This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online
(https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html).

To receive publishing updates, please subscribe at
http://www.apd.army.mil/AdminPubs/new_subscribe.asp.

Preface

This manual establishes the techniques used by individuals, teams, and units of United States (U.S.) Army Civil Affairs (CA) forces, as well as planners of civil-military operations (CMO). The techniques prescribed in this manual are used when engaging other government agencies, indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other military and nonmilitary entities in support of conventional and special operations missions. This manual elaborates on doctrine contained in Field Manual (FM) 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations.

CA forces are one of the primary resources a commander has to help him deal with complex and ever-changing civil components of the operational environment (OE). CA forces are trained, organized, and equipped to plan, execute, and assess the joint force commander’s concept for CMO. They are essential elements in support of the commander by virtue of their area and linguistic orientation, cultural awareness, training in military-to-host nation (HN) advisory activities, and civilian professional skills that parallel common government functions.

SCOPE

As with all doctrinal manuals, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.50, Civil Affairs Civil Information Management, is authoritative but not directive. It serves as a guide and does not preclude CA personnel or units from developing their own standard operating procedures (SOPs). The techniques presented in this manual should not limit CA forces from using their civilian-acquired skills, training, and experience to meet the challenges they face while conducting Civil Affairs operations (CAO) and providing support to CMO.

APPLICABILITY

The principal audience for ATP 3-57.50 is Army CA forces, officers and noncommissioned officers who support joint and Army forces or serve on the staff that supports commanders and operations at all levels of war. It is also an applicable reference to the civilian leadership of the U.S. interagency.

This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

ATP 3-57.50 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-57.50 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ATP 3-57.50 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

The proponent of this ATP is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Reviewers and users of this ATP should submit comments and recommended changes on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-CDI-CAD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610 or by electronic mail to AOJK-DT-CA@soc.mil.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

Introduction

ATP 3-57.50 establishes the techniques used by CA forces, as well as planners of CMO, at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war for development of civil information management (CIM) requirements that reside in FM 3-57.

CIM is one of the five core tasks of CA forces. CA forces provide the military commander with expertise on the civil component of the OE. CIM is the process that develops the civil component information critical to the commander’s CMO planning. CIM is continuous and occurs across the range of military operations. The CIM process, when conducted correctly, provides the commander with accurate, timely, and accurate information to develop courses of action (COAs) that promote the growth, legitimacy, and ultimate transfer of authority to the HN government.

ATP 3-57.50 consists of eight chapters and two appendixes as follows:

Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the CIM process and details the critical need for accurate, timely and actionable data on the civil component of the OE for the commander’s CMO planning and execution. The chapter further discusses the role and responsibilities of CA forces in relationship to CIM and the operational processes.

Chapter 2 discusses planning and the way CIM incorporates the data into the planning process. Specifically, a discussion of the roles and responsibilities of CA forces integrated in the support of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and offensive tasks. The chapter provides techniques and considerations for CA forces conducting CIM in support of commanders and staffs conducting CMO.

Chapter 3 describes the collection phase of CIM and the techniques used by CA forces to collect the civil data that begins the CIM process. This chapter specifically covers civil reconnaissance (CR), data mining, collaboration, and the integration of these methods into the CIM process.

Chapter 4 is designed to assist CA forces with the collation of collected civil data while assigned to CA units, G-9/S-9 staffs, or in CA plans officer positions. This chapter provides guidance for operational and tactical collation efforts for CA forces to support conventional forces and Army special operations forces (ARSOF).

Chapter 5 details the processing of CIM data by CA forces. This chapter is designed to assist CA forces with the processing of collated civil data while conducting operations in support of commander’s CMO plans. The chapter provides guidance for operational and tactical CA forces through predeployment, deployment, transition, and postdeployment phases of the operation. This chapter provides information that will assist CA forces in synchronizing processing efforts with the staff functions of the supported unit.

Chapter 6 provides a detailed discussion on analysis of CIM data and incorporation of this data into useful guidance for the supported commander. In this chapter, extra emphasis is placed on understanding how the analysis of civil information supports the operations process and the requirement of CA forces to be proficient and articulated during this step of the CIM process.

Chapter 7 is designed to assist CA forces with CIM production in support of the commander and staff. This chapter provides guidance for the production of CIM products and considerations that will assist in the production process through all phases of operations. This chapter discusses methods of integrating CIM products into the operational process and emphasizes the synchronization of the products into the planning cycles of supported staffs.

Chapter 8 details the dissemination of CIM products to the supported commander and staff. The chapter stresses the importance of providing critical information in a format that the force can use to make appropriate decisions about the civil component of the area of operations (AO).

Appendix A provides the Army’s format for the development of Appendix 3 (Civil Information Management) to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) within the operation order (OPORD) format. The appendix provides detailed explanations of the situational paragraph, executive paragraph, and the assessment matrix needed to assess CIM measures.

Appendix B provides an example of civil analysis. The civil information is depicted through political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) and is broken down into specific groupings of raw data using areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). The example demonstrates the interrelationship of PMESII-PT and ASCOPE when conducting civil analysis.

Chapter 1

Overview of Civil Information Management

CIM is a critical process that helps the commander to develop the civil component of the OE. CA forces provide the commander with expertise on the civil component and use CIM to develop data that can be incorporated into the running estimate to help the commander and staff clearly understand the status of the civil environment within the OE. CIM helps CA forces to provide the commander with branches and sequels to the operation plan (OPLAN) based on likely outcomes of CMO within the OE. The key to understanding how CIM facilitates CAO in support of the commander’s CMO plan is to recognize the importance of leveraging the relationship between the command and individuals, groups, and organizations in the OE to create an effect to achieve the objective.

The mission of CA forces is to support commanders by engaging the civil component of the OE to achieve CMO or other stated U.S. objectives and to ensure the sustained legitimacy of the mission and the transparency and credibility of the military force, before, during, and after other military operations. CIM supports the planning process by enhancing situational understanding, identifying centers of gravity (COGs), and supporting the commander’s visualization.

The fundamental principles of CIM foster information sharing and facilitate well-informed decisionmaking. As with any rule of conduct, the fundamentals of CIM provide general guidance and, when adhered to, lay the foundation for successful CIM operations. The fundamentals are as follows:

CIM is accomplished by the actions of CA professionals applying a disciplined approach toward managing civil information; it is not accomplished by hardware.

CIM sets conditions for greater access and, in turn, greater influence across a population, organization, agency, or theater of operation.

Civil information leverages the power of information and uses it to create greater sharing and participation.

CIM helps provide indicators of need, measures progress, and determines when transition will be successful.

CIM is not an intelligence activity.

CIM supports all operations. A lack of civil information in the operations process forces planners to make uninformed decisions about where the greatest needs exist.

CIM is a collaborative exchange. It builds rapport between partners, the value of which is at least as great as the information and analysis it produces.

GENERAL

1-1. The focus of CAO is to enable commanders to engage the civil component of their OE. CIM is one of the five CA core tasks. CIM provides the enterprise that facilitates CAO. Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, states CAO are actions planned, executed, and assessed by Civil Affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Through a six-step process, CIM supports CAO by extracting operationally relevant data from collected civil information and fusing it with the operations process.

1-2. According to FM 3-57, CIM is conducted in six steps that generate civil information through collection, collation, processing, analysis, production, and dissemination (Figure 1-1). Rarely conducted in the absence of other CA core tasks, CIM focuses on the collected civil information to maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental organizations and NGOs, and the civilian populace within any given AO. CIM provides commanders with a focal point for CAO and ensures that CA forces are used to their fullest potential.

1-3. Information management is at the core of CIM. Information management is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect data that is intrinsic to CAO and the operations process. It is the provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate situational understanding and decisionmaking.

1-4. CIM focuses on information developed from data related to civil considerations (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events [ASCOPE]) within the commander’s AO. The collation of civil data into a central database is not enough to support the operations process. Civil data must be processed, developed into relevant information, and integrated into the operations process.

THE CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PROCESS

1-5. The management of civil information is the execution of the CIM process to benefit the situational awareness, situational understanding, and situational dominance of the supported commander, Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, IGOs, NGOs, and IPI. CIM is the process whereby civil information is collected (entered into a central database) and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters (HHQ), other United States Government (USG) and DOD agencies, IGOs, and NGOs. In addition, CIM ensures the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the AO.

1-6. CIM is not the sole task of the CA unit’s CA elements (or G-9/S-9). It is an essential task for all components of a CA unit. Commanders should broadly task civil information collection to the supported unit’s intelligence and maneuver elements to enhance the common operational picture (COP) and the IPB process. CIM assists the situational understanding for all elements in the OE to enhance decisionmaking.

STEP 1: COLLECTION

1-7. Collection is the first step of the CIM process. It refers to the literal gathering of relevant civil data (Figure 1-2). Driven by requirements, collection occurs at all levels of the operation through CR; data mining; and collaboration with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and other government agencies. In the beginning, there is little, if any, screening of the data collection; everything related is relevant.

1-8. About 90 percent of civil information starts as open-source information. The security classification associated with intelligence products is determined by regulations regarding the safeguarding of technical collection methods and the systems used, as well as those for specific operations. The intent of CIM is to keep most of this information unclassified and easily shared with non-USG partners.

1-9. The heart of collection is the daily interaction between U.S. forces and the myriad of civilians in the supported commander’s AO and the capture of these contacts and data points. Every Soldier who encounters the civilian elements of an AO is a potential sensor of civil information. Civil information collection focuses on CR, data mining, and collaboration.

Civil Reconnaissance

1-10. CR is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the environment. CR focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented by the mnemonic ASCOPE. CR can be conducted by CA forces or other forces, as required (FM 3-57). Priority intelligence requirements focus CR for the purpose of collecting civil information to enhance situational understanding and facilitate decisionmaking. CAO planners, in coordination with the civil-military operations center (CMOC), integrate and synchronize CR to develop situational understanding of the civil component of the COP. Potential sources of civil information that a coordinated CR plan considers include—

Ongoing ASCOPE assessments of the AO that identify measure of effectiveness trends.

CA interaction with IPI spheres of influence that include but not limited to—

HN government officials.

Religious leaders.

Tribal or clan leaders.

Dislocated civilian (DC) camp leaders.

Data Mining

1-11. Data mining is the collection of information from various sources. Primarily conducted within the CIM cell, data mining is a collection activity that uses a combination of open- and restricted-source materials for routine and continuous study and research. Focused by information requirements, data mining sources data statistics and corroborates other collected civil data. Data mining is focused on—

Answering the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).

Refining the CCIRs.

Maintaining the CAO running estimate.

Collaboration

1-12. Collaboration is a coordinated effort focused on sharing data. Collaboration increases overall operational efficiency by eliminating redundant collection efforts. Collaborative tools are information systems that include online capabilities that enhance team development and facilitate collaboration. Examples of collaboration include—

Information operations working groups.

CMO working groups.

IGOs, NGOs, and IPI.

Military decisionmaking process (MDMP).

Multinational forces.

Chat rooms, white-boarding, professional forums, and communities of interest.

Battle update briefs, commander’s update briefs, and targeting boards.

Observations made by maneuver forces supporting CA teams in the conduct of offensive tasks.

Debriefs of Soldiers involved in civic action projects. These debriefs will be conducted to determine the attitudes of the local population that are affected by the operation.

Debriefs of Soldiers involved in daily convoy operations.

STEP 2: COLLATION

1-13. Collation, the second step in the CIM process, is the ordering of data into groupings (Figure 1-3). The tools and methods for this step vary, and at this stage, most are still developing. Available computer-based software programs can accomplish this step. Additional web tools to catalog vast amounts of data continue to emerge. Collation focuses on data management and dissemination.

STEP 3: PROCESSING

1-14. Processing, the third step in the CIM process, is the physical and cognitive manipulation of separate pieces of data into information (Figure 1-4, page 1-6). Processing structures the collated data into a usable form for the analyst. The data collector often collates and processes the data into information. Personnel often gather articles of data into a processed form, such as a book, article, Web site, film, or previously compiled database on the subject. The analyst should provide feedback to the collection manager to improve the effectiveness of the collection. Processing focuses on information management, which is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect knowledge products, data, and information.

STEP 4: ANALYSIS

1-15. Analysis, the fourth step of the CIM process, is the sifting of information for patterns and indicators of past behaviors or ideas that might possess predictive value and application (Figure 1-5, page 1-6). Analysis molds information into a knowledge product. The most difficult analysis performed uncovers the “unknown unknowns.” Unknowns are indicators of future events previously obscured in the background data. CA Soldiers must direct analytical efforts to answer the unknowns in the COP rather than exhaustively refining known data. Analysis of civil information is similar to the normal enemy force-friendly force analysis in process but instead focuses on—

Identifying mission variables.

Identifying operational variables.

Identifying COGs.

Identifying trends.

Conducting predictive analysis.

Identifying civil vulnerabilities.

STEP 5: PRODUCTION

1-16. Production, the fifth step of the CIM process, is the packaging of civil information into easily disseminated forms and structures (Figure 1-6, page 1-7). The production phase of the CIM process ensures CIM products and services are relevant, accurate, timely, and useable by commanders and decisionmakers. Products of civil information analysis are—

Layered geospatial information.

Civil information for the COP.

COGs.

Civil considerations products.

Answers to requests for information.

Reported priority intelligence requirements.

Updates to ongoing CAO assessments, area studies, and running estimates.

STEP 6: DISSEMINATION

1-17. Dissemination, the sixth step of the CIM process, is actively pushing CIM products to consumers (Figure 1-7, page 1-8). The consumers may not realize what they need; therefore, CA forces must anticipate the information needs of the supported unit or agency. Although sharing is the cornerstone of CIM and the hallmark of interagency cooperation, sharing should only be done at the discretion of the supported commander. Thorough dissemination of CIM products reduces redundancy by ensuring strategic objectives are met with minimal waste in manpower or resources. Examples of dissemination include—

Integration with the COP.

Civil information repositories.

Reports.

Update briefs.

Online databases.

CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SUPPORT TO OTHER CIVIL AFFAIRS CORE TASKS

All CA core tasks complement one another, but none more so than CIM. CIM provides CA forces with a supporting framework from which to conduct CAO. When integrated into a task force, CIM provides the task force with the supporting framework from which to conduct CMO. CIM fuses the CA core tasks with the operations process. The other four CA core tasks are as follows:

Populace and resources control (PRC).

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA).

Nation assistance (NA).

Support to civil administration (SCA).

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

1-18. U.S. forces do not conduct operations in a vacuum free of the presence of civilian influences. The following can disrupt operations:

Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of frightened civilians in the environment.

Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians conducting legitimate activities.

Illegal or illegitimate activities, such as insurgent operations or black-market activities.

1-19. The PRC operation consists of two distinct yet linked components—populace control and resources control. Normally, PRC is the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. These controls must be defined and enforced during times of civil or military emergency. For practical and security reasons, U.S. forces use PRC measures during military operations. The measures are executed in conjunction with and as an integral part of all military operations.

1-20. During PRC operations, it is essential for CA forces to collect specific information, such as the location of potential DC camps, possible transit routes, and available transportation assets. CA forces should also identify NGOs, IGOs, and any HN assets that are available to support PRC operations. CIM efforts should focus on the operational area and beyond to other areas affected by ongoing operations or natural disasters. CA forces use a central database that identifies effective CIM by area, location, resources, and transportability. By defining these considerations, the CA force develops effective measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. Metrics for measures of effectiveness, measures of performance, and the CIM processes may overlap different CA core tasks. The CA force—

Maps collection points, assembly areas, and potential DC camps. This identifies areas that offer protection and easy access to transportation assets. These areas include but are not limited to the following:

Government facilities.

Hospitals and medical facilities.

Large buildings.

Religious facilities.

Schools.

Maps transit routes. This identifies the flow of DCs, suspected and confirmed, in relation to ongoing operations. The CA force projects future movement of DCs from affected areas and their impact on current operations. These areas include but are not limited to the following:

Primary and secondary roads.

Security conditions.

Conditions of transit routes.

Bridges and grades.

Maps the flow of commodities. This identifies the flow of goods to market, as well as the flow of local nationals to the market. It helps the CA force determine current conditions and what PRC measures can be taken to influence those conditions. These areas include but are not limited to the following:

Food staples.

Water requirements.

Illegal goods.

Legal goods.

Maps the location of NGOs, IGOs, and their assets. This identifies locations, types, and quantities of available resources that serve to determine the best location to implement PRC measures and facilitate coordination efforts across NGO, IGO, multinational, and interagency communities. General considerations include but are not limited to the following:

Locations.

Resources.

Nationality of the agency, language barriers, and cultural customs.

Maps transportation assets. This identifies available transportation, thus determining what can be moved and how far. General considerations include but are not limited the following:

Type of asset.

Fuel.

Range of asset.

Maintains a significant events calendar. Calendars bring a temporal view of local events into the operational focus and are essential to mission planning. General considerations include but are not limited to the following:

National holidays.

Religious holidays.

Political holidays.

Crop cycles.

Elections.

Weather patterns.

Develops and maintains a significant activities tracker. Significant activities are major events that occur within the AO. Significant activities trigger decision points and influence specific branches and sequels. Measured as measures of effectiveness and measures of performance, significant activities are AO-specific and are measured differently at every level of operation. Some examples include but are not limited to the following:

Civil disturbances.

Threats.

Natural disasters.

Economic stimulus.

NGO and IGO operations.

Focuses collection efforts on developing a database that maps significant activities, past, present, and future. Significant activities should contain as much information as possible to allow for thorough analysis. Significant activities should not be limited to hostile activity. To capture a temporal view of the civil component of the OE, significant activities should also reflect but are not limited to the following:

Worker strikes.

Disasters (both natural and man-made).

Antigovernment protests.

Anti-American protests.

Demonstrations.

Ribbon cutting ceremonies.

Road and bridge openings.

School openings.

Analyzes specific areas for perceived civil vulnerabilities. This identifies and mitigates civil vulnerabilities that either pose a threat or have the potential to pose a threat to the successful and timely completion of the mission. Some considerations include but are not limited to the following:

Flood areas.

Drought areas.

Natural disasters.

Threats.

Disease.

Crime.

Maps religious locations and maintains a cultural events calendar. This identifies when religious activities will take place and where these activities are in relation to established ethnic boundaries. A temporal view of religious events is developed in relation to impending operations. Some considerations include but are not limited to the following:

Areas that reflect an anticipated movement of local nationals during religious events.

Locations of culturally sensitive sites.

Dislocated Civilian Operations

1-21. DC operations (also commonly referred to as resettlement operations) are actions required to move civilians out of harm’s way or to safeguard them in the aftermath of a disaster. Disasters may be natural, such as a flood or an earthquake, or man-made, such as combat operations, social or political strife, or a technological hazard emergency. The requirement to conduct DC operations may occur across the range of military operations. DCs are categorized as—

Displaced persons.

Refugees.

Evacuees.

Stateless persons.

War victims.

Internally displaced persons.

Returnees.

Resettlers.

1-22. CIM plays a vital role in categorizing DCs. FM 3-57 provides additional information on the categories of DCs. Effective categorization starts with developing a database that captures specific information. It is important to involve internationally mandated organizations in the planning process to determine additional information requirements. For each DC, general information collection requirements should determine—

Identity.

