. There are two problems confronting the supporting medical units and MEDEVAC elements. First, contact with the supported units is maintained. Responsibility for the contact follows the normal pattern, higher echelon evacuates from lower echelon. Contact is maintained by forward deployed air and ground MEDEVAC resources. Second, the mobility of the medical treatment facilities and units supporting the division’s BCTs must be maintained. The requirement for prompt MEDEVAC of patients from forward Role 1 medical treatment facilities requires available ambulances to be positioned well forward from the outset. The division surgeon section coordinates for both air and ground ambulance support beyond the capabilities of BCT medical companies with the division’s supporting medical unit(s) and combat aviation brigade.

6-95. The offense’s major casualty area is the area where the division’s main effort or decisive operation takes place. As the division’s primary mission is accomplished, those participating units receive first priority in the allocation of combat power, including medical support. The allocation of forces within the division’s BCTs dictates roughly the areas likely to have the greatest casualty density. As the operation moves from the areas of initial contact, coordinated movement of medical treatment capabilities will be necessary to provide continuous medical support. For additional information refer to FM 4-02.

PROTECTION

6-96. The fluidity and quick tempo of the division offense pose challenges in planning for the protection of division assets. The forward movement of the division’s BCTs and supporting brigades are critical if the division is to maintain the initiative necessary for conducting successful offensive tasks. Although the conduct of protection tasks often have a lower priority during the offense, they become important during operational pauses and consolidation of objectives. The discussion of protection tasks found in FM 3-90-1 and chapter 5 also applies to the offense with appropriate adjustments.

SECTION IV – PREPARING FOR OFFENSIVE TASKS

6-97. Even in fluid situations, preparations for the conduct of offensive tasks are best organized and coordinated in assembly areas. However, if rapid action is essential to retain a tactical advantage, the commander may decide not to use assembly areas. Detailed advance planning—combined with digital communications, standard operating procedures, and battle drills—reduces the negative impacts of such a decision.

MISSION COMMAND

6-98. During the preparation phase, the commander uses the visualize-describe-direct methodology to inform his or her decisionmaking with regards to the plan (see ADRP 6-0). The commander validates the plan with no changes, directs adjustment of the plan based on new information, or rejects the plan.

OPERATIONS PROCESS

6-99. During this phase, the commander continues to conduct battlefield circulation. These visits to subordinate units allow the commander’s moral and physical presence to be felt, and the commander’s will for victory be expressed, understood, and acted on. The division conducts combined arms and other rehearsals and subordinates backbrief the commander on their plans for the offense. The commander checks on the progress of preparations for the offense and takes sensings of the morale of subordinate commanders and their units. The commander exercises command regardless of location within the division area of operations using the information systems found in the division mobile command group’s vehicles or aircraft from the supporting combat aviation brigade.

6-100. The attacking BCTs continue their respective military decisionmaking processes and troop leading procedures and priorities of work to the extent the situation and mission allow before moving to attack positions. These preparations include but are not necessarily limited to—

Protecting the force.

Conducting task organization.

Performing reconnaissance.

Refining the plan.

Briefing the troops.

Conducting rehearsals, including test firing of weapons.

COMMAND POST OPERATIONS

6-101. The division’s main and tactical command posts know the locations of friendly units. Digitization provides several systems to help with this process, such as blue force tracker. However, each of the functional and integrating cells retains the capability to manually track friendly units if digital systems are impacted by enemy electronic attack or environmental factors.

6-102. At some point during this phase, the division tactical command post may displace so that it is no longer co-located with the division main command post. This is true when the division conducts an operation where a headquarters above the BCT level is needed, such as the crossing force headquarters for a major river crossing operation within the division’s larger attack. While each command post no longer depends solely on line-of-sight communications to communicate; a physical separation of the division main and tactical command posts helps to ensure survivability against single point failure due to enemy action or natural disaster. The division operations order specifies which subordinate brigade headquarters assumes control of the division’s operations if both the main and tactical command posts are destroyed if not already established in the division’s tactical standard operating procedures. The division tactical command post usually moves into the area of operations of the BCT conducting the division’s decisive operation. The division commander uses the mobile command group to command the division from a forward location. The mobile command group may be secured by a military police element from the maneuver enhancement brigade or BCT maneuver forces may be tasked to perform that function.

6-103. The main command post may not need to displace forward until the division seizes its objectives and reaches its limit of advance because of the extensive presence of satellite based communications and secure internet computer systems. If the division commander does decide to displace the main command post forward as the offense progresses, the tactical command post will temporarily assume the current operations functions of the main command post. The commander may decide to augment the manning of the tactical command post by personnel assigned to the main command post. This will temporarily give the tactical command post greater capabilities during the time it takes the main command post to complete its displacement and regain functionality.

INFORMATION PROTECTION

6-104. During the preparation phase, the division G-6 ensures that the division’s communications system has redundant capabilities to allow the division mission command system to function throughout the conduct of the offense. The communications system also links into adjacent, supporting, and supported units, higher headquarters, appropriate other service headquarters, and multinational forces and governmental agencies as necessary. During this phase, liaison teams are exchanged to ensure unity of effort and common understanding if they have not previously been deployed.

6-105. The G-6 continues to refine the division information protection plan during the preparatory phase of the division’s offensive actions. The G-6 staff section works with the protection cell to provide staff supervision of the implementation of intrusion and attack detection. This happens by monitoring perimeter protection tools and devices to identify activities that constitute violations of the information protection plan and security policy. Selected events or occurrences, such as numerous log-on attempts within a period, are monitored to detect unauthorized access and inadvertent, malicious, or nonmalicious modification or destruction of data.

6-106. Network managers react to counter the effects of an incident on the network during this phase just as they do during the execution of operations. Reaction to a network or information system intrusion incorporates the capability to restore essential information services, as well as initiate attack response processes. Disaster recovery capability requires stopping the breach and restoring the network. (See Signal center of excellence doctrinal publications for additional information concerning network operations.)

INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES

6-107. Preparation to employ information related capabilities is one of the first things initiated because many of the capabilities require long lead times to create the desired effects. The division information operations officer takes advantage of previous efforts to analyze potential target audiences. Those efforts include:

Assessing religious, ethnic, and cultural mores, norms, and values.

Assessing potential areas of agreement and conflict between target audiences.

Assessing the literacy rate of target audiences.

Assessing the languages used by target audiences and the availability of friendly personnel to communicate in those languages.

Assessing the communications infrastructure available to target audiences.

Assessing the susceptibility of various target audiences to cyber attack and military information support operations (MISO).

Assessing the division’s readiness to employ other information related capabilities against different target audiences.

These assessments forecast the readiness of the division to employ information related capabilities.

6-108. Preparation of the division to employ information-related capabilities takes place at three levels: the division information operations staff, units assigned to conduct information related tasks, and at the individual Soldier level. The division information operations officer helps prepare by performing staff tasks associated with the information operations function. That individual monitors preparations by units assigned to conduct tasks. Subordinate brigades perform preparation activities as a group for collective and individual tasks. (See FM 3-13 for more information.)

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

6-109. Multiple actions, events, and activities are accomplished to get the division ready to conduct offensive actions. This includes plan refinement, movement, assembly, conduct of pre-combat checks, and conducting any necessary situation training. Planned requirements are communicated to divisional units and supporting agencies, which take actions to prepare and organize the Soldiers, supplies, and equipment for offensive action. This includes getting support organizations prepared to displace forward at appropriate times and in the appropriate configuration to continue providing timely sustainment of offensive action.

6-110. Unless already in assembly areas, the division’s subordinate BCTs moves into them during the preparation phase. Each BCT moves with as much secrecy as possible. Normally this involves night movement along routes that prevent or degrade the enemy’s capabilities to visually observe or otherwise detect the movement. Each BCT avoids congesting its assembly area and occupies it for the minimum possible time. While in the assembly area, each BCT provides its own local security. The division tasks one or more subordinate maneuver units to screen or guard those locations selected to concentrate the division’s combat power. BCTs and supporting brigades preparing to attack remain as dispersed as possible until immediately before initiating offensive actions.

6-111. The division and its subordinate brigades may conduct one or more approach marches during this phase if the division’s BCTs and support brigades are located in areas at considerable distance from their designated attack positions. This requires the division commander to be relatively certain that the enemy is not in medium artillery range of approaching friendly forces or otherwise able to interdict the division’s movement.

6-112. The division completes the task organization of its engineer assets during this phase. The division tasks the supporting maneuver enhancement brigade and any supporting engineer brigade to provide mobility assets forward to augment the BCTs organic engineer capabilities according to the division scheme of maneuver. Mobility and countermobility tasks during this phase include—

Conducting route clearance operations.

Improving and maintaining lines of communications and other routes within the division area of operations. This includes replacing armored vehicle launched bridges with other types of bridging as the division continues to move forward.

Augmenting reconnaissance forces in terrain analysis, especially in bridge classification and mobility analysis for routes of advance.

Emplacing obstacles on the division’ flanks and against likely enemy avenues of approach into and within the division area of operations.

INTELLIGENCE

6-113. In the offense, the intelligence effort helps the commander decide when and where to concentrate overwhelming combat power. Information collection assets answer the division commander’s priority intelligence requirements and other information requirements, which flow from the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and wargaming. Information required may include—

Enemy centers of gravity or decisive points.

Location, orientation, and strength of enemy defenses.

Location of enemy reserves, fire support, and other attack assets to support defensive positions.

Close air support and aviation assets for defensive areas, air avenues of approach, and likely enemy engagement areas.

Key terrain, avenues of approach, and obstacles.

6-114. The capabilities of unified action partner intelligence assets are synchronized into the division’s operations. The ability of the division to exchange information and intelligence with any multinational units supporting the division’s offensive actions varies significantly from country to country. The G-2 is proactive to ensure that all information necessary for the multinational partner to accomplish its mission is provided promptly without violating classification guidance and foreign disclosure procedures. A focused approach in allocating collection assets maximizes the capabilities of the division’s limited number of collection assets.

INFORMATION COLLECTION

6-115. The G-2 identifies threats to the division support area, such as enemy special purpose forces and insurgent activities that may interfere with division mission command systems and sustainment operations during the conduct of the division’s attack. The G-2 synchronizes intelligence operations with combat operations to ensure all information collection assets provide timely information to support current operations. The G-2 recommends reconnaissance tasks for the G-3 to task the division’s supporting battlefield surveillance brigade or other organizations to accomplish.

SUPPORT TO TARGETING

6-116. In keeping with the commander’s priority intelligence requirements, the G-2 tasks collection assets to support targeting (decide, detect, deliver, and assess). Collection assets locate and track high-payoff targets and pass targeting data to fire support elements.

FIRES

6-117. The division fires cell ensures that organic, attached, and supporting Army and joint fire assets understand the ground scheme of maneuver so they can maximize their capabilities for the greatest effect. Allocating and synchronizing all elements of fire support, especially joint fires and nonlethal systems, complements and weights the division’s decisive operation. Synchronization also helps the division control the tempo of the attack. When preparing for offensive actions, the fires cell conducts coordination, rehearsals, and plan refinement to ensure that during the conduct of the attack, the division’s supporting fires assets can—

Conduct intense and concentrated preparatory fires before and during the initial stages of the attack.

Conduct suppressive fires to isolate the objective of the decisive operation and to help fix or disrupt enemy forces impacted by the division’s shaping operations.

Augment BCT fire assets as required to provide continuous suppression to allow subordinate BCT attacking formations to close with the enemy.

Conduct suppression of enemy air defense missions, some of which are appropriate for nonlethal attack assets.

Conduct counterfires to diminish or stop the enemy’s ability to effectively employ artillery.

Destroy selected enemy high-value targets or time sensitive targets designated by the joint force commander.

Deny, through electronic attack, enemy use of a critical command and control system, fire support, and intelligence systems.

Coordinate and integrate offensive cyberspace operations.

6-118. Timely execution of joint fires is critical when conducting offensive actions. All Army and joint fires assets supporting the division’s offensive actions must understand fire support and air coordination measures and procedures for controlling fires. Considerations impacting the selection of fire support and air coordination measures employed include—

The location of enemy forces.

The anticipated rate of the friendly advance.

The scheme of maneuver, including the maneuver of Army aviation units.

The desired tempo of operations.

6-119. During this phase, the division positions its Sentinel radars where they can best initially support the division’s offensive actions. The selection of those positions reflect a risk assessment design to preclude their early lose to enemy action. The air defense and airspace management element ensures that it has communications with the appropriate air and missile defense organization’s command post. That command post provides additional information to the division to expand the fidelity of the air component of the division’s common operational picture including information on the engagement of air threats by U.S. Air Force defensive counter air and Patriot air defense systems. The division concentrates on conducting passive air defense measures during this phase. If attacked or observed by enemy aerial systems (including UASs) in assembly areas, attack positions, or while moving the division’s subordinate units will disperse and conduct small arms air defense to the best of their capabilities.

SUSTAINMENT

6-120. Division offensive actions require forward sustainment support responsive to the resupply needs of the brigade support battalion’s within the division’s BCTs and support brigades. The sustainment brigade supporting the division positions sustainment assets and supply stock as close to the division’s BCTs and supporting brigades as the situation allows, commensurate with the level of risk the commander is willing to accept before the initiation of offensive actions. These sustainment locations support the division’s commander’s priorities, with the decisive operation as the principal focus. The actions of all logistics, personnel services support, and medical units supporting the division are directed toward maximizing the division’s available combat power. Distribution units must optimize their assets to rapidly deliver supplies and replacement personnel to maneuver units when needed.

6-121. Engineer elements within the maneuver enhancement brigade and any supporting engineer brigades will be performing the following sustainment and protection tasks in the division support area during the preparation phrase—

Providing general engineering for follow-on forces and logistics units.

Maintaining key facilities, such as airfields and landing strips.

Conducting survivability engineer operations to protect key assets, such as aviation assembly areas; petroleum, oils, and lubricants sites; and ammunition points.

Protecting other designated critical facilities, in priority.

PROTECTION

6-122. Those offensive protective preparation activities discussed in FM 3-90-1 apply to conducting division offensive actions. Those protective activities conducted in the preparation phase for the defense that were discussed in chapter 5 also apply during the preparation for offensive actions.

SECTION V – EXECUTING DIVISION OFFENSIVE TASKS

6-123. The division conducting offensive actions employs forms of maneuver—envelopment, flank attack, frontal attack, penetration, turning movement—previously mentioned. After the division completes its offensive plan and preparations and the attack starts, the division commander controls the action through fragmentary orders issued to subordinate BCTs and supporting brigade that reflect the commander’s adjustments to the initial order and the employment of Army and joint fires. The BCTs and combat aviation brigade are the units of execution. The division’s offensive actions thus become a series of coordinated and integrated BCT engagements. The distinction in the division form of maneuver exists primarily in the intent of the division commander since the subordinate elements of the division may use all forms of maneuver in their attack. The offensive execution considerations in FM 3-90-1 apply to the conduct of division offensive actions. What follows is either information not contained in that manual or that needs additional amplification to make it applicable to division operations.

MISSION COMMAND

6-124. In the execution phase, the division commander exercises judgment to enable the force to gain and maintain the initiative. The division mission command system supports the commander to allow the development of the commander’s accurate and timely situational understanding. It allows the commander to make necessary adjustment decisions on a timely basis with the associated near instantaneous propagation of those adjustment decisions to affected organizations.

6-125. The division commander does not normally directly control close combat operations around the line of contact between subordinate BCTs and the enemy. The commander supports the division’s decisive operation by employing available combat multipliers throughout the division’s area of operations in a manner designed to create and sustain the conditions necessary to ensure the success of the division’s subordinate brigades. This includes the division’s supporting combat aviation and FA brigades in addition to joint fires. The commander employs fires to reach deep into the enemy’s defenses to strike vulnerable, high value targets or engage uncommitted enemy forces and thereby shape the area of operations to enable the success of the division’s subordinate brigades.

6-126. During execution, the division commander locates in the best position to sense the progress of the offensive action while still being able to exercise effective mission command. Sometimes this is at the main or tactical command post. At other times, the commander elects to use the ground or air mobile command group to command from a forward location. The commander balances the need to make personal observations, provide command presence, and sense the mood of subordinates in forward locations with the ability to maintain communication and control with the entire force. The division commander continues to look beyond the current operation to anticipate future actions.

6-127. When commanding from the mobile command group, the division commander positions the mobile command group forward where the commander can see and sense the battle once it is joined. As a rule, the mobile command group is initially located in the area of operations of the area of the lead BCT in the division’s decisive operation and moves with that BCT. Alternatively it could be with the initial main effort if the units conducting the initial main effort and the decisive operation are not the same.

6-128. The main command post continues to synchronize the division’s decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. It ensures the commander’s decisions are relayed and acted on by committed units. It generally remains stationary throughout the course of the current operation. The tactical command post maintains its situational awareness of the current operation and has copies of future operations plans so that it is prepared to take over in the event of the incapacitation of the main command post if it is deployed away from the main command post as a survivability measure.

6-129. The division G-9 works with any supporting civil affairs units and the G-3 to minimize civil interference with division operations and maximize the use of available civilian resources by the division, providing those resources are surplus to the needs of the civilian population. This includes keeping division movement routes clear of civilian traffic.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

6-130. The Army’s vision of fighting division battles and engagements emphasizes the conduct of simultaneous operations to gain their total, synergistic effect. BCT and smaller tactical commanders may have to fight sequentially to secure advantages for later engagements, but the preferred method for a division is to overwhelm an enemy force during a short period of time regardless of its location within the area of operations. Multiple attacks place several critical enemy functions at risk all at once. Such attacks deny the enemy the ability to synchronize or generate combat power. They also deny the enemy any unit cohesion to execute a plan. Simultaneous attacks in depth induce friction into the enemy’s scheme of maneuver and significantly degrade the enemy’s will to fight.

6-131. Simultaneous attacks result in the enemy’s partial destruction, confusion, and demoralization. This gives friendly commanders opportunities for decisive strikes. Such simultaneous attacks allow the division commanders to completely dominate the tempo of operations within their areas of operations. Thus, friendly subordinate brigade commanders control their own tempo and, through synchronized operations, influence the tempo of the enemy. This allows the division commander to gain (or retain) initiative and freedom of maneuver. When the division strikes at the time and place of its choosing throughout the battlefield, it causes the enemy commander multiple, critical problems—little warning time, compressed planning, poor decisions, and no good courses of action.

6-132. Division units vary the tempo of operations, concentrate rapidly to strike the enemy, then disperse and move to subsequent objectives. These actions keep the enemy off balance and preclude the enemy’s effective employment of area effects and weapons of mass destruction. Before the main attack, the division conducts shaping operations to establish the conditions necessary for the decisive operation’s success including feints, demonstrations, or a reconnaissance in force to deceive the enemy and/or test the enemy’s dispositions before conducting the division’s decisive operation.

6-133. It is possible that advances in enemy anti-satellite, electronic warfare, cyber warfare, and air defense systems when coupled with large scale effective use of electronic emissions control and military deception measures mean that the division will not have an accurate intelligence picture of the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and combat capabilities. When the intelligence picture is incomplete or dated, the division commander may direct that the entire division or one or more of its combat brigades supported by other division elements to conduct a reconnaissance in force. This reconnaissance in force employs the R&S assets of subordinate BCTs and the division’s supporting combat aviation and battlefield surveillance brigades to find the enemy and determine the enemy’s dispositions. If the mission dictates, the BCTs and combat aviation brigade then develop the situation to determine enemy weakness to establish the conditions necessary for conducting the division’s decisive operation.

6-134. At the prescribed time, the division concentrates attacking units sufficiently to mass their effects at a point in the enemy defense. This achieves decisive results by appropriately weighting the decisive operation. To achieve tactical surprise, this concentration occurs under strong operations security measures and within the parameters of the division or higher headquarters military deception plan. If the division moves a considerable distance to gain contact or attack the enemy, it conducts an approach march to close with the enemy force.

6-135. The division resources the close fight around its BCTs. Attacking BCT commanders fight their battalions, which use direct and indirect fires and maneuver against the defending enemy. Attack helicopters, combat engineers, electronic warfare, FA units, and joint fires support maneuver battalions in their destruction of defending enemy units. The division provides additional assets to subordinate BCTs where and when needed. The decisive operation receives additional tactical maneuver units, combat engineers, reinforcing artillery and joint fires, and sustainment. The division ensures that every available resource supports its decisive operation.

6-136. When the division employs armored forces in close proximity to infantry and Stryker force, it ensures that the infantry and Stryker forces dominate close terrain within the division area of operations. Infantry and Stryker units can more effectively prevent enemy light forces from using close terrain to interfere with the division’ offensive action by more effectively controlling that terrain than can ABCTs. Friendly infantry and Stryker forces also deny enemy heavy forces easy access through close terrain. Doing so forces the enemy to fight dismounted to protect their tanks and to engage friendly infantry. The division can then use friendly ABCTs to strike decisive blows at chosen times and places.

6-137. When possible, all units conduct in-stride breaching operations during the offense to allow the force to maintain its offensive momentum. Successful breaching of complex obstacles requires detailed combined arms planning.

INTELLIGENCE

6-138. During the conduct of division offensive actions, the intelligence cell continues to provide the commander, the staff, subordinates, supporting, and higher headquarters with the composition, disposition, limitations, and employment characteristics of enemy forces, and the enemy’s anticipated actions in a timely manner. This allows the commander to make those adjustment decisions that significantly affect the enemy commander’s decision cycle. It ensures commanders have the intelligence they need to conduct offensive actions with minimum risk of surprise.

FIRES

6-139. Fires that support offensive actions are responsive and timely to support maneuver and help the force achieve and sustain the initiative. Supporting fires elements should never be out of range of advancing maneuver formations. The general tasks of the FA brigade during the offense are to—

Execute division shaping operations against uncommitted enemy forces, enemy command nodes, fires and air defense networks, and enemy information collection assets.

Establish support relationships to facilitate responsive reinforcing fires to lead division elements.

Support BCTs during the attack by providing close suppressive fires to isolate objective and fix enemy forces.

Shift fire support to interdict enemy reinforcements and escape routes.

Structure communications networks to maintain continuous responsive fire support to maneuvering forces.

Focus available survey assets on extending control forward to support the movement of radars forward to support the attack.

Move meteorological sections forward by echelon to provide continuous meteorological coverage to the force.

Coordinate meteorological coverage with BCT FA battalions.

(See ADRP 3-09 and related publications for additional information on the employment of fires by units to support offensive actions.)

SUSTAINMENT

6-140. Conduct of offensive actions requires large amounts of petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and the provision of continuous support depends on open and secure lines of communications. Those lines of communications lengthen during the conduct of the offense which in turn requires the forward movement of stocks and sustainment units and the establishment of forward bases. The forward movement of sustainment units and stocks must be timed to minimize the impact on support to maneuver units. (See FM 4-95 for more information on logistics operations.)

PROTECTION

6-141. Protection considerations during the conduct of offensive tasks continue those activities initiated during planning and preparing phases. Additional protective considerations include the following.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

6-142. During the offense a quick response to an isolating incident is generally a key factor in the successful resolution of a personnel recovery incident for four reasons. First, the isolated personnel are less likely to move or be moved very far from their last know location which reduces the size of the search area. Second, the provision of prompt medical attention reduces the probability that any injuries suffered by the isolated personnel will result in the loss of life or limb. Third, because it keeps the enemy from reacting in a coordinate manner to the presence of isolated friendly personnel. Finally, environmentally related factors, such as cold and wet weather, presence of endemic diseases and animals and insects dangerous to man, and hunger or thirst, will be of lesser importance to the physical well being of the isolated personnel.

6-143. The division personnel recovery element forward any personnel recovery support requirements that are beyond the division’s capabilities to the Army force rescue coordination element, such as requirements for additional personnel recovery capable forces, planning information, and requests for evasion aids. (See FM 3-50 for more information on the execution of personnel recovery operations.)

FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE

6-144. Division fratricide avoidance efforts during execution focus on maintaining previously established control measures that minimize blue on blue engagement when BCTs converge. This convergence occurs primarily during link-up operations, during the conduct of flank attacks and envelopment, and during movement of one formation through another. During execution, in-stride risk assessment and reaction can overcome unforeseen other fratricide risk situations. The following are lower echelon factors to consider when assessing fratricide risks—

Intervisibility between adjacent units.

Amount of battlefield obscuration.

Ability or inability to identify targets positively.

Similarities and differences in equipment, vehicles, and uniforms between forces.

Vehicle density on the battlefield.

The tempo of the battle.

6-145. Maintaining an awareness of the common operational picture at all levels and at all times as an operation progresses is another key to fratricide reduction. To aid leaders and Soldiers in this process, units develop and employ effective techniques and standard operating procedures including—

Monitoring the next higher radio net.

Radio cross-talk between units.

Common operational picture updates.

Accurate position reporting and navigation.

Training, use, and exchange of liaison officers.

SECTION VI – ASSESSMENT

6-146. Assessment was addressed in chapter 5. The division commander and staff base their assessments of the division’s offensive actions on their situational understanding. The applicable measures of performance are if the offensive purposes were accomplished. These purposes are referenced in paragraph 6-2 of this chapter.

6-147. Measures of performance in the offense are equally simple and are commonly understood. These include the ratio of friendly and enemy losses of personnel (including prisoners of war and line crossers) and combat systems of various types and how much terrain is seized. Another measure of performance might be if the division’s information collection effort was able to determine the enemy’s chosen reaction to the division’s attack in time for the division effectively counter or preempt that reaction.

6-148. The division commander’s evaluation of the division’s offensive efforts allows the identification of variances from the offensive plan. These variances may be opportunities to accomplish the offensive mission more effectively or as threats to mission accomplishment or survival of the force. Just as in the defense, the division staff incorporates their assessments based on their evaluations into running estimates that present adjustment recommendations to the division commander. The division commander considers these recommendations, makes a decision, and directs actions to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. (See chapter 5 of ADRP 5-0 for more information on assessment.)

SECTION VII – TRANSITIONS

6-149. A transition occurs when the commander makes the assessment that the unit must change its focus from one element of military operations to another. (See chapter 1 of FM 3-90-1 for more information on transitions from offensive tasks.)

SECTION VIII – SCENARIO CONTINUED

6-150. The X Corps defense was successful and caused the REDLAND army to culminate. (See figure 6-1 for the situation as X Corps transitions to the offense.)

6-151. All committed REDLAND forces in GREENLAND are estimated as being less than 50 percent effective due to losses suffered from coalition air attack and ground defensive actions. Air interdiction and direct action missions by coalition special operations forces (SOF) are successful in preventing any operationally significant regeneration of attrited REDLAND forces by the movement of war reserve stocks and replacements from their depots in REDLAND. That portion of the REDLAND 10th Tank division tactical group (DTG) located within the 52nd Division area of operations is estimated at less than 33 percent effective. The 51st motorized DTG is estimated at 40-percent effective but can muster detachments in company-sized strength to counterattack into the southern flank of the 52nd Division’s east-west movement corridor. The 26th mechanized DTG is estimated at 35-percent strength. Additionally the insurgency remains capable of temporary interdicting X Corps ground lines of communications at times and places of their choosing with up to platoon-sized forces. Terrorists based along the international border between REDLAND and GREENLAND are not a significant factor affecting the 52nd Division’s tactical operations within GREENLAND at this point in time. This is because they lack the combat power to attack coalition military targets along the forward edge of the battle area and have no effective way to penetrate coalition front lines in a timely manner to attack GREENLAND civilian targets located within GREENLAND administered territory.

6-152. The readiness of coalition force land component ground forces is mixed. Both 52nd Division and 53rd Division are at approximately 90 percent strength. The GREENLAND 38th Division located on the southern flank of the division is at 75-percent strength and is capable of attacking to fix those portions of the REDLAND 53rd and 51st motorized DTGs located within its area of operations. The GREENLAND 62nd Division located on the northern flank of the 53rd Division is at 70-percent strength and is capable of attacking to defeat the 52nd motorized DTG. The GREENLAND 67th Division is at 65 percent strength and can only attack to fix the 20th tank DTG. The 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade remains the coalition force land component reserve with a secondary mission of securing the joint security area.

6-153. In this phase of the operation, the 52nd Division attacks with the 2/52 and 4/52 ABCTs, the 1/52 IBCT, and the 2/26 SBCT. This is a shaping operation for the X Corps. While the defensive scenario in chapter 5 unfolded, additional forces continued to deploy to or be constituted within the joint operations area. The reinforcements made available to the 52nd Division for the conduct of offensive tasks are—

The 108th Military Police Battalion and 803rd explosive ordnance disposal Company (attached to 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade).

The 3rd Battalion 99th Motorized Brigade of the GREENLAND Army (GA).

The 555th Engineer Brigade consisting of three engineer battalions and a geospatial information and services support team. (The X Corps commander reinforces the division with this organization because additional engineer forces in the form of an engineer command and additional engineer brigades have now had the opportunity to close within the joint operations area.)

The division has been given OPCON of the 555th Engineer Brigade because of the number of rivers that it will have to cross during its planned advance and the need to maintain mobility during the advance. The 75th Military Police and GA motorized infantry battalions were added to help the division provide security for the conduct of its sustainment operations. (See figure 6-2 on page 6-29 for the 52nd Division’s troops available for the offense).

6-154. The main command post remains in its base in the theater security area and maintains coordination with higher headquarters. The division plans cell at the main command post refines sequels and branches to the current operation. The plans cell conducts planning for the conduct of future division stability tasks for execution in the next phase of the joint force commander’s campaign. The intelligence cell at the main command post is providing updated intelligence products to the division’s major subordinate commands as they begin to conduct offensive tasks.

MISSION

6-155. On order, the 52nd Division attacks from PL MAMMEL to seize OBJ DIANA. This is part of a X Corps offense designed to restore the territorial integrity of GREENLAND.

COMMANDER’S INTENT

6-156. The purpose of this operation is to isolate REDLAND forces from their support and sustainment bases. The key task is to seize OBJ DIANA which will lead to either the encirclement of the majority of REDLAND forces or a political settlement resulting in their withdrawal from GREENLAND. The desired end state is the withdrawal or destruction of REDLAND forces from the 52nd Division’s area of operations, which returns control of the land, people, and resources in country to the internationally recognized government of GREENLAND. Insurgent and terrorist personnel encountered during this operation are to be destroyed or captured.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

6-157. The 52nd Division attacks with the 4/52 ABCT in the north to destroy the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group and secure OBJECTIVES JOHN and BEM so they can serve as bridgehead to enable the forward passage of the 2/52 ABCT to seize OBJECTIVE DIANA and destroy the 261st Mechanized Brigade Tactical Group. The axis of advance is along Highway 1. However the network of secondary roads allows 4/52 ABCT to bypass any enemy attempts to block movement along Highway 1. PL HARRIS is the division limit of advance for this attack. The 2/25 SBCT is the division reserve and follows the 4/52 ABCT and the 2/52 ABCT along Highway 1 to an assembly area centered on the intersection of Highway 1 and PL FAHRNI after completing its mission staging operations. The 1/52 IBCT attacks to fix the 512th Motorized Infantry Brigade tactical group in their current locations to prevent their counterattacking into the flank of the decisive operations down Highway 1. The 575th FA and 11th Combat Aviation Brigades helps the BCTs accomplish these tasks. The disposition of enemy forces and the separation of key terrain compel the division to conduct non-linear operations that occasionally involves the use of noncontiguous area of operations. (See figure 6-3 for a schematic showing the division’s intent graphics as it transitions to the attack).

6-158. The division commander task-organized the capabilities in response to the current mission variables of METT-TC. Table 6-2 shows the division’s revised internal task organization for this phase. The division commander, based on the staff’s mission analysis, determined that the primary stability tasks during this phase of the operation provide temporary humanitarian assistance to GREENLAND civilians affected by the division’ offensive combat operations until the GREENLAND government assumes responsibility for their welfare. Thus the commander does not request the additional specialized capabilities necessary to accomplish stability tasks on a large-scale.

DECISIVE OPERATION

6-159. Once the 4/52 ABCT secures OBJECTIVE BEM, the 2/52 ABCT conducts a forward passage of lines through the 4/52 ABCT, east of OBJECTIVE BEM, and attacks to destroy the 261st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group and seize the key terrain vicinity of OBJECTIVE DIANA. This isolates REDLAND forces from their support and sustainment bases. The 4/52 ABCT is initially the division’s main effort. The 2/52 ABCT becomes the division’s main effort once it begins its forward passage of lines through the 4/52 ABCT. The 2/52 ABCT attack is the division’s decisive operation. Priority of support once the 2/52 ABCT becomes the main effort is to the 2/52 ABCT and then to 4/52 ABCT, the 1/52 IBCT, and 2/26 SBCT and the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade in that order. Elements of the 555th Engineer Brigade are initially in direct support of the 4/52 ABCT and integrated into the 4/52 ABCT’s order of march. The 575th FA Brigade provides a reinforcing cannon equipped FA battalion to the 2nd and 4/52 ABCTs. Figure 6-4 is a schematic showing the planned disposition of the division’s BCTs and the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade at the conclusion of this phase. The other supporting brigades occupy bases and base clusters within the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade’s area of operations. Notice that the size of each BCT area of operations is based on the size of their respective areas of influence and the division is occupying noncontiguous areas along Highway 1.

SHAPING OPERATIONS

6-160. The 4/52 ABCT (the initial main effort) attacks in the northern portion of the division's area of operations along Highway 1 to destroy enemy forces (101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group) and secure OBJECTIVES JOHN and BEM which allows the division to penetrate the enemy’s defenses. The fire support coordination line (FSCL) is initially PL FAHRNI.

6-161. The 2/52 ABCT initially follows the 4/52 ABCT. It becomes the division’s main effort, conducting the division’s decisive operation after conducting a forward passage of lines with 4/52 ABCT east of OBJECTIVE BEM and attacks to destroy the 261st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group and secure OBJECTIVE DIANA. This assists in the X Corps/coalition force land component envelopment of the remaining REDLAND forces west of PL HARRIS.

6-162. The 1/52 IBCT attacks to fix the 512th Motorized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group in the southern part of the division area of operations to protect the 2/52 ABCT from attack. The 2/25 SBCT becomes the division reserve after the 4/52 ABCT conducts its forward passage of lines through the 2/26 SBCT’s current positions.

6-163. The 575th FA Brigade's priority of fires are to destroy the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group and other REDLAND forces located along the 4/52 ABCT axis of advance (Highway 1). The second priority is to the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade to prevent elements of 51st motorized DTG from influencing 4/52 and 2/52 movement. The third priority is to suppress enemy indirect fire to protect the division’s BCTs. The fourth priority is to engage identified enemy UAS launch sites.

6-164. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade initially places an attack reconnaissance helicopter battalion OPCON to the 4/52 ABCT to help destroy previously detected enemy forces in the 4/52 ABCT area of operations and react to REDLAND attempts to interdict traffic along Highway 1. This battalion remains OPCON to the 4/52 ABCT throughout this phase of the operation. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade retains control of it other attack battalion and supports the 2/52 ABCT in destroying the 261st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group. Before the commitment of the 2/52 ABCT that 11th Combat Aviation Brigade supports, 1/52 IBCT efforts to fix the 512th Motorized IBCT in its current position and block other 51st motorized DTG elements from moving to where they can influence 52nd Division movement and maneuver along Highway 1. (See figure 6-4).

6-165. The 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade uses its assets to conduct R&S operations primarily to determine the presence and composition of REDLAND forces on OBJECTIVES JOHN, BEM, and DIANA and other forces capable of interdicting Highway 1. The second priority is to detect REDLAND and insurgent forces trying to move to positions from which they could interdict friendly movements along Highway 1.

6-166. The 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade remains responsible for security within its area of operations and the security and maintenance of division ground lines of communications in that same area of operations. Through separate but connected episodes, it is assigned a temporary area of operations to allow it to establish and secure movement corridors for ground lines of communications between the noncontiguous area of operations of the BCTs. This allows the 27th Sustainment Brigade to conduct periodic resupply of the forward support companies and CSSBs operating within those BCT areas of operations. The brigade supports the division’s conduct of limited stability tasks by conducting initial damage assessments, repairing critical civil infrastructure within its capability, and providing local security to population centers within its area of operations until local control is established. This becomes more important as the division begins recovering previously occupied GREENLAND territory containing significant numbers of civilians and the boundaries of the brigade are adjusted based on the mission variables of METT-TC.

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

6-167. The BCTs provide the minimal amount of humanitarian assistance to GREENLAND civilians encountered during their conduct of offensive tasks consistent with international law during this operational phase. Humanitarian assistance operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the U.S.. Military support provided by a BCT during this phase is only intended to temporarily supplement other agencies. It may include establishing temporary control of and providing security to concentration of civilians encounter during the course of the attack. It will probably include the provision of—

Temporary emergency medical treatment to civilian casualties of combat operations.

Food.

Water.

Shelter.

Transportation out of danger areas.

The BCTs use their civil-military operations centers (CMOC) to expedite the transfer of responsibility for the civilians they encounter to GREENLAND civil authorities and appropriate international organizations.

6-168. The 27th Sustainment Brigade and 48th Medical Brigade (Support) provide logistics, human resources, and Army health system support to the division’s BCTs and supporting brigades. Commanders and staffs of these two brigades and sustainment planners elsewhere within the division plan for increased quantities of fuel, ammunition, and selected other classes of supply and as for maintenance and recovery of damaged equipment using the operational logistics planner software. This software forecasts sustainment usage factors and can be found on the Army Knowledge Online Web site.

6-169. Priority is to the 4/52 ABCT until the 2/52 ABCT begins its forward passage of lines and becomes the division’s main effort. Sustainment operations in the offense are characterized by high-intensity operations that require anticipatory support as far forward as possible. Sustaining operations plans ensure agile and flexible capabilities to follow exploiting forces and continue support. The division’s lengthening lines of communications are major challenges during this attack. Transportation support is closely coordinated to deliver essential support to the right place at the right time with security provided by organic and external elements.

6-170. Medical planners address projected casualty and other Class VIII usage rates. Commanders preposition medical treatment and evacuation capabilities forward to efficiently evacuate casualties to where they can receive the appropriate medical care. When developing the Army health system plan for the offense, the surgeon section planner considers many factors (FM 8-55). The forms of maneuver, as well as the threat’s capabilities, influence the character of the patient workload and its time and space distribution. The analysis of this workload determines the allocation of medical resources and the location or relocation of medical treatment facilities.

6-171. Health service support in the offense is responsive to several essential characteristics. As operations achieve success, the areas of casualty density move away from the supporting medical treatment facility. This causes the routes of MEDEVAC to lengthen. Heaviest patient workloads occur during disruption of the enemy's main defenses, at terrain or tactical barriers, during the assault on final objectives, and during enemy counterattacks. The accurate prediction of these workload points by medical planners is essential if MEDEVAC operations are to be successful. As advancing combat formations extend their control over additional areas, supporting medical elements have the opportunity to clear the battlefield. This facilitates the acquisition of the wounded and reduces the vital time elapsed between wounding and treatment.

6-172. There are two problems confronting the supporting medical units and MEDEVAC elements. First, contact with the supported units must be maintained. Responsibility for the contact follows the MEDEVAC tenant—higher echelon evacuates from lower echelon. The forward deployed air and ground evacuation resources maintain the contact. Secondly, the mobility of the medical treatment facilities supporting the combat formations must be maintained. The requirement for prompt MEDEVAC of patients from forward facilities requires available ambulances to be echeloned well forward from the outset. MEDEVAC support (both air and ground ambulances) beyond the capabilities of the brigade support medical company is requested through the BCT operations officer to the division main command post current operations integrating cell in coordination with the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade, the 48th Medical Brigade (Support), and the division surgeon section.

MISSION COMMAND IN THE OFFENSE

6-173. The division mobile command group continues to give the commander the flexibility to move—with a small staff element—to critical positions on the battlefield to employ battlefield presence to assess the situation and make adjustments by seeing, hearing, and understanding what is occurring.

DIVISION MAIN COMMAND POST

6-174. The main command post remains in the joint security area throughout this phase. The main command post retains primary responsibility for planning sequels to current operations, intelligence analysis, estimates, and provides support to the tactical command post as needed. This support may include planning branches to current operations. Through orders, units may be task-organized, missions assigned, and priorities set for fires, information collection, support functions, and protection. All elements of the main command post coordinate with higher headquarters—X Corps/coalition force land component to remain synchronized with their intent and efforts, and will normally coordinate information with corresponding elements at the tactical command post through multi-user voice and data networks.

6-175. The plans element continues planning sequels for the next phase of the operation—which will focus more on the conduct of stability tasks than the current offensive phase. They are assisted in this task by a civil affairs planning team from the 548th Civil Affairs Battalion. The intelligence cell provides analysis of all information collected. The current operations integrating cell provides the division's common operational picture to all main command post elements to enable the main command post staff to provide estimates and plans based on accurate information of forces available and the enemy situation. The G-9 element maintains liaison with the 548th Civil Affairs Battalion CMOC and the civil affairs companies supporting the BCTs.

6-176. The fires cell at the main command post continues to synchronize the planning of Army indirect fires, joint fires, and information-related capabilities targeting to support the division commander’s intent through physical destruction, information and denial, enemy system collapse, and erosion of enemy will. The fires cell does this by:

Producing the division fire support plan.

Producing and updating the fire support estimate and annex.

Interfacing with X Corps/coalition force land component fires cell for operational targeting coordination.

Managing target nominations from subordinate BCTs and the tactical command post and tracking the lifecycle of the nomination.

Interfacing with all joint boards/cells.

Maintaining contact with higher and adjacent fires organizations.

The division information operations officer has staff responsibility for information related capabilities.

6-177. The coordinating and special staff sections within the main command post remain fully involved with the X Corps/coalition force land component Army sustainment cell (in their role as the Army force) and the theater sustainment command staff. They retain responsibility for ensuring the provision of sustainment to division current and future operations. This will require flexibility and foresight on their part as they begin obtaining those CLASS X items needed for the conduct of stability tasks beyond humanitarian assistance in the next operational phase of the joint force commander’s campaign. Indeed some orders for especially long-lead items will need to have been placed even before the division deployed into the joint operations area.

6-178. When the attack begins, the main command post coordinates for the forward movement of the FSCL from PL FAHRNI to PL KEELER, and later to PL HARRIS. The movement of the FSCL is coordinated by the JAGIC with the combined air operations center through the coalition force land component fires cell and battlefield coordination detachment with the forward movement of division units. During the offense, the main command post fires cell provides input to fragmentary orders, monitors the current fight, monitors shaping operations, recommends reallocation of fire support assets, and recommends changes to fire support priorities.

6-179. The division main command post coordinates the activities of the supporting brigades with the actions of the division’s BCTs. It supervises the handover of time-sensitive target information from the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade to the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade or 575th FA Brigade as appropriate. If necessary, it can designate an area of operations for the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade to help the brigade engage the enemy and direct the division’s R&S assets, such as UASs or other sensors, to conduct combat assessment after the conclusion of strike operations. The main command post’s involvement is necessary to integrate division-directed warfighting tasks, such as information collection and fire support activities, in the unassigned areas of the division area of operations. Additionally, the main command post designates temporary area of operations that the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade can use as movement corridors to ensure the security of supply convoys moving between the division sustainment area and the BCTs brigade support areas. The 56th’s Battlefield Surveillance Brigade’s cavalry squadron may also be assigned an area of operations, but only limited responsibilities for that area, to facilitate its information collection activities.

DIVISION TACTICAL COMMAND POST

6-180. During the division’s focus on the conduct of defensive tasks that was discussed in the previous chapter the tactical command post assumed responsibility for overseeing the division’s preparations for the attack even while it supervised the final divisional elements processing through theater RSOI activities. This included the conduct of rehearsals. Of course those divisional units not currently actively committed to current operations—2/52 and 4/52 ABCTs—were more free to participate in all preparatory activities that those divisional units, such as the 2/25 SBCT, 1/52 IBCT, 575th FA, and 11th Combat Aviation Brigades, that were actively conducting defensive tasks. For example in the case of these later organizations liaison officers often had to represent their respective commanders during the conduct of division-level rehearsals.

6-181. The tactical command post is assigned responsibility as the crossing force headquarters during the division’s gap crossing operations. (See ATTP 3-90.4 for details on gap crossing operations.) The tactical command post is also given responsible for synchronizing the division’s ongoing conduct of stability tasks once the division transitions to the offense. This is especially important as the division begins recovering previously occupied GREENLAND territory. This requires the tactical command post to provide stability input for the fragmentary orders issued by the main command post and synchronize division responses to humanitarian assistance requirements during this phase including the handling of displaced persons. The tactical command post takes advantage of the G-9 staff section at the main command post and the 548th Civil Affairs Battalion’s civil affairs planning team as it coordinates its actions with the GREENLAND government and various local and international volunteer organizations.

6-182. The division tactical command post is also given two “be prepared” missions. The division commander wants the tactical command post to be prepared to produce a division river crossing plan as a branch to the current operation and act as the crossing force headquarters if the complexity of the division’s river crossing operations during the attack exceed the capability of a single BCT to control. Alternatively, the division commander understands the possible need for the tactical command post to control division air assault operations designed to secure the Lusk Reservoir dam to prevent its destruction by REDLAND forces and the resultant long-term negative effects on the GREENLAND civilian economy. The tactical command post may need to have some staff elements augmented with personnel and equipment to control these operations. This augmentation can be from the main command post or from supporting units.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

6-183. The division headquarters and headquarters battalion continues to support each division command post with life support, communications, and security throughout the division’s conduct of offensive tasks. It provides or coordinates for additional assets to support the movement of the various command posts as required.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS IN THE OFFENSE

6-184. The decisive action concept and the division’s transition to a focus on the conduct of offensive tasks means that while the majority of the division is focused on the conduct of offensive tasks, simultaneously, some division elements are conducting simultaneous defensive and stability tasks. In this illustrative scenario, while the 2/52 ABCT and 4/52 ABCT conduct the division’s decisive operations, the 2/25 SBCT will conduct local security operations as it prepares to be committed as the division reserve.

6-185. During this operational phase focused on offensive tasks the division’s BCTs conduct of stability tasks are largely concentrated on ending or alleviating human suffering. This humanitarian assistance only temporarily supplements or complements the efforts of the GREENLAND civil authorities or agencies that have primary responsibilities for providing relief. The health and infrastructure conditions encountered by the BCTs during their advance will vary extensively ranging from adequate to nonexistent. The potential for violence, crime, theft, escalation of terrorist acts, and further destabilization is always present. The potential for shifts in the perceptions and attitudes of the local GREENLAND populace is always present. As a minimum, the BCTs are responsible for providing a secure environment for humanitarian relief efforts conducted by other agencies to progress.

6-186. The engineer organization within the BCTs will concentrate on providing mobility support to their respective BCTs, including the use of their task-organized dry and wet-gap crossing and minefield breeching capabilities. Their respective commanders employ their countermobility, survivability, and general engineering capabilities as necessary to accomplish their missions.

2/25 STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

6-187. The 2/25 SBCT initially conducts an area defense during this phase. It establishes two passage lanes—Alpha and Bravo—and assists in the forward passage of the 4/52 ABCT and 2/52 ABCT through its area of operations. PL MAMMEL is the battle handover line. After the 4/52 ABCT completes its forward passage, the 2/25 SBCT begins its mission staging operation (see paragraph 6-188). The 2/25 SBCT becomes the division reserve following the completion of this operation. The 2/25 SBCT must be prepared to conduct a battalion air assault to secure the northern dam and outlets of LUSK reservoir to prevent REDLAND forces from releasing the water stored there and/or destroying the dam and generators located there and thereby causing significant long-term disruption of the GREENLAND civilian economy. The 2/25 SBCT must also be prepared to counter REDLAND attempts to interdict Highway 1. Priority of planning goes to air assault followed by reaction plans to any attempts by elements of the 10th Tank or 51st Motorized DTGs or insurgent forces to interdict Highway 1 and then to countering any REDLAND attempt to counterattack from north to south across the ALBA River—the terrain feature forming the division’s northern boundary. On order the brigade displaces from its current location and follows the 4/52 ABCT and 2/52 ABCT to an assembly area centered on the intersection of PL FAHRNI and Highway 1.

6-188. A mission staging operation is planned by the division as part of its ongoing operation. Mission staging operations involve the division cycling its supporting BCTs in and out of ongoing combat operations. The division’s conduct of this type of operations must be synchronized with the efforts of the division’s supporting sustainment brigade (27th Sustainment). Each BCT refits, rearms, incorporates replacements, and conducts necessary training once it is out of the front lines. Mission staging for a single BCT requires 24 to 72 hours. In this scenario, the 2/26 SBCT stays in its current location. The conduct 2/25 SBCT’s mission staging operation remains under the control of the 2/25 SBCT commander. That commander determines the order and pace at which subordinate battalions are restored to their maximum possible combat effectiveness within the limits of available resources and the time constraints established by the division. These division imposed time constraints are influenced by the 2/25 SBCT’s combat readiness at the completion of the 4/52 ABCT’s forward passage of lines. However, the mission variables of METT-TC will dictate the time that the division gives the 2/25 SBCT and 27th Sustainment Brigade to complete this mission staging iteration. The 27th Sustainment Brigade, working with the 21st Theater Sustainment Command, arranges for enough supplies and repair parts to restock the brigade. Available replacements are also integrated into the 2/25 SBCT’s subordinate battalions and companies during this operation and necessary training conducted. While conducting its mission staging operation, the 2/25 SBCT focuses on the restoration of its maximum combat effectiveness given available resources and should not be tasked by the division to conduct tactical tasks other than local security except in the case of an emergency.

4/52 ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

6-189. The 4/52 ABCT is initially the division’s main effort as it conducts a forward passage of line through the 2/25 SBCT to attack to destroy the remnants of the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group. Following the destruction of the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group, it maneuvers along the axis of advance formed by Highway 1 to secure OBJECTIVES JOHN and BEM. After seizing OBJECTIVE BEM, the 4/52 ABCT establishes two passage lanes through which the 2/52 ABCT can be committed to seize OBJECTIVE DIANA. Securing OBJECTIVE BEM enables and expedites the forward passage of lines of the 2/52 ABCT.

6-190. While the 4/52 ABCT attempts to seize the existing Highway 1 bridges, the brigade prepares to conduct deliberate wet gap crossing operations as part of operations designed to secure both OBJECTIVES JOHN and BEM. The existence of bridges over the various tributaries to the ALBA RIVER—either existing ones seized relatively intact or emplaced as part of the brigade’s wet gap crossing operations—are key to the division’s continued advance. Therefore the brigade secures each objective with at least a combined arms battalion. (ATTP 3-90.4 discusses wet gap crossing operations.)

2/52 ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

6-191. Until the 4/52 ABCT seizes OBJECTIVE BEM, the 2/52 ABCT follows the 4/52 ABCT along the axis of advance formed by Highway 1 and the surrounding terrain. On order, the 2/52 ABCT conducts a forward passage of lines through the 4/52 ABCT, attacks to destroy the 261st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group, and seizes OBJECTIVE DIANA, the bridges north and east of KILLEAN. Securing OBJECTIVE DIANA—with the operations of the 53rd Division—completes the isolation of the majority of REDLAND’s combat power. It also prevents REDLAND from reconstituting an operational reserve—the 26th mechanized DTG.

1/52 INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

6-192. The 1/52 IBCT attacks to fix the 512th Motorized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group in the southern part of the 52nd Division area of operations. This denies the enemy the ability to expeditiously reposition elements of the 51st motorized DTG to conduct a counterattack into the flank of the division’s advance along Highway 1 or interdicting that main supply route.

SUPPORTING BRIGADES IN THE OFFENSE

6-193. The following brigades support the offense:

11th Combat Aviation Brigade.

27th Sustainment Brigade and 48th Medical Brigade.

34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.

56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade.

575th FA Brigade.

548th Civil Affairs Battalion Brigade.

555th Engineer Brigade

11TH COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE

6-194. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade receives priorities and mission orders from the main command post. It provides an attack reconnaissance battalion OPCON to 4/52 ABCT to support their attack to destroy the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group and secure OBJECTIVES JOHN and BEM. That attack reconnaissance battalion remains OPCON to the 4/52 ABCT to help secure the axis of advance (Highway 1). The brigade’s second attack reconnaissance battalion initially provides support to the 1/52 IBCT to help fix the 512th Motorized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group and block the movement of other 51st motorized DTG and insurgent forces to positions that would allow them to interdict Highway 1. It also provides assault lift capabilities to the 1/52 IBCT to enable the infantry to fix 51st motorized DTG elements in their current locations or block their movement to position where they could interdict Highway 1. On order it provides an attack reconnaissance battalion OPCON to the 2/52 ABCT to support their attack to destroy the 261st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group and secure OBJECTIVE DIANA. The aviation brigade provides long range UAS assets OPCON to the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade and the 575th FA Brigade. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade must be prepared to provide assault lift capabilities to the 2/25 SBCT, if the 2/25 SBCT is ordered to secure the LUSK reservoir dam. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade provides cargo helicopter (CH)-47 support to the 27th Sustainment Brigade for the purpose of conducting aerial resupply of critical items. The air ambulance companies provide aerial MEDEVAC assets to support the division mission.

27TH SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE AND 48TH MEDICAL BRIGADE (SUPPORT)

6-195. These brigades initially provide sustainment and force health protection support from their locations in the division sustainment area. The 27th Sustainment Brigade and the 48th Medical Brigade (Support) begin mission staging operations to support the 2/25 SBCT after the 4/52 ABCT completes its forward passage of lines. The brigades support the 4/52 ABCT and 2/52 ABCT using a combination of hasty and deliberate replenishment operations and mission staging operations as they continue the attack and cycle battalions and companies out-of-combat to replenish supplies. The 27th Sustainment Brigade supports the 1/52 IBCT and all other divisional units using a mix of supply-point and distribution-based support. It uses its available assets to provide this support, including the use of U.S. Air Force fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters to deliver supplies and personnel when needed.

6-196. The 27th Sustainment Brigade provides movement control assets, such as a movement control team, to the division transportation officer to help that individual plan the movement of logistical convoys throughout the division area of operations. The division current operations integrating cell in the main command post integrates these convoys and their associated convoy escorts into the division’s ongoing operations. Other movement control teams stationed at key locations along the division’s main supply routes help the division transportation officer control and assess the conduct of convoy operations within the division area of operations.

6-197. The first scheduled deliberate replenishment operation for the 4/52 ABCT occurs in OBJECTIVE JOHN after it is secured. The first scheduled deliberate replenishment operation for the 2/52 ABCT occurs along the axis of advance in the vicinity of PL KEELER before its forward passage through 4/52 ABCT forces on or around OBJECTIVE BEM. The second deliberate replenishment operation for the 4/52 ABCT occurs on OBJECTIVE BEM after the BCT secures that objective; the 2/52 ABCT conducts its forward passage of lines and is advancing toward OBJECTIVE DIANA. The second scheduled deliberate replenishment operation for the 2/52 ABCT is scheduled to occur after it secures OBJECTIVE DIANA. The division commander conducts a mission staging operation for the 2/25 SBCT because it restores the maximum possible combat effectiveness to a BCT. However, because a BCT undergoing mission staging operation should only perform local security tasks, the division commander must ensure that the tactical situation allows the 2/25 SBCT to “stand down” from operations for the one to three days it takes to conduct a mission staging operation.

6-198. The 27th Sustainment Brigade can support the division’s BCTs and support brigades with aerial delivery equipment and systems, including parachute packing, air item maintenance, and rigging of supplies and equipment. The brigade can use airdrop resupply operations to support all of the division’s elements. The 27th Sustainment Brigade's airdrop supply company also supports the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. As a vital and flexible link in the distribution system, it provides the capability of supplying the force even when land lines of communications are disrupted. ATP 4-48 addresses the aerial delivery of supplies. The division’s medical units are prepared to help with aerial MEDEVAC operations with the receipt of patients. Planned and executed aerial MEDEVAC operations will reduce the time for evacuation of patients to the appropriate role of care.

34TH MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE

6-199. As the offense commences, the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade’s military police and engineer forces clear, maintain, and secure the movement routes to ensure freedom of movement for sustainment elements and follow on maneuver forces. Engineer forces, with CBRN elements, conduct initial damage assessments and repair critical civil infrastructure within their capability. Military police forces, with the GREENLAND 3rd Battalion 99th Motorized Brigade, provide local security to population centers to create a stable and secure environment.

6-200. The extended size of the division area of operations as the division attacks toward OBJECTIVE DIANA means that the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade cannot secure the entire length of the division’s main supply routes from aerial and ground attack even though it was reinforced by the addition of the 108th Military Police Battalion and a GREENLAND motorized infantry battalion (3/99th). (The distance between PLs MAMMEL and PL Harris is approximately 175km.) The complex mountainous terrain in the southern portion of the division area of operations means that there is a high probability that small REDLAND forces will penetrate through 1/52 IBCT positions and attack friendly forces moving along Highway 1. Therefore, the brigade provides convoy security to sustainment convoys traversing division main supply routes and conducts periodic clearing operations for selected segments of those main supply routes according to division taskings. Maintenance of these main supply routes may require road repair and maintenance including those portions that cross gaps such as culverts, bridge sites, and fords and are likely targets for interdiction and damage. Another technique is for the division main command post to periodically assign the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade a temporary area of operations along Highway 1 to allow the 34th to establish mobility corridors that support sustainment convoys, prepared for their own self-protection, moving between the division sustainment area and brigade support areas. Either technique will likely require significant engineer support.

6-201. The 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade engineer elements construct the division detainee holding area operated by the 591st Military Police Company of the 59th Military Police Battalion. The 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade is also called on to help construct one or more BCT initial detainee collection points. The 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade prepares for the operation of dislocated civilian facilities before they return to their own homes. GREENLAND dislocated civilians are evacuated from areas where they may interfere with the division's current or future operations. Alternatively, GREENLAND authorities assume responsibility for them. The brigade coordinates its dislocated civilian activities with GREENLAND civil authorities using the division CMOC established by the 548th Civil Affairs Battalion since the civil affairs company that previously supported the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade during the defense is now supporting the 2/52 ABCT.

6-202. The 325th CBRN Battalion conducts chemical reconnaissance and decontamination as required to ensure that division operations along ground main supply routes are not degraded by REDLAND employment of CBRN weapons or the release of toxic industrial materials. CBRN reconnaissance elements assess sensitive sites within the area of operations to identify potential hazards to military and civilian personnel.

6-203. The 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade remains responsible for the conduct of civil-military operations within its area of operations even though it no longer has a supporting civil affairs company. This requires commanders and staffs within the brigade to maintain previously established relationships or establish new personal relationships with GREENLAND civil authorities, local informal leaders, and a variety of international and private volunteer organizations to ensure the successful conduct of brigade stability tasks without the presence of Army-trained civil affairs specialists.

56TH BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE

6-204. As the 52nd Division transitions from the defense into the attack, the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade conducts R&S operations designed to satisfy the division’s information requirements. The brigade focuses its collection efforts on the division’s multiple intermediate objectives as well as the final objective. Concurrently, the brigade staff—in collaboration with the 52nd Division staff and the staffs of the division’s BCTs and other supporting brigades—turn their collective planning efforts toward sequels focused more on stability tasks rather than combat operations. Its collection tasks during this phase are to—

Track the movements and activities of previously identified REDLAND units, including their tactical and operational reserves, in addition to insurgent forces and terrorists groups.

Continue—

Surveillance of the LUSK reservoir dam and key bridges along the division’s avenue of approach to support the commander’s decision point to use existing bridges or conduct river crossing operations.

Reconnaissance of fording sites and key, secondary, and alternate routes along the division’s avenue of approach (with engineer reconnaissance support).

Detect the movement of REDLAND, insurgent, or terrorist elements into the flank of the division’s advance.

Gather detailed information about applicable civil considerations in the area projected to be occupied by the division after the conclusion of conventional combat operations. This includes reconnaissance to determine the current status of the area’s infrastructure.

6-205. This last bullet includes a lot of nonstandard information. Examples of this nonstandard information include the location and condition of critical infrastructure; cultural, religious, and historical monuments or points of national or regional pride; and local and regional power brokers in the 52nd Division’s area of operations. The G-2 recommends which areas are occupied by 52nd Division units; matching terrain and enemy situation to units. Whenever possible, these areas closely match existing GREENLAND political boundaries to hand authority back to the GREENLAND government once the security situation permits. Additionally, the division commander matches the personalities of subordinate BCT and supporting brigade commanders with their GREENLAND counterparts in an attempt to make more cohesive teams. The 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade prepares to supply this information as the division’s post-conflict responsibilities begin to be more clearly defined.

6-206. The 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade staff responds to the varied requests for information during this phase with help from X Corps, joint force, and nationally controlled assets. For example, airborne sensors could detect significant vehicle movement within a BCT area of operations. The brigade staff conducts analysis to determine the source and probable composition of the vehicle movement. The staff determines additional information required. In this case, the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade re-tasks a UAS to the location determined by the airborne sensors, confirming that the vehicle traffic was in fact a REDLAND tank company and not a line of farm trucks and tractors carrying GREENLAND refugees. This drives a requirement to use a long range surveillance team to satisfy division information requirements if weather and terrain prevents the UAS from determining what this REDLAND tank company is doing and its current strength.

6-207. As the 4/52 ABCT secures the 52nd Division’s intermediate objectives, long range surveillance teams observing those objectives are relieved and moved to secure locations for resupply, rest, and later reinsertion. The long range surveillance company headquarters—with the 3rd Squadron-23rd Cavalry and 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade staffs—conduct follow-on mission planning for the company’s surveillance teams. The 3-23rd Cavalry and the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade staffs are crucial to providing intelligence that support not only long range surveillance operations, but employment of all brigade associated sensors both organic and task-organized. In a similar manner, the squadron’s two ground reconnaissance troops conduct ground route and area reconnaissance of selected targeted areas of interest.

6-208. Supporting the attack, the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade reinforces the 52nd Division main effort by providing task-organized counterintelligence and human intelligence teams OPCON to the 4/52 ABCT and 2/52 ABCT to conduct tactical questioning and document exploitation. The brigade provides additional task-organized counter and human intelligence teams OPCON to the 2/25 SBCT and 1/52 IBCT as they begin to transition to area security and protection operations within their area of operations. The bulk of the 513th Military Intelligence Battalion’s collection and an exploitation company supports interrogation and document exploitation at the 52nd Division's detainee holding area. Information from the collection and exploitation company is provided to the G-2 and the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade for intelligence target refinement for future operations.

6-209. For example, integrators from the 513th Military Intelligence Battalion’s collection and exploitation company conducting an integration of a REDLAND Soldier at the 52nd Division detainee holding area provide intelligence about the location of a previously unidentified multiple rocket launcher battery. That information quickly passes through the collection and an exploitation company to the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade and the division all-source collection element for further analysis. The 513th Military Intelligence Battalion—with the 56th Brigade—conducts mission planning to redirect a technical sensor (in this case an extended range UAS from the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade that is TACON to the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade) to investigate the suspected location. The 513th Military Intelligence Battalion staff conducts the technical planning to redirect the unmanned aerial sensor, while the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade staff determines if some other theater asset has already discovered the location of this suspected enemy multiple rocket launcher battery. The brigade staff conducts coordination with the division staff as well as the 575th FA Brigade and 11th Combat Aviation Brigade to begin setting the conditions that would enable the conduct of a strike operation against the enemy battery if the information is confirmed and the situation and ROE permit the engagement of that battery. The brigade staff continues to coordinate with the BCTs not only for areas within which the brigade’s signals intelligence sensors and teams can operate to collect against REDLAND mission command nodes, but also local security for those same sensors and teams.

575TH FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE

6-210. The FA brigade’s operations that support the attack must be responsive and timely to support maneuver and help the force achieve and sustain the initiative. Supporting fires elements should never be out of range of advancing maneuver formations. The general tasks of the FA brigade in the offense is to:

Execute division lethal and nonlethal shaping operations against uncommitted enemy forces; command, control, and communications nodes; fires and air defense networks; and enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition assets including UAS launch sites.

Establish support relationships to facilitate responsive reinforcing fires to lead division elements.

Support BCTs during the attack by providing close suppressive fires to help isolate objective and fix enemy forces.

Shift fires and effects to targets away from objectives to interdict enemy reinforcements and escape routes.

Structure communications networks to maintain continuous responsive fires and effects to maneuvering forces.

Focus available survey assets on extending control forward to support the movement of radars forward to support the attack.

Move meteorological sections forward by echelon to provide continuous meteorological coverage to the force. (This includes coordinating meteorological coverage plans with BCT FA battalions.)

6-211. During an attack, the division needs less centralized control of fires because the division has the initiative. The main effort is weighted by providing reinforcing, TACON, or OPCON cannon equipped artillery battalion fires to the BCT designated as the main effort, and by positioning general support (GS) or GS-reinforcing rocket/missile-equipped artillery battalions within the area of operations or along the axis of advance for the attacking BCTs. The allocation of artillery fires support the division main effort helps control the tempo of offensive actions.

6-212. The FA brigade maneuvers its forces within the area of operations of all four of the division’s BCTs. The division articulates the fire brigade’s positioning or security tasks in its orders to the BCTs. Each BCT or maneuver enhancement brigade operations officer coordinates the final positioning of artillery assets within their respective area of operations. Specific FA brigade actions are—

Deconflict positioning with air integration measures that may impact on the responsiveness of fires.

Consider the requirements to support follow-on offensive tasks (pursuit/exploitation)

Ensure routes have sufficient mobility to rapidly move to support the division.

Position target acquisition radar to provide coverage over the entire force and to fill-in for gaps in the BCT coverage.

Consider positioning individual Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS) batteries well forward to support shaping operations.

6-213. The timely displacement of fire support assets is essential to conduct successful offensive tasks. Units positioned by the 575th FA Brigade may be left behind unless repositioning is frequent and synchronized to support the forward progress of the division’s BCTs. Displacements maximize delivery of fires and are completed as rapidly as possible. FA battalions move well forward before an attack, displacing by echelon and carrying maximum amounts of ammunition. Specific actions performed by the brigade that support movement include—

Use echeloned movement to provide continuous coverage to the force.

Move a small fires element (MLRS battery) well forward with each BCT to support fires forward of the force.

Provide radar and metrological coverage for the BCTs to allow the uninterrupted movement of their assets forward during the attack.

6-214. FA brigade target acquisition assets are focused on identifying enemy systems from the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group that can interdict the division as it moves forward during the attack. The FA brigade ensures the momentum of the division is not lost during the attack. The FA brigade focuses its target acquisition radars, UASs, and other information collection assets—linked to lethal and nonlethal systems—to insulate the advancing 4/52 ABCT from interference from enemy forces forward of the 1/52 IBCT (515th Motorized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group) as the maneuver forces posture for and execute close operations. Specific FA brigade considerations include—

Position radars as far forward as possible to maximize range and provide maximum flexibility as the division begins the offense.

Position lightweight counter mortar radars to cover critical point targets vulnerable to mortar fire from bypassed regular or irregular forces.

Coordinate radar coverage across the division to ensure there are no gaps in coverage.

Integrate feeds from joint airborne sensors with UASs to target repositioning or reinforcing enemy ground forces.

Execute long-range target acquisition to support division shaping operations forward of PL KEELER.

6-215. During the attack, the 575th FA Brigade employs its UASs to reconnoiter routes and areas for fires and effects assets. Armed UASs are linked to joint fires systems to defeat repositioning or committing enemy reserve forces and protect the flanks of the division. Armed UASs conduct long-range attack to support division shaping operations. Specific FA brigade UAS considerations include—

Focus UASs on supporting strike operations against the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group.

Employ UASs ahead of firing elements to clear radar and firing unit routes and position areas.

Maintain 25 percent of available UASs in reserve to reinforce success by the division and to support an exploitation and pursuit.

Coordinate UAS routes to minimize airspace conflicts and permit maximum flexibility in the use of lethal fires.

6-216. The 575th FA Brigade provides the following close support to the BCTs during the offense—

Provide reinforcing cannon equipped FA battalions to 4/52 ABCT and 2/52 ABCT.

Provide preparatory fires to shape the close fight to support the BCTs.

Provide massed lethal fires to the BCTs to support penetration of enemy positions.

Provide radar coverage and counterfire support to the BCTs to prevent interruption of the movement of the BCTs during the approach.

Respond to requests for support by the BCTs against uncommitted and repositioning enemy forces in the BCT area of operations.

6-217. The 575th FA Brigade conducting the following shaping operations to support the division offense—

Attack enemy operational reserves, and second echelon forces outside the BCT area of operations using joint fires.

Support attack aviation operations executed by the aviation brigade; locate and neutralize enemy air defense artillery systems by lethal and nonlethal means.

Provide target acquisition, UAS, artillery, and joint fires against enemy forces forward of 1/52 IBCT to protect the flanks of 4/52 ABCT during their advances.

Support division military deception operations through destruction of enemy command and control systems and nodes.

Execute long-range target acquisition and strikes against the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group.

6-218. The 575th FA Brigade conducting the following counterstrike operations to support division offensive actions—

Execute counterstrike to neutralize enemy fires systems before the approach of the division during the attack.

Integrate available joint CAS into the division’s counterstrike operations.

Develop procedural control measures for the rapid employment against acquired fires systems.

Coordinate counterstrike information collection requirements with and between the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade and the division G-2.

Establish communications channels between target acquisition assets and MLRS FA battalions for immediate execution of counterstrike missions.

548TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION

6-219. The 548th Civil Affairs Battalion task-organizes four companies OPCON to the division’s four BCTs. These civil affairs companies establish or maintain previously established brigade-level CMOCs and coordinate with local mayors and community leaders including those individuals returning to coalition control during the conduct of the division’s attack. The 548th employs some of its Soldiers to interact the liaison parties provided by the government of GREENLAND whenever possible. The immediate focus of this coordination is to gain the local civilian government cooperation necessary for the success of the attack, such as route clearance, occupation of areas, intelligence, and refugee control. A secondary mission is the temporary provision of humanitarian assistance to GREENLAND civilians until the division transfers the responsibility to the GREENLAND government. As situationally allowed, the 548th and functional specialty cells from higher echelon civil affairs and other organizations augment tactical civil affairs forces’ civil reconnaissance through different types of assessment and surveys—including such things as the determination of civilian food stock levels, capabilities and capacity of the existing civil infrastructure, and civil population opinion polls—to identify potential threats to civil society and determine other items associated with planning and conducting stability tasks. Surveys require more time, resources, and technical expertise to conduct than do assessments.

555TH ENGINEER BRIGADE

6-220. Elements of the 555th Engineer Brigade provides engineer support, primarily bridging and other mobility enhancing assets, to the two ABCTs attacking along Highway 1 in the northern part of the division area of operations and provides supervision for river crossing operations. Initially in direct support of the 4/52 ABCT, elements of the 555th Engineer Brigade are integrated into the 4/52 ABCT’s movement columns and combat formations. The 555th Engineer Brigade tactical command post is the crossing area engineer headquarters. Once the 4/52 ABCT secures OBJECTIVE BEM, elements of the 555th Engineer Brigade are chopped from direct support of the 4/52 ABCT to direct support of the 2/52 ABCT for the duration of the offense. However, if REDLAND countermobility efforts are successful, situationally appropriate elements of the 555th Engineers support the 4/52 ABCT to ensure the continued trafficability of Highway 1.

6-221. During the offense, the 555th Engineer Brigade conducts infrastructure reconnaissance and the engineer-related critical infrastructure tasks associated with sewer, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations (SWEAT-MSO) as part of reconstruction, maintenance, and creation of infrastructure in the areas behind the lead BCTs. At the end of the offensive phase, the 555th must be prepared to rapidly support construction of division forward bases. The initial base construction plan articulated in the original operations plan and the engineer support plan is updated to reflect the current mission variables of METT-TC. Brigade assets that don’t support the 52nd Division attack will continue to execute engineer missions throughout the division area of operations in support of division priorities.

Chapter 7

The Division in Stability

This chapter discusses division stability fundamentals. It then discusses organizing forces for stability tasks and planning considerations for stability tasks. This chapter then discusses preparing to conduct and executing stability tasks and the assessment and transitions. Finally, the chapter ends with a continuation of the scenario from chapter 3.

SECTION I - DIVISION STABILITY FUNDAMENTALS

7-1. Operations conducted by the division outside the United States (U.S.) and its territories simultaneously combine three elements—offense, defense, and stability. The division conducts its operations inside an area of operations that contain a civilian population. This requires the division to defeat enemy forces and shape civil conditions. Conducting offensive and defensive tasks defeat enemy forces whereas conducting stability tasks shape civil conditions. Shaping civil conditions (in concert with unified action partners is as important to the campaign’s success as combat. In some joint operations, the conduct of stability tasks can be more important than the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks.

7-2. The possible sources of instability within an area are many. They include actors, actions, or conditions that exceed the legitimate authority’s capacity to exercise effective governance, maintain civil control, and ensure economic development. Examples of these sources of instability include, but are not limited to:

Insurgents forming a shadow governmental structure.

Religious, ethnic, economic, and political friction between different groups within the local population.

Natural disasters or resource scarcity.

Super-empowered individuals disrupting legitimate governance.

Severely degrading infrastructure or environment.

Immature, undeveloped, or atrophied government, social, or economic systems.

Ineffective or corrupt host nation security forces.

The enemy leverages these potential sources of instability to create conflict, exacerbate existing conditions, or threaten to collapse failing or recovering states.

STABILITY GOALS

7-3. The division conducts stability tasks to create conditions so that the local populace regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. The division’s first goal when conducting stability tasks is to secure the populace and lessen the level of violence within the division’s area of operations. The second goal is to enable the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions. Lastly, the division encourages the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior. Sources of instability manifest themselves at the local level. As a result these local sources of instability correspond to the division’s tactical echelons.

STABILITY PRINCIPLES

7-4. Regardless of where it is operating along the range of military operations, the division uses the principles of stability with the principles of joint operations to conduct stability tasks. An effective commander understands the joint principles in the context of stability as part of decisive action and in the context of how to use the following stability principles:

Conflict transformation.

Unity of effort and unity of purpose.

Legitimacy and host-nation ownership.

Building partner capacity.

(See ADRP 3-07 for a discussion of these four stability principles.)

THE FRAGILE STATES FRAMEWORK

7-5. The division commander uses the fragile states framework to understand how far and quickly a state moves from or toward stability. Fragile state refers to the broad spectrum of failed, failing, and recovering states and is explained in ADRP 3-07. The fragile states framework provides a model for how the division works within the framework of the country team to apply development assistance in fragile states.

STABILITY FRAMEWORK

7-6. This framework encompasses the stability tasks performed by the division and civilian actors across the range of military operations. It guides the division commander’s understanding of the effort and commitment necessary to shape activities during military engagement to prevent conflict and to support a nation torn by conflict or disaster. The phases of the framework are:

Initial response.

Transformation.

Fostering sustainability.

7-7. When applied, the stability framework helps the division commander identify the types and ranges of tasks performed in the phases and identify lead responsibilities and priorities. The framework is not linear in that the division can perform these tasks concurrently. Military operations conducted across this framework vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity. (See ADRP 3-07 for a more detailed discussion of the stability framework.)

PRIMARY ARMY STABILITY TASKS

7-8. The division can be involved in the conduct of all five Army primary stability tasks:

Establish civil security (including security force assistance).

Establish civil control.

Restore essential services.

Support to governance.

Support to economic and infrastructure development.

These tasks support efforts that encompass both military and nonmilitary efforts required to achieve stability. These tasks are similar to and nested with the joint functions and Department of State stability sectors. (See ADRP 3-07 for a discussion of these stability sectors.) Taken together, they provide a base for linking the execution of activities among the instruments of national and international power as part of unified action.

7-9. None of these primary tasks is performed in isolation. At the operational level, the primary stability tasks are the lines of effort or a guide to action, ensuring broader unity of effort across the Department of State’s stability sectors. In any operation, the primary stability tasks—and the subordinate tasks included in each area—integrate with offensive and defensive tasks.

MINIMUM-ESSENTIAL STABILITY TASKS

7-10. Generally, the responsibility for providing for the needs of the civilian population rests with the host-nation government or designated civil authorities, agencies, and organizations. The division provides minimal essential services to address the immediate sources of instability when there is no legitimate civil authority present. This involves providing minimum levels of civil security and restoring essential services to the local populace until a civil authority or the host nation is able. These essential services provide minimal levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. In this case, the division and all subordinate commanders assess resources available against the mission to determine how best to conduct these minimum essential stability tasks and what risks they can accept.

COUNTRY TEAM

7-11. A deployed division will normally need to coordinate with the country team. A country team is the U.S. diplomatic mission to a host nation and includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies present in the country. The President gives the chief of the diplomatic mission, normally an ambassador, full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. government executive branch employees in-country. However, this authority does not extend to personnel in other missions or those assigned to either an international agency or to a geographic or other supported combatant commander. Although the diplomatic mission is beyond the realm of the geographic combatant commander’s responsibility, close coordination with each mission in the geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility is essential to build an effective overlying regional security program.

7-12. The country team concept denotes the process of in country, interdepartmental coordination among key members of the U.S. diplomatic mission. The composition of a country team varies depending on the desires of the chief of mission, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of U.S. departments and agencies present. The principal military member of the country team is the senior defense official. The senior defense official is the U.S. defense attaché and the chief of the security cooperation organization. Although the U.S. area military commander (the geographic combatant commander or a subordinate) is not a member of the diplomatic mission, that military commander may participate or be represented in meetings and coordination conducted by the country team. (See JP 3-07 and JP 3-08 for additional information on the country team.)

STABILITY-RELATED CONTROL MEASURES

7-13. The standard control measures that apply to conducting offensive and defensive tasks are applied to conducting stability tasks. The establishment of the division area of operations (and subordinate brigades’ areas of operations) is the most important. Wherever possible, the boundaries of these areas of operations follow the boundaries of the appropriate administrative divisions—states, provinces, districts, counties, townships, and wards—of the governmental agency each unit supports. These boundaries are temporarily changed at random periods to prevent the establishment of sanctuaries along the seams of those boundaries. ADRP 1-02 includes control measures and graphics for activities not normally encountered when conducting offensive and defensive tasks that should be tracked. These include drive-by shootings, arrests, mass grave sites, and structure fires. The rules of engagement (ROE) under which the division operates are also important control measures.

7-14. The laws and regulations of the country where the division conducts its stability activities are important control measures that either restrain or expedite the division’s conduct of civil security tasks. This includes whatever status of force agreement exists between the host nation and the U.S. The enforcement of host nation laws and regulations promotes respect for the host nation government, security forces, and U.S. divisional forces in addition to the primary purpose of the law or regulation. The division judge advocate reviews that agreement and local laws to ensure that the division is not enforcing laws and regulations that violate human rights. Dissemination of information on new host nation laws and regulation increases the probability that the civil population will comply with these laws and regulations, especially if they are changes from prevailing cultural standards. Ignorance does not bar prosecution, but increases the frequency of violations. This increases the enforcement work of the police and the courts. It also creates in a convicted, inadvertent violator a sense of resentment based on fancied unfair treatment.

7-15. ROE are also control measures for the division and its Soldiers during the conduct of stability tasks. Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitation under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-04). ROE provides authorization for and limit on the use of force and the employment of certain capabilities. ROE do not normally dictate how to achieve a result but indicates what measures are unacceptable in achieving that result. Soldiers are trained on the applicable ROE before their deployment with refresher training given at appropriate times. Competent authority adjusts those ROE based on the situation.

SECTION II – ORGANIZATION OF FORCES FOR STABILITY TASKS

7-16. Just as when conducting primarily offensive and defensive tasks, the organization of forces for a division focused on the conduct of stability tasks is based on the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). One advantage is that the prolonged nature of operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks gives additional time to educate the division leadership and train divisional units in the effective performance of these tasks. It allows time to gain familiarity with the operational environment specific to the division’s area of operations. The request for forces process may give the division commander the ability to request required capabilities not normally available to the division. In all cases, the division commander alters the command and support relationships of the brigade combat teams (BCT) attached to the division or under the division’s operational control (OPCON) and other brigades according to the mission variables of METT-TC.

7-17. While each stability-focused operation takes place in its own specific operational circumstances, there are some common organizational considerations that apply. The structure of the supported host nation government or transitional military authority impacts what organizations the division commander and staff interact with. A division may work with two different echelons of host nation planning and coordination centers. A division headquarters works with the host nation’s national planning and coordination center if it is also the Army force headquarters in a particular country. If the division headquarters acts as a tactical headquarters, it works with one or more host nation area coordination centers. The division headquarters designates additional staff officers beyond those found in the division assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations (G-9) to work nontraditional actions with the host nation government at different levels. This is in addition to the liaison it will have to conduct with the planning, intelligence, and military affairs organizations in these centers.

HOST NATION NATIONAL, AREA PLANNING, AND COORDINATION CENTERS

7-18. There should be national and area organizations that develop host nation and regional internal defense and development (IDAD) plans, coordinate the execution of the programs called for within those plans, and assess the results of these plans while making necessary adjustments to reflect ongoing developments. Internal defense and development is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). The major offices of these organizations normally correspond to established branches and agencies of the host nation government. If such host nation organizations do not exist, then the U.S. security assistance office to the host nation makes every effort to develop such organizations. Each country uses its own terminology to designate the offices performing these functions. A division whose mission focuses on the conduct of stability tasks will need to interact with at least a host nation area planning and coordination center. (See JP 3-22 for additional information on the organization and functions of these centers.)

DIVISION STAFF AND COMMAND POSTS

7-19. During prolonged operations focused on conducting stability tasks, the division’s two command posts—main and tactical—co-locate on a single base. This allows economy of scale to occur among the staff so that individual staff officers that have skill sets appropriate to the conduct of stability tasks in the division‘s area of operations are relieved of their normal warfighting duties and tasked to perform stability related functions instead. When conducting operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks as part of short term military engagement or limited contingency operations, the division chooses to deploy only its tactical command post into the area of operations. If the division conducts stability tasks as a shaping operation within the context of major operations, it is not necessary to make any changes to the organization of its command posts.

7-20. While it is conceivable that a commander and staff of a division conducting stability-focused operations are required to interact directly with a national IDAD planning and coordination center; it is far more likely that the division interacts directly with one or more subnational area coordination centers. The functions performed in the area coordination center’s subordinate offices have no direct military counterparts. These include the economic planning and operations and cultural and political affairs. The scope of activities coordinated by the host nation strategic communications office includes more than just information-related capabilities. The division develops nontraditional military capabilities and organizations that work with the appropriate host nation or transitional military authority area coordination center and its subordinate offices.

7-21. Operations focused on conducting stability tasks will typically involve the division with more multinational partners than do major operations focused on combat. These partners will typically be in the nature of small (battalion-sized or less) organizations. The diplomatic and informational advantages to the mission resulting from incorporating staff officers from multinational partners may outweigh the military advantages provided by the resulting multinational division staff. Each situation is different and must be examined carefully to develop the appropriate staff structure and composition. The division should have a full-time foreign disclosure officer designated to help the staff understand and work in a multinational environment.

7-22. As mentioned in chapter 2, the division assistant chief of staff, personnel (G-1) takes advantage of personnel files screened by subordinate brigade and battalion manpower and personnel staff sections to review the records of identified Soldiers that might have specific skill sets useful to the division during the conduct of stability focused operations. The screening by brigade and battalion manpower and personnel staff sections might not be completed before deployment, especially as it pertains to newly assigned Soldiers. These skill sets include individuals with professional certification or work experience in those non-military fields that might have utility during operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks. This includes individuals that have the necessary degree of cultural understanding and foreign language skills to effectively augment the division information operations special staff officer and public affairs staffs.

7-23. The G-1 works with the assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) and assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) to create a division database that tracks the college degrees, civilian work experience, cultural knowledge, and language proficiencies of Soldiers identified during the personnel files screening. Such a database is also useful to support tasking to support of the concept of an aligned combatant commander’s theater engagement plan as part of the regionally aligned forces concept. (See chapter 9 for a discussion of this concept.) However, as previously mentioned, the G-1 cannot be expected to requisition and fill positions based on professional certifications and past duty assignments.

7-24. The division intelligence cell should have a document exploitation team that can deploy into subordinate brigade areas of operations to support the division’s brigades, especially those conducting cordon and search missions. That team can come from the human intelligence company found in the military intelligence battalion of the division’s supporting battlefield surveillance brigade or in the expeditionary-military intelligence battalion found in a corps expeditionary-military intelligence brigade. A majority of these subordinate brigade cordon and search missions collect documents, articles, equipment, and assorted paraphernalia that needed immediate exploitation for time sensitive purposes. Otherwise valuable time is lost in tagging and transferring this material to the division main command post before its analysis. That time could be invaluable in allowing the division to operate inside any enemy or adversary decisionmaking cycle and in supporting the division protection warfighting function.

7-25. The division intelligence cell assists the rest of the division plan, prepare, execute, and assess site exploitation operations. Subordinate divisional units execute tactical site exploitation to detect and collect information, materials, and people from a site or objective. Division Soldiers process and analyze the collected items using deployable site exploitation kits to support presumptive testing when and where possible. These Soldiers disseminate the resulting information or intelligence to support subsequent operations. Collected items are transferred to a supporting organization or laboratory, equipped to perform technical exploitation, when technical requirements to analyze collected information, materials, or detainees exceeds the capability of divisional units. Here, the collected materials undergo more stringent analysis through application of forensic science. Information or intelligence resulting from technical exploitation is disseminated back to the division where it is integrated into the common operational picture. This helps enable subsequent operations and enhance commander and staff situational understanding of the operational environment. The information and intelligence derived from site exploitation is also normally time sensitive and the latency of information is a critical considerations.

7-26. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle integrates the division’s supporting civil affairs battalion into mission preparation and training. This enables the G-9 to ensure the supporting battalion is incorporated into the division’s mission command system. The G-9 should analyze the capabilities of the supporting civil affairs unit and determine potential capability and/or capacity gaps based on the mission variables.

7-27. The current division personnel structure is only structured to provide critical wartime essential personnel services such as awards and decorations. The other doctrinal essential personnel services functions differ during execution until after the conclusion of active combat operations. (See FM 1-0 for more information on these essential personnel services functions.) During prolonged operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks, the personnel structure within the division will require augmentation. This augmentation is provided by a combination of requesting individual augmentees from outside the division, specially detailing individual division personnel, and contracting out the conduct of personnel services functions.

7-28. Another attachment that a division headquarters concentrating on the conduct stability tasks should expect to receive is a mobile public affairs detachment (MPAD). (See FM 3-61 on the organization and capabilities of this organization.)

7-29. The division could request establishing a joint military and Department of State headquarters element to address gaps in U.S. coverage of the administrative divisions in the host nation government based on understanding of the operational environment and the mission derived through the operational and mission variables. This coordination involves the division’s higher headquarters and the American Embassy in the host nation. An example of this occurred in Afghanistan through the establishment of provincial reconstruction teams. A civil affairs battalion civil-military operations center (CMOC) supports this type of civilian-military teaming. The joint civilian and military headquarters help build capacity for host nation administrative entities, such as states, provinces, or districts. This provides a bridge in development between local and national government entities. Task organizing military and civilian contributions in a joint headquarters can improve efficiencies in both entities and supports unified action. The division plans how it supports the various U.S. teams operating in its projected area of operations. This support ranges from providing security and sustainment support to providing personnel recovery forces if one or more of their personnel become detained, missing, or captured.

ATTACHED, OPERATIONAL CONTROL, TACTICAL CONTROL, AND SUPPORTING BRIGADES

7-30. The subordinate brigades of a division conducting primarily stability tasks will often be significantly different than a division conducting combat operations. The division’s task organization may include additional functional brigades, such as military police and engineers, detachment of the field artillery (FA) brigade and be supported by additional sustainment brigades and medical units than a division conducting primarily offensive or defensive tasks. These types of supporting functional and multifunctional support brigades and other forces may have an increased role because of their specific capabilities and the mission requirements of some categories of stability tasks. These types of brigades may constitute the majority of the division’s troop list or even be the only forces under the command of the division headquarters in some operations.

7-31. BCTs, because of their combined arms nature, have the organic capability to conduct minimal essential stability tasks within their respective areas of operations. These headquarters can also allocate resources to their subordinate battalions and coordinate with the division headquarters, host nation political and security force authorities, other U.S. governmental agencies, other international organizations, and multinational organizations and forces.

7-32. The specific requirements of stability tasks result in the augmentation of the division’s BCTs with additional functional capabilities. Civil affairs, military police, military working dogs, public affairs teams, special forces teams, joint units, host nation security forces, multinational units, military information support units, and additional engineer and sustainment assets can be tailored to augment these BCTs.

7-33. The division commander can direct that each brigade plan and prepare for the potential that it will provide one or more mobile training teams to host national security forces if a separate U.S. training organization does not exist. For example an infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) should be able to provide host nation security forces with training, advice, and assistance in infantry tactics and the use of infantry weapons up through battalion level. That training and assistance emphasizes counterinsurgency tactics and techniques. A military police brigade can expect to train and advise host nation military, paramilitary police, and other police organizations in riot control, area control, police public relations, police intelligence, physical security, and general criminal investigations. These brigade teams may be placed under the OPCON of a U.S. security assistance organization. Each team should be able to provide limited advice and assistance on the conduct of other stability tasks. At a minimum, small units within each brigade will be expected to mentor/advise those host nation counterparts with which they work.

7-34. In recent operations, some multifunctional and functional brigades filled the role of BCTs in conducting stability tasks within an area of operations. The division commander should recognize that the assignment of an area of operation to these types of brigades is an economy of force solution to tactical problems. The maneuver enhancement brigade is the only type of multifunctional support brigade whose headquarters design allows it to accomplish all of the doctrinal functions associated with owning an area of operation. Other than BCTs and maneuver enhancement brigades, all brigades assigned an area of operation reorganize their headquarters to accomplish these functions. The assignment of a civil affairs company to the four other types of multifunctional support brigades and the functional brigades is a technique to provide those brigade headquarters with some of those required capabilities.

SECTION III – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY TASKS

7-35. Chapter 4 of ADRP 3-07 discusses stability planning considerations. Those considerations are:

Recognize complexity.

Balance resources, capabilities, and activities.

Recognize planning horizons.

Avoid planning pitfalls.

7-36. Later in that same chapter, it states that planning for stability in operations draws on all elements of operational art but certain elements are more relevant than others in operations characterized by the conduct of stability tasks. That chapter then goes on the discuss:

End state and conditions.

Decisive points.

Lines of effort.

7-37. The rest of this section of text addresses common division planning considerations for conducting stability tasks. It then addresses planning considerations for conducting stability tasks in an irregular warfare environment. It also addresses common planning considerations related to conducting stability tasks during foreign humanitarian assistance and consequence management. Finally it addresses stability planning considerations by warfighting function.

COMMON STABILITY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

7-38. The initial response stability tasks that the division performs as shaping operations during the conduct of all missions include the following:

Civil security—

Identify and neutralize enemies and potential adversaries.

Establish and disseminate rules relevant to civilian movement.

Secure government-sponsored civilian reconstruction and stabilization personnel.

Secure contractor and civilian reconstruction personnel and resources.

Secure critical infrastructure, natural resources, civil registries, and property ownership documents and databases.

Secure place of religious worship and cultural sites.

Secure important institutions, such as government buildings, medical and public health infrastructure, and banks and other financial institutions.

Secure military depots, equipment, ammunition (conventional and unconventional), and communications nodes.

Map, survey, and mark locations where mines, unexploded explosive ordnance, other explosive, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards are encountered.

Civil control—

Protect vulnerable elements of the civil population, such as ethnic and religious minorities, dislocated civilians and refugees, from enemy action and illegal intimidation and exploitation.

Ensure humanitarian aid organizations have access to endangered civil populations and displaced persons/refugee camps.

Control crowds, prevent looting, and manage civil disturbances.

Identify, secure, and preserve evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity, corruption, terrorism, and organized crime including human and illegal drug trafficking.

Identify and detain perpetrators of criminal offenses.

Assess needs of vulnerable subgroups within the civil population.

Restoration of essential services—

Provide for immediate humanitarian needs of the population—food, water, shelter, and medical support.

Ensure civil population employs proper sanitation measure.

Provide interim sanitation means and waste disposal services.

Help dislocated civilians including ensuring their local security.

Assess public health hazards within the area of operations.

Operate or augment the operations of existing civilian medical facilities.

Prevent epidemics through the provision of immediate vaccinations, enforcement of quarantine provisions, and control of disease vectors.

7-39. While this list of initial response stability tasks appears large, it largely consists of minor changes to things the division does while conducting combat operations. It does not reflect all of the collective stability tasks found elsewhere in doctrine, only those most likely for the division to conduct. Most of the initial response civil security tasks are variations of the division’s ongoing intelligence and protection warfighting functions. Likewise, most initial response civil control tasks are variations of local security and site exploitation tasks. Initial response tasks associated with the restoration of essential services expand ongoing sustainment tasks beyond supporting divisional units including the civilian population. The staff identifies and quantifies civilian needs in this primary stability task area and then task the sustainment system to provide the additional quantities of supplies and medical services. Indeed many of the preventative medical measures aimed at the civilian population actually help prevent the spread of disease to division Soldiers.

IRREGULAR WARFARE

7-40. Division stability planning during irregular warfare must account for the prolonged time period associated with the conduct of foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and combating terrorism. These are the three doctrinal types of irregular warfare operations that a division conducts. Doctrinally, special operating forces conduct support to insurgency and unconventional warfare (the other two types of irregular warfare operations). Each type of irregular warfare conducted by the division requires the conduct of stability tasks if the operation is going to be successful. There could be limited times when the conduct of offensive or defensive tasks is the division’s decisive operation.

7-41. The basis for division prolonged stability-focused plans is the IDAD strategy of the government the division is deploying to support, available civilian and military resources, and estimated combined military and civilian capability to achieve the objectives established for the division. Each supported host nation or transitional military authority is responsible for developing its own stabilization plan designed to meet its particular needs and circumstances. Historically national IDAD strategies take many years to execute and in addition to the nine principles of war involve the three additional principles of joint operations to accomplish—perseverance, legitimacy, and constraint.

7-42. Division plans ensure sufficient personnel and materiel for conducting all five doctrinal primary stability tasks throughout the period of the division’s projected deployment. Resources allocated are sufficient to accomplish the objective sets by higher headquarters for the division. The division exploits airpower for transportation and resupply over extended distances and, where appropriate, tightly controlled close air support (CAS). Plans include measures for effective use of all resources.

7-43. Division commanders and staffs must understand the host nation’s IDAD strategy if they are to plan effectively to support it. In some cases, one of the tasks assigned to division planners may be to help the host nation in formulating an appropriate IDAD strategy or emergency response plan. Often a supported host nation government must overcome the inertia and shortcomings of its own political system before it can cope with the internal stability challenges it is facing. This may involve the adoption of host nation political, economic, military, and/or political reforms during a time of crisis when pressures limit flexibility and make implementation of these reforms more difficult.

7-44. One of the fundamental goals of the IDAD strategy is the prevention of an insurgency or other forms of lawlessness or subversion from developing. This is accomplished by working to correct conditions that promote violence and meet the expectations and needs of the citizens of the supported host nation. The government of that host nation must mobilize its population to participate in its efforts. Ideally, this strategy for employing all instruments of national power is preemptive in nature. However, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or other threat develops it must become active in nature. It is under these conditions that a division is most likely to be introduced.

7-45. This IDAD strategy integrates security force and civilian programs into a coherent, comprehensive effort. Security force actions, including the division’s actions, provide a level of external and internal security that permits and supports growth through balanced development. This development requires change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may in turn promote unrest in other groups within the society that perceive their power, wealth, or influence being reduced. The concept, includes measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can occur.

7-46. The host nation government or transitional military authority analyzes the results of its IDAD strategy and program. This requires the establishment of situationally appropriate measures of performance and effectiveness. The government should also have a methodology to provide feedback for future planning, refinement of strategy, and continued formulation of strategic national policy. This feedback involves informing the civilian population of progress being made and obstacles on the stabilization lines of effort that still must be overcome. This information loop is an important part of the host nation mobilization function.

7-47. As part of prolonged operations this host nation, IDAD strategy focuses on building viable and sustainable political, economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of that country’s society. A successful host nation IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats. The division commander and staff expend significant resources ensuring that the host nation IDAD strategy and the host nation’s execution of that strategy—supported by the division’s actions—focus on blending these four functions. These functions are balanced development, security, threat neutralization, and mobilization.

BALANCE DEVELOPMENT

7-48. Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, social (educational, medical, and welfare), and economic programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the supported host nation society to share in the rewards of development, thus alleviating frustration. Balanced development satisfies legitimate grievances that destabilizing insurgents or terrorist elements attempt to exploit. The supported host nation government must recognize conditions that contribute to the host nation’s internal threats and instability and take preventive measures. Correcting conditions that make the supported host nation’s society vulnerable is the long-term solution to the problem. But those corrections need to be balanced so that they do not create additional vulnerabilities. For example, providing college- and graduate-level education in numbers beyond what the country’s economic and political systems can efficiently support leads to increased instability instead of greater stability. This is because the government finds itself unable to meet the rising expectations of its educated class.

SECURITY

7-49. Security in this context includes all activities implemented to protect the populace from the threat and to provide a safe environment for national development. Protection and control of the populace permit development and deny the insurgent or terrorist enemy access to popular support. The security effort establishes an environment in which the local populace provides for its own security with limited government support.

THREAT NEUTRALIZATION

7-50. Within the context of stability and reconstruction operations threat neutralization is a political concept that makes an organized force irrelevant to the political process. It involves the physical and psychological separation of the threatening elements from the population and includes all lawful activities (except those that degrade the government’s legitimacy) to disrupt, preempt, disorganize, and defeat the insurgent or terrorist organizations. (It should not be confused with the rendering of a mine, by external means, incapable of firing on passage of a target which is the meaning of this term in FM 3-34.210.) Threat neutralization can involve public exposure and the discrediting of opposition leaders during a period of low-level unrest with little political violence. It can involve arrest and prosecution of the leaders and members of disruptive organizations and groups when laws have been broken. It can involve combat action when insurgent or terrorist violent activities escalate. Thus, threat neutralization is closely related to the security function. All of the division’s threat neutralization efforts must be legal. They must scrupulously observe constitutional provisions regarding rights and responsibilities. The need for security forces to act lawfully is essential not only for humanitarian reasons but also because this reinforces the host nation government’s legitimacy while denying insurgents and terrorists an exploitable issue. Within a host nation special emergency powers may exist by legislation or decree. Division Soldiers advise those host nation government agents with which they interact not to abuse these powers because they might well lose the popular support they need. Denying insurgents and terrorists an opportunity to seize on and exploit these types of issues against the host nation government helps to discredit their leaders and neutralize the effectiveness of their propaganda.

MOBILIZATION

7-51. Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources. It includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support of the host nation government. This support is important for the success of the host nation’s IDAD strategy. If successful, mobilization maximizes manpower and other resources available to the government while it minimizes those available to the insurgent or terrorist. Mobilization allows the host nation government to strengthen its existing institutions, to develop new ones in response to demands, and promotes the host nation government’s legitimacy.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENT

7-52. Conducting stability tasks in a foreign humanitarian assistance and consequence management environment will often constitute a major portion of the division’s decisive operation. The primary doctrinal difference between these two environments is that in addition to programs conducted to relieve or reduce or mitigate the results or problems associated with natural or man-made disaster, foreign humanitarian assistance can address endemic conditions, such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that presents a serious threat to life or that results in great damage to or loss of property. Consequence management involves action to maintain or restore essential services. The division and its subordinate brigades is equipped and structured to provide a rapid and capable response when such missions arise. However, the division and other U.S. military forces are not the primary U.S. government means of providing foreign humanitarian assistance. Ultimately, the division’s participation in foreign humanitarian assistance only supplements the activities of U.S. and foreign civil authorities as well as private organizations. (See JP 3-29 for more information on foreign humanitarian assistance.) (See JP 3-41 for more information on CBRN consequence management.) Both joint publications address planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of these missions.

7-53. Division operations focus on initial response tasks for three of the five doctrinal primary stability tasks—establish civil security, establish civil control, and restore essential services. During foreign humanitarian assistance and consequence management, the division may get involved in providing support to economic and infrastructure development. The broad objectives of division’s plans address saving lives, meeting human needs, and protecting existing infrastructure and the environment. However, the division only performs those initial response tasks that the host nation cannot provide.

MISSION COMMAND

7-54. Division commanders devote much of their time and energy to the problems of coordination and cooperation during stability-focused operations. This is because stability-focused operations tend to be joint, interagency, and multinational in nature. The division plans and conducts these operations in concert with unified action partners, although command of divisional units always stays within a U.S. chain of command. The division will often be part of a supporting organization rather than the lead agency. However, the effort of all organizations involved is coordinated toward a unified effort. The division commander uses liaison elements and coordination centers to facilitate unity of effort where unity of command cannot be achieved.

7-55. The division commander’s definition of the desired end state is a required input to operations. While that end states is normally described as a stable, safe, and secure environment, this description is not sufficient. Initial measures of effectiveness and performance quantifying that environment are determined at this time. Measures of effectiveness are criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). Such criterion could be the number of merchants offering goods in the local market or number of girls attending school. A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 3-0). Such criterion could be the number of miles of road checked daily for mines. This is important in stability-focused operations since traditional combat measures, such as territory gained, enemy personnel killed or captured, and enemy combat vehicles destroyed or captured do not apply. Likewise, the desired end state should reflect the prolonged time period associated with many stability-focused operations.

DEVELOP TEAMS

7-56. When operating inside a multinational organization, the division and subordinate commanders should expect to integrate foreign units down to the company level for BCTs and in some cases individual multinational Soldiers in supporting brigades. Commanders at all echelons within the division train with the fact that they will have to routinely interact with multinational partners. The division’s standard operating procedures require modification to allow the division to incorporate these multinational small unit and individual augmentees that do not have compatible communications and information systems.

7-57. One factor that distinguishes the conduct of stability tasks from the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks is the requirement for interagency coordination at the BCT and maneuver battalion/task force level and below. In interagency operations, Army commanders at all echelons have inherent responsibilities including the requirements to clarify the mission; to determine the controlling legal and policy authorities; and to task, organize, direct, sustain, and care for the organizations and individuals for whom they provide the interagency effort. They also ensure seamless termination of the mission under conditions that ensure the identified objectives are met and can be sustained after the operation.

7-58. The division examines the possibility of establishing a joint military/Department of State headquarters element for any PRTs scheduled to operate in the division’s area of operations. This coordination involved the division’s higher headquarters and theAmerican Embassy in the host nation. Establishment of this joint headquarters establishes a central location with greater access to a wide range of resources where problems can be resolved.

OPERATIONS PROCESS

7-59. Success in stability-focused operations depends on the division commander’s ability to identify tasks essential to mission success, and prioritize and sequence the execution of those tasks by the division’s available combat power. Those tasks mitigate the sources of instability and are aligned with U.S. and host nation political objectives. There is a diverse array of actors that interact with the division and there is a limit on the ability of the civilian population and/or host nation government to accept change. Even more so than in the offense and defense, the conduct of stability tasks require the division commander to demonstrate cultural awareness and a clear understanding of the myriad stability tasks involved in such an operation to determine which are truly essential to mission success. Among the numerous tasks possible, relatively few are truly essential.

7-60. The division commander and staff identify essential stability tasks based on due consideration of the relevant mission variables. By definition, they list these tasks in the mission statement of the division operations order. Essential stability tasks are those that the division or its subordinate brigades must successfully execute to accomplish the mission. That list may be short or long. The essential stability task list includes the specified and implied tasks required to establish the end state conditions that define success in this situation. These include primary and subordinate stability tasks and supporting information-related capabilities directed toward a wide array of audiences. In addition, the task list includes any essential offensive and defensive tasks associated with the defeat of an enemy force, insurgent group, or organized criminal cartel. Typically, the division conducts initial response stability-related tasks incidental to its offensive and defensive actions. Other essential stability tasks may be included that are not the primary responsibility of divisional forces. Some of these essential stability tasks are executed simultaneously and some are executed sequentially.

7-61. For the division commander and staff, conducting stability tasks requires a combination of knowledge of operational design, the ability to achieve unity of effort, and a thorough depth of cultural awareness relating to the division’s area of operations. A finite amount of combat power is available to apply against the essential tasks associated with a given stability-focused operation. Essential stability tasks lay the foundation for success of the other instruments of national power. This foundation sustains the burdens of governance, rule of law, and economic development that represent the future stability of a state. Decisions about use of combat power are more than a factor of the size of the force deployed, its relative composition, and the anticipated nature and duration of the mission. Assuring the long-term stability of a host national government depends on applying the division’s combat power to the tasks that are, in fact, essential.

7-62. Determining which assessment tools are going to be used and what needs to be measured are key planning considerations for all stability tasks. Determining the effectiveness of the division in conducting these tasks is challenging, especially in post-conflict situations. It often takes months or longer to accurately measure the affect of the division’s operations on the civilian inhabitants of the division’s area of operations. ADRP 3-07 discusses stability assessment frameworks.

7-63. The military decisionmaking process outlined in ADRP 5-0 is valid for all operations. However, the nature of the operational environment in which the division conducts stability-focused operations requires commanders and staff at all echelons to view the six mission variables of METT-TC—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations—from a different perspective than when division focuses on the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks.

Mission

7-64. In stability-focused operations, the missions come from various sources. The operation order of the division’s higher headquarters is not the only source for mission analysis. Terms of reference, special agreements (such as the Dayton Accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Military-Technical Agreement regarding Kosovo), status-of-forces agreements, ROE, status of mission agreements, and executive orders are examples of mandates and declarations that must be reviewed for mission requirements.

Enemy

7-65. The characterization of the enemy is a critical concern in operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks. For combat operations conducted to support a primary stability task, such as forcible separation of adversaries when enforcing a cease fire, the enemy is analyzed, as it would be for the offense and defense. But for other subcategories of primary stability tasks, the concept of enemy is much different. In peace operations, it is the conflict and not the parties to the conflict that is the enemy. In complex contingencies, it may be hunger or disease and not competing political factions that is the enemy. Commanders guard against taking actions that would inadvertently create an enemy where there was not one. For example, the impression that one of the parties to a conflict is receiving favorable treatment could turn other parties against the division (as in Lebanon in 1982 when Shi’a forces attacked U.S. Marines whom they saw as favoring the Maronite Christian-dominated government).

Terrain and Weather

7-66. Decisive and key terrain in stability focused operations may not be a hilltop or defile, but rather the restoration of civil infrastructure, such as the local electric power grid or opening schools. The impact of weather on civilians—especially displaced civilians without permanent shelters—and the potential for a worsening humanitarian crisis creates specific concerns for commanders in stability focused operations. The same applies to rains or other weather-related events that impact on an areas ability to feed its civilian inhabitants.

Troops and Support Available

7-67. The commander attempts to tailor division into a force suitable for the mission. The inherent decentralized execution of stability-focused operations creates challenges in force tailoring. When considering troops available, commanders expand their thinking to consider different sources of support to the mission.

7-68. The conduct of many division stability tasks require specialized capabilities found in multifunctional support brigades and functional brigades to a greater degree than do offensive and defensive tasks. The commander considers the synergy and enhanced capabilities inherent in unified action when force tailoring the division for the mission. Multinational forces, other U.S. government agencies, contractors, and host-nation civilians may be available to support division mission accomplishment. The commander plans the division’s task organization based on each unit’s ability to contribute to achieving national interests and objectives and perceptions of the civilian population, the international community, and the American public. The commander seeks to coordinate and leverage the substantial contributions to the overall goals of the operation made by international and nongovernmental organizations. Building teamwork early and continually is vital to successful operations.

7-69. The commander recognizes the availability and contribution of Army civilians and contractors as part of the total force. These civilians participate to provide expertise not available through uniformed service members and to most effectively use government resources. Support provided by civilians in past stability-focused operations included, but was not limited to: communications, intelligence, contract construction, real estate leasing, water detection, civil engineering technical assistance, and logistic services. Civilians in the nonappropriated fund category staff the service exchanges and provide morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs. Local hire civilians may also be a source of both skilled and unskilled labor.

7-70. All divisional commanders and staffs consider the type and nature of other governmental agencies, host nation agencies, international organizations, and private volunteer organizations historically found within the division’s projected area of operations during planning. Each of these organizations has their own role to play. Each will impact operations in one way or another.

Time Available

7-71. Commanders at all levels consider the possibility of long term commitment to some stability focused operations. As a result of the 1978 Camp David Accords, the Army provided a battalion task force to the multinational forces and observers in the Sinai over 30 years. As a result of the 1995 Dayton, North Atlantic Treaty Organization-assigned U.S. forces continued to enforce the peace in Bosnia for over a decade. Planners anticipate long-term commitments that require developing a rotation policy. See the U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Web site for more information on the Camp David Accords and 1995 Dayton.

Civil Considerations

7-72. Civil considerations are important in all operations but are critical in stability-focused operations. The command and division staff determines what it can or cannot do to execute the five primary stability tasks. The commander considers the civilian populace and its impact—whether it is supportive, neutral, or hostile to the presence of military forces—on the division’s mission. A supportive populace provides resources that facilitate division operations. It also provides a positive climate for military and diplomatic activities that the U.S. pursues to achieve its foreign policy objectives. A hostile populace threatens the division’s immediate operations and can undermine public support at home for U.S. policy objectives. The division determines ways it can employ military forces and their activities that reduce civilian vulnerabilities. It does this by anticipating and lessening the possibility that harm to civilians may result during—or in retaliation to—its operations. The division commander and planners can better ensure that unit actions minimize the potential for civilian harm by adding protection of civilians to their standard decision criteria.

INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES

7-73. The division’s accomplishment of essential stability tasks also depends on the employment of information related capabilities. The final success or failure of the division’s stability-focused operations rests with the perceptions of the inhabitants within and external to the division’s area of operations. The division goes beyond defeating the enemy. It secures the trust and confidence of the civilian population. This requires the integrated employment of military information support operations (MISO), combat camera, and the other means necessary to influence enemy, adversary, neutral, and friendly audiences. The use of information-related capabilities promotes the legitimacy of the division’s mission and reduces bias, ignorance, and confusion by persuading, educating, coordinating, or influencing targeted audiences. It includes the interaction of the division’s commanders and Soldiers at all echelons with these audiences so these target audiences understand the objectives and motives of friendly forces, and the scope and duration of friendly actions. The use of information related capabilities are integral to the conduct of each of the five primary stability tasks. Combined with broad efforts to build partner capacity, they are essential to achieving decisive results: a stable host nation government, and peaceful civilian population.

7-74. Without a detailed Soldier and leader engagement plan, different divisional units and staff elements meet with and engage local leadership with different desired end states thereby undermining the ability of any or all division forces to build capacity and work towards transition to host nation lead. The creation of a detailed engagement plan does not ignore the differences between provinces or localities within the province; instead it sets out the objectives to be obtained. Host nation leaders in a city, district or province typically will have face to face meetings with divisional leaders. These meetings are used to advance the creation and building of host nation capacities. However, if two or more staff elements or units within the division work with the same host nation individual or office without coordination, it affords host nation personnel the opportunity to exploit gaps between the instructions of these divisional organizations.

7-75. No other military activity has as significant a human component as operations that occur among the people. Human beings capture information and form perceptions based on inputs received through all the senses. They see actions and hear words. They compare gestures and expressions with the spoken word. They weigh the messages presented to them by the division and other sources with the conditions that surround them. When the local and national news media are unavailable or unreliable, people turn to alternative sources, such as the internet—where information flows freely at unimaginable speeds—or rumor and gossip. Perception equals truth to people lacking objective sources of information. Altering perceptions requires shaping information according to how people absorb and interpret information, molding the message for broad appeal and acceptance.

7-76. In its planning for stability tasks, the division focuses on the civilians within its area of operations. The division plans, prepares, executes, and assesses essential stability tasks to ensure that its efforts improves the safety, security, social well-being, and livelihood of those individuals. The division plan when executed should shape a positive future for individuals once on the brink of despair. The division commander’s list of information related tasks when conducting stability-focused operations include—

Initial response:

Identifying or establishing outlets for international, national, and local news media.

Using the local media as a public information vehicle to provide factual information and control rumors and disinformation.

Issuing effective press releases and timely provision of information services in local languages.

Assisting any transitional military administrations with public information programs.

Synchronizing messages with the division’s operations.

Ensuring that division messages are consistent with the actions of division forces.

Assessing media capability and capacity of the host nation.

Tailoring the division’s MISO and command information plans to the ability of the local populace to receive messages—it does no good to broadcast television messages if most of the populace lacks electricity and cannot hear the TV broadcast.

Integrating cultural understanding with into division plans.

Initiating contacts to establish personal relationships between commanders and local authority figures.

Transformation, which in addition to those items addressed in the division’s initial response, includes such items as:

Offering security to identified media sources, reporters, and outlets.

Assisting local newspapers, periodicals, radios, and television stations to resume normal operations—using indigenous personnel and supplies wherever possible.

Establishing means by which the local populace receives division messages, such as distributing hand cranked amplitude modulation or frequency modulation radios.

Establishing working relationships with members of U.S., local, and international media based in or visiting the division’s area of operations.

Assisting local entertainment modes, such as live theater, cinemas, and other places of public entertainment that favor U.S. intervention to resume normal operations once again using indigenous personnel and supplies wherever possible.

Helping local authorities within the division’s area of operations in purging sold or freely distributed public media, such as libraries, books, magazines, radio and television recordings, films, compact disks, digital video disks, and audio formats of inflammatory material.

Establishing personal relationships between division commanders and local authority figures.

Fostering sustainability builds on division transformation efforts by doing such functions as:

Establishing licenses and registration requirements for local media.

Developing public affairs and strategic communications offices within the supported host nation government.

Developing institutions that impart information engagement skills to the local population.

Developing capabilities to locally manufacture and distribute different types of information media.

7-77. These tasks are not the sole responsibility of the division information operations officer. Many of them require assistance from available civil affairs Soldiers and other division personnel. The division staff judge advocate reviews plans to accomplish these tasks to determine their legality in the existing operational environment.

7-78. The division information operations officer in the assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) cell synchronizes information-related capabilities into the division’s planning. This requires division information operations staff to participate in division targeting within the fires cell as well as the various working groups and meetings chaired by the current and future operations and plans integrating cells. This participation allows the division staff to develop a holistic understanding of the information environment within the problem set facing the division staff. This staff-wide understanding helps synchronize the information-operations related planning and targeting and allows for shifts in priorities. It also allows the division information operations officer and G-9 coordination and work with other governmental agencies, multinational organizations, host national government, and international and volunteer organizations to be incorporated into division planning.

7-79. It is important to seek the advice and opinions of division chaplains concerning matters of religion, culture, and religious key leaders in the division’s area of operations and areas of interest. Religion is an important factor when planning stability tasks and key leader engagements in many parts of the world. Chaplains provide important, up-to-date perspectives not often included or clear in other sources. Chaplains that conduct battlefield circulation provide valuable input to commanders and staffs concerning local, provincial, and national atmospherics. When needed, Chaplains can play an important role in bridging gaps with religious leaders that set conditions for future successful key leader engagements and civil affairs operations.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

7-80. A division’s stability tasks are conducted among the people, in the spotlight of international news media and under the umbrella of international law. Therefore, the division and its attached brigade forces ensure consistency in their actions and messages. These echelons coordinate with the news media to provide prompt and factual information to quell rumors and misinformation. They offer open access to media representatives whenever possible. Finally, they understand the culture of each audience and public—enemy, adversary, neutral, and friendly—within and external to their respective areas of operations and tailor their messages appropriately.

7-81. Enemies, adversaries, and other organizations use propaganda and disinformation against the division to influence various civilian populations within and external to the division’s area of operations. The division’s public affairs staff works closely with the division intelligence cell to be predictive, rather than reactive, to such attacks. Public affairs personnel inform and counter the effects of propaganda and misinformation. The command establishes mechanisms, such as a media center and/or editorial board, to educate and inform local and international media. An informed public, with accurate and timely information, is a force multiplier in stability-focused operations.

AIRSPACE CONTROL

7-82. The division does not do anything different in this area during operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks than it does when focusing on the offensive and defensive tasks. (For more information, see FM 3-52.)

MILITARY DECEPTION

7-83. Division military deception planners understand the collection means available to the division’s adversaries. Enemy and adversary information collection is a mixture of high and low technology and range from using commercial means, through buying commercial satellite imagery, to using observers linked by cell phones. This means that the division continues to employ military deception during operations focused on the stability element of decisive action if there is any type of human adversary. Just as in military deception of offensive and defensive tasks, division military deception planners have to understand how that enemy or adversary views the world and makes decisions. They remember that the division’s military deception activities endure long enough to place that enemy or adversary in a disadvantageous position when reacting to the division’s operations. A key decision is whether or not to cause the enemy or adversary to not trust an intelligence source by feeding that source false information to support a current military deception activity or to preserve that source as an asset that the division can exploit in the future.

INFORMATION PROTECTION

7-84. Protecting information is a key factor in protecting divisional units and the overall stability mission. The secure and uninterrupted flow of data and information allows the division to multiply its combat power and synchronize the division’s activities with other unified action partner capabilities. The need to be candid and responsive to requests for information balance the need to protect operational information, such as troop movements, security plans, and vulnerabilities. Working closely with all parties planners develop the essential elements of friendly information to preclude inadvertent public disclosure of critical or sensitive information. Information protection includes cybersecurity, computer network defense, and electronic protection. All three are interrelated.

7-85. Numerous threats to the protection of the division’s information and databases exist in stability-focused operations beyond those encountered during the conduct of combat-focused operations. The establishment of semipermanent forward operating bases and the life support area provide locations where insurgent, terrorist, and organized criminal elements focus their data collection and data corruption efforts. The presence of local-hire and third-nation contract civilians to support the division’s operations gives increased opportunities for computer viruses and worms to be inserted into division information systems. This results not only in restrictions on when, where, and under what supervision civilian janitorial staff and other support personnel perform their duties but also to how higher-level civilians of all types are integrated into the division staff’s operations. The mix of other U.S. governmental, host nation, and multinational agencies along with international and private volunteer organizations and the media, all of which may have totally different cultures and standards when it comes to safeguarding information further complicates the situation. Division assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6) planners consider these additional factors when addressing information protection.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

7-86. The division plans its offensive and defensive movement and maneuver simultaneously with its stability movement and maneuver. The division’s lethal capabilities make the execution of the five primary stability tasks possible even if the probability of combat is remote. The division commander plans to have the right mix of forces available to quickly transition the focus of its operations to combat operations. Additionally, when conducting operations focused of the conduct of stability tasks, the commander must plan for the future deployment of the division headquarters and its attached brigade elsewhere. This may be in the supported joint force commander’s joint operations area, into the joint operations area of another joint force commander, or back to the garrison locations of these units. Paragraphs 7-87–7-91 include some movement and maneuver considerations specific to stability focused tasks.

EMPLOY DIRECT FIRES

7-87. Maneuver and the application of direct fires lend themselves only to a few subcategories of the civil security and civil control primary stability tasks. On the other hand, combat forces play major roles in ensuring the outcome of these subcategories of tasks is favorable to U.S. interests. These subcategories include the enforcement of peace agreements, support of disarmament, border control, and the establishment of public order and safety. Combat forces are useful in the conduct of other primary stability tasks because of their deterrence value and the flexibility that their combat systems and manpower provide to the commander.

MOBILITY AND COUNTERMOBILITY

7-88. The division has freedom of movement while conducting operations. However, in stability focused operations, mobility operations allow civilian traffic and commerce to continue or resume. Resuming the normal civilian activity in an area is an important objective in an operation. In operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks, mobility focuses on keeping ground and inland water lines of communications open and on reducing the threat of mines and other unexploded ordnance to Soldiers and civilians.

7-89. Combat engineer support from the supporting maneuver enhancement brigade is required when the division conducts various primary stability tasks. This support falls under the mobility and countermobility tasks. It includes—

Constructing combat roads and trails.

Breach existing obstacles (including minefields).

Marking minefields, including minefield fence maintenance.

Clearing mines and debris from roads.

Conducting route reconnaissance to support division main supply routes and civilian lines of communications.

Creating obstacles between opposing factions to prevent easy movement between their positions.

7-90. The division and its subordinate brigades maintain adequate echelon reserves to exploit opportunities and redeemed reverses. The maintenance of a reserve allows commanders to plan for worst-case scenarios, provides flexibility, and conserves the force during long-term operations.

OCCUPY AN AREA

7-91. Planning for the division’s relief in place and the associated transfer of authority (TOA) begins before the division deploys. This planning builds on the doctrinal fundamentals of a relief in place as found in FM 3-90-2. Such planning includes not only U.S. military forces and their activities, but also other governmental agencies, multinational partners, host nation agencies, and potentially international organizations. The mission variables of METT-TC determine the type of relief in place/TOA that occurs. Sometimes a traditional relief in place is appropriate. This occurs when the division’s stability-focused operations occur within limited intervention or peace operations missions. However, transition by function may be more effective if the relief in place/TOA is takes place with host nation military forces and civil authorities within the range of military operations of irregular warfare. Some of these functions include medical and engineer services, local security, communications, and sustainment. Division plans should not remove a division provided capability from the area of operations until the replacement capability is operating.

INTELLIGENCE

7-92. The effectiveness of intelligence is measured against the relevant information quality criteria of accuracy, timeliness, usability, completeness, precision, and reliability. Intelligence is relevant, predictive, and tailored. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on these criteria.) During planning, the division intelligence cell and knowledge management element develop procedures to share intelligence data and products, both vertically and horizontally, throughout the division. Successful implementation of operations necessitates an operations security and counterintelligence program to protect friendly force operations and to counter and penetrate enemy and adversary intelligence collection operations in an environment focused on the conduct of stability tasks. Intelligence and counterintelligence operations must be designed so as to assess accurately enemy and adversary capabilities. They must provide timely warning to the host nation or transitional military authority and divisional forces. They must be able to penetrate and be prepared to compromise hostile operations on order. If the host nation or transitional military authority does not perform these missions effectively before the division’s commitment, then U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence elements deploy to accomplish these missions. In this event, the division assists the host nation or transitional military authority in the development of their own internal intelligence and security forces to perform these missions effectively. Divisional elements help the host nation or transitional military authority develop intelligence capabilities within the confines of U.S. government directives and as deemed appropriate by the supported geographic combatant or joint force commander in coordination with the U.S. ambassador of the host nation.

7-93. Conducting stability tasks demands greater attention to civil considerations—the political, social, economic, and cultural factors in the division’s area of operations—than does conducting conventional offensive and defensive tasks. Commanders expand the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process beyond geographical and force capability considerations. (See FM 2-01.3 for more information on how this process needs to be modified during the conduct of these types of tasks.)

7-94. Conducting stability tasks requires the division’s information collection efforts to develop a clear definition, understanding, and appreciation of all potential threats, including disease and injury. Success in this environment requires multidiscipline, all-source, fused intelligence. Although a single source approach cannot support all requirements, counterintelligence is a vital part of the overall all-source process. Thorough mission analysis allows commanders to tailor their intelligence capabilities to fit the mission’s requirements. Commanders adapt tactically to select the intelligence capabilities needed.

7-95. In many instances international organizations and nongovernmental organizations will have been in the area of operations long before U.S. military forces arrive. These organizations produce reports, have Web sites, and maintain databases of immense value that the division can exploit during the planning and preparation phases. In the case of mines or unexploded ordnance, there is often a global positioning system reference collection of minefield survey data. Divisional brigades should attempt to access this information before beginning deployment. However many of these nongovernmental organizations will not cooperate with U.S. forces for fear of losing legitimacy in the eyes of the host nation populace. Although commanders may access this information using intelligence operations, sound civil-military coordination may be a more effective approach for obtaining the necessary information.

SUPPORT TO FORCE GENERATION

7-96. Higher echelon intelligence organizations, not part of the division and positioned outside the division area of operations push intelligence products forward and simultaneously receive priority intelligence requirements and request information for collection and processing.

7-97. There may be an increased reliance on split-based operations to provide intelligence support while conducting stability-focused operations. Split-based operations can help overcome certain constraints that are often present in operations where the stability element is the division’s decisive operation, such as force caps and limited strategic or operational lift availability. This split-based support allows the division commander to deploy the division’s attached brigades into an area of operations and still receive continuous, relevant, and timely intelligence support during all operational phases. Intelligence split-based operations use direct broadcast technology from collection platforms, communications, and a small forward-deployed intelligence support element. The majority of the division intelligence cell conducts operations outside the division area of operations, possibly in their peacetime location. The majority of the intelligence cell closes with the forward-deployed intelligence support element once allowed by the mission variables of METT-TC.

SUPPORT SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

7-98. Cultural information is critical to gauge the reaction of the civilian population within and external to the division’s area of operations to a particular course of action conducted, to avoid misunderstandings, and to improve the effectiveness of the execution of that course of action by the division. Changes in the behavior of the populace may suggest needed change in division tactics, techniques, and/or procedures or even strategy. Biographic information, leadership analysis, and methods of operation within the existing cultural matrix are keys to understanding the attitudes and ability of positional and reference civilian leaders to favorably or unfavorably influence the outcome of the division’s operations.

7-99. Defining the ground rules for sharing unclassified information between the division, other U.S. military forces and foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations and international agencies according to national and combatant/joint task commander policy is an important function of the division knowledge management element and the foreign disclosure officer. The division assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6) staff section is responsible for implementing those ground rules.

Priority Intelligence Requirements

7-100. Information collection in stability-focused operations adjusts to the civil inhabitants and their cultures, politics, crime, religion, economics, and related factors and any variances within affected groups of people. Priority intelligence requirements are tied to identifiable indicators of change within the operational environment. For example, priority intelligence requirements related to violations of any cease fire agreements or protection efforts may continue as long as the mission requires. However, identified enemy and adversary activities are still tracked in stability-focused operations where appropriate.

INFORMATION COLLECTION

7-101. The division does not do anything different for information collection focused on the conduct of stability tasks than it does in operations focused on the offensive and defensive tasks. The information requirements collected against are different. The commander needs to know how best to affect the eight interrelated operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time and thus enhance stability. A lack of knowledge concerning local politics, customs, and culture leads the division to conduct actions against inappropriate target or offend and cause mistrust among the local population. Likewise the information collection tasks conducted by the division’s brigades are different because of the operational environment where the division finds itself and the need to collect against those factors instigating instability. Greater granularity or attention to detail collecting information is required since the operational environment changes from block to block in urban areas.

7-102. Care must be taken to ensure collection efforts do not violate U.S. laws in regards to collecting intelligence on U.S. citizens overseas. All intelligence leaders should know the implications of and considerations associated with the general intelligence provisions and authorities included in the following U.S. Code titles: 10, 32, and 50, and with Executive Order 12333. Executive Order 12333 can be found on the National Archives Web site. The implications of and considerations associated with these provisions and authorities include the oversight, management, and resourcing of intelligence operations and the authority for or prohibitions on certain activities. Titles 10 and 50 are inextricably linked and mutually supportive statutory provisions for Department of Defense intelligence activities at every level of operations (strategic, operational, and tactical) during peacetime or war.

7-103. Intelligence activities authorized by Executive Order 12333 are extended to combatant commanders through operation orders and plans. Certain intelligence activities are directed by other legislative authority and are not exclusive to Title 10 or Title 50 statutes. Beyond these general intelligence authorities, it is important to note that an organization or unit has a mission to conduct a particular type of intelligence activity. These authorities are found in a wide range of documents such as Department of Defense (DOD) directives, intelligence-agency-specific authorities, ARs, operation orders, and operation plans. If the intelligence staff has any questions on authorities or funding sources, it coordinates closely with the unit staff judge advocate because of the dynamic nature, complexity, and large volume of intelligence laws and policies.

Human Intelligence

7-104. There is an increased reliance on human intelligence when conducting stability tasks. Commanders at all division echelons emphasize the importance of always being intelligence conscious to all their personnel. Commanders also provide guidelines to improve their intelligence-gathering capability. Interpreters, low-level source operations, debriefs of local civilian personnel, screening operations, and patrolling are primary sources for assessing the economic and health needs, military capability, and political intent of those receiving assistance who or are otherwise a party to the contingency. Medical personnel must know the Geneva Convention restrictions against medical personnel collecting information of intelligence value except that which is observed incidentally while accomplishing their humanitarian duties.

7-105. Planners ensure that division human intelligence assets are employed effectively, which is typically by pushing teams down to the lowest level possible. When this is done, their security is accounted for by the gaining unit, and tasking priorities and command relationships must be established for both temporary and long term commitments. Intelligence center of excellence doctrinal publications discusses the use of multifunctional teams and the conduct of intelligence analysis.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance

7-106. The division employs the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) assets of its subordinate brigades to determine the disposition, activities, and intentions of civilian populations (hostile and neutral) and uniformed or irregular threats. Reconnaissance associated with information collection and security continues throughout the conduct of stability tasks. Success requires integrating all available information from civil and military sources. When the division plans how best to restore essential services in close coordination with the host nation, reconnaissance helps the division determine how and where to apply limited assets to benefit the most individuals. (See FM 3-90-2 for more information on reconnaissance.)

FIRES

7-107. Planning and delivery of fires precludes fires on protected targets, unwanted collateral damage, and the political ramifications of perceived excessive fire. Mortars, due to their smaller bursting radius, reduce collateral damage. Mortars may provide illumination rounds to demonstrate deterrent capability, observe contested areas, support friendly area security, or help patrolling maneuver forces.

DELIVER FIRES

7-108. FA howitzers and rocket systems provide continuous deterrents to hostile action and are a destructive force multiplier for commanders. To counter an indirect fire threat, the force locates hostile indirect fire systems using counterfire radars. The use of quick reactionary forces, attack helicopter, or local friendly forces are ideal for response to counterfire radar acquisitions as clearance of fire procedures are often time consuming and not necessarily reliable when determining locations for host nation forces. Additionally, indiscriminate use of indirect fire on counterfire radar acquisitions can lead to unwanted collateral damage.

7-109. Constraint is vital when employing fires during stability tasks. Such constraint concerns the munitions employed and the targets engaged to obtain desired effects. Having the ability to employ a weapon does not mean it should be employed. In addition to collateral damage considerations, the employment of fires could have second and third order negative effects. Collateral damage could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. The use of nonlethal capabilities is considered to fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly force to avoid unnecessarily raising the level of conflict. Excessive force antagonizes those friendly and neutral parties involved. Constraint increases the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while potentially damaging the legitimacy of an opponent.

INTEGRATE FIRES

7-110. Fire support coordination, planning, and clearance demands special arrangements with joint and multinational forces and local authorities. These arrangements include communications and language requirements, liaison personnel, and procedures focused on interoperability. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization standardization agreements (STANAGs) provide excellent examples of coordinated fire support arrangements. These provide participants with common terminology and procedures. ROE should provide guidelines for clearing indirect fires (both lethal and nonlethal).