Nationality.

Religion.

Sex.

Age.

Known illnesses.

Next of kin.

Date of birth.

Medications.

Home of record.

Trade or skill set or professional certifications.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

1-23. The term noncombatant evacuation operations refers to operations directed by the Department of State (DOS) or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the DOD whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens as designated by the DOS. CA forces assist the combatant commander or the ambassador in the planning and management of a noncombatant evacuation operation through CA planning teams. CA forces involved in noncombatant evacuation operations assist in the screening and identification of U.S. citizens and other evacuees. Noncombatants are categorized as—

U.S. citizens ordered to evacuate, which include—

Civilian employees of all agencies of the USG and their dependents.

Military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants.

Dependents of members of the U.S. Armed Forces.

U.S. and non-U.S. citizens that competent authority may authorize or assist (but not necessarily order) to evacuate, which include—

Civilian employees of USG agencies and their dependents who are residents in the country but are willing to evacuate.

Private U.S. citizens and their dependents.

Military personnel and their dependents (short of an ordered evacuation).

Designated aliens, including dependents of civilian employees of the USG and military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces, as prescribed by the DOS.

1-24. CA forces planning for a noncombatant evacuation operation should identify assembly areas and evacuation routes to minimize population interference with current and proposed military operations.

Note: JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, and FM 3-05.131, Army Special Operations Forces Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, provide additional information on noncombatant evacuation operations.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

1-25. FHA programs are conducted outside of the United States and its possessions to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions, such as human pain, disease, hunger, or need, that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Limited in scope and duration, FHA provided by U.S. forces supplements the efforts of the HN civil authorities and IGOs that possess the primary responsibility for providing FHA. CIM facilitates this by effectively linking together the affected areas with available FHA. Examples of disasters include hurricanes, typhoons, floods, tsunamis, earthquakes, oil spills, famine, disease, civil conflicts, terrorist incidents, and incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. CIM helps—

Map the affected area.

Provide total numbers of the affected population.

Categorize available HN, NGO, and IGO FHA.

Analyze collected data to determine—

Daily food requirements.

Daily water requirements.

Medical requirements.

Security conditions.

NATION ASSISTANCE

1-26. NA is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. NA operations support the HN by promoting sustainable development and the growth of responsive institutions to promote long-term regional stability. NA programs often include but are not limited to security assistance (SA), foreign internal defense (FID), Title 10, United States Code, programs, such as military civic action (MCA), and activities performed by federal agencies or IGOs. All NA operations are usually coordinated with the U.S. Ambassador through the country team.

1-27. CIM facilitates NA operations by providing a flow of civil information that assists commanders and their staffs with identifying COGs and developing COAs. Through CIM, CA forces categorize and catalog civil vulnerabilities and the operational capabilities offered by federal agencies, NGOs, IGOs, the HN, and other sources. CIM facilitates the coordination effort led by the CMOC to combine resources with needs identified during the initial assessment.

Security Assistance

1-28. SA operations are DOS programs that provide military assistance and other broad, related services aimed at enhancing regional security. CA support to SA can include training foreign military forces in CMO and civil-military relations. CIM supports these efforts by using measures of effectiveness and measures of success to determine if SA programs are meeting the desired intent of U.S. national policies and objectives.

Foreign Internal Defense

1-29. FID is an umbrella concept covering a broad range of activities to describe participation in civilian or military activities of a government by another government. The primary intent of FID is to legitimize the HN government by assisting HN military and security forces to address internal threats and their underlying causes. CIM plays a key role in the support of FID operations. Through the CIM process, CA forces assist in identifying the underlying causes of instability and can recommend CMO to mitigate the effects of subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency while focusing CAO on denying the insurgents safe haven.

Military Civic Action

1-30. MCA involves operations intended to win the support of the local population for the HN and its military. MCA predominantly uses indigenous or paramilitary forces as labor. MCA plans consist of a series of short-term projects with the long-term goal of fostering national development. Properly planned, executed, and promulgated in close cooperation with local authorities, military, and community leaders, MCA projects can be useful in reaching desired objectives and goals. In MCA programs, U.S. personnel are limited to training and advising the HN military on planning and executing projects (for example, building schools and clinics, digging wells, and developing roads) useful to the local population. The intent of MCA is to enhance the image of the HN military and increase its acceptance and the supported government’s acceptance with the local population.

1-31. The desired intent of MCA is achieved through CIM. CIM focuses on identifying the best locations to implement MCA to achieve desired effects, such as locations for—

Operating an emergency medical clinic.

Distributing food.

Building temporary shelter and sanitation facilities.

1-32. Developmental MCA projects are long-term projects designed to enhance the infrastructure of a local area. They are often preventive in nature and include any activities that actually eliminate or reduce the probability or occurrence of a disaster. To be effective, developmental MCA projects require continuous support from HN government sources and interagency cooperation, especially with the United States Agency for International Development and the chief of mission. Some examples of developmental MCA projects are—

Building or redesigning facilities to reflect better land-use management.

Building or reinforcing structures to withstand the destructive elements predominant to the area.

Building or rehabilitating water sources and sanitation facilities to eliminate or prevent the spread of disease.

Operating a long-term public health campaign to educate the populace on preventive medicine measures (a medical readiness training exercise).

Conducting some humanitarian demining operations.

Reviewing U.S. SA program and HN internal defense and development (IDAD) goals and planning CAO and CMO to support the HN program.

Identifying, validating, or evaluating MCA project nominations.

Synchronizing MCA projects with other military and civilian programs.

Training HN military to plan, train for, and execute PRC and other CAO appropriate to the IDAD plan of its country.

Tracking costs associated with execution of MCA projects.

Performing quality control assessments of MCA operations and costs.

Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of MCA operations.

SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

1-33. SCA is a military operation that helps to stabilize or continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. SCA operations are required until a formal government is established or until the existing government can transition authority and execution of civil requirements from U.S. forces supporting the SCA operations.

1-34. SCA occurs most often in stability tasks. SCA manifests in the other CAO areas of PRC, FHA, and NA. CIM support to SCA operations consists of—

Mapping the occupied territory.

Identifying, validating, or evaluating foreign nation or HN essential service infrastructure. Through CIM, CA forces can effectively link resources with areas identified in need.

Providing detailed analysis of the IPI through the six CA functional areas.

Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of the IPI.

Synchronizing efforts and resources between military and civilian agencies.

Identifying specific PRC measures.

CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SUPPORT TO THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

1-35. All CA forces, those assigned to CA units and to G-9/S-9 positions across the Army, are responsible for identifying and satisfying the civil information needs of the supported commander. Commanders use the operations process—plan, prepare, execute, and assess—to continuously design and conduct operations.

1-36. Commanders cannot successfully accomplish activities involved in the operations process without the necessary information to make informed decisions. The design and structure of CAO supports the operations process by providing essential civil information to facilitate informed decisionmaking at all levels. CIM is integral to military operations. CIM ensures civil vulnerabilities are factored into the operations process. The commander’s intent and the CCIRs focus CAO and define civil information collection plans. In return, CA forces provide the operations process with a continual flow of essential civil information through the CAO running estimate during offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. This relationship tailors CAO to effectively identify and assess civil vulnerabilities, enabling U.S. military forces to achieve decisive results.

1-37. Throughout the operations process, CIM facilitates the—

COP.

IPB process.

COG identification.

THE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE

1-38. The commander’s visualization is the mental process of achieving a clear understanding of the force’s current state with relation to the enemy and environment (situational understanding) developing a desired end state that represents mission accomplishment and the key tasks that move the force from its current state to the end state (commander’s intent) (Army Doctrine Publication [ADP] 5-0, The Operations Process). Through the commander’s visualization, commanders ensure the best employment of assigned forces by clearly visualizing the end state of the operation to include the civil environment and describing how military power will be applied to obtain this end state. Civil information is collected as a result of military operations within an area where a population lives, works, and plays. CA forces are responsible for engaging other government agencies to document and nest their strategy for development and reconstruction with those events being conducted by multinational forces. Linking the actions of IPI and participating partners to the CCIR, lines of effort (LOEs), and objectives through the CIM process enhances the commander’s ability to visualize his AO.

1-39. The foremost task for all commanders is the accomplishment of the mission. Through the commander’s visualization, commanders transition from situational awareness to situational understanding. Situational awareness can be defined as understanding the current situation and promoting timely, relevant, and accurate assessments of friendly, enemy, and other operations within the OE. Situational understanding occurs after commanders and their staffs analyze the OE through mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available and civil considerations (METT-TC). The “C” in METT-TC stands for civil considerations. CA professionals have the lead in identifying how civil considerations affect the commander’s visualization of the operational area. CIM supports the process of the civil considerations analysis by providing civil data that is used to update the commander’s COP. Chapters 6 and 7 provide additional information on civil considerations analysis and production of civil inputs to the COP.

1-40. The outcome of this process—the commander’s intent—is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and desired end state. Once published, the commander’s intent provides guidance for subordinate units. The subordinate units then start the same process for their subordinate units; the cycle continues until every echelon has a refined commander’s intent that is applicable to each individual unit’s mission-essential task list. CA forces support the commander’s visualization by—

Anticipating the information needs of the supported commander and meeting those needs through the CAO estimate.

Conducting civil analysis.

Identifying COGs.

It is important for personnel to remember that the commander’s visualization is an ongoing process. Commanders and staffs strive to achieve situational dominance through situational understanding.

1-41. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking. Support to situational understanding is the task of providing civil information to commanders to assist them in achieving a clear understanding of the civil component’s current state with relation to other aspects of the AO. Situational understanding supports the commander’s ability to make sound decisions. Support to situational understanding includes—

Producing the CAO estimate.

Conducting civil considerations analysis.

Supporting the IPB process.

SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-42. IPB is a systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the mission variables of threat, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. IPB is a continuous staff planning activity undertaken to understand the OE and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. FM 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace, provides additional information on IPB.

1-43. In collaboration with other staff, CA forces conduct civil considerations analysis during mission analysis. This collaborative effort develops CCIRs, identifies COGs, and enhances situational understanding. In support of IPB, the CIM cell should—

Provide civil considerations analysis.

Develop the CCIR.

Provide COG analysis.

Provide input to the restricted target list.

Identify civil information gaps.

Review the mission statements, the HHQ intent, the AO, and the area of interest (AOI).

Facilitate reconnaissance and surveillance integration by synchronizing civil information collection with the G-3/S-3.

Develop consequence management templates.

IDENTIFY CENTERS OF GRAVITY

1-44. At all levels of operation, commanders visualize and direct all aspects of campaigns, translating HN interests and U.S. foreign policy into a clearly defined end state. CA forces are trained and equipped to enhance the commander’s situational understanding by identifying complex civil considerations that often become COGs and safe havens for potential threats. COGs are those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. CIM directly supports COG analysis by collating and processing relevant civil data and, through the operations process, focuses CAO exclusively on the targeted AOIs that are the most vital to mission success.

1-45. Coordination forges the vital link between the military and the economic, political or diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG, as well as NGOs and IGOs. Successful coordination and planning enables these agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation, achieving unity of effort (FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency).

CONSTRAINTS

1-46. CIM is a key component of successful operations. However, even effective CIM will not produce immediate answers to complex problems. To prevent unrealistic expectations, commanders must understand that civil information only reduces uncertainty of the OE; it does not entirely eliminate it.

1-47. The potential value of operationally relevant civil information may be further constrained by a—

Lack of a standardized assessment process to determine the root causes of instability.

Failure to make the local population the COG during stability tasks.

Failure to integrate tactical civil information into the strategic planning framework.

Failure to integrate CAO and CMO planning into the operations process.

Failure to synchronize civilian programs with CAO and CMO.

Failure to produce a CAO estimate.

Failure to accurately depict the civil layer of the COP.

Loss of CA personnel.

Limitation of equipment. CA forces cannot effectively and efficiently provide civil information without adequate communications equipment, automations support, and connectivity. Commanders must ensure communications and automation support to facilitate CIM.

1-48. These shortcomings and deficiencies can be linked to the level of influence that CA forces project on the operations process. Without regard to the type of operation, CA forces and CMO planners that remain focused on developing an accurate CAO estimate and incorporating it into the operations process will be more successful across the range of military operations. This approach assures the accurate depiction of the IPI in the COP, eliminating redundant CMO and maintaining synergy.

CONSIDERATIONS

1-49. The primary purpose of CIM is to provide the supported commander with a steady flow of operationally relevant civil information to facilitate well-informed decisionmaking. In many cases, the need for the operation dictates the sharing of civil information to agencies and organizations outside of the DOD. However, the decision to share is at the discretion of the supported commander and in all cases should be done with the purpose of facilitating the operations process.

SUMMARY

1-50. CIM is a six-step process whereby CA forces collect, collate, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate CIM products to facilitate the operations process. The purpose of CIM is to enhance the commander’s situational understanding and facilitate informed decisionmaking. When integrated into the operations process, CIM products provide commanders with a focal point for CAO and CMO, thus enabling them to engage the civil component of their OE.

Chapter 2

Planning

This chapter is not intended to replace ATP 3-57.60, Civil Affairs Planning, but is designed to assist CA Soldiers with CIM planning considerations while assigned to CA units, G-9/S-9 staffs, or in CA plans officer positions. This chapter provides guidance for garrison, predeployment, deployment, transition, and postdeployment. It recommends training considerations for CA units to support conventional forces and ARSOF and assists CA forces in guiding the preparation of tactical units to support the operations process through CIM.

PLANNING CYCLES

2-1. CA forces must be able to actively participate in the varied planning cycles utilized in the joint force structure. Outside of the CA force structure, CA Soldiers will have to participate in other planning cycles during mission planning. In all instances, the planning considerations for CIM focus on the following:

Participating in the unit MDMP.

Producing an updated CAO running estimate.

Updating situational awareness.

Developing input to the supported unit’s CCIR.

Preparing CAO annexes.

Developing the civil information collection plan.

2-2. CA forces planning for CAO use the CA methodology (assess, decide, develop and detect, deliver, evaluate, and transition) to describe how CA Soldiers, elements, and units approach CAO (Figure 2-1, page 2-2). In no way is the CA methodology intended to replace MDMP; it is, however, intended to provide the rationale necessary in the planning of CAO. The CA methodology consists of the following six steps:

Assess. Assess current conditions against a defined norm or established standards.

Decide. Decide who, what, when, where, why, and how to focus CA assets and actions that support the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and concept of operations (CONOPS).

Develop and detect. Develop rapport and relationships with the nonmilitary participants of the operation (including the IPI) and detect those conditions or events that call for a specific CAO/CMO response.

Deliver. Engage the civil component with planned or on-call CAO (PRC, FHA, NA, SCA, and CIM)/CMO, as appropriate.

Evaluate. Evaluate the results of the executed mission.

Transition. Transition CAO or CMO to follow-on CA units, other military units, HN forces or agencies, United Nations (UN) organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and other civilian agencies, as appropriate.

CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PLANNING IN SUPPORT OF INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

2-3. CA forces, in collaboration with other staff, support the IPB process during mission analysis. That collaboration should result in the drafting of initial priority intelligence requirements, which translate into taskings to subordinate units. Through the IPB, CA forces should provide a clear understanding of potential civil vulnerabilities or COGs, which friendly forces can then exploit. CA forces should anticipate information requirements to support the IPB process and plan accordingly. Considerations include the following:

Reviewing friendly mission statements, HHQ intent, the AOI, named area of interest, and target area of interest.

Identifying information gaps.

Facilitating reconnaissance and surveillance integration by providing the commander and operations officer (G-3/S-3) with civil input to the initial intelligence synchronization plan.

Coordinating with the staff for local cultural considerations and effects.

Coordinating with the intelligence staff officer (G-2/S-2) for input of civil considerations data into the COP.

Performing civil analysis and visualization of the AOI, named area of interest, and target area of interest.

Providing CIM products.

CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SUPPORT TO OFFENSIVE TASKS

2-4. During offensive tasks, CA planners continue to develop the COP through running estimates. The running estimates focus on the civil component of the COP and the commander’s end state for CMO. CA planners should focus operational capabilities on the following:

Depriving the enemy of resources.

Contributing to the COP.

Creating a secure environment for stabilization.

DEPRIVE THE ENEMY OF RESOURCES

2-5. At the operational level, offensive tasks may seize control of major population centers, seats of government, production facilities, and transportation infrastructure. Losing these resources greatly reduces the enemy’s ability to resist. In some cases, Army forces secure population centers or infrastructure and prevent irregular forces from using them as a base or benefitting from the resources that they generate.

CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE

2-6. Enemy deception, civil interference, and security concerns may prevent CA forces from collecting civil information. Some CAO are conducted to develop the situation, assess current conditions, and validate facts and assumptions.

CREATE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR STABILITY TASKS

2-7. Stability tasks cannot occur if significant enemy forces directly threaten or attack the local populace. Offensive tasks destroy or isolate the enemy so that stability tasks can proceed. Offensive tasks against insurgents help keep them off balance. These actions may force insurgents to defend their bases and keep them from attacking.

CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

2-8. Data collection has several complicated factors that must be considered before any data mining, collaboration, or CR can be done. Failure to implement appropriate mechanisms and controls can seriously degrade data collection operations. Although planning is not integral to the CIM process, there are several planning considerations prior to, during, and postdeployment, such as—

Predeployment considerations.

Operational considerations.

Transition considerations.

PREDEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

2-9. During predeployment, all CA forces should—

Update the current area study.

Plan the initial assessment.

Determine theater-specific reporting requirements.

Identify the reporting format used by the support unit.

Determine automations requirements.

Analyze the supported unit’s CCIR to plan, resource, and execute mission-oriented predeployment training CAO/CMO.

Identify established LOEs to plan, resource, and execute mission-oriented predeployment training.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

2-10. Collection is dependent on the level of operations and environmental factors. The civil information collection plan must—

Determine data requirements (running estimates, requests for information, and CCIRs).

Provide all elements of the CCIR and essential elements of friendly information.

Determine theater-specific reporting requirements.

Determine specific collection targets.

Identify and separate responsibility for supporting the civil information collection plan and conducting data collection.

Synchronize the collection plan with the CCIR.

2-11. During deployment, CA forces should—

Explain the unit’s CIM process so new personnel understand how the unit goes about the most basic CIM functions:

Periodic reporting, which informs civil situational awareness (such as routine periodic briefs).

Recording, processing, and storing civil data for future retrieval.

Plan and coordinate for training to orient incoming CA units deploying in support of the unit. Such training can be part of the relief-in-place/transfer-of-authority process.

Coordinate with the unit G-3/S-3.

Transition the incoming CA unit on the unit’s CIM process and periodic reporting SOP.

TRANSITION PLANNING

2-12. Transition operations are an intrinsic part of military operations. Military units conduct transitions as part of their deployment and redeployment. CIM considerations are particularly important in planning, shaping, and implementing the transition of CAO across the range of military operations. Transitional planning must be incorporated into the operational planning and revised by the G-9/S-9 as conditions change.