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

7-111. Offensive and defensive air defense planning considerations continue to apply when the division conducts stability-focused operations. However, the air threat trends toward Group 1 and 2 unmanned aerial system (UAS) employed by groups opposing division effort to provide stability. Air and missile defense sensors, and mission command elements, provide divisional forces early warning against aerial attack, and populate their portion of the division’s common operational picture. Divisional units should continue to employ passive air defense measures. Soldiers must train in aircraft recognition and ROE since many stability situations will have multiple factions using the same or similar aircraft. Also an absence of active hostilities offers international and private organizations an opportunity to employ their own or chartered civilian aircraft within the division area of operations. The flight control of these civil aircraft will not be routinely integrated into the air traffic service operations provided by the air traffic service company from the division’s attached, OPCON, or tactical control (TACON) combat aviation brigade.

7-112. Counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) batteries may be located in forward operating bases or logistics support areas established by the division to support its stability-focused mission. Each battery’s sensors detect incoming rockets, artillery, and mortar shells. They may also detect Group 1 and 2 UAS. The battery’s fire control system predicts the flight path of incoming rockets and shells, prioritizes targets, activates the supported base’s warning system according to established ROE so that exposed individuals can take cover and provides cueing data that allows the battery’s weapon system to defeat the target before the target can impact the base. It is important that the command and support relationships between these C-RAM batteries and the division be clearly defined during the planning phase.

SUSTAINMENT

7-113. The sustainment cell enables the division commander to execute the division mission and sustain the division headquarters and its attached brigades. This is as true during the conduct of operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks as it is for operations focused on the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks. However, when the division is focused on conducting stability tasks, it is far more likely that the forces in the division’s supporting sustainment brigade or organic to the division’s attached brigade will be employed in nonstandard tasks or in quantities disproportionate to their normal roles.

LOGISTICS

7-114. Host-nation support, contracting, and local purchases are force multipliers in many of these operations. Situations that lack optimal sustaining capabilities may require using nonstandard logistics. They may augment or replace existing military logistics capabilities. They can reduce dependence on the theater logistic system, improve response times, and free airlift and sealift for other priority needs. Contracting personnel should precede the main body of the Army if feasible. Nonstandard logistics may be employed for—

Limited supplies such as Classes I, II, III, IV, and IX.

Obtaining Class X supplies necessary for the conduct of division’s operations.

Services such as catering, maintenance and repair, sanitation, and laundry.

Rental services such as mobile communications.

Transportation.

7-115. The logistics civilian augmentation program (LOGCAP) is advanced acquisition planning to use civilian contractors during wartime and unforeseen military emergencies to augment Army capabilities. The LOGCAP objective is to preplan for the use of contractors to perform selected services to augment the Army. AR 700-137 establishes this program. While the division takes advantage of any existing LOGCAP arrangements; these arrangement may be more important in stability-focused operations where access to Army National Guard and Army Reserve sustainment assets may be restricted. Manpower caps may also be placed on the numbers of uniformed Soldiers that can deploy into an area of operations.

7-116. The division employs LOGCAP to increase sustainment capabilities if troop strength limitations are placed on the division during the conduct of its stability-focused operations. It will be a challenge to increase the capabilities of the available contractor support so the earlier in the operations cycle that the requirements for the contractor become known, the easier—and potentially cheaper—it will be to meet those requirements. There is a lag time between when the division is able to express these requirements in detail and the contractor will be able to respond.

Division Sustainment Support to Other Agencies

7-117. When directed by competent authority, the division provides sustainment support and assistance to agencies other than the U.S. military that lack the capability to sustain their operations. The division and its supporting sustainment brigade sustainment capabilities—such as transportation, supply, or medical services—often support other U.S. government agencies, international organizations, and private volunteer organizations during its conduct of sustainment operations. Division planners identify the scope and scale of this support to other agencies as early as possible in operations.

7-118. The division provides this support by employing LOGCAP and the Defense Logistics Agency for delivering food, the construction and operating of dining facilities, base construction, and the provision of bulk fuel. Common user land transport to these other agencies will be provided by a mix of military and contract provided vehicles.

Financial Management

7-119. Financial management during combat operations is straightforward when compared to financial management during stability-focused operations. Many possible sources of funding exist in operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks; legal restrictions often limit using these funds. Auditors expect peacetime financial accountability standards to apply in stability-focused operations. Unauthorized expenditure of funds can lead to criminal or administrative action against those responsible. Some principles of which the division commander and staff should be aware as the operations cycle begins include—

Expenditures are reasonably related to the purpose for which Congress made the appropriations.

Expenditures must not fall specifically within the scope of some other category of appropriation (such as Title 10, Operations and Maintenance funds versus Title 22, Security Assistance funds).

If two appropriations permit the expenditure, either is used, but not in combination or interchangeably to achieve the same objective. This is a prohibition against augmentation of funds.

Upon mission receipt, division financial managers account for expenditures and tracking the use of sustainment assets to capture costs of the operation for reimbursement.

Financial accountability at all levels is important for reimbursement and is legally required for reporting the costs of operations to Congress.

Operational Contract Support

7-120. Theater support contracting support is provided from the supporting contracting support brigade in direct support to the designated Army force headquarters. Commanders can expect that contractors will be located within the division’s area of operations to support division operations. This applies during the conduct of defensive and stability tasks as well. The management and control of contractors differs from the command of Soldiers and Department of the Army (DA) civilians. During military operations, Soldiers and Army civilians are under the direct control of the military chain of command. Commanders can direct Soldier and Army civilian task assignment, special recognition, and disciplinary action. However, they do not have the same control over contractors. The terms and conditions of the contract establish the relationship between the military and the contractor. (See ATTP 4-10 for considerations regarding contract support.)

General Engineering Support

7-121. Engineer planners consider personnel or materiel assets available to help perform general engineering through contracts, local sources, and private agencies, including the LOGCAP. General engineering operations require large amounts of construction materials acquired locally, regionally, and from the continental U.S. (CONUS). These materials are obtained through military supply channels or by contract. Engineers identify, prioritize, and requisition required construction material consistent with acquisition regulations. Supply units process the requisition and acquire, receive, store, and transport construction materials. This support may also be provided through a combination of engineer unit Class IV acquisition and storage by contractor support.

7-122. Engineer battalions assigned to the division’s attached maneuver enhancement brigade provide general engineering services to the division and supported host nation agencies during stability-focused operations. However, most construction requires additional engineer units. Specialized engineer teams, such as firefighting and utility detachments as well as real estate teams, are important for developing base camps, logistic facilities, roads, and airfields. General engineering missions help the host nation by constructing facilities and supporting government or civil agencies. Engineers also teach engineer skills to local civilian and military personnel and then work together on projects that support host nation institutional and infrastructure development.

7-123. Local acquisition of construction materials helps restore the local economy and puts additional civilians to work. The division engineer staff conducts analysis during planning to see if the benefits of obtaining these materials locally outweigh the negative impacts of this course of action, such as causing inflation in the local economy and putting additional strains on nongovernment organizations trying to provide essential services to the civilian population.

PERSONNEL SERVICES

7-124. Personnel services include human resources support, financial management, legal support, religious support, and band support. Personnel services are those sustainment functions related to Soldiers’ welfare, readiness, and quality of life; and provide funding, accounting and cost management, banking, and disbursing support. Personnel services complements logistics by sustaining division personnel. Human resources providers at all division echelons implement the human dimension of soldiering. (See FM 1-0 for a discussion of human resources support. See FM 1-06 for a discussion of financial management operations.) The execution of these tasks while conducting stability-focused operations is the same as they are for offensive and defensive focused operations—although the intensity of effort for a particular function may be quite a bit different—with the following exception in paragraphs 7-124 and 7-126.

7-125. The division commander and staff provide recommendations on the rotation policy to the next higher commander when conducting prolonged stability-focused operations. A rotation policy and procedures for the deployment, re-deployment or movement of units, individual augmentees, Department of Defense civilian employees, and contract personnel is necessary to avoid recruitment, retention, and psychological problems associated with indefinite tours. Ideally, the rotation policy is established before commencement of the operation. It is based on the mission, length of operation, operational environment, and requirements for skills. A key decision is rotation of units or individuals. Final decisions on the theater rotation policy are made by the Secretary of Defense because of its impact on all of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, and military).

7-126. A standard tour length for all units or personnel may seem more equitable and impact more favorably on morale, but may not be supportable because of personnel shortfalls in some military occupational specialties or lack of necessary force structure. Other factors influence tour length, such as legal restrictions impacting tour lengths of U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard units and personnel. Military necessity may also extend these timelines.

ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM SUPPORT

7-127. Health service support resources may be used across a broad spectrum of missions (from consulting to delivering health care) in operations focused on conducting stability tasks. The division surgeon, together with the staff judge advocate, advises the commander on which groups of individuals within the division area of operations are eligible beneficiaries to receive military health care. This is not a simple matter due to Title 10 restrictions and the constraints imposed by the Geneva Conventions. Financial management specialists also need to determine the methods used to obtain reimbursement for medical services rendered. Medical care is included in the primary stability task of restoration of essential services. In operations focused on conducting stability tasks, the civilian population served will differ from the traditional healthy and fit Soldiers in the division. The patient load includes children; infants; and a wide variety of obstetrical, gynecological, and geriatric patients. Treatment of farm animals are a major consideration as will the inspection of local food sources and processing facilities. The composition of the affected population requires medical planners to augment existing medical equipment sets with specialized equipment, instruments, and medicines. Consultation and advice from CONUS teaching hospitals and medical centers of excellence handle local endemic diseases and help the host nation in enhancing or developing the medical infrastructure, civilian medical programs, health and sanitation services, and animal husbandry programs.

7-128. A planning challenge for the division medical staff is to reduce the number of Soldiers that require evacuation to Role 3 medical treatment facilities during prolonged stability-focused operations. This includes the division establishing liaison with the treatment facilities through which sick, injured, or wounded Soldiers move as they are evacuated outside the division area of operations and the theater of operations back to the Warrior Transition Unit that oversees their treatment and rehabilitation in CONUS and eventual medical discharge or return to duty. The division surgeon anticipates a growing range of illnesses and injuries while supporting prolonged stability-focused operations, such as mild and severe traumatic brain injuries and psychological injuries.

PROTECTION

7-129. Initial division protection planning requires various assessments to support protection prioritization; namely, threat, hazard, vulnerability, criticality, and capability. These assessments determine which assets can be protected given no constraints (critical assets) and which assets are protected with available resources (defended assets). Commanders make decisions on acceptable risks and provide guidance to the staff so that they can employ protection capabilities based on the critical asset list and defended asset list. These lists are coordinated with the division’s higher headquarters. All forms of protection are used and employed during preparation and continue through execution to reduce friendly vulnerability.

7-130. Commanders and staff planners assess the need for providing protection to contractors operating within the division area of operations and designate forces to provide security to them when appropriate. The mission of, threat to, and location of each contractor determines the degree of protection needed. Protecting contractors involves not only active protection through the use of armed military forces to provide escort or perimeter security, but also training and equipping of contractor personnel in self-protection (protective equipment and weapons). When the threat exists and the commander of a combatant command grants approval, contractor personnel may be trained and equipped to work in a CBRN environment. The same personnel carry individual, military specification weapons for personal protection, provided the contractors’ company policy permits and the employees agree.

7-131. Host nation support is important in the variety of services and facilities that can support security and protection of division assets. These services provided by the host nation relieve the division or higher Army headquarters of the need to provide equivalent capabilities thereby reducing the U.S. sustainment and protection footprint.

7-132. The division protection cell publishes a protection template that integrates all protection tasks in an appropriate way for use by the division’s brigades and any bases and base cluster operations center envisioned to be established during the division’s deployment. This template is available for subordinates to use as a reference before the division’s deployment. Brigade and base/base cluster situational modifications to this template, and their regular rehearsal of all parts of their protection plans are inspected periodically by the division protection working group. That protection working group identifies weak areas in subordinate protection plans, ensures that area of operations protection best practices are incorporated into the plans of all brigades, and provides protection-related observations, insights, and lessons learned to subordinate units, any unit relieving the division, and appropriate portions of the operating and generating forces.

OPERATIONAL AREA SECURITY, PHYSICAL SECURITY, AND ANTITERRORISM

7-133. Commanders at all division echelons have an inherent responsibility for planning, resourcing, training, exercising, and executing area security, physical security, and antiterrorism measures that enhance the security of their commands. In large part, these measures are the same or complementary for these three protection tasks. The commander uses a vulnerability assessment methodology to determine which of these measures should be prioritized. This methodology includes the review of site specific characteristics, mission, threat analysis, security plans, procedures, threat and disaster response capabilities, and any command concerns. Likewise, every Soldier, Department of Defense employee, contractor, and local national employed by the division maintains vigilance for possible enemy, criminal, and terrorist actions. Division activities associated with these tasks in stability-focused operations closely resemble division activities for these three tasks during the conduct of offensive- and defensive-focused operations except that it is important that division personnel work closely with the civilian inhabitants of the area of operations.

Sites, Accommodations, and Defensive Positions

7-134. Precautions should be taken to protect positions, headquarters, support facilities, and accommodations including the construction of obstacles and shelters. Units practice alert procedures and develop drills to rapidly occupy positions. A robust engineer force supports survivability needs. Units maintain proper camouflage and concealment based on the mission variables of METT-TC. Additional information on these precautions is provided in ATP 3-37.34.

Roadblocks

7-135. The division directs subordinate forces to establish and maintain roadblocks. A division employs roadblocks not only to restrict traffic for security purposes, but also to control the movement of critical cargo. That cargo could be generators designed to restore electric power in a large area or items that support the division’s population and resource control operations.

Personnel Vulnerabilities

7-136. Forces are vulnerable to personnel security risks from local employees and other personnel subject to bribes, threats, or compromise. The threat from local criminal elements is a constant threat and protection consideration.

Personal Awareness

7-137. The most proactive measure for survivability is individual awareness by Soldiers in all circumstances. Soldiers look for things out of place and patterns preceding aggression. Commanders ensure that their Soldiers remain alert, do not establish a routine, and maintain appearance and bearing. This is even more important for the division’s senior leadership.

Sniper Threats

7-138. In stability-focused operations, the sniper poses a significant threat. Counter-sniper drills should include rehearsed responses, R&S, and cover and concealment. The division’s ROE provides instructions on how to react to sniper fire, including restrictions on weapons to be used depending on the circumstances. For example, the ROE allow units to use weapon systems, such as a sniper rifle team, to eliminate a positively identified sniper even in crowded urban setting because of the reduce possibility for collateral damage.

Security Measures

7-139. Exact security measures employed by each unit within the division depend on the existing mission variables of METT-TC. They may include the full range of active and passive measures such as patrolling, R&S, and the use of reaction forces. Joint doctrine (JP 3-10) and Army doctrine (ATP 3-37.10) discuss security measures associated with bases. Convoys leaving various bases employ security measures also discussed in doctrine. Patrols and individuals operating within the area of operations needs to consider security and personnel recovery measures associated with those activities.

Coordination

7-140. Commanders coordinate their security efforts with local host nation military and civil agencies and humanitarian organizations when possible. Care must be taken during to mitigate insider threats.

Evacuation

7-141. The division and subordinate brigade commanders must have plans to evacuate small U.S. and host nation security forces and other U.S. governmental, host nation government, international organization, and private volunteer organization civilians and contractors from their work locations should conditions warrant; such as when those sites are in danger of being overrun by enemy uniformed forces, irregular threats, or civilian mobs during the conduct of operations. These plans should include appropriate routes for ground, sea, or air evacuation, reinforcement, or relief. All units should rehearse their evacuation plans and develop contingency plans that cover such tasks as the breakout from encirclement or the fighting of a delaying action. Operations security is critical as public knowledge of such plans or witnessing of a rehearsal by the host nation civilian population could erode the confidence of that local population and thus the legitimacy of the division mission.

SAFETY AND FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE

7-142. Commanders at all echelons within the division reduce the chance of mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, conducting a safety program, and seeking advice from local personnel. The division safety program begins with training conducted before deployment and continues throughout the deployment. This training includes factors that affect safety such as the environment, terrain, road conditions, and local driving habits; access or possession of live ammunition; presence of unlocated or uncleared mine fields within the division area of operations; and special equipment, such as tanks, construction equipment, helicopters, and other systems, that present special hazards. If possible, the division surgeon and safety officer coordinate with local authorities concerning environmental and health concerns.

7-143. Most measures taken to avoid fratricide during stability focused operations are the same as those measures taken during the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks. However, commanders consider other factors such as local hires or nongovernmental organizations personnel that may be as much at risk as divisional elements. Fratricide avoidance is an important part of civil-military operations; effective civil-military coordination and sharing information reduces fratricide and collateral damage. Accurate information about the locations and activities of both friendly and hostile forces and an aggressive airspace management plan help commanders avoid fratricide. Liaison officers and digital connectivity between subordinate command posts increase the accuracy and timeliness of the common operational picture shared between them. This increases the likelihood that the two organizations share a common situational awareness. Shared situational awareness is necessary between divisional elements and host nation and international organizations operating in the division’s area of operations and enhances the probability of unity of effort. It reduces the probability of fratricide. The division plan for the CMOC includes establishing that common operational picture consistent with the needs of operations security.

7-144. Likewise host-nation security forces equipped with similar night vision devices as divisional elements help target identification during combined operations under limited visibility. The division plans how it ensures that host nation security forces have the proper night vision and target identification equipment while preventing those same resources from falling into the hands of any hostile elements in the division’s area of operations.

7-145. ROE might prevent Soldiers from using some weapon systems and lessen the risk of fratricide. The collateral effects of friendly weapons in urban and restricted terrain affect fratricide. Soldiers must know the penetration, ricochet, and blast consequences of their own weapons.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

7-146. Operations security is as important during the conduct of stability-focused tasks as it is during the conduct of conventional offensive and defensive tasks. Operations security contributes to the ability of the division to achieve surprise and complete its mission with fewer losses. The division’s human adversaries monitor the division’s normal activities to detect variations in activity patterns that forecast the division’s future operations. They monitor the conversations of division Soldiers both on duty and off duty to gain information and intelligence. They monitor commercial internet activity and phone calls from division recreation facilities. They will look at trash created by division activities. The absence of operations security about division activities contributes to excessive friendly casualties and possible mission failure in stability-focused operations just like it does in combat operations. The division’s information superiority hinges in no small part on effective operations security; therefore, measures to protect essential elements of friendly information cannot be an afterthought. However, the need to maintain transparency of the division's intentions in operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks is a factor when balancing operations security with information engagement.

7-147. Release authority for information must be fully understood by the division information operations special staff officer and the public affairs officer in the coordination and synchronization processes. Release authority for information rests with the commander. The division public affairs office is normally the section that releases the information to the media according to the commander’s guidance and higher echelon public affairs guidance. Before the public affairs office releases information, there are other requirements which must be met first. There is a regulatory requirement for an operations security review before information is released to the media or via other sources to ensure it does not contain sensitive unclassified information or other critical information which could be of value to potential adversaries. The G-2 and division operations security officer are members of the information operations working group.

7-148. Multinational staffs result in additional security problems. Each nation has different access to U.S. information systems. Maintaining operations security on a multinational staff is difficult and sometimes the security rules restrict the ability of multinational partner staff officers to contribute. The chief of staff and foreign disclosure officer develop workarounds. One is providing each senior multinational staff officer a U.S. assistant that gets on U.S. secure information systems and ensures their senior multinational staff officer has the information needed to perform duties. The division G-6 runs and maintains two separate sets of different information systems when this occurs.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PROTECTION

7-149. This task includes providing intelligence that supports measures the command takes to remain viable and functional in this environment by protecting itself from the effects of enemy, adversary, and criminal activities. It also involves providing intelligence products that supports recovery from enemy, adversary, and criminal actions. The execution of human intelligence, counter intelligence, and document exploitation is a large part of this task because in operations focused on the conduct of stability-tasks, there is not normally a conventional enemy force. The inside threat may be a much of danger to the division’s operations and U.S. Soldiers as anything else. The danger may range from lethal attacks directed against partnered U.S. Soldiers to the release of damaging information about the conduct of the division’s operations. Proper vetting of all host nation and multinational personnel working with the division’s Soldiers is important.

CONDUCT LAW AND ORDER

7-150. Division planning for stability tasks addresses underpinnings for the rule of law within the division’s area of operations. Division planners consider policing and penal activities and the role of military police units performing area security protection missions and law and order activities to restore order and fair treatment of civilians. The use of force is more graduated with an emphasis on nonlethal, peaceful actions by Soldiers working among noncombatants. When conducting stability tasks, the division considers those requirements that support the primary stability tasks of higher echelon plans. Military police enable and lead the restoration of essential police and penal services. Division planners consider the present host nation capabilities and capabilities required to establish or restore services for the provision of law and order. Military police assessment of the area of operations and planning efforts account for the different aspects of political and cultural considerations that are present or must be reestablished during the division’s conduct of stability tasks. When analyzing troops available, the provost marshal and division staff planners consider host nation, third-party nongovernmental organizations, or other multinational forces involved with police, security, investigative, or corrections capabilities. Interaction with these other parties requires military police to address interoperability, common standards, and mutual agreements. Military police planners address issues when stability tasks are conducted with offensive or defensive tasks. Civil affairs, MISO, medical, and engineer forces work closely with military police units through host nation agencies and other civilian organizations to enhance the host nation government’s legitimacy.

SURVIVABILITY

7-151. Division survivability measures in stability-focused operations closely resemble its survivability measures during offensive- and defensive-focused operations. All divisional units plan for the following—

Constructing hardened command posts.

Constructing protective structures, such as bunkers, trenches, hardening sleeping quarters, hardened mess halls, earth revetments, and Texas barriers.

Constructing fighting positions, including wire obstacles, anti-access ditches, fortified entry control points, and clearing fields of observation and fire.

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

7-152. The nature of stability-focused operations requires the division surgeon section to stress planning for the provision of preventive medicine, veterinary services, and combat and operational stress control over that inherent when conducting combat operations. This is because division troops focusing on the conduct of stability tasks interact with the civilian population of its area of operations to a far greater degree. The probability that Soldiers will be exposed to zoonotic diseases, toxic industrial chemicals and other pollutants, and bad food and water increases. The prolonged tours of duty typically associated with these operations and the enemy’s use of unconventional weapons, such as mines and suicide bombers, tends to increase psychiatric casualties. The division surgeon coordinates the employment of combat stress teams with the chaplain to best meet the needs of division Soldiers for stress control.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

7-153. The division employs three principles to survive in this environment and sustain its operations: avoidance of CBRN hazards, particularly contamination; protection of individuals and units from unavoidable CBRN hazards; and decontamination. An effective CBRN defense by the division counters enemy threats and attacks and the presence of toxic industrial materials in its area of operations by minimizing vulnerabilities, protecting friendly forces, and maintaining an operational tempo that complicates enemy or terrorist targeting. The Army and its multinational partners deter the use of CBRN weapons by denying or countering any military or psychological advantages that an enemy may accrue from using CBRN weapons.

7-154. Commanders consider the requirement for CBRN support if evidence exists that enemy forces or terrorists have employed CBRN agents or have the potential for doing so. A mix of different CBRN units—such as decontamination, reconnaissance, and obscuration—are necessary to balance capabilities. CBRN staff officers at the division, brigade, and battalion echelons participate in the intelligence process to advise the commander of commercial and toxic industrial materials in the local area. (See FM 3-11 for additional information on this subject.)

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

7-155. The protection cell coordinates through the explosive ordnance disposal staff officer or noncommissioned officer with the explosive ordnance disposal battalion providing direct support to the division for explosive ordnance disposal support to the division in stability-focused operations just as it does during combat-focused operations. It also coordinates with any groups conducting humanitarian demining operations so that their operations are incorporated into the division’s common operating picture. Depending on the mission variables of METT-TC, the protection cell’s planning addresses the identification, marking, removal, and detonation of mines, booby traps, and unexploded friendly and enemy ordnance from areas, buildings, and other facilities projected to be occupied or used by divisional forces during the conduct of prolonged stability-focused operations. This includes divisional supply routes and higher echelon lines of communications that run through the division’s area of operations. They work with the division cyber electromagnetic activities element to plan how the division counters command detonated mines. They work with the division transportation office to designate alternative supply routes to mitigate the effects of any unconventional attacks on division sustainment operations. It plans for the demilitarization of captured ordnance stocks within the division’s area of operations or the reutilization of those captured ordnance stocks by reconstituted host nation security forces.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

7-156. The noncontiguous nature of operations focused on conducting stability tasks means that small elements move around the division area of operations out of the line-of-sight of each other. That fact and the presence of a sovereign host nation complicate the planning, preparation, and execution of personnel recovery during stability-focused operations. Likewise, the widespread presence within the division area of operations of other U.S. governmental agencies, international organizations, and private volunteer organization not under division control, any of whose members are isolated, detained, or captured by different groups and whose recovery by division unit may be directed really complicates planning. This is true since those groups and individuals do not normally participate in the personnel recovery planning process by making their requirements known.

DETAINEE OPERATIONS

7-157. Detainee is a term used to refer to any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force (JP 1-02). Most detainees are civilians, and a very few qualify as enemy prisoners of war. Detainee capture predictions and dislocated civilian estimates are critical to planning and must be monitored and updated frequently. While local government officials will detain certain individuals because of suspected criminal activity or for security purposes, there will be times, when divisional forces capture and detain individuals who pose a threat to division and host nation personnel and interests. Long-term operations, focused on the conduct of stability tasks, especially within a counterinsurgency produce many detainees that stress logistical assets and impact operations. The act of capturing a detainee is the first step in a lengthy and highly sensitive process.

7-158. Detaining personnel carries the responsibility to guard, protect, and account for them. All persons captured, detained, interned, or otherwise held in divisional custody are given humane care and treatment from the moment they fall into the division’s hands until final release or repatriation. The inhumane treatment of detainees is prohibited and not justified by the stress of combat or by deep provocation. Inhumane treatment is a serious and punishable violation under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and international law.

7-159. Detainee operations are resource intensive and highly sensitive. Holding detainees longer than a few hours requires detailed planning to address the extensive requirements of the Geneva Conventions for proper administration, treatment, protection, security, and transfer of custody of detainees. If the division commander anticipates holding detainees at the division or brigade level—as opposed to expeditiously evacuating them to a theater detention facility—the division will need to:

Include military police detention units in division and brigade task organization. Military police detention units are specifically trained and resourced to conduct detainee operations.

Ensure a clear delineation of the interdependent and independent roles of those Soldiers responsible for custody of the detainees and those responsible for any interrogation mission.

Request those additional resources necessary to provide the expected number of detainees the logistic and medical support required by regulation and law.

7-160. JP 3-63, FM 3-63, and international law address policy, procedures, and responsibilities for the administration, treatment, protection, security, and transfer of custody of detainees. The two Geneva Conventions most likely to be employed in detainee operations are the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoner of War, 12 August 1949, and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War, 12 August 1949. These publications provide other planning factors and the regulatory and legal requirements concerning detainees. See The Library of Congress Web site for more information on the Geneva Conventions.

7-161. The event that caused the division to be given the mission of conducting humanitarian operations can produce overwhelming numbers of displaced civilians. Based on U.S. and host nation national policy directives and other political efforts, the combat or joint force commander will provides directives on the care, control, and disposition of displaced civilians. The division resettlement operations plan—

Includes migration and evacuation procedures.

Establishes minimum standards of care.

Defines the status and disposition of displaced civilians.

Designates routes and movement control measures.

Identifies cultural and dietary considerations.

Includes information on displaced civilian plans, routes, and areas of concentration that all concerned staff elements will need.

Provides measures to relieve suffering.

Establishes proper order and discipline measures within the resettlement facilities for the mutual security and safety of displaced civilians and Soldiers.

Provides an aggressive information engagement using all available information engagement capabilities support agencies and displace civilian leadership.

FM 3-39 addresses the conduct of resettlement operations by military police organizations.

SECTION IV – PREPARING TO CONDUCT STABILITY TASKS

7-162. During the preparation stage, civil and military forces plan, train, organize, and equip for operations. Civilian and division planners continue to synchronize their efforts. In stability-focused operations, close combat dominance remains the principal means that the Army uses to influence enemy and adversary actions. The combat tasks, tactics, techniques, and procedures used to conduct offensive and defensive tasks are the same as those employed during the conduct of stability tasks. However, the conditions and standards of performance of the warfighting functions are modified by the mission variables of METT-TC considerations and the more restrictive ROE required in stability-focused operations.

7-163. The division’s ability to extensively prepare the headquarters and attached subordinate brigades to conduct stability-focused operations is limited if the division is conducting or was previously focused on combat operations. Under these circumstances, the commander must rely on established doctrine and previously conducted stability-related mission essential task list (METL) training.

7-164. If ARFORGEN provides the division headquarters and its brigades advanced notice of a mission focused on conducting stability tasks, a greater degree of preparations for the mission takes place. The division commander, assisted by the staff and with guidance from appropriate higher echelon Army and/or joint commanders, develops a list of the tasks required to accomplish the mission based on a thorough mission analysis. (This list includes training on the cultures found in the division’s new area of operations.) This resulting consolidated task list forms a new preparation foundation along with training events directed by higher headquarters and provides a focus for division training and leader education. The division’s commanders and Soldiers have a learning curve when performing tasks they have not previously trained. But through training and understanding of standards and procedures, unit and individual performance improves. When developing that consolidated task list, the commander, assisted by the division staff, captures a broad range of stability tasks required for the mission. The tasks on which the division headquarters and its subordinate and supporting units expand beyond the minimal essential stability tasks including the primary stability tasks of support to governance and support to economic and infrastructure development. But in either case the commander takes advantage of the initiative, versatility, and education of the division’s Soldiers. (See ADP/ADRP 7-0 for more information on METLs, Combined Arms Training Strategies, and the management of training.)

7-165. Stability tasks increase the demands of staffs to perform tasks or functions outside their traditional scope of duties. The commander’s realignment of the division staff organization and functions reflects carefully weighing and accepting risks in many areas to reflect the demands of the mission.

MISSION COMMAND

7-166. Stability-focused operations tend to be complex and involve unified action partner forces and agencies. The division will often find itself to be a supporting organization rather than a supported force. A division commander cannot expect to achieve unity of command of all the groups involved in the operation or operating within the division’s area of operations but should strive towards unity of effort. The commander spends a great deal of effort during the preparatory period clarifying the roles and functions of the various often completing agencies. The commander modifies standard command and support relationships to meet the requirement of the situation.

7-167. The division’s preparatory training stresses what authoritative relationships are established between the division and the other military service components that operate in the division’s projected area of operations. This allows commanders, staffs, and leaders at all echelons to understand how joint and Army doctrinal command relationships apply or don’t apply to the division’s organizational structure once it deploys. Expectation management during major command post and mission rehearsal exercises are helpful to prepare for successful air-ground, ground-special operations forces (SOF), and division-other government agency integration.

7-168. Brigade and battalion commanders will often have to integrate host nation security forces and interagency activities with U.S. combat arms companies and platoons and down to the individual Soldier level for support units. This requires the division to obtain additional communications support means to support its operations. Obtaining the necessary numbers of scalable communications packages to support the division’s planned operations and training commanders and Soldiers to take advantage of the capabilities of these communications packages are important preparatory activities. Commanders must train with this reality in mind. Army commanders have the inherent responsibilities—including the requirements to clarify the mission; to determine the controlling legal and policy authorities; and to tasks, organize, direct, sustain, and care for the organizations and individuals for whom they provide the effort in these interagency and multinational operations.

DEVELOP TEAMS

7-169. As part of the division’s coordination efforts, the commander may form special negotiation teams that move wherever they are needed to diffuse or negotiate confrontations in the division area of operation. Each of these teams has linguist support and personnel with the authority to negotiate on behalf of the division’s chain of command. These teams help attached brigades and facilitate negotiations between groups. The individual personalities and skill sets of these team members are more important than which unit or branch they come from. Combat elements of attached BCTs are required to support their operations. The division commander ensures that these teams have access to required transportation and communications assets.

Operations Process

7-170. Within the operations process, preparations for stability-focused operations address the same areas as combat operations: establishing coordination and liaison, revising the plan, developing a common understanding of the plan, task organizations for operations, conducting pre-combat checks and inspections, and integrating new units and Soldiers into the force. (The last area was addressed in chapters 1 and 2.)

Establishing Coordination and Liaison

7-171. As previously mentioned, the division and its subordinate brigades do not have the number of liaison teams on their respective tables of organization and equipment available that are necessary to accomplish needed liaison and coordination in most stability-focused operations. Commanders use the preparatory phase to examine the total scope of their liaison requirements and develop situationally appropriate solutions. This often involves re-tasking existing assets. In every case, these solutions account for the personal relationship and other factors described in ADRP 6-0 that exist between the commander and the liaison officer. An example of a workaround is an ABCT combined arms battalion commander coordinating with the ABCT’s artillery battalion commander to use one or two company fire support teams to support the combined arms battalion as liaison teams. The BCT or division commander could also direct this re-tasking to have those assets available to fill their respective liaison requirements. The remaining two or three fire support teams remain available to coordinate fires to support any of the combined arms battalion’s four maneuver companies that might need them. In this situation the commander assumes the risk that all four companies will not need simultaneous fire support. Another workaround involves a commander using a liaison team to coordinate with two different but geographically closely located organizations.

7-172. The division can expect to receive liaison teams from many diverse groups once deployed. During preparations for that deployment the division staff considers how to handle several challenges. These challenges include—

Managing the control and release of information that has strategic or political sensitivities. The development of options for the commander before the anticipated need is a prudent planning staff action, but it may send an unintended and misleading signal to multinational partners.

Accounting for capability and caveat differences between like units from different countries.

Allotting liaison officers several days to develop answers to requests for information from parent organizations.

Overcoming language and cultural barriers.

If, during its preparations, the division can obtain qualified regional foreign area officers as augmentation, these individuals can act as advocate and integrators for multinational partners within the division headquarters. This method requires that all assisting U.S. personnel understand proper classification systems to facilitate access to appropriate levels of information. It requires the division to resource additional mission command systems and operators to support these multinational partners. The payoff for the division is, of course, better multinational integration in division operations.

7-173. One of the possible answers to these challenges is for the division to provide multiple liaison teams to maintain digital communications links with host nation and multinational partners. It may even be necessary to provide liaison teams to other U.S. governmental agencies that have significant presence within the division’s area of operations. This may create a serious resource gap if large numbers of these teams are required to accommodate higher headquarters policies prohibiting direct linkages between multinational military and civilian forces and agencies and the division’s mission command systems. The requirements to provide liaison packages should be properly identified during the division’s pre-deployment visit. The division uses available preparatory time to identify methods for resourcing these identified requirements—including requesting additional assets from outside the division, such as a digital liaison detachment. The G-6 should identify common transport communications systems and standardized policies for dealing with direct information system links.

Revising the Plan

7-174. Division plans are not static. The commander constantly adjusts the plan, branches, and sequels based on new information. During the preparatory period, the situation within the division’s area of operations changes. Assumptions made during planning are proven true or false. The division conducts the four information collection tasks—reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations—to confirm or deny enemy, friendly, and neutral actions and dispositions. The status of friendly units also changes. As these and other aspects of the situation change, the division commander determines whether the new information requires changing the plan (reframe) or preparing a new one. When deciding whether to change the plan, the commander has to balance the loss of synchronization caused by a change against the problems produced by executing a plan that no longer fits reality. Any refinement to the plan must fit within the higher commander’s intent. Any refinement that will cause a major change in preparation activities must be identified early enough to allow divisional elements to react. Examples of such refinements include drawing additional equipment or resources and training on newly required tasks.

Developing a Common Understanding of the Plan

7-175. A successful transition from planning to execution requires those charged with executing the order to fully understand the plan. A successful transition ensures that the brigades executing the order understand the division concept of operations, commander’s intent, and details necessary to synchronize the action of the division headquarters and its attached brigades as a whole. The transition between planning and execution takes place both internally within the division headquarters—between the plans and the current operations integrating cells—and externally—between the division commander and subordinate brigade commanders. Subordinate confirmation briefings and backbriefs and the plans-to-operations handover facilitate this transition. Rehearsals also contribute to developing a common understanding of the plan. See FM 6-0 for additional information on developing a common understanding of the plan.

Task Organization

7-176. During planning, the division was tailored to provide it the assets needed for its expected missions and area of operation. During the preparatory phase the division conducts task organization to allocate available assets to subordinate commanders while simultaneously establishing command and support relationships. The tables of organization and equipment for all three types of BCTs s are focused on the conduct of combat operations. The division commander task-organizes the attached brigades and any separate battalions that are attached or under the division’s OPCON to obtain the right mix of forces, capabilities, and expertise to accomplish a mission by establishing the appropriate command and support relationships. The receiving brigade integrates units that are attached, placed under its operational or TACON, or placed in direct support. The division commander addresses the sustainment of these task-organized brigades. This requires working with the theater sustainment command and the sustainment brigade or brigades supporting the division to ensure that the organization of each combat sustainment support battalion reflects the task organization of the brigade or brigades it is supporting. The earlier in the process task organization occurs, the more time will be available to establish necessary personal relationships between all the members of these new teams and the better integrated and more familiar with each other’s capabilities and limitations each team element will be.

7-177. In task organizing the capabilities of the division and its attached brigades, commanders must weigh the suitability of using emerging technology based on the nature of the stability-focused operation, maintenance requirements, local sensitivities, and other factors. Emerging technology, even in small numbers, can make a big difference in the effectiveness of division operations. For example, electronic translation devices increase the effectiveness of small-unit patrols and checkpoints that would not normally be resourced with interpreters. Man-packed sensors carried by Soldiers during the conduct of patrols can determine if encountered civilians have recently fired weapons and then record their biometric data for positive identification. Commanders decide on the use of emerging technology consistent with mission accomplishment.

Pre-combat Checks and Inspections

7-178. Preparation for the division’s two command posts includes completing pre-combat checks and inspections. This specifically means that the division headquarters successfully completes staff training culminating in an externally directed mission rehearsal exercise. Together, these checks ensure that the division’s headquarters, its brigades with their Soldiers and combat and tactical systems are as fully capable and ready to execute as time and resources permit. The inspections ensure that the force has the equipment and resources necessary to accomplish the mission. Also during pre-combat checks and inspections, leaders check Soldiers’ ability to perform crew drills that may not be directly related to the mission, such as those that respond to a vehicle rollover or on-board fire.

COMMAND POST OPERATIONS

7-179. The ability of the division staff to integrate actions across multiple lines of operations is a key element of success in stability-focused operations. This integration occurs partly by explicitly organizing planning boards, cells, and organizations so that each consisted of full-time members from lethal and nonlethal activities. The division staff needs an ability to anticipate and exploit or mitigate the second and third order effects of military actions on interagency and multinational developmental activities. The division’s ability to answer requests for information and obtain reachback support is an important part of this integration effort.

7-180. Part of division command post operations is establishing the division’s battle rhythm during its deployment. The division commander is in charge and establishes the battle rhythm for the headquarters and it is not set by default. Developing and maintaining a functional daily and weekly battle rhythm is difficult, however planning horizons, staff focus, and priorities facilitates the intent of the commander not just the staff process. The division’s battle rhythm meets the needs of its higher Army and joint force commanders, political leaders, and multinational partners. For example, the division commander and staff should complete any update analysis briefings before the time political leaders within the Washington, District of Columbia beltway come to work so the commander and staff can answer their questions quickly without major disruptions to ongoing staff operations. Shift changes within the battle rhythm should be staggered to prevent all the institutional knowledge of ongoing events from leaving at the same time. The division’s battle rhythm and supporting sleep plans should be included in division standard operating procedures.

7-181. The division chief of staff creates special areas on the current operations integrating cell floor for embedding host nation and multinational military liaison officers. These liaison officers may not have access to division secure internet protocol router (SIPR) systems but to a separate classified system, and have restricted viewing of computer displays depicting information not releasable to foreign audiences. Embedding these liaison officers on the current operations integrating cell floor will enable the chief of operations to rapidly query and develop situational awareness of events occurring in the non-U.S. area of operations, and the ability to better integrate with these host nation and multinational forces.

KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

7-182. Division staff officers and information system operators need training on the systems, such as command post of the future and SIPR portal training, that they will use in-theater before the division’s mission rehearsal exercise and their deployment. Most likely the division headquarters will not have all of its required Soldiers before the mission rehearsal exercise. Soldiers who arrive after that exercise may not receive the training on these systems. This systemic problem requires each staff cell to establish a routine process to train new arrivals on automated user tools. Contractors can provide this training. Using these systems to coordinate the division’s daily operations at home station is a proven technique for maintaining user skills.

7-183. When subordinate units conduct a relief in place, the G-6 and information management elements works with the G-3 and appropriate property book officers provide guidance and publish orders to match communications systems between the relieving unit and the unit they are relieving if this was not previously done during the planning phase. This is often made more difficult because of a proliferation of commercial-off-the-shelf communications systems that are not programs of record common in many prolonged stability-focused operations. Otherwise the G-6 will have to make a significant effort to swap out systems and re-outfit vehicle platforms once the division’s brigades and battalion deploy. The reduction in the division’s operational tempo while this swap out occurs and operators are trained creates a one or two week window of vulnerability that armed opponents could exploit. The division staff looks at these commercial systems during their predeployment visit to see what accommodations need to be made to ensure they continue to work given the climatic conditions prevailing in the division’s projected area of operations. These accommodations might include the provision of environmental shelters with air conditioning and dehumidifiers in hot and humid regions with their associated demands on the division’s fuel and power generation capabilities. The G-6 works with the theater spectrum manager to deconflict use of the electro-magnetic spectrum by all of the electronic systems and sensors used by the division.

7-184. The management of detainee information is critical to their identification and disposition. The division uses available preparatory time to refine procedures, positive control, and the exchange of information between those military police units in the projected area of operations conducting detainee operations and the division’s brigades. Information gained through interrogation provides valuable input to understanding the operational environment. Social network analysis coupled with areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, peoples, and events (ASCOPE) information works to place detainees within a accurate context with the current operational environment. Thorough statements from detainees at their point of capture are important to this process. Brigades historically have a 24-hour hold at these points of capture. This limited time highlights the need for the division to establish automated information exchange of detainee information, such as detainee identification, biometrics, and watch lists, down to the company level. Training Soldiers on the use of evidence tags assists in the management of detainee information. Tracking unit pick-up, drop off, and final disposition by unit will be an important part of social network analysis.

INFORMATION RELATED CAPABILITIES

7-185. Collective training events must prepare commanders and staffs at all division echelons to anticipate and manage Soldier and leader engagement requirements within the human social terrain framework of the division’s projected area of operations. The trust and confidence that this civilian population impacted hold in the division’s leadership and Soldiers are important to the division’s success. Preparations should try to capture soft skill (face-to-face) interaction. The ARFORGEN training schedule should support the development of this skill set at multiple division echelons when preparing for stability-focused operations. The division’s mission rehearsal exercise should be country focused and stress realism in its depiction of social interactions and negotiations.

7-186. Care should be taken to ensure that deploying public affairs staff participates fully in the division’s collective training events so they properly prepare for those activities they will conduct once deployed. These activities include producing a division publication, preparing local American Forces Network broadcast segments, and capturing video vignettes of the division’s field actions, such as destroying arms and munitions; providing food, water, shelter, and medical care; and providing micro economic development grants. They should not be so involved with visitor bureau events that they neglect their public affairs responsibilities.

CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES

7-187. During operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks, the focus of division cyber electromagnetic activities shifts to gaining situation awareness while protecting Soldiers and mission command systems. The division can use joint cyber assets to exploit enemy, and if authorized, adversary information adversary systems. These capabilities are synchronized by the division cyber electromagnetic staff element with other elements of combined arms using the operations process. To this end, division efforts in this area leverage the cyber, electronic warfare, and spectrum management systems available to the division in its area of operations. The division cyber electromagnetic staff element integrates the capabilities of these systems through the operations process to achieve mission objectives and counter enemy and adversary actions given existing or projected ROE.

7-188. The employment of the division’s electronic warfare systems, such as counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device electronic warfare devices, for protection directly affect other division operations which require coordination and guidance down to the lowest echelons operating in the area of operations and normal communication between units. The division headquarters ensures that its deploying brigades and battalion identify and train personnel within their organization to serve as electronic warfare operators. The division headquarters and many subordinate units have Soldiers holding the electronic warfare military occupational specialty or functional area (29E for noncommissioned officers, 290A for warrant officers, and 29A for officers) on their tables of organization and equipment. Soldiers at the company level may hold the additional skill identifier of 1K for completion of the Counter Radio-controlled improvised explosive device Electronic Warfare device Master Gunner Course, or 1J for the Army Operational Electronic Warfare Operations Course. The most important attributes for an electronic warfare operator serving on a division, brigade, or battalion staff are: an understanding of the military decisionmaking process for planning, an understanding of tactical operations, an understanding of how to obtain electronic warfare capabilities external to the unit, and how to manage equipment operational cycles so that it is available when needed.

MILITARY DECEPTION

7-189. Division preparations focus on implementing military deception plans developed during planning. The staff takes advantage of ongoing knowledge management, information management, information collection, and other efforts to determine if the desired military deception story is being received by the targeted audiences and acted on by those audiences in the desired way. The division’s military deception plans are modified as necessary during preparations to account for detected changes in the operational environment that impact their story lines.

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

7-190. Civil affairs personnel use available preparatory time to complete or update areas studies of the division’s projected area of operations. These area studies help commanders and staffs understand and visualize the civil component of the area of operations. These studies provide detailed analysis based on careful consideration of operational and mission variables. These studies can help explain—

The root causes of instability and civil strife in the area of operations.

The requirement for CMOCs to facilitate communications and coordination with civilian agencies and organizations operating in the area of operations.

The need to use liaison teams to enhance communications and coordination with civilian agencies and organizations to facilitate operations at all echelons.

What, when, where, and why civilians might be encountered in the area of operations; what ongoing or planned military operations might impact the activities of those civilians; what activities those civilians are engaged in that might affect military operations; and what actions the military force must take to mitigate the effects of those civilians.

Measures of performance and measures of effectiveness for civil affairs operations to support the division’s larger military operation.

AIRSPACE CONTROL

7-191. Division airspace control preparations for stability-focused tasks center on refining the airspace control plan previously developed and establishing automated links with as many Army, joint, interagency, multinational, and civilian airspace users as possible before the division’s deployment. The division airspace control element also uses any preparatory time to begin establishing automated sensor links with various radars covering the division’s projected area of operations as is possible. (It may not be possible to establish these automated sensor links before completion of the deployment process.) The probable presence of civil aviation assets in stability-focused operations complicates the ability of the division to provide a high fidelity aviation common operational picture to other divisional staff cells and subordinate units while simultaneously deconflicting the use of that airspace.

7-192. The division plans cell and airspace control element concentrates on practical drills during pre-deployment training and focus on a variety of targets, assets, and weaponry. Mission rehearsal and command post exercises should present multiple target types—urban, rural, underground, and exposed—with multiple types of assets available to service the targets. These types should include Multiple Launched Rocket System, attack aviation, fixed wing, Tomahawk land attack missiles, and cannon artillery. Combined air operations center planners, knowledgeable in the decisionmaking criteria that go into weapon selection, collateral damage estimate considerations, target location errors, and platform selection help this training.

INFORMATION PROTECTION

7-193. Information protection plans previously developed begin their implementation during this period. These plans are revised as conditions warrant. Personnel deployment dates and sensitive equipment movement dates may be essential elements of friendly information requiring protection if there are groups objecting to the division’s deployment.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

7-194. Division movement and maneuver preparations in stability focused operations are largely the same as those discussed in the offensive and defensive chapters of this manual. The division headquarters will be responsible for preparing, directing, and de-conflicting the maneuver of multiple brigades involved in conducting the five primary stability tasks. The operational environment and the ROE will guide the division’s maneuver preparations. However stability-focused maneuver operations normally involve preparing for the division’s deployment into and out of its area of operations and the conduct of relief in place operations (see chapter 4 for more information on deployment).

DEPLOY

7-195. One major difference between deploying for a stability-focused mission and deploying for a combat-focused mission is the ability to conduct a pre-deployment survey when preparing to conduct primarily stability tasks. Before deploying its advance party, the division takes the opportunity to send a pre-deployment site survey team to the division’s projected area of operations. This team is resourced to effectively perform coordination and reconnaissance to provide information to the division plans and other integrating and functional cells, coordinating and personal staff sections. At a minimum, the team includes appropriate personnel from each integrating and functional cell and the G-6 and G-9 staff sections. Situationally dependent, the commander may also consider sending personal staff officers in the following disciplines: medical, public affairs, legal, and unit ministry personnel. This team should include personnel from other governmental agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, and may include multinational personnel. The commander consults with international and private volunteer organizations with detailed knowledge of the area. (See FM 3-35 and JP 3-35 for more information on deployment and redeployment preparatory activities.)

7-196. During their pre-deployment, site survey members of the division fires cell visit the joint and/or multinational air operations center and the battlefield coordination detachment that will support Army operations. Such a visit provides an understanding about how airspace over the division’s projected area of operations is managed and controlled. The division’s air support operations center (ASOC) facilitates the visit and discusses with the airspace control authority (ACA) the setting of coordinating altitudes and the dimensions of the division’s allocated airspace.

MANEUVER

7-197. The division’s maneuver preparations focus on the tasks its subordinate brigades are expected to perform with deployed into their respective area of operations. These stability-focused tasks typically include: convoys moving through multiple battalion and brigade area of operations, local security tasks, cordon and search, reconnaissance patrols, checkpoints, establishment of austere forward bases and combat outposts, and advising host nation security forces. Brigades preparing to conduct stability tasks over a prolonged period should also have training objectives that include—

Military occupational skill proficiency for those skills appropriate to the stability mission.

Proficiency in stability-focused peculiar tasks, such as establishing and conducting traffic control points and population and resource control operations.

Understanding the role of the brigade in the overall missions.

Awareness of their designated area of operations including culture, religion, terrain, weather, and factions.

Language training and maintenance of language skill proficiency levels.

The Combined Arms Training Strategies associated with each type of the division’s brigades provide training standards for these tasks.

OCCUPY AN AREA

7-198. The considerations for occupying an area discussed in FM 3-90-1 apply to occupying areas in stability-focused operations and division preparatory training for its stability-focused mission reflect those considerations. The division and brigade staffs will use the preparatory phase to refine the locations that they need to occupy to best accomplish the division’s mission. Population and resource control measures appropriate to the stability mission should be considered in the determining locations for occupation. Procedures by which division units gain access to desired locations, required construction standards, and appropriate compensation methods and amounts also should be refined during this phase.

7-199. Transfer of authority (TOA) for an area of operations between units conduct primarily offensive and defensive tasks usually occurs because of a passage of lines or the conduct of a relief in place. The same thing happens in stability-focused operations. The extended time period associated with stability-focused operations means that the division will normally need to accept and transfer authority for its area of operations from and to other U.S. or multinational military forces or civilian agencies. Preparations in stability-focused operations for these actions are similar to the relief in place preparations in the combat operations except for the extensive use of “right-seat rides” down to the platoon and squad level. (See FM 3-90-2 for more information.) It is important that as part of these right-seat rides, in as much as is possible, that the human relationships developed by the original units be transferred to the relieving units. The division coordinates and manages the preparations for the relief in place of its brigades and TOA for the area of operations. The intent of the division’s preparations for this process is to present a seamless transfer of responsibility, both in efficiency and effectiveness and to prevent anything from occurring by accidental commission or omission that a human opponent may exploit.

MOBILITY AND COUNTERMOBILITY

7-200. The execution of most primary stability tasks requires divisional forces and those civilian agencies supported by the division to have freedom of movement within the division area of operations. Engineers within the division’s combined arms team participates as part of combined arms force and perform mobility tasks to provide that freedom of movement. These mobility tasks involve the construction and maintenance of combat trails, roads, airfields, landing zones, ports, pipelines, and other associated missions, such as land mine detection and removal and the breaching of natural and man-made obstacles. (However, removal of mines by engineers during stability-focused operations is based on tactical necessity.) Division preparations for mobility operations focus on determining specifics of the nature and scope of mobility operations that the division performs in its projected deployment and training to standard for these projected missions.

7-201. The divisional engineer staff uses available preparation time to refine planning figures on the nature and scope of countermobility operations facing the division once it is deployed into its projected area of operations. These countermobility tasks typically involve constructing barriers and other obstacles that impede vehicular and pedestrian traffic as part of border control and population and resource control measures. The division’s countermobility operations in stability-focused operations might also closely resemble traditional combat-focused countermobility operations if the division is engaged in an irregular warfare environment.

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

7-202. R&S preparations for division stability-focused operations are similar to R&S preparations for offensive and defensive focused operations. The division staff takes advantage of any preparatory time to conduct as much R&S synchronization and integration as they can. They exploit any actual surveillance and reconnaissance of the division’s projected area of operations conducted by other military units and government agencies. What is different is that the commander’s critical and other information requirements drive the staff’s information collection synchronization and integration efforts are designed to answer largely different questions. The ability of an area to feed itself and export any surplus food stocks may be more important than the location of a reserve brigade tactical group. Likewise knowledge of familial relationships and influence may be more important than knowing who occupies the formal governmental leadership positions. The net results of the division’s preparatory R&S efforts provide commanders and staffs at all divisional echelons situational understanding of their projected areas of operations or knowledge of what they must do to resolve uncertainty and ambiguity in as much as they can be resolved.

INTELLIGENCE

7-203. Intelligence preparations involve numerous activities that occur upon receiving the operations order, operations plans, warning order, or commander’s intent before executing the mission. These activities include the following:

Establish the intelligence architecture.

Participate in the military decisionmaking process.

Update intelligence preparation of the battlefield products.

Update four intelligence databases—threat, terrain, weather, and civil considerations—addressing the division’s projected area of operations and the commander’s area of interest.

Produce the intelligence estimate.

Update the running intelligence estimate.

Ensure intelligence personnel are trained.

Review and update intelligence cell standard operating procedures and staff drills.

Review ROE and consider making recommendations to the commander for exceptions to or modifications of the ROE to facilitate human intelligence and counterintelligence collection or information collection asset placement.

Review and update reporting procedures.

Verify communications and information links with supporting and supported intelligence cells.

Conduct rehearsals.

Update and brief the division staff and attached units on the most recent intelligence on the threat or enemy, environment (terrain and weather), and civil considerations, and update the threat or enemy portion of the common operational picture. If the division is going to conduct a relief in place, this also includes a review of all intelligence hand-off considerations.

Planning, managing, and coordinating these activities are continuous and is a coordinated effort involving the G-2, G-3, and other division staff members. An early on-the-ground assessment of the division’s projected area of operations by division personnel is absolutely critical to refine previously developed plans by proving or disproving planning assumption in all warfighting functions.

SUPPORT FORCE GENERATION

7-204. The direction, collection, processing, and dissemination of available information concerning all aspects of the division’s projected area of operations are important for stability-focused operations. The division intelligence cell, in coordination with other U.S. and host country government agencies, starts these actions as early as possible. Intelligence activities devoted establishing a civil consideration data base concerning all ASCOPE aspects of the division’s projected area of operations in preparation for whatever roles the division will be military is required to perform while deployed.

7-205. Stability-related intelligence preparations should focus on the following elements: developing cultural awareness of the intended area of operations, fine tuning stability-related intelligence preparation of the battlefield analytical skills, rehearsing the anticipated battle rhythm, and training on skill sets needed to conduct predictive analysis. Intelligence personnel require more in-depth cultural awareness training than other branches to understand the threat and operational environment to provide the commander with that predictive analysis. Commanders capitalize on opportunities for advanced technical training needed for intelligence Soldiers.

7-206. Military intelligence personnel must train on the actual systems that they will use once deployed into the division area of operations. Many of the systems/software require accounts and passwords and take time to activate. A lack of pre-deployment training on and immediate access to the intelligence systems reduced the overall effectiveness of the division intelligence cell for a short period of time. The division G-2 should make every effort to ensure that the mission rehearsal exercise certifying the division as ready to deploy to its projected area of operations should include a realistic portrayal of the volume of collection assets; the numbers of processes and agencies to coordinate with to task assets; or competition for these assets by outside units and agencies during collection. Rehearsing procedures by which the division collects, analyzes, and disseminates information with all services and agencies present in the area of operations with the corresponding differences in releasability restrictions has a significant payoff. A second improvement is to ensure the simulation or the scripters feed reports into the unit in the correct format, using systems that will be in place once deployed. The G-2 works with information from the area of operations to practice processes and learn about the operational environment the division is deploying into.

7-207. The division requires highly trained intelligence personnel to collect, analyze, and disseminate information using sophisticated intelligence processing tools and communications equipment. These systems include (Distributed Common Ground System-Army, TROJAN and TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (TROJAN SPIRIT), Global Broadcast Service, Imagery Work Station, etc). Off-site training at the National Security Agency, National Ground Intelligence Center, Army Space Program Office, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Defense Intelligence Agency and other agencies provides current training to raise skill levels of the division’s intelligence cell’s Soldiers to support the division’s stability-focused operations, especially since intelligence targets in a stability-focused environment are comprised largely of low signature and unpredictable targets or are items not normally tracked by intelligence analysts, such as smuggling, drug production, and attitudes of the civilian population. The G-2 balances the provision of this advanced intelligence skills to intelligence cell Soldiers with existing constraints, such as temporary duty funds and supporting the division headquarters’ predeployment training exercise schedule.

7-208. Security practices and procedures in a multinational environment require more emphasis during pre-deployment training. This training includes theater-specific security training. The division staff trains how to properly classify information in a multinational environment, and the intricacies of releasing or disclosing information to host nation or third nation personnel. The commander and the G-2 integrate theater and coalition (specific) security procedures during predeployment training on the division’s mission command systems. Foreign disclosure clearance that supports high demand information sharing is a topic where all division intelligence personnel and operations security managers need training. Intelligence center of excellence doctrine has additional preparatory considerations for a division intelligence cell in stability-focused operations.

7-209. The division considers the early deployment of the division analysis and control element from the Intelligence cell once the mission rehearsal exercise concludes if the division is going to conduct a relief in place. Such an early deployment of the analysis and control element provided the leadership and analysts the opportunity to work with their counterparts that already had an in-depth knowledge of intelligence operations in the division’s projected area of operations. The analysis and control element can use this head start to gain a thorough understanding of the operational environment of that area of operations.

INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

7-210. Within the analysis and control element, synchronization managers attend courses, such as the U.S. Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations Course at Goodfellow Air Force Base and the Ground Intelligence Support Activity 2000 Course at Fort Meade to develop and hone their skills. This is important because collection management is not a branch-qualifying job so keeping experienced synchronization managers is difficult. Additionally, synchronization managers should be avail themselves of the opportunity to accompany the division’s pre-deployment site survey to better understand collection management operations in their projected area of operations as well as those systems they have not had the opportunity to train to during home-station training.

FIRES

7-211. Once the division receives its mission, it determines what fires preparations it needs to complete before deployment. Recent experience indicates that a large amount of the FA assets in the division’s attached brigades are re-tasked to perform other tasks. Training for their new missions and the disposition of their organic equipment and drawing of the equipment required for these new missions—along with required maintenance and property accountability actions—occupy a lot of the time available during this phase.

INTEGRATE FIRES

7-212. As the mission variables of METT-TC becomes clearer, the division fires cell coordinates with the fires cells within its attached brigades to refine previous fire support planning. The extended distances, noncontiguous areas of influence, and restricted ROE associated with most stability-focused operations complicates the refinement of fire plans. The division fires cell tries to ensure that no divisional element is outside supporting distance of fires assets and prepares to reposition indirect fire systems as needed to ensure that as much of the division’s units are within supporting range.

7-213. Training continuity and standardization is central for divisional units to sustain a viable air ground operations capability. Integrated training with air and ground units provides the construct to facilitate development of division standard operating procedures and practical application of joint air ground procedures with other services. Training standardization and team member familiarity enhances coordination and execution of air ground assets. Therefore, division preparations for stability-focused operations include providing its Soldiers at low tactical levels with the capability to effectively communicate with aircraft supporting their operations and training them in the procedures they will use to accomplish this task. This includes allowing them to request support and describe the common operating picture to facilitate aircrew integration in their operations.

CONDUCT TARGETING

7-214. The division staff, the fires and intelligence cells in particular, works to determine what constitutes high payoff and high value targets in the division’s projected area of operations during the preparation phase. In stability-focused operations, this requires the staff to fully understand not only the military aspects of the division’s projected area of operations but also the full impact of civil consideration impacting that area of operations. The staff works together to determine what key cultural, business, religion, politics, leaders should be targeted by the division and what means are best employed to achieve the division’s objectives.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

7-215. Historically there has been no air or missile threat during the conduct of stability-focused operations. However, depending on the operational environment in which the division finds itself, this may or may no longer be true. Continued technological developments and the proliferation of remotely controlled UAS make the need to conduct an updated threat assessment of the division’s projected area of operations important. At a minimum the division air defense element examines the division’s need to acquire and employ counter-rocket and mortar and counter UAS assets given the mission variables of METT-TC existing within that area of operations. The air defense element refines how it transmits air warnings to a divisional unit operating in and external to established bases. (See ATP 3-01.60 for more information on counter-rocket and mortar intercept operations. See chapter 9 for more information on division counter UAS activities.)

SUSTAINMENT

7-216. Preparation for sustainment operations includes activities performed by divisional elements to improve their ability to execute operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks. These preparatory activities include, but are not limited to, plan refinement, conduct of rehearsals, inspections, preparing equipment for movement, maintenance of equipment, acquisition of supplies, and turn-in of equipment not needed. Since deployment is a movement and maneuver task, the preparation phase of any stability-focused operation includes the establishment of a sustainment base to support the division’s projected operations. They may involve refining a previously existing sustainment base if the division is going to conduct a relief in place. Throughout the preparatory period, the division staff will try to refine previously developed plans, including confirming or denying planning assumptions and quantifying requirements for nonstandard logistics, and determining the support the division will need to provide to other governmental agencies and third parties.

LOGISTICS

7-217. The division sustainment is involved in the following areas during the preparatory phase: sustainment preparation of the operational environment, negotiations and agreements, operational contract support, Army pre-positioned stocks, and theater opening. All these areas are involved in preparing a sustainment base—including force structure and resources—capable of supporting the division’s projected operations.

7-218. During deployment preparations the Sustainment Automation Support Management Office (SASMO) should make every effort possible to improve the reliability and durability of the division's Logistics Information System (LIS). This requires great effort until all sustainment systems under development are fielded. The SASMO focuses on developing ways to improve connectivity by essentially creating a "methods menu" for users to follow when transferring LIS data between systems. All possible courses of action for transferring data are part of the menu, including computer disk exchange, wireless Combat Service Support Automated Information System Interface, and satellite connectivity. The benefits of such efforts by the SASMO are twofold: accurate and timely sustainment data for the division commander and increased Soldier confidence in the supply system.

Operational Contract Support

7-219. An important capability for the commander is to incorporate contract support with operational reach. The major challenge is ensuring that theater support and external support contracts are incorporated and synchronized with the division’s overall sustainment plan. During the division’s predeployment visits, coordination occurs so that all existing contracts for services and equipment in the division’s area of operations are closed out before the relieved unit’s redeployment or transferred to division contracting officer’s representatives (COR) and supporting contracting officers for continuation. It may take longer than anticipated for many vendors to complete closeout, and commanders and CORs are often tied up with other redeployment tasks. It is important that the division works with the theater sustainment command or expeditionary sustainment command support operations officer and the Army force assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4) to coordinate with the supporting Army field support brigade or contracting support brigade. It is the contracting support brigade that publishes contracting support plans for theater operations or contingency plan and then commands those contracting units deployed to support those plans. Close coordination with the theater sustainment command, Army field support brigade, and contracting support brigade is necessary for maintaining accountability of contractor personnel.

7-220. The division provides contracting officer representative training and certification during the preparatory period down to low tactical levels—company and platoon and headquarters staff sections and branches. This training should reflect the operational environment—high tempo and high risk to low tempo and low risk—found within the area of operations the division is projected to occupy. Each contracting officer representative represents the “last tactical mile” of expeditionary contracting. Historically, contracting officer representative turnover is high, thus the need to ensure that as many Soldiers as possible are trained to preclude gaps in contract coverage. This training must show how each contracting officer representative can best monitor and ensure that contracts are performing and providing the contracted services and supplies to the required quality given the historical shortage of quality assurance surveillance resources. Focus areas include the proper writing of the performance work statement/statement of work, developing independent government cost estimate, quality assurance surveillance plan, and contract administration.

7-221. Theater opening operations encompass the critical initial actions involved in the rapid insertion and expansion of force capabilities into an area of operations. The capability of strategic lift to move divisional personnel, equipment, and materiel to theater ports of debarkation must be matched by the capability to receive and process the deploying divisional units. The division desires a theater opening capability capable of performing the full range of theater-opening tasks under all access conditions. These tasks include the following:

Opening and operating ports of debarkation.

Establishing and operating the initial distribution system.

Conducting and controlling reception, staging, and onward movement activities.

Providing for protection and life support functions for units deploying into the theater of operations.

7-222. Theater opening operations for the division are performed across many threat conditions and vast capability differences in theater reception infrastructure. These operations either augment those of the host nation or create a reception infrastructure that will support any foreseeable expansion of military force requirements.

7-223. U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), through its service component commands, is the single port manager for aerial ports of debarkation and seaports of debarkation. Movement control teams (MCT) at each location process equipment and personnel through their locations. The theater Army conducts the rest of theater opening tasks unless those responsibilities have been delegated to a subordinate Army force headquarters.

General Engineering Support

7-224. During the preparatory phase, the division engineer staff conducts an on-site assessment of the projected ports, routes, and area of operations that the division plans to use during its deployment if such an assessment was not part of the planning phase. These assessments help ensure that an adequate engineer support is available for troop bed down, sanitation, throughput, and protection to the deployed division. This early on-the-ground engineer assessment identifies—

Status of the infrastructure in the area of operations, including airfields, roads, ports, logistics bases, and troop bed-down facilities; real estate acquisition; environmental standards, conditions, and considerations; construction material supply; construction management; and line haul requirements.

Specialized engineer requirements such as prime power, well drilling, and firefighting support.

Requirements for officers with contracting officer representative or Army Corps of Engineers experience.

Potential requirements for LOGCAP, contractor responsibilities, contract-construction procedures, and initial work areas.

Rapid Equipping Initiative/Rapid Fielding Initiative

7-225. Command oversight is critical to conducting these programs throughout the division’s preparations for deployment and actual operations during its deployment. Some U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) program managers attempt to coordinate directly with gaining units in an attempt to speed up the process. This is more of a problem when the division is deployed and operating in small units over comparatively large geographic areas. All of the division’s equipment-fielding requirements are coordinated through the division force modernization officer in the plans cell. This ensures that commanders at all echelons are aware of capability upgrades and changes to Soldiers’ equipment and the maintenance of equipment/property accountability. It is preferred that units complete the field of new equipment before their deployment. The execution of modification work orders (MWOs) is coordinated through division command channels so operators understand they will be losing a certain number of systems for a period while MWOs are completed.

PERSONNEL SERVICES

7-226. Personnel services preparations include human resources and financial management support. Human resources support includes personnel readiness management; personnel accounting and strength reporting; personnel information management, casualty operations, and postal operations. Division human resources planners coordinate with human resources sustainment organizations, such as the Human Resources Sustainment Center, to facilitate personnel accountability in the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) area and at air terminals. As preparations for the division’s stability-focused operations allow, the division can seek to influence theater or joint operations area postal and MWR policy and programs to better support the division’s Soldiers once they deploy. While band operations are METT-TC dependent, they can provide morale enhancing music at departure ceremonies for the division and subordinate brigade’s advance parties.

7-227. Cultural awareness and religious training for division chaplains during the preparatory phase go beyond basics. Their level of expertise about the division’s projected area of operations within their mission set should be similar to that required of intelligence analysts. That training encompasses the more complex underpinnings of how religion and culture influence the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to accomplish the division’s mission. That training must also enable chaplains to be able to forecast how a given population—Soldier and civilian—react physically and emotionally to maintain different sets of stimuli.

7-228. The division’s sustainment cell works with Human Resources Command to achieve manning according to current ARFORGEN manning guidance to assign in-bound Soldiers to units. Under ideal conditions this would entail achieving full manning of deployable Soldiers at least 120 days before the scheduled deployment of their parent unit. This gives these newly assigned Soldiers time to become assimilated into their new duty positions and at least participate in their unit’s mission rehearsal exercise. It also provides them time to complete other required predeployment training.

7-229. Financial management support to the division during its preparations is a complex activity. They include managing the division’s various funding streams, ensuring banking and disbursing services are available while deployed, pay support, accounting support, cost management, and management internal controls.

ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM

7-230. Medical preparations included conducting combat lifesaver training, with the goal of having one trained combat lifesaver as part of the crew of every combat system in the division and ensuring deployment readiness for all medical areas including immunizations, dental care, and female health. The widely dispersed and small-unit nature of most stability-focused operations makes the availability of trained combat lifesavers an important factor in reducing fatalities during operations. The division surgeon staff section coordinates for prophylactic medical treatments for the division’s projected area of operation and with projected supporting medical organizations to ensure they can support the division’s projected operations and resupply divisional medical units and combat lifesavers with Class VIII (medical materiel).

PROTECTION

7-231. At Army installations hosting the division headquarters and its brigades, threat intelligence working groups are used as a forum to involve installation protection personnel with local, state, and federal law enforcement officials to identify potential threats at the installation and to improve interagency communications. Before its deployment, the division protection cell staff coordinates with the installation staff to help develop protective measures as required by the local threat assessments.

OPERATIONAL AREA SECURITY, ANTITERRORISM, AND PHYSICAL SECURITY

7-232. Each deploying battalion and higher echelon should have a trained Level II antiterrorism officer assigned. This training requirement should be completed during the predeployment phase. These antiterrorism officers work to ensure that security considerations are integrated in base designs and unit operations. These individuals guide their units in conducting threat assessment, criticality assessments, and vulnerability analysis to determine each unit’s vulnerability before deployment. These assessments are conducted sufficiently in advance of deployments to allow for the development of security procedures and coordination of necessary security measures for deploying assets. These assessments help guide the types of conventional and terrorist response plans that need to be developed.

7-233. Commanders and staffs at all division echelons start refining their security and antiterrorism requirements and plans as the division continues its preparations for its stability-focused deployment. This is because as answers to various requests for information become available, commanders can better determine the best locations to place area security measures and conduct area security operations. They better understand how their individual unit security measures fit into the area security operations of the host nation. These units work with the division intelligence cell and provost marshal’s office to develop a readily searchable database—including biometric data if possible—of potential insurgents, terrorists, and criminals that might be found within the division’s projected area of operations. This information can be used by patrols to identify individuals who should be detained according to applicable guidance when they are encountered during the course of reconnaissance patrols and other operations. (See the deployment chapter of this publication for physical security preparation considerations.)

SAFETY AND FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE

7-234. Previously developed safety standards should be maintained. This is increasingly more difficult as the division’s operational tempo increases and the need to realistically train for the challenges that will be faced by the division once deployed become clear. Obtaining and installing blue force tracker and combat identification systems on division vehicles are major preparatory activities for the division’s brigades. Training on ROE is part of the division’s predeployment training program. Likewise insuring that both the division and host nation security forces have a shared understanding of control measures and rules of interaction is an important part of the fratricide avoidance process.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

7-235. Division headquarters staff personnel train on operations security before their deployment. All Soldiers in the division headquarters are trained to understand the classification procedures applying to each host nation or multinational partner operating with the division. This is especially true if liaison officers from foreign militaries are located within the division’s functional or integrating cells. U.S. military personnel should receive familiarization training regarding the service culture, rank insignia, customs, military organizations, and capabilities of these foreign liaison officers.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PROTECTION AND LAW AND ORDER

7-236. Previously developed plans for these two protection tasks start being executed during the preparation phase. Their execution will become more difficult as the tempo of operations increases.

SURVIVABILITY

7-237. The protection and sustainment cells work together to develop a schedule for shipping Class IV and other protective material and supplies to the projected area of operations so they are available for employment when needed. Other capabilities needed to ensure the desired degree of protection, such as engineer, CBRN detection, and preventative medicine systems, are prepared to flow into the division’s area of operations as the division deploys. The division prepares to conduct actions to control pollution and hazardous materials caused by its own actions, industrial actions, or enemy actions as soon as it deploys.

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

7-238. During this preparatory period, the division surgeon works with the Army Medical Department facilities on the various installations from which the division and its brigades will deploy to provide preventive medicine services including dentistry and optical support. The goal is to qualify as many Soldiers as possible for deployment. The surgeon section works with the theater Army surgeon, civil affairs staff, and other government and international agencies to obtain up-to-date medical intelligence on the division’s projected area of operations. Pre-deployment behavioral health surveys should be conducted as part of deployment processing.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

7-239. The division CBRN element should use the preparatory period to determine the fine points of the geographic combatant and joint force commander CBRN defense policies, such as the location and number of individual protective equipment (IPE) stocks required in the division’s area of operations. It should be clear if IPE will be supplied in the joint operations area or not, if IPE should be in unit accompanied baggage, or if it can be shipped via sealift. Policy on providing IPE to individual replacements and augmentees in the joint operations area is clarified so it is understandable by the division’s rear detachment and CONUS replacement center supporting the division’s deployment. Standards for providing IPE to U.S. government and contractor civilians need to be clearly understood by every echelon within the division as should be the CBRN defense standards for the division’s Soldiers. Standards for civilian pre-deployment processing are clear as to CBRN defense training and the issuance of IPE. The CBRN element needs to coordinate with the supporting contracting support brigade to standardize contractual terms regarding to what CBRN defense measure will be provided to contractors in the division’s projected area of operations.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

7-240. The protection cell uses the preparatory period to refine the division’s explosive ordnance disposal support structure and reporting and tasking procedures. Subordinate brigades take advantage of this period to train their Soldiers to identify common munitions and unexploded ordnance that can be found in the division’s projected area of operations. This includes the detection of landmines and booby traps and the situationally appropriate actions for dealing with these munitions according to the established ROE. It also includes techniques and procedures that Soldiers use to collect, inventory, transport, and dispose of munitions caches detected by division Soldiers or turned in by local civilians during the conduct of the division’s stability-focused operations. These techniques range from marking munition locations, to using engineer systems to develop breaches in detected minefields, to destroying them in place. The protection cell works with the G-3 and public affairs office and the supporting tactical MISO company to develop local civil education programs regarding munitions and reporting procedures for caches and any payments provided to reporting individuals to support removing these caches from the streets and fields of the area of operations.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

7-241. Personnel recover preparatory activities outlined in FM 3-50 apply to a division preparing to conduct stability-focused operations. The division personnel recovery element works with other U.S. government agencies and nongovernmental organizations located in the projected area of operations to train their personnel that the division will have to recover in the event that these personnel become isolated, missing, detained, or captured.

DETENTION OPERATIONS

7-242. Division staff preparations for detainee operations include the following:

Refinement of detention operations plans as planning assumptions are verified, refuted, or modified and additional coordination occurs with various other U.S. governmental agencies, the host nation or transitional military authority, and international organizations.

Oversight of detainee operations training received by division Soldiers and military police units.

Refinement of division and brigade detention operations standard operating procedures, and facility standards to meet the exact mission variables of METT-TC applying in the division’s projected area of operations.

Conduct of detention operations staff battle drills including the G-2X, Provost Marshall, staff judge advocate, surgeon, G-1, G-4, and G-9.

Ensuring that sufficient logistics and medical supplies are available at the right time and place for the division’s expected detainee and displaced person workload.

Designation of exactly who at the division and brigade levels will be the chief of detainee operations at those echelons.

SECTION V – EXECUTING DIVISION STABILITY TASKS

7-243. Conducting division stability-focused operations should reflect transformation and foster sustainability efforts include developing host nation capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, legitimate and effective institutions, and a robust civil society according to DODI 3000.5. That conduct helps build the capacity and competence of indigenous current and future leaders in the host nation. This includes training programs on democracy, good governance, public policies, social management, project management, leadership, and other topics. The division encourages the sharing of experience among those responsible for host nation policies, programs and projects. The division promotes the use of sustainable new information and communications technologies to expedite that sharing of experience. The division assists, where possible, the development of networks of institutions oriented on the development of indigenous leaders for all instruments of national power.

7-244. The division commander employs technology that allows systems to perform multiple simultaneous functions. For example, transport helicopters may conduct incidental aerial surveillance of movement routes to detect the planting of mines and booby traps. Satellites, scout aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, airborne reconnaissance, and the joint surveillance, target attack radar systems are means to increase the fidelity of the division’s common operating picture and measure things not normally regarded as important, such as crop yields and soil moisture content. Ground surveillance technology—such as radar and thermal sights—help detect smuggling and other criminal activities in addition to the movement of armed opposing groups during hours of darkness.

7-245. Technology that Soldiers are less familiar with includes using equipment that may help forces conduct operations in consonance with the principle of constraint and minimal necessary force. These types of weapons could be used control potentially hostile crowds without the necessity of employing lethal means. Such technology requires special consideration of the ROE, humanitarian practices, unintended environmental or personnel effects, availability and state of development, and long term effects.

7-246. Like other operations, the division success in stability-focused operations depends on its ability to seize the initiative. In fragile states, the sudden appearance of divisional forces typically produces a combination of shock and relief among the local populace. Resistance is unorganized and potential adversaries are unsure of what course of action to take. This malleable situation is often referred to as the “golden hour” that follows in the wake of conflict, disaster, or internal strife. In this moment the division has the greatest opportunity to seize the initiative within its area of operations. By quickly dictating the terms of action and driving positive change in the lives of the civilians within its area of operations, division forces improve the local civil security situation and create opportunities for partner agencies and organizations to contribute.

7-247. Initiative embodies the division’s offensive spirit. The division commander embraces risk to create opportunity. The commander relentlessly sets the tone and tempo of operations to ensure decisive results. This offensive mindset represents the core of the Army’s operational concept and serves to guide subordinate commanders and leaders at all echelons in the performance of their duties. Seizing the initiative within the context of a fragile state requires the division to have or be able to access a broad mix of situationally appropriate capabilities. The division and its brigades has the capability and capacity to either guide and help the support structure of a host nation government or institute a transitional military authority capable of performing all five primary stability tasks.

7-248. The presence of well-trained, equipped, and led forces is a potent nonlethal capability. In some cases, demonstrating the potential for lethal action contributes to maintaining the order vital to establishing a safe, secure environment. Even though stability-focused operations emphasize the use of nonlethal actions, the ability to engage potential enemies with decisive lethal force remains a sound deterrent. Enemies and adversaries may curtail their activities to avoid being engaged by division forces they perceive to be capable and willing to use lethal force. This allows the division to extend the scope and tempo of nonlethal actions.

MISSION COMMAND

7-249. The fundamentals of exercising mission command outlined in ADP/ADRP 6-0 apply to operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks as much as they do to operations focused on the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks. A division conducting stability-focused operations will always remain under a U.S. chain of command. However, operational or TACON of the division remains in a unilateral U.S. or in some type of multinational headquarters depending on the nature of the United Nations mandate or controlling legal authority surrounding U.S. operations in a given nation. Both the unilateral U.S. and the multinational headquarters directing division operations in turn may be strictly military in nature or include both military and civilian governmental agencies, such as the police, national intelligence, paramilitary organizations, and groups such as the U.S. Agency for International Development. The interagency type of headquarters is best able to conduct the interagency coordination required in long term stability-focused operations because it is better able to minimize conflicts between diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities.

DEVELOP TEAMS

7-250. The division commander interacts with the U.S. ambassador, the senior military defense representative on the country term, and the other interagency representatives constituting the country team as well as with host nation representatives. It is important to the success of the mission that a level of trust exists between the division commander and these various individuals. The division commander devotes time and other resources to the establishment and maintenance of personal relationships with these individuals. Subordinate commanders and staff officer should nurture similar personal relationships with their counterparts.

OPERATIONS PROCESS

7-251. The division’s current operations integrating cell supervises the execution of division operations order by its subordinate brigades. During this process, the division commander and staff use their situational understanding to assess progress of division stability-focused operations and make adjustment decisions just as they would during the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks. A complicating factor is that except for a few areas, such as the provision of essential civil services—food, water, shelter, and emergency medical treatment—it often takes an extended time before progress in these areas can be observed, second- and third-order impacts can be assessed, and adjustment decisions made.

Synchronize Actions to Maximize Military Power

7-252. SOF in the division area of operations share mission information, consistent with security limitations with the brigade or battalion owning the area of operations. Extremely sensitive information can be shared at the division commander level allowing the division commander to inform necessary individuals on the division staff and in subordinate brigades. This prior knowledge allows the division and its attached brigade to plan exploitation efforts and prepare to conduct post-mission exploitation. After all, it is the division’s conventional forces that will be queried by the local populace and have to work with any agitated local civilians after the conclusion of the special operations mission.

Assess Stability Situation and Division Tactical Operations

7-253. Assessment begins with receipt of the stability-focused mission or task. The mission or task originates from the division commander’s intent and desired end state. All of the division’s functional and integrating cells and separate staff sections establish baseline data at the start of the operation to assess the changes over the course of the operation. Assessment continues as a dynamic, continuously updated process, adapting to changes in the operational environment within the division area of operation. Assessment incorporates crosswalks between the functional and integrating cells to ensure no gaps in the holistic view of the operational environment with respect to the division’s mission. These crosswalks also provided linkages to the higher headquarters mission, intent, and end state. While the assessment focused on quantitative assessment, the process incorporated qualitative factors. Each cell can make direct contact with the source of the report or information if there was dissonance among the sources of data and information. The answers to the commander’s critical information requirements provided key indicators to success or failure.

7-254. Doctrinal assessment during execution established in ADP/ADRP 5-0 applies to the conduct of stability tasks just as it does to the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks. That assessment focuses at providing a running comparison of the current situation to the forecast conditions described in the division’s plan. The broad doctrinal assessment steps are:

Monitor and collect information.

Analyze and evaluate relevant information.

Provide recommendations.

7-255. These three steps of assessment occur in short interactive cycles and occur over a longer period of time. For example, within the current operations integrating cell, these steps occur numerous times within a 24 hour period. The division headquarters may also cycle through these steps over a period of a month when assessing the overall progress of operations over an extended time frame.

7-256. The division staff develops an appropriate analysis framework to prioritize various tasks and objectives that accounts for trade-offs between tasks and objectives. This is essential due to the time and resource constraints common to all military operations. Equally important is the development of tools that provide the division commander with an accurate account of progress or the lack thereof. The division uses its existing tools and reports to provide some of that information, such as in-process reviews and spot reports. It takes advantage of more militarily unconventional tools, such as attitudinal surveys of the civilian population, commonly used by commercial advertisers.

7-257. One approach that the division can take is to use operations research and systems analysis techniques to develop that analysis framework and assessment tools. One such technique is a decision analysis approach to value focused thinking about the conduct of stability tasks. Value focused thinking provides insight for decisionmaking by helping the commander define trade-offs between competing and conflicting objectives. Value focused thinking is also a methodology to address decisions with uncertainty. These qualities make value focused thinking an appropriate methodology for addressing the many objectives and uncertain consequences of operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks.

7-258. Value focused thinking handles qualitative and quantitative analysis equally well. Decisionmaking is partially subjective, objective, quantitative and qualitative. Professional military judgments about uncertainty and values are important inputs for decision analysis. Value focused thinking offers a methodology to combine these attributes into defendable analysis for the commander’s decision.

7-259. Value hierarchy is a structure used to view and analyze the objectives developed using value focused thinking. It provides the commander with a wealth of information helpful in making a decision. The value hierarchy provides a guide to information collection, helps to identify alternatives, facilitate communications, and evaluate alternatives. Value hierarchies ensure the information gathered is pertinent to the values in the decision. Value hierarchies help guide the development of alternatives focused on the values of the decision. Value hierarchies foster communication by providing a simple mechanism for all stakeholders to see the common values in a decision. Finally, a value hierarchy provides a structured evaluation of alternatives, providing an ordinal ranking of alternatives from best to worst.

Conduct Transitions

7-260. The unit responsible for conducting operations in a given area will be relieved of those responsibilities at some point. This occurs in major operations when the unit maneuvers or moves out of the area. In prolonged stability-focused operations it occurs when the unit is relieved-in-place and TOA occurs. This transition of authority may be to another military unit, a host nation government, a transitional military authority, or some other authority. When this happens to the division, regardless of what organization is going to assume responsibility for the conduct of operations in the division’s area of operations, certain actions need to occur. The considerations for a relief-in-place found in FM 3-90-2 generally apply. However, a couple of items require special emphasis.

7-261. Stability task related databases, staff running estimates, and unit operations orders are organized, saved, and sorted so that personnel from the relieving organization can easily locate the information they require. The outgoing unit makes every effort to ensure all information regarding operations is seamlessly transferred to the incoming unit. All staff principles and shift leaders review their subordinates’ plans and preparations for the conduct of this knowledge transfer and check to make sure that this knowledge transfer actually occurs to ensure that the gaining organization has complete ownership. Recent data—less than one year old—should be shared face-to-face. Older, historical data should be archived in a format and media that the relieving organization can use. That data is labeled with an intuitively understood taxonomy. An extended co-location of command posts during the conduct of “right-seat rides” by the relieving organization is a technique for ensuring that this occurs.

COMMAND POST

7-262. The division main command post and tactical command post are normally co-located. The division maintains the ability to displace the tactical command post to closely monitor or control an operation, particularly if the operation is being conducted by host nation or multinational elements.

KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

7-263. Execution of division knowledge management in operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks involves many subjects not normally required during combat-focused operations, such as secondary education curriculum and the local availability at affordable prices for agricultural products. The organization and contents of the division Web page should expand including stability related information while remaining intuitive to use. Having the division knowledge management element located with the current operations integrating cell educates the knowledge management element of the need including those additional subjects on the division Web page. It allows the element to receive immediate feedback if the Web page is not intuitive to use. This also allows the knowledge management element to automate updating and inputting information into the division common operational picture for the division battle major.

7-264. Division commander’s meetings include command level discussions of lessons learned. In this matter, the division uses its mission command systems as its main support knowledge management tool. Additionally, cross talk among subordinate brigade commanders using their information systems, as well as personal contact, whether by voice or face-to-face, contributes greatly to learning.

7-265. Each division functional and integrating staff cell and special staff section makes a conscious decision about using any automated data management tools developed by their predecessors to provide the necessary information if it is conducting a relief-in-place. Any concerns about a lack of pre-deployment training on these tools are mitigated by several procedures. Among these are:

Extended right-seat rides by selected members of the division staff so they can become familiar with these tools before the division deploys.

Internet training on these systems by operators at the division home station linked to the deployed division subject matter experts.

Fielding these tools in the division before its deployment.

Having key individuals familiar with these tools extend their deployments to provide additional time for division personnel to become conversant in their use.

Asking previous users about the tools before changing them.

7-266. Conducting stability tasks routinely involves the division working closely with host nation and multinational partners. Access to the SIPR portal for these host nation and multinational partners is a challenge during the conduct of division stability tasks regardless of the division’s preparations. The division chooses to provide U.S. military or Army civilian assistants with secure access means to serve as assistants or liaison officers to host nation and multinational partner commanders so that they can directly access the division’s SIPR network and provide the appropriate information to those partner commanders. The division table of organization and equipment does not provide enough liaison officers and equipment to provide these assistants without degrading some other ongoing function in the absence of augmentees and equipment being provided from resources external to the division.

7-267. Commanders at all echelons within the division foster communications and share valuable information of appropriate classification with those international and nongovernmental organizations operating within the division’s area of operations. They are more familiar with cultures and sensitivities of the local population. These nonmilitary organizations provide valuable information. However, they may resent being considered a source of intelligence. Because of the nature of their work, some organizations must remain independent and nonaligned with any military force. Sharing relevant information is an element of information management and not intelligence.

7-268. Changes in the division’s information services configurations, software, and hardware may require change because of the extended nature of stability-focused operations. These changes include changing from one operating system to another or from one version of Microsoft Office to another. These changes are pushed by a higher level headquarters according to a plan that does not consider the division’s ongoing operations. The division G-6 tries to time the imposition of these changes to minimize disruptions to the division’s ongoing tactical operations. For example, adjustments to division information systems are not initiated during inconvenient periods, such as when daily status reports are due to the current operations integrating cell. The division G-6 schedules user training required to support these adjustments at multiple times instead of just once to provide the best chance of all users being able to attend the training. This is because the normal battle rhythm of the division staff precludes everyone from being able to attend a single training session.

7-269. The division considers providing training on commercial off-the-shelf and non program of record communications and other information system equipment available for its use at a centralized location within its area of operations during its deployment. In the past such a centralized school is more efficient than each brigade and battalion trying to run their own training facilities. If the instructors are certified, they offer their students the training necessary to take industry certification exams. Indeed the division can work with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to get generating force service school instructors rotated as necessary through this division school. As equipment configurations and information system protocols change, the school can test these changes and train Soldiers on the most current digital techniques and procedures.

7-270. Lastly, the division should consider establishing an information systems validation board to standardize its use of commercial off-the-shelf and non-program of record information systems in the area of operations. This board should include key players from all subordinate brigades and staff cells including the division Judge Advocate General. This board should consider network vulnerability, defense and bandwidth usage, electromagnetic spectrum analysis, and integration across all echelons in its deliberations. This board is more appropriate to stability-focused operations than offensive- and defensive-focused operations because the extended times lines associated with stability-focused operations provide time—and usually the funds—necessary to specifically tailor the division information systems to the mission. The division should consider coordinating with any unit relieving it to leave these mission and area of operations information systems behind.

INFORMATION RELATED CAPABILITIES

7-271. As previously stated, perception is a major factor in stability-focused operations; the actions of division Soldiers, both positive and negative, during the conduct of operations have the greatest influence on the civilian populace’s perception of the division and its mission. Therefore, in all actions, leaders at all echelons manage expectations, informing the local civilian population, and countering rumors and propaganda. This is accomplished through the division’s employment information-related capabilities. Commanders at all division echelons use these activities to persuade the local populace within their areas of operations to support the division’s mission and the host nation government. They integrate information-related capabilities into the conduct of the five primary stability tasks to counter false and distorted information and propaganda.

7-272. Stability-focused operations are conducted within the lens of the media. The division employs information related capabilities to influence host nation or other civilian attitudes and reduce commitment to a hostile cause. It also uses these capabilities to convey the division’s willingness to use force without actually employing it. Using information this way helps friendly forces accomplish missions faster, with fewer casualties and fewer adverse effects. The division can also use information related capabilities to counter the effects of enemy propaganda, misinformation, and rumors. By doing this, the division can reduce confusion, fear, and apprehension among the local populace.

7-273. Information is central to the success of each primary stability task, reinforcing and complementing actions on the ground with supporting messages. The division’s ability to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative often depends on the perceptions of the various audiences that observe the division’s operations. The division will use cultural understanding and media engagement to seize and retain the initiative, communicating with local populace in an honest, consistent fashion while providing fair and open access to media representatives. As much as practical, division military actions are coordinated with the news media to ensure prompt and accurate reporting of factual information. Leaders use the positive results of actions among the local populace to exploit the initiative, earning their lasting trust, confidence, and respect.

7-274. The division’s use of information-related capabilities accomplishes three important things—

Sustains the trust and confidence of American and multinational partner civilian populations in the division mission and operations, while simultaneously gaining the confidence and support of host nation positional and reference leaders and the civilian population as a whole.

Wins the psychological contest with any adversaries and potential adversaries in the area of operations.

Wins the contest for the use of information technology in cyberspace and across the electromagnetic spectrum.

7-275. Opponents of the division’s stability efforts attempt to seize on relatively minor incidents to reduce the legitimacy to achieve obtain advantages in the element of combat power. The division’s operations are carried out in the full glare of public scrutiny. Potentially, a single act or series of acts of indiscipline by a single Soldier or small groups of Soldiers undo months and years of disciplined effort.

Public Affairs

7-276. The public affairs staff requires augmentation to provide full support during protracted operations. Public affairs activities provide factual, accurate, and timely information about operations and activities. All information can potentially influence an audience; however, public affairs must inform without intending to influence public opinion. Accomplishing this requires additional care and consideration when synchronizing public affairs into information engagement.

7-277. The division public affairs officer routinely prepares the division commander, brigade commanders, and principle staff officers for media engagements. However, all subordinate commanders and Soldiers must know how to deal effectively with broadcast, print, and Web-based media and photographers. They should also understand which subjects they are authorized to discuss and which ones they must refer to a public affairs officer. Slide briefings used in press conferences should be produced by individuals that routinely work with the individual giving the briefing because of their greater understanding of the subject matters with the information operations officer and public affairs officer reviewing the completed product for consistency of external and internal messages. The division commander emphasizes approved messages and themes by doing media events and having the public affairs officer send out copies of the transcripts for subordinate brigades to review and then take advantage of the commander’s battlefield circulation to interact with the division’s attached brigade and see if they understood the commander’s media engagement intent.

7-278. The media wants unfettered access to Soldiers and units and will attempt go everywhere they can to uncover specific angles and stories. They will grudgingly accept being placed in media pools, since they try to gather their information first hand. They expect daily authoritative briefings from the division senior leadership and staff, but as a group mistrust or discount official statements or accounts. One-on-one interviews are effective in getting out the division’s story. They seek fresh stories every day. The media are particularly interested in excessive civilian casualties, fratricide, and the plight of noncombatants. They want to discuss ROE and issues related to them which intend to encroach sensitive or even classified information. Also of media interest are any military-civilian disagreements or conflicts, such as looting, murder, rape, or mistreatment of prisoners. Any host nation civilian opinions blaming U.S. forces for lack of food, fuel, water, or medical care are sure to reach the press. Also looming large on the press list are U.S. and civilian casualty figures, both actual and projected.

7-279. The media has is able collect and transmit images and sounds worldwide from any location. They have the ability to cover events quickly and to influence American and international public perceptions either positively or negatively. Large numbers of media reporters can rapidly descend on the division if something occurs or can potentially occur that is of worldwide interest. The media expects the division to meet their life support requirements. Some will expect military transportation resources to be placed at their disposal. The media speculation on ongoing and future operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures can impact division operations security. Freedom of the press does not negate the requirement for operations security and the accomplishment of the military mission.

Military Information Support Operations

7-280. MISO forces operating at the division levels advise the commander on the psychological effects of operations, plan and execute MISO, and, with the intelligence community, assess its effects. This information helps commanders understand the psychological effects and potential consequences of planned military actions and operations. MISO forces advise the maneuver commander on the positive and negative effects that military activities have on local populations and targets, as well as advising on the commander’s Soldier and leader engagement plan. The analysis of what military actions can influence the operational environment, to what degree, and in what manner contributes significantly to a prudent and successful decisionmaking process. Conventional MISO forces are trained, manned, and equipped to conduct operations down to the BCT level.

7-281. MISO staff planners and attached MISO units manage the commander’s Soldier and leader engagement efforts. As the Army’s primary influence capability, MISO Soldiers are trained, educated, equipped, and organized to plan, conduct, monitor, and assess engagement with foreign populations. This includes planning the commander’s engagements with foreign populations, leaders, key communicators, and others in positions to be influenced to achieve the commander’s objectives. MISO staff planners plan, monitor, assess, and report the commander’s Soldier and leader engagement efforts in their complementary influence role and use those Soldier and leader engagement efforts as part of the overall information related line of effort by the command. The MISO role includes conducting target audience analysis of engaged foreign leaders, recommending talking points, and recording the discussions to ensure continuity of message and that any promises made are followed up on, and that any obligations incurred by the foreign audiences are carried through. This intense program management is critical to ensure continuity and credibility of the commander and his units when dealing with foreign populations.

7-282. During the conduct of operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks, the division’s supporting tactical MISO company headquarters will normally be augmented or at least supported by MISO print and broadcast assets. When augmented with these capabilities the company is then able to produce limited MISO series products, such as leaflets, handbills, posters, and other printed material. Those series of products must conform to the authorities and guidance provided in the MISO program and higher headquarters, such as a MISO task force. They must also be authorized by the MISO approval authority. See CJCSI 3110.05E titled Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and FM 3-53 for additional information on MISO and its associated authorities.

7-283. The employment of MISO encompasses everything from the traditional activities such as loudspeakers, print and traditional broadcast, to leveraging modern technology and social media capabilities. Authorities for these activities are outlined in the MISO program and handed down through the orders process. If these authorities are not outlined in the MISO program or higher headquarters order the MISO staff planner should request the authorities through MISO channels to the higher headquarters MISO staff. The authority to use social media is an important step as often, social media reaches beyond the intended target audience and has the potential to be seen worldwide. Understanding the host nation, partner nations, or neighboring nations’ sensitivities, as well as deconfliction with ongoing U.S. activities is necessary to keep problems and conflicting messages to a minimum. The conduit for the coordinating and approval authorities is through the higher headquarters MISO staff. This will not only help frame the request for the proper authorities, but will also allow that staff to deconflict the request with any ongoing MISO series and activities.

Combat Camera

7-284. Combat camera teams provide powerful documentary tools to support the use of the division’s information-related capabilities, specifically MISO. For example, combat camera units can prepare products documenting successful division stability activities that counter enemy and adversary propaganda claiming the opposite. The digital cameras in the division’s support tactical MISO battalion can be used to provide this capability if a combat camera team is not available to the division. Indeed the low cost and widespread proliferation of digital cameras, including those built into cell phones, means that almost all division units down to the squad level can visually document their activities. Controlling the dissemination of these digital products is impossible and division Soldiers must constantly be reminded not to share inappropriate pictures from both subject content and operations security points of view.

Soldier and Leader Engagement

7-285. Soldier and leader engagement does not occur within the information operations staff. Division Soldiers and leaders engage host nation leaders while conducting all five primary stability tasks. The division information operations officer does try to synchronize the talking points used by division key leaders. The division prevents its subordinate brigades from conducting conflicting leader and Soldier engagement strategies by ensuring that they all adhere to the division’s detailed communication strategy—one that is fully integrated with higher Army and joint communications strategies. This includes any PRTs operating in the division area of operations. Too often in the past, different small units would meet with and engage local leadership on the exact same issues, but with different desired end-states and little to no internal coordination. This undermines the ability of all these units to build capacity and work towards transition.

7-286. This required synchronization should not restrict Soldier and leader engagement to any echelon or agency. Every division echelon should be allowed to address targeted host nation individuals or leadership groups. Typically a brigade commander talks to provincial governors and senior host nation tactical commanders. Battalion commanders talk to local community leaders, such as the city mayor or tribal sheiks, and mid-level host nation tactical commanders. This because they have the most complete knowledge and understanding of the role, goals, strengths, and weaknesses that individual or group plays within the host nation community.

7-287. The division may want to consider employing augmentees to create a visitor’s bureau-type element to help the division’s information operations staff synchronize the leader engagement efforts of division key leaders. This element would expedite the engagement of key host nation and multinational partner leaders, media, and other dignitaries by the division’s general officers. These individuals include those that do not support and actively resist the division’s operations as well as those that have a more favorable position. The dual nature of this mission results in this element’s operations being part information-related capabilities and part traditional protocol. Division personnel only provide truthful information to visiting U.S. political leaders.

Integrate Information-related Activities

7-288. The information operations staff integrates information related capabilities into the division’s overall operation during the operations process. The information operations staff considers how actions proposed by other command post cells may affect information engagement They are responsible for the following:

Synchronizing the conduct of information related capabilities according to the commander’s intent and guidance.

Synchronizing the employment of information-related capabilities by subordinate units.

Assessing the effects of Soldiers’ actions on the division’s information related plans.

Making recommendations on how to ensure Soldiers’ actions and the division’s use of its information related capabilities produce complementary effects.

CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES

7-289. Threats to division control nodes and information systems may not be easily identifiable during the conduct of stability-focused operations. Primarily, the division will leverage joint cyber electromagnetic activities to attack and exploit enemy, and if authorized, adversary command and information systems; gain situational understanding; and protect Soldiers and division mission command systems. Understanding the enemy’s or adversary’s use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum is an important component of situation awareness. The division cyber electromagnetic staff element will integrate available capabilities within the ROE. It is likely that actions and procedures available to conduct cyber electromagnetic activities may be more restricted than those available during combat-focused operations.

7-290. The key to identifying threats to division control nodes and mission command systems is a comprehensive intelligence analysis. Possibilities of nontraditional threats to division mission command systems during the conduct of stability-focused operations include:

Organized military forces who are overtly or covertly opposed to the presence or objectives of U.S. or friendly military forces in the division’s area of operations.

Paramilitary, guerrilla, organized crime, or police forces that are overtly or covertly opposed to the presence or objectives of U.S. or friendly military forces in the area of operations.

Political, religious or social factions and groups, inside or outside the division area of operations. If these groups are overtly or covertly opposed to the presence or objectives of division operations, they may be motivated to actively try to deny, degrade, influence or exploit the division’s mission command system.

Individuals, inside or outside the division area of operations. If individuals are motivated to actively oppose the presence or objectives of the division on a mission, they may try to deny, degrade, influence or exploit the division’s mission command systems to oppose division objectives.

The cyber electromagnetic activities element ensures that refinements of the division cyber electromagnetic objectives are appropriate for the nontraditional aspects of the identified threat to the division’s control nodes and mission command systems.

7-291. The division’s actions to achieve cyberspace superiority may be similar to conducting electronic warfare in combat operations when the threat to division control nodes and mission command systems is organized military or paramilitary forces. The division’s actions to achieve cyber superiority may be limited by legal, moral, diplomatic, or politico-military considerations when the threat to division mission command systems is from political, religious, social factions, or individuals. Against these later types of threat, division cyberspace actions may be limited to protection measures, such as operations security, MISO, and military deception, while relying on other U.S. governmental agencies and host nation intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, and public affairs cooperation to attack these types of adversaries.

MILITARY DECEPTION

7-292. Military deception can be used to—

Protect the force by deterring local elements from hostile acts.

Mask intentions.

Encourage cooperation among belligerent parties.

Conceal the timing, circumstances, and conditions of withdrawal upon mission completion.

7-293. The division’s use of military deception in stability-focused operations must be carefully weighed against immediate and long-term political impacts. Determining military deception objectives will likely require ingenuity. When military deception operations are appropriate, the following considerations apply:

Political goals and objectives often prevail over military considerations. Deceptions perfectly logical from a military perspective may not be appropriate for political reasons. Deceptions that the division considers benign may be considered hostile by the deception target and his supporters.

Because of political sensitivities, coordination and approval of the division’s military deception plans can be both lengthy and complex.

Because conditions are often chaotic, it may be difficult to identify suitable military deception targets.

If the opposing intelligence system is poorly organized or technologically simple, there may be only a small number of exploitable systems. Some technical military deception means may not work.

Military activities and personnel are usually readily accessible to the general populace during the conduct of most stability-focused operations. This may offer opportunities to use the local civilian populace as a conduit to the targeted opposing decision maker.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

7-294. The division CMOC is the primary coordination interface for the division and the host nation civilian population and institutions. It is also where the division and any humanitarian organizations, international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational military forces, and other U.S. civilian agencies of the U.S. government coordinate their ongoing and future actions. The division’s supporting civil affairs battalion can develop, manage, and analyze civil inputs into the division common operational picture from its CMOC. The civil affairs battalion’s subordinate companies do the same thing for the brigades they support from their respective CMOCs. See FM 3-57 for more information on how civil affairs units support the division in executing civil affairs tasks.

7-295. Civil affairs operations supporting the division commander’s mission during the conduct of stability-focused operations include—

Promoting U.S. policy objectives by influencing the civilian inhabitants of the division area of operations to support the division’s operations or at least not actively oppose them.

Reducing demands on the Army supply system by facilitating the coordination of local resources and supplies where appropriate.

Advising the division commander on the division’s responsibilities under U.S. and international laws relevant to the civilians located within the division area of operations.

Coordinating with available host nation authorities to minimize civilian interference with the division’s operations and the impact of those operations on the civilian population.

Coordinating the division’s operations, as appropriate, with civilian agencies represented in the division CMOC.

Advising the division and brigade commanders on the exercise of transitional military authority in division occupied or liberated areas until control can be returned to civilian or non-U.S. military authorities.

Supporting the coordination of host nation and other civilian efforts to provide assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population in the division area of operations.

Coordinating the provision of direct assistance—food, water, temporary shelter, and emergency medical care—to the civilian population by other divisional elements according to internationally accepted standards and principles in areas where civilian operators are not present.

Providing expert advice to other divisional units conducting primary stability tasks that are normally the responsibility of civilian authorities, as applied to implementing U.S. policy to advise or help rehabilitate or restore functionality in those civil-sector functions.

AIRSPACE CONTROL

7-296. Within the joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC), the division airspace control element receives and sends information to and from every subordinate headquarters on every manned and unmanned system that occupies airspace above the division area of operations and deconflict their flight paths during the conduct of stability-focused operations just as it does during the conduct of combat-focused operations. However the process is more complicated during stability-focused operations than it is during combat-focused operations. There are three primary reasons for airspace control being more complicated in this environment. The first reason is that the division is no longer operating within only a military airspace control framework. Many more actors will be using the airspace, such as host nation civilian commercial and civil aviation and various international and nongovernmental organizations. Their operations will not be captured on the air tasking order (ATO). Secondly, the host nation airspace control system responsible for selected portions of the airspace within the host nation may have different technical specifications and characteristics and be incompatible with the division’s airspace control system. This requires the division to provide liaison with these host nation airspace control nodes. Lastly, tolerance for mistakes is reduced. During combat operations, inadvertently engaging friendly military or civilian aircraft or allowing a mid-air collision results in personal tragedy for the Soldiers, airmen, and families involved. However, those accidents normally do not have operational or strategic consequences. During stability-focused operations, the inadvertent downing of an aircraft owned by the host nation, a multinational partner, or international relief organization almost certainly will have significant operational or even strategic consequences. Risk management is inherent to the conduct of this task during the conduct of stability-focused operations.

INFORMATION PROTECTION

7-297. The execution of information protection capabilities—cybersecurity, computer network defense, and electronic protection—is the same during operations focused on the stability element of decisive action as it is for operations focused on the offensive and defensive elements. What is different while conducting stability tasks is that threats to the information contained on division mission command systems tend to come from a much wider group than during combat operations. During stability-focused operations, potential threats not only avowed opponents to U.S. operation in the host nation. It also includes host nation agencies, multinational partners, and nations and groups outside the region where the division is conducting operations. All of these potential threat may seek additional information they are not authorized to have or attempt to hinder the division’s ability to use automated tools to conduct the military decisionmaking process and corrupt the information used by the division in that process in the furtherance of their own goals.

7-298. The division employs methods to authenticate authorized Army customers; provide for encryption of transport, applications and data; assess and respond to network intrusions, attacks, or hostile operational disruptions; and execute previously developed continuity of operations plans as required. The possible lack of a clearly defined opponent results in a lack of vigilance and attention to detail in the execution of the information protection capabilities during protracted division stability-focused operations. The intelligence and network operations cells in the division headquarters periodically remind division Soldiers to keep up their guard and always properly execute protective protocols during the conduct of all operations. Threats to the division’s information systems, the reliability of the data contained on those systems, and the division’s ability to use the electromagnetic spectrum will not necessarily come from enemies or potential adversaries located within the division’s area of operations.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

7-299. Success in stability-focused operations depends on military forces, of which the division is a part, seizing the initiative to improve the civil situation while preventing further deterioration. By having the initiative, division units and other friendly forces dictate the terms of action and drive positive changes to the operational environment. Initiative creates opportunities to rapidly stabilize the situation and begin the process that leads to a lasting peace. In turn, this improves the security environment, creating opportunities sooner for other governmental agencies and international organizations to contribute. Commanders draw on their situational understanding to retain the initiative, remaining flexible to a dynamic environment while anticipating the needs of the host nation populace. By acting proactively to positively influence events, the division exploits the initiative to ensure steady progress toward conditions that support a stable, lasting peace.

MOVEMENT

7-300. Divisional movement in stability-focused operations closely resembles divisional movement in traditional combat operations with extensive emphasis on security. The movement of divisional units within their own area of operations is decentralized to the brigade or battalion level if stable subordinate areas of operations have been established that cover the entire division area of operations. These brigades maintain visibility of convoy and unit movements transiting their area of operations. Depending on the situation, the division may need to treat all movements traversing two or more different brigade area of operations as tactical operations and control them from the division current operations integrating cell in the main command post. As required, BCTs receive support from the division’s attached or supporting multifunctional support brigades and functional brigades when the need arises. These later brigades shift their support priorities and move their assets around the division’s area of operations as conditions change and requirements evolve. Once again, situationally dependent, the division current operations integrating cell may control the movement of these assets as they move from one BCT area of operations to another and treat those movements as tactical operations

7-301. Establishment of communications architecture and procedures so that convoys and march units communicate with the different organizations that control traffic through the different area of operations being transited is vital to successful movement operations. This includes the integration of communications security packages for units and convoys traversing between different BCT areas of operations.

7-302. The division commander synchronizes and controls the movement of divisional elements into their new areas of operations so as to maintain the proper balance of security and flexibility. The commander decides the sequence in which brigades enter their areas of operations. The commander considers the number of suitable routes and tactical lift assets available to meet the division’s movement requirements. Other considerations include—

Traffic control permitting or restricting military and civilian movement along established routes.

Road and route improvement and maintenance.

Route construction.

Obstacles clearance.

Repair of bridges and culverts.

Bridging rivers or dry gaps.

Establishment of route and convoy security.

The division may initially deploy an advance party heavy with logistical and engineering support if the new area of operations does not have the infrastructure needed to support the operation. It may be necessary for the division early entry command post (EECP)—task-organized for stability-focused operations by the addition of civil affairs, contract officers, and staff judge advocate personnel—to lead that advance party. The EECP will set the groundwork for the rest of the division’s movement into the area of operations by conducting face-to-face coordination with local civilian or military leaders. In all cases, a well-developed movement order is essential.

7-303. Any private security services operating within the division area of operations follows the division’s established movement policies. In recent history, division commanders have control of less than half of the contracts in their area of operations. The others are under interagency control. There is no system currently existing for the division to have visibility of the movement or operations of these contractors. If incidents occur involving these contractors, the division is required to “pick up the pieces” and handle the fall-out, causing friction between the division’s subordinate commanders and local civilian governmental leaders.

7-304. The movement of any private security contractors, for example those supporting the American Embassy Regional Security Office, can cause friction between the contractors, divisional elements, host nation security forces, and the civilian population of the area of operations. This is especially true if they don’t coordinate the movement of their principals—U.S. Ambassador and other Foreign Service Officers—with the division which will be expected to provide quick reaction forces, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), and incident mitigation if anything occurs during the movement of these Department of State individuals. The division or its next higher headquarters should develop a memorandum of agreement between division commander and the ambassador that the Department of State Regional Security Office will daily receive and pass a matrix of mission and routes that the Ambassador and diplomats moving outside the American Embassy use for their diplomatic movements. The division then can review, comment, and develop plans to support. These plans will prevent contractors from unknowingly entering areas regarded as dangerous and allow the division to de-conflict their movements with other ongoing operations.

MANEUVER AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE INTEGRATION

7-305. Air and ground maneuver considerations appropriate to combat-focused operations also apply during the conduct of stability-focused operations. However, there is a greater propensity of potential overlap in areas of operations between divisional units and SOF during the conduct of stability-focused operations. Time sensitive SOF operations with their associated coordinating measures, such as restricted operations zones, cause confusion and friction, especially in crowded operational areas. In many cases, operations security concerns preclude the SOF from providing advance notice of their operations. The establishment of a SOF restricted operations zone within an existing division or BCT area of operations without prior coordination prevents divisional or BCT elements from operating inside that area without the approval of the establishing SOF headquarters. This can disrupt ongoing or planned division and BCT operations for many hours. To limit, as much as possible, the probability of this happening the division should directly establish liaison with the appropriate SOF task force or have its higher headquarters establish that liaison so that the division and its attached brigades can be notified as rapidly as operationally possible about these SOF operations. This allows the division’s conventional operations to be modified to better account for and possibly support the SOF task force’s activities.

EMPLOY DIRECT FIRES

7-306. The division and its attached brigades want to use constraint and only the minimum level of force necessary to resolve a situation in the division’s favor. Constraint does not preclude the application of overwhelming force when required to establish dominance, to display U.S. resolve and commitment, to protect U.S. or local civilian lives and property, or to accomplish other critical objectives. The fundamental of constraint does however permeate considerations concerning ROE, the choice of weapons and equipment, and control measures, such as weapon control status. When force is used, it should be precise and overwhelming to minimize friendly and noncombatant casualties and collateral damage. Collateral damage destroys government legitimacy. The division mission may be served by making payments to noncombatants for any loss of life, injuries, or property damages

OCCUPY AN AREA

7-307. The considerations for the division and its brigades to occupy their respective areas of operations are the same in stability-focused operations as they are in combat-focused operations with minor additions. Priority of defensive and protection actions remains the same. However, during the conduct of stability tasks, in this type of environment the division needs to get permission to occupy base locations and facilities from appropriate authorities. These authorities are individual owners, tribal elders, or government officials and vary from country to country. The division and its brigades can expect to provide some form of compensation to the owners of the land and facilities they occupy. That compensation may be money, food, other goods, or even services. They can also expect that the environmental standards associated with that base will evolve over time to become increasingly strict.

MOBILITY AND COUNTERMOBILITY OPERATIONS

7-308. Mobility in the division’s area of operations are restricted due to poorly developed or significantly damaged road networks and the limited availability of other transportation infrastructure, such as railroads, airfields and fuel distribution nodes. One difference when conducting mobility operations in a stability environment is that the ability of the civilian population to move and conduct daily activities becomes important.

7-309. Removal of unexploded ordnance, mines, and booby traps by engineers and explosive ordnance disposal teams during operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks is based on tactical necessity. Humanitarian demining organizations provide the preponderance of mine removal. In many demining missions, military ordnance specialists and civilian organizations participate in partnership. Demining in most situations is a host nation responsibility. Army participation in humanitarian demining operations focuses on mine-awareness education and, most importantly, training of host nation personnel in the surveying, marking, and clearing or lifting of mines. Army personnel do not remove mines (they are prohibited by DOD); however, they may help and train others to learn demining techniques and procedures. Specialists, such as explosive ordnance disposal personnel, may be called on to destroy unexploded ordnance, including munitions shells, fuses, grenades, and rockets.

7-310. During stability-focused operations, the division employs countermobility operations as part of coordinated actions designed to isolate targeted groups physically, electronically, and psychologically. The division may also employ countermobility measures to help in populace and resource control and border control operations.

BATTLEFIELD OBSCURATION

7-311. Obscuration systems are effective for what they were designed—combat operations. They are not designed to facilitate the conduct of stability tasks. However a division’s use of obscuration during the conduct of offensive and defensive focused operations may negatively impact on the conduct of stability tasks by making it harder for small units to detect the presence of civilians. The use of obscuration assets also makes even harder the ever difficult Soldier task of distinguishing noncombatants from combatants during lethal close-quarter engagements. Lethal engagements can occur at almost any time during the conduct of stability tasks even if the individuals doing the shooting are common criminals encountered during the commission of a crime instead of terrorists or insurgents. This is not to say that smoke grenades and smoke shells have no utility during the conduct of stability tasks. Their use can be vital to the survival of small units taken by surprise in some type of ambush by allowing friendly Soldiers to break contact when they lack the combat power to effectively counterattack. They have multiple other uses including marking unit positions, helping orientate lost Soldiers and small units, and indicating wind speed and direction for helicopter landings.

INTELLIGENCE

7-312. Every member of the division, both Soldier and civilian, gathers information to support division operations. The commander employs the division intelligence cell as a coordinated all-source intelligence production team. That cell manages the information collection effort to ensure every divisional unit understands the information required and plays an active role in its collection. This text segment addresses specific considerations associated with the intelligence warfighting function during the conduct of operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks. Previously mentioned intelligence considerations in preceding chapters apply. The intelligence warfighting function plays an important role in the division's accomplishment of stability-focused operations. The division commander continues to use every available asset to collect the information needed to accomplish the mission. Information collection elements normally available to the division include any attached BCTs with their organic cavalry squadrons, combat aviation, FA, and battlefield surveillance brigades. The division can also exploit intelligence products provided by the theater Army’s military intelligence brigade and joint and national intelligence collection platforms and analysis agencies.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO FORCE GENERATION

7-313. Specific intelligence support to force generation for a division includes establishing relationships with other U.S. government agencies, conducting coordination with applicable host nation agencies, collection of open-source information, and matching the division intelligence force to the mission.

Establishing Relationship with Other Governmental Agencies

7-314. Military (external to the division) and government intelligence and investigative agencies maintain extensive terrorist threat and other databases that may apply in part to the division’s area of operations. The collecting and processing of terrorist intelligence is principally the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency outside of CONUS, but the Defensive Intelligence Agency, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, and host nation intelligence agencies are also active participants in that process. While the Federal Bureau of Investigation is primarily responsible for collecting and processing domestic terrorist information, those terrorist groups may have overseas affiliates operating in the division area of operations. Other agencies which maintain threat data include the Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Homeland Security, and Federal Communications Commission.

Division Coordination with Applicable Host Nation Agencies

7-315. The division takes advantage of host nation intelligence organizations and personnel to the maximum extent in addition to Army, joint, and interagency assets. In doing so it may need to establish memorandums of agreement or understanding with various host nation intelligence organizations to formalize working relationships.

7-316. The nature of intelligence operations requires that division intelligence and other personnel have a detailed knowledge of local customs, languages, cultural backgrounds, and personalities. As a result, compared with conventional combat, the division intelligence cells and organizations must give full attention to the use of host nation military or police operations, such as populace and resources control activities, search and seizure operations, and the monitoring of civilian-organized groups or parties.

7-317. During stability-focused operations, accurate and timely information on the organization and operations of the internal opposition and insurgent political structure (infrastructure) are required by the division. Division intelligence staffs and units make every effort to gain exploitable data on these organizations to help in their early neutralization, cooption, or destruction.

7-318. The cross posting of divisional and host nation intelligence personnel integrates the efforts of both in an effective manner. Security restrictions may prevent the efficient transmission of information between the division intelligence cell and host nation intelligence organization but workarounds are developed, such as placing U.S. personnel with appropriate access to U.S. intelligence system as liaison officers in host nation intelligence offices. Definition of the level and extent of division and host nation intelligence integration is the responsibility of the senior in country U.S. military commander, who must weigh requirements against the possible risks. Since the risks will vary from time to time during these operations, division and host nation intelligence coordination must be continuously reviewed.

Collection of Open-Source Intelligence

7-319. Open-source intelligence comes from publicly available information collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to appropriate audiences for the purpose of addressing intelligence requirements. The division collects, retains, and stores this information without special authorization. Open-source intelligence is often very useful in fleshing out the civil considerations variable of METT-TC during the conduct of stability tasks and should not be overlooked. Open sources are not a substitute for classified sources, but they can provide a valuable foundation and context for rapid orientation of the analyst and consumer and for the establishment of collection requirements that take full advantage of the access by classified sources. ATP 2-22.9 provides details on this intelligence discipline.

Tailoring the Division Intelligence Force

7-320. The division decentralizes attached information collection assets and apportions those assets provided by higher headquarters down to the lowest possible level to support the operations of that echelon. This idea is the cornerstone of the commander’s allocation and apportionment of division information collection assets.

7-321. The commander separates information collection assets into two categories: allocated and apportioned. Allocated assets are used by the division to fill emerging high priority requirements. Apportioned assets, however, are controlled by the brigades. The brigades write their own target decks and count on their apportioned asset day after day. This provides much needed predictability to the brigades while ensuring flexibility. Real-time coordination to facilitate command decision is crucial. Every brigade’s are of operations has a different operational environment and only the commander knows how to best integrate information collection.

SUPPORT SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

7-322. Stability task considerations related to the execution of situational understanding not previously addressed in this manual include perform intelligence preparation of the battlefield and police intelligence operations.

Perform Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

7-323. The principal difference between the conduct of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process for conventional combat operations and during operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks is the focus and the degree of detail required to support the commander’s military decisionmaking process. The division intelligence cell defines and examines the operational environment, describes environmental effects, evaluate threats, and determine threat courses of action. Application of these steps, however, varies with each situation and mission. In stability-focused operations this examination includes the impact of the ROE, political situation (including such things as legal mandates or terms of reference), and the enormous demand for demographic analysis. The G-2 must be prepared for new information categories that emerge as the commander directs Soldiers and accomplishes missions in this environment. See FM 2-01.3 for additional information on the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process.

Police Intelligence Operations

7-324. During execution, the G-2 maintains liaison with the division provost marshal, military police battalion or brigade S-2s, and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command battalion S-2s operating in the division area of operations. The G-2 also needs to understand how police intelligence operations can support the overall intelligence effort. See ATTP 3-39.20 for additional information on how police intelligence operations impact the conduct of the division’s stability-focused operations.

SUPPORT TARGETING

7-325. Target development focuses on identifying various subgroups within the civilian population as well as identified insurgent, terrorist, or organized crime groups and their supporters. The safe houses, facilities, camps, installations, and weapon systems of these later groups can be targeted for engagement by lethal means if allowed by the ROE. The G-2 and intelligence cell must be prepared to combine or discard various intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures to suit the situation and to provide the commander with the necessary intelligence support. They must innovate as necessary.

CONDUCT INFORMATION COLLECTION

7-326. Division information collection efforts include all sources and disciplines. Division technological capabilities may not provide a significant advantage in some environments. Human intelligence is a major focus and often the main source of intelligence during operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks. The intelligence cell must remember that there may be internal and external restrictions on the dissemination of combat information and intelligence products produced by its collection activities.

Information Collection Synchronization

7-327. Planning requirements and assessing collection in stability-focused operations differs from conventional intelligence collection. Priority intelligence and information requirements are many and varied as are collection resources and methods; however, information collection still requires a systematic, multidiscipline execution effort. The most productive discipline in stability-focused operations is human intelligence. Other productive sources of usable information are the media, publications and public statements by spokespersons “representing insurgent or terrorists causes.” As a result, a flexible, dynamic, dispersed information collection plan will lend itself to situations where there are many diverse information requirements and the availability of information collection systems is far outweighed by the number of requirements. This type of information collection plan assists the commander and G-2 during execution by providing techniques that carefully prioritize each indicator and serious incident report, in addition to the supported priority intelligence and information requirements.

Conduct Tactical Reconnaissance

7-328. The division on rare occasions may direct its subordinate brigades conduct ground reconnaissance patrols directed at locations. The directing headquarters take precautions to protect the Soldiers conducting the patrol regardless of whether the patrol is operating overtly or covertly. Overt patrols also have the mission of establishing the division’s presence in a given area. When necessary each Soldier or vehicle involved in conducting the patrol must be readily identifiable to other divisional elements.

Conduct Surveillance

7-329. The division directs subordinate brigades establish observation posts sited to cover division targeted or named areas of interest. Factors considered when selecting exact locations for an observation post includes a maximum view of the surrounding area, clear communications—via combat net radio or satellite communications, and defensibility. Their locations are recorded and propagated through the division common operational picture. Division directed observation posts tend to be more permanent in nature during stability-focused operations than they are during combat-focused operations and thus they soon start to resemble combat outposts in the nature and scope of their associated protective measures. Typical missions of division directed observation posts include the following:

Any observed violations of agreements with local positional and reference leaders.

Monitoring the movement of potentially hostile forces, including unit identification, time, direction, and other details that the observation post can ascertain.

Shooting, hostile acts, or threats directed against division elements, host nation security forces, or the civilian population.

Any changes in the pattern of civilian activities in the observed areas, such as more businesses opening or civilians leaving the street before the passage of U.S. or host nation security forces.

Conduct Related Missions and Operations

7-330. This intelligence task includes the various intelligence disciplines and associated tasks (mission and debriefing program, intelligence coordination, technical authority, and intelligence support to personnel recovery). The various execution considerations associated with those disciplines in the conduct of stability tasks are addressed in paragraphs 7-333 to 7-336.

7-331. Counterintelligence. The division relies on echelon above corps counterintelligence organizations that provides a backbone for communicating counterintelligence information, advisories, and alerts to the commander as to what antiterrorism actions should be taken. Conducting counterintelligence operations within the division area of operations is complicated by the degree of reliance that must be placed on local organizations and individuals in operations and the difficulty in distinguishing between friendly and hostile members of the civilian population. Political considerations frequently hinder proper counterintelligence screening of indigenous personnel. Close and continuing coordination and liaison by the G-2 with the G-9 and supporting civil affairs units can help, in some measure, in resolving these problems. Likewise similar coordination through the appropriate higher headquarters with the country team may mitigate host nation political interference.

7-332. Human Intelligence. Human intelligence provides the most useful source of information during the conduct of stability tasks. Interpreters, low-level source operations, debriefs of indigenous personnel, screening operations, and patrolling are primary sources for assessing the economic and health needs, military capability, and political intent of those receiving assistance who or are otherwise a party to the contingency. They are also a primary means of understanding the attitudes and perception of the local populace. Division medical personnel are aware of the Geneva Convention restrictions against medical personnel collecting information of intelligence value. They are allowed to report what is incidentally observed while performing their humanitarian duties.

7-333. Division medical personnel must know the Geneva Convention restrictions against medical personnel collecting information of intelligence value. They are allowed to report what is incidentally observed while performing their humanitarian duties.

7-334. Geospatial Intelligence. Geospatial intelligence tasking is done through the use of either fragmentary orders modifying the intelligence annex to the operations order or by requests for information at the division level. Geospatial intelligence systems are controlled by higher headquarters, other services, or national agencies respond to approved requests for information through appropriate channels. The channels used depend on the agency, the requirement, the agency receiving the request, and command procedures. Army units at various echelons provide geospatial intelligence when the target area falls within the range of their organic systems. Other services and national assets provide geospatial intelligence support when requested through appropriate channels.

FIRES

7-335. ROE are restrictive and limit the employment of lethal fires during the conduct of stability-focused operations. The division commander integrates fires into ongoing operations according to those ROE and restrictions imposed by the controlling headquarters, such as no-fire areas, presence of noncombatants, and so forth. Special considerations include—

Procedures for the rapid clearance of fires.

Close communication and coordination with host nation officials.

Increased security for indirect firing positions.

Restricted use of certain munitions such as dual-purpose improved conventional munitions, area denial artillery munitions, or remote anti-armor mines (RAAMs).

An increased reliance on precision-guided munitions in areas with a high likelihood of collateral damage.

7-336. The leadership, problem-solving, and communications skills of division fires cell personnel frequently play a greater role during operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks than does their employment of lethal fires. The political nature of the division mission—and the need to maintain legitimacy for that mission—while conducting stability tasks requires division fires cell personnel to understand that the excessive use of lethal fires in a stability-focused operation may not deter an enemy who counts on the cumulative undesirable effects of friendly lethal fires, such as collateral damage, to wear down a host nation’s population’s support for U.S. forces. The three integrating cells and the fires cell must weigh the short- and long-range risks and payoffs associated with employing lethal fire support.

7-337. An important part of targeting during the conduct of stability tasks is identifying potential fratricide situations and the coordination measures to manage and control the attack of targets. These measures are incorporated in the coordinating instructions and appropriate annexes of operations plans and orders. Assessment of division targeting activities during stability-focused operations must address unintended consequences of the attack of these targets.

7-338. If the division artillery (DIVARTY) headquarters has not yet been activated, the division fires cell acts as the force FA headquarters if force tailoring for the stability-focused operation leaves the division without an attached FA brigade. This requires augmentation of the fires cell to conduct those functions. The division fire support coordinator will employ the fires cell to plan, supervise the preparation and execution, and assess tasks—doctrinally done at a FA brigade—most notably acting as a counterfire headquarters and conducting detailed targeting and execution.

7-339. FA resources and units attached to the division may be tasked to perform security, humanitarian, or any number of support missions. The command, control, communications, transportation, observation, liaison, and logistics capabilities of any attached FA brigades can be applied by the division against the division’s requirements in these areas. Convoy operations, local security operations, liaison support to civil affairs, and reconnaissance (air and ground) are potential missions that the division can assign to an attached FA brigade in this environment. A capability to rapidly transition back to providing lethal fires should be maintained for at least some fires assets. In any case, ROE must be developed and clearly communicated and enforced down to the lowest level. ROE that specify when lethal and nonlethal effects are appropriate and authorized are essential to avoid situations detrimental to the overall success of the operation.

7-340. A joint fires observer (JFO) is a certified and qualified Service member trained to request, control, and adjust surface-to-surface fires, provide timely and accurate targeting information to support CAS to a joint terminal air controller (JTAC), forward air controller (airborne), or directly to an aircraft when authorized by the controlling tactical air controller (JTAC or forward air controller [airborne]), and perform autonomous terminal guidance operations. Each JFO obtains their initial certification through a JFO-producing schoolhouse and must remain qualified by accomplishing the minimum semiannual training and evaluation requirements according to the JFO memorandum of agreement. If the division does not have an effective JFO sustainment program or cannot manage its JFOs’ qualification status closely, its capability of conducting CAS and other Joint fires missions will be degraded. JFOs working with U.S. Air Force JTACs are the maneuver commander’s link to safe and lethal joint fires. The division fires cell must maintain visibility of where JFOs are located and ensure their JFOs remain qualified and proficient in their JFO skills.

DELIVER FIRES

7-341. Because much of the available fires assets may not perform their lethal mission on a day to day basis during division stability-focused operations, it is hard to maintain lethal fires skills sets for employment when needed. The division’s artillery systems must be able to quickly transition to the delivery of lethal means from a largely deterrent role during the conduct of stability-focused operations. That employment must be according to the ROE using available systems and munitions in ways that minimize collateral damage.

INTEGRATE ALL FORMS OF ARMY, JOINT, AND MULTINATIONAL FIRES

7-342. The division must be able to integrate all forms of fires into its operations. This includes not only cannon and rocket, but also fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, such as AC-130, F-16s, and attack helicopter-64s. Stability-focused operations emphasize nonlethal actions by military forces operating among the local populace, such as electronic warfare, civil affairs, and information-related capabilities, but these actions must be integrated with the division’s lethal activities. There is an inherent, complementary relationship between lethal and nonlethal actions; each situation requires a different combination of violence and constraint. Lethal actions leverage swift, decisive force to impose friendly will, which is important in combat operations. Nonlethal actions contribute in all operations, but are typically decisive only in the execution of stability-focused tasks. Every situation varies and requires a careful balance between lethal and nonlethal actions to achieve success. Determining the appropriate combination of lethal and nonlethal actions necessary to accomplish the mission requires the commander to execute the art of tactics.

CONDUCT TARGETING

7-343. In combat operations, targeting focuses on identifying capabilities or resources the enemy can least afford to lose, then attacking them with fire support, aviation, and CAS. During the conduct of stability-focused operations, the role of targeting expands including a broad range of both enemy (lethal) and civil (nonlethal) targets that a wide variety of actions by the division can be used to attack or influence.