2-13. For U.S. forces, transitions are often part of the relief-in-place/transfer-of-authority process by which the unit assumes or relinquishes responsibility for operations. In regards to CIM, planning during this phase of the operation focuses on transitioning or terminating operations. For CA forces, this ultimately dictates whether the CA unit will transition with a follow-on unit, transition some activities to HN or other civil agency responsibility, or terminate operations altogether.

2-14. Termination represents an ending of operations or activities for any number of reasons. These reasons may include that a specified time has passed, milestones or objectives were reached, loss of support for the operation or activity, or a change of mission. In any case, termination procedures will include administrative closeouts, the return or transfer of equipment or facilities, and the completion of after action reviews (AARs) and evaluations.

2-15. CIM transitional considerations are similar, even if they vary in degree. CIM transition planning considerations include—

Identifying all operations, tasks, and issues that require transition.

Reviewing key events (past and present) that impact the operation, task, or issue.

Developing a realistic timeline (with sufficient overlaps) for the units and organizations involved.

Understanding the capabilities of the follow-on organization taking over the tasks and operations.

2-16. Transition planning should include—

Arranging meetings between transitioning organizations to develop a plan and timeline.

Agreeing on and understanding the following (this should be reflected in a written plan):

Operations, tasks, and projects to transition.

Timeline for transitions, to include orientation and formal transfers of authority.

Property, resources, and facilities to transfer.

Information exchange requirements and points of contact in each organization.

Identification of transitions that require the involvement of outside organizations and agencies, especially in cases that require approvals and coordination.

Legal requirements for the handover of projects and financial obligations.

Identifying key leaders and spheres of influence to transition a relationship to the incoming unit or organization.

Developing a written plan that includes—

Specific requirements for the transfer of each operation, task, and activity.

Valid information (levels of completion and quality assurance/quality control) of ongoing work, maintenance, and functionality status of transferred equipment, projects, and physical resources.

Timelines for each step and the specific requirements and criteria for dictating when transfer of authority occurs.

Introduction and orientation of the organization and personnel assuming responsibility with the area, individuals and key leaders and details of the transferring operation, task, or activity.

Identifying the documents required for the handover of responsibilities. This is particularly true of U.S.-funded projects, though it may also be true of other operations and tasks. Organized transition of documentation is often a key determinant on the kind of experience a transitioning organization has and will reflect on the staff work conducted.

Handing over the civil database of information, the area assessment, and the civil component of the COP from one U.S. military unit to another U.S. unit.

Updating and refining the civil component of the COP and the supporting area assessment, which is critical for the incoming unit. The quality of the products will impact how readily new personnel absorb and understand the information and how quickly the new unit orients to its civil OE. An organized transfer of information with updated products supports mission continuity.

Planning briefings and orientations for incoming personnel to become familiar with the civil OE and identification of key leaders and specific operational products.

Applying situation-specific considerations when transitioning information products to a coalition member or organization or a HN force or agency.

Coordinating with the commander and the S-2.

2-17. Successful transitions are well planned and detail oriented. They have logical and organized documentation that personnel can easily present to commanders and staffs. Successful transitions are extremely important to the overall experience of a unit’s deployment.

2-18. During transition, redeployment, and postdeployment operations, the CA staff should concern itself in the following areas:

Capturing lessons learned.

Improving processes and capturing SOP changes.

Scheduling, developing, and conducting training to sustain unit CAO and CMO skills.

Reviewing and safeguarding classified information.

Preparing computer-based files and continuity books for follow-on personnel.

Capture Lessons Learned

2-19. Capturing lessons learned is usually initiated before redeployment and culminates at the home station. An AAR captures the following topics:

Operational information and lessons learned. Operation information and lessons learned review what worked, what did not, and what the pitfalls were. They recommend remedies and improvements.

Organizational information. Organizational information outlines how CA forces were task organized to conduct CAO and CMO. It explains what worked and what did not.

Recommendations for training. Training recommendations identify shortfalls and recommend training to prepare for the next deployment.

Interactions between interagency and HHQ and adjacent headquarters (HQ). This section of the AAR is a review of what worked and what did not in interagency interactions and in interactions with HHQ and adjacent HQ. This part of the AAR makes recommendations.

Equipment performance and shortcomings. This identifies what worked and what did not work for the CIM process.

2-20. The CA staff AAR process provides information to the following audiences:

Center for Army Lessons Learned.

HHQ G-9/S-9 staff sections.

CA community at large. CA AARs should be forwarded by electronic mail to the CA Doctrine Branch at AOJK-DT-CA@soc.mil.

Improve Processes and Capture Standing Operating Procedure Changes

2-21. The CA staff assesses and evaluates the SOP. They review and evaluate the CAO and CMO sections. The CA staff reviews the reporting mechanisms and methods for updating and sharing civil situational awareness. They recommend changes and follow up with the unit G-3/S-3. The CA staff captures the SOP and formats in computer files easily accessed by follow-on replacement personnel.

Schedule, Develop, and Conduct Training to Sustain Unit Civil Affairs Operations and Civil-Military Operations Skills

2-22. During the planning stages of a tactical unit’s reset phase, the CA staff works with the G-3/S-3 (training) to integrate CAO and CMO training into the annual training calendar. CAO and CMO skills will not be the first priority, as units retrain on individual and collective skills. The CA staff plans a gradual step-by-step approach to reintroduce CAO and CMO training by—

Identifying and developing training for individual and collective CAO and CMO skills, as required.

Identifying when team and unit training events permit the integration of CAO and CMO training tasks.

Developing a CMO working group to conduct officer and noncommissioned officer professional development on CAO, CMO, and stability task skills. Ideally, such a group would include personnel responsible for CAO and CMO.

Review and Safeguard Classified Information

2-23. Normally, upon redeployment and return to a garrison, unit staffs move from a classified operating environment that uses a SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to an unclassified one that uses a Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network. The G-2/S-2 sections keep all classified hard drives and data during the return to the unit’s home station. CA staff personnel should coordinate with the G-2/S-2 to review all classified information and determine what to keep and how to organize it. The CA staff should follow G-2/S-2 procedures when transferring information from classified to unclassified networks.

Prepare Computer-Based Files and Continuity Book for Follow-On Personnel

2-24. The CA staff saves useful files, SOPs, AARs, lessons learned, reports, and formats in computer-based files that follow-on personnel and replacements can easily access. This process establishes a sustaining continuity on CA staffs during periods of high personnel turnover.

SUMMARY

2-25. This chapter provided planning considerations for CIM while in garrison and during predeployment, deployment, transition, and postdeployment operations. It also recommends CIM training considerations for CA units supporting conventional forces and special operations forces. While planning is critical to all operations, planning considerations for CIM are solely those that facilitate the effective management of civil information. Operational planning is the domain of the various planning cycles that CIM supports.

Chapter 3

Collection

Collection is the first step of the CIM process and refers to the literal gathering of relevant civil data. Driven by the CCIR, collection occurs at all levels of the operation through CR, data mining, and collaboration with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and other government agencies. The purpose of collection is to provide the flow of data necessary for CA commanders and CA planners to assist in the MDMP. All civil information collection efforts should be synchronized with the IPB process and should ultimately serve to enhance the situational awareness and understanding for all elements in the OE. In addition, collected and processed civil information will enhance decisionmaking at all levels of command.

CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE

3-1. CR is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific aspects of the OE. CR focuses on the factors that define the civil component—ASCOPE. CR is conducted at the tactical level. CA forces use CR to gather information from the IPI through civil engagements, such as key leader engagements, program management, civic action programs, and assessments. CR is focused by the civil information collection plan, which synchronizes CA collection efforts with the CCIR and specific requests for information through the operations process. MDMP initiates troop leading procedures (TLP) at tactical levels, and thus begins the CR planning.

3-2. CR begins with the commander’s guidance, which is published in the warning order. The OPORD, developed with input from CA forces, is produced through MDMP. MDMP generates tasks to subordinate units. TLP for Civil Affairs teams (CATs) is the same as for any other operational unit. TLP focuses on what the CAT will collect (equivalent to mission). Upon the receipt of the mission, the CAT leader or the team sergeant initiates TLP. ADP 5-0 provides additional information on TLP.

WHAT TO COLLECT

3-3. The civil information collection plan outlines the information collection requirements for the CATs. Although the CMOC team chief usually manages the plan, any CA Soldier responsible for synchronizing the plan with the CCIR may manage it. The civil information collection plan focuses all collection efforts for CA forces. To focus CA collection efforts, the civil information collection plan synchronizes the CCIR and the reconnaissance and surveillance plan with the information requirements spelled out in the CAO estimate. Successful CR occurs when the civil information collection plan is fully synchronized with the commander’s CMO plan, focusing CAO efforts on specific aspects of the civil environment. If a collection tasking does not include direction on what information is to be collected, the CAT requests clarification of the tasking.

3-4. CMO planners should consider whether the commander possesses the necessary authority to collect data. Operations conducted in foreign countries under Title 22, United States Code, authority are to be integrated and coordinated through the American Embassy in support of the HN’s IDAD plan.

KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENT

3-5. The key leader engagement is a method for building relationships and developing influence within the AO. Focused by CAO, the key leader engagement is a face-to-face engagement that brings CA forces and the IPI spheres of influence together. Effective key leader engagements foster communication and cooperation between U.S. forces and the IPI. Successful key leader engagements are those that are well planned and rehearsed. Key leader engagements should follow the following steps:

Identify the key leader by—

Determining which key leader needs to be influenced.

Assessing the key leader’s capability in relation to the desired effects.

Prepare for the key leader engagement by—

Conducting mission and contingency planning.

Briefing and consulting the interpreter on social nuances.

Identifying roles for each team member.

Rehearsing the engagement.

Execute the key leader engagement by—

Directly engaging the key leader.

Focusing the conversation on the objective.

Looking away from the interpreter.

Instilling local ownership in solutions.

Promising only what can be delivered.

Report the key leader engagement by—

Conducting a postengagement AAR.

Submitting a postengagement report.

Submitting relevant key leader information on a contact report.

Reengage the key leader by—

Reviewing previous key leader engagements.

Maintaining the relationship.

Exchanging current contact information.

Note: Typical key leaders are HN government officials, religious leaders, tribal or clan leaders, DC camp leaders, and so on.

Identify

3-6. CA forces conduct key leader engagements to elicit certain behaviors and collect specific information. Identifying the right key leader to engage is the key to an effective engagement. Assessing the key leader’s ability to influence will help determine this and ensure that the engagement will produce the desired effects. On many occasions, what takes place outside of the engagement is just as important as what is discussed in the engagement. Therefore, every member of the team must fully understand the objective of the engagement.

Prepare

3-7. During the prepare stage, every member of the team should be assigned a role during the engagement. Although each team member is assigned a primary task, personnel need to remember that every Soldier is a sensor. Rehearsals provide excellent opportunities to develop and refine SOPs for conducting planned and unplanned key leader engagements. During a key leader engagement, the position of the key leader dictates the position of the remaining team members. Rehearsing SOPs eliminates confusion, builds confidence, and hones skill sets challenged by an OE that is constantly changing. Assigning roles ensures that every aspect of the engagement is being exploited to its fullest potential. Typical roles are—

Engagement lead. Whether the engagement is impromptu or deliberate, the engagement lead positions himself to allow the rest of the team to fulfill their assigned roles and to promote open discussion. The engagement lead should introduce every member of the team and offer whatever hospitality is available.

Recorder. The recorder is positioned close to the key leaders and through the discussion; records the flow of the conversation. The recorder’s job is to capture the details and specific data points.

Note taker. The note taker should also be positioned close to the key leaders to aid in capturing any nuances or details that fall outside of the conversation. The note taker should pay close attention to nonverbal communication that is taking place during the engagement.

Photographer. The photographer has the responsibility of capturing critical moments in time and minor details.

Interpreter. The interpreter automatically approaches and stays to the rear on either side of the engagement lead as space or seating permits.

Execute

3-8. During the engagement, it is important for the engagement lead to focus the discussion on the primary objective while maintaining an open dialogue. A good understanding of cultural considerations helps guide the engagement lead through this. There is nothing wrong with not having the answer to a question. If the engagement lead cannot provide an answer, he should conduct a follow-on engagement. During the engagement, team members should—

Be supportive and show genuine concern.

Never promise anything that cannot be delivered.

Develop cohesion and legitimize the local governance.

Maintain eye contact with the key leader, especially when using an interpreter.

Speak clearly and refrain from using acronyms and slang because they cause confusion and may be misinterpreted.

Actively listen and display a genuine interest in the individual’s ideas and opinions.

Never become the main character of the meeting.

Be truthful and honest.

Report

3-9. After the engagement, the CAT should conduct an AAR as soon as possible. Capturing all of the data from each team member’s perspective is critical for accurate reporting of the engagement. Every team member reviews the key leader engagement from his perspective, ensuring full dissemination across the team. The interpreter should be included to capture his thoughts and perspective. The CAT should use caution when discussing CCIRs and ensure that it handles sensitive information correctly.

3-10. Details of the key leader engagement should be captured in both operational and situational reporting. Locations, status, and arrival and departure times are examples of operational reporting and should be reported through operational channels. In addition to reporting operational details, personnel should report any information or CCIRs collected during the engagement through situational reporting channels according to the supported unit’s SOP. A key leader engagement that is not reported is a key leader engagement that did not happen and represents a lost opportunity. When reporting on the details of the key leader engagement, the CAT should capture the following:

Ethnicity (language/dialect).

Tribal background.

Religious affiliation.

Political affiliation.

Associations.

Agenda.

Motivations.

Interests.

Reengage

3-11. Reengagement is necessary when an engagement concludes without the gathering of all critical information or when the engagement lead has unanswered questions. Reengagements are important because they foster cooperation, relationships, and communication flow between the parties. Exchanging contact information between the parties is invaluable for future engagement coordination and follow-up discussions on gathered information. Team members should be familiar with available resources and techniques to develop relationships. Additional considerations include—

Being familiar with and prepared to discuss available funding sources to facilitate objectives defined during the engagement.

Continuing to update contact data on key leaders. Redundant information is better than assumptions.

Widening the social network through repeat engagements by encouraging local ownership and acceptance from the IPI.

Reengaging, which offers the opportunity to establish measures of effectiveness.

CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS

3-12. Civic action programs are operations undertaken to leverage expertise and financial resources against civil vulnerabilities in areas determined to be susceptible to insurgent influences or challenged by slow development. Civic actions programs consist of both long-term developmental projects and short-term, high-impact programs.

3-13. Each civic action program offers unique information collection opportunities for CA forces and is helpful in identifying key leaders, conducting deliberate assessments, and answering specific information requirements. Civic action programs deal specifically with information collection. This section provides collection considerations to produce civil data suited for trend analysis. Upon nomination, each civic action program undergoes an approval process with specific information requirements that include but are not limited to—

Area (population density, ethnic boundaries, and civil disturbances identified through geospatial analysis).

Structures (identifying public facilities and infrastructure).

Capabilities (assessments of medical, security, and academia).

Organizations (data mining and collaborating on paramilitary forces, gangs, NGOs, and IGOs).

People (key leaders).

Events (cultural events calendar).

3-14. Common civic action programs include the following:

Engineering civic action programs. These programs are conducted in conjunction with available resources to challenge negative influences on civil vulnerabilities, mitigate human suffering, and deny the enemy safe haven.

Dental civic action programs. These programs involve providing dentists and dental technicians with equipment and supplies to set up a temporary field clinic to provide dental treatment to the local population.

Medical civic action programs. These programs involve providing medical specialists and supplies to provide limited medical treatment to the local population. Medical civil action programs are generally narrow in scope and usually provide targeted assistance, such as inoculations.

Veterinarian civic action programs. These programs involve providing veterinary specialists and supplies to the local population. Veterinarian civic action programs are generally narrow in scope, usually provide targeted assistance, and are particularly useful in operational areas where the IPI is dependent on livestock for farming purposes.

ASSESSMENTS

3-15. CA assessments are techniques that provide precise means to extract meaningful and significant information. CA Soldiers perform three basic types of assessments—initial assessments, deliberate assessments, and surveys. Gathering information should not be a haphazard process. Each type of assessment is based upon the information and analysis of the previous type. In addition, each type of assessment in the progression becomes more focused, specific, and detailed with an ultimate goal of identifying and mitigating civil vulnerabilities that pose a threat to the successful and timely completion of the mission. The basic steps of a well-formed assessment plan include—

Determining what information to gather (in concert with the operational planning staff).

Determining the most likely source (such as a person, place, event, or reference) from which to obtain the information.

Preparing a list of questions for the source that supports the information requirements.

Engaging the source (for example, research references, observe activities, assess locations or systems, and interview individuals).

Compiling the results.

Reporting the results according to the CIM process and unit SOP.

3-16. Every assessment must contain well-defined geographical boundaries and time frames within which the assessment is valid. As mere “snapshots in time,” assessments and surveys must be updated as often as necessary to remain current. It is also crucially important to georeference whatever is reported.

Initial Assessment

3-17. The initial assessment is conducted upon entry into the designated AO. The objective and focus of the initial assessment should be broad enough to allow CA forces to quickly get an updated baseline of the general conditions within the entire AO. This validates or refutes the information and assumptions used in planning and aids with updating the CAO priorities and information collection plan. During continuous operations, the initial assessment requirement may not be necessary for follow-on CA forces because of the transfer of current and detailed operational data during transition. CA teams conducting initial assessments must be aware of the security situation at all times. The objectives of the initial assessment are to—

Obtain a rapid overview of the conditions in the AO.

Validate or refute information used during planning.

Validate or refute assumptions used during planning.

Determine general areas of perceived civil vulnerabilities.

Update the CAO running estimate.

Finalize or modify operations planned before deployment.

Update CAO priorities.

Identify key areas for follow-on deliberate assessments.

Update the CAO information collection plan to provide input to priority intelligence requirements and the CCIR.

Update the area study.

Identify patterns and indicators.

Identify requirements for follow-on CA forces.

Identify requirements for functional specialty support.

3-18. Products of the initial assessment include situation reports, spot reports, and requests for assistance. The findings of an initial assessment may lead to refined mission statements, updates to the CA area study, input to fragmentary orders, and reallocation of forces and resources.

Deliberate Assessments

3-19. Deliberate assessments are conducted in a methodical manner in accordance with CAO priorities and the CAO information collection plan on specific geographic areas or social, economic, governmental or infrastructure systems of interest. They are a determination of current conditions, capabilities, or attitudes within these defined areas. Deliberate assessments are characterized by firsthand observation, key leader engagements, interviews, and other tools to gather information used to make knowledgeable decisions and to determine locations and priorities for follow-on, in-depth analysis. CA teams may use a wide variety of detailed checklists or formats during a deliberate assessment to ensure that they scrutinize all aspects of the assessment target. Deliberate assessments can be ongoing or directed. The objectives of deliberate assessments are to—

Update the area study.

Collect civil information on specific geographic areas (region, city, or town).

Collect civil information on social, economic, governmental, legal, health, educational, or infrastructure systems.

Determine specific areas of perceived civil vulnerabilities.

Provide greater detail on priorities identified during the initial assessment.

Update the CAO running estimate.

Update the CAO information collection plan to provide input to priority intelligence requirements and the CCIR.