7-344. Conducting stability-focused operations places a high priority on target acquisition to protect the division. Target acquisition radars are invaluable in providing surveillance over key areas or organizations of interest. Combat observation and lasing teams and other organizations occupying permanent or temporary observation posts can also detect suspicious activity, determine the coordinates of that activity, and determine if it is hostile and can be engaged by fires assets.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

7-345. The division air defense officer updates previously developed analysis of aerial threats in the division area of operations throughout the division’s deployment to determine the validity and nature of the aerial threat. These threats include fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, UASs—including remote controlled model aircraft equipped with explosives, and cruise missiles. If an air threat exists or is possible, the air defense officer must take care to use any attached or supporting air defense firing batteries to combat the threat in full compliance with the existing ROE. Aircraft recognition is challenging since more than one of the forces involved may use similar aircraft. Passive defenses against air and missile attack, such as the dispersal and hardening of key division facilities, the provision of redundant capabilities, and the construction of survivability positions all increase the division’s overall protective posture against a wide variety of threats. The division air defense officer ensures that information concerning any hostile air capabilities remains a priority intelligence requirement because of the capability of such a threat to disrupt the division’s ongoing stability tasks.

7-346. C-RAM and counter UAS doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures will continue to evolve throughout the life of this publication. Current 20mm cannon-based C-RAM systems may be replaced by directed-energy systems that do not pose additional threats from falling friendly ordnance to the defended asset and the civilian population and infrastructure of the area immediately around the defended asset. The technical capabilities of the target acquisition and any C-RAM and counter UAS systems available to the division will guide their employment. Division counterbattery capabilities remain part of C-RAM operations as allowed by the ROE. Likewise warning systems designed to alert personnel around the defended assets of incoming ordnance and division ground operations designed to detect the occupation of firing position and kill or capture enemy personnel crewing these types of systems are part of integrated protection operations.

SUSTAINMENT

7-347. The division’s ability to sustain itself depends on the theater’s maturity, the structure of the sustainment brigade supporting the division, and the time flow and order of arriving and departing forces. Refugees or displaced civilians, an inadequate infrastructure, and demands by the host nation and multinational partners can make sustainment support of the division and its operations complex. To make up for inadequate logistical and health service infrastructures in the area of operations, the division’s supporting sustainment brigade may be augmented with additional sustainment elements to address civilian requirements. Some or all of these supporting sustainment elements may precede divisional brigades into the area of operations. In addition to supporting divisional units, these sustainment elements may provide support for—

Joint U.S. forces.

Multinational or host nation governmental agencies.

Multinational or host nation civilians.

Multinational or host nation military forces.

Other U.S. governmental agencies.

Authorized nongovernmental organizations (U.S., multinational, host nation, and international).

There are logistics, personnel services, and health service support execution considerations specific to the conduct of stability-focused operations.

LOGISTICS

7-348. Conducting division logistics during stability task focused operations remains the science of executing and assessing the movement and maintenance of divisional and other authorized elements just like it is in combat operations. The same logistical functions are performed—maintenance, transportation, supply, field service, distribution, operational contract support, and general engineering support. However, the following specific logistics considerations apply during these operations including logistical support of other agencies and other nations.

Maintenance

7-349. The G-4 advance party’s logistics focus becomes the establishment of Global Combat Support System—Army between the supporting sustainment brigade and divisional units once the division begins stages into tactical assembly areas. The logistics automation officer establishes connectivity through the use of satellite communications. Quickly establishing these key systems allows the division to begin monitoring the operations of the class IX pipeline between the brigade support battalions and forward support companies of its brigades and the theater sustainment command. This allows the G-4 to maintain visibility of the readiness of division key systems.

7-350. The G-4 coordinates with the theater sustainment command to surge maintenance and transportation assets to support the division’s onward movement and integration from theater tactical assembly areas. The sustainment brigade or brigades supporting the division’s onward movement provides maintenance and recovery teams along the division’s movement routes to augment the organic capabilities of the division’s brigades. These teams conduct multiple round trips along these routes to ensure that all division equipment is rapidly recovered and moved forward to prevent theft and damage from unfriendly elements.

Transportation

7-351. The division prioritizes all movement in its area of operations, through proper movement control agencies, telling units when to move, when not to move, what to move, and what routes to take. Higher echelon assets wanting to move on division routes must conform to division movement orders and not just move when and where it is convenient for them. The fact that the division’s stability-focused operations occur inside the territory of a sovereign nation adds another player to the required coordination. Liaison teams at or from these higher and supporting headquarters help coordinate and resolve any positioning, movement, protection, and support issues as they arise. The division staff makes every effort to resolve these issues at the staff level and not involve commanders unless absolutely necessary.

Supply

7-352. Division G-4 advance party personnel deploying into the division area of operations focuses on establishing connectivity to the theater Army’s Global Combat Support System-Army to ensure that sufficient stocks of all supply classes are available to support the flow of division personnel into the area of operations. This includes food, bulk and package petroleum products, ammunition, and repair parts. The G-4 advance party is also responsible for integrating the division with the theater sustainment command’s logistics infrastructure. This is a critical prerequisite for setting the conditions for the division's successful RSOI.

7-353. Supply stocks supporting the division’s conduct of operations reflect the needs of the civilian population that cannot be meet from local civilian and governmental resources in both their quantity and storage locations. Any locally procured supplies should provide an economic stimulus to the local area, ideally without causing local inflation. Local procurement of supplies can be used to reward good behavior by a targeted group while punishing behavior that hinders ongoing operations. Local procurement contracts need including cancellation provisions allowing the division to do exactly that.

7-354. A division deployed on protracted operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks will often have equipment, both major end and auxiliary items, issued to it in response to specific characteristics of the operational environment. Examples from Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom vary from mine resistant ambush protected vehicles to wraparound sunglasses. Many of these items will only be made available to division units during theater reception. The late issuance of equipment will have a negative impact on the division’s ability to employ them to their maximum effectiveness and maintain these nonstandard systems.

Field Services

7-355. The provision of clothing and textile support, hygiene support, nutrition support, and general-purpose shelters and systems to Soldiers and other authorized personnel is called base camp sustainment. The division commander determines the priorities for base camp sustainment within the division area of operations. The sophistication and level of base camp sustainment depends on the mission variables of METT-TC, how much time a particular base camp will be in existence, the demographics of the population serviced, and the operational environment.

7-356. One way to provide base camp sustainment is to use the Army’s Force Provider System. This system is modular and provides the Soldier with a brief respite from the rigors of a combat environment. Unit commanders and staffs coordinate their requirements with the supporting sustainment units, host nation, and contractors providing services, including potable water supplies. They also coordinate with these later organizations for waste management, real estate management, firefighting support, base construction management, and facilities maintenance.

Operational Contract Support

7-357. Contracting can be an effective force multiplier for the division and augments existing logistics capabilities. Weak logistical infrastructures in the area of operations will make it necessary to use contracting for some supplies and services. The division obtains guidance from its higher headquarters concerning contracting for services and supplies during the initial stages of its operations. This includes providing essential civil services for the local populace. Contract selection used by the division needs including a vetting process to avoid awarding contracting to individuals and groups whose goals are counterproductive to the division’s stability mission or have an unsavory past and their receipt of a contract will counter the division’s ongoing information engagement messages.

7-358. It is possible that both the Expeditionary Contracting Command and the Defense Contract Management Agency operate in the division area of operations. It is difficult for the division to get a common picture of all military contracting in its area of operations let alone contracts let by other U.S. governmental agencies, third countries, and international organizations. Management and coordination of contracts to ensure they are mutually supporting and don’t conflict with other agencies and activities will be a problem requiring constant attention. The chief of sustainment tracks these contracts and ensures that they are mutually supporting and do not conflict.

7-359. The division avoids developing contracts easy to administer but have a disproportionate impact on the division and its supporting organizations. The division monitors the contracts developed by subordinate units as well. A lack of integration during contract development can have tremendous second and third order effects. For example, issues with food and other life support items became problems when the brigade and lower echelon contracts are not coordinated through the division staff and the supporting sustainment brigade.

Logistical Support to Other Agencies

7-360. When directed, logistic assistance is provided to agencies other than the U.S. military that lack the capability to sustain their own operations. Army sustainment capabilities—such as transportation, supply, or medical services—often support other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and authorized individuals during these operations. Identification of these other agency needs far enough in advance that their lack does not impede the operations of these other agencies or division operations require special attention by liaison officers. At the same time, the supporting sustainment brigades and medical units must continue to support divisional elements.

Logistical Support to Other Nations

7-361. Equipping multinational forces is problematic. State Department negotiations conducted to get a third country to participate in the division’s ongoing operations usually do little to ensure support and equipping needs, such as proper vehicles and body armor, of that third country are met before their arrival in the division area of operations. Significant needs of these multinational units are often identified only after they arrive. Without a responsive system to meet their emerging equipment needs, third country forces have only a minimal capability to support the division’s operations until the necessary equipment is provided, sometimes at a cost of diverting them from other U.S. divisional units. The division can request that the theater sustainment command or supporting sustainment brigade create special support organizations to support areas where there are more joint, agency, or multinational elements requiring support than there are divisional elements.

PERSONNEL SERVICES

7-362. Financial management and legal services are important while conducting prolonged stability-focused operations. There are often congressional requirements to track elements of expense expenditures by the division.

Financial Management

7-363. Many possible sources of funding exist for conducting division operations focused on conducting stability tasks. Congressional restrictions often limit the division commander’s flexibility in employing these funds. Unauthorized expenditure of funds can lead to criminal or administrative action against those responsible.

Legal

7-364. As with all phases of division operations, U.S. Soldiers remain subject to the Uniformed Code of Military Justice for misconduct committed while conducting stability tasks. Contractors are subject to their home nation’s laws. In addition, contractors authorized to accompany the force are subject to U.S. laws via the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) for felonies. Commanders consult with their supporting staff judge advocate before taking any action against contractors for misconduct.

ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM

7-365. The division concept for medical support is continually refined to adapt to the changing nature of operations. Periodic conferences of the division medical staff supports that refinement and better synchronization of medical support to all division Soldiers.

7-366. While conducting stability tasks, the medical brigade supporting the division deploys with its attached tasked organized medical assets. The division’s attached brigades deploy with their organic medical assets. Within each BCT, the brigade support battalion medical company may be augmented with a forward surgical team and a forward support MEDEVAC platoon (FSMP). Health service support depends on the stability tasks that must be accomplished, anticipated duration of operations, number of personnel deployed, evacuation policy, medical troop ceiling, anticipated level of violence, and number of host nation civilians that must be supported. Additional Army Health System support requirements could include veterinary services, preventive medicine, hospital, laboratory, combat and operational stress control, and dental support.

7-367. Division combat health resources are used across many missions (from consulting to delivering health care) when conducting stability tasks. The civilian population served differs from the traditional healthy and fit military force, and is comprised of children; infants; and obstetrical, gynecological, and geriatric patients. The varied composition of the civilian population will require augmentation of existing medical equipment sets with specialized equipment, instruments, and medicines. Due to Title 10 restrictions and the constraints imposed by the Geneva Conventions, the command surgeon, together with the staff judge advocate, advises the commander on which groups of individuals are eligible beneficiaries to receive military health care and the methods of reimbursement for services rendered.

7-368. The division surgeon element establishes links from the medical brigade supporting the division to the medical platoons and teams in its brigades as each brigade completes its deployment. Division medical support includes both air and ground ambulance platforms and embedded forward surgical, combat stress control, and preventive medicine teams. The surgeon identifies additional medical resources needed to support additional divisional attachments received in the joint operations area and those elements of the civilian population whose needs are not meet by civilian medical assets. (Those needs depend to some degree on the culture of the local civilian populace. Third word rural area used to only traditional medicine will require less support than urban regions where western medical practices are more common.)

7-369. The division medical supply office in the division surgeon element establishes links to the theater medical logistics infrastructure to begin the class VIII resupply process once deployed. The division surgeon section anticipates customer class VIII unit requisitions. They identify and build up class VIII stocks in medical brigade Role 3 medical treatment facilities supporting the division to reduce the resupply turnaround times for forward surgical teams in the division’s brigades. (Role 3 care is lifesaving surgery and resuscitative care.) Those same stocks may be tapped to support emergency medical care in the civilian population. They determine situationally appropriate medication resupply protocols for cold packages, birth control, and venereal disease. They track the expenditures of prophylaxis means, such as anthrax and smallpox vaccinations.

7-370. Consultation and advice are required to help the host nation in enhancing or developing the medical infrastructure, civilian medical programs, health and sanitation services, and animal husbandry programs. See ATP 4-02.42 for additional information on health service support during operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks. See AR 40-400 for information on providing emergency medical treatment to host nation civilians during the conduct of these operations.

PROTECTION

7-371. The majority of division’s protection capabilities required for combat operations are applicable to operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks. Execution of the protection warfighting function include not only division forces, but also join forces, other U.S. governmental agencies, multinational partners, and nongovernment agencies located within the division’s area of operations. Broad-based situational understanding and knowledge building throughout the physical and information domains in which these different groups operate is essential to identifying threats to their ongoing actions and their different vulnerabilities

OPERATIONAL AREA SECURITY

7-372. When the division conducts area security, it is a mixture of offensive and defensive activities involving not only the division’s brigades but also those host nation security forces over which the division has a command relationship such as OPCON, or can otherwise influence. Offensive area security activities include the establishment of moving and stationary screens and guard forces within the division area of operations and combat patrols designed to ambush detected hostile forces. Recent history does not show the need to establish a covering force during the conduct of stability-focused operations. Defensive area security activities include the establishment of base perimeter security, combat outposts, observation posts and reconnaissance patrols.

7-373. Division’s area security operations focus on protected forces, installations, routes, or areas. Protected forces range from the division command post through attached brigades and host nation security forces, to the sustainment brigade supporting the division. Protected installations encompass the base camps of the division’s attached brigades down to small jointly manned by U.S. and host nation security stations and combat outposts or they constitute part of the civilian and military infrastructure, such as the electric power grid, found within the division area of operations. Areas to secure range from points, such as bridges and defiles, and terrain features, such as rivers and ridgelines constituting political boundaries to large population centers and their adjacent areas.

7-374. All U.S. and host nation forces in the division area of operations protect themselves from Level I threats. This includes medical units although they have reduced defensive capabilities since they can only use their non medical personnel to provide their own local security. Locating medical units on bases with other units mitigate this factor. The division works with the host nation area coordination center to resource reaction forces that can respond to Level II threats within the division area of operations or, with coordination, respond to Level II and Level III threats outside the division area of operations. Positioning these response forces requires an appreciation of time-distance factors so that no element is left outside supporting distance from a response force. The division integrates combat aviation brigade and joint fires assets into the composition of its tactical combat force when reacting to the emergence of any Level III threats. This is because the speed at which they can react over the extensive distances involved in most division-level operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks keeps the majority of the division area of operations within supporting distance of the division tactical combat force. Where possible, host nation security forces constitute part of division response and tactical combat forces to smooth the interactions of these forces with the civilian population.

7-375. Protection of installations or areas requires the significant allocation of combat assets if a threat beyond organized crime exists. Area security includes route and convoy security. As many host nation security forces as possible are involved in the performance of these tasks. The operations of resupply convoys transiting from one base to another should be treated as tactical actions and tracked in the division main command post current operations integrating cell. Care is taken so that division response forces do not establish patterns when responding to incidents. Establishment of patterns—same route, same combat formation, configuration and order of vehicles, and same response force responding from the same base—allows an enemy to ambush the response force at a point of its choosing.

7-376. The division commander may be required by a higher commander or individually determines that it is necessary for the success of the division mission that security for high value host nation civil and military authorities and other selected individuals be provided by division Soldiers. This usually occurs when the host nation security forces have been so extensively penetrated by hostile elements that they cannot be trusted to provide protective services or when host nation security forces lack the technical skills and capabilities to provide the desired degree of protection. The division G-3 ensures that platoons from attached brigades tasked by their commanders to perform protective services for division designated personnel receive as much training and specialized equipment as is possible during the division’s deployment training.

SAFETY AND FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE

7-377. Commanders at all division echelons rely on the division’s noncommissioned leadership to maintain established standards in all protection tasks throughout the division’s deployment. The division’s noncommissioned officers are assisted in this task by a division safety office staffed by some mixture of Soldier, Army civilian, and contractor personnel. This safety office is not a table of organization and equipment organization but is resourced to fit the division’s mission and situational requirements. Commanders reduce the chance of mishaps by conducting risk assessments, conducting unit safety programs, and seeking appropriate advice from local personnel. The division safety office puts out periodic updates on how factors, such as the weather, terrain, road conditions, driving habit of the host nation population, availability of live munitions, and undetected or uncleared mine fields impact both unit operations and the operations of division combat and tactical vehicles and aircraft.

7-378. Consistent use of doctrinally correct terminology and control measures when issuing orders and the adherence to established ROE and escalation of force procedures are key to fratricide avoidance. The use of technological means to aid in determining location, such as the global positioning system, and combat identification, such as blue force tracker, at all division echelons is also key to fratricide avoidance. Constant risk management assessment and adjustment is another key to fratricide avoidance. The existence of an almost real time, high fidelity common operational picture of all of the mission variables of METT-TC in all of the division’s command posts down to the battalion echelon assists the process. Proper training, equipping, and adequate troops to task manning levels at all division echelons so that Soldier fatigue and stress levels do not impact on Soldier performance makes a contribution to fratricide avoidance as well.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

7-379. A good operations security program enables commanders to deny or protect unclassified, but critical, information about divisional forces from current enemies and potential adversaries. If these threats are unclear about division capabilities and intentions they normally cannot react quickly enough to division operations to preclude the division from accomplishing its objectives. However this critical information provides sufficient information to allow an enemy or potential adversary to determine the division’s next operations while also allowing them to accurately assess division strengths, weak points, and critical vulnerabilities. The enemy or potential adversary in turn uses this information to delay or disrupt the division’s plans, operations, or missions.

7-380. The conduct of division operations security capabilities is the same during stability-focused operations as it is during the conduct of offensive- and defensive-focused operations. Human nature being what it is; Soldiers are not as strict as they should be in regards to operations and physical security measures they consider burdensome while conducting division stability tasks in the absence of a clearly defined threat unless closely supervised by their leaders, both commissioned and noncommissioned. This natural tendency to reduce vigilance increases the division’s vulnerability to intelligence compromise and possibly allows for the physical penetration of division facilities. The division intelligence and protection cells periodically remind and educate Soldiers in the need to conduct this task. In addition the division continues to need effective counterintelligence support.

PHYSICAL SECURITY AND ANTITERRORISM MEASURES

7-381. Those normal area security and survivability measures taken by the divisional units contribute to the division’s physical security and antiterrorism programs. This involves reducing Soldier vulnerability to insurgents and terrorism by understanding the nature of the threat in the area of operations, knowing current threats, identifying unit, installation, and Soldier vulnerabilities to attack, and by implementing protective measures against insurgence and terrorist attacks. The division’s physical security and antiterrorism efforts also include involves treating casualties, minimizing property damage, restoring facilities damaged during these attacks, and expediting the criminal investigation and collection of lessons learned from terrorist, insurgent, and criminal incidents. During operations focused on conducting stability tasks, the division and its Soldiers cannot divorce themselves from interacting with the civilian population of their area of operations.

SURVIVABILITY

7-382. The division protection cell creates a critical item list for those items that enable the division to conduct stability tasks just as it does for those items that enable the division to conduct offensive and defensive tasks. The position each item holds on the critical item list depends on the current priority the division gives to each element of decisive action. The division critical item list is a fluid document that changes frequently according to changes in the operational environment.

7-383. The division engineer element and the engineers organic or attached to the division’s brigades are involved in conducting division survivability measures. They provide input necessary to modify existing division and brigade protection plans to meet current conditions within the division’s area of operations. They also help the critical aspects of execution and monitor the implementation of their respective commander’s plan. The division engineer ensures that the following functions are accomplished when providing force-protection support during operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks:

Establish a division standard level of protection needed in the area of operations, based on the expected threat.

Develop survivability construction standards for division bases, including the need for security fencing, lighting, obstacles, and guard posts.

Ensure the adequate availability of survivability-related construction materials.

Establish facility security-inspection procedures with military and local law enforcement personnel to identify and repair breaches. Examples of such breaches include—

Perimeter surveillance cameras not working properly.

Perimeter gates malfunctioning.

Reduction in the guard force for a critical item.

Communications vulnerabilities.

Access control vulnerabilities.

TM 3-34.85 contains additional low tactical level survivability information.

7-384. There are not be enough engineer assets, including civilian contract engineer support, to simultaneously perform all five engineer missions for all divisional units. BCTs use their existing capabilities to construct their initial survivability positions. Much of the survivability effort available from the engineer battalion in the division’s maneuver enhancement brigade or engineer brigade is initially devoted to the construction of survivability positions for the division headquarters, the attached combat aviation brigade, and the division’s supporting sustainment brigade.

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

7-385. Force health protection execution during stability-focused operations comprises all doctrinal force health protection activities—preventive medicine, veterinary services, combat and operational stress control, dental services, laboratory services—with an increased surveillance for occupational exposure to numerous industrial chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. Medical personnel within the division’s brigades or otherwise supporting the division provide advice and assistance. This includes, but is not limited to, the areas of food sanitation, entomology, epidemiology, occupational health, housing, water treatment, and waste disposal. Additionally, medical personnel provide technical advice concerning: the suppression of mosquitoes, flies, lice, other arthropods, animals, and rodents; provisions for prophylaxis, such as malaria pills; the construction and maintenance of sanitary facilities; clearance of debris from drainage structures; collection and disposal of animal carcasses; and collection and disposal of food that has been condemned by local authorities.

7-386. Veterinary services, including food inspection, animal care, and the prevention and treatment of zoonotic diseases, play an important part during stability-focused operations. The provision of veterinary services to farm and working animals may play an important part in the restoration of essential services and economic development within the division’s area of operations. Likewise the identification of germs, viruses, and toxic chemicals present within the division’s area of operations is important to protecting the division’s Soldiers and providing care as needed and authorized to the civilian population of that area.

7-387. Combat and operational stress control is as necessary during operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks as it is to combat operations. The psychiatrist position on the division surgeon staff allows the surgeon to plan for and monitor the execution of stress control in these small units.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

7-388. While conducting stability-focused operations, the division and its attached brigades retain a capability to respond to CBRN events if and when they occur even if there is no credible CBRN threat in the area of operations. The global availability of toxic and other hazardous materials used for a wide range of agricultural, manufacturing, and other legitimate pursuits means that those same materials can quickly be diverted to more nefarious ends. In April 2004, Al Qaeda attempted to inflect an estimated 80,000 casualties in Jordan using a toxic mix of 71 chemicals aggregating 20,000 tons. In early 2007 Al Qaeda killed scores of Iraqis in a series of chlorine bomb attacks, chlorine being widely used in making potable water. Commanders at all levels should resist employing their CBRN staff officers and units to perform nonstandard missions, such as manning base and base cluster operations centers, to the detriment of being able to rapidly respond to CBRN-related incidents.

7-389. The division CBRN element works closely with the surgeon and other elements in the division staff to determine the CBRN risks, such as the previously mentioned toxic industrial chemicals and biological or nuclear research facilities, present in the division’s area of operations and any opposing threats to the division’s stability-focused operations.

7-390. Identifying what hazardous materials are located where in the area of operations and in what quantities, however, is only a part of what commanders want. Once hazardous material is detected and located, it has to be secured until proper disposition is made with applicable technical directives. The effects of detected toxic waste sites need to be mitigated before they can spread further in the ecology of the area. Commanders want to have any hazardous materials in their areas of operations neutralized or removed as rapidly as possible if for no other reason than to avoid the dispersal of unit resources that providing such security represents. Proper disposal of hazardous material on a large scale involves larger funds, multiple skill sets, and significant specialized equipment and supplies. It is not strictly a CBRN unit function. That disposal also tends to take considerable time to accomplish. Sometimes the best solution for toxic industrial materials may be to continue to use them commercially while increasing security around their storage sites and tracking their movement from point of origin to point of use.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

7-391. As previously stated, divisional personnel do not remove mines as part of humanitarian demining operations—this is prohibited by Department of Defense instructions. However, they may help and train others in demining techniques and procedures. Specialists, such as explosive ordnance disposal personnel, called on to destroy unexploded ordnance, including munitions shells, fuses, grenades, and rockets that impede division operations are not conducting humanitarian demining operations. Explosive ordnance disposal and engineer personnel attached to the division are involved in programs supporting mine and unexploded ordnance educational programs and they are integrated into training missions directed towards civilian demining organizations.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

7-392. The division sustains its personnel recovery capabilities while conducting stability-focused operations by having commanders, staffs, units, and individuals refine their skills throughout the division’s deployment. Each echelon staff conducts rehearsals to exercise their personnel recovery battle drills to ensure proficiency. Personnel joining the division as augmentees and replacements after deployment require training in division procedures in this area. Personnel recovery coordinating messages are prepared and disseminated per the division’s standard operating procedures. Division commanders at all echelons down to the company level establish and maintain personnel accountability procedures. The division personnel recovery element ensures that personnel recovery communications architectures within the division are established by G-6 personnel and maintained to ensure operational capabilities. FM 3-50 provides details on personnel recovery execution.

DETENTION OPERATIONS

7-393. SOF may conduct operations within the division area of operations, but are under the command of a joint special operations task force commander. This presents legal issues when they capture and process detainees at the division holding area or the brigade detainee collection point. There are occasions when these SOF elements cannot release the top secret compartment information on which the detainee’s apprehension was based to the division and subordinate commanders and their staff judge advocates because of its sensitive nature. However those commanders and attorneys are charged with evaluating the evidence and making the decision whether to transfer the captured person to the theater or regional detention facility, transfer the individual to the host nation police, or release them. This is a reason for the division to push getting the means and proper technology to support compartmentalized top secret-level information out to the brigades and forward bases. In addition, the division G-2 works closely with the joint special operations task force to prevent any apparent—or perhaps the perceived—over classification of the evidence by the SOF community. The division G-2 and brigade S-2s should work with SOF commanders and S-2s to downgrade the classification of detainee related information so that it can be passed over the division SIPR network to allowed correct decision on the disposition of these detainees.

SECTION VI – ASSESSMENT

7-394. The division commander and staff assess the current situation gauging progress against the desired end state. The division commander and staff base their assessments on how the division conducts stability tasks on measures of performance and effectiveness established before executing stability tasks so that the assessment process is not unduly influenced by ongoing events.

7-395. Stability related measures of performance reflect actions by the division. Examples include how many gallons of potable water were delivered or how many meals were provided to civilian groups authorized to receive them by appropriate authorities. Traditional division reporting systems and methods adapt to reporting inputs such as the quality of material provided to the host nation and others. Measures of effectiveness are another matter entirely. Measures of effectiveness assess the division’s progress toward changing the state within the division’s area of operations to that envisioned in the commander’s intent. Examples of measures of effectiveness included reduced inflation or the acceptance of local police by the local population. In many cases indicators that directly assess a given stability task are not available. In these cases the division may need to use proxy indicators. Proxy indicators are indicators that measure second-order effect. See chapter 4 of ADRP 3-07 for additional information on assessment while conducting stability-focused operations.

SECTION VII – TRANSITIONS

7-396. A transition occurs when the commander makes the assessment that the unit must change its focus from one element of military operations to another. A division primarily conducting stability tasks will not transition to a focus on the conduct of either offensive or defensive tasks at the division level unless its efforts have been totally ineffective. This is not to say that subordinate brigades, battalions, and companies are not focused on the defense or the offense within their respective areas of operations given local variances.

7-397. The primary transition that divisions face is the TOA and responsibility for its area of operations to another organization. See FM 3-90-2 for a discussion of a relief in place. See FM 3-35 for information on Army deployment and redeployment operations.

SECTION VIII – SCENARIO CONTINUED

7-398. The X Corps/coalition force land component offense succeeded in causing the withdrawal of those REDLAND conventional forces not destroyed during the attack from GREENLAND territory. However, a small percentage of the REDLAND Soldiers assigned to those divisions destroyed during the attack chose to disperse and join forces with the ongoing insurgency rather than be policed up into enemy prisoner of war facilities for later reparation to REDLAND. Their motivation for joining the insurgency varies widely from individual to individual between religious fanaticism to a desire to act out pathological desires. The military training and equipment that these individuals possess make them welcome by insurgent forces operating within both rural and urban areas of the country. Intelligence determines that REDLAND covert support to that insurgency remains active. Small terrorist base camps remain in the border region.

7-399. In addition, combat operations result in the extensive devastation of much of GREENLAND’s limited modern infrastructure. The ability to provide governmental services to the civilian population is in doubt. It is the reasoned analysis of the GREENLAND political leadership that their ability to mitigate the worst effects of those combat operations and meet the expectations of the civilian population directly affects the continued stability of the GREENLAND federation. The dissolution of the federation negatively impacts the continued capability to extract oil from the region with corresponding negative impact on the global economy. The net result of all these factors is that the 52nd Division remains deployed in GREENLAND for an unspecified period to conduct operations focused on stability and reconstruction tasks. (The 11th Combat aviation brigade commander is in charge of the division base camp until the 601st Regional Support Group arrives.) Figure 7-2 on page 7-77 depicts the division’s revised task organization.

MISSION

7-400. The 52nd Division conducts operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks within its area of operations. This will enable the GREENLAND civil authorities to provide security and essential governmental services to its citizens until relieved by follow-on coalition forces.

COMMANDER’S INTENT

7-401. The 52nd Division conducts operations focused on stability tasks within its area of operation. The purpose of these operations is to enhance the legitimacy of the GREENLAND government, support host nation ownership of the foreign internal defense program, respect for human rights, link security and justice, and foster transparency. The key task is the establishment of civil security. The desired end state is that our area of operations is secure and stable and essential services restored, all under the control of GREENLAND authorities; and the 52nd Division is prepared to redeploy. (See figure 7-1 for the assigned area of operations for the 52nd Division Brigades).

COMMANDER’S PLANNING GUIDANCE

7-402. The division conducts operations focused on conducting stability tasks to create a secure and stable environment to enable the resumption of essential services and prepare for the transition of governmental and civil services to designated military or civil authorities. The division is tailored by the X Corps/coalition force land component with additional capabilities that help conduct the five primary Army stability tasks. This includes engineer, civil affairs, and military police brigade headquarters with their related functional branch assets and another military intelligence battalion tailored to conduct human intelligence. The division conducts operations along the five lines of operations based on those primary stability tasks: civil security, civil control, restoration of essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. The establishment of civil security to the civil population is the division’s decisive operation; the other lines of operations are shaping operations.

7-403. The division maintains the capability to conduct offensive tasks to capture or destroy terrorist cells and insurgent main and local force elements located within the 52nd Division’s area of operation. Our remaining ABCT (2/52) will be reinforced to conduct a defensive cover operation along the border to prevent cross-border infiltration of supplies and personnel to terrorists and insurgent groups currently operating within GREENLAND, deter any future cross-border invasion by REDLAND conventional forces, and in the event that deterrence fails, provide time for the rest of the division to assume a defensive posture. (See figure 7-2 for the 52nd Division revised organization).

52ND DIVISION CONCEPT FOR THE CONDUCT OF STABILITY TASKS

7-404. Each of the five maneuver brigades assigned geographical areas of operations—1/52 IBCT, 2/52 ABCT, 1/25 SBCT, 2/25 SBCT, and 99th Brigade (GREENLAND Army [GA])—conduct activities along each of the five lines of operations. These five brigade areas of operations constitute the entire division area of operations outside of the division base camp. The commander of the 601st Regional Support Group will be the division base camp commander once it arrives in the division area of operations because the 34th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade is no longer attached to the division. These maneuver brigade areas of operations are based on previously existing GREENLAND political geographical organizations to ease military to civilian contact.

7-405. The six other brigades assigned to or supporting the division—11th Combat Aviation, 27th Sustainment, 48th Medical (Support), 92nd Military Police, 118th Civil Affairs, and 555th Engineer support the division’s five maneuver brigade in the conduct of activities along the appropriate lines of operations. Direct liaison is authorized between all division units.

7-406. The 52nd Division main and tactical command posts are co-located in the division base camp while conducting this protracted phase of the campaign. This recognizes the complexity of stability and reconstruction tasks that the division is conducting. The information systems of tactical command post are not physically integrated with those of the main command post so that the division retains the capability to displace the tactical command post as necessary to control multi-brigade operations. The 52nd Division commander uses the mobile command group to conduct battlefield circulation.

7-407. The commander ensures that the main command post and the division have the following critical capabilities. The products of the division’s information-related activities must be received by the insurgents, terrorists, and organized criminal elements operating within the division’s area of operation and giving the division the ability to influence actions. The division identifies critical infrastructure nodes within its area and then analyzes the most probably and most dangerous threats to those nodes. This so it can marshal assets to protect these nodes. And lastly the division integrates its lethal and nonlethal capabilities so that their application is appropriate to situations.

CIVIL SECURITY

7-408. There are five necessary conditions for the establishment of civil control in doctrine:

Cessation of large-scale violence.

Public order.

Legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence.

Physical protection.

Territorial security.

7-409. The division has three major objectives for the civil security line of operation. The first objective is to eliminate GREENLAND insurgent forces and terrorist elements operating along the international border. This requires the division and its combat elements to conduct offensive counterinsurgency operations designed to destroy these threat base areas and kill or capture the associated insurgents and terrorists. The second objective is to protect division assets and the GREENLAND civilian population. This requires the division to fortify its various base camps and provide area and local security to selected civilian facilities and population centers. The third objective is to establish law and order within the division area. The first step to achieving all these objectives along the civil security line of operations is the establishing an effective information collection system. The few local police that have returned to duty and GREENLAND military forces are good sources for collecting information and intelligence. However, covert U.S. controlled indigenous human intelligence is the most reliable source.

7-410. Offensive and defensive counterinsurgency operations are well documented in doctrine. The establishment of small, specialized counterinsurgency units, to neutralize or destroy the leadership of the insurgents fighting against divisional forces coupled with well-disciplined and trained, highly mobile, counterguerrilla forces are understood counterinsurgency tactics. Establishing law and order is not as well documented. It has four components—

Police—responsible for stabling legitimate order and capable of growing into a trustworthy and competent force.

Law—protects persons and property and provides a stable and secure environment including laws for public safety, such as traffic regulations and curfew.

Detention—the governing authority must be able to apprehend and hold violators in detention facilities to deter crime and protect communities.

Courts—must be functioning to administer justice and process suspected criminals to release the innocent and detain the guilty for punishment and later reintegration into civil society.

7-411. Policing in failed states is the art and science of collecting and exercising legitimate use of authority and force for public order and safety. A legitimate police force requires the authority to employ force, but ultimately depends on achieving the trust and confidence of the local civilian population. Trust and confidence come when individuals can safely conduct commerce, go to school, and interact with their communities. Policing needs to become a community based function as soon as possible. It starts with establishing police stations and a policing force that has access to and serves the community. It is important to have Soldiers and international police get this endeavor started while training up a new police force at the earliest possible time. Interpreters and communication are a key issue for outside police—the environment is challenged by individual agendas and vendettas of the local personnel involved at all levels.

CO-LOCATION OF THE DIVISION MAIN AND TACTICAL COMMAND POSTS

7-412. The division’s main and tactical command posts are co-located. However, the tactical command post retains the capability to displace as necessary. This could be the result of major disturbances in civilian population centers or in case of a major cross-border incursion from REDLAND.

7-413. The intelligence cell conducts those types of intelligence threat analysis appropriate to this line of operation. This includes pattern analysis, link analysis, cultural-tribal-religious analysis, and communications-linguistic analysis necessary to understanding insurgent strengths, weaknesses, objectives, and probable courses of action. The division G-9 staff section acting as liaison with the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade helps with this process. The Provost Marshal office, assisted by a supporting criminal investigation division group, integrates forensic analysis and police intelligence operations in general into the threat common operational picture while staying within legal and regulatory restrictions on their activities as the pertain to U.S. citizens.

7-414. The intelligence cell accesses required additional intelligence resources external to the division using secure information systems. These resources are adjacent units, joint intelligence activities, and government and nongovernmental centers of excellence internal and external to the division’s area of operations for such things as cultural intelligence, open-source and background historical information, perception experts, and political-economic intelligence. As part of this process, the current operations integrating cell tasks available division information collection element to determine the current prevailing authoritative-social structures (governmental, tribal, and religious) and personalities in various localities within the division’s area of operations in light of the recent conclusion of combat operations. These assets map, survey, and mark explosive and other hazards. The intelligence cell assesses existing tribal rivalries, jealousies, and ethno-religious fault lines facing different local communities within the division’s area of operations.

7-415. The commander establishes a fusion center within the division base camp to manage the flow of information and intelligence; focus information collection to satisfy information requirements; and to process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate the resulting collection. Personnel manning this fusion center include intelligence and cultural specialists, security personnel, antiterrorism/force protection specialists, liaison officers from the division’s subordinate brigades, linguists, contracting specialists, any available U.S. Department of State, political-military specialists, engineers and public works specialists, MISO, media relations specialists, and economic advisors. This fusion center collects, analyzes processes, defines courses of action, and then disseminates the necessary intelligence to the division’s unified action partners, such as vetted GA and other security forces, and other U.S. personnel in the area from the Department of States and other government agencies. Primary benefit derived from specialized personnel involvement in cross-functional analysis over a protracted time period is an increased ability to understand the insurgents and terrorists operating in the division area and better predict their actions. The fusion center provides the division and 2/52 ABCT indicators and warnings of REDLAND conventional and unconventional movements across the restored international border.

7-416. The division current operations integrating cell works with the limited numbers of GREENLAND authorities that are available to establish and disseminate rules that promote civil security within the division’s area of operations. The division uses all available means, such as print, audio, radio, posters, video, and cyber to disseminate these rules. These rules address a number of subjects. Included are procedures whereby isolated REDLAND military can turn themselves in for reparation to REDLAND. Also addressed are the amounts and types of weapons allowed to remain in civilian hands and how unauthorized weapons and munitions are collected and secured and stored until their proper disposition is accomplished. In a similar manner, rules relevant to civilian movement and the establishment of checkpoints and civilian identification programs are devised.

7-417. The division’s current operations integrating cell seeks to favorably influence the other U.S. governmental agencies, GREENLAND coalition military, GREENLAND civilians, international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the terrorists and insurgents located within its area of operations. This includes the host nation and international media covering the division’s operations. The current operations integrating cell integrates all aspects of political, economic, and military power remembering that in this environment the power of perception and influence. It is responsible for orchestrating the distribution of reconstruction and relief funds, food, medicine, educational services, fuel, employment, and bestowing recognition and respect on local leaders. Information is ammunition and this element is responsible for integrating and acting on all aspects of political, economic, and military power. The division maintains a high tempo of actions that seek to force the insurgents and terrorists to react to its operations.

7-418. The division headquarters staff mentors the 99th GA Motorized Brigade staff to increase that brigade’s ability to train the staffs of its three subordinate infantry battalions. The emphasis of that training effort is on conducting the military decisionmaking process and the conduct of civil security tasks by GREENLAND forces. The 2510th Digital Liaison Detachment provides half the personnel to support this effort as divisional liaison and mentors to the 99th, while the other half of the 2510th serves as division liaison with its higher GREENLAND regional military command.

7-419. The division’s fires cell ensures that the actions of the maneuver brigade fires cells are integrated and synchronized. It is important the lethal and nonlethal effects are integrated at all levels from the reconnaissance patrol to the division according to the most current version of the division’s ROE. The division is involved in a war of ideas, a battle for the mind and must react intelligently to intelligence and combat information. There is a moral and mental aspect to the division’s operations. At times this means that lethal means will be employed less often and with greater restrictions because of the second and third order effects resulting from their employment.

7-420. The division G-6 is responsible for the classified and unclassified network transport to support the critical information exchanges within the headquarters and between the headquarters and its subordinate commands so that the following critical information can be exchanged and necessary coordination or actions occur in near real time—

Information collection capability enhancements including human intelligence reports and location and tracking.

Information-related activities and media relations.

Dissemination of indictors and warnings.

Military deception operations.

Counter-rocket and mortar warnings and fires.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

7-421. This unit provides local security for that section of the division base camp formed by the division’s two co-located command posts. It prepares to deploy a life support element to support the division’s tactical command post. The digital liaison team supports the operations of the division headquarters by enabling digital communications between the division headquarters and selected host nation security forces and governmental agencies.

1/25 STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 2/25 STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, AND 1/52 INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

7-422. These units establish a secure environment for the GREENLAND civilian population located within their areas of operations. This includes protecting personnel, resources, infrastructure, and civil records necessary for reconstructing GREENLAND civilian institutions. This protection effort includes defending against insurgent or terrorist propaganda and intelligence operations. Cultural sites are protected to prevent looting or desecration by disaffected groups. This enables the conduct of humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations on other lines of operation to occur within their respective areas of operations. Brigades conduct search and attack operations against those destabilizing elements using lethal means against coalition forces and civilians. Brigade commanders train local self-defense and paramilitary forces.

2/52 ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (REINFORCED)

7-423. In addition to the responsibilities assigned to the division’s other BCTs, this brigade conducts border security and covering force activities to protect the rest of the division from conventional and unconventional threats coming out of REDLAND into the division area of operations until the division’s other forces and joint fires have time to react to their advance. GREENLAND customs and border police elements are incorporated into 2/52 ABCT operations as they become available. Border security requires the accomplishment of three related functions—detection, delay, and neutralization.

7-424. Detection is accomplished by conducting a mixture of R&S along the entire international border during all conditions of weather and light. Detection efforts include troop observation, night vision devices, communications, intelligence, and emplaced sensors. Detection efforts are directed against both ground and aerial violations of the international border. Concurrent with detection is conducting identification measures required to prevent reaction to false alarms and to the presence of friendly individuals and systems. Identification and engagement authority for Group 1 and 2 UAS has been delegated to the brigade commander.

7-425. The brigade employs an obstacle zone that provides sufficient hindrance to infiltrator’s progress after detection to provide adequate time for friendly forces to react to their incursion. The obstacle and barrier system should canalize infiltrators into ambush points.

7-426. Neutralization is accomplished by killing, capturing, repelling, or monitoring the ground infiltrators with reactive firepower, maneuver forces, or surveillance elements. The brigade defeats aerial intruders using available means according to established ROE. The intercept element is composed of a mix of ground and air maneuver forces in varying numbers and using a variety of weapons, such as tank cannon, machine guns, artillery, attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. The ABCT also employ division controlled cyber electromagnetic activities against the control nodes of these UAS.

7-427. 2/52 ABCT conducts offensive actions to destroy insurgent and terrorist camps and kill or capture insurgent and terrorist personnel located within its area of operations. 2/52 ABCT and other ground maneuver brigades work closely with the division intelligence cell, local GREENLAND authorities, and the division’s SOF liaison element to determine threat locations. Once insurgent or terrorist forces or bases have been located, 2/52 ABCT elements maneuver to destroy or neutralize them. This maneuver includes but is not limited to conducting the tasks of movement to contact, reconnaissance in force, encirclement, pursuit, and raid. The intent is to establish a secure environment for the GREENLAND civilian population located within 2/52 ABCT’s area of operations to enable humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations to occur.

99TH MOTORIZED BRIGADE, GREENLAND ARMY

7-428. This unit establishes a secure environment for the GREENLAND civilian population located within its area of operations to conduct humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations. The brigade staff and its subordinate maneuver battalion staffs are mentored on conducting the operations process and conducting stability tasks by the 2510th Digital Liaison Detachment. (The 27th Sustainment Brigade trains the brigade’s 995th Support Battalion in the areas of logistics staff operations and technical skills.)

11TH COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE

7-429. The brigade provides attack assets to support of the 2/52 ABCT’s covering force mission. It also provides attack assets to support all ground maneuver brigade offensive counterinsurgency operations. Attack assets are a part of the division ready reaction force in response to ground assaults on the division and brigade base camps and scheduled convoys and other troop movements. The division G-3 resolves conflicts between the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade and the supported brigades when there are not enough aviation assets to provide the requested support.

7-430. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade provides lift and assault assets to support maneuver and functional brigade stability and reconstruction operations. The brigade conducts personal recovery operations within the division area of operations. The brigade also provides manned and unmanned aerial observation and surveillance assets to support of brigade operations to included major convoys.

27TH SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE

7-431. This brigade conducts those logistical and personal operations to sustain the division’s operations (less medical and those acquisition, technology, and contracting functions provided by teams from the European Army Field Support Brigade). The brigade also trains the staff and personnel of the GREENLAND 995th Support Battalion in logistical operations and the provision of technical services (maintenance, supply, and transportation). It secures its assigned portion of the division base camp perimeter.

48TH MEDICAL BRIGADE (SUPPORT)

7-432. This brigade conducts those medical operations necessary to sustain the division’s operations and is attached to the 27th Sustainment Brigade. It also advises and assists their GREENLAND civilian and military counterparts (within the limits of legal and regulatory guidance) in the reconstruction of GREENLAND public health support within the division’s area of operations.

56TH BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE

7-433. This brigade augments the R&S capabilities of the division’s BCTs. It also augments the human intelligence capabilities of each of the division’s maneuver brigades as they conduct area security and protection operations within their areas of operations.

92ND MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

7-434. This brigade provides ground security escorts for major convoys traversing division major supply routes. It provides a response force for the division based camp. It secures its portion of the division base camp perimeter and for conducting security patrols beyond that perimeter as directed to the base defense operations center. It provides escorts for detainees being evacuated from brigade detainee collection points to the division detainee holding area. This brigade runs and secures the division detainee holding area within the division base camp. The 92nd Military Police Brigade works with the Department of Justice to identify gaps and capabilities for the GREENLAND police capacity, including infrastructure and organizational requirements. The 92nd, together with the Department of Justice, recruits, trains, and partners with, and mentors GREENLAND police organizations until the force is capable of independent law enforcement and police operations.

118TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE

7-435. This brigade establishes and runs the division CMOC. This brigade provides information collected during of the operations of that center to the division’s fusion center. It is responsible for securing its portion of the division base camp perimeter.

555TH ENGINEER BRIGADE

7-436. This brigade conducts those mobility, countermobility, and survivability engineer operations necessary to support the division’s security operations. Though the likelihood of combat operations is reduced, key resources and personnel remain vulnerable to other types of hostile action or attack. Commanders protect vital resources such as fuel sites, sustainment convoys, forward operating bases, and logistic support areas since the division’s entire area of operations has an equal potential for enemy attack. Therefore, priority of work for construction assets is more focused on protecting these types of resources than constructing fighting positions for combat vehicles or crew served weapons. Vital resources requiring survivability include facilities critical to the civilian infrastructure such as key industrial sites, pipelines, water treatment plants, and government buildings. Engineers employ protective obstacles as a key tool to protect these important assets and locations. Protective obstacles range from tetrahedrons and concrete barriers to networked munitions. Physical barriers provide inexpensive, though relatively inflexible, survivability capability. Networked munitions, with their built-in sensor capabilities and central control, provide a flexible intrusion detection and denial system. The brigade is responsible for technical oversight and training of the 99th GREENLAND Army (GA) Motorized Brigade’s sapper company. It secures its portion of the division base camp perimeter.

601ST REGIONAL SUPPORT GROUP

7-437. This group headquarters runs the base cluster operations center for the division base camp and sets security policy for all units in the division base camp. It establishes and trains the base defense force including the response force. It plans the defense of the base camp and ensures that each tenant within the base camp participates as an integrated part of the base defense. It coordinates with the division staff for joint assets that support the defense of the division base camp. It is responsible for securing its designated internal security positions around high value targets within the division base camp perimeter.

CIVIL CONTROL

7-438. Civil control ensures that citizens live in a safe society where individuals and groups do not take the law into their own hand. While this is a long-term process, the division supports the efforts of GREENLAND authorities to build GREENLAND capability along this line of operation throughout its deployment. It is the only authority capable of immediately implementing some level of civil control within its area of operation at the conclusion of active combat operations. Civil control includes the following necessary conditions:

Legal framework perceived as just.

Public order.

Accountability to the law.

Access to justice.

Culture of lawfulness.

7-439. The division objective for this line of operation is the re-establishment of GREENLAND government agencies capability to provide civil control for its own citizens. This line of operation is a shaping operation for the division. This objective has many more civil than military characteristics. As such, the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade functional specialty cell (specifically the rule of law functional specialists within that cell) is the division lead for this line of operation. The division’s Staff Judge Advocate section supports the actions of the cell. The 92nd Military Police Brigade is the division lead for establishing public order and safety and establishing an interim corrections system to support civil control efforts.

7-440. The division performs a few governmental functions within its area of operations. The GREENLAND government formally asked the U.S. European Command commander and U.S. Ambassador to GREENLAND to conduct tasks on a temporary basis for those areas of GREENLAND liberated from REDLAND occupation until GREENLAND civil authorities assume those functions. The President agreed. These tasks include:

Establish public order and safety.

Establish interim criminal justice system.

Establish interim corrections system.

Support public outreach and community rebuilding programs.

As the situation stabilizes, responsibility for performing these governmental functions returns to GREENLAND civilian agencies. It is envisioned that this occurs over a six to twelve months period. This transition is a gradual one and requires detailed planning and coordination with GREELAND counterparts.

7-441. Based on directions received from the President through the Department of State, the American Ambassador in GREENLAND negotiated a civil administration support agreement with the nation’s government. This agreement outlined the nature and extent of the support needed. It defined the limits of authority and liability of U.S. military personnel. The European Command and X Corps/coalition force land component legal staff was involved in the coordination for this support agreement and reviewed and recommended approval of the final product.

7-442. The division commander maintains liaison with U.S. Departments of State and Justice representatives in the GREENLAND embassy to ensure maximum efficiency and unification of policy. The division will establish liaison with GREENLAND legal professionals. An executive order covers the scope of authority and provides procedural guidance.

DIVISION CO-LOCATED COMMAND POSTS

7-443. The intelligence cell provides the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade information on the area of operations that the brigade updates or completes all portions of the brigade’s area study. This cell provides estimates of the influence of existing political, economic, religious, and social factors on the division’s military operations. The intelligence cell reviews public communications and media policy in coordination with the G-6 and information operations staff to ensure that operations security is maintained to the maximum extent possible. This cell reviews open-source and other material for information of tactical or operational interest.

7-444. The current operations integrating cell submits requests for information and tasks divisional elements to conduct information collection activities designed to augment the civil reconnaissance efforts of the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade. That information collection effort expands to determine the actual location and status of selected sensitive sites. The intelligence and sustainment cells help develop information requirements for this line of operation. The objective of these information collection efforts provides the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade’s civil affairs planning team and the division’s integrating cells with the civil data necessary to develop courses of action, orders, and plans to accomplish the division’s tasks within this line of operation.

7-445. The current operations integrating cell receives a sensitive location list, such as historical sites, religious shrines, and critical infrastructure from the CMOC and propagates that list to all divisional units and the X Corps headquarters so that they can considered when developing courses of action and schemes of maneuver and fire support. It recommends the adjustment of BCT tactical plans to prevent the destruction or looting of sensitive sites. It assigns a tactical unit the mission of securing selected sensitive sites. It adjudicates disputes between the CMOC and other major divisional subordinate commands when the other lines of operations are affected by the allocation and priority of civil control activities.

7-446. Division information-related activities reinforce European Command X Corps approved information themes. These themes stress that the American administration was requested by their legitimate government and is temporary in nature. The division is there to help and we will turn over governmental responsibility as soon as possible. This is because GREENLAND’s citizens are willing to accept the temporary civil administration requested by their political leadership.

7-447. The division G-1 reviews personnel records of the division’s Soldiers to determine if any individuals have specific skill sets relevant to this line of operation. For example, Army National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers supporting the division may have civilian law enforcement, judicial, or corrections experience. The division’s special staff officers provide technical advice and assistance to the G-3 and G-9 to determine the need for assistance, measures to restore, and recommendations for the restoration of public services. For example, the division provost marshal plans for the provision of U.S. military, host nation, third nation, or contract security for GREENLAND critical infrastructure, financial institutions, government offices, and significant cultural artifacts. The division public affairs officer develops a media plan that facilitates informing U.S. and international publics of U.S. aims and goals related to the division’s temporary conduct of these civil security tasks.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

7-448. The division headquarters and headquarters battalion supports the operations of the division’s two command posts and the mobile command group with communications and life support. The battalion commander also supervises the internal security activities of divisional forces tasked for that mission around the division main and tactical command posts.

1/52 INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 2/52 ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 1/25 STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 2/25 STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, AND 99TH GA MOTORIZED BRIGADE

7-449. These brigades provide local security for individuals and small elements from the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade’s functional specialty cell and other U.S. governmental and international agencies and organizations conducting these four tasks within their respective areas of operations. They reopen or establish police stations as necessary to protect the civilian population within their respective areas of operations. They protect these stations from attack. Vulnerable groups are identified and protected. These brigades control crowds, prevent looting, and manage civil disturbances. This requires their Soldiers to secure key facilities, detain violators, and detain any identified instigators of violence until they are processed at the brigade collection point. These brigades seek out local GREENLAND political, social, religious, and economic leaders to control the behavior of civilians within their respective areas of operations. Where available, they use attached loudspeaker teams and any other available means to communicate with the local civilian inhabitants. These brigades execute any necessary resource and population control measures developed by the division and GREENLAND authorities and ensuring the regulated movement of commerce through their respective areas of operations.

7-450. These brigades use any available commander’s emergency relief program-type funds to support local high priority public outreach and community rebuilding programs. Care should be taken to ensure that such funds do not support criminal or corrupt elements. The results of the expenditure of these funds should be recognized a beneficial to the local civilian population as a whole. They should be able to be operated and maintained by GREENLAND assets and the expenditure of these funds should not negatively inflate or disrupt the local economy in ways that detract from overall mission accomplishment.

11TH COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE

7-451. The 11th Aviation Brigade provides lifts assets to support the operations of individuals and small elements from the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade’s functional specialty cell and the other U.S. and GREENLAND governmental and international agencies and organizations that provide civil control within the division’s area of operations. This support is provided on a case by case basis, in response to taskings from the division G-3.

27TH SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE

7-452. The 27th Sustainment Brigade provides logistical support to the operations of the 118th Civil Affairs elements and other U.S. governmental and authorized GREENLAND civil and other organizations responsible for providing civil control within the division’s area of operations. The brigade is involved in providing supply Class II, IV, VI, and X items to support public outreach and community rebuilding programs developed by 52nd Division elements. This support is provided on a case by case basis, in response to taskings from the division G-3.

48TH MEDICAL BRIGADE (SUPPORT)

7-453. This brigade supports brigade combat team developed medical civic action programs designed to build support of the GREENLAND government within the division’s area of operation. This support is important for medical problems behind the capability of the brigade medical company. The 48th Medical Brigade (Support) works with public health and welfare specialists from the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade, the division surgeon, GREENLAND medical authorities, and international relief organizations to reestablish sustainable medical capabilities within the division’s area of operations and shift medical capabilities to where they are most needed.

56TH BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE

7-454. The 52nd Division G-3 tasks this brigade to collect information of interest to the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade’s planning team and functional specialty cell and other division integrating and functional cells as necessary. This includes the collection of nontraditional information such as crop distributions and projected yields and the locations of concentrations of displaced civilians. These same assets support law and order operations.

92ND MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

7-455. The 92nd Military Police Brigade is involved in performing civil police and corrections functions until GREENLAND authorities can assume those roles. Conducting policing activities to support civil security and civil control lines of effort are critical to establish the rule of law. Police intelligence operations are integrated and executed continuously throughout all military police operations. This includes establishing, using, and transferring host nation police intelligence operations information collected through police engagement. The brigade works closely with rule of law specialists from the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade, the Department of Justice, and GREENLAND law enforcement agencies to establish the rule of law. This requires the brigade to train and mentor newly assigned GREENLAND constabulary and police until they are capable of assuming the execution of all local police functions.

7-456. Military police corrections support to GREENLAND is critical. Detainees that have committed crimes against GREENLAND are managed and should not be transferred to GREENLAND police or corrections custody until the GREENLAND individuals manning these facilities are trained, disciplined, and equipped to hold them safely and securely. The status of detainees determines the manner in which they are processed, the degree of due process they are afforded, and whether their offense is military or criminal in nature. Detainee status and identification develops and determines eventual rehabilitative, reconciliatory, and release strategies. Large detainee populations are fertile ground for insurgent, extremist, and criminal recruitment, development, and growth if not processed quickly and effectively. The development and growth of insurgent and/or criminal networks, if not identified and mitigated, poses significant threats to the cadre and the detainee population.

118TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE

7-457. The 118th Civil Affairs Brigade is the division lead for this supporting line of operations. Unless the GREENLAND government is viable and exercises its authority effectively throughout the country, little will have been gained in the long run because of the recent combat operations. The brigade leads the division’s coordination efforts with GREENLAND agencies at all levels in the planning and execution of civil control. This brigade’s general tasks include—

Identifying, validating, or evaluating GREENLAND infrastructure.

Understanding the needs of the local populations and institutions in terms of civil affair’s functional specialties.

Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of GREENLAND‘s civilian populations and institutions in terms of the functional specialties.

Performing liaison functions between the division, other governmental, and civilian—U.S., GREENLAND, international, and private volunteer—agencies.

Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational support to civil control activities.

Participating in the execution of selected support to civil control activities as needed or directed.

Performing quality-control assessments of support to civil control activities and costs.

Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of support to civil control operations.

Coordinating and synchronizing transition of support to civil control operations from the 52nd Division to the GREENLAND government.

7-458. The 118th Civil Affairs Brigade’s functional specialty cell is the lead divisional organization for civil control. The functional specialists within that cell are the primary special staff officers that the division will use to plan and assess this temporary civil control mission. These functional specialists receive guidance from U.S. Department of State and Justice level representatives working with the GREENLAND national government. There may be multinational or international organizations operating within GREENLAND that will participate in the restoration of civil control.

7-459. The division civil-military operations center is organized and lead by 118th Brigade personnel. This center recommends to the division G-3 those public outreach and community rebuilding programs, in priority, which should be initiated to help restore the physical, economic, and moral well being of the civilian population of the division’s area of operations. That recommendation is based on the tactical situation. The 118th Civil Affairs Brigade personnel meets with local GREENLAND leaders on a regular basis, assesses their needs, and passes the appropriate information to the appropriate units so that any necessary corrective actions can occur.

555TH ENGINEER BRIGADE

7-460. For this line of effort, the 555th Engineer Brigade provides backup construction support to the building or refurbishing of police stations, permanent traffic control points, courtrooms, and detention facilities for the division’s BCTs. The division G-3 tasks the brigade to provide that support as needed. The brigade actively searches out sources of building and fortification material within GREENLAND that it can make available to engineer elements within the division’s BCTs. It also provides additional technical expertise to support the division and its subordinate brigade public outreach and community rebuilding programs.

RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES

7-461. Essential services fit in two categories. The first category includes immediate humanitarian needs of GREENLAND civilians located within the division’s area of operations, such as food, water, shelter, and public health support to sustain the population until divisional units restore or develop local civil services. While not equipped to provide a full range of relief capabilities, divisional units are involved in these efforts because they have the organization, presence, communications, transportation, and many relief assets necessary to respond effectively. However, in a comprehensive approach, divisional units work from the outset with other actors such as other U.S. government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.

7-462. The second category includes the long-term services that GREENLAND civil authorities eventually will provide. These include sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations (SWEAT-MSO). Depending on the circumstances, “other considerations” can include religious requirements, transportation, communications, arts and culture, or recreation programs such as parks or athletics. While not matters of life-or-death, a functioning society requires these considerations. (See Appendix C of FM 3-34.170 for more information on SWEAT-MSO.)

7-463. The restoration of essential services includes several necessary conditions:

Access to and delivery of needs and services.

Access to and delivery of education.

Return and resettlement of dislocated civilians, including refugees and internally displaced persons.

Social reconstruction.

7-464. The division establishes these conditions by performing the following subordinate tasks:

Provide essential civil services.

Help with civilian dislocation.

Support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.

Support nonfood relief programs.

Support public health programs.

Support education programs.

The division helps provide the population’s immediate humanitarian and other needs by conducting this list of tasks. The conduct of these tasks supports and enables other actors to become responsible for conducting these tasks as they become operational within the division’s area of operations.

7-465. This line of operation is a shaping operation for the division. The division’s four objectives for this line of effort are the restoration of the regional electrical power grid, water distribution, sewage treatment, and ground transportation networks within the division’s area of operations. Since these objectives are largely general engineering in nature, the 555th Engineer Brigade is the division lead for this line of operation. The 555th Engineer Brigade coordinates with the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade to ensure that maximum possible use is made of local contractor provided resources and laborers in an effort to provide increased opportunities for GREENLAND entrepreneurs and laborers which will help stabilize the local economy.

DIVISION MAIN COMMAND POST

7-466. The division current operations integrating cell tasks the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade and other divisional units to conduct reconnaissance to answer information requirements related to this line of operation. The division plans cell is involved in this line of operation. There are three primary reasons for this—

The protracted time period required to rehabilitate key infrastructure.

The need to coordinate reconstruction plans with multiple organizations and agencies external to the division.

The lead time necessary to obtain required resources—both financial and specialized equipment and repair parts.

7-467. This command post ensures that the division’s efforts along this line of effort reflect the five stability principles addressed. Based on the answers provided to various information requirements, the division and subordinate BCTs determines if it brings relief resources to the population or the population to centralized locations. Transportation assets within the division BCTs or the supporting sustainment brigade may need to support these civilian movements.

7-468. Divisional plans and orders for this line of operations address the provision of adequate security to ensure that food and other supplies are not diverted from their intended recipients and displaced civilians are not mistreated. Divisional units will use leaflets, signs, radio broadcasts, and loudspeakers to instruct GREENLAND civilians on how, when, and where they can obtain relief supplies and report criminal acts although literacy rates may limit the effectiveness of these measures. Positive control over relief supplies is maintained as long as possible to prevent pilferage and to ensure that adequate amounts are available. In extreme cases, the division transportation officer coordinates the use of airdrops to get these supplies to the necessary locations.

7-469. All three integrating cells within the division’s main command post monitor and assess the status of this line of operation. Each focuses on their associated timeframes. Many of these assessments include nontraditional inputs, such as the cost and availability of food in local markets and the number and types of attacks on vulnerable minority groups. As a result, they provide and receive appropriate information from the division CMOC, maneuver brigades, and higher headquarters.

7-470. The division assistant chief of staff, financial management (G-8) arranges for the provision of the resources necessary to conduct restoration and reconstruction operations and accounting for the expenditure of resources. There are different sources of funding for these activities. The G-8 works closely with the division staff judge advocate to ensure that funds are being properly expended.

7-471. To meet the immediate medical needs of the GREENLAND population, medical planners from the division surgeon staff section and the supporting 48th Medical Brigade (Support) get involved early in the division’s planning process. The division coordinates with U.S. country team, the GREENLAND ministry of health and agriculture, and those relief organizations such as U.S. Agency for International Development and the United Nations World Food Program that choose to cooperate with the division. This coordination prevents duplication of effort and ensures the availability and proper distribution of food, water, medical supplies, and other support.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

7-472. This unit does not actively participate in activities related to this line of operations except by employing vetted local vendors for those supplies approved for local procurement and labor and other services. Assigned Soldiers in this and other divisional units may choose to support local charitable causes, such a adopting a local school or relief center.

1/52 INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 2/52 ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 1/25 STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 2/25 SBCT, AND 99TH GA MOTORIZED BRIGADE

7-473. Army units distribute military rations such as meals, ready-to-eat or humanitarian daily rations rapidly, but they are costly to provide over extended periods and stocks may be limited. Some meals, ready-to-eat, however, may not conform to local religious or cultural dietary norms. These brigades develop an ability to provide easily mass-produced food—soups, rice, or porridges. They transfer these efforts to GREENLAND and other actors quickly. It is necessary for these brigades to provide utensils such as bowls, fuel, hygienic cooking facilities, and clean-up capability. Security of food distribution networks is maintained. Units deliver bulk water as necessary. They establish and enforce interim sanitation, wastewater, and waste disposal standards and services.

7-474. It is necessary for these brigades to provide emergency shelter to GREENLAND civilians. This includes pre-fabricated or improvised tents, blankets, heaters, and mosquito nets. The brigades and subordinate battalion use materials from one damaged building on another building as a temporary measure to make the second building habitable. If the brigades provide materials and other support, civilians build their own huts or other traditional dwellings. Some of these restored buildings are used as interim schools after the initial crisis has passed.

7-475. When directed, maneuver brigades provide emergency medical support to GREENLAND civilians suffering from injury, illness, or other conditions, such as childbirth. Brigade medical personnel augment reconnaissance patrols or other missions to give their parent units increased medical capabilities when working and interacting with GREENLAND civilians.

7-476. Additionally, the maneuver brigades participate in community relations-type activities, such as adopting schools located near their bases and assisting GREENLAND charitable organizations, whenever possible to promote a favorable view of coalition forces, their activities, and goals. They help division information-related activities by distributing leaflets, posters, and handbills developed in response to the information operations appendix (appendix 15 of annex C) of the division operations order. If required they distribute the means, such as radios, televisions, antennas, and prerecorded media players, to enable the civilian populace to listen to electronic media explaining U.S. goals and objectives.

7-477. These units participate in conducting infrastructure recovery operations within the division area of operations in the following ways. They adapt their concepts of operations and schemes of maneuver to project critical infrastructure and prevent further damage to critical infrastructure systems whenever and wherever possible. They used vetted local vendors whenever possible to provide general labors and other services, such as dining, laundry, and bath necessary to support mission accomplishment over a prolonged period. They ensure that their Soldiers do not destroy or vandalize local property. Additionally, these units provide area security for reconstruction teams operating in their areas. These reconstruction teams may be from the 555th Engineers, international or local civilian contractors, multinational civil engineers, GREENLAND civil authorities, or a combination of these sources.

11TH COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE

7-478. This unit contributes to this line of operations by employing vetted local vendors for labor and services and ensuring Soldiers do not want to only destroy or vandalize local property. On a case by case basis, when tasked by the G-3, it provides lift assets to support the reconstruction operations of other divisional units, U.S. governmental agencies, the GREENLAND government, contractors, international, and private organizations.

27TH SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE

7-479. The 27th Sustainment Brigade works with the public transportation and civilian supply functional teams from the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade, contractors, and GREENLAND civil authorities to restore civilian transportation and distribution capabilities and skills within the area of operation. It employs vetted local vendors for labor, supplies, and services. The logistics support based established by the 27th Sustainment Brigade within the division base camp is the location into which all reconstruction supplies coming from venders located external to the division’s area initially flow. Supplies are then pushed to individual job sites within the division area according to priorities of resupply established by the G-3.

48TH MEDICAL BRIGADE (SUPPORT)

7-480. This unit contributes to this line of effort by advising and assisting the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade’s public health team, international health organizations, and local GREENLAND medical organizations in restoring medical care to GREENLAND civilians. It also employs vetted local vendors for common medical supplies authorized for local procurement and services. Soldiers from this brigade may need to support division medical personnel in the operating existing civilian medical facilities and conducting civilian vaccination programs.

56TH BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE

7-481. This unit responds to the G-2’s reconnaissance taskings related this line of operation. It also employs vetted local vendors for laborers, common supplies, and services.

92ND MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

7-482. This unit’s actions along the “secure” line of effort applies on this line of effort by advising and assisting the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade’s public safety and civil defense team, Department of Justice, and local GREENLAND law enforcement agencies in restoring the rule of law within the division’s area. This includes the establishment of local police stations and corrections facilities. The brigade stations a squad in each police station as they are activated to serve as mentors and trainers for GREENLAND police to reinforce the training the GREENLAND police received at the national police academy. The brigade escorts select commercial and military convoys containing high priority reconstruction-related supplies and special equipment to prevent their destruction by terrorists and insurgents. It also employs vetted local vendors for laborers, common supplies, and services.

118TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE

7-483. The brigade’s public transportation, public works, and civil defense functional teams plays a key role in infrastructure recovery. They are responsible for ensuring that GREENLAND civilian requirements and priorities are included into the 52nd Division’s infrastructure reconstruction plans.

555TH ENGINEER BRIGADE

7-484. The 555th advises and assists their GREENLAND civilian and military counterparts (within the limits of legal and regulatory guidance) in the reconstruction of GREENLAND infrastructure—highways, railways, sewer, area power, health clinics and hospitals, and public water treatment—within the division’s area of operations. This requires the brigade to survey the area to determine the current condition of the public infrastructure and prepare plans to repair damage and build new facilities to meet X Corps/coalition force land component standards with emphasis on the restoration of the regional electrical power grid, water distribution, sewage treatment, and ground transportation networks. The brigade also conducts any required environmental studies.

7-485. The brigade consults with military and civilian centers of excellence located in the U.S. or elsewhere as necessary to resolve complex engineering problems associated with this line of operation. The brigade coordinates its actions with contracting teams from the Army Field Support Brigade so that both U.S. and international civilian engineering firms and GREENLAND engineering companies. One of the aims of that coordination is to ensure that the money spent to repair infrastructure will also result in unemployed or underemployed civilians within the area of operation being put to constructive work as a means of returning stability to the area.

SUPPORT TO GOVERNENCE

7-486. Good governance includes the following necessary conditions:

Provision of essential services.

Stewardship of state resources.

Political moderation and accountability.

Civic participation and empowerment.

7-487. Divisional units will support governance by accomplishing the following subordinate tasks:

Support the development of local governance.

Support anticorruption initiatives.

Support elections.

7-488. The active support and participation of the local GREENLAND civilian population is important to accomplishing the 52nd Division’s mission of conducting this primary stability task. The image that the 52nd Division wants to have in the minds of U.S., GREENLAND, and international civilians observing the division’s operations is that the division competently and professionally supports the restoration of GREENLAND civilian governance within its area of operations. It respects the cultural heritage and religious beliefs of the GREENLAND civilian population. This line of effort is a shaping operation for the division. The 52nd Division information operations special staff officer within the G-3 is the division lead for this line of effort.

7-489. The 118th Civil Affairs Brigade’s civil information officer, the joint MISO task force supporting the European Command commander, and the division public affairs office are synchronized into the delivery of information that contributes to the development of favorable perceptions of divisional activities within this line of operation in GREENLAND civilians and international observers. Close coordination for timing and dissemination is critical for success. Accurately informing the public about ongoing activities will broaden popular support for the division’ operations and mission.

7-490. Operating within established international law and norms of behavior is important. Adherence to the values and goals we claim to espouse is central to success since actions speak louder than words. One picture of a GREENLAND civilian being mistreated or U.S. troops acting in an undisciplined and destructive manner will counteract days, weeks, and months of favorable media coverage.

DIVISION MAIN COMMAND POST

7-491. Initially, the division vets all the GREENLAND officials it works with. These GREENLAND personnel help the 52nd Division by providing advice and administering essential services. The division G-2 and supporting counterintelligence elements identify competent, honest officials with histories relatively clean of abuses or other misconduct. Since the 52nd Division’s area of operations was recently liberated, most of the area’s former GREENLAND officials and civil servants are not currently able to resume their previous positions and responsibilities. The G-2 looks closely at any GREENLAND civil servants that REDLAND retained in position during their short occupation.

7-492. The division current operations integrating cell with the advice of the intelligence cell tasks the 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade and other divisional units to conduct reconnaissance and analysis to answer information requirements related to this line of operation. The current operations integrating cell forwards requests for information to other appropriate agencies as necessary. These agencies include the X Corps/coalition force land component operational intelligence and fires cells, and the intelligence center, the MISO task force of the joint task force. Relevant information will also be requested from other U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of State.

7-493. The division current operations integrating cell coordinates public meetings between the division senior leadership and GREENLAND civilians. This coordination can be extremely difficult. As the number of local and international spectators attending these meetings increases, the associated physical requirements also increase drastically. Security and safety issues become more acute. The mediator must weigh concerns for security against the advantages gained by such a public displays.

7-494. The division information special staff officer incorporates information-related activities into all division operations through staff coordination with the division’s three integrating cells. The planning, preparing, executing, and assessment of information-related activities are addressed in FM 3-13. The routine integration of lethal and nonlethal capabilities in the accomplishment of division objectives reduces collateral damage and second and third order unintended effects.

7-495. The information environment extends down to the average civilian and Soldier. Local events and the immediate impressions of individuals about those events can have international significance as the global media broadcasts them. The goals of the division’s information-related activities include reassuring, persuading, and influencing the locals within the division’s area of operations and the local region to consent to our stability and reconstruction operations and to work with divisional units as we seek to reestablish GREENLAND civilian governance. Since the GREENLAND civilian population was previously subject to REDLAND propaganda, they need objective, factual, truthful, and credible information. The division’s information-related activities need to propagate the core message, explaining the objectives and role of the forces, update the message and information in a consistent manner.

7-496. Additionally, the information operations staff synchronizes the dissemination of information through the current operations integrating cell, such as minefield locations, how to report or turn in weapons, and new or revised ordnances. The information operations staff requests joint MISO assets to produce and disseminate this information using various means including: leaflets, posters, handbills, interviews, as well as loudspeaker, radio, and television broadcasts that are beyond the organic capabilities of the division’s supporting tactical MISO company. The division’s information operations staff may also require the use of electronic warfare or signals intelligence assets to locate and counter any REDLAND radio/TV transmitters trying to destabilize the situation while simultaneously securing our own use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

7-497. The public affairs officer assists the division’s information operations efforts by conducting public affairs planning, developing information strategies, and facilitating media operations that contribute to enhancing key publics’ knowledge of U.S. intentions, capabilities and alliances. This includes the internal publics of operation participants, the American public, the citizens of the area of operations, and global, international publics. The division public affairs office will conduct regular information sharing sessions with local, national, and international media. The division commander, assistant division commanders, and primary staff officers will also conduct regular briefings to media and government officials that address progress along this line of operation.

1/52 INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 2/52 ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 1/25 STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 2/25 STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, AND 99TH GA MOTORIZED BRIGADE

7-498. The U.S. brigades have only a limited time to establish local governance and gain the support of GREENLAND’s civilian population. These brigades are responsible for initially reconstituting GREENLAND civilian leadership at multiple subordinate levels within their respective areas of operations. Units seek out good candidates rather than relying on self selected individuals. They incorporate surveys, screenings, and interviews to obtain information about prospective GREENLAND officials. They focus on local governance using a bottom-up approach from the village or district level. The battalion and company commanders in these brigades identify and potentially designate interim local leaders based on the recommendations of social—tribal or religious—leaders or other knowledgeable personnel, such as a supporting human terrain team. Initial appointments will have provisions and a limited term. Salaries associated with these positions are sufficient so that local officials do not need to use corrupt measures to make an adequate living. Subsequent terms depend on the official’s performance with inadequate performers replaced. Such actions should be transparent and defensible based on clear and logical standards. When possible, they crosscheck information with multiple sources to form an accurate personality folder of these officials, ensuring that descriptions are not skewed by those with grudges or ulterior motives. The division and each U.S. brigade will rely heavily on advice provided by the leadership of the 99th GA Motorized Brigade.

7-499. Each brigade should take care to ensure that all local factions are represented in these newly reestablished local governing bodies and that the human rights of minority groups are maintained. Initially these local governing bodies may be asked to provide advice. Later, as competence is demonstrated, they can be given clearly defined responsibilities and commensurate authorities. Care should also be taken to ensure that technical expertise necessary to the operation of local governance is retained.

7-500. Along with identifying local leaders to work with, these brigades identify and secure facilities necessary for local governments to operate. As previously addressed in the civil security discussion, these facilities include schools, courthouses, police stations, jails, as well as electric generations, water purification, and sewage treatment plants. In addition to normal local governmental services (SWEAT-MSO) other important service categories, such as radio, television, and telephone may require early U.S. involvement. These brigades and their subordinate units may have to rehabilitate these facilities using their organic capabilities and available GREENLAND contractors and laborers so that they can function at least at a minimal level. As GREENLAND authorities regain the capabilities to perform local governance, these brigades will continue to provide resources—such as money, expendable supplies, and generators—to sustain local government agencies until they become self-sufficient. Each brigade monitors the consumption of these resources within their respective areas of operations to provide accountability to ensure that these local civilian agencies use these resources for their intended purposes. Once GREENLAND authorities assume responsibility for local governance, brigades will carefully avoid undermining the legitimacy of these local governments.

7-501. In the chaos following the expulsion of REDLAND forces from GREENLAND, some individuals will be involved in corrupt activities designed to enrich themselves or their associates. Corruption is an obstacle to the division’s stability efforts. It impedes economic growth, hinders the provision of essential services, and detracts from security efforts. Each brigade relies on area studies and available subject matter experts to determine the local cultural norms regarding these practices—such as extortion, bribes, favoritism, nepotism, and diverting resources from their intended uses. They will implement anticorruption precautions from the outset.

7-502. Each brigade determines voter identification requirements for local elections if those requirements have not been established by the GREENLAND government. This involves establishing or verifying a voter registry. It may involve issuing temporary identification cards to GREENLAND civilians within their respective areas of operations. As GREENLAND governmental agencies conduct elections or referenda each brigade will maintain a secure environment within their respective areas of operations so that individuals can debate and resolve political issues without violence. Election periods require an increased presence by U.S. and GREENLAND security forces, strong information-related activities to encourage participation and responsible behavior. Heightened security is needed along routes used by voters to travel and from polling sites. Security is also increased around political rallies, media centers, international observers, and GREENLAND candidates.

11TH COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE

7-503. On a case by case basis, when tasked by the G-3, the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade provides lift assets to support the reestablishment of local governance. This includes transporting subject matter experts to survey and repair key portions of the local infrastructure when ground transportation is not feasible. It also includes on occasion transporting GREENLAND civilian authorities with their U.S. military or civilian advisors. These actions contribute to conducting the division’s information-related activities that support the development or retention of favorably perceptions by the GREENLAND civilian populace toward the 52nd Division’s mission and presence within the country. Other missions that this brigade might be called on to support include the transport of media to and from high priority events that they could not get to in time to meet their deadline requirements by use of their private ground transportation or when it would be too risky for them to use that ground transportation. Another example could be the transport of GREENLAND civilian leaders or important leaders of international organizations to CMOC meetings. Additionally, the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade also participates in community relations-type activities.

27TH SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE, 48TH MEDICAL BRIGADE (SUPPORT), 92ND MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, AND 555TH ENGINEER BRIGADE

7-504. The Soldiers of these units support the governance line of operation by performing their day-to-day duties in a professional manner while treating the GREENLAND civilian inhabitant of the area with respect. Because of the special skills of the Soldiers assigned to these units and the specific capabilities of their parent units these organizations will play an important part in standing up minimal essential government services (SWEAT-MSO) within the division’s area of operations. They conduct community relations activities and distribute printed and other media that helps inform GREENLAND civilians of coalition, X Corps/coalition force land component, and division goals, and objectives in addition to other useful information.

118TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE

7-505. The 118th Civil Affairs Brigade will be heavily involved in advising GREENLAND authorities in conducting governance and performing governmental functions within the limits of the division’s authority. This brigade supports this line of operation by:

Helping the division’s BCTs identify, validate, and evaluate GREENLAND civilian infrastructure.

Assisting the division’s BCTs in understanding the needs of GREENLAND’s local populations and institutions in terms of the six functional specialties of civil affairs—governance, economic stability, infrastructure, public health and welfare, public education and information, and rule of law.

Monitoring and anticipating future GREENLAND requirements in terms of the six functional specialties.

Performing liaison functions between the division and civilian agencies.

Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational support to governance.

Assisting the division’s BCTs and the 99th GA Motorized Brigade in the execution of support to governance subordinate tasks as needed or directed.

Performing quality control assessments on the execution of the division’s BCTs execution of support to governance operations and costs.

Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of support to governance operations between the division’s BCTs and the 99th GA Motorized Brigade and GREENLAND civil authorities.

Coordinating and synchronizing transition of support to governance functions from divisional elements to the GREENLAND government.

7-506. Personnel assigned to the 118th Civil Affairs Brigade meet regularly with local GREENLAND formal and informal leaders. This provides these local leaders with a means of influencing the division’s actions and priorities. The personal relationships established in these meetings provide another avenue for informing influential GREENLAND civilians of U.S. goals and objectives.

7-507. Conducting these public meetings are an effective vehicle for widely demonstrating trust and cooperation between divisional and GREENLAND civilian political, economic, and social leadership. Public meetings also help establish an air of permanence and add to the legitimacy of the efforts of the leadership. They are also useful when there is limited literacy or public written and electronic communications means have been disrupted.

ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

7-508. Long-term stability requires sustainable economic and infrastructure development. The availability of food and water, shelter, means of economic self-sufficiency, transportation, and communications contributes to that stability. Efforts by the division to preserve economic and infrastructure assets, such as factories, transportation nodes, road networks, and markets, dramatically reduces the time required to reestablish a sustainable level of economic activity. After gaining situational awareness of the current status of this supporting line of effort the division will work with GREENLAND national and local civilian authorities, other U.S. government departments, international organizations, and private organizations to developing and implement economic and infrastructure development plans that establish the following conditions:

Employment generation

Macroeconomic stabilization.

Market economy sustainability.

Control over any illicit economies and economic-based threats to stability.

Functioning civil societal infrastructure and local community development.

Many divisional actions along the other lines of operations will impact on this line of operation.

7-509. The division and its subordinate brigades will concentrate on conducting the following economic and infrastructure development subordinate tasks:

Support private-sector development.

Protect natural resources and environment.

Support agricultural development programs.

Restore transportation infrastructure.

The division supports efforts along the other subordinate tasks conducted by the joint task force and X Corps/coalition force land component according to published orders and policy. Each BCT and the 99th GA Motorized Brigade have the lead for the conduct of this task within their respective areas of operation. The division’s other brigades support division efforts along this line of operation.

7-510. Initially division actions along this line of operations are directed towards the prevention of further deterioration of the economy. Such actions at this stage are essential to the eventual revitalization of the local economy. These actions include the seizure and protection of records, closing of financial institutions, location of and preservation of stockpiles of essential goods, submission of detailed reports on conditions within the area, ordering key personnel to remain in their jobs, posting proclamations, screening of personnel, and elementary restoration of transportation networks. The development of overall priorities and required coordination between subordinate brigades is a division headquarters responsibility.

7-511. Later as combat no longer poses an immediate threat to human life and property, the major economic problem will be to start GREENLAND civilian actions that can support the division’s military efforts and minimize drains on military resources while, at the same time, laying the groundwork for larger reconstruction efforts and return to GREENLAND civil control. Division activities along this line of effort will remain diverse in nature. These actions may include but are not limited to:

Screen GREENLAND civilians occupying positions of economic power.

Reopen financial institutions with appropriate limitations on their operations.

Impose direct economic controls, such as price, rationing, wage, manpower, and rent controls.

Operate industry.

Restore agricultural production and distribution.

Survey and transfer goods and services as dictated by military requirements.

Protect special classes of property, such as cultural and historical artifacts.

The U.S. country team or higher headquarters will provide general economic directives that will require the division to expand to meet the local situation.

DIVISION MAIN COMMAND POST

7-512. The division chief of sustainment along with that individual’s subordinate coordinating staff sections—G-1, G-4, and G-8—play an important role in planning and assessing actions along this line of operation. The division G-1 will screen available personnel records for Soldiers with formal education in the conduct of these tasks as evidenced by formal degrees, such as a master of business administration or civil engineering certification, or practical experience, such as internships with the Bureau of Land Management, work on family or commercial farms, and commercial marketing experience. The division G-4 coordinates the procurement of many Class X items. The division transportation officer will need to ensure that any operationally significant transportation shortfalls associated with economic development are mitigated by the use military transportation assets until adequate civilian assets can be made available. The G-8 works closely with the Staff Judge Advocate to ensure that only properly authorized funds are expended within this line of operation.

7-513. The division engineer develops recommended priorities for infrastructure restoration and construction projects for the division commander to approve. These priorities are developed after coordination with the servicing Corps of Engineers office, the 555th Engineer Brigade, the maneuver brigades, the country team, and appropriate GREENLAND officials.

7-514. Some activities along this line of effort approach the complexity of combat operations. An example would be the movement and installation of major power generators needed to restore the civilian commercial power grid within GREENLAND. The destruction or damage of these generators by insurgents or terrorists would be a major propaganda coup by these disaffected elements and seriously impede division efforts to restore the local economy for a considerable period. The division current operations integrating cell will control these categories of activities.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

7-515. This unit provides limited economic relief and assistance to those GREENLAND civilians initially located in the vicinity of its portion of the division base camp by jobs that involve the provision of unskilled labor. Individuals providing that unskilled labor that enhance conditions within the main command post and the battalion’s associated life support area must be properly vetted.

1/52 INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 2/52 ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 1/25 STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 2/25 STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, AND 99TH GA MOTORIZED BRIGADE

7-516. Creating jobs is a keystone of any economic recovery program. These brigades provide immediate, short-term opportunities that yield quick impact on the economic conditions of their respective areas of operations. These job opportunities are often associated with the repair or provision of critical infrastructure (SWEAT-MSO). Care should be taken to provide jobs for all ages and genders. In many places, the key may be simply to enable GREENLAND civilians to return to their fields and pastures to resume farming.

7-517. Jobs that favor quick impact cannot be substituted for long-term civilian careers. After a short initial period the brigades assess the labor force for critical skill requirements and identify shortfalls by surveying local marketplaces, factories, farms, and individual micro or small businesses. Ideally, any new employment opportunities identified should accommodate physical disabilities of former combatants and civilians. This survey should also identify local pay norms for different categories of labor.

7-518. Agriculture is the foundation of food security. Beyond supporting food security a viable agricultural market economy relies on links with all parts of the GREENLAND economy, providing crops, livestock, and other products vital to the functioning of local, national, and even international markets. While the U.S. Departments of Agriculture and State are responsible for the long-term growth of the sector of the economy and will work with other outside and GREENLAND development agencies these brigades have related tasks to perform. They provide humanitarian assistance, including food aide, within their respective areas of operations until those areas can achieve self-sustaining production. That food aid has the potential to distort farm markets by driving down the price of local produce, discouraging local production, and conflicting with efforts to stimulate private-sector development and farm employment. These brigades will reduce, as soon as is practicable, the use of imported relief foods to allow the use of locally produced food stocks.

7-519. Each brigade assesses the status of farms within its area soon after it assumption of responsibility for that are of operations. Each brigade will use Soldiers with agricultural education or work experience to perform these surveys if agricultural experts from outside the brigade are not available. They secure important agricultural facilities, such as grist mills, and irrigation dams. Where necessary they help local farmers rebuild irrigation systems. They protect water sources. They provide animals to be used as future food sources or as work animals were necessary. They will channel food aid to only those locations and individuals that need the aid. They will encourage enterprise restoration or creation that establish farm-market networks that support the food security of authorized groups and prevent the diversion of food to insurgent, terrorist, or criminal elements through the use of population and resource control measures. This may require temporarily providing security to routes or convoys moving food stocks to authorized markets.

7-520. Each brigade is alert for the need to arrange for start-up funds. These are provided through the commander’s emergency response program and other funding sources. Commanders balance funding of new businesses with modernizing and expanding existing businesses. Obstacles, such as lack of security around markets and internal trade routes, political and social barriers to entry, high export and import taxes, lack of business credit, and lack of electric power, to private-sector development should be identified so that the brigades can take steps to mitigate those obstacles. Some of these later obstacles are beyond the capability of the brigades to mitigate and will require resolution at the national level. The civil security line of effort impacts this line of effort because these newly started or revised businesses must be protected from robbery and extortion by criminal and other elements.

7-521. The brigades strengthen the local economy of their respective areas of operations through the use of purchase orders for locally available supplies and outsourcing the conduct of selected services, such as laundry and waste management, with local businesses when possible and desirable. Each brigade conducts a risk assessment to determine the risk of using locally obtained supplies and contract support capabilities compared to the potential positive and negative impacts on the local community. For example, local businesses may be incapable of providing the required support reliably; local contracting may create security risks; or significantly inflate the cost of these items or services with an associated detrimental economic effect.

7-522. Each of these brigades is required to protect natural resources located within its area of operation. Each brigade conducts a survey soon after assuming responsibility for their area of operations to determine the location and amounts of natural resources located within that area and the condition of the facilities developed to extract those resources. Each brigade secures sensitive or extremely valuable natural resources to prevent their diversion to unauthorized individuals or groups—insurgents, terrorists, or criminal elements—until the appropriate GREENLAND agency or business can assume responsibility. They may need to secure routes at least on a periodic basis from these mills and mines to where these resources can be brought to market. Through the conduct of reconnaissance and police intelligence operations each brigade watches for indications that a black market economy in these resources is developing.

7-523. Engineer units in each of these brigades assess the current transportation infrastructure located within the respective areas of operations of their parent brigade. They work with available local GREENLAND authorities and civil affairs Soldiers to prioritize the repair or construction of transportation projects. Projects beyond the limited capabilities of brigade engineers will be the responsibility of the 555th Engineer Brigade or the servicing Corps of Engineers office. Transportation infrastructure projects can be a source of temporary employment for laborers.

11TH COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE

7-524. This brigade transports teams making those surveys necessary to provide the information required to develop situational understanding and appropriate plans for the improvement of the local economy and related infrastructure within this line of effort according to taskings from the division current operations integrating cell when the use of ground transportation is not practical. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade will also transport quality control teams inspecting the performance of high value projects in accordance with division taskings. It may be tasked to provide aerial reconnaissance, surveillance, and quick reaction force support for military and civilian convoys transiting the division area of operations carrying high value cargos. This same aerial R&S support may be used to help protect natural resources within the division area of operation.

27TH SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE

7-525. The logistics support based established by the 27th Sustainment Brigade within the division base camp is the location into which all economic and infrastructure development supplies not specifically intended for the maneuver brigades initially flow. These supplies are then pushed to the brigades according to priorities established by the G-3.

48TH MEDICAL (SUPPORT), 56TH BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE, AND 92ND MILITARY POLICE BRIGADES

7-526. These brigades do conduct activities that support this supporting line of effort. These activities are in addition to obtaining local procured supplies and services from approved local vendors. The preventative medicine and veterinarian capabilities of the 48th Medical Brigade (Support) will be used to inspect local farms, businesses, and factories for threats to occupational health and safety and to the local food supply. The reconnaissance, surveillance, and police intelligence capabilities of the 56th and 92nd Brigades will be directed towards deterring criminal and other threats to the local economy and detecting crimes when they do occur. The 92nd Military Police Brigade will help local GREENLAND police departments in the apprehension and detention of individuals and groups involved in economic crimes.

118TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE

7-527. This brigade lacks organic economic stability functional area specialists. If the European Command’s supporting civil affairs command is able to provide those specialists, then those specialists augment the division plans integrating cell and help develop division policy and plans for this line of operation. If those specialists cannot be provided, then the brigade uses its CMOC to coordinate division plans for this line of operations with appropriate members of the U.S. country team, GREENLAND civil authorities, and other outside groups.

555THH ENGINEER BRIGADE

7-528. The existence of a functioning transportation network is necessary to the economic and infrastructure development line of operation. The 555th Engineer Brigade is responsible for the overall assessment of the interrelationships of the different modes of transportation supporting the division area of operations, such as the road or rail network leading to a seaport or airport. The brigade staff assesses how well the critical road transportation components—chokepoints, hazardous materials, routes, key bridges, and so on—interrelate. Additionally, they assess the weight and volume of traffic the infrastructure can withstand. Some transportation infrastructure share rights-of-ways shared with other infrastructures such as between road and rail or between roads and communications lines. This includes assessing the vulnerabilities of that transportation infrastructure.

Chapter 8

Special Topics

The special topics discussed in this chapter are aspects of division operations that are not adequately addressed in the rest of this manual. These special topics are include division reconnaissance, division security, division mobility, division air support enablers, division counter-unmanned aerial system (UAS) operations, division cyberspace operations, and division as a regionally aligned force.

These topics were chosen based on observation of various mission command training program supported exercises of one type or another.

SECTION I - DIVISION RECONNAISSANCE

8-1. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). Those other detection methods include the use of probes, reconnaissance by fire, and other means to fight for information. Reconnaissance within the division is continuous and is a necessary precursor to all operations using available units and technical assets. Through reconnaissance the division identifies terrain characteristics, enemy and friendly obstacles to movement, and most importantly gains and maintains contact with the enemy. This allows the division commander to maneuver division forces freely and rapidly. Reconnaissance can also be used by the division to acquire knowledge about the civilian population. FM 3-90-2 establishes the doctrinal fundamentals and tactics of reconnaissance.

8-2. Effective reconnaissance and security are essential to all successful operations. Reconnaissance should not be confused with security operations although they are inextricably linked. Information collection and development through reconnaissance drive the division’s future operations and allow the division to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Reconnaissance orients on the enemy, terrain, infrastructure, and society to collect information that through analysis is turned into intelligence products that influence the conduct of current and future operations. Reconnaissance also verifies or refutes analyzed information produced during the conduct of intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

8-3. The division commander determines what information is available and what information needs to be collected. Reconnaissance is one means used to satisfy these information requirements. This information allows the commander to make sound decisions, conduct maneuver, and avoid being surprised by an enemy force. Information requirements are the basis for orders and missions governing the preparation of information collection plans. The commander relies on the division assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) for the majority of this analysis; however, the G-2 receives assistance from other staff officers in their respective fields of expertise.

8-4. Staff responsibilities for reconnaissance are clear (although different staff sections and oversee different reconnaissance means). While the division’s chief of staff coordinates the efforts of the coordinating and special staff, the division assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) has primary responsibility for the reconnaissance supporting an operation. The G-3 normally has staff responsibility for ground and air units. The G-2 normally has responsibility for the technical assets.

8-5. Although coordinating and special staff officers have reconnaissance responsibilities, the G-2 and the G-3 synchronize all planning to conduct information collection operations. The G-3 coordinates with the G-2 to integrate reconnaissance into the overall plan. The G-3 is responsible for preparing Annex L, Reconnaissance and Surveillance, of the plan or order. The chief of staff remains aware of the division’s information collection activities and ensures that the G-2 and G-3 synchronize their efforts. The chief of staff intervenes when necessary, but the commander is the final authority.

RECONNAISSANCE FORMS

8-6. The five forms of reconnaissance are—

Route reconnaissance.

Zone reconnaissance.

Area reconnaissance.

Reconnaissance in force.

Special reconnaissance.

These five forms of reconnaissance are defined in ADRP 3-90. Table 1-2 in FM 3-90-2 shows what types of Army dedicated reconnaissance units are typically assigned the missions of conducting the first four forms of reconnaissance. Special operations forces (SOF) conduct special reconnaissance. That manual also discuses each of these five reconnaissance forms and the tasks associated with the conduct of each form of reconnaissance.

RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS

8-7. There are seven fundamentals of successful reconnaissance. Commanders—

Ensure continuous reconnaissance.

Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.

Orient on the reconnaissance objective.

Report information rapidly and accurately.

Retain freedom of maneuver.

Gain and maintain enemy contact.

Develop the situation rapidly.

FM 3-90-2 discusses each of these seven reconnaissance fundamentals.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR DIVISION RECONNAISSANCE

8-8. Effective reconnaissance allows the division commander to gain and maintain contact with the enemy and to direct friendly units into the fight at opportune times and places. Units conducting reconnaissance orient on the reconnaissance objective. They fight for information when necessary but usually avoid decisive combat. They also provide the commander with the necessary information to keep other divisional units free from contact as long as possible, so that they can concentrate on conducting the division’s decisive operation. Reconnaissance before unit movements and occupation of assembly areas is critical to protecting the force and preserving combat power.

8-9. The division commander orients units tasked with a reconnaissance mission and division reconnaissance assets by identifying one or more reconnaissance objective within the area of operations. The reconnaissance objective is a terrain feature, geographic area, enemy force, adversary, or other mission or operational variable, such as civil considerations, about which the commander wants to obtain additional information (ADRP 3-90). The reconnaissance objective clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance effort by specifying which priority intelligence requirements to obtain from the reconnaissance effort. However, there are times in which the reconnaissance objective assigned to a unit or system will not be a priority intelligence requirement.

8-10. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). At the division echelon, reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence missions or operations are the primary means by which they commander plans, organizes, and executes those shaping operations or supporting efforts that answer the commander’s critical and other information requirements and support the division’s decisive operation or main effort. FM 3-55 discusses information collection as it is applied in all portions of the operations process.

CHARACTERISTICS OF DIVISION RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS

8-11. The division reconnaissance effort consists of a complementary combination of manned ground (mounted or dismounted) and air assets in subordinate units supported by technical systems. The information collected by the division reconnaissance effort feeds all of the warfighting functions. Information requirements provide added detail to the commander’s visualization of the battlefield. Regardless of whether the division is advancing or retreating, the division uses these assets and systems to detect enemy forces, maintain contact with those enemy forces, and use that information in the assessment of the enemy situation within its area of operations. The division staff synchronizes the reconnaissance effort and reports information requirements according to the division tactical standard operating procedures to facilitate mission accomplishment. However, the division commander must be careful not to over task or over extend the division’s dedicated information collection assets, such as the battlefield surveillance brigade’s counterintelligence, human intelligence, signals intelligence, and unmanned aircraft systems. (FM 3-55 provides additional information on all of the information collection assets available to a division.)

8-12. The commander uses all available resources, not just dedicated reconnaissance units, to satisfy existing priority and other information requirements. Spot reports from maneuver and reconnaissance units, and technical reports and analysis from supporting functional and multifunctional units develop the situation to enhance the commander’s ability to understand and visualize the operational environment. Engineer reconnaissance teams collect information concerning the terrain regarding trafficability and obstacles. (See Maneuver Support center of excellence publications for additional information on engineer reconnaissance.) CBRN reconnaissance teams determine the presence, absence, and extent of CBRN contamination as a component of the protection warfighting function. Both are key parts of intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Joint forward observers, fire support teams, and combat observation and lasing teams (COLTs) report combat information as they observe the battlefield. Any air defense units in the commander’s area of operations observe and report enemy aircraft and air corridors in use. This information supplements the air common operational picture provided by the radars found in the division headquarters battalion. The combination of all assets allows the division commander to visualize the battlefield and develop the situation with the smallest element while retaining combat power.

8-13. Effective reconnaissance requires a coordinated and focused team effort and is accomplished through an integration of units and technical assets. Employing ground reconnaissance and aerial reconnaissance in the same scheme of maneuver can increase the tempo of reconnaissance while integrating technical collection elements adds to the efforts ability to detect other available enemy signatures. Not all information collection assets are adequate for every situation. Commanders and staffs encounter problems, such as too few collectors for the amount of area they must observe, assets that cannot relocate as quickly as needed, or assets that are not fully effective for an environment, such as during the conduct of peace operations. These problems can degrade reconnaissance efforts, directly impacting the success of engagements and battles.

GROUND RECONNAISSANCE

8-14. Ground reconnaissance develops the situation in contact with the enemy to determine enemy composition, disposition, and strength and to confirm or deny planning assumptions impacting current and future operations. The division commander can use ground reconnaissance units to guide or orient the movement and maneuver of friendly forces to exploit weaknesses in the enemy’s defenses. However, they are generally limited in the depth to which they can conduct reconnaissance. All division units can and do perform some ground reconnaissance in the conduct of their operations to provide the commander with an all weather, eyes-on-target capability. The commander can employ available ground reconnaissance assets even when and where air and technical reconnaissance assets are ineffective, such as when weather conditions preclude the conduct of aerial reconnaissance.

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

8-15. Aerial reconnaissance gains and maintains enemy contact and develops the situation. Reconnaissance conducted by manned and unmanned aviation platforms complements ground reconnaissance by increasing the speed and depth with which reconnaissance can be conducted over an area. These systems can cover large areas relatively quickly. Of course there can be a loss of detail associated with the conduct of aerial reconnaissance as compared with ground reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance results can be used to effectively direct ground reconnaissance units to locations where their capabilities are most useful in answering the division’s priority intelligence requirements. Aerial reconnaissance systems operate over terrain that hinders ground reconnaissance operations, such as swamps, extremely rugged terrain, or deep snow.

8-16. Conducting aerial reconnaissance in an uncontested air environment normally involves less risk of loss to the system performing that reconnaissance than does the conduct of ground reconnaissance. The risk factor changes radically for the worse in a contested air environment where the enemy processes an integrated air defense system. The risk associated with aerial reconnaissance also increases in extreme weather conditions.

8-17. Aviation assets operate at a considerable depth far in advance of dedicated ground reconnaissance elements focused on the close fight. Under favorable conditions, aviation furnishes early information concerning the enemy’s general disposition and movements to a considerable depth beyond the forward edge of the battle area. These conditions provide the commander with additional time to react to the enemy. Attack reconnaissance helicopters and UASs use their optics, video, thermal imaging, electronic sensors, and communications capabilities to detect and report enemy activities. All types of aviation units create pilot reports when conducting their primary missions. These reports are often a source of valuable combat information.

TECHNICAL RECONNAISSANCE

8-18. Technical reconnaissance includes all electronic gathering methods. While several of these technical systems perform reconnaissance, most of these systems are considered surveillance platforms. The use of these technical means allows the division to cover extremely large areas or focus on very precise targets, such as a terrain choke point. Data from national and theater-level technical systems are provided to the division’s tactical commanders in near real time. Surveillance complements reconnaissance by cueing the commitment of reconnaissance assets against locations or specially targeted enemy units. Cueing involves the use of one or more methods of reconnaissance (air, ground, or technical) to provide information that directs collection by other systems. For example, Guardrail common sensor may intercept transmissions of a suspected enemy air defense site. This, in turn, may cue an unmanned UAS launch to confirm or deny this location. If detailed or first-hand reconnaissance is required, the commander may choose to dispatch a ground reconnaissance element. Cueing maximizes the efficient use of limited collection assets to support multiple, often competing, intelligence collection priorities. The complementary use of all these assets—ground, air, and technical—provides the commander an accurate picture of ongoing activities and the situation within the division’s area of operations.

8-19. Military intelligence units conduct both surveillance and reconnaissance missions. These units provide signals intelligence (SIGINT), unmanned aircraft systems sensor feeds, and human intelligence, counterintelligence, and downlinks from theater of operations and national assets. SIGINT support may include electronic intercept, direction finding, and signal terminal guidance. Theater of operations and national reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) systems provide dissemination of information and intelligence to the division commander and provide near real time imagery as a part of an integrated intelligence effort. Artillery and air defense target acquisition radars complement military intelligence surveillance systems as a part of that effort. Human intelligence collection occurs through face-to-face interrogation of captured enemy soldiers, screening of the civilian population, and debriefing of friendly Soldiers, such as scouts and SOF. Human intelligence operations will also include military source operations that are directed towards establishing human sources who agree to meet and cooperate with human intelligence collectors for the purpose of providing information.

DIVISION RECONNAISSANCE UNIT CHOICES

8-20. The division commander relies on the assets of brigade that are attached or under the operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of that commander to conduct division-level reconnaissance. Currently the battlefield surveillance brigade has the primary doctrinal responsibility for conducting R&S operations to answer the division’s priority intelligence requirements and other information requirements which in turn, enables the division commander to focus the elements of combat power to accomplish the division’s mission. The reconnaissance and security (R&S) brigade is corps primary reconnaissance organization. Depending on the situation the complete R&S brigade or a tailored task force from that brigade may support the division’s reconnaissance efforts. The division has to task one or more brigade combat teams (BCT) and the combat aviation brigade to perform the R&S functions typically performed by the battlefield surveillance brigade if the division does not have an attached, OPCON, or TACON battlefield surveillance brigade or access to the corps R&S brigade. Any unit that does not have the conduct of reconnaissance tasks as part of its mission essential task list (METL) will need to train on the conduct of these reconnaissance tasks to be able to execute reconnaissance to established standards.

8-21. The battlefield surveillance brigade currently has the resources and capabilities to execute R&S missions across the division’s area of operations without conflicting with BCT R&S activities. It can conduct a route, zone, or area reconnaissance. The scope of that zone is restricted to a two troop frontage, not the frontage of the division. The R&S brigade can also conduct a route, zone, or area reconnaissance. The R&S brigade’s reconnaissance capabilities are considerably larger than that of a battlefield surveillance brigade given the additional nine ground maneuver companies available in the R&S brigade. The division commander assigns either the battlefield surveillance brigade or the R&S brigade an area of operations designed to facilitate its R&S operations. Assignment of an area of operations to the battlefield surveillance brigade, however, requires the division commander to provide the brigade with enablers that allow it to perform all the doctrinal responsibilities associated with owning an area of operations.

8-22. If the division commander conducts a reconnaissance in force, then a BCT (including the R&S brigade if one is available) should be tasked to perform that form of reconnaissance. This is because the battlefield surveillance brigade lacks the organic capability to fight through enemy security elements to obtain the desired information about the enemy. The battlefield surveillance brigade bridges the gap between the tactical R&S executed at brigade level and the R&S activities executed at the division and higher echelons.

8-23. The battlefield surveillance brigade provides augmentation for other brigades as counterintelligence, human intelligence, signals intelligence, and UAS assets in response to taskings from the current operations integrating cell. These capabilities are provided by the corps expeditionary military intelligence brigade if the division is not supported by a battlefield surveillance brigade. In some situations, augmentation includes elements of the cavalry squadron. Information collected allows the division commander to assess, direct, and decide on courses of action based on the information gathered. The brigade also provides other divisional brigades with the assets, capabilities, or increased capacity required for a mission or operation.

NOTE: Current plans call for the deactivation of all battlefield surveillance brigades in the active component force structure by the end of fiscal year 2016. Seven reserve component battlefield surveillance brigades will remain in the force structure. After this date the division may have to task its other types of modular brigades to conduct this mission. Once this occurs the division commander has three options for conducting division-level reconnaissance. The first option is to direct each of its BCTs to conduct R&S designed to answer division priority intelligence requirements within their respective areas of operations. The second option is to task a single BCT to answer those division-level priority intelligence requirements. The third option is to detach a cavalry squadron or a maneuver battalion from an attached or OPCON BCT and task this detached unit to conduct R&S activities designed to answer division priority intelligence requirements. The division may receive long-range surveillance support from the corps long-range surveillance company.

8-24. Responsibility for conducting reconnaissance does not reside solely with specifically organized units. Every unit has an implied task to report information about the terrain, civilian activities, and friendly and enemy dispositions. This is regardless of its location and primary function. Troops in close combat and reconnaissance patrols of maneuver units at all echelons collect information on enemy units with which they are in contact. Within the division support area, the division reserve, functional and multifunctional support and sustainment elements, other governmental agencies, and multinational forces observe and report civilian and enemy activity and significant changes in terrain trafficability. Table 1-1 of FM 3-90-2 shows the typical R&S assets available at different echelons from the platoon to the corps echelon. However, that table does not current reflect the reconnaissance and security brigade.

8-25. Often during the conduct of a retrograde, only the commander in contact has accurate information concerning enemy unit locations, the capabilities of those same enemy units, and the course of action that they are pursuing. The division commander’s information collection requirements increase as division forces are echeloned to the rear and as friendly combat power in close proximity to the enemy is reduced. R&S systems remain well forward to locate enemy attempts to pursue, outflank, and isolate all or a portion of retrograding divisional force.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR RECONNAISSANCE TASK ORGANIZATION

8-26. Units conducting reconnaissance may require task organization to help them accomplish the information collection tasks. There are several aspects to consider when deciding on the necessary task organization. This includes a thorough review of the mission variables of METT-TC and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield. It also includes an evaluation of priorities and an evaluation of risk so the commander can make an informed and conscious decision on the level of risk that is acceptable.

8-27. The following bullet points address various aspects by warfighting function that the division staff should consider when recommending the task organization of units conducting reconnaissance. If the division is considering the conduct of a reconnaissance in force, special emphasis should be placed on the maneuver, mobility, and fires requirements. This is because fighting for information can be anticipated to be a key aspect of the mission.

Mission command.

▪   Level of headquarters (dependent on span of control).

▪   Unity of command required; discretion of the commander).

Movement and maneuver.

▪   Ground maneuver and reconnaissance and aviation attack and reconnaissance capabilities that depend on the number of routes or areas; size of the zone or area(s) assigned; anticipated enemy and the need to fight for information; speed required; detail required; mobility relative to the enemy and the main body.

▪   Mobility including engineer reconnaissance (dependent on obstacles anticipated and the detail required; detail of infrastructure required) and engineer mobility capabilities (dependent on obstacles anticipated and the requirement to breach; types and number of gaps anticipated and required to cross).

Intelligence.

▪   SIGINT capabilities (dependent on requirement to collect on aspects of enemy communications; distance from the main body and capabilities of SIGINT assets; site exploitation requirements).

▪   Human intelligence capabilities (dependent on time available to collect; information required; site exploitation requirements).

▪   TECHINT capabilities (dependent on time available to collect; information required; site exploitation requirements).

▪   UASs (dependent on unit capabilities; speed required; number and types of NAIs or reconnaissance objectives; terrain).

Fires.

▪   Indirect fires capabilities (dependent on organic capabilities; anticipated enemy and the need to fight for information; distance from the main body or supporting fires capabilities).

▪   Indirect fires radar capabilities (dependent on other units’ ability to provide radar coverage; distance from main body).

▪   Air defense capabilities (dependent on air threat and ability of other air defense artillery units to provide coverage).

Sustainment.

▪   Sustainment capabilities (dependent on the breadth and depth of the reconnaissance mission; organic sustainment capabilities; duration of the mission).

▪   Transportation capabilities (dependent on the mobility of the unit conducting reconnaissance; distance required to travel; time available; speed required).

Protection which includes CBRN reconnaissance and decontamination capabilities (dependent on anticipated CBRN threats); anticipated contaminated areas; CBRN sites anticipated to be encountered, and the detail of information required at each site).

SECTION II - DIVISION SECURITY

8-28. Security operations are those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force (ADRP 3-90). These operations are a part of every military operation along with reconnaissance. The ultimate goal of a division’s security operations is to protect the all subordinate divisional units from surprise, reduce the unknowns in any situation, and conserve the division’s combat power. The division may also be involved in providing security to the civilian population, civil institutions, and civilian infrastructure within the division’s area of operations.

8-29. The purposes of division security operations is to deny the enemy air and ground observers knowledge of what the division is doing and protect the division against surprise attack and observation by enemy air and ground forces. Security may be achieved by establishing protective measures or by conducting military deception operations that confuse and dissipate enemy attempts to interfere with the division’s operations. The effective execution of division security operations prevents the enemy from gaining an unexpected advantage over the division and it subordinate elements. Simultaneously the effective conduct of security operations allows the division to maintain its freedom of maneuver by providing reaction time and maneuver space.

8-30. The commander conducts security operations to the front, flanks, or rear of the division’s deployed forces. The main difference between the conduct of security and reconnaissance is that the conduct of security orients on the force or facility being protected, while reconnaissance is enemy and terrain oriented. Security operations are shaping operations. As a shaping operation, economy of force is often a condition of tactical security operations.

8-31. The division commander is responsible for the security of the entire division. In conducting security operations, a higher headquarters commander prescribes security measures for the force as a whole and coordinates those adopted by subordinate commanders. Subordinate commanders provide additional security as required for their own local protection.

8-32. Security orients primarily on the protected force, not the enemy. This section reminds the reader about the five security tasks, the five fundamentals of security operations, and the general considerations related to the conduct of security operations. It discusses division security operations in the offense and defense. Finally it addresses division area security operations.

SECURITY OPERATIONS TASKS

8-33. Security operations encompass five tasks—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security. These five security tasks are defined in ADRP 3-90. FM 3-90-2 discusses the critical tasks, organization of forces, control measures, and the planning and execution considerations associated with the conduct of the screen, guard, and cover tasks. Assets employed for reconnaissance also provide a degree of security by gaining and maintaining contact with enemy forces, collecting and providing information on enemy forces.

8-34. It is important that the division takes actions to preempt and counter the enemy’s reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition efforts. Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct mission; rather, it is a result of security operations. Units conduct traditional security tasks—screen, guard, cover, area, and local security—as well as many other activities, such as operations security, military deception, and physical security. The purpose is to counter the enemy’s reconnaissance effort and, in doing so, defeat or destroy hostile reconnaissance forces.

FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY OPERATIONS

8-35. Successful security operations depend on properly applying five fundamentals:

Provide early and accurate warning.

Provide reaction time and maneuver space.

Orient on the force or facility to be secured.

Perform continuous reconnaissance.

Maintain enemy contact.

FM 3-90-2 discusses each of these five security fundamentals.

SECURITY GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

8-36. All division forces have a security responsibility and are capable of conducting security operations of some type. Commanders may consider giving a cover force mission to a BCT or a maneuver battalion when weighing the mission variables of METT-TC during planning. As in reconnaissance operations, all divisional units-contribute to the division’s overall security situation. However, the R&S brigade is designed specifically to conduct security operations and is the preferred organization to conduct that mission if it is available to the division. The FM 3-90-2 discussions of the planning considerations for security missions apply to the conduct of division security operations.

DIVISION SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE OFFENSE

8-37. The division commander provides security to the division in the offense, just as it does in all other operations. The division uses available surveillance and fires assets in addition to maneuver units to provide that security. The division will also employ operations security, military deception, and obstacles to protect itself.

8-38. During offensive (and retrograde tasks), the speed at which the main body moves provides some measure of security. Rapidly moving units in open terrain may have an increased reliance on technical assets to provide advance warning of the presence of operationally or tactically significant enemy forces. However, the commanders and chain of command within small units always remain responsible for the local security of their own units. Causalities inflicted in the kill zone of a previously undetected enemy ambush are just as dead or injured as if they were members of the British forlorn hope at the siege of Badajoz in 1812. In restrictive terrain, security forces focus on key terrain, such as potential choke points.

8-39. Before the start of the offense the division may decide to directly control the division’s security forces conducting a forward screen, guard, or cover mission. Alternatively it may have previously tasked its subordinate BCTs to perform those security tasks. The division plans how it will maintain its forward, flank, and rear security once it begins its offensive actions. Generally the division should control the division security force if the division is not in contact with the enemy before the beginning of the offense. If the division is in contact with the enemy, then its subordinate BCTs should plan to control their own security forces. However, if a particularly sensitive flank is identified during planning, then the division elects to provide a separate security force on the flank under division control. This is because flank security is more difficult for a BCT to coordinate and adequately address.

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

8-40. A division almost always establishes an advance guard during the conduct of a movement to contact. The division’s leading BCT usually furnishes and controls the advance guard, which is task-organized with additional information collection, engineers, and artillery assets to secure the division’s uninterrupted movement. That division advance guard may constitute an entire BCT. Analysis of the mission variables of METT-TC determines the organization of the advance guard. A division commander may choose to employ a division covering force in addition to an advance guard.

8-41. Flank and rear security forces protect the division’s main body from ground observation and surprise attack. A battalion or cavalry squadron is the normal size of a division screening force and a division flank or rear guard. These security forces are task-organized based on their mission to provide them with the needed capabilities. These forces are strong enough to defeat small enemy units or to delay a stronger enemy attack. Flank security travels on routes parallel to the division main body and occupies key terrain along routes where appropriate. Rear security follows the division’s main body.

ATTACK/PURSUIT/EXPLOITATION

8-42. Before and during the conduct of these offensive tasks, the conduct of screen, guard, and cover security tasks prevents unexpected enemy interference with the operations of the division and its subordinate BCTs. Division security forces regardless of their location respective to the main body orient their movement on the movement of division’s main body. Frequently, however, the best security is the violence and speed of the division’s offensive actions themselves. That violence and speed keeps the enemy so involved that the enemy has neither the time nor means to endanger the success of the division’s offensive activities. The commander’s retention of a division reserve in the case not only provides the commander additional flexibility in conducting these offensive tasks but also enhances the division’s security posture.

8-43. The introduction of a division-controlled forward security element between the attacking BCTs and the enemy increase the planning and coordination requirements for all involved headquarters and complicate the control and execution of close combat operations. During the conduct of prolonged offensive actions, the division’s exposed flanks may be too long for a single unit battalion task force to secure. Therefore, the division may elect to provide flank security to only the leading echelons and to direct follow and support forces to secure their own flanks.

8-44. An envelopment or flank attack requires the friendly force to find or create an assailable enemy flank. Success in an envelopment or flank attack depends on agility, surprise, and the ability of division shaping operations, such a military deception, or supporting attacks to hold enemy forces in their current positions. Rapid and unimpeded movement of the division’s enveloping BCTs and other shaping operations or supporting attacks directed at enemy forces in the division’s deep area are essential to prevent the enemy’s reserves from counterattacking or occupying prepared positions. The attacking brigades will employ subordinate maneuver battalions and companies to provide security to their flanks and rear. Both the division and subordinate brigades will use scatterable mines, attack helicopters, and obstacles secure the flanks of enveloping forces.

8-45. During the exploitation and pursuit, the extended distances and changing rates of advance make it more appropriate for the leading BCTs (exploiting force and encircling force) to control security to the division’ front and forward flanks. The more fluid the division operation, the more the division relies on its combat aviation brigade’s and battlefield surveillance brigade’s assets for R&S coupled with the use of attack helicopters, extended range munitions employed by the supporting field artillery (FA) brigade and joint air assets for rapid response to enemy threats to exposed BCT flanks.

OFFENSIVE COVERING FORCE

8-46. The division may be assigned a covering force mission for an attacking, exploiting, or pursuing corps or joint force land component (JFLC). The division, as a covering force, is responsible for developing the situation early, providing security for the main body, and preventing unnecessary delay of the main body’s forward movement.

8-47. Covering a corps or JFLC entire area of operations requires a division to operate on a broad front and requires a well coordinated operations order. The division covering force requires control measures that synchronize actions of the covering force with the movement of the remaining corps or joint land forces. These control measures may include checkpoints or phase lines (PL); boundaries between brigades and divisions; and the coordinated use of mission command systems to maintain a free flow of combat information and intelligence products up and down the chain of command.

8-48. Covering force actions are characterized by maintaining speed and aggressiveness, developing situations rapidly with strength, committing reserves to eliminate enemy resistance, and keeping the enemy off balance. The division concentrates its attention, primarily combat aviation, rocket and cannon FA, and joint forces, against enemy forces of sufficient size to threaten the movement of the corps or joint land force component main body while bypassing and reporting minor resistance. Every division action is directed toward ensuring the uninterrupted movement of the main body.

DIVISION SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE DEFENSE

8-49. In the defense, just as it does in the offense, a division employs security operations to protect its subordinate elements and other friendly forces. Defensive security operations provide the maneuver space and reaction time necessary to allow the main body to protect itself.

8-50. The division conducts security operations orientated toward the main enemy threat. In a contiguous area of operations this is forward and to the flanks of the BCTs occupying the main battle area. The division’s security force, of BCT or greater size, generally operates under division control unless a higher echelon land commander—corps or JFLC—establishes a corps or JFLC controlled security force. Commanders only delegate control of division security force operations to subordinate BCTs by exception. Having separate main battle area BCT-controlled security forces operating forward of the main battle area makes a coordinated division security fight harder to conduct and divides the attention of main battle area BCT commanders between the security force and the main battle area fight. However, if the commander decides to delegate control of division security forces to the BCTs located within the main battle area, then the size of those respective BCT areas of operations expand including the former division forward security area.

8-51. Security operations help identify the enemy’s main effort and attrit lead enemy echelons. They also help shape the enemy’s penetration to support the commander’s intent of where and how to defeat or destroy the enemy. There activities may be the division’ first opportunity to seize the initiative from the attacking enemy. However, the commander must also synchronize security force operations with all aspects of division operations.

8-52. The division defensive plan enhances unity of effort when addressing control of the security force. Considerations include the defense task being conducted, the size of the area of operations, the commander’s ability to communicate with subordinate brigades, the availability of controlling headquarters, and the number of units operating in the security and main battle areas. When the division controls the security force, subordinate BCTs maintain liaison with division controlled security forces operating to their front and/or flanks. BCTs within the division main battle area in this situation should—

Monitor covering force combat net radio nets, blue force tracker, security force unit Web sites, and other information systems to maintain an accurate common operational picture, an understanding of how the security fight is progressing, and an understanding of how that security fight will impact the main battle area fight.

Establish and maintain liaison with security force units forward of their positions.

Prepare for actions at the battle handover line.

Maintain liaison during the rearward passage of security force units.

8-53. The division’s initial plan includes contingencies for unexpected results in the security force fight that will directly impact on the main battle area fight. Other planning considerations for security operations are similar for both mobile and area defenses, except that in the mobile defense, the division commander almost always retains control of the covering force to ensure unity of effort in shaping the penetration. When possible, the boundaries of the subordinate battalions and companies within the security force coincide with those of those BCTs and battalion task forces found in the main battle area. The division commander assigns the security force a screen, guard, or cover mission.

DEFENSIVE SCREEN

8-54. The division commander assigns a division security force a screen mission when that force is responsible for securing a large area and lacks significant combat power. A screen, deploying forward of the forward edge of the battle area or to one or more of the division’s flanks or rear, provides the least degree of security to the BCTs in the main battle area and other divisional elements. Task organizing aviation assets with ground screening forces significantly enhances the ability of the screening force to accomplish the mission. Aviation assets provide greater depth and the ability to conduct reconnaissance of areas the ground force may not be able to access. Tasks implied when conducting a division screen include—

Providing early warning to those BCTs located within the main battle area to protect them from surprise and provide time for them to reposition forces to meet the enemy attack.

Delaying and harassing the enemy with supporting indirect fires.

Destroying enemy reconnaissance elements within its capability to deny the enemy information regarding friendly defensive positions within the main battle area.

An ABCT or SBCT conducting division screen operations do not normally require extensive augmentation because of their organic assets. An infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) assigned this mission will require additional tactical mobility assets at a minimum unless the division is facing only dismounted enemy forces.

DEFENSIVE GUARD

8-55. A division security force assigned a guard mission accomplishes all tasks of a screen mission. In addition it prevents enemy observation and direct fire engagement of the BCTs in the main battle area through its combat operations for a specified period. A security force conducting a guard operation operates within supporting range of the division main body, but unlike a security force conducting a screen, an ABCT or SBCT conducting a division guard mission normally does receive augmentation. This augmentation usually includes at least additional artillery and engineer assets. It may include additional reconnaissance, ground maneuver, intelligence, attack reconnaissance aviation, and other situationally appropriate assets.

DEFENSIVE COVER

8-56. A division security forces assigned a cover mission accomplishes all the tasks of a guard mission. It operates as a tactically self-contained force outside supporting range of the BCTs in the division main battle area. The ABCT or SBCT assigned to conduct a cover mission will be assigned significant additional combat power to enable it to conduct this task over the division’s frontage. Tasks inherent to a covering force include—

Forcing the enemy to prematurely deploy and commence the attack.

Identifying the enemy’s main effort.

Reducing the enemy’s strength by either destroying maneuver units and/or stripping away essential assets, such as artillery, air defense, and engineer systems.

Shaping the penetration of the enemy’s attack.

8-57. The division commander uses a covering force to provide increased security to the division as a whole and specifically to those BCTs constituting the division’s main battle area. The commander designates a division forward security area with sufficient depth to allow the division covering force room to maneuver. That forward security area should also be deep enough to force the enemy to reposition artillery and air defense systems before attacking into the division’s main battle area. Enemy repositioning of artillery and air defense artillery is a primary indicator of the enemy’s main effort. The detection of these systems is easier when they are displacing which makes them vulnerable to friend deep strikes. It also limits the effectiveness of enemy massed artillery fires until all those systems finish repositioning.

8-58. The covering force fight in the security force area is a shaping operation before the division’s main battle fight. However, at the time it occurs, that covering force fight is the division’s main effort. This is because the covering force fight is directly tied to the division’s future fight in the main battle area, the division’s decisive operation, as part of the division’s scheme of maneuver. The division commander anticipates the various ways that the covering force can impact for good or ill the division’s decisive operation in the main battle area. For example, the covering force might inflict too much enemy attrition, causing the enemy to stop and transition to a defensive posture well forward of the main battle area. This action could derail a corps/JFLC plan that called for luring the major enemy force into the larger echelon’s main battle area and destroying it according to the corps commander’s intent.

8-59. The division plan has the covering force conducting operations to either defend against or delay an attacking enemy force. The parameters of covering force’s mission dictate whether it will conduct a delay or defense. The plan should designate the enemy force the covering force is expected to defeat or to destroy before conducting battle handover if the commander directs the covering force to defend. When planning for a delay operation, the division commander will state whether the covering force is to delay forward of a terrain feature for a specified time (high risk) or whether preservation of the covering force (low risk) is of primary importance.

8-60. When a commander’s plan involves employing a strong covering force in a security area that has adequate depth, that covering force anticipates fighting major engagements. It also plans for an area defense rather than delay, which would cause follow-on enemy forces to commit themselves to a particular course of action, thus disclosing the enemy’s main attack. The division uses its available Army and joint surveillance means, reports from the covering force, and higher level intelligence inputs to determine (or confirm) the axis and strength of the enemy main attack.

8-61. In the absence of corps or JFLC covering force, the division assigns an armored or SBCT to conduct the division covering force battle. A division controlled covering force allows the division to seize the initiative from an attacking enemy force. The size and composition of the division covering force depend on its mission, the enemy, the terrain, and available forces. These variables take on added significance and complexity, depending on the enemy’s chosen course of action, the depth and width of the area of operation available for the covering force fight, and the time required for main battle area brigades to prepare their defensive positions.

8-62. The division’s initial defensive plan includes branch contingencies for unexpected results of the covering force fight that directly impact on the division’s decisive operation within the main battle area. A situation may develop that requires the division commander to establish a strong covering force to form the first part of his defense in depth. The commander decides that the covering force mission is to destroy and disrupt leading enemy formations, causing the early commitment of enemy follow-on units—tactical reserves or possibly second operational echelon forces—and forcing the repositioning of enemy artillery and air defense systems. This will help disclose the enemy’s chosen course of action and main effort. While the covering force fights the enemy’s lead elements, the division uses available rocket and joint fires against follow-on forces and critical enemy nodes.

8-63. A BCT commander operating as the division covering force commander uses a mixture of the tactics and control measures associated with the conduct of an area defense and a delay. These tactics and control measures associated with both an area defense and a delay are explained in FM 3-90-1.

8-64. The goal is to provide one artillery battalion to support each ground maneuver battalion within the covering force. One method of providing these additional artillery systems to support the division covering force is to establish a support relationship (typically reinforcing) between the artillery battalions organic to those brigades constituting the division main battle area and the artillery battalion organic to the brigade constituting the division covering force. An alternative method would be to establish a support relationship (typically general support(GS)-reinforcing or reinforcing) between the artillery battalions assigned to a supporting FA Brigade and the covering force brigade’s organic artillery battalion.

8-65. While echelon above division air and missile defense units do not normally support the covering force, they may be able to range far enough forward to provide some limited coverage. The air and missile defense element within the division main command post coordinates with the area air defense commander to provide air and missile defense coverage of those locations constituting the division’s critical asset list. Generally this includes the division main command post, aviation forward arm and refuel points and hide positions, sustainment units, and passage lanes or points supporting the covering force’s rearward passage of lines through main battle area brigades. Covering force units engage enemy attack and reconnaissance helicopters as well as enemy UAS with their organic machineguns and cannons. They also use artillery when possible against enemy helicopter attack and hide positions and UAS launch sites. If the enemy aerial threat is sufficiently high, man-portable air defense teams will be task-organized within maneuver and other forces for use against these same types of aerial threat and manned enemy aircraft.

8-66. Depending on the priority of effort, engineers from the division’s maneuver enhancement brigade or an engineer brigade locate well forward in the security area to augment to BCT’s organic engineers in the emplacement of obstacles, preparation of vehicle fighting positions, and providing for the covering force’s mobility. Obstacles are more important to the covering force operations when the enemy has numerical advantage in artillery and maneuver strength. The division commander makes a key decision involving priority of engineer effort—security force area versus main battle area. Engineer units mounted in armored vehicles are required for covering force operations; other less-protected engineer units can complete the terrain reinforcement of the security area.

8-67. Cyber electromagnetic operations help locate the enemy’s main effort. The division combines its cyber electromagnetic actions with other elements of combined arms, such as artillery and joint fires, to locate and destroy enemy jammers and other electronic systems when appropriate and such actions support the division’s defensive efforts. Cyber electromagnetic actions directed against the enemy’s command and control network and other weapon control systems are according to division commanders’ established priorities. Echelon above division assets can augment division cyber electromagnetic capabilities in the security area to provide continuous coverage within the cyber domain.

8-68. All sustainment assets positioned within the division’s forward security area must be 100 percent mobile to function in that fluid arena. Forward support company maintenance teams and maintenance collection points can quickly fix or recover some categories of maintenance failures and combat losses. The division or the security force commander issues guidance on evacuating systems from the forward security area assessed as being unable to return to a level of combat effectiveness within a specified time. This guidance helps prevent an unmanageable collection of unserviceable, but repairable vehicles and systems, from aggregating in the security area where they are subject to being captured by the enemy or destroyed by divisional forces to prevent their capture. The brigade support battalion of the BCT constituting the division covering force normally locates temporarily in the division main battle area near passage points, lanes, and road networks that support the forward covering force. This requires close coordination with the owning commander. This battalion and other sustainment elements from the division’s supporting sustainment brigade or combat support sustainment battalion also require extensive coordination with main battle area ground commanders to conduct the multiple forward and rearward passages of lines necessary to sustain the covering force.

8-69. The chief of the sustainment controls and coordinates the division’s reorganization of the covering force based on priorities the G-3 and the covering force commander establish. Planning for the covering force’s reorganization precedes the battle. The division has neither the time nor the resources to conduct regeneration. The division’s higher headquarters must assume this responsibility. Based on the covering force’s follow-on mission and the ability of that higher headquarters to effect timely reconstitution, the division commander normally states to the covering force commander the acceptable losses during the course of the covering force fight in terms of both personnel and weapon systems.

8-70. All nondivisional and divisional units not assigned to, but in support of, the covering force fight and located within the security area coordinate with the covering force commander before moving to locations within the division security area. This coordination includes terrain management, security, movement, and the synchronization of their actions with covering force operations.

SECURITY FORCE TASK ORGANIZATION CONSIDERATIONS

8-71. The division commander considers many of the same factors when task organizing the division forces for the security mission of screen, guard, and cover as are considered when conducting reconnaissance missions. Especially since continuous reconnaissance is a fundamental of all security missions. Unlike reconnaissance missions which are all mobile operations, security missions may be classified as either stationary (defensive) or moving (offensive or advance). Even stationary security missions require a degree of mobility relative to the enemy and the protected force or installation. Among the questions that should be answered when task organization the division security force are the following:

Mission command.

▪   What is the appropriate headquarters to control the division’s security operations?

▪   What is the appropriate span of control for that headquarters?

▪   Does the security force require unity of command or can control of different portions of the security force be assigned to different brigades?

▪   What decisions can be made by the division security force commander and what decisions require the approval of the division commander.

Movement and maneuver. The answers to many of these questions depends on the size of the security area, terrain characteristics of that area, enemy capabilities, and the main body’s required level of security.

▪   What size of ground maneuver force is required?

▪   What reconnaissance capabilities does the security force require to collect the necessary information to support the security mission?

▪   What aviation attack and reconnaissance capabilities are required to collect the necessary information to support the security mission including UASs?

▪   What engineer mobility and countermobility capabilities are required? (This also depends on if the security force is largely stationary or moving, the size of the security force’s anticipated area of operations, and the number and types of obstacles anticipated to be emplaced or breached and what obstacle effects they need to inflect on enemy forces.)

Intelligence

▪   What SIGINT capabilities are required to support the security force? (This is largely dependent on requirements to collect on aspects of enemy communications, distance from the main body, and the capabilities of supporting SIGINT assets.)