Identify key locations for follow-on surveys.

Identify patterns and indicators.

Update requirements for follow-on CA forces.

Update requirements for functional specialty support.

Validate or assess measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

Surveys

3-20. CA forces conduct surveys in a methodical manner in accordance with CAO priorities and the CAO information collection plan on specific locations identified as requiring in-depth analysis during deliberate assessments. These surveys could include specific people, groups, locations, facilities, or capabilities within a specific location or a specific piece within a system. CA forces conduct surveys as time and circumstances permit. The survey is a detailed assessment in which the object of the assessment is examined carefully, as during an inspection or investigation. During the survey, the CAT may use a variety of detailed checklists or formats within the CIM construct to ensure it has scrutinized all aspects of the specified group, location, or facility targeted for survey. Survey development should leverage operations/research analysis capabilities if available. The findings of a survey may lead to refined mission statements or reallocation of forces and resources. Surveys can be ongoing or directed. The objectives of a survey are to—

Collect detailed civil information on a specific location within a geographic area (forest, lake, valley, or neighborhood).

Collect civil information on specific components of social, economic, governmental, legal, health, educational, or infrastructure systems (religious sect, water treatment plant, hospital, or prison).

Identify capabilities and capacities, to include shortfalls, of surveyed items.

Analyze specific areas of perceived civil vulnerabilities.

Identify patterns and indicators.

Identify possible project solutions to identified shortfalls and vulnerabilities when appropriate.

Update requirements for follow-on CA forces.

Update requirements for functional specialty support.

Validate or assess measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

DATA MINING

3-21. Data mining is the collection of information from various sources. Primarily conducted within the CIM cell, data mining is a collection activity that uses a combination of open- and restricted-source materials for routine and continuous study and research. The CCIR and the civil information management collection requirement focus data mining. Data mining provides corroboration of other collected civil data. Data mining is focused on—

Priority intelligence requirements.

Requests for information.

Gaps remaining in the area study and area assessment.

CAO running estimate.

3-22. Data mining occurs at all levels of the operation. The commander provides the guidance and focus through the CCIR, priority intelligence requirements, and friendly force information requirements that drive the operations and intelligence processes.

COLLABORATION

3-23. Collaboration involves the sharing of civil data, information, and knowledge and is normally done online. Collaboration may take many forms. Collaborative tools include computer-based tools that help individuals work together and share information. These tools allow for virtual online meetings and data sharing. Sharing allows analysts, other intelligence personnel, and other subject-matter experts to freely exchange information and intelligence to assist in answering their commander’s requirements. The intelligence staff must identify the most effective methods to share intelligence with all required users. Sharing applies specifically to multinational partners who are unable to access U.S. information systems or data files. Some users may require hardcopy printouts of new or updated intelligence, some may simply need to access the unit intelligence Web page, and some may require access to specific unit databases.

3-24. Collaboration is a coordinated effort focused on sharing data. Collaboration increases overall operational efficiency by eliminating redundant collection efforts. Collaborative tools are information systems that include online capabilities that enhance team development and facilitate collaboration. Examples of collaboration include the following:

Inform and influence activities working groups.

CAO working groups.

IGOs, NGOs, and IPI.

MDMP.

Multinational forces.

Chat rooms, white-boarding, professional forums, and communities of interest.

Battle update briefs, commanders update briefs, and targeting boards.

Observations of maneuver forces supporting CATs in the conduct of offensive tasks.

Debriefings of Soldiers involved in civic action projects conducted to determine the attitudes of the local population affected by the operation.

Debriefings of Soldiers involved in daily convoy operations.

Note: About 90 percent of intelligence starts as open-source information. The security classification typically associated with intelligence products is due to the sources and methods of collection. The intent of CIM is to keep most of this information unclassified and easily shared with non-USG partners.

PREDEPLOYMENT COLLECTION EFFORTS

3-25. CA forces should not wait until they deploy to a theater of operation to initiate a civil information collection plan. Collection, like the CIM process, is cyclic in nature and is performed at every level and throughout every phase of the operation. Collection is conducted to fulfill the information requirements established by the commander and his staff. Inherent in all CAO is the task to anticipate the needs of the commander by identifying the “unknown unknowns.” Collection is the first step in identifying those information requirements. Collection is conducted at all levels of the operation and during every phase of the operation. At first there is little, if any, quality screening of the data collection; everything related is relevant.

3-26. Establishing the civil collection plan is a task that may be conducted by any CA Soldier. Without regard to the size of the CA element, the requirement to establish the civil information collection plan remains the same. All CA forces must be actively engaged in identifying the early information requirements for the supported commander. Predeployment considerations include—

Identifying primary sources of information. CA forces should focus on identifying existing sources of civil information for inclusion in the area study. These sources could be forces already in the operational area.

Identifying existing sources of information. CA forces should focus on identifying existing sources of civil information for inclusion into the areas study format.

Identifying current conditions on the ground. During the planning for the predeployment site survey (PDSS), the operations representative is tasked to identify reporting requirements, the existing civil information collection plan, and the collection tasking requirements from the supported unit.

Starting the CAO estimate. The CAO estimate is derived from the area study; it identifies facts and assumptions to be corroborated or refuted during the initial assessment. Preparing the CAO estimate during mission planning starts the initial running estimate by identifying and laying the groundwork for the civil information collection plan.

Preparing for the initial assessment. During mission planning, information gaps identified during the area study should be used to direct the collection efforts during the initial assessment.

CONSTRAINTS

3-27. There is a distinction between civil information collection and intelligence gathering. CA forces are not active intelligence collectors and must avoid giving that impression. CAO are a force multiplier because of the unique ability to influence the local populace and enable HN governance while furthering U.S. interests within the AO. CA forces bridge the gap between U.S. foreign policy and the HN’s IDAD, building up local support for military operations by addressing civil vulnerabilities.

3-28. While all Soldiers are reconnaissance and surveillance assets, all CA Soldiers must be mindful of being associated with an intelligence gathering activity. If compromised, all CA forces—

Become the target of hostile activity.

Lose access.

Lose credibility.

3-29. Civil information collection is driven by the supported unit’s CCIRs and by reporting through the operations process in the same manner as IPB. However, collection tasking requirements must be filtered through the civil information collection plan to ensure that the solicited information remains focused on the civil component of the COP.

DATA

3-30. CA forces should ensure that collected data is checked for accuracy and relevancy and that it contains common information to guarantee the usability of the data now and in the future. Collected data should contain—

Grid location.

Date-time group.

Reliability.

Accuracy.

Grid Location

3-31. Regardless of the type of mapping software used, all CIM data should be indexed by location. The military grid reference system is the coordinate system used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for locating points on the earth. The use of a 10-digit grid coordinate with a grid zone designator suffices to identify a location anywhere in the world.

Date-Time Group

3-32. The date-time group is a prescribed format expressed as six digits followed by the time zone suffix at which the message was prepared for transmission (the first pair of digits denotes the date, the second pair the hours, and the third pair the minutes followed by a three-letter month abbreviation and two-digit year abbreviation.

Reliability

3-33. Reliability ratings range from A (reliable) to F (cannot be judged). An F rating does not necessarily mean the source is unreliable; it means the contact has no previous experience with the source upon which to base a determination. Table 3-1 provides reliability rating criteria.

Table 3-1. Reliability ratings

A | Reliable. There is no doubt the source has authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency. There has been a history of complete reliability. The source has demonstrated adherence to known professional standards and a verification process.
B | Usually reliable. There is minor doubt that the source has authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency. There is a history of valid information most of the time. There may not be a history of adherence to professionally accepted standards.
C | Fairly reliable. There is doubt that the source has authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency but information provided in the past has been valid.
D | Not usually reliable. There is significant doubt that the source has authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency, but information provided in the past has been valid.
E | Unreliable. The source is lacking in authenticity, trustworthiness, and competency. There is a history of invalid information.
F | Cannot be judged. No basis exists for evaluating the reliability of the source.

Accuracy

3-34. Accuracy ratings range from one (confirmed) to six (cannot be judged). A six rating does not necessarily mean the information is inaccurate but that the team has no means of verifying the information. A block for assessing source reliability and accuracy is included on assessment forms. Table 3-2, page 3-10, provides accuracy rating criteria.

3-35. The basis of collection is the daily interaction between U.S. forces and the myriad of civilians in the supported commander’s AO. All CA forces who encounter the civilian elements of an AO are potential sensors of civil information. Civil information collection focuses on CR, data mining, and collaboration.

3-36. CIM collection considerations should be focused on during each of the following:

FHA operations. Collection tasking requirements are usually funneled through the lead relief agency and focused on the state of essential services. CA forces should note initial assessment works to establish a baseline of data and provides a point from which to measure both effectiveness and performance (measures of effectiveness and measures of performance).

SCA operations. Collection tasking requirements draw on collaborative efforts above the tactical level of the operation and demonstrate the importance of a well-managed civil information collection plan to synchronize collection efforts across all levels of the operation.

PRC operations. Collection tasking requirements draw on interagency and HN resources, as well as collaboration with NGOs and IGOs in the operational area. Collection efforts should focus on identifying capabilities and available resources.

NA operations. Collection tasking requirements draw on all three collection subsets—CR, data mining, and collaboration. NA operations focus CAO on long-term developmental operations. The collection efforts focus on demonstrating the effects of CAO to guide operational- and strategic-level decisionmaking.

Table 3-2. Accuracy ratings

1 | Confirmed. The information is confirmed by other independent sources. The information is logical in itself. The information is consistent with other information on the subject.
2 | Probably true. The information is not confirmed. The information is reasonably logical in itself. The information agrees with some other information on the subject.
3 | Possibly true. The information is not confirmed. The information is possible but not logical. There is no other information on the subject.
4 | Doubtfully true. The information is not confirmed. The information provided is possible but not logical. There is no other information on the subject.
5 | Improbable. The accuracy of the information is not confirmed. The information is not logical in itself. The information is contradicted by other information on the subject.
6 | Cannot be judged. No basis exists for evaluating the validity of the information.

SUMMARY

3-37. CA forces conduct collection activities at every level of operation and during every phase of operation. Directed by the CCIR, the purpose of CA collection efforts is to fulfill the information requirements of the supported unit. Through CR, data mining, and collaboration, CA forces drive the CIM process into the next step, collation. It is incumbent upon the commander to ensure that CA collection activities remain focused on the civil aspects of the OE.

Chapter 4

Collation

This chapter is designed to assist CA Soldiers with the collation of collected civil data while assigned to CA units, G-9/S-9 staffs, or in CA plans officer positions. This chapter provides guidance for operational and tactical collation efforts for CA units to support conventional forces and ARSOF.

GENERAL

4-1. Civil information is developed from data collected within the civil component of the commander’s OE. The transition of data into information occurs when the collected civil data is brought together and processed. Each piece of collected data, no matter how insignificant, is a piece of the puzzle. Many times even the most mundane data can be used to corroborate facts and confirm an assumption. Collation is a key part of this process and the activities contained therein ensure all reported civil data is compiled in its raw form. As with the preceding steps of the CIM process, it is important for personnel to remember that no analysis is performed until the data is fully processed to prevent developing premature conclusions.

4-2. Collation is the second step of the CIM process and refers to compiling civil data. Factors in the OE and the operations process drive collation. The OE may limit a tactical CAT’s ability to send collected data that exceeds the bandwidth available through tactical satellite, or the OE may dictate that reporting methods be modified to allow the flow of some data but not all. For example, during a mission, CATs and CMOCs may have to provide collected data in real time, along with operational reporting. At other echelons, the targeting cycle and mission planning may dictate collation. Collation focuses on data management and synchronization with the supported unit’s battle rhythm.

4-3. Collation is not limited to CATs reporting to the CMOC. The collation step consists of compiling all collected civil data into one location, whether the data was collected by a brigade staff officer in collaboration with another staff element or a CA specialist conducting data mining in the CMOC. Collation is the bringing together of multiple sources of data from every level of operation.

Note: It is important for personnel to remember that civil reporting must be collated and processed by CA forces to ensure the data presented for analysis remains in its raw form.

PREDEPLOYMENT COLLATION CONSIDERATIONS

4-4. CA forces should not wait until their deployment into a theater of operation to determine how and where collected civil data is compiled. Predeployment considerations should consist of identifying the method by which subordinate units conduct operational and situational reporting during the PDSS. The following paragraphs discuss collation considerations.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

4-5. Visualizing the OE during the PDSS is essential to mission planning. CA forces working outside the spectrum of an established task force or CATs operating independently of an operational command will have unique reporting requirements. In many cases, the supported unit does not know the data reporting requirements that are necessary for CA forces to conduct CAO; therefore, it is incumbent upon the personnel conducting the PDSS to identify those requirements and begin precoordination for resources. Identifying concerns during the PDSS will ensure any unusual equipment requirements are identified and sourced during predeployment. CA forces should consider the following:

What are the bandwidth constraints of wireless communications systems for operational and situational reporting?

How does the supported unit report collected data?

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

4-6. The first step of collation includes the transmission of data. The PDSS should identify existing techniques that operational units use for operational and situation reporting by—

Determining operational reporting requirements.

Determining if the technical capability to meet the reporting requirements exists within the current table of organization and equipment.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

4-7. During the predeployment phase, it is essential to identify the information requirements dictated by the supported unit’s operational tempo. This requires identifying the information requirements necessary to maintain the running CAO estimate and support other staff functions, such as CMO working groups, targeting boards, and mission planning cycles that regularly occur. Determining reporting requirements dictates how and the frequency with which civil data is to be collated, ensuring that processing, analysis, and production take place in a timely manner. Factors that guide reporting requirements include—

Identifying the battle rhythm of the supported unit’s staff.

Collaborating with the G-9/S-9 during the PDSS to determine production timelines and specific requirements.

Tailoring predeployment training to prepare the CA unit to operate with the reporting format established by the supported unit.

Developing a data management system to efficiently manage civil data. The importance of good data management cannot be overstated. Data management begins before initial deployment, continues throughout the deployment process, and terminates only with the transition of responsibility to the incoming unit. Good data management begets a ready source of data; poor data management results in gigabytes of data of no value to anyone.

Training of CA personnel on systems and software to be used in-theater.

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

4-8. During any predeployment survey, CA forces should determine the existing automation capabilities. This will determine if new automation equipment must be requisitioned and will help focus CIM training and preparation. If a communications specialist is not available to assess automation requirements, another member of the PDSS team should be identified to capture these requirements. Technical considerations include the following:

Does the supported unit’s communications section require reimaging computers for use on their network?

Does the CA force have the necessary CIM-specific software to reinstall on the computers?

Will the CA force have access to both Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network and SIPRNET?

How many network drops will be provided at the location of every CA element?

DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

4-9. The actual conduct of collation amounts to little more than sending collected data to a single source, and although the methods and technologies vary, the end state does not. Collation supports the CIM process by providing to the CIM cell collected civil data for inclusion into the COP.

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

4-10. Throughout the deployment, it is essential to continually assess the supported unit’s information requirements to ensure that CAO remains focused on the commander’s priorities. This requires a periodic assessment of the civil information collection plan to ensure collection efforts continue to meet the evolving information requirements of the commander and his staff. CA forces should also monitor other staff functions, such as CMO work groups, targeting boards, and mission planning cycles, to better anticipate these groups’ information needs as well. These practices are best facilitated by—

Synchronizing CIM production to the battle rhythm of the supported unit’s staff.

Collaborating with other staff functions to determine deadlines and specific requirements.

Continually assessing the supported unit’s information requirements.

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

4-11. The first step of collation includes the transmission of data. During tactical operations, it is critical for the CA force to know the reporting requirements and to ensure the timely transmission of collected data. CA forces should be aware of any changes to the mission plan that might affect collation requirements. Tactical considerations include the following:

Classification of data. It is important to classify all data. The danger of not classifying data correctly is that the submitted data will be given the same classification as other data submitted or by the medium used to transmit the data. Not classifying data undermines the ability for CA forces to share information with NGOs and multinational forces.

Mission requirements. It is essential that CA commanders ensure the widest dissemination of CCIRs and priority intelligence requirements to ensure operational CA forces are actively soliciting and reporting pertinent data. It is incumbent upon leadership to ascertain the difference between operational reporting and situational reporting, especially on those occasions in which they may be one in the same. For example, a priority intelligence requirement may require units to report coalition forces operating in the area while a specific civil consideration is reporting coalition forces conducting CMO in the area.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

4-12. Collation occurs every day in the CIM cell. Along with other CIM efforts, sending and receiving collected data are regular daily occurrences within the CIM cell. Therefore, it is critical for the CIM cell leadership to structure the OE to facilitate all CIM operations. This is especially true during collation. Operational considerations include—

Classification of data. All data must be classified and handled accordingly. The CIM cell must ensure data is properly classified upon receipt.

Mission requirements. In many instances, data is sent through the supported unit’s communications section. It is incumbent upon the CIM cell to check regularly for incoming data.

Collation from the supported staff. At the operational level, much of the collected data comes from other staff sections through collaborative efforts. CA forces at the operational level should ensure that they are on routine distribution lists from those staff sections and that they receive regular reporting.

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

4-13. Collation depends heavily on technology to transmit, receive, and store data. It is important to limit the amount of liability by developing strong data management SOPs. Data management involves developing a working structure of files and folders. Categorizing and cataloging incoming data is paramount to the successful collation of civil data. A key requirement for CA forces to remember during collation is the accuracy and timely reporting of the data that is received. There is no substitute for good data management and it starts at collation. It is too late to change or modify the file structure architecture after the fact; there is too much data to manipulate. Good practices for CA forces to follow are to—

Collate unprocessed data in one location for processing.

Back up all data on a regular basis. This pertains to all levels of the operation. All CIM files should be backed up to a separate physical location (like an eternal hard drive or server) on a regular basis.

Develop uniform reporting to reduce workload at the collation point.

TRANSITION CONSIDERATIONS

4-14. Collation efforts must be adjusted to meet the changing operational requirements and technical capabilities during ongoing operations. Collation efforts will also conform to the changing characteristics and entities within the OE.

4-15. During the transition phase, it is essential for CA forces to maintain an operational tempo while transitioning responsibility. There are two significant opportunities available for the unit, transition operations and capturing lessons learned. The replacing unit may not be a unit at all; it may be a NGO or an IGO. During transition, the final collation activities must be focused on the gathering of all remaining data for the purpose of maintaining a historical database of the CAO that took place. Some transition considerations include—

Capturing lessons learned.

Completing and collating AARs.

Bringing back collected data to update area studies.

CONSTRAINTS

4-16. Although limited by operational constraints and available technologies, collation is most affected by time. Collected information must be collated in a timely manner. The relationship between the parent organization and the supported unit may further hinder collation. CA leadership must anticipate these issues to achieve a balance between tactical and operational reporting to ensure all information requirements are being met. It is incumbent upon CA leadership to anticipate these issues and prevent dire consequences.

SUMMARY

4-17. In all circumstances, CA forces conduct collation activities at every level and during every phase of an operation. It is incumbent upon the supported commander to support CA collation efforts, thus ensuring that civil data is delivered in a timely manner to the appropriate agency.