▪   What human intelligence capabilities are required to support the security force? (This depends on the time available to collect and what information is required.)

Fires.

▪   What are the anticipated indirect fires capabilities required by the security mission? (These largely depend on the security forces’ organic capabilities; the size of the area of operations, anticipated requirements to defeat, delay, and attrit enemy reconnaissance and maneuver capabilities, and the distance from main body or support fires.)

▪   What indirect fire target acquisition capabilities are required? This largely depends of the organizational capabilities of the security forces, such as artillery radars, the ability of other units to provide radar coverage over the security force which is partial dependent on the distance of the security force from the from main body.

▪   What Army air and missile defense capabilities are required? This is largely dependent on the air threat and ability of echelon above division air and missile defense units to provide coverage over the security force.

What sustainment—logistics, personnel support, and Army Health System—capabilities are required to sustain the operations of the division security force? This is dependent on the breadth and depth of the security area, the terrain and weather characteristics of that security area, the organic battlefield mobility of the security force, the organic sustainment capabilities of the security force, and the anticipated duration of the security mission.

Protection.

▪   What are the necessary survivability capabilities of the security force? (This answer depends on the time available, whether it is a stationary or moving security operation, and anticipated enemy capabilities.)

▪   What are the required CBRN reconnaissance and decontamination capabilities of the security force? (This depends on the anticipated CBRN threat and the presence of any anticipated contaminated areas.)

BATTLE HANDOVER

8-72. The division’s main battle area BCTs assume responsibility for the battle as enemy forces reach the forward edge of their areas of operations. The division headquarters prescribes the general location where division covering force units will pass through main battle area units. The commanders of main battle area BCTs and the division covering force commander normally coordinate the details associated with the conduct of a rearward passage of lines by the division’s covering force. (See FM 3-90-2 for tactics and techniques associated with conducting a passage of lines.) They coordinate passage lanes and any passage details not contained in the division’s operations order. Generally, the boundaries of the various maneuver battalions within the division covering force should coincide with those of the BCTs in the division’s main battle area. This simplifies battle handover coordination. The risk is, however, that the enemy will deduce the location of these unit boundaries during the course of the covering force fight and attempt to exploit the weakness normally associated with BCT boundaries during future attacks within the main battle area.

8-73. The units constituting the division’s covering force retain their freedom of maneuver before their passage of lines with the brigade in the division main battle area. The covering force passes through or around the main battle area units quickly to minimize the vulnerability of both to nuclear strikes or conventional fires. Moving around a friendly defending brigades and battalions rather than through them minimizes tactical vulnerability and confusion of both units. The covering force’s supporting and sustainment assets initially located in the division security area pass rearward early to preclude hampering the passage of combat elements. The BCTs within the division’s main battle area normally provide direct and indirect fire assets in the vicinity of the battle handover line, which is normally positioned forward of the forward edge of the battle area. This allows direct fire systems to provide overwatching fires to cover the withdrawal of covering force units and to close lanes upon the completion of the rearward passage of those covering force units.

8-74. The division commander considers the subsequent employment of division covering force units. Only in emergency situations are they attached to the forward committed brigades. This is because they have probably expended considerable stocks of ammunition and fuel during the covering force fight and require resupply. They have suffered casualties and the chain of command must be reestablished to the lowest level and replacements integrated. The Soldiers in these units have also been under considerable physical and emotional stress. They are most effectively employed after reorganization and resupply as new division reserve on commitment of the division’s initial reserve force.

8-75. All units composing the division’s security force should not automatically conduct a rearward passage of lines even if the tactical situation force some elements of that security force to do so. If the tactical situation and scheme of maneuver allow, forward security elements in the division security area not pressed by enemy action should remain in place to provide security to division units in the main battle area. This may require adjustments in command relationships. For example, if an ABCT conducting a guard mission for the division, was forced by enemy action to conduct a rearward passage of lines, it is possible that one of its combined arms battalions on a secondary avenue of approach could remain in place. In this case it is likely that command of the combined arms battalion would be chopped to the BCT in front of whose area of operations it is located.

RETROGRADE SECURITY OPERATIONS

8-76. Security for the division main body in a retrograde is similar to that for a division conducting a movement to contact. Advance, flank, and rear guards are necessary to provide security. The division’s rear guard is normally stronger when a withdrawal action precedes a retirement. If enemy contact occurs, the rear guard uses delaying actions to hold the advancing enemy and to prevent interference with the movement of the main body.

COMBAT OUTPOSTS

8-77. Combat outposts provide commanders at various levels of command a technique to secure their forces in the defense. Combat outposts require a significant expenditure of resources to establish and may fix in place the forces committed to them. They are well suited for use by a division operating in mountainous areas, such a Korea or portions of Afghanistan where they cannot easily be bypassed. Commanders can use combat outposts to provide substantial security for their forces when breaking up momentum of enemy attacks, or when disengaging from the enemy and a covering force is not available. The use of combat outposts differs somewhat from the traditional security missions of screen, guard, and cover. Combat outposts normally fight from well-prepared, well-dug-in, non-mobile positions. If directed, they accept decisive engagement. They engage and destroy initial enemy forces with direct and indirect fires. Commanders augment combat outposts with substantial fire support and other combat multipliers to provide them with sufficient combat power to accomplish their mission.

8-78. When employing a liner operational framework, the division and subordinate commanders establish a series or line of combat outposts which, in addition to securing their forces, may deceive the enemy on the location of the divisions’ primary defensive positions. These outposts should be able to observe at least a portion of the forward edge of the battle area and may cause the enemy to deploy early and reveal the enemy’s main effort.

8-79. If a requirement exists to establish a line of combat outposts, such as when a decision has been made to cordon a main supply route, coordination and control are necessary. This is because the enemy can bypass or flank individual outposts if they are not carefully sited. Usually in this situation, the division directs the trace of the line and BCTs control those combat outposts within their respective areas of operations. A brigade commander may pass control of one or more outposts to the commander of a subordinate battalion or task force, permitting teams to fight or withdraw as required to achieve the intended mission of these outposts. Further, if the division does not direct the establishment of an outpost line, a brigade or battalion commander may establish one within that individual’s area of operations if the situation requires the adoption of that course of action. (See FM 3-90-2 for information on the combat outpost.)

DIVISION AREA SECURITY OPERATIONS

8-80. Area security is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area (ADRP 3-90). A division conducts area security operations regardless of which element of decisive action currently dominants. The normal objective of the division’s area security operations is to ensure the division’s freedom of action over a prolonged period in consonance with the commander’s concepts of operations and intent. The division’s area security operations are numerous, complex, and never ending. However, their conduct is normally an economy-of-force mission for the unit charged with execution.

8-81. The division and subordinate brigade commanders and their staffs synchronize and integrate their security efforts. They focus on protected forces, installations, routes, or areas. Protected forces range from echelon headquarters through artillery and echelon reserves to the division’s sustaining base. Protected installations can also be part of the sustaining base, or they can constitute part of the area’s civilian infrastructure. Areas to secure range from points (bridges and defiles) and terrain features (ridge lines and hills) to large civilian population centers and their adjacent areas. Population-centric area security missions are common across the range of military operations, but are almost always a requirement during the conduct of irregular warfare. Area security is also often an effective method of providing civil security and control during the conduct of some primary stability tasks. These population-centric area security operations typically combine aspects of the area defense, offensive tasks to eliminate the efficacy of internal defense threats, and police law and order operations.

8-82. Both the maneuver enhancement and the division’s supporting sustainment brigade command posts analyze future division plans for their impact on the current and future operations of these units. They work together to provide sustainment and other support when and where needed. The maneuver enhancement brigade command post deconflicts tactical and administrative moves and controls them when required. It manages the terrain in the division support area. It assigns units to bases, designates base clusters when necessary, and appoints commanders for bases and base clusters. The maneuver enhancement brigade main command post coordinates and synchronizes security operations for the division support area. It integrates subordinate base and base cluster defense plans and coordinates actions of any tactical combat forces.

8-83. Divisional units engaged in area security can saturate an area or position on key terrain to provide protection through early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance and to guard against unexpected enemy or adversary attack with an active response. This early warning, reconnaissance or surveillance may come from ground- and space-based sensors. The conduct of area security often focuses on named areas of interest in an effort to answer commander’s critical information requirements, aiding in tactical decisionmaking and confirming or denying threat intentions. Division forces engaged in conducting the area security task are typically organized in a manner that emphasizes their mobility, lethality, and communications capabilities.

8-84. When properly task-organized, augmented, and supported, any element assigned to or supporting the division may perform security operations. The division conducts other security actions as part of tactical operations that also protect the force and its mission. These actions include (but are not limited to) electronic attack, electronic warfare support, deception operations, operations security, and cover and concealment.

8-85. Combined arms, Stryker, and infantry battalions are normally used in the division close operation to close with and destroy enemy forces. The division integrates available attack reconnaissance helicopters, as part of its combined arms effort, into all division operations. The division can employs these units as part of its security operation in both the offense and the defense.

8-86. Divisional units restrain the use of force when conducting area security operations since civilians are normally present within the division’s area of operations. However, a commander remains responsible for protecting the force and considers this responsibility when establishing rules of engagement (ROE). Restrictions on conducting operations and using force must be clearly explained and understood by everyone. Soldiers must understand that their actions, no matter how minor, may have far-reaching positive or negative effects. They must realize that media (either hostile or neutral) and adversaries can quickly exploit their actions, especially the way they treat the civilian population.

8-87. Conducting area security measures may be the predominant method of protecting the division support area. In contiguous areas of operations, a support area is an area for any command that extends from its rear boundary forward to the rear boundary of the next lower level of command (ADRP 3-0). The division support area is the area where the majority of the division’s sustainment functions occur. The division support area also facilitates the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control divisional forces, such as the division command post. For a division conducting contiguous operations the division support area extends from the division rear boundary forward to the rear boundary of the division’s committed BCTs.

8-88. The division commander’s terms of reference establishes area security responsibilities for the division support area. Those terms of reference usually state that the commander of the division’s attached, OPCON, or TACON maneuver enhancement brigade will have TACON of all units within or transiting that area for security and defense. It specifies that individual’s broader TACON authority for the protection, security, defense, movement control, and terrain management. The content of those terms of reference will be reflected in division operations orders.

8-89. In this case, the division support area becomes the maneuver enhancement brigade’s area of operations. This is because the staff of this brigade was designed specifically for this mission. Units located within or transiting the division support area are responsible for self protection against Level I threats. They must coordinate with the maneuver enhancement brigade for maneuver, troop movements, and indirect fires outside of the established perimeter of any base to which they are assigned because the division support area is this case is the maneuver enhancement brigade’s area of operations and all of the doctrinal responsibilities associated with owning an area of operations apply.

8-90. In the absence of a maneuver enhancement brigade the division commander assigns the mission to another brigade commander. The division commander augments the staff of that brigade to accomplish all of the doctrinal responsibilities associated with controlling an area of operations if that brigade is not a BCT. The division headquarters remains responsible for all unassigned areas within its area of operations that are not assigned to subordinate brigades. The rest of this chapter uses the division support area commander term for this individual.

8-91. The division commander emphasizes the conduct of area security by the division if the division’s subordinate brigades are assigned noncontiguous areas of operations. This is because the division headquarters, usually the current operations integrating cell within the main command post, is responsible for the doctrinal responsibilities for security, information collection, and clearance of fires within those portions of the division area of operations that were not assigned to subordinate brigades. (This is in addition to the other six doctrinal responsibilities of area owning unit commanders listed in ADRP 3-90.) For a division employing noncontiguous areas of operations, the division support area is that area defined within the division commander’s area of operations providing a location to base the division’s sustainment assets and provide sustainment to the division.

8-92. The maneuver enhancement brigade (and some military police units) are specifically equipped and trained to conduct area security within the division support area and may constitute the only available force during some phases of division operations. The maneuver enhancement brigade conducts battles and engagements within the division support area when required to do so. However, the division’s conduct of area security takes advantage of the local security measures performed by all units, regardless of their location in the division’s area of operations. At times, a single maneuver enhancement brigade may need to control two noncontiguous areas of operations.

8-93. All commanders apportion combat power and dedicate assets to protection tasks and systems based on an analysis of the operational environment, the likelihood of enemy action, and the relative value of friendly resources and populations. Although all resources have value, the mission variables of METT-TC make some resources, assets, or locations more significant from enemy or adversary and friendly perspectives. The division commander relies on risk management and other assessment methods to facilitate decisionmaking, issue guidance, and allocate resources. Criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability are some of the most significant considerations in determining protection priorities that become the subject of the division commander’s guidance and the focus of division area security efforts. The conduct of area security often focuses on the following activities:

Control exercised by the division support area commander.

Base/base cluster defense.

Critical asset, facilities, and high-risk personal security. (See discussion in ATP 3-37.10).

Response force operations.

Lines of communications/main supply route security.

Checkpoints and combat outposts. (See FM 3-24.2 for a detailed discussion of checkpoints. FM 3-90-1 and paragraphs 8-77–8-79 discuss combat outposts.)

Convoy security.

Port area and pier security. (See discussion in JP 3-10.)

Area damage control.

Each of these subjects are discussed in paragraphs 8-94-8-152 as they apply to the division echelon except for port area and pier security, which is discussed in JP 3-10.

CONTROL EXERCISE BY THE DIVISION SUPPORT AREA COMMANDER

8-94. There are three considerations in determining command policies governing the authority and limitations of the commander designated to execute area security within the division support area. These three factors are—

The threat levels and situation within the division support area.

The utility of different locations within the division support area.

Political considerations.

Threat Levels

8-95. Threats in the division support area are categorized by the three levels of defense required to counter them. Any or all threat levels may exist simultaneously in the division support area. Emphasis on base defense and security measures may depend on the anticipated threat level. A Level I threat is a small enemy force that can be defeated by those units normally operating in the echelon support area or by the perimeter defenses established by friendly bases and base clusters. A Level I threat for a typical base consists of a squad-sized unit or smaller groups of enemy soldiers, agents, or terrorists. Typical objectives for a Level I threat include supplying themselves from friendly supply stocks; disrupting friendly mission command nodes and logistics facilities; and interdicting friendly lines of communication.

8-96. A Level II threat is an enemy force or activities that can be defeated by a base or base cluster’s defensive capabilities when augmented by a response force. A typical response force is a military police platoon (with appropriate supporting fires); however, it can be a combined arms maneuver element. Level II threats consist of enemy special operations teams, long-range reconnaissance units, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, and partially attrited small combat units. Typical objectives for a Level II threat include the destruction, as well as the disruption, of friendly mission command nodes and logistics and commercial facilities; and the interdiction of friendly lines of communications.

8-97. A Level III threat is an enemy force or activities beyond the defensive capability of both the base and base cluster and any local reserve or response force. It consists of mobile enemy combat forces. Possible objectives for a Level III threat include seizing key terrain, interfering with the movement and commitment of reserves and artillery, and destroying friendly combat forces. Its objectives could also include destroying friendly sustainment facilities, supply points, command post facilities, airfields, aviation assembly areas, arming and refueling points, and interdicting lines of communications and major supply routes. The division response to a Level III threat is a tactical combat force.

Utility of Different Locations

8-98. The utility of a given location is a vital factor to the division support area commander. There are some areas that facilitate the conduct of the division’s sustaining operations better than other areas. There are areas where the commander must exercise some general control but which are neither critical nor a priority to the conduct of the division’s sustainment operations. Finally, there are areas of no importance to the conduct of the division’s sustaining operations.

8-99. A critical area is an area or geographical point essential to accomplishing the division’s sustaining operations. The loss, neutralization, or interdiction of this area allows no alternate options and adversely affects the conduct of the division’s sustaining operations. An example of a critical area would be the only available hard service airfield within the division’s area of operations.

8-100. A priority area is also an area or geographical point essential to accomplishing the division’s sustaining operations except that within an acceptable amount of time sustaining operations functions can be transferred to an alternate location without an immediate significant impact on the division’s total sustainment effort. An example of a priority area would be a supply point containing the ammunition designed to support an attack or an installation performing an important function, such as repairing thermal sights. Another example of a priority area would be a bridge over a major waterway.

8-101. Areas retained under general control are the best areas for their designated purpose, but sustaining operations conducted within them can move to other locations without major problems. Examples of areas over which the division support area commander must have some general control are the division’s lines of communications and main supply routes.

8-102. The division support area commander coordinates with the host nation, using available civil affairs and operational law personnel to obtain the necessary authority to conduct situationally appropriate security measures. These security measures include conducting patrols outside of base perimeters, establishing procedures for clearing indirect fires, and conducting counterintelligence operations. Negotiations also address such measures as establishing a curfew, imposing circulation control over civilian traffic, and similar policies for the host nation civilian populace as dictated by other civil considerations.

8-103. At the division echelon, there are areas within the division support area that do not affect the conduct of the division’s sustaining operations. The division support area commander prefers not to commit scarce information collection resources in those areas but leaves the responsibility for detecting and countering enemy activity in those areas to the host nation.

BASE AND BASE CLUSTER DEFENSE

8-104. Developing different courses of action for the division includes identifying tentative base locations within the division support area. Planners consider the forces, equipment, and technical capabilities needed to defend those bases. Base defense is the local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to U.S. forces (JP 3-10). A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported (JP 4-0). It can contain one unit or multiple units. It has a defined perimeter, established access controls, and is situated and configured to take advantage of natural and man-made terrain features. Missions and security considerations determine the selection of a base site. To nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attack, the division support area commander assigns all units located in the division support area that are not actively involved in operations to an established base or directs them to establish their own perimeter security. When bases are located closed enough to one another to provide mutual support the commander of that area of operations typically further organizes them into a base cluster and designates a base cluster commander.

8-105. A base cluster in base defense operations is a collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control (JP 3-10). A base cluster normally does not have a defined perimeter or established access points. The base cluster is normally the next higher tactical headquarters of a base. A base cluster typically contains five bases but can range from two to seven bases. Base clusters and separate bases located within the division support area report directly to the maneuver enhancement brigade main command post.

8-106. The division support area commander approves main supply routes and base and base cluster locations. The division or maneuver enhancement brigade standard operating procedure establishes the nomenclature for designating each base or base cluster. This can be a name or a mixture of alpha-numeric characters. This information is integrated by the maneuver enhancement brigade’s main command post into division support area plans. These plans address security and the sustainment of new or transiting unit which in turn are passed to the division main command post.

Fundamentals of Base and Base Cluster Defense

8-107. The fundamentals of base defense are—

Understand the enemy.

See the area of operations.

Use the defender’s advantages.

Concentrate at critical times and places.

Conduct counterreconnaissance and counterattacks.

Coordinate critical defense assets.

Balance operational area security with political and legal constraints.

Know the ROE.

Responsiveness.

8-108. Understand the enemy. Defenders must be familiar with the capabilities and limitation of enemy forces, weapons, equipment, and tactics. The base commander also must have access to the latest intelligence concerning probable enemy intent.

8-109. See the area of operations. Information collection is key to assembling an accurate picture of the area of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield provides the commander a continuous, integrated, and comprehensive analysis of the effects of enemy and neutral capabilities, terrain, and weather on operations. It helps the commander anticipate events and develop the priority intelligence requirements and information requirements tied to those events. Intelligence and multidiscipline counterintelligence estimates are prepared, continuously updated, and integrated into the base commander’s staff decisionmaking. Space-based, airborne, and ground sensors, patrols, and counterintelligence activities are all means that commanders in the division support area and elsewhere can employ to detect possible indicators of planned enemy action.

8-110. Use the defender’s advantages. Defender’s advantages may permit a numerically inferior force to defeat a much larger one. Some of these advantages are:

The ability to fight from cover.

More detailed knowledge of local terrain and environment.

The ability to prepare positions, routes between them, obstacles, and fields of fire in advance.

The ability to plan communications, control measures, indirect fires, and logistic support to fit any predictable situation.

The ability to deceive enemy forces about friendly defensive capabilities, dispositions, and execution of operations.

8-111. Concentrate at critical times and places. A base commander must measure and continually evaluate the various risks to the base. An enemy usually concentrates resources on the most sensitive or vulnerable targets. Defense of a base is normally conducted along interior lines, permitting the timely and secure movement of forces to engage the most critical threats. The commander must mass enough combat power at points of decision by economizing in some areas, employing a reserve, and maneuvering to gain local superiority at critical points.

8-112. Conduct counterreconnaissance and counterattacks. A major contributing factor to friendly vulnerabilities with the division support area is the relatively fixed nature of operations. An enemy can study the operational patterns of semifixed units and installations to determine their existing defensive measures. Further, fixed bases having well-established perimeters usually have limited depth. Counterreconnaissance and counterattack add depth to the battle outside the perimeter, allowing the base to continue its primary mission with minimal interference.

8-113. Coordinate critical defense assets. Synchronization of indirect fires, tactical aircraft, engineers, dismounted troops, armored vehicles, naval surface fire support, and helicopters can produce a combined arms effect. Synchronizing forces and fires produces a synergy capable of defeating a larger enemy force. This synergy results from making enemy movement difficult or impossible without detection by divisional elements and by causing a reaction that may make enemy forces more vulnerable to other division capabilities. Periodic rehearsals of security plans ensure effectiveness of the alert system, proficiency of key individuals, and identification of potential problem areas.

8-114. Balance operational area security with political and legal constraints. Operational area security may have to be designed around numerous political constraints. This may include aligning unit areas of operation with the host nation’s existing political boundaries.

8-115. Know the ROE. The base commander and that individual’s subordinates must comply with established ROE. The commander ensures the reconciliation of any inconsistencies between the division’s ROE and ROE of any joint or multinational forces located on the base or within base clusters established by the division in consultation with the staff judge advocate.

8-116. Responsiveness. The division support area commander and subordinate base cluster and base commanders have the authority and the capability to communicate operational requirements directly to units located within their respective areas of operations. The chain of command frequently changes from the functional or technical to the tactical chain of command after implementation of the operational area security plan. Therefore, the division support area commander must critically analyze and test communications systems that filter through various levels of command to assure that they are responsive under given emergency conditions. The division support area commander establishes direct communication links between the maneuver enhancement brigade (or designated other brigade) main command post and subordinate base cluster and base operations centers if existing mission command systems are not adequate to transmit security-related information to those centers in a timely manner.

8-117. Responsiveness may be attained by many different procedures and capabilities including:

Clearly established authority granted to base cluster and base commanders.

A wide-area mission command system that provides a flexible warning system for a large variety of situations.

Continuous identification and tracking of resources that help provide operational area security, such as maintenance float weapons systems and replacement crews.

Response forces have mission command systems capable of using the existing wide-area mission command system to communicate directly with threatened base defense operations centers. They also can communicate with the base cluster operations center located in the threatened base cluster and the maneuver enhancement brigade (or designated other brigade) main command post and the division main command post.

Military police forces responding to Level II threats have combat vehicles with a mixture of firepower, armor protection, and a high degree of tactical mobility.

Identifying dual-capable units. For example, a security response force identified to respond to Level I or Level II threats also has capabilities to perform rescue or provide labor in an area damage control mission. However, a security response force should not concurrently be identified as an area damage control element.

Base and Base Cluster Defense Control Measures

8-118. The framework for operational area security and defense consists of three primary areas. The first is an outer security area that extends outside the perimeter of the bases to the limit of the base commander’s area of operations. The base perimeter and those areas immediately in front or behind that perimeter needed for observation posts, fighting positions, and entry control points constitute the second primary area. The third primary area consists of inner security areas that add depth to the base defense plan and halts or impeded the progress of threat penetrations of the base perimeter. See ATP 3-37.10 for an in depth discussion of these three areas.

8-119. Otherwise those control measures in base defense operations are the same as those used in the conduct of other defensive tasks. (See figure 8-1 on page 8-23.) The headquarters establishing the base or base cluster designates the base’s area of operations using rear, lateral, and forward boundaries. The area of operations for a base may or may not be contiguous to the area of operations of other units.

8-120. The division support area commander may further subdivide the division support area into subordinate areas of operations, bases, and base clusters. That commander can assign available maneuver forces to assembly areas and battle positions. The division support area commander establishes PLs, contact points, objectives, and checkpoints as necessary to control maneuver. Fire support coordinating measures are established to permit or restrict fires in and around the base. (See FM 3-09 for a discussion of fire support coordinating measures.) No-fire areas may need to protect civilians, prevent disruption of sustaining operations, or protect combat outposts, observation posts, and patrols from friendly fire. All established control measures are coordinated with host nation agencies to minimize interference, misunderstandings, and unnecessary collateral damage. The base defense force commander, in coordination with the base commander, designates the base perimeter, target reference points, and sectors of fire to organizations located within the base.

TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE

8-121. A tactical combat force is a combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets, that is assigned the mission of defeating Level III threats (JP 3-10). These threats result from enemy forces infiltrating friendly positions or penetrating friendly defensive positions and moving into the division support and other friendly areas, or conducting airborne/air assault operations. A successful defense against such a Level III threat requires planning and preparing for the tactical combat force’s employment. The division commander can dedicate a tactical combat force to address such a threat, designate another force as the on-order tactical combat force, or accept the risk of not having a designated tactical combat force. A dedicated tactical combat force has the necessary assets, such as artillery and combat engineers, allocated to it to accomplish the mission. The division commander decides the exact composition of the tactical combat force after weighing the risk of allocating forces to the tactical combat force and thus decreasing the combat power available for the division’s decisive operation. A division tactical combat force should have the capability to counter limited enemy—

Heliborne or air assault operations.

Airborne operations.

Amphibious operations.

Infiltration operations.

Ground force attacks in the division support and other division controlled areas.

8-122. The G-3 designates more than one tactical combat force according to the situation and the division commander’s guidance. Designating more than one tactical combat force provides the division commander flexibility of response to competing needs. The primary advantage of having a dedicated, rather than an on-order, tactical combat force is the assurance that it will be available when needed. Other advantages include the ability of the tactical combat force staff to focus the force’s planning and preparing activities on just one mission. This includes establishing liaison and communications with supported bases or base clusters and echelon Level II response forces. It also allows the dedicated tactical combat force to rehearse its plans. When the division commander assigns a subordinate unit an on-order tactical combat force mission, that individual must establish criteria on when to commit that unit as the tactical combat force.

8-123. The tactical combat force is normally a combined arms organization. Its size and composition, however, is determined by an analysis of the mission variables of METT-TC. A tactical combat force can expect support from the following types of assets:

Military police with working dog teams.

Military intelligence disciplines.

FA.

Engineers.

Army aviation (attack reconnaissance, air assault, mission command, and possibly special electronic mission aircraft).

Public affairs.

Area signal nodes.

Civil affairs assisted by military information support operations (MISO) elements.

Sustainment elements required to sustain the force conducting area security.

Any or all of these types of assets may not be immediately available to the tactical combat force on its commitment. They are limited assets and may be engaged in other missions. A tactical combat force mission may also receive support from other U.S. and multi-national assets, including the host nation

8-124. The mission variables of METT-TC determine the size of the tactical combat force. A division designates a reinforced company team as its tactical combat force. The division commander configures the tactical combat force to conduct attacks. The tactical combat force must be extremely mobile and capable of moving by air and ground modes because of limited reaction time and extended distances between units common to the division support area. The tactical combat force must be as mobile as the enemy. It should be capable of destroying armor-protected vehicles and dismounted infantry and of suppressing enemy short-range air defense systems. Consequently, a tactical combat force typically consists of an infantry rifle company reinforced with Army aviation (attack-reconnaissance and utility helicopters [UH]), with engineer and FA support. The commander may also organize a tactical combat force with armor and mechanized or Stryker infantry units if the situation so dictates.

8-125. The division support area commander strives to obtain tactical self-sufficiency within both available response forces and the tactical combat force. This occurs by attaching or placing in direct support adequate fire support and sustainment elements so that these units can perform semiindependent operations. In addition, this commander must obtain resources, such as civil affairs and MISO, and interpreters, for interacting with the civilian population residing within the division support area.

8-126. The division G-3 designates a tactical combat force as part of the division’s overall task organization to respond to threats to the division’s sustaining operations in general and specifically the division support area. The designation of the tactical combat force is based on the results of intelligence preparation of the battlefield focused on the enemy threat to the division support area, an analysis of the mission variables of METT-TC, and the division commander’s assessment of the overall enemy capabilities. The division’s tactical combat force may receive fire support from a direct support FA battery from its parent BCTs’ artillery battalion or from FA units in GS or GS-reinforcing of the division. The tactical combat force will often have combat aviation support provided by the division’s supporting combat aviation brigade. When the tactical combat force is designated, the commander and staff of that force coordinates with the division support area commander and the division and maneuver enhancement brigade main command posts to develop multiple contingency plans for its employment in the division support area.

8-127. Depending on the nature and scope of the threat to division sustaining operations, the tactical combat force may need to be released by the division commander before its commitment by the division support area commander. This is because the premature commitment of the division’s tactical combat force may rob the division of the flexibility and initiative required to counter the most significant enemy actions in the division’s area. The division support area commander requests that the division commander release the tactical combat forces for use in operations within the division support area once the division support area commander determines that both base or base cluster defense forces and Level II response forces cannot counter an enemy incursion in that area or that the threat poses such a risk to the success of the division’s operations that commitment of the tactical combat force is necessary.

8-128. The division support area commander designates an area of operations for the tactical combat force once that force is committed. The tactical combat force commander gains OPCON for tactical operations of all base and response forces within that area of operations on commitment of the tactical combat force until the threat is eliminated.

8-129. Once released by the division commander, the tactical combat force task-organizes its units as necessary to reflect the current tactical situation maneuvers them to where they can best interdict or engage the enemy force. The tactical combat force initially focuses on countering the enemy’s most serious threats to the division mission, typically these are ground and air avenues of approach, drop zones, and landing zones within the division support area.

8-130. The tactical combat force coordinates with response forces (normally military police) regarding the exchange of reconnaissance information, battle handover procedures, and contingency plans for tactical combat force operations. The maneuver enhancement brigade main command post ensures that ongoing movements within and through the division support area do not impede the movement and maneuver of the tactical combat force.

8-131. On commitment of the division’s tactical combat force, its movements take priority over all other movement and sustainment activities. If the tactical situation warrants, the maneuver enhancement brigade or division main command post requests additional Army and joint assets to help the tactical combat force. Such assets include other maneuver units, fire support assets, assault helicopters, and close air support (CAS). All requested support for the tactical combat force operations is initially placed under the OPCON of the tactical combat force commander.

8-132. SOF may be involved in combating terrorism within the division support area. The division support area commander and the maneuver enhancement brigade may be tasked by a higher headquarters to provide conventional support to these elements. If SOF are operating within the division support area, a special operations liaison element will normally be attached to the division or maneuver enhancement brigade for the duration of a mission.

LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS/MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE SECURITY

8-133. Route security is a specialized area security task conducted to protect lines of communications or main supply routes and friendly forces moving along them. Enemy attempts to interdict lines of communications may have little immediate impact on the division’s ongoing decisive and shaping operations because of subordinate unit basic loads and previously positioned caches. However, the security of those routes over which the division’s sustaining operations flow are critical to sustained land operations, regardless of whether the division is attempting to exploit success or recoup failure.

8-134. The security of the division’s lines of communications and supply routes, whether rail, pipeline, highway, or waterway, presents one of the greatest security problems in the division support area. Route security operations are defensive in nature and are terrain-oriented. A route security force prevents an enemy force from impeding, harassing, or destroying traffic along the route or portions of the route itself. Establishment of a base along that route permits the concentration of security resources. Route security requires dedicated resources at almost an infinite number of points or reaction forces to counter possible enemy action. Units performing missions that require the habitual use of lines of communications and supply routes, such as military police, maintenance, transportation, supply, and field service units, can perform route security operations with their primary activities. The division support area commander can employ the following techniques to provide route security:

Passive security.

Route reconnaissance.

Cordon security.

Combat security.

While the scope of these operations depends on the mission variables of METT-TC, route security operations tend to require the commitment of significant resources. A combination of passive and route reconnaissance is the most common pattern used over secured routes, such as a division main supply route.

Passive Security

8-135. The passive security technique for provide route security includes those measures initiated to achieve security without a significant expenditure of manpower or resources. It includes—

Camouflage

Convoy formation and march control so as to present the least lucrative target possible under prevailing conditions.

Proper selection of routes.

Capitalizing on security offered by related activities taking place without regard to the route’s security requirements. These activities include aircraft traversing over all or portions of the route, maintenance activities taking place along the route, training exercise or troop movement adjacent to or along the route, military and host nation police traffic control activities, and the activities of the civilian population.

The division support area commander employs passive security for all conditions or situations and as an adjunct to any other technique of route security employed. They are the products of a long-term and continually improved program for an integrated security system.

Route Reconnaissance

8-136. Route reconnaissance addresses not only the route itself, but also all terrain along the route from which the enemy could influence the movement of divisional forces. Route reconnaissance takes place at irregular intervals to avoid developing a regular pattern that an enemy could exploit. (See FM 3-90-1 for a longer discussion of route reconnaissance.)

Cordon Security

8-137. It is normally not feasible to secure all points along a route by physically allocating resources to all the points of the route. Cordon security is the security provided between two combat outposts positioned to provide mutual support. The division support area commander can assign any available air assault, mechanized, Stryker, and military police units to combat outposts established at critical locations along the route. (See the checkpoint and combat outpost discussion below.) That commander locates these combat outposts within supporting distance of each other whenever possible. Units assigned to these combat outposts provide response forces in the event of enemy activity along the route within their subordinate areas of operations. Forces based at these combat outposts conduct reconnaissance patrols and offensive actions between their base combat outpost and adjacent combat outposts designed to counter enemy activities between these two points on a frequent but irregular schedule.

8-138. Normally, each combat outpost contains at least a platoon-sized element and is equipped with automatic weapons, communications, and sensors and supported by those fire support assets available to the division support area commander. The outpost commander rotates personnel between duty at the combat outpost and duty on patrol. The higher commander of each combat outpost makes frequent contact with each deployed combat outposts to check its status.

8-139. The establishment of cordon security will do little to eliminate those threat forces that require the adoption of this technique. A commander directing the establishment of cordon security should also direct a series of parallel corrective actions, including—

Searching for a new route.

Vigorous search and attack operations to destroy the enemy within the division support area.

Rigorously enforcing circulation control measures in coordination with the host nation over the civilian population.

Removing cover from areas offering concealment to an enemy.

Constructing new routes to bypass dangerous areas.

Repositioning supply activities to permit better route selection.

Mass evacuation of the civilian population from towns and villages along the route. (This is an extreme measure and requires consultation with host nation authorities and adherence to the laws of land warfare.)

8-140. The division support area commander must recognize the loss of complete control over any given route within the division support area early. The continued investment of resources into a “lost route” merely serves the enemy. The expenditure of resources and energy used for security in more profitable corrective measures should be adopted whenever feasible. Cordon security requires a considerable expenditure of manpower and other resources. As a result the division support area commander uses this technique only when a clear and evident requirement exists.

Combat Security

8-141. Combat security involves all measures taken by maneuver units to seize and secure the terrain necessary to permit use of the route in question. Units conduct combat security along a route to prevent enemy ground forces from moving into direct fire range of the protected route. The route and its adjoining terrain compose the area of operations. A route security force operates on and to the flanks of a designated route.

8-142. Combat security is the most costly technique for providing route security and draws on the strength of the division’s maneuver forces. For example, because of the distances involved, a commander assigns at least one battalion-sized unit, if not more, to secure one route through a division-sized area of operations. This maneuver force establishes a perimeter around the route or cordons sections of it to search suspected enemy locations while establishing roadblocks and checkpoints along the main route and lateral routes to stop and search vehicles and individuals as they enter or leave the route. Special considerations include coordinating the actions of the maneuver force with segments manned by other security forces. The maneuver enhancement brigade’s main command post integrates the maneuver force’s operations with other defense activities within the division support area. This includes clarifying of command arrangements between the maneuver force and other security forces operating within the division support area, such as military police response forces.

Convoy Security

8-143. Convoy security is a specialized area security task conducted to protect convoys. Units conduct convoy security any time there are not enough friendly forces to continuously secure lines of communications in an area of operations and there is a significant danger of enemy ground action directed against the convoy. The commander may also conduct them with route security operations. Convoy operations are generally conducted at the battalion level or below, with brigade oversight. The division will assign responsibility for convoy security in the division support area to the commander of that area (which is usually the maneuver enhancement brigade commander). Likewise responsibility for the security of convoys transiting BCT areas of operations is the responsibility of the appropriate BCT commander. Security of convoys transiting previously unassigned areas within the division area of operations will typically be the responsibility of the commander assigned responsibility for the temporary mobility corridor designated by the division to support that convoy. Appendix A of ATP 4-01.45 details command and staff responsibilities for the battalion and brigade staff. Planning considerations for the division include:

Ensure proper allocation of combat power to the task.

Coordinate combat multipliers (fires, attack aviation, electronic warfare assets, etc) for the supported units.

Allocate information collection assets.

Track convoy movements between subordinate areas of operations.

Ensure common standard operating procedures for battle hand-off between areas of operations

Maintain and disseminate a master route status.

Assess the classification of proposed convoy routes within the division area of operations and supervise trafficability and maintenance of those routes.

Provide requested communications support to ensure 100 percent coverage throughout the division area of operations, as well as adjacent area of operations that the convoy will conduct movement through.

AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

8-144. The area damage control term refers to measures taken before, during, or after enemy action or natural or man-made disasters to avoid or reduce the probability of damage and to minimize its effects on the division’s operations. These measures include planning, training, practice alerts, dispersion, and the use of camouflage. When such an event occurs, the objective is to resume operations, including the maintaining or restoring of control, evacuating casualties, isolating danger areas, and reducing personnel and material losses.

Control and Assessment Teams

8-145. All division units organize control and assessment teams. The next higher echelon commander sends a control and assessment teams to the appropriate location when a unit is subjected to massed fires, weapons of mass destruction, or natural disasters. The senior member of this team determines the operational effectiveness of the impacted unit, supervises the conduct of area damage control operations, and takes other actions as necessary to help the unit resume its primary mission. That senior member assumes command of the unit if required. The control and assessment team estimate the type and number of casualties, the effective strength of the affected units, and the loss of commanders, if applicable. The team’s senior member submits reports through command channels by the most rapid available means.

8-146. Each commander is responsible for area damage control operations within that individual’s area of operations. The maneuver enhancement brigade commander is responsible for the detailed planning and execution of area damage control for all units, installations, and main supply routes located within or transiting the division support area. That commander is also responsible for insuring that the area damage control plan conforms to the overall division area damage control plan.

8-147. The division chief of protection has coordinating staff responsibility for area damage control. This individual supervises the preparation of division plans and exercise staff supervision over division area damage control operations.

Base Area Damage Control Efforts

8-148. After an incident the base commander conducts an immediate assessment of the damage and reports that assessment to the base cluster operations center and maneuver enhancement brigade main command post. Simultaneously the base commander initiates actions to isolate danger areas and to prevent extension or continuation of the damage, such as fighting fires and minimizing flooding.

8-149. Casualties receive self, buddy, and first aid. If possible, medical personnel and ambulances evacuate casualties. However, the timely transportation of casualties is important. The situation may require using non-medical vehicles for mass casualties. If possible, medical personnel accompany those patients being transported in non-medical vehicles to provide en route patient care.

8-150. The base establishes traffic control using military police or other Soldiers to ensure fire-fighting equipment gain access to the area and ambulances and evacuation vehicles clear the area. The base defense operations center notifies the base cluster operations center (if applicable) of blocked routes and necessary traffic diversions. The element conducting traffic control can also temporarily be used to control displaced civilians and stragglers. The operational area security force can provide a degree of local security for the damaged area.

8-151. The base defense operations center coordinates with the base cluster operations center (if applicable) and the maneuver enhancement brigade main command post for engineer support to restore critical facilities and any specialized firefighting capabilities required. Engineers support is normally needed to clear debris and rubble to support the base damage control mission and extinguish extensive fires. The base defense operations center also coordinates for any necessary explosive ordnance disposal and decontamination support.

8-152. The base commander takes precautions when receiving area damage control support from host nation resources to ensure that the security of the base is not further endangered by maintaining local security and interior guard posts. The commander cannot afford confusion surrounding the base’s damage control efforts to provide an opportunity for enemy saboteurs and other hostile personnel to penetrate the base’s perimeter.

SECTION III - DIVISION MOBILITY

8-153. The mobility of the division is fundamental to the successful conduct of almost all division operations. The division commander cannot concentrate his forces to fight, maneuver to avoid combat, or benefit from successful tactical actions unless the division can move quickly, securely, and efficiently. The division must be prepared to tactically move all or some of the division from one part of the joint force commander’s operational area to another. This requires the division to coordinate the provision of additional transportation assets to its moving brigade since they are not one-hundred percent mobile with organic assets. This is in additional to strategic and operational deployments and redeployments discussed in chapter 4 of this publication and in FM 3-35.

8-154. Movement control is the dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating movements according to command priorities to synchronize distribution flow over lines of communications to sustain land forces (ADRP 4-0). Division movement control includes the planning, prioritizing, deconflicting, and execution of division movement plans, both internal and external (other U.S. forces and host nation) to a unit. These movements may be either tactical or administrative in nature. The division G-3 has coordinating staff responsibility for tactical movements within the division’s area of operations. The division assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4) has coordinating staff responsibility for the division’s administrative movements. The division’s tactical and administrative movements are both controlled by the division current operations integrating cell within the division’s main command post. In a similar manner subordinate brigade commanders and their operations and logistics officers are responsible for prioritizing and deconflicting non-division directed movements within their respective areas of operations. This includes the maneuver enhancement brigade commander, brigade operations and logistics officers for the division support area.

DIVISION TACTICAL MOVEMENTS

8-155. Retaining the flexibility to execute a variety of attack plans until late in the enemy’s planning cycle is a goal of movement planning. Detailed and practiced division movement standard operating procedures and task organizations simplify division march planning, provide flexibility and greater responsiveness, and provide a smoother cooperation through the maintenance of habitual relationships between different units. However, the use of standard divisional task organization precludes having carefully tailored organizations for each contingency.

8-156. For tactical movement, division planners must understand the size of units and the related time and space factors for most movement operations. Changes in unit strength because of maintenance failures and repairs or small-scale combat losses are unpredictable. Division planners should not try to keep up with these normal fluctuations. They should know the time it takes the division to pass on multiple routes at a designated speed (a division normally requires at least four routes), general pass times, column lengths, and its fuel requirements. They must also appreciate the effects of weather and enemy action on the carrying capacity of the available road network within the division’s area of operations. They must also understand the engineer effort necessary and the time required to gain and maintain tactical mobility over different types of roads and terrain and breach natural and enemy linear obstacles of different sizes and types.

8-157. For efficient movement, the division is organized into a serial of march units that are of uniform size. A standard march unit normally corresponds to the size of a maneuver company or team or matches the rapid refueling capability of a pre-positioned supporting sustainment unit. This is a manageable-sized element for sustainment commanders, movement planners, and traffic controllers.

8-158. Depending on the situation, the division’s march may be controlled by the division G-3 from the division tactical command post; from the current operations integrating cell of the division main command post; or from an ad hoc movement control headquarters consisting of representatives from the G-4, division transportation officer, division provost marshal, division signal officer, division engineer, and other staff sections. No matter who controls it, march planning must include the following minimum requirements:

Reconnaissance of primary and alternate routes and assembly areas.

The prompt dispatch of liaison teams to other headquarters.

Standing teams of communicators, traffic controllers, and quartering elements.

8-159. The division tactical command post along with at least a military police company to regulate traffic flow along the division’s routes of march; necessary engineer mobility teams, information collection elements; and select sustainment units; and liaison parties normally move before the division main body to be in position to synchronize and coordinate the movement and eventual employment of the rest of the division. The intent of these division advance elements is to identify problems in advance of the arrival of the division main body, control the movement of march units, provide a functional division mission command node while the main body moves, clear and repair the route, and ensure smooth movement in and out of positions at either end of the route.

8-160. Not all of the division and its supporting units can move at once. The division main command post and combat sustainment support battalions are not 100-percent mobile using organic transportation assets and require multiple lifts (or transportation augmentation). The combat aviation brigade’s movement requires special consideration since forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) or support areas are established before commitment of the brigade’s helicopters.

8-161. In a corps or intermediate tactical headquarters directed movement that schedules one division to move behind another along the same routes, displacement of the division’s support area and coordinating the use of multiple routes is complicated. Traffic control, area responsibilities, communications, and fire support are meticulously coordinated.

8-162. While on the move, the division must be ready to meet threats from any direction and to attack from the march if necessary. To retain this flexibility, the division’s subordinate brigades and battalions march in formations that provide all-around (and overhead) security. Accompanying supporting and sustainment units are interspersed in the brigade and battalion movement column where they can support the force without hindering its maneuver. Protecting these supporting and sustainment assets is important to the division’s overall mobility capabilities.

8-163. When the entire division marches, each of the division’s leading BCTs should move on multiple routes. Battalions optimally march on single routes in column formation. Battalion commanders arrange their march order to secure their trains while moving and to drop their trains quickly if ordered to attack from the march. Mortar platoons and scouts march in positions that allow prompt support of the force. Other combat units of a battalion or task force move in a standard order that permits the rapid conduct of actions on contact (see FM 3-90-1) and rapid movement onto and off of designated routes.

8-164. Deployment to and from brigade and battalion columns and other combat formations should be well-rehearsed battle drills. Forward of their attack positions, committed battalions or task forces require the use of at least two routes to deploy quickly. As a rule, the time allowed for deployment should not be less than the pass time of the leading companies or teams that must bring their trail platoons on line to support the leading units.

8-165. Brigades organize differently. If expected to deploy and fight, they need at least two routes, even when moving through the division support area. A division with two brigades on the move needs at least four routes for security and for rapid deployment at the destination of the two brigades. Supporting battalions may move on separate routes from their supported brigades even during the conduct of their supported brigade’s approach marches, but need standardized internal arrangements within the division to simplify planning, routine coordination, and speed up their movements.

8-166. In a crisis, a division in reserve, unencumbered with forces in contact or other missions, should be able to stage its units forward from assembly areas to attack positions over a period of hours. By prepositioning its tactical command post and critical engineer mobility and sustainment assets ahead of its combat forces, the division should be able to deliver a coordinated attack with just a few hours’ notice. (See chapter 5 of ATP 4-16 for more information on movement control within a division.) Specific additional planning considerations associated with the conduct of an approach march or movement to contact, an attack, and a retrograde follow.

DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUSTAINMENT MOVEMENTS

8-167. The division’s chief of sustainment and G-4 recommends main supply routes to the G-3 and the commander for approval. The division transportation officer controls the use of main supply routes within the division area of operations. The G-4 and division transportation officer coordinates supply route usage for any nondivisional elements from echelons above division operating within the division’s area of operations, such as military intelligence systems belonging to a corps expeditionary military intelligence brigade and air and missile defense units from an Army air and missile defense command. The G-4 identifies critical points along these main supply routes to the G-3 who coordinates with the brigade commander owning the terrain if those critical points are located within the areas of operations of the division’s subordinate brigades. The division provost marshal and the division engineer are coordinated with for the security, area damage control, and main supply route maintenance of supply routes in areas retained under division control.

8-168. The G-3 establishes priorities for movements along division main supply routes based on the division’s overall sustainment priorities to support ongoing and future operation. Movement priorities are passed to the division provost marshal who enforces them.

SECTION IV – DIVISION AIR SUPPORT ENABLERS

8-169. This section describes those Army and U.S. Air Force organizations that are involved in the coordination and control of air support to the division. It briefly discusses each of the air operational functions that the division uses to support its operations, introduces common airspace coordinating measures, and provides a reference for additional information on the subject. For the purposes of this appendix, references to other Joint and coalition airpower are omitted. This appendix focuses primarily on the U.S. Air Force airpower command and control support to the Army. (The U.S. Air Force generally controls air component assets that support the Army.)

8-170. Air support is vital to the conduct of successful division operations. The division is dependent on Joint fires and maneuver provided by fixed-wing aircraft to support many of the division’s decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, CAS, air interdiction, offensive information operations, electronic warfare, and airlift missions. The multiple systems provided by the U.S. Air Force enhance the conduct of Army strike or attack operations whether those operations are conducted by the FA or aviation brigades.

8-171. Airpower’s flexibility, with other fires and maneuver, at the desired place and time makes it an important component of decisive operation planning. This can involve the use of ground maneuver to cause enemy forces to mass so they are increasingly vulnerable to air attack or using airpower to attack massed enemy forces so they can be destroyed piecemeal by ground forces.

8-172. The division requires joint fires, maneuver, intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, and electronic warfare support from the U.S. Air Force. This support is for the conduct of operations within the division’s area of operations.

8-173. Air support of the division’s sustaining operations may involve airlifting critical supplies or augmentation units and providing counterair support to preempt or counter enemy air attacks. While CAS is not usually distributed to units in the division support area, it may be reprioritized from other missions to help counter a Level II or III threat. The rest of this section discusses air support organizations, division fires cell and air support operations center (ASOC)/tactical air control party (TACP) interface, air operational functions that support division operations, and common airspace control measures.

AIR SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS

8-174. To achieve the necessary degree of Joint coordination, the Army and U.S. Air Force provide qualified personnel to work with each others’ headquarters. The supporting U.S. Air Force personnel remain under the U.S. Air Force chain of command and receive logistical support from the supported Army unit. See ATP 3-52.2 for more detail on the Theater Air Ground System and the Army air ground system.

THE AIR FORCE THEATER AIR CONTROL SYSTEM/THE ARMY’S ARMY AIR-GROUND SYSTEM AGENCIES AND PERSONNEL

8-175. The Commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) exercises command and control over assigned and attached forces through the theater air control system (TACS). TACS provides the commander the capability to plan and conduct joint air operations. The COMAFFOR’s focal point for tasking and exercising OPCON over Air Force forces is the Air Force air operations center which is the senior element of the TACS. The U.S. Air Force -only air operations center will become the joint air operations center if or when the COMAFFOR is designated the JFACC by the joint force commander. Closely related to, and interconnected with the TACS is the AAGS.

Army Air-Ground System

8-176. The AAGS is the Army's system for synchronizing and integrating air operations with the ground commander's concept of operations. AAGS is that part of the Army Mission Command System that connects to the U.S. Air Force TACS and/or supporting joint air components. AAGS provides for interface between Army and air support agencies of other components in planning, processing, and coordinating air support requirements and operations. AAGS provides the framework for initiating and processing air support requests, and coordinating air and missile defense, airspace control, joint fires, and collection requirements. AAGS and TACS are used to conduct critical functions to enhance air-ground integration and are habitually integrated to create synergistic effects for joint operations.

Air Support Operations Squadron and Expeditionary Air Support Operations Squadron

8-177. In garrison, the U.S. Air Force aligns an air support operations squadron (ASOS) with the division headquarters. The ASOS provides the TACP and ASOC functions to perform air-ground integration within the division’s airspace. The ASOC and TACP are element of the TACS. Under normal situations, the aligned ASOS will deploy with the division in response to the division’s request for forces. However, in some situations in which no ASOS is available for tasking, the establishment of a provisional unit, an EASOS, will need to deploy with the division to meet the division’s request for forces. Regardless of naming convention, ASOS or EASOS, the functions provided by both units are TACP and ASOC functions.

Tactical Air Control Party

8-178. The TACP consists of air liaison officers (ALO) and joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC). The TACP elements are U.S. Air Force liaison elements aligned with each Army maneuver unit. The mission of TACPs assigned to the brigade-level and above is to advise their respective ground commanders on the capabilities and limitations of airpower and help the ground commander plan, request, and coordinate CAS, the ALOs primary function. The TACP also provides terminal attack control of CAS to support ground forces, the JTACs primary function. The multifunctional support brigades (battlefield surveillance, FA, maneuver enhancement, and combat aviation brigades) could be supported by a brigade-level TACP—depending on their mission and the applicable mission variables of METT-TC—by requesting that the Air Force temporarily shift TACP personnel to support these brigades for a mission. The division is responsible for providing transportation to move these TACP personnel from one brigade to another.

Air Liaison Officer

8-179. An ALO is an officer TACP member attached to a ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on air operations. An ALO is an expert in the capabilities and limitations of air operations. The ALO plans and supports execution of airpower according to the ground commander’s and joint force air component commander’s (JFACC) guidance and intent. ALOs can be found at each echelon depending upon requirements. The senior ALO at each echelon uses the title of their supported level with the term ALO, e.g., the senior ALO at a brigade would be referred to as the brigade ALO.

8-180. The division ALO is the senior Air Force officer aligned to the division. That individual commands the ASOS or EASOS and functions as the COMAFFOR’s primary advisor to the division commander on air operations. The division ALO is part of the commander’s special staff as outlined in Army and joint doctrine. The special staff duties do not convey any authorities over assigned air component forces to elements of the land component. The division ALO remains subordinate to the ASOG/EASOG commander and COMAFFOR/JFACC and retains command authority of ASOS/EASOS forces. The division ALO provides oversight of the joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC) functions and ASOS/EASOS personnel. The ALO normally delegates authority to integrate and control air operations within division assigned airspace to the senior air director. The most senior ALO in the U.S. Air Force chain of command is found at the Air Support Operations Group, which is aligned at the corps level. (See FM 3-94 for additional discussion of roles and missions of this group.)

Joint Terminal Attack Controllers

8-181. A JTAC is the ground commander’s CAS expert. JTACs provide the ground commander recommendations on the use of CAS and its integration with ground maneuver. They are members of TACPs and perform terminal attack control of individual CAS missions. In addition to being current and qualified to control CAS, the JTAC must—

Know the enemy situation, selected targets, and location of friendly units; supported unit's plans, position, and needs.

Validate targets of opportunity.

Advise the commander on proper employment of air assets.

Submit immediate air support requests for CAS.

Control CAS with supported commander’s approval.

Perform battle damage assessment.

8-182. The JTAC conducting terminal attack control of CAS assets, provides the final action in the TACS for the execution of CAS. There are both ground and airborne elements of the TACS to accomplish this mission. Figure 2-1 in FM 3-52 shows the alignment between Army units and the U.S. Air Force ASOS and the functions performed by Theater Air Ground System agencies and personnel.

Joint Fires Observer

8-183. Although not a part of the division’s supporting ASOS, the joint fires observer (JFO) is integrated into the TACP mission. A JFO is a trained service member who can request, adjust, and control surface-to-surface fires, provide targeting information to support Type 2 and 3 CAS terminal attack controls (see JP 3-09.3 and paragraph 8-213 for further description of CAS control type), and perform autonomous terminal guidance operations. JTACs cannot be in a position to see every target on the battlefield. Trained JFOs, together with JTACs, help maneuver commanders with the timely planning, synchronization, and responsive execution of all joint fires and effects. Autonomous terminal guidance operations independent of CAS requires the JFO to have direct or indirect communications with the individual commanding the delivery system plus command and control connectivity with the JFO’s maneuver commander or appropriate weapons release authority. While any personnel may need to perform non-qualified JTAC control procedures in the CAS mission area, JFOs are better trained and prepared to execute these “In Extremis” procedures. The intent of a JFO is to add joint warfighting capability, not to circumvent the need for qualified JTACs. JFOs provide the capability to exploit those opportunities that exist in the joint operational areas where a trained observer could be used to efficiently support air delivered fires that are not JCAS, deliver surface-to-surface fires, and facilitate targeting for the JTAC in situations that are joint CAS.

U.S. Air Force Air Support Operations Center

8-184. The air support operations center (ASOC) is usually co-located with the senior Army tactical echelon (normally a division as described in the scenario used in this publication, but it may be a corps) and coordinates operations between the permanently aligned tactical air control parties and the air operations center. The ASOC and TACP will normally be integrated with the current operations fires cell and airspace elements to form the JAGIC. The ASOC is responsible for coordinating, controlling, and executing air operations that directly support ground combat forces. When the division is that senior tactical ground force, the supporting ASOC will normally co-locate with the division main command post.

8-185. The division may employ the JAGIC to better integrate Air Force personnel involved with the coordination, synchronization and employment of joint air assets supporting or operating within division assigned airspace and Army personnel responsible for Army operations in the same geographic space. The JAGIC is an organization that co-locates Army and Air Force personnel performing similar warfighting functions within an Army division current operations integrating cell. See ATP 3-91.1 for additional information on JAGIC capabilities and operations.

8-186. ASOCs report to the joint air operations center, and provide expertise on how and when air operations can enhance the effectiveness of ground operations. In a multi-ASOC operation, each ASOC reports individually to the joint air operations center. The joint air operations center may grant the ASOC control (launch authority) of missions designated to it on the air tasking order (ATO). If the COMAFFOR or JFACC does not give the ASOC launch or redirect authority over air support missions, they must contact the joint air operations center to launch or redirect air support missions. The ASOC processes Army immediate air support requests submitted by ground maneuver forces for CAS. (See Figure 9-2.) Once the Army approves these immediate air support requests, the ASOC tasks on-call missions or redistributes scheduled missions (in coordination with Army and joint air operations center) to satisfy the immediate air support requests. Immediate air support requests may be processed through the JARN from a TACP element directly to the ASOC or the Army fires cell can process immediate air support requests or JTARs using AFATDS.

Senior Air Director

8-187. The Senior Air Director is the senior U.S. Air Force officer in the JAGIC. This individual acts as the primary operational liaison between the JAGIC and the joint air operations center and is the focal point for supporting air operations on the current ATO within the division-assigned airspace or areas. The Senior Air Director assists the division ALO and the TACP with advising the division commander on the proper integration of airpower and coordinating air support through Army channels.

U.S. AIR FORCE AIR OPERATIONS CENTER

8-188. The COMAFFOR uses the air operations center to turn the joint force commander’s guidance into a component air operations plan. Normally, the COMAFFOR is assigned the JFACC responsibilities by the joint force commander. In the JFACC role the COMAFFOR allocates resources and tasks forces made available to him or her through ATOs. When the COMAFFOR is also the JFACC, that individual will augment the air operations center with elements from other components to create a joint air operations center C. (See JP 3-30 for more information on joint air operations center.)

BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION DETACHMENT

8-189. The battlefield coordination detachment is assigned to the theater Army and represents the Army force commander to the supporting air component commander or designated JFACC at the joint air operations center. The battlefield coordination detachment’s mission is to facilitate the synchronization of air support for Army operations. The battlefield coordination detachment monitors and interprets the land battle for the JFACC staff. It is integrated into the joint air operations center, participates in joint processes, such as the joint air tasking cycle. It passes Army force and JFLC operational data and operational support requirements from the Army force or JFLC commander to the joint air operations center and the JFACC. Detachment preplanned air support requests for CAS, air interdiction, and electronic warfare. The battlefield coordination detachment coordinates intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements; airlift; U.S. Air Force aeromedical evacuation (MEDEVAC); suppression of enemy air defense; and other support requirements from the JFACC to the Army force commander.

8-190. The battlefield coordination detachment is responsible to the Army force or JFLC commander and coordinates with and receives objectives, guidance, and priorities from the Army echelon’s operations officer (G-3) through the Army senior fire support element. Specific requirements include processing Army air support requests, monitoring and interpreting the land battle situation for the joint air operations center, providing the necessary interface between the Army force and supporting air component commanders for the exchange of current intelligence and operational data, and coordinating air and missile defense and airspace control matters. The battlefield coordination detachment expedites the exchange of information through digital interfaces and face-to-face coordination with the joint air operations center. (See ATTP 3-09.13 for additional information on this organization.)

DIVISION FIRES CELL AND ASOC/TACP INTERFACE

8-191. The division fires cell is the link for the CAS mission area between the division and the ASOC/TACP. The division fires cell is responsible for fire support and planning, coordination, integration, and synchronization of lethal fire support and joint fires delivered on surface targets by all fire-support assets under their control, or to support the unit. As part of this responsibility, the division fires cell coordinates the airspace usage with the division’s airspace control and air and missile defense elements. The division fires cell, ASOC, and TACP synchronize and integrate CAS for the division. Close air support coordination occurs through the ASOC and the divisions ALO or TACP with the division deputy fire support coordinator and G-3. The TACP is also the initial point of contact for planning the integrated use of multiple effects supplied by air in addition to fire support. Additional expertise in planning integrated air operations (the use of synchronized information collection, strike, and ground forces) exists at the joint air operations center. If the United States (U.S.) Navy or U.S. Marine Corps CAS is available, a Marine Corps air and naval gunfire liaison company may provide the division, BCT, and ground maneuver battalion fires cells with supporting arms liaison.

8-192. The provision of CAS is expedited when the ASOC supporting the division can talk directly with the aircraft conducting the CAS mission. Figure II-3 in JP 3-09.3 shows the U.S. Air Force and Army airspace control agencies and their communication nets. The single greatest operational limitation of the ASOC is the distance out to which the ASOC can effectively control aircraft, which depends on the terrain and other communications enablers, such as manual radio relay, joint surveillance target attack radar system (known as JSTARS), and airborne forward air controllers. When alternative means are used to pass information to aircraft, these often introduce delays that decrease the number of aircraft the ASOC can direct in a given time period. Location of the ASOC has to be balanced between its need to be co-located with the fires cell of the senior tactical headquarters, its ability to communicate, and security concerns. The location of the division’s main command post can impact the division’s ability to employ CAS based on known communications limitations.

8-193. The division assigned airspace is that airspace assigned by the airspace control authority (ACA) within the boundaries of the division’s area of operations up to the coordinating altitude. The airspace assigned is normally not over the entire area of operations, but is normally from the rear boundary to the fire support coordination lines (FSCL) and between the lateral boundaries.

8-194. The ASOC and select TACP personnel will normally be integrated with the current operations fires cell and airspace element to form a JAGIC. The JAGIC is designed to fully integrate and coordinate fires and air operations over and within the division’s area of operations.

AIR OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS

8-195. The COMAFFOR provides significant support to the joint force commander, the joint force land component commander, and Army divisions. This support includes, but is not limited to counterair, counterland, airlift, surveillance and reconnaissance, and weather support. A more detailed description of this support is included in the following paragraphs. In addition, the COMAFFOR is normally dual-hatted as the JFACC and serves as the ACA, and the area air defense commander.

COUNTERAIR

8-196. The objective of counterair operations is to gain control of the air and space environment to achieve air supremacy. Counterair operations protect friendly forces, ensure freedom to perform other missions, and deny that freedom of use to the enemy. It is conducted in a manner or at a distance to render unnecessary detailed integration with fires and the movement of friendly ground forces. It is consistent with the joint force commander’s objectives, and may initially have the highest priority of all air operations. Counterair operations involves the performance of offensive counterair and defensive counterair operations, including the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). The JFACC determines ratio of forces assigned between these three types of counterair operations, based on—

Joint force commander guidance.

Level of enemy air threat.

Vulnerability of friendly forces to air attack.

Enemy air defense capability.

Offensive counterair operations are essential to gaining air superiority and should be conducted at the start of hostilities to seize the offensive. They are typified by attacks against enemy (list not all inclusive)—

▪   C2 facilities.

▪   Munitions and missile storage sites.

▪   Aircraft on the ground or in the air.

▪   Any target that contributes to the enemy’s airpower capability.

8-197. SEAD operations are a form of offensive counterair operations designed to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy air defense systems and thus detract from the enemy’s airpower capabilities. Their goal is to allow friendly aviation forces to effectively perform other missions without interference from enemy air defense. The division’s surface-to-surface weapons complement the efforts of Joint systems. The JFACC conducts SEAD against surface-to-air defense systems. SEAD operations are planned and conducted in localized areas by battalion and larger land units to protect fixed and rotary wing aircraft using available FA cannon and rocket systems, attack helicopters, direct fire weapons, and cyber operations, such as electronic warfare.

8-198. Defensive counterair operations detect, identify, intercept, and destroy enemy airpower attempting to attack friendly forces or penetrate friendly airspace. Initially they may be the mission of emphasis if the enemy has seized the initiative through surprise or friendly political constraints. They involve active measures such as using combat fighter aircraft and air defense artillery. It also involves passive measures, not involving weapons systems, such as—

Radar coverage for early warning.

Protective construction (for example, hardened sites).

Cover, camouflage, deception, dispersion, and frequent movement of personnel and equipment.

See JP 3-01 for additional information on the U.S. Air Force contribution to countering air and missile threats.

COUNTERLAND

8-199. Counterland operations are air operations against enemy land force capabilities to create effects that achieve joint force commander objectives (U.S. Air Force Volume 4). Counterland operations consist of two types of air missions: air interdiction and CAS. Air interdiction consists of air operations to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. Close air support consists of air operations against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly force requiring detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. CAS can be conducted at any place and time friendly forces are in close proximity to enemy forces. At times, CAS may be the best means to exploit tactical opportunities in the offense or defense. CAS provides fires to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or delay enemy forces. It should be noted that while the location of the FSCL can facilitate interdiction of enemy targets beyond the FSCL, the FSCL does not determine whether a particular air support request or air mission is controlled using CAS procedures or air interdiction procedures. The word “close” does not imply a distance from friendly forces; rather, it is situational. The requirement for detailed integration because of proximity, fires, or movement is the determining factor for which procedures are used.

8-200. While the ASOC primarily directs and controls CAS missions, air interdiction missions conducted short of the FSCL in the division’s area of operations, whether or not it supports the division, must be coordinated with the ASOC. The authority to redirect aircraft to or from missions beyond the FSCL will normally remain centralized at the CAOC, while the authority to flow CAS assets to and from shallow air interdiction targets short of the FSCL is often delegated to the ASOC or TACP. Additionally, the ASOC may also coordinate in other mission areas, including air interdiction; U.S. Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; joint SEAD; and joint personnel recovery.

8-201. Interdiction operations are Joint actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or otherwise meet the joint force commander’s objectives. It may—

Reduce the enemy’s capability to mount an offensive.