Chapter 5

Processing

This chapter is designed to assist CA Soldiers with the processing of collated civil data while assigned to CA units, G-9/S-9 staffs, or in CA plans officer positions. This chapter provides guidance for operational and tactical CA forces through the predeployment, deployment, transition, and postdeployment phases of the operation. It recommends training considerations for CA units to support conventional forces and ARSOF. This chapter provides information that will assist CA forces in synchronizing processing efforts with the staff functions of the supported unit.

GENERAL

5-1. Processing is the third step in the CIM process. It is the physical and cognitive manipulation of separate pieces of civil data into civil information. Processing begins with the collation of raw data and groups the collected data into cataloged categories. Data processing focuses on information management, which is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect knowledge products, data, and information.

5-2. Processing structures collated data into a usable form, making it readily available for detailed analysis. Once processed, the civil data becomes civil information. Effective information management provides timely and protected dissemination of relevant information to commanders and their staffs.

5-3. The key to efficient processing of civil data is information management. Information management is the process of managing an organization’s information resources by handling the knowledge acquired by individuals and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a legitimate need to know.

5-4. Effective information management requires developing file and data management procedures that facilitate search and retrieval capabilities. Currently, the styles and methods for developing these procedures vary and most are still being developed. CIM is a process and although technological tools may expedite the process, the techniques used to effectively process raw civil data into civil information remain the same. Readily available computer-based software programs can help catalog vast amounts of data. Many of these programs are already installed on most DOD computer systems.

DATABASES

5-5. Databases facilitate CIM. CA databases contain civil information that is structured and indexed for the user’s access and review. CA databases are made to facilitate information sharing. They should provide civil information to the supported units and agencies partnered with CA units across the OE. It is important to remember at this stage that naming conventions and the use of standardized terms and graphics become critical. When processing data, CA forces should remember the quality of the input impacts the quality of the output and that erroneous entries or misspellings can cause critical data elements to fall by the wayside and go unnoticed. It is also important for personnel to remember that every piece of information is important no matter how insignificant it may seem at the time of collection.

5-6. Information structured into a database can be quickly retrieved when there is an immediate need for it. In addition to mission planning for current operations, databases also support other staff functions, including updating the area studies and feeding the CAO running estimate. Although the content will vary depending on the mission, the purpose of the CIM database is to enhance the commander’s situational understanding by offering insight to past and present conditions within the civil component of the OE. Examples include the following:

Civil considerations (ASCOPE data).

Requests for information. Capturing requests for information and the response within a database ensures the answer to that particular question is readily available for future reference.

Civic action programs. Tracking civil action programs is an excellent way to measure past and present influence within the AO by establishing the necessary data foundation for predictive analysis.

Significant activities tracking. Capturing the date, time, and location of significant activities within a database offers a source of measurable factors on current operations.

Mapping. Mapping CAO and CMO, both past and present.

Targeting. Synchronizing CAO with areas identified by the commander as being AOIs.

5-7. Databases that interact with analytical software like geographic information systems (GIS) are designed to capture very specific data to facilitate analysis. GIS supports mission planning, enhances predictive analysis, and prepares graphic analytical products in support of other staff functions. To best leverage analytical software, the associated databases should be continually refined to ensure both accuracy and relevancy. These databases—

Support time event charts, association matrices, link analysis, and other analytical tools.

Require a designated systems administrator at each echelon. To ensure a high degree of integrity, the metadata must be verified for accuracy and completeness. Without accurate metadata, databases cannot be easily searched for their information. In addition, a lack of metadata makes verification of the source nearly impossible.

Duplicate or replicate data on higher security networks (for example, Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network to SIPRNET and SIPRNET to Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System).

Allow operators, managers, and analysts to—

Compartment (protect) source-sensitive, operational database segments, files, records, and fields.

Create, update, and maintain databases from locally generated information.

Import complete or partial databases from databases that are the same size or larger.

Share databases between subordinates, peers, or highers with appropriate access authorization.

Adapt data processing to meet the needs of the supported unit’s operations, standardized forms, and associated databases for information storing, sharing, retrieval, and analysis.

Allow query functions for decisionmaking, as well as operational and analytical support.

Provide analytical programs that are able to correlate data and aid with information retrieval from other data repositories.

Incorporate information retrieval functions, such as browsing, Boolean functions, key word searches, and similar functions.

5-8. The primary purpose of gathering civil information is to update the CAO running estimate. All data stored in a file management system should be stored to support the updating of the CAO running estimate. As the CAO running estimate changes to meet operational needs, the CIM database also changes. CA forces must anticipate those changes to ensure the CIM database accomplishes its primary goal—to facilitate well-informed decisionmaking by enhancing the commander’s situational understanding. The CA database is structured around the CAO estimate, which is the primary use for the collected civil data. The evolving structure of the CAO running estimate offers CA forces the necessary architecture to index the data to best facilitate the next step of the CIM process—analysis.

SPREADSHEETS

5-9. Spreadsheets are another way to categorize and catalog data. By using a software program, such as Microsoft Excel, vast amounts of data can be quickly imported and exported to meet current operational needs while maintaining integrity for future use. Data entry occurs when the collected data is broken down into specific categories determined by current operational needs. Once categorized, the data is stored in cells and further defined by columns and rows.

5-10. In the CIM process, data entry is more than entering raw data into a spreadsheet. CA Soldiers must first mine the raw data to extrapolate relevant data. Figure 5-1 provides an article collected through data mining in the United States Pacific Command Theater. At first glance, the article reveals four casualties resulted from a flood in East Java. A closer examination reveals many people are missing and hundreds were forced to relocate.

5-11. Different data processing techniques result in different groupings of the same data set. For example, when indexed into columns under major groupings, the data may look something like the data in Figure 5-2, page 5-4.

5-12. However, if the raw data was indexed based on all available groupings from the context, it may look something like Figure 5-3, page 5-4. While the difference is obvious, what is not so obvious is the wealth of analytical capability that the data offers when it is categorized and cataloged into more specific data sets. What this shows is that, under certain circumstances, insignificant data may become operationally relevant and the key to ensuring that all information maintains the potential to be operationally relevant is through the proper structure of the database.

DATA STORAGE

5-13. Every database has a stockpile of supporting documents that were used to compile the database. The processing of civil data will amass significant amounts of data. Data is lost if it is stored in a manner in which it cannot be retrieved. Erroneous entries or misspellings can cause data to be lost or stored improperly and may also call into question the accuracy of the facts in the report. Standardized naming conventions and the use of standard terms and graphics work to ensure that all civil data is stored so that all CA forces can retrieve it, regardless of the composition or the type of software in use.

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

5-14. While developing data management procedures, there are technical concerns that should be addressed. Some OEs may not offer commercial power or internet access. These situations require generators and satellite defense network systems. Under these circumstances, it is especially important for the CA force to use uninterruptible power sources and sufficient surge protection. In all environments, it is a good practice to back up data regularly to ensure the integrity of the available data.

CONSTRAINTS

5-15. Information that is incomplete or imprecise is the same as having no information. Information that is untimely or not in a usable form is the same as not having information, and information that is inaccurate or irrelevant is worse than no information at all. In general, a commander does not require information beyond a moderate level to accomplish the mission, as long as the information is relevant, accurate, timely, and usable. To meet the commander’s needs, civil information must be processed both quickly and accurately. CIM is only as effective as the relevancy of the products provided and the degree in which it is incorporated into the operational process. It is imperative to develop relationships with the other staff functions and to integrate into the operational process.

WORKSPACE

5-16. Processing and analyzing of civil information requires a work environment conducive to conducting research, having discussions, and being free of distractions. When planning the workspace the following needs to be considered:

CA forces must have unrestricted access to the World Wide Web.

Processing and data entry cannot be rushed or performed in conjunction with other duties.

Operational relevance is the key to establishing credibility.

TASK ORGANIZATION

5-17. Task-organized CA forces may deploy without a CIM cell. Therefore, the ability to effectively process civil information is incumbent upon all CA Soldiers, whether assigned as a G-9/S-9 CAO/CMO planner or as a member of a tactical CA element.

INTEGRATION

5-18. CIM is, by definition, the collation and management of civil information. Mission analysis is a staff function, and CIM is a supporting function to that process. Even in a joint CMO task force, the CIM cell only provides civil information to be integrated with other mission variables and analyzed through full MDMP as a staff function. CIM analysis is limited to identifying civil considerations that influence the civil layer of the COP and assist commanders and their staff in COA development.

MAINTAINING LIVING DOCUMENTS

5-19. All civil information changes constantly. It must be continually updated as conditions change. These living documents of civil information must be maintained for historical purposes, reference data, and for any future needs of the force. Continually updating the information as conditions change provides the commander the ability to visualize the civil component of the OE.

SUMMARY

5-20. The processing of civil data can be considered the nexus of CIM. Efficient processing of civil data can supply the supported unit with critical information and lay the foundation for targeted CAO and CMO. Inefficient processing techniques may as well not have occurred at all.

Chapter 6

Analysis

The CA core tasks established in FM 3-57 focus the process of analyzing civil information. CA forces must be proficient in the CA core tasks articulated in FM 3-57. They must understand how the analysis of civil information supports the operations process. ADP 5-0 provides a detailed discussion of military planning and operations. CIM, as a CA core task, focuses on managing the collection, collation, and processing of civil data within an AOI. Analysis, the fourth step in the CIM process, refers to transforming the managed data into useful guidance for the supported commander.

GENERAL

6-1. Analysis means to scrutinize or to breakdown. Analysis is performed to provide simple answers to complex situations. When applied to CAO, analysis is the sifting of civil information for patterns and indicators of past behaviors or ideas that might possess predictive value and application. More than restating facts, analysis is a process where complicated issues are simplified by separating the data into the basic components of cause and effect. For example, analysis of a complex machine would reveal that it is nothing more than several simple machines.

6-2. There is not a definitive approach to analysis. In fact, there are many different processes and methodologies to frame problems and evaluate data. CIM analysts must be critical thinkers and problem solvers who are familiar with different problem-solving methods to uncover the unknown unknowns. Examples of different analytical methods are as follows:

Critical thinking.

Logic.

Reasoning types.

Hypothesis formation.

Comparative analysis.

Scientific method.

6-3. Civil analysis is performed to support the operations process. The operations process refers to the phases of planning, preparation, and execution of military operations. Planning cycles and the established battle rhythm dictate the type of civil analysis necessary to support operations. Civil analysis usually creates more questions than answers and will generate several requests for information. CIM cell officers-in-charge and noncommissioned officers-in-charge should plan for the handling of requests for information to ensure timely, accurate responses.

6-4. Analysis combines the civil considerations of operational and mission variables provided by CA forces and the analysis of these variables by the G-2/S-2, providing a complete and detailed COP for the commander. This analysis assists the commander in the development of his CMO plan.

CRITICAL THINKING

6-5. Critical thinking is the foundation of analysis. Critical thinking is purposeful, reflective judgment focused on what to believe or what to do. Essential to problem solving, critical thinking involves forming a hypothesis by applying logic and reasoning to determine if adequate justification exists to support conclusions. Critical thinkers often reevaluate their work to ensure accuracy and relevancy.

6-6. CA forces may be inclined to develop conclusions based on personal experience. However, experience is subjective and may lead to flawed conclusions. Unbiased knowledge should be the basis for critical thinking. In addition, when it is combined with experience, unbiased knowledge greatly enhances CIM analysis. Objectivity should drive critical thinking and be the cornerstone for CIM analysis. ADP 5-0 and ADP 6-0, Mission Command, provide more information on critical thinking and planning.

6-7. A foundational requirement for critical thinking is the use of logic. Logic is the study of reason or rationalization of the causes of a situation. Logic involves both inductive and deductive reasoning. Logical reasoning is only as effective as the information under analysis. The use of logic during critical thinking provides a systematic process to analyze data and deduct what that data is providing to the user.

REASONING TYPES

6-8. Two types of reasoning are discussed below:

Inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning (factual assumptions) develops logical conclusions based on similar criteria. Inductive reasoning is based on the concept that what is perceived to be true is true; however, the possibility exists that the findings may be false.

Example

All reporting from CA forces on the island of Basilan, Philippines, indicates every village assessed was Muslim. Therefore, inductive reasoning would dictate that all of the villages on Basilan are Muslim when, in fact, they are not.

Deductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning is based on a series of facts that form a natural conclusion. Deductive reasoning is not based on assumptions.

Example

The provincial reconstruction team in Ghazni, Afghanistan, reported increased NGO activity across their AO. CA teams operating in the same area reported NGOs distributing humanitarian aid from UN-marked vehicles. Therefore, deductive reasoning dictates that the NGOs are working with the UN. In regards to the analysis of civil information, deductive reasoning forms the basis for trend analysis.

FORMING A HYPOTHESIS

6-9. A hypothesis is an educated guess based on known facts and logical assumptions. CIM analysts form hypotheses to provide explanations for problems that they intend to prove through further analysis. During civil analysis, developing a hypothesis involves understanding the problem and formulating solutions. Much like conducting an operational crosswalk, the hypothesis identifies the central issue (the problem), and an appropriate CA core task (the solution) to achieve the desired end state (commander’s visualization) through an established LOE (the approach). When problem solving, it is a good practice for CIM analysts to develop more than one hypothesis or develop variations to the supporting arguments for comparative analysis. A sound hypothesis—

Is clear and concise.

Reflects a position that the analyst is taking.

Is arguable and has an opposing argument.

Can be tested.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

6-10. Comparison provides CA forces with the opportunity to find shortcomings in the supporting arguments. Many CIM analysts will find that the best COA is not a single COA but the combination of several different COAs. It is important for the CIM analysts to define opposing arguments and maintain objectivity throughout the analytical process. Comparison focuses on the following areas:

Test results.

Objectivity.

Simplicity.

SCIENTIFIC METHOD

6-11. The scientific method is a process that is used to acquire, confirm, or make changes to knowledge. It is a series of steps that identifies and solves problems. Although the scientific method follows a six-step process, new information or a change in thought may cause the CIM analyst to repeat steps as often as necessary.

STEP ONE: DEFINE THE PROBLEM

6-12. The most difficult step in applying the scientific method to CIM analysis is defining the problem. However, the nature of systems analysis is to precisely define the problem. The challenge is quite simple—we do not know what we do not know. Once the problem is defined, it must be stated in such a way that observation or experimentation can provide an answer without preconceptions or bias.

STEP TWO: GATHER DATA

6-13. The CIM analyst must gather all available data and information relating to the problem. For the CIM analyst, this generally includes reviewing historical databases or data files, as well as current reporting on the defined problem.

STEP THREE: FORM A HYPOTHESIS

6-14. Based on a review of gathered information, the CIM analyst develops a hypothesis that provides a tentative explanation of the problem and makes an educated guess at how to solve the defined problem identified in step one. The hypothesis must be focused on providing a solution that is feasible and is based on the CA core tasks. The hypothesis may present new problems, demanding additional research and analysis.

STEP FOUR: TEST THE HYPOTHESIS

6-15. The CIM analyst tests the hypothesis by confirming or rejecting it through evaluation and investigation. The CIM analyst uses various methods to investigate his hypothesis. These methods include the following:

Pattern analysis based on time and events.

Link analysis.

Research.

Trends.

STEP FIVE: DRAW A CONCLUSION

6-16. The CIM analyst formulates conclusions by reviewing available facts, as well as considering relevant and reasonable assumptions, when analyzing a hypothesis. When formulating a conclusion, the analyst must be unbiased. If the facts and assumption do not support the hypothesis, a new hypothesis must be formed and investigated.

STEP SIX: COMMUNICATE RESULTS

6-17. Analytical results may be reported in several different ways. The most effective way is answering information requirements through clear and concise statements in detailed assessments relating to the effects of each COA and then conducting the supporting briefings. Each of these communication vehicles is centered on the analytical findings of the situation and is based on available data. Analytical results are not just a compilation of facts. Analytical results are a combination of facts and findings that either confirm or refute the hypothesis. When presenting analytical results, CA Soldiers must explain what they know and why they know it, what they think and why they think it, as well as what they do not know and what they are doing about it. In doing so, clear concise communications provide an unbiased framework for the commander to conduct an independent analysis of the situation.

CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS

6-18. Civil analysis breaks through social nuances and cultural barriers, enhancing situational understanding and supporting the commander’s visualization. When analyzed, civil information reveals factors in the civil component of the OE that provide commanders with a focal point for CAO. At tactical and operational levels, CIM analysis supports the operations process by identifying civil considerations and COGs during the MDMP (for example, mission analysis and COA development).

TYPES OF CIVIL ANALYSIS

6-19. Different information requirements call for different types of analysis. For example, civil analysis conducted during the planning and execution of tactical operations is focused on civil considerations. In contrast, civil analysis at operational levels focuses more on the systems approach. All CA forces should be familiar with the different civil analytical models to maximize the accuracy and relevancy of CIM analysis. The following is a list of different types of analysis:

Civil considerations analysis. Civil considerations analysis is conducted in support of mission analysis based on the mission variables outlined in the memory aid METT-TC.

Systems analysis. Systems analysis is conducted at operational levels and above to identify COGs based in the operational variables outlined in the memory aid PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time).

Nodal analysis. Nodal analysis is the study of the interrelationship of nodes.

Trend analysis. Trend analysis identifies patterns and inclinations in data.

Link analysis. Link analysis illustrates the interrelationship of people, events, and locations through associations.

6-20. Most civil analysis falls into either civil considerations analysis or systems analysis. Both processes exercise simple logic and employ inductive and deductive reasoning. Civil considerations analysis is performed to measure how civil considerations will impact operations. Systems analysis is performed to define the physical or behavioral state of the operational variables within the environment.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS ANALYSIS

6-21. During mission analysis, the commander and his staff ensure that they understand the OE and design the tactical end state with regard to the civil component. Mission analysis focuses on the mission variables of METT-TC that will directly affect the mission. Civil considerations analysis is the “C” in METT-TC. Civil considerations analysis is the process by which civil information is evaluated to determine the impact of the civil environment on operations, as well as the impact of operations on the civil component. Based on the factors of ASCOPE, civil considerations analysis is critical to mission success. Figure 6-1, page 6-5, shows the relationship between METT-TC and ASCOPE.

6-22. Identifying civil considerations during mission analysis is inherent in all operations and is the key to mission success. However, identifying the tertiary effects from operations is just as critical. CA forces are best suited to anticipate the unforeseen consequences of military operations. During mission analysis, CA forces provide critical guidance that employs the simple adage prevention is the best medicine.

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

6-23. Systems analysis identifies the root cause of instability. The cause may be a natural or man-made disaster arising from conflict or changes in the status quo. Systems analysis identifies civil vulnerabilities within the civil component by determining both the cause and the effect. Based on ASCOPE and focused on PMESII-PT, systems analysis defines COGs and enhances situational understanding. Systems analysis is conducted based on operational necessity and the products reflect a single moment in time.

6-24. Systems analysis closely follows the scientific method; it focuses on evaluating operational variables against civil considerations (Figure 6-2, page 6-6) and is based on the ASCOPE/PMESII-PT analytical paradigm. It is important to remember that the purpose of all civil analysis is to facilitate operations, and regardless of the operating environment, CAO should remain focused on and established in LOEs. During combat operations, systems analysis focuses more on limiting civil interference on operations while avoiding damage to the IPI. During stability tasks, systems analysis focuses more on identifying civil vulnerabilities. In both instances, the operational focus helps frame the problem and reveals which CA core tasks may be best suited to resolve the issue.

Framing the Problem

6-25. Systems analysis begins with framing the problem. Framing the problem is an analytical process and in some cases amounts to COG analysis. During this phase of the analysis, it is necessary to identify the problem, facts, and assumptions and to determine if there is enough information available to conduct detailed analysis. Framing the problem creates requests for information to source additional information, driving the civil information collection plan and focusing collection efforts. Effective problem framing focuses on—

The visualization of the commander.

The enhancement of situational understanding.

The development of facts and assumptions.

Filtering the Data

6-26. Once the problem has been effectively framed, it is then necessary to gather all relevant information together and to identify any information gaps. Information gaps are voids in understanding that must be filled to conduct accurate analysis. Once identified, these gaps become requests for information. Filtering the data is accomplished by addressing those AOIs to the commander in order of significance. Filtering data focuses analytical efforts within a specific area and greatly reduces the analytical workload. Civil information databases are structured to filter information quickly and efficiently. Chapter 3 of this manual provides more information on databases. Filtering focuses analysis on—

Areas of concern.

Nodes or links.

Geographical locations.

6-27. In addition to meeting operational requirements, populating the CAO running estimate, and writing the CAO annex, CA forces must anticipate the needs of the commander and his staff. Therefore, CA forces should continually look at all civil aspects of the OE. CA forces should continually assess factors within the OE that possess the ability to impact CAO.

NODAL ANALYSIS

6-28. Nodal analysis reveals the interrelationship between people, organizations, entities, and locations. The individual nodes represent complex relationships between a person, place, or physical thing that are a fundamental component of a system and link the behavioral, physical, or functional relationships between the nodes. Critical nodes are those identified as being essential and whose disruption or removal becomes a single trend analysis point failure. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, contains additional information on this subject.

6-29. Trend analysis is a continuous analytical process that identifies patterns or societal behaviors in response to enemy and friendly operations over a period of time. Typically, trend analysis is the compilation of several system analytical products, reflecting changes in a temporal view and giving analysts a glimpse into the future.

LINK ANALYSIS

6-30. Link analysis is the process of identifying and analyzing relationships between personnel, contacts, associations, events, activities, organizations, and networks to determine key or significant links. CIM analysts use link analysis to determine who is involved with whom and how they are involved. Link analysis tools include association matrices, activity matrices, and link diagrams. These tools are discussed later in this chapter.

6-31. The matrix is the simplest way to show the relationships between associated items. The items can be anything, such as people, places, organizations, events, or locations. In civil analysis, matrices are typically used to identify who knows whom or who has what in a clear concise manner.

6-32. There are two types of matrices used in civil analysis. The two types are the—

Association matrix, which is used to determine existence of relationships between people.

Activities matrix, which is used to determine connectivity between individuals and any organization, event, address, activity, or other entity.

The graphics involved in constructing the two types of matrices differ slightly, but the principles are the same.

CIVIL ANALYSIS

6-33. In addition to answering specific requests for information, CA forces must anticipate the needs of the commander and his staff. In addition to supporting the operations process, CA forces should continually look at all civil aspects of the OE. Although civil analysis should be focused on specific mission sets, CA forces should also continually consider those factors that may be benign to the operational forces yet still possess the ability to impact CAO.

6-34. Civil information viewed through PMESII-PT is broken down into specific groupings of raw data. When categorized by the mnemonic ASCOPE, the data is further divided and lends itself to detailed analysis. The PMESII-PT/ASCOPE analytical paradigm provides CA Soldiers with a tool with which to identify specific factors and conditions that impact the OE. Appendix B details an example of civil analysis using the PMESII-PT/ASCOPE analytical paradigm.

SEEING THE DATA

6-35. Creating a visual display of information assists in identifying relationships. In many cases, displaying the data on a map will reveal previously hidden links. Building charts and matrices will give clarity to cause and effect in a linear fashion. Civil information can be demonstrated with different types of products, such as—

Stability matrices.

Nodal analysis charts.

Link analysis charts.

Geospatial analysis.

Civil considerations overlays.

STABILITY MATRIX

6-36. The stability matrix (Figure 6-3, page 6-8) offers a visual representation of cause and effect and is helpful in determining the root causes of instability. The matrix aids with identifying the main concerns and serves as a reference point for targeted questioning. The data is combined with input from other staff sections and other information sources. All this input is used to create a prioritized list of the causes of instability and sources of resiliency that guide the conduct of CAO.

NODAL ANALYSIS CHART

6-37. Nodal analysis essentially brings systems analysis and link analysis together. Figure 6-4, page 6-9, shows the relationship between the two types of analysis.

Association Matrix

6-38. A known association is determined by direct contact between individuals. Direct contact is determined by a number of factors, including but not limited to face-to-face meetings of all members of a particular organizational cell. CA forces should remember that the association matrix (Figure 6-5, page 6-9) will show only the existence of relationships and not the nature of the relationships.

6-39. During CAO, the association matrix is a good tool for mapping the relationships between key leaders, organizations, and significant events. This information assists in the planning and execution of CAO.

6-40. The rationale for depicting suspected associations is to get as close as possible to an objective analytic solution while not straying from known or confirmed facts. A secondary reason for depicting suspected associations is that it gives the CIM analyst a focus for requests for information to confirm the suspected association. Suspected associations are considered to be associations that are possible or even probable but cannot be confirmed using the above criteria. The CIM analyst should continually work to corroborate information and confirm suspected associations. Examples of suspected associations include the following:

A key leader engagement in which one party can be identified but the other party can only be tentatively identified.

A New group of people identifying with different ethnicities.

A political party affiliation.

A family relation.

6-41. When corroborating suspected information, it is important for the CIM analyst to remember that information sources are not limited to official sources. Local television, radio, newspapers, and online news sources are all excellent examples of the different kinds of information available.

6-42. The association matrix is constructed in the form of an equilateral triangle having the same number of rows and columns. Personalities must be listed in exactly the same order along both the rows and columns to ensure that all possible associations are correctly depicted. An alternate method is to list the names along the diagonal side of the matrix.

Note: In the event that a person of interest is or becomes deceased, a diamond is drawn next to his or her name on the matrix. The purpose of the association matrix is only to show the analyst who is associated with whom.

Activities Matrix

6-43. The activities matrix determines connections between individuals, organizations, events, entities, addresses, activities, or anything other than another person. The activities matrix is a rectangular array of personalities compared against activities, locations, events, or other appropriate information. The kind and quantity of data that is available to the analyst determines the number of rows and columns and the content. The CIM analyst may tailor the matrix to fit the needs of the problem at hand or may add to it as the problem expands in scope.

6-44. The activities matrix is constructed with personalities arranged vertically on the left—events, activities, organizations, addresses, and capabilities arranged along the bottom of the matrix. Figure 6-6 provides an example of an activities matrix. The activities matrix identifies internal and external activities, external ties, and links revealing motivational factors.

6-45. As in the association matrix, confirmed or strong associations between individuals and entities are shown with a solid circle or dot while suspected or weak associations are illustrated by an open circle. By using matrices, the analyst can pinpoint the optimal targets for further intelligence collection, identify key personalities within an organization, and considerably increase the understanding of an organization and its structure. Matrices can be used to present briefings and evidence or to store information in a concise and understandable manner within a database. Matrices do not replace standard reporting procedures or standard database files.

LINK DIAGRAM

6-46. The link diagram shows the connections between people, groups, or activities. It differs from matrices in that the link diagram portraits all relationships, not just those made through an activity or an association. The link diagram uses standardized symbols that represent locations, people, and organizations by linking them through activities, associations, and events. Association matrices show who knows whom, who did what, who went where, and who belongs to what group. The link diagram draws information from association and activities matrices. People should be grouped into organizations or cells based on information about joint association, activities, or membership. Lines are drawn to represent connections between individuals, organizations, or activities to complete the diagram. Figure 6-7 provides graphics for various degrees of link diagramming. The link diagram identifies relationships between people through events, locations, and organizations. Similar to nodal analysis, link analysis focuses on social networking and identifying relationships between people.

Note: Entities are linked together through associations, locations, and events. This offers the greatest potential for further analysis. When individuals are only linked to individuals, the only association they have to the rest of the link chart is through another person, failing to link the entity by membership in a group or an association with another entity or an event.

GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS

6-47. Geospatial analysis refers to analyzing imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities that are of interest to the support commander. Geospatial analysis produces imagery-based products and geospatial information in a GIS common to the entire DOD that is designed to capture, store, manipulate, and manage all types of geographically referenced data. Geospatial analysis draws geospatial information from the global information grid. The global information grid is a globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information. CA geospatial analysis focuses on COGs within the civil component. Personnel continually update geospatial analysis to meet the commander’s intent.

6-48. Geospatial information identifies the geographic location and characteristics of natural or constructed features and boundaries on the Earth, including statistical data and information derived from, among other things, remote sensing, mapping, and surveying technologies; and mapping, charting geodetic data; and related products (JP 2-03). Geospatial information is the foundation upon which all other information about the physical environment is referenced to form the COP. CA forces develop geospatially referenced civil information to answer requests for information and to develop mission-specific products. Effective geospatial analysis demands timely, accurate, and relevant geospatial information to support the operations process and enhance the commander’s situational understanding.

6-49. Geospatial analysis is conducted by mapping the interrelationships of operational variables (PMESII-PT), current conditions (situation) and their combined impact on the civil component. When the civil component is broken down by operational variables, each variable can be used independently of the others to determine specific indicators of instability. When stacked together, these individual variables, or layers, identify complex relationships and reveal how these factors may impact the OE. For example, if a road map were overlaid with a layer showing populated areas and another layer showing the locations of available potable water, the routes people would take to and from the water sources would be easily identified. Geospatial analysis—

Significantly contributes to anticipating, estimating, and warning of possible future events.

Supports the MDMP.

Provides the foundation for developing shared situational awareness.

Produces geospatial information on GIS products.

Improves understanding of CA capabilities and limitations.

Describes the civil environment.

Facilitates staffs analysis of the OE.

Supports situational understanding.

Enables well-informed decisionmaking.

6-50. Although geospatial analysis infers the use of GIS, geospatial analysis can be performed with nothing more than a base map and layers of acetate. The concept of geospatial analysis is essentially applying the fundamentals of nodal analysis to geographic information to reveal both the cause and effect of social instability.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS OVERLAY

6-51. The civil considerations overlay is a tool used to graphically depict civil considerations on an operational map. The overlay should be clear and concise and capture the entire operational area. In addition to identifying the ASCOPE variables, some other considerations include the following:

Traffic flow. The overlay identifies main thoroughfares for vehicular, rail, and water traffic to determine the impact on military operations.

Commodity flow. The overlay identifies the manner in which goods are brought to market.

Essential services. The overlay identifies potential single-point failures in power facilities, water sources, sewer, media sources, bridges, and other potential civil vulnerabilities that, if damaged, could potentially create a humanitarian crisis.

Population density. The overlay identifies how many people per square mile are in the AO.

Ethnic overlays. The overlay identifies ethnic boundaries and cultural calendars; it also identifies significant events that may take place during the operation and necessitate the need for different interpreters or further civil analysis.

6-52. Although Microsoft PowerPoint is the most common briefing tool, CA Soldiers should be prepared to conduct civil considerations analysis on a 1/50,000 scale map with clear acetate. Having an in-depth understanding of the OE, a rudimentary understanding of the local culture, and the ability to generate requests for information, the CA generalist is well prepared to conduct this critical requirement. Chapter 7 of this manual provides more information on preparing and producing Microsoft PowerPoint briefing slides. Figure 6-8 is an example of a civil considerations overlay.

SOCIAL-CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

6-53. When local support is necessary for success, as is often the case in operations in the urban environment, the population is central to accomplishing the mission. The COG of operations in urban environments is often human. To effectively operate within an urban population and maintain its goodwill, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture to include values, needs, history, religion, customs, and social structure.

CENTERS OF GRAVITY DURING FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

6-54. CA forces engaged in FHA operations may not have an enemy COG to contend with. However, COG analysis is just as critical and will provide the CA commander with clear LOEs to effectively employ FHA. FHA COG analysis focuses on the relationship between the operational variables (PMESII-PT) and civil considerations (ASCOPE). CIM cells staffed to support FHA operations should make use of a central database to facilitate interagency coordination efforts and ensure that limited HA resources are being used to their fullest potential. FHA operations require shared civil data that details the location of DC camps, HN civil service operations, USG assets, and NGO and IGO assets, as well as the available resources. FHA COG analysis reveals focal points for short-term, high-impact mitigating operations that alleviate human suffering. These focal points are identified by detailed analysis of each operational variable, determining availability and need for essential services (water, food, and shelter) as well as the ability of the HN to supply these services. Once identified and geospatially referenced, these focal points will form clusters within the IPI and, when coalesced, form COGs. Further analysis of the clusters, called nodes, identifies specific civil capabilities and vulnerabilities within the clusters.

IDENTIFYING CENTERS OF GRAVITY DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS

6-55. CIM supports the operations process, and only through full collaboration with other staff can COG analysis be effective. CA forces work closely with commanders and their staffs during COG analysis, focusing on—

Framing the problem.

Formulating the design.

Framing the Problem

6-56. Framing (and reframing) the problem consists of marrying the commander’s visualized end state with the COG. Framing requires a systemic approach to identifying and analyzing COGs, and like the initial COG analysis, it is a collaborative effort.

6-57. CIM supports framing at all levels of operation through a process of systems approaches. Analysis of the civil dimension reveals appropriate operational themes and approaches to the commander.

Formulating the Design

6-58. Formulating the design builds on the framework developed through framing the problem and lies in the domain of the supported commander. CIM supports this by identifying COGs and offering solutions to the problem by—

Recommending appropriate operational approaches.

Helping to identify decisive points.

Developing lines of operations and effort.

6-59. Determining the operational approach includes identifying the defeat or stability mechanisms that best accomplish the mission. Decisive points that offer the greatest leverage against COGs are then selected. CIM analysts establish decisive points through establishment of measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

6-60. CIM analysis graphically depicts civil vulnerabilities, allowing commanders to determine what operational assets within their command can be employed along LOEs to impact strategic level effects.

CONSTRAINTS

6-61. Effective CIM analysis is subject to many shortcomings. The OE, technical issues, high operational tempo, and data integrity typically confound day-to-day CIM operations. Although effective CIM planning can mitigate many of these issues, inaccuracy, relevancy, biases, assumptions, and omissions are harder to plan for and adversely affect CIM analysis. These issues are typical and, if left unchecked, challenge the timely and accurate analysis of civil information. It is incumbent upon leadership at all levels to address these considerations to maximize the CIM cell’s ability to analyze civil data.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

6-62. CIM analysis requires critical thinking. Leadership at all levels should ensure CIM cells are provided an environment that that is conducive to critical thinking. Although the CMOC and CIM cell are often located together, every effort should be made to maintain a workspace that promotes critical thinking and lends itself to analysis. In circumstances where the CMOC and the CIM cell are collocated, the CA commander should ensure that the CIM cell is insulated from internal CMOC functions and is focused exclusively on CIM. OE considerations include the following:

Workspace.

Distractions.

CIM battle rhythm.

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

6-63. Effective CIM analysis requires unhindered access to media sources and operational reporting from the supported unit. CIM analysis is constrained by technical factors that include the following:

Limited bandwidth. Units reporting from austere environments may not be able to send detailed information in a timely matter. CIM cells should make every effort to use brevity and codified terms to expedite the transfer of data.

Different programs of record. CIM cells must develop methods of bridging the gap between different CIM technologies. A good example is the use of Microsoft Excel, which is common to all users and a good universal data tool.

Automation system. Computers are the weakest link in CIM analysis. The CIM cell should be afforded automation systems with high processing capabilities that are capable of handling large files and detailed graphics. CIM computers should be restricted exclusively to CIM operations and to CIM personnel.

Software considerations. Different versions of similar software may not be compatible. In addition, not all software can be installed on the different government networks. Local units should accept software installation vetted by other DOD networks.

6-64. Addressing technical considerations during CIM planning greatly enhances the CIM cell’s ability to analyze and fuse data with the supported unit. Chapter 2 provides a detailed discussion of CIM planning.

PROGRAMS OF RECORD

6-65. Different CIM programs of record use different methods for extracting key information from collected civil information. Although CIM programs of record differ in execution, the process in which civil information is collected, collated, analyzed, and produced remains the same. However, these differences do impact CIM during transition operations when the incoming CA forces and the redeploying CA forces use different programs of record. These conditions force incoming units to focus on adapting to new technologies or upset the operations process by initiating a change to the status quo. It is imperative that through these changes the structural integrity of all collected data is maintained.

ACCURACY

6-66. Accurate information is the key to accurate analysis. Decisions based on inaccurate information are made in error, causing a waste of time and resources. Every effort must be made to corroborate information and update existing data. Assessments, area studies, and country studies are all living documents and have a limited shelf life. Living documents are those documents that are continually edited and updated. It is important for CA forces to remember that any analytical work based on dated information is subject to be dated as well.

RELEVANCY

6-67. CA forces are a very limited resource; every effort must be made to ensure CAO remains operationally relevant. Relevancy means relating to or bearing upon the matter in hand, and in regards to CIM, relevancy, asks the necessary question “So what?” It is important for CA forces to remember that all civil information is relevant. However, not all civil information is operationally relevant. Operationally relevant civil information is information that specifically satisfies a CCIR/priority intelligence requirement. To ensure the relevancy of CAO and CMO, analysis should remain focused on the following:

Developing new requests for information.

Defining COGs.

Supporting MDMP.

Refining named areas of interest and target areas of interest.

Conducting trends analysis.

Refining CCIRs.

Example of Relevancy

In support of the DOS economic stimulus policy during the surge in Iraq, CA forces were directed to identify the location of all financial institutions in densely populated areas.

Orders were issued, the CCIR was refined, and priority intelligence requirements were developed as taskings went out across the combined joint task force, requesting the locations of the financial institutions across Iraq. Subsequently, CA forces conducted assessments of all the financial institutions in Iraq, collecting enormous amounts of data that were eventually submitted to the combined joint task force CIM cell.

The end state: the DOS only requested the location of all the financial institutions in densely populated areas, and while the collected information was relevant, it was not operationally relevant and delayed the process.

BIAS

6-68. CA Soldiers must understand bias to remain objective. Bias is a preconception that sways an individual’s outlook or temperament. Developed throughout our lives, biases emanate from cultural beliefs and life experiences. Biases may become manifested personally or institutionally, either cognitively or subconsciously, imperceptibly manipulating perspectives and beliefs.

6-69. To be objective is to remain neutral, or unbiased. For example, to state that “Americans have a unique perspective of the world” demonstrates bias. However, to state that “all people have a different perspective of the world” demonstrates objectivity.