Restrict the enemy’s freedom of action and increase vulnerability to friendly attack.

Prevent the enemy from countering an increase in friendly strength.

Decrease the enemy’s battlefield reserves.

8-202. Targets nominated by the division for air interdiction are prioritized by the Army force/JFLC commander. The Army force /JFLC commander’s prioritized targets are considered along with those of the other functional or service components.

8-203. Air interdiction occurs at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. When air interdiction occurs inside the FSCL, the ASOC will normally be the principal command node for direction and control of the missions, ensuring the necessary coordination with ground operations.

8-204. The conduct of accurate and effective attacks on targets far beyond the division’s forward line of own troops (FLOT) help to establish the conditions necessary for the conduct of the division’s decisive operation. The Army force/JFLC commander may provide a portion of the sorties allocated to air interdiction to the division commander. Normally, however, the division commander may only nominate targets for the air commander to attack.

8-205. The joint force commander may designate the JFACC responsible for the joint force commander’s air interdiction effort, while the ground force commanders remain the supported commanders for interdiction in their area of operations. Air interdiction that supports the Army commander disrupts the continuity of the enemy’s operations. Objectives may include—

Reducing the enemy’s capability to employ follow-on forces.

Preventing the enemy from countering friendly maneuver.

Hindering the enemy’s ability to resupply his committed forces.

8-206. In truly interdependent joint operations, the Army commander may be the supporting commander during air interdiction operations by using subordinate fire and maneuver forces to cause the enemy to mass or break cover, thus increasing their vulnerability to air attack.

8-207. Although it is possible to nominate air interdiction targets by unit, time, and place of attack, it is generally more effective to describe to the air commander the desired results or objectives. This use of mission-type targets allows the air commander greater flexibility in planning and executing the attack. However, commanders can recommend or request munitions against a target particularly vulnerable to the munitions requested. An example of a mission-type target is, “Delay the 20th Tank Division east of the Orange River until 271800ZOCT."

8-208. The division’s air interdiction targeting process does not stop with nomination of the targets or mission-type requests. Refinement of target intelligence is continuous from the time the target nomination is made, to when the target is detected and tracked, and until it is finally attacked.

8-209. The division staff must allocate intelligence and surveillance assets to support the combat assessment of targets attacked by both CAS and air interdiction. The division and U.S. Air Force must share close and continuous intelligence, particularly for targets that have limited dwell time or cannot be accurately located until just before attack. (See JP 3-03 for additional information on Joint interdiction operations.)

8-210. Close air support is an attack against hostile surface forces that are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration into the supported commander’s scheme of fires and maneuver. To be successful, CAS must be responsive to the ground commander’s needs. Close air support targets are selected by the ground commander. Close air support is planned, directed, and controlled by elements of the TACS. It enhances surface force operations by providing the capability to deliver a wide range of weapons and massed firepower at decisive points. Close air support is conducted to—

Blunt an enemy attack on a friendly position.

Help obtain and maintain the land offensive.

Provide cover for friendly movements.

8-211. The JFLC commander normally distributes CAS sorties to subordinate Army commanders who can then further distribute those CAS sorties. By retaining control over a significant portion of the CAS sorties, the division commander can shift priorities, weight the division’s decisive and shaping operations, and rapidly respond to emerging opportunities without shifting CAS sorties from one BCT to another. The combination of CAS with attack helicopters and artillery can produce a highly effective joint air attack team.

8-212. Recent technological advances in aircraft capabilities, weapons systems and munitions have provided JTACs additional tools to maximize effects of fires while mitigating risk of fratricide when employing airpower in close proximity to friendly forces. Global positioning system-equipped aircraft and munitions, laser range finders/designators and digital system capabilities are technologies that can be exploited in the CAS mission area. The following terminal attack control procedures exploit advances in technology.

8-213. There are three types of terminal attack control (according to JP 3-09.3). Each type follows a set of procedures with an associated risk. The commander considers the situation and issues guidance to the JTAC based on recommendations from the staff and associated risks identified in the tactical risk assessment. The intent is to offer the lowest-level supported commander, within the constraints established during risk assessment, the latitude to determine which type of terminal attack control best accomplishes the mission. Specific levels of risk should not be associated with a given type of terminal attack control (for example, global positioning system and digital targeting systems used in Type 2 control may be a better mitigation of risk than using Type 1). The following three types of control are not ordnance specific:

TYPE 1 control is used when the JTAC requires control of individual attacks and must visually acquire the attacking aircraft and the target for each attack. Analysis of attacking aircraft geometry is required to reduce the risk of the attack affecting friendly forces. Language barriers when controlling coalition aircraft, lack of confidence in a particular platform, ability to operate in adverse weather, or aircrew capability are examples where visual means of terminal attack control may be the method of choice.

TYPE 2 control is used when the JTAC requires control of individual attacks and any or all of these conditions exist:

▪   JTAC is unable to visually acquire the attacking aircraft at weapons release.

▪   JTAC is unable to visually acquire the target.

▪   The attacking aircraft is unable to acquire the mark/target before weapons release.

TYPE 3 control is used when the JTAC requires the ability to provide clearance for multiple attacks within a single engagement subject to attack restrictions. Like Type 1 and 2, only a JTAC can provide Type 3 control. During Type 3 control, JTACs provide attacking aircraft targeting restrictions (for example, time, geographic boundaries, final attack heading, and target set) and then grant a “blanket” weapons release clearance (“CLEARED TO ENGAGE”). Type 3 control does not require the JTAC to visually acquire the aircraft or the target; however, all targeting data must be coordinated through the supported commander’s battle staff. The JTAC will monitor radio transmissions and other available digital information to maintain control of the engagement. The JTAC maintains abort authority. Observers may be utilized to provide targeting data and the target mark during Type 3 control. Type 3 is a CAS terminal attack control procedure and should not be confused with terminal guidance operations or air interdiction.

8-214. Because there is no requirement for the JTAC to visually acquire the target or attack aircraft in Type 2 or 3 control, JTACs may need to coordinate CAS attacks using targeting information from an observer (preferably a qualified JFO). If a JFO is not available, the observer may be a scout, combat observation and lasing team, fire support team, UAS, SOF, or other asset with real-time targeting information. The JTAC maintains control of the attacks, making clearance or abort calls based on the information provided by other observers or targeting sensors. The JTAC must consider the timeliness and accuracy of targeting information when relying on any form of remote targeting. (See JP 3-09.3 for additional information on CAS.)

AIRLIFT

8-215. Airlift is the transportation of personnel and materiel through the air, which can be applied across the entire range of military operations to achieve or support objectives and can achieve tactical advantage through strategic effects. Airlift provides rapid and flexible mobility options that allow military forces as well as national and international governmental agencies to respond to and operate in a wider variety of circumstances and time frames. It provides U.S. military forces the global reach capability to quickly apply strategic global power to various crisis situations worldwide by delivering necessary forces. The power projection capability for airlift supplies is vital since it provides the flexibility to transport rapid-reaction forces to the point of a crisis with minimum delay. Airlift can serve as American presence worldwide, demonstrating our resolve, as well as serve as a constructive force during times of humanitarian crisis or natural disaster.

8-216. U.S. Air Force airlift missions encompass passenger and cargo movement, combat employment, and sustainment, air MEDEVAC, special operations support, and operational support airlift. These missions can be tasked in a variety of ways: Channel, Air Mobility Express (a special category of Channel), special assignment airlift mission, special air mission, joint airborne/air transportability training, or exercise and contingency missions. These missions are executed using four delivery concepts that work together to provide efficient and effective mobility: airland, airdrop, hub-and-spoke, and direct delivery.

8-217. Airlift is designed to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces by the timely movement, delivery, and recovery of personnel and equipment. Airlift allows the joint force commander to maneuver fighting forces to exploit an enemy’s weakness. Airlift may be categorized as either inter-theater or intra-theater. Division requests for inter-theater airlift (between different theaters of operations) are handled by the U.S. Air Force air mobility liaison officer supporting the division through U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) channels. Division requests for intra-theater airlift (within a theater) support are handled through Army logistic channels, with variations for the immediacy of the request.

8-218. Airlift may involve the airdrop, extraction, or air-landing of ground forces and supplies when supporting the division’s conduct of decisive action or when evacuating casualties. Airlift may also support the division operations by transporting an airborne BCT or battalion to conduct a vertical envelopment or by conducting aerial resupply when the division is conducting nonlinear and noncontiguous operations. See JP 3-17 for additional information concerning air mobility.

SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

8-219. Surveillance is the function of systematically observing air, space, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Surveillance is a continuing process, not oriented to a target. In response to the requirements of military forces, surveillance must be designed to provide warning of enemy initiatives and threats and to detect changes in enemy activities.

8-220. Air and space-based surveillance assets exploit elevation to detect enemy initiatives at long range. For example, its extreme elevation makes space-based missile-launch detection and tracking indispensable for defense against ballistic missile attack. Surveillance assets are now essential to national and theater defense and to the security of air, space, subsurface, and surface forces.

8-221. Reconnaissance complements surveillance by obtaining information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy through visual observation or other detection methods; or by securing data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. This can be an important part of the division’s targeting. The locations and activities targeted for R&S can also reveal important civil considerations during operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks. Reconnaissance generally has a time constraint associated with the tasking. The division G-2 normally handles requests for aerial reconnaissance. Subordinate Army commanders submit their requests for information through echelon channels. If the intermediate echelons cannot answer them, they are passed to the joint task force's request for information section for research and response. The joint intelligence operations center apportions its assets or other resources from higher echelons against the requests it receives, in order of priority, as defined by the joint task force commander. Requests that cannot be satisfied by assets controlled or apportioned by the joint task force are translated into the national intelligence system for collection.

8-222. Combining the effects of U.S. Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets with air component air strikes and the maneuver of ground assets provides a synergistic effect and maximizes the use of limited assets ensuring joint force success. Integrating air and space assets to supply multiple effects toward accomplishing operations objectives requires coordination between the G-2 cell and the division’s three integrating cells during planning.

WEATHER SERVICES

8-223. Weather services conducted by the U.S. Air Force provide timely and accurate environmental information, including both space environment and atmospheric weather, to commanders for their objectives and plans at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Weather services gathers, analyzes, and provides meteorological data for mission planning and execution. Environmental information is integral to making the decision and timing for employing forces and planning and conducting air, ground, and space launch operations. Weather services also influences the selection of targets, routes, weapons systems, and delivery tactics, and are a key element of information superiority. (See JP 3-59 for additional information on this subject.)

AIRSPACE COORDINATING MEASURES

8-224. A high concentration of friendly surface, subsurface, and air-launched weapons systems must share the airspace without unnecessarily hindering the application of combat power according to the joint force commander’s intent. The joint force commander normally designates an ACA to ensure the airspace requirements of subordinate commanders are met. The ACA assumes overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system. The ACA achieves unity of effort primarily through centralized planning and control. The primary goal of airspace control is to enhance combat effectiveness of the Joint force. JP 3-52 and FM 3-52 discuss airspace coordinating measures as well as airspace control procedures. ATP 3-09.34 discusses the use of kill boxes as a fire support coordination measure.

SECTION V – DIVISION COUNTER UAS OPERATIONS

8-225. The division conducts counter UAS operations against enemy UAS launched within and operating over its area of operations. The division will also work with its higher headquarters to locate and defeat enemy UASs operating over the division’s area of operations. Currently (2014) the division has only a limited capability to conduct counter UAS operations but this is expected to improve within the lifespan of this publication. The division’s counter UAS efforts are not independent, but are part of a larger joint, interagency, and frequently multinational effort. This section will first discuss the UAS threat, then it will address the division’s role in the detection, identification, and defeat of enemy UAS.

UAS DESCRIPTION

8-226. The importance of counter UAS technology to the division stems from the expansion of UAS research and fielding activity in recent years. There are over 700 current and developing UAS programs worldwide. Dual-use civilian technologies, especially information technologies, high-resolution imagery, unmanned airframes, and global positioning systems are now widely commercially available. It is rapidly becoming less expensive to acquire and operate UAS. As a result less sophisticated adversaries and emerging peer competitors are capable of fielding at least a limited UAS capability. Their payloads may consist of radar seeking or high-explosive warheads, forward-looking infrared cameras, laser designators, real-time television cameras, thermal imaging devices, chaff, decoy, and electronic attack capabilities. Ranges vary from 25 to 800 kilometers, and the upper limit of endurance reaches 72 hours. They perform a wide variety of missions including reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition; air defense suppression; ground attack; and communications relay. Enemy UAS may have the capability to pass real-time information back to their long-range attack systems. The enemy will seek to use their UAS to determine gaps or weaknesses in the defenses of divisional elements.

8-227. JP 3-30 provides the doctrinal reference to categorize and group threat UAS by capability, size, and speed. UAS Groups 4 and 5 are large, high flying, long distance capabilities and could include modified manned aircraft in an unmanned role. These UAS perform missions that are generally operational or strategic in nature. UAS Groups 2 and 3 are employed in tactical roles. They are the primary UAS threat to the division. UAS Groups 2 and 3 typically use small airframes with low radar cross-sections. Group 1 UAS are micro UAS and have very small airframes with limited range. Typical roles for this group of UAS are limited-scale R&S. Most do not have real-time data links and must land before their data can be processed. However, miniaturization will make this group of UAS increasingly more capable in the future.

8-228. The division intelligence cell determines the capabilities of different groups of enemy UASs regarding—

Performance (speed, altitude, and launch restrictions).

Endurance and range.

Contour flying or terrain-limiting factors.

Target acquisition and standoff range?

Sensor package and payload (maximum weight, type, and load mixture)?

Loiter time (how long can the UAS stay on station)?

Visibility affects on acquisition.

Modes of recovery and turnaround time.

Real-time, data-link capability.

Guidance modes (ground-controlled and preprogrammed). (Preprogrammed UAS are passive and do not transmit information while in flight.)

Normal operator proficiency.

As with all other types of enemy activities, the division intelligence cell continually reassesses enemy UAS operations and enemy reactions to our counter UAS operations.

DETECTION

8-229. UAS are hard to detect and present challenges. UAS have low radar cross sections, small heat signatures, and limited electromagnetic footprints. UAS detection considerations include:

The division must be able to determine the magnitude of the threat that the enemy’s use of UAS posses to the division. (This requires a careful analysis of the types of UAS the enemy possesses, the enemy’s doctrine or tactics, techniques, and procedures for their use, and likely friendly targets.)

Low, slow, small enemy UAS have very small radar cross sections that only high-fidelity sensors will be able to successfully detect and discriminate between friendly and enemy UAS.

Some U.S. radars have the capability to detect enemy UAS but the data might not be processed due to programming and sensor settings.

The division must be able to locate enemy UAS ground control stations for targeting.

Determining the point of origin for enemy UAS provides targetable data to the division.

The division must be able to see all friendly use of the airspace above the division area of operations.

The division airspace management capabilities impact all division systems the use that airspace, this includes artillery, Army aviation, and friendly UAS.

8-230. The detection of UAS begins with planning. Division planners must apply knowledge of friendly capabilities and the UAS threat to create a plan which provides the optimal probability for detection of enemy UAS. Some factors that planners must consider are forces available, the location of critical assets, sensor ranges and sensor floors, and clutter filtration settings. These plans should be tested as thoroughly as possible through simulation and war gaming before providing courses of action to the division commander for decision.

8-231. The ongoing intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is critical to the division’s counter UAS operations. IPB provides the commander and staff with an assessment of enemy UAS types, trends, and tactics. Estimates of possible UAS launch points and ground control stations will help the division to defeat enemy UAS through the use of fires and ground maneuver. Effective distribution of intelligence updates will inform the dynamic targeting processes that are critical to the defeat of enemy UAS in the air and on the ground.

8-232. The division wants to detect enemy UAS at ranges to preclude their ability effectively collect information about divisional units and their activities or to attack the division’s units and systems. In its information collection plan the division addresses the use of traditional information collection assets as well as available cyber, signal, and links to space capabilities in its efforts to detect all enemy UAS groups. This includes determining their launch locations, their flight routes, and the location of any control and communications nodes through which flight control is maintained. The G-2 and G-3 work together to develop the division information collection plan. The division takes advantage of the existing counterair procedures and sensors established by the area air defense commander to detect larger enemy UAS that normally fly at higher altitudes, such as those in found in Groups 4 and 5. The goal is to provide early warning of aerial attacks across all division formations by integrating sensors, mission command nodes, and communications. This process warns friendly forces in areas targeted by enemy UAS surveillance or attack.

8-233. The division air defense structure uses air defense warnings (ADWs), local air defense warnings, and directed early warning to alert all members of the force of hostile air activities. Air defense warnings represent the area air defense commander's evaluation of the probability of air surveillance or attack. The area air defense commander issues air defense warnings throughout the entire theater of operations. The three ADWs are red, yellow, and white.

ADW Red. Attack or surveillance by hostile aerial platforms is imminent or in progress. This means that hostile aerial platforms are within a respective area of operations or in the immediate vicinity of a respective area of operations with a high probability of entry.

ADW Yellow. Attack or surveillance by hostile aerial platforms is probable. This means that hostile or unknown aerial platforms are en route toward a respective area of operations.

ADW White. Attack or surveillance by hostile aerial platforms is improbable. ADW White can be declared either before or after ADW Yellow or ADW Red.

8-234. While ADWs describe the probability of hostile air action over the entire theater of operations, a division issues local air defense warnings to tell with certainty what the air threat is for all or a portion of the division area of operations. These local ADWs are designed to alert a particular unit, several units, or all units within a given area of an impending air attack. The division uses local ADWs to alert subordinate units about the current exact air threat and can be used with ADWs. Local ADWs do more than describe the current level of air threat in the immediate area. They also require air defense reactions from receiving units. The division commander establishes in the division tactical standard operating procedures what units do on receiving a local ADW.

8-235. The division’s current ground-based air defense radars (Sentinel AN/MPQ-64 radars) have the capability to detect, track, and classify small radar cross section targets when they are illuminating. (There is potential that the division air and missile defense element may discard this data as clutter.) Army attack reconnaissance helicopter have sensors that can detect and track enemy airborne UAS encountered while in flight. Those sensors can also detect UAS threats on the ground. Soldiers contribute to the detection of all groups of enemy UAS. Any Soldier may detect a UAS visually, audibly, or by other means. Training on UAS detection fundamentals: their mission profiles, UAS recognition (friend and enemy), and proper reporting methods should be skills common to all division Soldiers. Regardless of how an enemy UAS is detected, that information is disseminated to not only all divisional elements but also to appropriate unified action partners.

IDENTIFY

8-236. Identification is determining the friendly or hostile character of an unknown detected contact through visual, procedural, and/or electronic means. Identification is important because not all of the division’s UAS are currently, or in the future, will be self-reporting. Continuous situational awareness by the JAGIC is critical to ensure that the division can react to any situation requiring immediate use of airspace, such as immediate fires or CAS mission, unplanned UAS launch, or diversion of Army and joint aviation assets in real time while reducing the possibilities for fratricide. Identification challenges for enemy UAS include: congested airspace; poor airspace control; lack of universal identification, friend or foe systems on friendly aerial platforms; and similarities (visual and electronic) between friendly and enemy UAS. There are several capabilities currently in development that will improve UAS identification:

The Army, through length discrimination or other means, must be able to classify enemy UAS groups 1-3 platforms as unmanned. This will enable sufficiently flexible ROE (ROE), such as engage on classification, where positive hostile identification may not be necessary for unmanned platforms.

Identification authorities must be passed to low enough tactical echelons (battalion, company, and platoon) to allow those low tactical echelons to engage time sensitive targets.

Electronic signature libraries must be developed since UAS are normally dependent on ground stations with data links for control and transport data.

8-237. Identification of UAS also begins with planning. Counter UAS identification planning consists of two key elements: the airspace control plan and identification criteria. The area air defense commander, in concert with ACA, will establish these elements. Division plans must clearly establish who has the actual authority to classify and identify enemy UAS. Those division plans have to reflect higher headquarters guidance in those areas.

8-238. Identification authorities will be required at the appropriate levels to facilitate prompt decisive action to identify threat UAS. The identification authority for UAS Groups 1 and 2—low, slow, and small UAS—identification should reside at company and platoon echelon. This will require sufficient coordination with higher authorities to ensure information collected at all echelons is readily available to tactical commanders. That identification occurs using procedural and positive processes. Procedural identification requires that joint and Army have a clear and concise understanding of the operational environment both on the ground and in the air. Positive identification will require effective and reliable sensors and other equipment, such as identification, friend or foe transmitters on friendly aircraft or non-cooperative target recognition software.

8-239. The division’s air and missile defense element helps process track data from the joint data network to help identify potential targets based on their points of origin or to make identification recommendations to higher authorities. The division JAGIC uses that information to update the division’s high-payoff target list, attack guidance matrix, targeting synchronization matrix, identification matrix, and surface-to-air-missile tactical order for any division controlled Avengers and man portable air defense systems as necessary to defeat identified enemy UAS threats. The division’s intelligence cell provides capabilities that help identify the danger posed by enemy UAS. This includes access to geospatial intelligence products. The intelligence cell disseminates updated enemy UAS-related information and intelligence over secure networks. Those division secure networks disseminate enemy UAS-related information to and from individual Soldiers as appropriate, as well as providing commanders and Soldiers with identification and engagement authority where possible.

8-240. The division’s BCTs provide information from their ground and aerial sensors to help identify enemy UAS. Additionally, these BCTs provide reconnaissance capabilities to identify UAS threats wherever they are encountered on the ground and in the air. Aircraft from the division’s combat aviation brigade can provide both electronic and visual identification of UAS encountered while in flight, as well as assisting in reconnaissance of potential enemy UAS launch locations and control nodes. All Soldiers may be in a position to visually identify enemy UAS.

DEFEAT

8-241. Within the division counter UAS context, defeat is destroying enemy UAS or preventing enemy UAS from performing their assigned mission against friendly forces. Defeat of UAS also begins in planning. Effective risk assessment will provide commanders with the ability to evaluate risk to friendly aerial systems versus the flexibility to defeat hostile systems.

8-242. The division intelligence cell provides critical signals and geospatial intelligence products. It provides insight into enemy UAS capabilities, operations and intentions. The intelligence cell provides long term trend analysis, predictive analysis, and fused intelligence products that support division counter UAS operations. Intelligence will also provide access to space based intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance sensors through collection management plans developed through intelligence assets.

8-243. The division JAGIC and assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5) plan fire support through the arrangement of coordinated and synchronized use of fires in time, space, and purpose, which will help to preempt enemy UAS operations by eliminating enemy combat capabilities at decisive points at extended ranges. Fire support coordination and synchronization is both a process and result. Accurately locating targets is essential to effective fires. Preplanning will identify deliberate targeting opportunities against enemy UAS on the ground and in the air. Targeting follows decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology. All available sensors (Army and joint) within an integrated collection plan are used to locate targets for planned, on-call, or immediate attack. Dynamic targeting will provide a means for defeating those enemy UAS that are time sensitive targets and targets of opportunity. Division artillery and air and missile defense planners develop fire plans that integrate fires against enemy UAS into the division’s other operations.

8-244. The division must effectively integrate its available UAS defeat mechanisms with the engagement decision authority. The division commander must ensure that adequate communication links between identification and engagement authority holders and possible shooters are established and maintained. These defeat mechanism includes Army and joint fires targeted against UAS ground stations, support networks and communications, and UAS platforms. Defeat also encompasses ground and aerial maneuver to destroy enemy UAS capabilities on the ground, combined arms air defense, cyber electromagnetic activities, and mitigating the effectiveness of the enemy UAS threat through other means, such as disinformation. Divisional units assess the effect of these defeat mechanisms on enemy UAS. Data must be accurate and near real time to facilitate re-engagement decisions.

8-245. The division employs passive air defense techniques including early warning, dispersion, hardening and camouflage. The division will employ multi/hyper-spectral obscurants to negate infrared and near-infrared and ultraviolet detection sensors. It will use camouflage and concealment techniques to defeat enemy observation and deny the enemy the ability to target friendly forces.

8-246. The division uses available cyber electromagnetic activities against enemy UAS systems according to the division commander’s guidance. Enemy UAS currently typically employ a mix of both digital RF and networked control systems. These UAS networks are susceptible to exploitation and/or attack. The division can employ electronic warfare using electronic support capabilities to provide electronic sensing of radio frequency emitters from enemy UAS that have active signal and data-links to ground control stations. This is particularly useful when the UAS has a small radar cross-section which makes it almost undetectable to conventional radar.

8-247. Most UAS are currently dependent on guidance from control stations while airborne. These control networks can be disrupted or attacked causing the operator to lose control of the system. This may also allows friendly operators to command the system to follow a different flight path than intended or have the system destroy itself by crashing into the ground. Immediate response actions to an enemy UAS could be a combination of fires and non-lethal effects. Jamming and network attack based on the threat presented and commander’s intent of denying the enemy the use of not only a single UAS, but also all UAS systems on that common network.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR ENEMY UAS

8-248. As previously stated, the engagement authority for Group 1 and 2 UAS should be nested with the identification authority, in most cases. This implies that engagement authority should be delegated down to company commanders and platoon leaders wherever possible as delineated in the ROE. One of the outputs of division planning will be the ROE for enemy UAS. Having ROE for enemy UAS properly tailored to the situation will facilitate timely engagements of enemy UAS while mitigating the chances of fratricide.

8-249. Hostile criteria is the description of conditions under which an aerial platform normally may be identified as hostile for engagement purposes. They are the rules for identification of friendly or hostile aerial platforms, established by the appropriate commander. The commander may consider speed and altitude, among other requirements, within a specified airspace when establishing hostile criteria. The commander may also consider enemy characteristics or hostile acts, such as conducting R&S.

8-250. Commanders at all echelons have the responsibility to take whatever action is necessary to protect their forces and equipment against enemy UAS. When under attack, the right of self-defense takes precedence over any other established rules and procedures which normally govern engagements. A commander and Soldier may always defend themselves and their unit from direct attack. The right of all divisional units to engage attacking aerial platforms is derived from that doctrine of self-defense. The division commander will need to determine if being the target of enemy UAS R&S efforts will qualify as being under attack. That determination will reflect guidance from higher authority.

8-251. To defeat enemy UAS, the division must have access to sensor feeds from systems capable of continuously tracking detected enemy UAS with enough accuracy to enable or help division systems involved in defeating enemy UAS. This requires systems to provide high track quality information. In addition, these systems must be able to deconflict and correlate tracks to reduce confusion from duplicate tracks. Optimally, track resolution and track history should be captured and disseminated to help intelligence assets determine their respective points of origin.

8-252. UAS engagements will likely always produce debris. As such, the expected results from both successful and unsuccessful aerial target engagements should be factored into engagement area selection. Weapons system crews must exercise care when engaging UAS targets since munitions passing through or near the targeted UAS pose a collateral damage or fratricide risk to friendly forces or noncombatants in proximity to surface impact points.

WEAPONS CONTROL STATUS

8-253. Weapon control statuses describe the relative degree of control of division air defense fires. Weapon control statuses apply to weapon systems, volumes of airspace, or types of air platforms. There are three different weapons control status:

Weapons free: Weapons can fire at any air target not positively identified as friendly. This is the least restrictive weapon control status.

Weapons tight: Fire only at air targets positively identified as hostile according to the prevailing hostile criteria. Positive identification can be effected by a number of means including visual identification (aided or unaided) and meeting other designated hostile criteria supported by track correlation.

Weapons hold: Do not fire except in self-defense or in response to a formal order. This is the most restrictive weapon control status.

The degree or extent of control varies depending on the tactical situation. Establishment of separate weapon control statuses for different types of aerial platforms, such as fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, UASs, and for missiles, is normal. The division air and missile defense element has the capability to receive and disseminate the following weapon control statuses for all types of air platforms.

8-254. The division’s directed early warning are designed to alert subordinate units or an area of the battlefield of an immediate or possible threat. It is passed over the division command net or a net designated by the division for flash precedence traffic. Directed early warning defines the LADW and states whether the aerial platform is friendly or unknown, a cardinal direction, and, if known, the most likely affected asset(s) within the supported force.

COMBINED ARMS AIR DEFENSE

8-255. Even if a division’s subordinate units are under direct attack by an enemy UAS (or other aircraft), practical consideration bears on decisions to fire. It makes no sense at all to shoot at a Group 4 or 5 UAS using an antitank missile from a standoff range of 3 kilometers, except perhaps with the main gun of a tank. A small-unit commander’s decision to fire should be tempered by consideration of the capabilities of available weapons. However, there is another side to the fire decision. Although small arms have a low probability of kill against all types of attacking aerial platform, the use of coordinated group firing, using all organic weapons is an effective technique.

8-256. Small arms fire against aerial platforms can be effective. In the Korean War, the U.S. Air Force lost 259 jet aircraft and 285 other aircraft to combined small arms and air defense fire. In South Vietnam, the U.S. lost 410 fixed-wing aircraft and 2,100 helicopters to antiaircraft artillery and small arms fire. Thirty-six coalition aircraft were shot down by ground fire in the Desert Storm. In Iraq and Afghanistan ground fire and man portable air defense missile likewise shot down a significant number of helicopters.

8-257. Combined arms air defense incorporates the use of volume fire and proper aiming points according to the target. This requires weapon system operators who are adequately trained to employ their weapons systems against threat UAS, including training on target acquisition and assessing post-engagement effects. If Soldiers are trained to apply an appropriate sequence of engagement techniques for different aerial platforms based on the rules for selecting an aiming point, the response will be automatic upon command. See Air Defense School publications for a discussion of these techniques.

SECTION VI – DIVISION CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS

8-258. The Army coordinates and integrates cyberspace operations through cyber electromagnetic activities. They do this to gain and maintain freedom of action in cyberspace and as required achieving periods of cyberspace superiority. Cyberspace superiority is the degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable conduct of operations by that force, and its related land, air, maritime, and space forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by an adversary (JP 1-02). Such interference is possible because large portions of cyberspace are not under the control of friendly forces. Cyberspace superiority establishes conditions describing friendly force freedom of action while denying this same freedom of action to enemy and adversary actors. Ultimately, the Army conducts cyberspace operations to create and achieve effects to support the commander's objectives and desired end state.

8-259. Division cyberspace operations involve the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Information systems exhibit inherent security vulnerabilities. Cost-effective, timely, and proactive cybersecurity measures and corrective actions will be established and implemented to mitigate risks before exploitation and to protect against vulnerabilities and threats once they have been identified.

8-260. Cyberspace operations are categorized into three functions including offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and Department of Defense information network operations. These functions are described in joint doctrine as missions in cyberspace that require actions in cyberspace (see joint doctrine for cyberspace operations). FM 3-38 provides additional details of Army cyberspace operations.

8-261. LandWarNet faces a full range of cyberspace threats, including advanced and persistent threats that can evade commercially available security tools and defeat generic security best practices. In this dynamic environment, it is critical that those responsible for building, operating, defending, maintaining, and ensuring the continuity of these information networks maintain a unified and resilient capability to minimize the impact of these threats on mission operations. This capability must be able to adapt over time to changes in the threat environment. The threat from adversaries to LandWarNet degrades the Army's ability to maintain current and future warfighting capabilities. While threats cannot be completely eliminated and will likely evolve over time, it is crucial to maintain a proactive, progressive, and coordinated approach to detecting and responding to cyber events and incidents that can adversely affect Army operations and LandWarNet.

SECTION VII – THE DIVISION AND REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES

8-262. Regionally aligned forces are those forces that provide a combatant commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable the combatant commander to shape the environment (FM 3-22). This includes Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities service retained but combatant command aligned for regional missions. All Army divisions, both Regular Army and Army National Guard are involved in this program in one form or another due to the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army's vision for providing combatant commanders with versatile, responsive, and consistently available forces. Regionally Aligned Forces allocated under the global force management allocation plan (GFMAP) help combatant commanders to meet their requirements for units and capabilities to support operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities. The implementation of the full Regionally Aligned Force concept will take several years to complete. Initial alignment of the three corps headquarters and eight of the ten Regular Army divisions occurred in Fiscal Year 2013. The projected date for completion of regional alignment down to the brigade echelon is 2016.

CURRENT GUIDANCE

8-263. The regionally aligned forces plan calls for divisions and their subordinate brigades to maintain their proficiency in wartime fundamentals, but also possess a regional mission and training focus that includes an understanding of the languages, cultures, geography, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed. Those designated regionally aligned forces provide crisis response, operational support, and theater security cooperation to all their combatant commander’s requirements within the authorities and limitations established by Congress, the Department of State, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The division’s leaders and Soldiers involved in this program must be able to impart military knowledge and skills to foreign security forces on matters of common interest. The division headquarters and subordinate brigades employ small, agile forces and teams to help those combatant command designated partner security forces develop their individual and unit proficiency in the conduct of tactical military operations.

8-264. When regionally aligned, a division with a tailored package of its subordinate brigades and other enablers—both Regular Army and reserve component—stationed in the continental U.S. (CONUS) are allocated to a combatant commander to help execute that combatant commander’s theater engagement campaign. Examples of additional enablers include civil affairs units, military intelligence units, digital liaison detachments, maneuver enhancement brigades, military police units, CBRN units, and engineer units. (See figure 8-2 on page 8-48). However the entire division headquarters and headquarters battalion or subordinate units with established unit identification codes do not deploy under the regionally aligned forces concept. The deployment of entire units requires Secretary of Defense authorization. Command and support relationships for the division and its subordinate units are as stated in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). The division is authorized to directly coordinate with the appropriate Army Service component command or theater Army upon its alignment with a geographic combatant commander.

8-265. The Secretary of Defense must also authorize deployment of the division or its subordinate brigades if the division or subordinate brigades are going to conduct decisive action focused on the conduct of offensive or defensive tasks or goes beyond the parameters of the theater engagement campaign plan. Deployment associated with the conduct of traditional operations by the deployed unit requires normal deployment, such as request for forces by the combatant commander.

8-266. A combatant commander can employ forward deployed assigned forces for conventional operations according to Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) and their inherent combatant command authority. Combatant commander employ allocated forces, such as detachments from regionally aligned divisions and their subordinate units according to GFMAP mission. Operations within the parameters of the GFAMP requires the Army Service component command or theater Army to provide general administrative support (Title 10) to deployed detachments conducting theater engagement activities. These detachment can come from either the combatant commander’s forward deploy assigned forces or from allocated forces. This may require the theater Army to augment these detachments to provide the required Title 10 support.

8-267. Forces assigned a regionally aligned force mission may be authorized by the Department of the Army (DA) to have a slightly reduced readiness posture throughout the ARFORGEN process. This reduced readiness level will be a result of deploying detachments to support the combatant commander’s theater engagement campaign plan. This tiered readiness will be managed by the combatant commander to which they are aligned. Costs associated with regional alignment may be significant depending on the number and scope of missions the division supports. The costs associated with regional aligned deployment will be shared between U.S. Forces Command and the combatant commander according to negotiated memorandum of agreements between the two commanders. The Army accepts the potential loss of flexibility for global commitments if a division has a significant number of deployed detachment when a contingency operation occurs outside the aligned region to which the division must respond.

8-268. FM 3-22 provides the conceptual framework for how division’s support geographic combatant commander theater campaign plan objectives. That publication focuses on security cooperation assessment, planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. It provides doctrinal guidance and direction for how the Army trains, advises, assists, equips, and assess foreign security forces. The DA headquarters G-3/5/7, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command are collaborating to adapt Army Force Generation training requirements, leverage best practices, and establish regionally aligned communities of purpose to best prepare units for this mission. The next few paragraphs address current guidance for regionally aligned forces.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

8-269. The division headquarters and headquarters battalion can provide the base around which a joint task force headquarters can be built in response to one or more small scale contingencies when required. (This will require the assignment of appropriate joint and service capabilities.) A detachment from the aligned division headquarters can provide training and readiness oversight for allocated BCTs or in the case of European Command its assigned BCTs. A regionally aligned division can be tasked to provide one or more operational planning teams or planning expertise to support the theater Army. It can also provide necessary enabler support, such as a white cell for a security cooperation exercise, which helps shape the theater of operations for the combatant commander.

REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCE CONCEPT ADVANTAGES

8-270. The primary advantage of this concept is that the combatant commanders have access to capabilities drawn from the Army to support a full range of military operations, military exercises and partnering activities. This regional alignment, in turn, will help improve the U.S. Army’s contribution to building trust and understanding with U.S. partners and allies, that can help lead to greater coalition effectiveness.

8-271. The division provides responsive capabilities to the combatant commander that help shape the area of responsibility. The regionally aligned forces concept helps to shape the security environment. Land forces are typically the dominant military service of partner security forces, and the senior military commander is normally from their army. As such, a division and its subordinate brigades can use deployed small teams and larger detachments to partner with these security forces at the tactical, institutional, and ministerial level to build trust and achieve greater influence through the conduct of different security cooperation activities. The concept facilitates the building of partnerships with various militaries with the combatant commander’s area of responsibility on a sustainable and long-term basis at the general officer level and below. This occurs as individuals have multiple short term deployments to the same country and interact with the same host nation individuals.

8-272. A regionally aligned division will have worked with allies and partners in a security cooperation context for many years. It will help partners through conducting various activities such as exercises, training, equipping, education, conferences, and military staff talks to shape the environment by building their capacity to prevent and deter conflict. Division support to security cooperation help to shape the regional security environment by—

Building defense relationships that promote U.S. security interests.

Developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.

Providing division and other U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations to prevent and deter conflict.

8-273. The division’s deployed teams and detachments support their aligned geographic combatant commander with skills, such as common Soldier, logistics, personnel services, communications, military rule of law, and other skill sets critical for establishing and maintaining security forces that can participate in multinational operations. At the same time these partner security forces remain answerable to their civilian authorities and respect the rule of law.

8-274. The division’s deployment of small teams and detachments occurs in the context of a rotational, cyclical readiness model that provides a predictable and sustainable supply of assets to the combatant commander. The division can also provide a surge capacity for unexpected contingencies in the supported combatant commander’s area of responsibility.

8-275. The execution of the regionally aligned forces concept allows most division integrating and functional cells and special staff officers to develop regional expertise over time. This specifically impacts the G-2, the assistant chief of staff, financial management (G-8), and the division information operations special staff officer through gains in effectiveness in return for dollars and other resources expended for specialized training. It also allows division leaders to develop necessary official and unofficial links with inter-agency and international partners to better synchronize activities. This can occur is the division can take advantage of the military personal exchange program to develop those links in the Department of State and other agencies.

8-276. Other advantages of regional alignment for division Soldiers and units include the following:

Engages and energizes leaders and Soldiers and acts as a positive retention tool.

Provides purpose for home-station training focus.

Builds on years of experience working with partners.

Enhances the division’s expeditionary capabilities.

Enhances the ability of division leadership to understand the historical and current situation in aligned regions, which allows greater situational understanding of ongoing regional events.

Selected Soldiers gain an appreciation of the primary languages in their aligned region.

DIVISION REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES CONSIDERATIONS

8-277. The following paragraphs provide known regionally aligned force planning considerations for the division commander and staff. The division headquarters needs to work with the supported combatant commander’s staff to identify and convey the combatant commander’s requirements for theater engagement as early as possible. This allows the division to determine appropriate funding sources without resorting to unfunded requirements. It also allows the division and subordinate staffs time to conduct thorough mission analysis and prepare the appropriate number and type of detachments to meet those requirements.

8-278. Division Soldiers will support geographic combatant command security cooperation programs of varying size and duration. For example, they can travel in teams as small two persons to support a military-to-military traveling contact teams to expertise to the host nation in areas, such as common core skills including land navigation and first aid, or critical skills, such as communications logistics, and intelligence. Divisions headquarters and their subordinate brigade may also need to provide several hundred Soldiers to support and participate in bilateral and multilateral military exercises, such as those held regularly in the U.S. Pacific Command region at the request of various host nations. While individual military-to-military contact team events generally last no longer than five days; exercise support could require some Soldiers to remain in country for a month or more. Additionally participation in some U.S. Department of State funded capacity building programs can last longer.

8-279. The division’s need to develop and foster an expeditionary mindset in response to this concept. There are some sustainment challenges that must be worked. Most notably, the need for support in getting passport and visa throughput; specifically for exercises. The division must ensure that U.S. Forces Command has visibility of the size and scope of its activities in the aligned area of responsibility for the supported combatant commander.

8-280. The division must determine quickly which newly assigned junior leaders and Soldiers should attend language training and be provided opportunities to develop regional expertise. The division headquarters has to plan and resource how their Soldiers will receive an introduction to the culture and history of their region of alignment. Ideally this training will primarily occur at the unit’s home station through online courses. It can also be conducted by training teams from the theater Army that travel to the unit’s location. The division should ensure that these individuals have the opportunity to develop language and regional expertise throughout their military career. This will require the division to work closely with the Army personnel system to allow those leaders and Soldiers repeated assignments with the division as they progress throughout that career and go from basic to fully proficient. Linguists in the division’s BCT military intelligence companies and the corps expeditionary military intelligence brigade that will support the division should have mastery of at least one of the targeted regional languages. Those linguists and all human intelligence personnel require regional expertise and full cultural understanding of the division’s aligned region.

8-281. Specific other considerations include the following:

Regionally aligned division need to designate a staff section with primary responsibility for regional issues. This could be an engagement cell.

Aligned divisions need to develop procedures for task organizing their tactical command post and other organizations to provide the supported combatant commander with the size and capability needed. Many times it will be necessary to deploy key senior individuals at the colonel and lieutenant colonel levels. It may require the division to task-organize even small teams to configurations other than what is reflected on tables of organization and equipment to meet the combatant commander’s requirements.

Aligned divisions need to establish an electronic community of interest in the Army Training Network to allow the exchange of identified problems and solutions.

The division’s leadership needs to be alert to detect and quickly resolve any friction or misunderstanding between the American Embassy in the host nation and the actions of the division’s deployed teams and detachments. This includes the division’s interactions with the Defense Attaché’s Office. Both the division and the embassy should understand the differences with Department of Defense authorities and chief of mission authorities.

The division needs to participate in joint exercises and receive the necessary training to allow it to be certified as a joint headquarters. This will require the division headquarters to request school quotas for field grade officers to attend the Joint Forces Staff College as well as augmentation in the form of experienced joint and Army plans officers to provide the necessary level of expertise in these areas to the division. It will also require the combat command to schedule key events that will allow the division to be certified as a joint task force headquarters. It will also require Department of Defense skilled joint staff trainers to participate. This joint training program should include phase zero activities that military organization conduct overseas to support the aligned combatant commander’s theater engagement plan.

Avoid the over commitment of division low density and high demand enabling capabilities, such as communications personnel and equipment, contracting, operational law, and protection (including personal security teams) if the division headquarters and its subordinate brigade are aligned to different combatant commanders.

Need to augment that portion of the division staff that remains at home station to allow the division to continue its garrison mission while simultaneously executing missions as a deployed headquarters. That portion of the division headquarters remaining at home station must be able to provide required support to the division’s tailored forward deployed headquarters.

Division needs to establish a comprehensive, recurring Soldier readiness program extending beyond tradition Soldier readiness process efforts. Since regional alignment requirements are iterative and occur throughout the readiness cycle of an aligned headquarters, Soldiers must remain deployable and will require frequent checks to ensure that they remain in a deployable status. This deployment readiness must include Soldiers having passports, appropriate security clearance levels, and access to existing accounts for access to corresponding levels of electronic communications networks.

Division needs to educate, train, certify, and battle-roster multiple Soldiers to have depth in key special skills and additional duties to allow the headquarters to be able to meet and sustain key deployed requirements over the alignment life-cycle. Examples of skills or certifications that require redundancy include: foreign disclosure officers, foreign disclosure representatives, contracting officer’s representatives, and government purchase card holders.

Division staff needs to be introduced to their theater Army, U.S. Air Force, special operations command, and combatant command staff counterparts early in the regional alignment cycle to allow for the establishment of staff relationships. In particular the division headquarters will benefit from developing an understanding of the functions and activities associated with the combatant commander’s theater engagement plan.

Division will need training to take advantage of joint enabling capabilities. This includes exposure to a joint command and control system and process. The division will need access to the supported combatant commander’s control systems even at home station.

Division leadership at all levels must be comfortable with ambiguity. Dealing with other agencies and partner nations is very much an art. Personal relationships are key to getting things done.

The division will need to operate where its interagency and multinational partners are most comfortable. This may require the division to establish and operate an analog command post with printed maps and acetate overlays instead of operating a digital command post.

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent manual for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABCT | armored brigade combat team
ADCON | administrative control
ALO | air liaison officer
AR | Army regulation
ARFORGEN | Army force generation
ASCOPE | areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, peoples, and events
ASOC | air support operations center
ASOS | air support operations squadron
ATO | air tasking order
ATP | Army techniques publication
BCT | brigade combat team
CAS | close air support
CBRN | chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CH | cargo helicopter
CMOC | civil-military operations center
COMAFFOR | Commander, Air Force forces
CONUS | continental United States
C-RAM | counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar
DA | Department of the Army
DTG | division tactical group
EECP | early entry command post
FA | field artillery
FM | field manual
FSCL | fire support coordination line
FLOT | forward line of own troops
G-1 | assistant chief of staff, personnel
G-2 | assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 | assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4 | assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-5 | assistant chief of staff, plans
G-6 | assistant chief of staff, signal
G-8 | assistant chief of staff, financial management
G-9 | assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
GA | GREENLAND Army
GS | general support
HMMWV | high mobility multi-wheeled vehicle
IBCT | infantry brigade combat team
IDAD | internal defense and development
IPE | individual protective equipment
JAGIC | joint air-ground integration center
JFACC | joint force air component commander
JFLC | joint force land component
JFO | joint fires observer
JP | joint publication
JTAC | joint terminal attack controller
LOGCAP | logistics civil augmentation program
MEDEVAC | medical evacuation
METL | mission essential task list
METT-TC | mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations
MISO | military information support operations
MLRS | Multiple Launched Rocket System
MPAD | mobile public affairs detachment
MWR | morale, welfare, and recreation
NMCS | national military command system
ONS | operational needs statement
OPCON | operational control
PL | phase line
R&S | reconnaissance and surveillance
ROE | rules of engagement
RSOI | reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SBCT | Stryker brigade combat team
SDDC | Army surface deployment and distribution command
SEAD | suppression of enemy air defenses
SIPR | secure internet protocol router
SOF | special operations force
SWEAT-MSO | sewer, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations
TACON | tactical control
TACP | tactical air control party
TACS | theater air control system (U.S. Air Force)
TOA | transfer of authority
UAS | unmanned aerial system
UH | utility helicopter
U.S. | United States
USAMC | U.S. Army Materiel Command
USTRANSCOM | United States Transportation Command

SECTION II – TERMS

area defense

A defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADRP 3-90).

area security

A security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area (ADRP 3-90).

attack

An offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both (ADRP 3-90).

base

A locality from which operations are projected or supported (JP 4-0).

base cluster

In base defense operations is a collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control (JP 3-10).

base defense

The local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to U.S. forces (JP 3-10).

combat formation

An ordered arrangement of forces for a specific purpose and describes the general configuration of a unit on the ground (FM 3-90-1).

command post

A unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities (FM 6-0).

*cordon security

The security provided between two combat outposts positioned to provide mutual support.

*convoy security

A specialized area security task conducted to protect convoys.

cyber electromagnetic activities

Activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system (ADRP 3-0).

delaying operation

An operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged (JP 3-04).

deployment

The rotation of forces into and out of an operational area (JP 3-35).

detainee

A term used to refer to any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force (JP 1-02).

division

An Army echelon of command above brigade and below corps. It is a tactical headquarters which employs a combination of brigade combat teams, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades in land operations (ADRP 3-90).

exploitation

An offensive task that usually follows the conduct of a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth (ADRP 3-90).

force tailoring

The process of determining the right mix of forces and sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander (ADRP 3-0).

forcible entry

Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition (JP 3-18).

information collection

An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55).

internal defense and development

The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22).

information management

The science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products (ADRP 6-0).

information system

Equipment that collects, processes, stores, displays, and disseminates information. This includes computers—hardware and software—and communications, as well as policies and procedures for their use (ADP 6-0).

intelligence preparation of the battlefield

A systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of threat/adversary, terrain and weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission (FM 2-01.3).

knowledge management

The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decisionmaking (ADRP 6-0).

*Level I threat

A small enemy force that can be defeated by those units normally operating in the echelon support area or by the perimeter defenses established by friendly bases and base clusters.

*Level II threat

An enemy force or activities that can be defeated by a base or base cluster’s defensive capabilities when augmented by a response force.

*Level III threat

An enemy force or activities beyond the defensive capability of both the base and base cluster and any local reserve or response force.

lodgment

A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations (JP 3-18).

mission command

The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0).

mission command system

The arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations (ADP 6-0).

mobile defense

A defensive task that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (ADRP 3-90).

movement control

The dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating movements according to command priorities to synchronize distribution flow over lines of communications to sustain land forces (ADRP 4-0).

movement to contact

An offensive task designed to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact (ADRP 3-90).

passage of lines

An operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force’s combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy (ADRP 3-90).

preparation

Consists of those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation (ADP 5-0).

pursuit

An offensive task designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (ADRP 3-90).

offensive task

A task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers (ADRP 3-0).

reconnaissance

A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0).

reconnaissance objective

A terrain feature, geographic area, enemy force, adversary, or other mission or operational variable, such as specific civil considerations, about which the commander wants to obtain additional information (ADRP 3-90)

retirement

A form of retrograde in which a force out of contact moves away from the enemy (ADRP 3-90).

retrograde

A defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy (ADRP 3-90).

security operations

Those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force (ADRP 3-90).

stability tasks

Tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-07).

support area

In congtigious area of operations, an area for any command that extends from its rear boundary forward to the rear boundary of the next lower level of command (ADRP 3-0).

survivability

All aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and supplies while simultaneously deceiving the enemy. (JP 3-34).

tactical combat force

A combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets, that is assigned the mission of defeating Level III threats (JP 3-10).

task organization

A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission (ADRP 5-0).

withdrawal operation

A planned retrograde operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force and moves in a direction away from the enemy (JP 1-02).

References

Field manuals are listed by new number followed by old number.

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 24 September 2013.

JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These document contain relevant supplemental information

JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm/

DODD 4500.09E. Transportation and Traffic Management. 11 September 2007.

JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013.

JP 1-04. Legal Support to Military Operations. 17 August 2011.

JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013.

JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011.

JP 3-01. Countering Air and Missile Threats. 23 March 2012.

JP 3-02. Amphibious Operations. 18 July 2014.

JP 3-03. Joint Interdiction. 14 October 2011.

JP 3-04. Joint Shipboard Helicopter and Tiltrotor Aircraft Operations. 06 December 2012

JP 3-07. Stability Operations. 29 September 2011.

JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011.

JP 3-09. Joint Fire Support. 30 June 2010.

JP 3-09.3. Close Air Support. 08 July 2009.

JP 3-10. Joint Security Operations in Theater. 03 February 2010

JP 3-13.3. Operations Security. 04 January 2012.

JP 3-13.4. Military Deception. 26 January 2012.

JP 3-17. Air Mobility Operations. 30 September 2013.

JP 3-18. Joint Forcible Entry Operations. 27 November 2012.

JP 3-22. Foreign Internal Defense. 12 July 2010.

JP 3-29. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 03 January 2014.

JP 3-30. Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 10 February 2014.

JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. 24 February 2014.

JP 3-33. Joint Task Force Headquarters. 30 July 2012.

JP 3-34. Joint Engineer Operations. 30 June 2011.

JP 3-35. Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 31 January 2013.

JP 3-41. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management. 21 June 2012.

JP 3-52. Joint Airspace Control. 20 May 2010.

JP 3-59. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations. 07 December 2012.

JP 3-63. Detainee Operations. 30 May 2008.

JP 4-0. Joint Logistics. 16 October 2013.

JP 6-0. Joint Communications System. 10 June 2010.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: http://www.apd.army.mil/

ADP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 August 2012.

ADP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 10 October 2011.

ADP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.

ADP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 26 July 2012.

ADP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 August 2012.

ADP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2012.

ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.

ADP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

ADP 7-0. Training Units and Developing Leaders. 23 August 2012.

ADRP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.

ADRP 3-05. Special Operations. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-09. Fires. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 14 June 2013.

ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2012.

ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-22. Army Leadership. 01 August 2012.

ADRP 7-0. Training Units and Developing Leaders. 23 August 2012.

ATP 1-20. Military History Operations. 9 June 2014.

ATP 2-22.9. Open-Source Intelligence. 10 July 2012.

ATP 3-01.60. Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Operations. 10 May 2013.

ATP 3-09.24. Techniques for the Fires Brigade. 21 November 2012.

ATP 3-09.34. Kill Box Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Planning and Employment. 16 April 2014.

ATP 3-11.36. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Aspects of Command and Control. 1 November 2013.

ATP 3-37.10. Base Camps. 26 April 2013.

ATP 3-37.34. Survivability Operations. 28 June 2013.

ATP 3-39.12. Law Enforcement Investigations.19 August 2013.

ATP 3-52.2. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System. 30 June 2014.

ATP 3-57.60. Civil Affairs Planning. 27 April 2014.

ATP 3-57.70. Civil-Military Operations Center. 5 May 2014.

ATP 3-90.90. Army Tactical Standard Operating Procedures. 1 November 2011.

ATP 3-91.1. The Joint Air-Ground Integration Center. 18 June 2014.

ATP 4-01.45. TCO Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations. 18 April 2014.

ATP 4-02.42. Army Health System Support to Stability and Defense Support of Civil Authorities Tasks. 9 June 2014.

ATP 4-02.46. Army Health System Support to Detainee Operations. 12 April 2013.

ATP 4-14. Expeditionary Rail Center Operations. 29 May 2014.

ATP 4-16. Movement Control. 5 April 2013.

ATP 4-93. Sustainment Brigade. 09 August 2013.

ATTP 1-19. U.S. Army Bands. 7 July 2010.

ATTP 3-09.13. The Battlefield Coordination Detachment. 21 July 2010.

ATTP 3-39.20. Police Intelligence Operations. 29 July 2010.

ATTP 3-90.4. Combined Arms Mobility Operations. 10 August 2011.

ATTP 4-10. Operational Contract Support Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 20 June 2011.

ATTP 4-15. Army Water Transport Operations. 22 February 2011.

FM 1-0. Human Resources Support. 1 April 2014.

FM 1-04. Legal Support to the Operational Army. 18 March 2013.

FM 1-05. Religious Support. 5 October 2012.

FM 1-06. Financial Management Operations. 15 April 2014.

FM 2-0. Intelligence Operations. 15 April 2014.

FM 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 15 October 2009.

FM 3-01. US Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. 15 April 2014.

FM 3-05. Army Special Operations. 9 January 2014.

FM 3-09. Field Artillery Operations and Fire Support. 4 April 2014.

FM 3-11. Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Options. 1 July 2011.

FM 3-13. Inform and Influence Activities. 25 January 2013.

FM 3-22. Army Support to Security Cooperation. 22 January 2013.

FM 3-24.2. Tactics in Counterinsurgency. 21 April 2009.

FM 3-34. Engineer Operations. 2 April 2014.

FM 3-34.5. Environmental Considerations. 16 February 2010.

FM 3-34.170. Engineer Reconnaissance. 25 March 2008

FM 3-34.210. Explosive Hazards Operations. 27 March 2007.

FM 3-35. Army Deployment and Redeployment. 21 April 2010.

FM 3-35.1. Army Pre-positioned Operations. 1 July 2008.

FM 3-38. Cyber Electromagnetic Activities. 12 February 2014.

FM 3-39. Military Police Operations. 26 August 2013.

FM 3-50. Personnel Recovery. 2 September 2014.

FM 3-52. Airspace Control. 08 February 2013

FM 3-53. Military Information Support Operations. 4 January 2013.

FM 3-55. Information Collection. 3 May 2013.

FM 3-55.1. Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BFSB). 14 June 2010.

FM 3-55.93. Long Range Surveillance Unit Operations. 23 June 2009.

FM 3-57. Civil Affairs Operations. 31 October 2011.

FM 3-60. The Targeting Process. 26 November 2010.

FM 3-61. Public Affairs Operations. 1 April 2014.

FM 3-63. Detainee Operations. 28 April 2014.

FM 3-81. Maneuver Enhancement Brigade. 21 April 2014.

FM 3-90-1. Offense and Defense Volume 1. 22 March 2013.

FM 3-90-2. Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks Volume 2. 22 March 2013.

FM 3-94. Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations. 21 April 2014.

FM 4-02. Army Health System. 26 August 2013.

FM 4-95. Logistics Operations. 1 April 2014.

FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.

FM 6-01.1. Knowledge Management Operations. 16 July 2012.

FM 6-02. Signal Support to Operations. 22 January 2014.

FM 8-55. Planning for Health Service System Support. 09 September 1994.

FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.

TM 3-34.85. Engineer Field Data. 17 October 2013.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

AR 15-6. Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers. 02 October 2006.

AR 40-400. Patient Administration. 8 July 2014.

AR 190-8. Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees. 1 October 1997.

AR 600-8-1. Army Casualty Program. 30 April 2007.

AR 608-1, Army Community Service. 12 March 2013.

AR 700-137. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. 28 December 2012.

PRESCRIBED FORMS

None.

REFERENCED FORMS

Forms are available online: www.apd.army.mil

DA Form 1156. Casualty Feeder Card.

DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

DD Form 1972. Joint Tactical Air Strike Request.

WEB SITES

Web sites were last accessed on 9 October 2014.

Army Knowledge Online. <https://www.usarmy.mil/suite/files/38799138>.

CJCSI 3110.05E. Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. <https://ca.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cjcs/instructions.htm>.

CJCSM 3130.03. Adaptive Planning and Execution Planning Formats and Guidance. <https://ca.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cjcs/manuals.htm>.

DODI 3000.05. Stability Operations.<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf>.

National Archives. Executive Order 12333. <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html>.

The Library of Congress. <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Geneva-Conventions_materials.html>.

Uniform Code of Military Justice. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ucmj.htm

U.S. Air Force Volume 4.<https://doctrine.af.mil/dnv1vol4.htm>.

U.S. Code 22. Foreign Relations and Intercourse. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title22/html/USCODE-2010-title22.htm>.

U.S. Code 32. National Guard. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title32/html/USCODE-2011-title32.htm>.

U.S. Code 50. War and National Defense. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title50/html/USCODE-2011-title50.htm>.

U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian. The War in Bosnia. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/bosnia>.

Index

Entries are by paragraph number unless indicated otherwise..

A

ABCT, 1-21-1-23, 6-189–6-190, 5-266–5-267

airspace control, 1-111–1-114

area of operations, 1-100–1-103

ARFOR, 1-6

Army health system, 1-60-1-63

battlefield surveillance brigade, 1-39, 5-268–5-274, 6-204–6-209

B

BCT, , 1-3, 1-19-1-33, 6-184–6-186

reconnaissance and security, 1-31-1-33

C

CBRNE support, 1-59

civil affairs battalion, 1-65-1-69, 5-298–5-300, 6-219–

civil control, 7-438–7-460

civil security, 7-408–7-437

combat aviation brigade, 1-40-1-41, 5-287–5-290, 6-194

command environmental program, 2-107–2-114

command leadership responsibilities, 2-71–2-89

discipline, 2-80–2-89

morale, welfare, and recreation, 2-72–2-79

command posts, employment of, 2-69

headquarters, headquarters battalion, 2-68

mission command post, 2-42–2-54

mobile command group, 2-61–2-67

tactical command post, 2-55–2-60

command programs, 2-70

commander’s intent, 3-31, 3-37, 3-54, 4-72–4-73, 5-249, 6-156, 7-401

commander’s mission, land, 3-36

commander’s planning guidance, 4-76–4-77, 7-402–7-403

concept of operations, 3-32–3-33, 3-53–3-67, 5-250–5-257, 6-157–6-172

defense, 3-59–3-61

deployment, 3-56–3-58

mission, 3-53

offense, 3-62–3-64

stabilization, 3-65–3-67

counter-UAS operations, 8-225–8-257

defeat, 8-241–8-257

detection, 8-229–8-235

identify, 8-236–8-240

UAS description, 8-226–8-228

cyberspace operations, 8-258–8-261

D

decisive action, 1-2

defense, 5-20–5-241

area defense, 5-11–5-12

characteristics of, 5-3

control measures, 5-7

defensive tasks, 5-4–5-6

forms of defense, 5-8

fundamentals, 5-1–5-8

mobile defense, 5-13–5-15

organization of forces, 5-9–5-19

purposes of, 5-2

retrograde, 5-16–5-19

deployment, 4-1–4-48

planning, 4-3–4-4

movement, 4-24–4-28

predeployment activities, 4-19–4-23

protection during transit, 4-29–4-40

RSOI, 4-41–4-48

digital liaison detachments, 1-76

division, organization, 1-7-1-18

division air support enablers, , 8-169–8-224

air operations functions, 8-195–8-223

air support organizations, 8-174–8-190

airspace coordinating measures, 8-224

division and regionally aligned forces, 8-262–8-281

advantages, 8-270–8-276

considerations, 8-277–8-281

current guidance, 8-263–8-268

division headquarters, 6-183

E

economic and infrastructure development, 7-508–7-528

engineer brigade, 1-56, 6-220

environmental considerations, 3-38–3-52

explosive ordnance disposal battalion/company, 1-72

F

FA brigade, 1-42-1-43, 5-275–5-286, 6-210–6-218

fire support coordination lane, 1-104–1-110

fires, 5-69–5-76, 5-146–5-148, 5-213–5-222, 6-68–6-84, 6-117–6-119, 6-139, 7-107–7-112, 7-211–7-215, 7-335–7-346, 8-191–8-194

force sequencing, 1-81

force tailoring, 1-77

forcible entry, 4-49–4-50

H

historical documentation and artifacts, 2-103–2-106

I

IBCT, 1-24-1-27, 6-192, 5-266–5-267,

information management, 2-33–2-34

information systems, 2-19–2-29

intelligence, 5-66–5-68, 5-141–5-145, 5-206–5-212, 6-59–6-67, 6-113–6-116, 6-138, 7-92–7-106, 7-203–7-210

K

knowledge management, 2-35–2-38

M

maneuver enhancement brigade, 1-44-1-46, 5-292–5-297, 6-199–6-203

military history detachment, 1-74

mission, 3-30, 4-71, 5-248, 6-155, 7-400

mission command, 5-23–5-39, 5-119-5-124, 5-173–5-184, 5-258–5-264, 6-15–6-26, 6-98, 6-124–6-129, 6-173–6-182, 7-54– 7-85, 7-166–7-193, 7-249–7-298

mission command system, 2-8

MLRS, 1-3

mobile public affairs detachment, 1-75

mobility, 8-153–8-168

administrative movements, 8-167–8-168

tactical movements, 8-155–8-166

movement and maneuver, 5-40–5-65, 5-125–5-140, 5-185–5-205, 6-27–6-58, 6-109–6-112, 6-130–6-137, 7-86–7-91, 7-194–7-202, 7-299–7-334

N

networks, 2-18

O

offense, 6-1–6-149

offensive task execution, 6-123–6-145

offensive task preparation, 6-97–6-122

operational frameworks, 1-98–1-99

P

personnel, 2-9–2-17

political considerations, 3-22–3-23

positive control, 2-5

protection, 5-85–5-117, 5-152–5-169, 5-235–5-237, 6-96, 6-122, 6-141–6-145, 7-129–7-161, 7-231, 7-371–7-393

R

rapid equipment, 2-115–2-116

rapid fielding, 2-115–2-116

rear detachment operations, 4-51–4-61

command, 4-55–4-57

family support, 4-62–4-63

operations and training, 4-58–4-59

reconnaissance, 8-1–8-27, 8-11–8-27

forms of, 8-6

fundamentals, 8-7

general considerations, 8-8–8-10

restore essential services, 7-461–7-485

S

SBCT, 1-28-1-30, 6-187–6-188

scenario, 3-1–3-52, 4-62–4-79, 5-242–5-300, 6-150–6-221, 7-398–7-528

security, 8-28–8-152

area security, 8-80–8-152

fundamentals of , 8-35

general considerations, 8-36

in the defense, 8-49–8-79

in the offense, 8-37–8-48

operations tasks, 8-33–8-34

special operations forces, 1-73

stability,

control measures, 7-13–7-15

country team, 7-11–7-12

framework, 7-6–7-7

fundamentals, 7-1–7-15

goals of, 7-3

principles of, 7-4

stability tasks, 7-8–7-10

stability assessment, 7-394–7-395

stability task execution, 7-243–7-393

stability task organization, , 7-16–7-34

stability task planning considerations, 7-35–7-161

common considerations, 7-38–7-39

consequence management environment, 7-52–7-53

foreign humanitarian assistance, 7-52–7-53

irregular warfare, 7-40–7-51

stability task preparation, 7-162–7-242

stability transitions, 7-396–7-397

staff tailoring, 1-81

support brigades, 5-291, 6-195–6-198

support to governance, 7-486–7-507

supporting functional brigades, 1-51-1-58

air and missile defense brigade, 1-52

civil affairs brigade, 1-53-1-55

military police brigade, 1-57

sustainment, 4-5–4-18, 4-60–4-61, 5-77–5-84, 5-149–5-151, 5-223–5-234, 6-85–6-95, 6-120–6-121, 6-140, 7-113–7-128, 7-216, 7-347–7-370

sustainment brigades, 1-34-1-50

sustainment movements, 8-167–8-168

T

tactical military information support battalion, 1-70-1-71

task organizing, 1-81

U.S. Air Force support, 1-64

ATP 3-91

17 October 2014

By Order of the Secretary of the Army

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE

Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

1428301

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Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media only (EMO).