6-70. During CIM analysis, biases can be factored by influence. Cultural, ethnic, and political biases are among the most prevalent. For example, ethnocentrism is the belief that one’s ethnic or cultural group is centrally important, and defines what is right and wrong. CA forces encounter ethnocentrism at all levels and in every theater. CA forces must be able to recognize bias to mitigate the influence of bias. It is important to remember that biases are quick to develop and difficult to overcome.

ASSUMPTIONS

6-71. Assumptions are among the biggest challenges to effective CIM analysis. This is because both inductive and deductive reasoning involve making an assumption. The problem is that assumptions are beliefs, and like all beliefs, assumptions may or may not be true.

6-72. The rationale that situational circumstances are the same in every AO is not accurate and usually stems from personal experiences. It is a good practice to treat every situation as its own and not to automatically render a response based on previous analysis or personal experiences. This is not to imply that CIM analysts cannot make assumptions. Logical assumptions, supported by facts are permissible and CIM analysts should not hesitate to render such assumptions during the analytical process.

GENERALIZATIONS AND PREMATURE CONCLUSIONS

6-73. Generalizations are akin to premature conclusions. Generalizations occur when CIM analysis is performed too hastily, either by shortcutting the CIM process or when there is not enough information to effectively analyze. Usually driven by operational necessity, commanders may at times put considerable pressure on CIM cells to produce results quickly.

6-74. Although there is a natural inclination to provide quick answers, every effort should be made to ensure CIM analysis is thorough. Leadership at all levels should ensure that CIM cells are given the suspense time up front and further should realize that the quality of CIM analysis is commensurate with the amount of time involved during analysis. CIM analysts must draw on training and experience to ensure quality products are developed in a timely manner.

OMISSION

6-75. Omission is another critical limiting factor to CIM analysis. To omit is to leave something out. During MDMP, it could be potentially devastating to leave out one of the factors of METT-TC. Omitting a factor during CIM analysis has the same potential to affect the accuracy and relevancy of the analytical product. This is the reason civil analysis is rarely done by itself.

6-76. Those circumstances, usually limited to FHA operations, provide clear-cut factors to not fall outside of the information collection capabilities of CA forces. However, during operations in which enemy forces provide a counter influence to CAO, the effects of their operations must be factored into systems analysis.

OVERSIMPLIFICATION

6-77. The complex nature of CIM analysis begs for simplification, and the natural reaction is to oversimplify by not addressing all the factors present during analysis. Oversimplifying can occur because of the need for brevity or clarity or because of a general lack of understanding of CIM analysis.

6-78. The real danger in oversimplification lies in the ability of the CIM analyst to articulate the matter at hand. The basis for CIM analysis is to enhance the commander’s visualization and to develop situational understanding. Oversimplification endangers both by usurping cognitive development and by merely sustaining situational awareness.

SUMMARY

6-79. The analysis of civil information is necessary to identify subtle influences that detract from the facts that measure stability or U.S. foreign policy. CIM analysis, used correctly, will provide the commander and staff with civil considerations that support current operations and a basis to measure trends that meet the commander’s end state. CIM analysis provides the focus point for commanders to direct CAO and CMO, thus ensuring that limited CA forces are used to their fullest potential.

Chapter 7

Production

This chapter is designed to assist CA Soldiers with CIM production while assigned to CA units, G-9/S-9 staffs, or in CA plans officer positions. This chapter provides guidance for the production of CIM products and considerations that will assist in the production process through the predeployment, deployment, transition, and postdeployment phases of the operation. It recommends training considerations for CA units to support general-purpose forces and ARSOF and can assist CA forces in synchronizing CIM production efforts with the supported unit’s operations process.

GENERAL

7-1. CIM products are developed from civil data that is collected, collated, and analyzed to enhance well-informed decisionmaking. Operational necessity determines production; CIM products may take many forms and are tailored to satisfy the information needs of the staff processes. CIM products are not produced without necessity; the application of the CIM process is a limited resource, and the products it develops should focus exclusively on responding to requests for information generated during mission planning. Production answers who, what, where, why, and when within the civil component of the COP. Production is the second-to-last step of the CIM process and one of the most critical.

“Information is not knowledge.”

Albert Einstein

7-2. The transition of data into information is built upon the time-honored processes of research, analysis, and deliberation. Libraries across the world are full of scrolls, periodicals, and books, all of which amount to massive amounts of data. However, not one word or idea from a single book becomes knowledge until it is retrieved and practically applied. The transition of information to knowledge is limited by the individuals who dictate what information will be produced, and where it will go.

CIVIL INFORMATION PRODUCTS

7-3. Production of CIM products will occur at all levels of operation to fulfill the various needs of the operations process. At tactical levels, civil considerations analysis is prominent in mission planning and defines the type of product that will be produced. Operational-level planning involves more in-depth analysis to meet different production requirements. CA forces at all levels must be familiar with the types of products that can be provided. They should also be familiar with the different mission planning cycles to accurately predict the information needs of the supported commander. CIM products may take many forms, such as the CAO estimate, GIS shapefiles, maps, CAO running estimate, link diagrams, and reports.

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS RUNNING ESTIMATE

7-4. Upon receipt or in anticipation of a mission, each staff section begins updating its estimate based on information requirements related to the mission. CA forces record relevant information in running estimates. They maintain a continuous assessment of the civil component of the OE as related to current operations as a basis to determine if they are proceeding according to the mission, commander’s intent, and CONOPS.

7-5. CIM has a mutually supporting relationship with the CAO running estimate. The CAO running estimate focuses the civil information collection plan, which in turn produces raw civil data that populates the CAO running estimate when processed. By itself, the CAO running estimate is the CIM product. FM 3-57 provides additional information on the CAO running estimate.

GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS

7-6. A shapefile is a standardized geospatial vector data format for GIS software that allows groupings of data to be graphically depicted in operational maps. Essentially, shapefiles are groupings of similar data that portray the location of the listed data on a map. For example, a medical infrastructure shapefile would contain a list of medical facilities and their locations. Shapefiles are not limited to location data. Shapefiles may also contain additional information. For example, when building an academic infrastructure shapefile, it would be a good practice to capture the number of students and teachers in each school in addition to their locations. Although the amount and type of data that can be stored on a shapefile is practically endless, personnel should ensure the data is operationally relevant and is focused on meeting the commander’s information requirements.

MAPS

7-7. A map is a graphic representation of a portion of the earth’s surface drawn to scale as seen from above. It uses colors, symbols, and labels to represent specific features and information of a particular location. Maps speak in a universal language, curbing operational challenges and language barriers to support mission planning. During any operation, Soldiers and materials must be transported, stored, and placed into operation at the proper time and place. Much of this planning must be done by using maps.

7-8. Maps offer perspective and, when used to graphically depict the civil environment, can be used to demonstrate trends, the location of events, and AOIs or to call attention to stratified layers of data. Maps offer CA forces a blank canvas from which to draw the civil environment as it stands and demonstrate how it should be.

7-9. To support the diverse nature of operations, CA forces must be able to prepare maps and mapping information that support the operations process. As a rule, there is no rule when it comes to maps. The content, type, and scale are left entirely to the map builder. The target audience should determine the particulars of the map. It is a good practice to determine the desired format and structure before building mapping products to ensure that the CIM products meet with their intended purpose.

LINK DIAGRAMS

7-10. Link analysis charts, maps, and graphs are all tools used to assist in developing trends and patterns. Care should be given to ensure standard symbols are utilized and that naming conventions are adhered to. This ensures greater interoperability and more widespread application of CIM products. When coupled with the G-2/S-2’s efforts, link diagrams demonstrate activity that may impact the operational picture, exceeding the impact of CAO.

REPORTS

7-11. Link analysis charts, maps, and graphs are all tools used to assist in developing trends and patterns. When coupled with the G-2/S-2’s efforts, these tools demonstrate activity that may impact the operational picture, IPB, and CCIR.

BRIEFING CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PRODUCTS

7-12. There is much truth in the saying “a picture is worth a thousand words.” Visual products are often the best way to produce CIM products. They are multilingual, save time, and, when used effectively, speak across social barriers. Maps, pictures, and graphics are intrinsic to CIM and present the opportunity to connect the physical environment to the cognitive realm by the use of visual aids. However, consideration should be given when determining the best method to present CIM products. The CA OE is multilingual, complex, and diverse. Some briefing recommendations include the following—

Slide show presentation.

Map briefing.

Pictures

7-13. When developing CIM products, it is important to first determine the forum the COP manager will use to brief the supported commander. The forum determines how do develop CIM products that are synchronized with the supported unit’s operations process.

Slide Show Briefings

7-14. Microsoft PowerPoint is very useful as a briefing tool and is a common format in most commanders update briefs. Microsoft PowerPoint offers the user many functional tools with which to graphically depict the civil component and to demonstrate through a series of slides current CAO or civil conditions in the OE. However, as useful as Microsoft PowerPoint is, care should be given to ensure that CIM products remain operationally relevant, are simple to understand, and are self-explanatory in nature.

Maps

7-15. Maps are excellent briefing tools. However, maps cluttered with too much data or too many colors may obstruct the briefer’s intent. When briefing a timeline of events, a good technique is to use a series of the same base maps with changes to the layered data to demonstrate a progression of the sequence of events. In briefings, maps should—

Be oriented to north or have a reference to indicate otherwise.

Be drawn to scale.

Avoid overcrowding.

Possess enough data in the margin to explain specific details on the map.

Contain a familiar geographic feature or insert to enhance geographic familiarity.

Pictures

7-16. When using pictures in briefs, the briefer should consider whether—

The picture clearly demonstrates the intended purpose or confuses or distracts from the intended purpose of the product.

All the pictures have been vetted by the appropriate G-2/S-2 and hold the appropriate classification for the intended audience.

All pictures have date-time group and military grid reference system coordinate data.

The visual quality of the picture has been checked.

Note: High-definition pictures create large file sizes. If compression software is being used, the quality of the picture may suffer.

PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT

7-17. CIM products are developed to display the results of an analysis. These products may be the end state or input for further analysis. CIM products should be prepared on a regular basis for practical application. It is incumbent upon CA leadership to ensure that production efforts are focused on information requirements generated by the supported commander.

7-18. CIM products take many forms. Microsoft PowerPoint is an excellent briefing tool, offering the presenter any number of options to present the material. Slides should be built to present facts or assumptions and demonstrate a theory that results in a recommended decision point.

7-19. The presenter should refrain from overusing colorful graphics and busy slides with too much information. He needs to consider the target audience when developing the product. It is important for him to remember that one busy slide is not as effective as a sequence of slides that take the reviewer through a range of events. The presenter should zoom in from macro perspectives to micro perspectives (Figure 7-1). He should keep in mind people receiving the information may not be familiar with the area. When the presenter starts with an overall perspective it helps the audience maintain perspective. Some good practices include—

Providing supporting information with the graphic. Additional information can remain hidden until needed.

Rehearsing the presentation on the projector that is to be used for the briefing to reveal poor color combinations and incorrect font sizes.

Keeping in mind that red laser pointers are not effective on plasma or liquid crystal display televisions; green laser pointers work much better.

SUMMARY

7-20. CIM production is the key to mission planning. Identification of specific product types and incorporating their production into the weekly battle rhythm will ensure success. All CIM products should answer specific information requests. Leadership must ensure that resources are focused on named areas of interest and target area of interest to maintain efficiency.

Chapter 8

Dissemination

This chapter is designed to assist CA Soldiers with the dissemination of CIM products while assigned to CA units, G-9/S-9 staffs, or in CA plans officer positions. This chapter provides guidance for operational and tactical CA forces through the predeployment, deployment, transition, and postdeployment phases of operation. It recommends training considerations for CA units to support conventional forces and ARSOF to assist CA forces in synchronizing dissemination efforts with the staff functions of the supported unit.

GENERAL

8-1. Dissemination is the final step in the CIM process and is defined as an information management activity, conducted to communicate relevant information from one person or place to another in a usable form by any means to improve understanding or to initiate or govern action. In CIM, dissemination involves the distribution of CIM products to interested parties to facilitate informed decisionmaking. The primary role of CIM is to provide civil information to the supported commander and his staff by updating the COP. The secondary role of CIM is to share civil information with interagency, NGO, IGO, and HN forces. Depending on the mission and the operating environment, these roles may be one in the same. However, CIM is conducted primarily to facilitate the operations process.

8-2. CIM product dissemination is at the discretion of the supported commander. Dissemination requires that all classified information be handled according to Army Regulation (AR) 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program, and only be shared with entities that have the appropriate clearance. Although over 90 percent of civil information is unclassified, it is important to remember that, when it comes to classifications, it is not necessarily the information itself that is classified but the aggregate of the information.

8-3. The purpose of dissemination is to ensure that users receive the civil information that they require to support operations. Currently, there are several technologies being developed to facilitate dissemination. However, only a single information repository is developed; it is incumbent upon all CA forces to disseminate civil information as widely as possible. This allows each level of operation to conduct analysis on that information based on their requirements. Examples of civil information dissemination include the following:

Disseminating directly.

Granting access.

Sharing.

Updating the COP.

8-4. Successful operations at all levels have increased the demand for civil information. Informed decisionmaking at all levels depends on an information architecture that supports a readily available flow of relevant civil information. It is therefore necessary to coordinate with the interagency, HN forces, friendly forces, NGOs, and IGOs to ensure the timely dissemination of key information at all levels.

DIRECT DISSEMINATION

8-5. Direct dissemination may be in a verbal, written, interactive, or graphic format. The type of information, operational tempo, and internal staff processes all influence the format. The CAO estimate provides a common backbone for direct dissemination of civil information. Answers to requests for information and CCIRs for the commanders and their staffs require direct dissemination. It is incumbent on the G-9/S-9 to develop the CIM dissemination plan.

GRANTING ACCESS

8-6. Managing access to databases ensures that personnel, units, or organizations that need it have access to and obtain the information they require. Civil information may reside on classified and unclassified databases, networks, and other Web-based collaborative environments. Granting access is governed by—

Multinational, joint, and Army policies and regulations; U.S. laws; DOD regulations; classification guidelines; and security protocols.

Individual system accreditation.

Specialized training for clearances and systems or database usage.

8-7. Granting access to civil information is a shared responsibility of the G-9/S-9 and the CIM data manager. Users requiring access to data files and databases must be identified by the G-9/S-9 and CIM data manager. Managing access to civil data ensures optimal information sharing and continuity of operations.

SHARING

8-8. Sharing is primarily conducted in a Web-based, collaborative environment. Collaboration involves the sharing of civil data, information, and knowledge and is normally done online. Collaboration may take many forms. Collaborative tools include computer-based tools that help individuals work together and share information. They allow for virtual online meetings and data sharing. Sharing allows the free exchange of information to assist with informed decisionmaking. The G-9/S-9 and CIM data manager must identify the most effective methods to share collected data with all required users. Sharing applies specifically to multinational forces, NGOs, IGOs, and HN forces that are unable to access U.S. information systems or data files. Therefore, it may be necessary to print hardcopies or provide access to specific data. In all instances, it is important to have the security manager authorize all disclosures of information pursuant to U.S. laws, DOD regulations, classification guidelines, and security protocols.

UPDATING THE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE

8-9. The supported unit’s operational tempo or battle rhythm will dictate how often new or updated information is required to update the COP. The COP is a single display of all operationally relevant information within a commander’s AOI and is shared by subordinate commanders. Based on common data and information, the COP is tailored to the commander’s requirements. It is conveyed through reports, automatic updates, and overlays that are common to all echelons and digitally stored in a common database. The COP facilitates battle command through collaborative interaction and the real-time sharing of information between commanders and staffs. The CA portions of the COP are those messages and overlays relating to the civil component of the OE that are maintained in a common access database. The G-2/S-2 officer-in-charge monitors the common database to ensure it reflects the most current information and intelligence available. All staff sections must regularly provide updated information to the COP in accordance with unit SOPs to support the commander’s and his staff’s situational awareness.

DISSEMINATION METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

8-10. There are numerous methods and techniques for disseminating civil information. The appropriate technique in any particular situation depends on many factors, such as capabilities and mission requirements. Possible dissemination methods and techniques include—

Dispersing information directly by electronic means.

Posting the information in authorized or secure chat rooms (for example, Army Knowledge Online, Joint Knowledge Online, and Army Knowledge Online–SIPRNET).

Posting the information on the Web.

Printing the information and sending it via courier.

Putting the information on a compact disc and sending it to the recipient.

8-11. CA forces must also develop techniques to disseminate CIM products when normal methods and techniques are unavailable. CIM products can be disseminated using liaisons or regularly scheduled resupply missions, provided that classified information is handled properly.

DISSEMINATION PROCEDURES

8-12. CA officers and personnel at all levels assess the dissemination of CIM products. Disseminating civil information simultaneously to multiple recipients is one of the most effective dissemination methods. Most reports and other CIM products move through specific personnel and along specific channels. These channels help streamline the flow of information and ensure the dissemination of the right information to the right person or section. There are three channels through which commanders and their staffs communicate:

Command channel. The command channel is the chain-of-command link that commanders and their staffs use for command-related activities.

Staff channel. The staff channel is the staff-to-staff link within and between units.

Technical channels. Staffs typically use technical channels to control specific activities.

SUMMARY

8-13. The best CIM product has no real value if it is not disseminated. The final step in the CIM process proactively pushes civil information products to end users. The best method to disseminate CIM products is to synchronize the CIM process with the supported unit’s battle rhythm, directly feeding CIM products into the operations process. This ensures the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination for mission planning.

Appendix A

Appendix 3 (Civil Information Management) to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations)

The CIM appendix serves the following three primary purposes:

The situation paragraph provides operational details on the situation from a CIM perspective.

The execution paragraph and matrix provide the direction needed to focus the effects of the CIM measures.

The assessment matrix displays the information needed to assess CIM measures.

The CIM appendix, Figure A-1, pages A-5 through A-11, also addresses sustainment and mission command aspects of CAO that are not covered elsewhere in the OPLAN or OPORD. Much of the information in the CIM appendix is derived from the CA area study or area assessment and the CAO running estimate. Major portions of the appendix can be written directly from the CAO running estimate.

OVERVIEW

A-1. The CIM appendix succinctly describes the CIM measures that the task organization of the command executes in support of the command’s stated mission and commander’s intent. The appendix organizes the information developed from the MDMP analysis of the civil component of the OE not addressed in the base order or the CAO annex. The appendix also provides information to facilitate coordination among organizations (higher, adjacent, and civil) outside of the command tasked to implement CIM measures.

A-2. The CIM appendix, together with its associated tabs and exhibits, is an information management tool. It simplifies the base order by providing a structure for organizing information. Just as the annex expands the information contained in the base order, appendixes contain information necessary to expand annexes, and tabs expand appendixes. The G-9/S-9 staff is responsible for the preparation of the CIM appendix and its attachments, when required.

A-3. The CIM appendix contains details of CIM support to the commander’s intent and CONOPS not readily incorporated into the base order. The appendix also describes the command’s CAO linkage to the next-higher command’s plan and its support of the overall joint force’s CIM objectives.

APPENDIX FORMAT

A-4. The CIM appendix follows the five-paragraph format of the base order—situation, mission, execution, sustainment, and command and signal. Information developed during MDMP and recorded using the CAO running estimate is used to complete the majority of the appendix. The following paragraphs provide doctrinal guidance for completing the CIM appendix.

SITUATION PARAGRAPH INFORMATION

A-5. The situation paragraph provides operational details on the situation from a CIM perspective. The situation paragraph of the CIM appendix does not repeat the OPLAN or OPORD situation paragraph. It is tailored to aspects of the OE that affect CIM. The situation paragraph describes how the CIM environment may affect friendly, adversary, and other operations. It should discuss how CIM would influence friendly operations. The subparagraphs of the situation paragraph are as follows:

Area of interest. Describe the CIM-specific components of the AOI defined in Annex B (Intelligence), as required.

Area of operations. Refer to Appendix 1 (Operations Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).

Terrain. List all critical terrain aspects that impact CIM. Refer to Tab B (Terrain) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence), as required.

Weather. List all critical weather aspects that impact CIM. Refer to Tab A (Weather) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence), as required.

Enemy forces. List known and templated locations and activities of enemy CAO units for one echelon up and two echelons down. List enemy maneuver and other capabilities that will impact friendly CIM. State expected enemy COAs and employment of enemy CIM assets. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence), as required.

Friendly forces. Outline the HHQ plan as it pertains to CIM. List the designations, locations, and outlines of plans of higher, adjacent, and other CIM assets that support or impact the issuing HQ or require coordination and additional support. Include additional information on interagency, IGOs, and NGOs that may impact CIM.

Other. List other elements in the AO that may impact the conduct of CIM operations or implementation of CIM-specific equipment and tactics. This section provides the CIM analysis of the civil component of the AO developed during mission analysis. This subparagraph includes a description of the general civil situation as it relates to CIM. It lists the major strengths and vulnerabilities of civil components of the AO and the manner in which they relate to the overall CIM mission. When developing this information, it is key to think in terms of nodal interaction that ultimately leads to support of the overall joint force CIM strategy with its inherent measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. This information is normally recorded in the “civil considerations” subparagraph of the Characteristics of the Area of Operations paragraph [2.b.(5)] of the CAO running estimate.

Civil considerations. Using the mnemonic ASCOPE, identify critical civil considerations that impact CIM. Refer to paragraph 1.f. of the base plan/order, as required. Subsequent subparagraphs under the civil considerations subparagraph contain discussions, in terms of ASCOPE, as analyzed in the CAO running estimate and area assessments of the nodes and relationships essential for success of the commander’s mission, which include the following:

Areas. This subparagraph lists the key civilian areas in the supported commander’s OE as they relate to CIM. It approaches terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Commanders analyze key civilian areas in terms of how they affect the CIM mission, as well as how military operations affect these areas. Examples of key civilian areas are areas defined by political boundaries (districts within a city; municipalities within a region; locations of government centers; social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves; agricultural and mining regions; trade routes; and possible sites for the temporary settlement of DCs or other civil functions). Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations), as required.

Structures. This subparagraph lists the existing civil structures, such as bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams (traditional high-payoff targets). Churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals are cultural sites that need to be listed and are generally protected by international law or other agreements. Other structures are facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants, which may be useful for military purposes. This section identifies structures or infrastructure targeted for specific CIM measures.

Capabilities. This subparagraph lists civil CIM capabilities of the HN by assessing if the legitimate HN government is capable of sustaining itself through public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture. It should also include whether the HN needs assistance with public works and utilities, public health, public transportation, economics, and commerce.

Organizations. This subparagraph lists civil organizations directly involved with the implementation of CIM measures. These organizations may or may not be affiliated with either USG or HN government agencies. They can be church groups, ethnic groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, IGOs, or NGOs.

People. This subparagraph lists civilian and nonmilitary personnel encountered in the supported commander’s OE directly involved with CIM measures. The list may extend to those outside the AO/AOI whose actions, opinions, and/or influence can affect the supported commander’s OE.

Events. This subparagraph lists the categories of civilian events that may affect military missions. These events include harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary). Determine what events are occurring, and analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications directly related to CIM measures.

Attachments or detachment. If not covered in the task organization, all military and nonmilitary organizations participating in CMOC operations and CIM should be included; for example, CA assets detached for liaison duties in support of reconnaissance and surveillance plans.

Assumptions. This paragraph includes—

Only part of an OPLAN, not an OPORD.

Critical planning considerations and unknown conditions that must be confirmed by deliberate assessments.

Statement describing the operational risks associated with not engaging the civil component of the AO through CIM.

MISSION PARAGRAPH INFORMATION

A-6. This paragraph states the approved restated CIM requirements resulting from mission analysis. This paragraph provides a short description of who (unit or organization), what (task), when (by time or event), where (AO, objective, grid location), and why (purpose, mission objective, end state). For example, the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division (who) plans, coordinates, and executes CIM measures (what) in support of joint task force GOLD in AO EAGLE (where) to accomplish FID objectives (why) commencing upon receipt of this order (when) to support “country X” in executing their IDAD program (why/end state).

EXECUTION PARAGRAPH INFORMATION

A-7. The execution paragraph provides the direction needed to synchronize CIM with the effects of CAO supporting the related CMO plan. The execution paragraph addresses the scheme of support, subordinate unit tasks, and any additional coordination instructions not addressed elsewhere. It outlines the synchronization and support that the commander wants CIM to achieve in support of CAO. It describes the activities of the force executing CIM in enough detail to synchronize them by means of incorporating CIM tasks into the CAO execution matrix. The CAO execution matrix is normally Appendix 1 to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) of the supported unit’s OPLAN/OPORD.

A-8. The CAO execution matrix shows when each CIM task is to be executed. The execution matrix helps the G-9/S-9 representative in the current operations integration cell of the command monitor and direct CIM during execution. The execution matrix is a tool to execute CIM effectively without incurring unanticipated interference or duplication of effort. CIM tasks are incorporated and synchronized in the G-3/S-3 execution matrix contained within Annex C. The CAO execution matrix is not a tasking document. The CIM tasks are detailed under tasks to subordinate units in paragraph 3.b. of the CIM appendix or in the appropriate tabs. The subparagraphs of the execution paragraph are as follows:

Scheme of support. The scheme of support describes how CIM supports the commander’s intent and the command’s CONOPS. This discussion details the CIM CONOPS supporting the approved COA, which comes from paragraph 4, Analysis, of the CAO running estimate developed during MDMP. This discussion includes the principle tasks required, the responsible subordinate units, and how the principle tasks complement each other. This paragraph should include a discussion of CIM objectives, civil decisive points, measures of performance, and measures of effectiveness, transition for each phase of the operation, and a general timeline for the operation. Each phase of the operation should be discussed in greater detail in the appendixes where the key nodal relationship will be further defined. The CIM discussion within this paragraph must be finitely detailed.

Tasks to subordinate units. This subparagraph lists the specific CIM tasks assigned to the elements listed in the task organization within the attachment of detachment subparagraphs of the task organization paragraph. The measures of performance for each task should be stated along with their corresponding measures of effectiveness. Measures of performance and measures of effectiveness detailed in this paragraph come from paragraph 4, Analysis, of the CAO running estimate. Assessment of measures of performance and measures of effectiveness are synchronized with the overall assessment plan contained at Annex M (Assessment).

Coordinating instructions. This subparagraph provides instructions and details of coordination that apply to two or more subordinate units not covered by SOP. This includes civil CCIR/essential elements of friendly information, policy statements, special reporting procedures, force protection guidance, effective time of attachments or detachments, references to annexes not mentioned elsewhere in the appendix, coordinating authority, and so on.

A-9. CIM support of the command’s identified mission-essential stability tasks are detailed in the coordinating instructions subparagraph. Units responsible for an AO must execute the below-listed tasks with available resources if no civilian agency or organization is capable. Primary stability tasks include—

Civil security.

Restoration of essential services.

Civil control.

SUSTAINMENT PARAGRAPH INFORMATION

A-10. This paragraph provides instructions and details concerning the service support relationship between the CIM elements and their supported units. CA staff officers should identify priorities of sustainment for CIM key tasks and specify additional instructions, as required, for—

Logistics. Refer to Appendix 1 (Logistics) to Annex F (Sustainment), as required.

Personnel. Refer to Appendix 2 (Personnel) to Annex F (Sustainment), as required.

Army health service support. Refer to Appendix 3 (Army Health Service Support) to Annex Q (Sustainment), as required.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL PARAGRAPH INFORMATION

A-11. This paragraph details specific CIM instructions and information that are not covered in the base order. The staff will specify additional instructions, as required for—

Command. The command paragraph will include the following:

Location of key CIM HN leaders.

Location and alternate locations of the supported command’s CIM point of contact.

Liaison requirements. The liaison requirement paragraph will include the following:

CIM liaison requirements to military organizations or Services.

CIM liaison requirements to HN agencies.

CIM liaison requirements to civilian organizations (NGOs, IGOs).

Communication and information networks. The communication and information networks paragraph will include the following:

CIM-specific communications requirements or reports.

Primary and alternate means of communicating with participating CIM civilian organizations.

Instructions regarding maintenance and update of the civil information management database.

TAB INFORMATION

A-12. Tabs include task-related plans, diagrams, synchronization matrices, and civil overlays relating to specific aspects of CIM. The following are possible tabs for the CIM appendix:

CIM assessment matrix.

CIM reporting formats.

Appendix B

Civil Analysis Example of the Interrelationship of Operational Variables and Civil Considerations

Appendix B serves as an example of civil analysis using PMESII-PT to break down specific groupings of raw data and then categorize that data by using ASCOPE. This example provides a detailed analytical tool to process data into quantifiable and actionable information, to assist the commander and staff in the development of appropriate courses of action, branches or sequels to current operations, and inputs to future operations concerning the civil component of the OE. Figure B-1, pages B-1 through B-8, shows the interrelationship of PMESII-PT and ASCOPE.

Glossary

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR | after action review
ADP | Army doctrine publication
ADRP | Army doctrine reference publication
AO | area of operations
AOI | area of interest
AR | Army regulation
ARSOF | Army special operations forces
ASCOPE | areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ATP | Army techniques publication
CA | Civil Affairs
CAO | Civil Affairs operations
CAT | Civil Affairs team
CCIR | commander’s critical information requirement
CIM | civil information management
CMO | civil-military operations
CMOC | civil-military operations center
COA | course of action
COG | center of gravity
CONOPS | concept of operations
COP | common operational picture
CP | command post
CR | civil reconnaissance
DA | Department of the Army
DC | dislocated civilian
DOD | Department of Defense
DOS | Department of State
FHA | foreign humanitarian assistance
FID | foreign internal defense
FM | field manual
G-2 | Army deputy chief of staff for intelligence (Army division or higher staff)
G-3 | assistant chief of staff, operations
G-9 | assistant chief of staff, Civil Affairs operations (brigade or higher civil-military operations staff office)
GIS | geographic information system
HHQ | higher headquarters
HN | host nation
HQ | headquarters
IDAD | internal defense and development
IGO | intergovernmental organization
IPB | intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPI | indigenous populations and institutions
JP | joint publication
LOE | line of effort
MCA | military civic action
MDMP | military decisionmaking process
METT-TC | mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available and civil considerations (Army)
NA | nation assistance
NGO | nongovernmental organization
OE | operational environment
OPLAN | operation plan
OPORD | operation order
PDSS | predeployment site survey
PMESII-PT | political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (Army)
PRC | populace and resources control
S-2 | battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 | operations staff officer
S-9 | Civil Affairs operations staff officer
SA | security assistance
SCA | support to civil administration
SIPRNET | SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SOP | standard operating procedure
TLP | troop leading procedures
UN | United Nations
U.S. | United States
USG | United States Government

SECTION II – TERMS

area assessment

The commander’s prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment. (JP 3-05)

center of gravity

The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 5-0)

civil administration

An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 3-05)

Civil Affairs

Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 3-57)

Civil Affairs operations

Actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called CAO. (JP 3-57)

civil considerations

The influence of man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. (Army Doctrine Reference Publication [ADRP] 5-0)

civil information

Relevant data relating to the civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of the civil component of the operational environment used to create knowledge products supporting the situational awareness of the supported commander. (JP 3-57)

civil information collection plan

A continuous activity that coordinates and integrates the efforts of all Civil Affairs forces by matching information requirements with appropriate collection capabilities and transforms information requirements into tasks and requests for information. Collection planning synchronizes the timing of collection with the operational scheme of maneuver and with other civil-military operations.

civil information management

Process whereby data relating to the civil component of the operational environment is collected, collated, processed, analyzed, produced into knowledge products, and disseminated. Also called CIM. (JP 3-57)

civil-military operations

Activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called CMO. (JP 3-57)

civil-military operations center

An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called CMOC. (JP 3-57)

civil reconnaissance

A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events. Also called CR. (JP 3-57)

commander’s critical information requirement

(DOD) An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decisionmaking. The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. See ADRP 5-0. Also called CCIR.

common operational picture

(Army) A single display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command. Also called COP. (ADRP 6-0)

country team

The senior, in-country United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission. (JP 3-07.4)

dislocated civilian

A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called DC. (JP 3-29)

displaced person

A broad term used to refer to internally and externally displaced persons collectively. (JP 3-29)

effect

1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 3-0)

essential element(s) of friendly information

(Army) A critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operations and, therefore, should be protected from enemy detection. (ADRP 5-0) See also commander’s critical information requirement.

foreign humanitarian assistance

Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA. (JP 3-29)

foreign internal defense

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (JP 3-22)

host nation

A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 3-57)

indigenous populations and institutions

The societal framework of an operational environment including citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, dislocated civilians, and governmental, tribal, ethnic, religious, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called IPI. (JP 3-57)

information requirements

(DOD) In intelligence usage, those items of information regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. See ADRP 2-0. (Army) Any information elements the commander and staff require to successfully conduct operations. (ADRP 6-0)

insurgency

The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24)

internal defense and development

The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called IDAD. (JP 3-22)

internally displaced person

Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. (JP 3-29)

joint task force

A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 1)

knowledge

Information that has been analyzed to provide meaning or value or evaluated as to implications for the operations. (FM 6-01.1)

link

1. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. 2. In communications, a general term used to indicate the existence of communications facilities between two points. 3. A maritime route, other than a coastal or transit route, which links any two or more routes. (JP 3-0)

measure of effectiveness

A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 3-0)

measure of performance

(DOD) A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. See ADRP 5-0.

military civic action

The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (United States forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 3-57)

nation assistance

Assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called NA. (JP 3-0)

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Also called OE. (JP 3-0)

populace and resources control

(Army) Operations that provide security for the populace, deny personnel and materiel to the enemy, mobilize population and materiel resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of civilians. Resource control measures include licensing, regulations, or guidelines; checkpoints (for example, road blocks); ration controls; amnesty programs; and inspection of facilities. Most military operations employ some type of populace and resources control measures. Also called PRC. (FM 3-57)

reachback

The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. (ADRP 3-0)

refugee

A person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. (JP 3-29)

security assistance

Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Also called SA. (JP 3-22)

situational awareness

(Army) The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking. (ADP 5-0)

situational understanding

(Army) The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the operational and mission variable to facilitate decisionmaking. (ADP 5-0)

special operations

Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. (JP 3-05)

stability operations

An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

support to civil administration

Assistance given by U.S. armed forces to stabilize or to continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Also called SCA. (FM 3-57)

terrorism

The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political. (JP 3-07.2)

threat

Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADRP 3-0)

References

REQUIRED REFERENCES

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication. None

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

ARMY FORMS

DA Forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site (www.apd.army.mil).

DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Army publications are available at the Army Publishing Directorate Web site (www.apd.army.mil). United States Army Training and Doctrine Command regulations are available at the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Web site (http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regndx.htm).

ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011.

ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.

ADP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.

ADRP 1-02, Operational Terms and Military Symbols, 31 August 2012.

ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 16 May 2012.

ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.

AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program, 29 September 2000.

FM 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace, 15 October 2009.

FM 3-05.131, Army Special Operations Forces Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 16 November 2009.

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006.

FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, 31 October 2011.

FM 6-01.1, Knowledge Management Operations, 16 July 2012.

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Regulation 381-1, Threat Management, 19 April 1993.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

JPs are available on the Joint Electronic Library Web site (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm) or the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Web site (https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=2).

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 March 2013.

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010.

JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 31 October 2012.

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.

JP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 April 2011.

JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 24 November 2010.

JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, 13 June 2007.

JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010.

JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, 5 October 2009.

JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 17 March 2009.

JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 12 January 2010.

JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, August 2013.

JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 23 December 2010.

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

United States codes are available at the following Web site: <http://uscode.house.gov//>.

Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, 10 August 1956.

Title 22, United States Code, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, 3 January 2012.

Index

A

after action review, 2-4 through 2-6, 3-2, 3-3

area assessment, 2-5, 3-7, A-1, A-7

areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events, 1-2, 1-4, 3-1, 5-2, 6-4, 6-5, 6-7, 6-12, 6-13, A-2, A-6, A-9, B-1 through B-8

Army techniques publication, iv, v, 2-1

C

center of gravity, 1-1, 1-5, 1-6, 1-12, 1-14 through 1-16, 2-2, 6-4, 6-5, 6-12 through 6-14, 6-16, A-6

Civil Affairs operations, iv, 1-1, 1-2, 1-4, 1-7, 1-12, 1-13, 1-14 through 1-16, 2-1, 2-3 through 2-6, 3-1, 3-2, 3-5 through 3-8, 3-10, 4-1 through 4-4, 5-1, 5-2, 5-5, 6-1, 6-4 through 6-8, 6-15 through 6-17, 7-1 through 7-3, 8-1, A-1 through A-6, A-8, B-1 through B-7

civil considerations, 1-2, 1-14, 1-15, 2-2, 5-5, 6-1, 6-4, 6-5, 6-12, 6-13, 6-17, 7-1, A-2, A-6, B-1 through B-8

civil information management, iv, v, 1-1 through 1-8, 1-10 through 1-16, 2-1 through 2-4, 2-6, 2-7, 3-1, 3-5 through 3-7, 3-9, 3-10, 4-1 through 4-4, 5-1 through 5-3, 5-5, 6-1 through 6-4, 6-7, 6-8, 6-10, 6-13 through 6-17, 7-1 through 7-4, 8-1 through 8-3, A-1 through A-11

civil-military operations, iv, v, 1-1, 1-4, 1-7, 1-12, 1-13, 1-16, 2-1, 2-3, 2-5, 2-6, 3-1, 3-7, 4-2, 4-3, 5-2, 5-5, 6-1, 6-16, 6-17, A-3, A-8

D

dislocated civilian, 1-4, 1-8, 1-10, 3-2, 6-14, A-7 through A-9

E

effect, 1-1, 6-1, 6-4, 6-7, 6-12, B-7

F

foreign humanitarian assistance, 1-7, 1-11 through 1-13, 2-1, 3-9, 6-13, 6-14, 6-17

foreign internal defense, 1-12, A-3

H

host nation, iv, v, 1-4, 1-8, 1-11 through 1-13, 1-15, 2-1, 2-4, 2-5, 3-1, 3-2, 3-8, 3-10, 6-14, 8-1, 8-2, A-2 through A-4, A-6, A-7, A-9, A-10, B-1, B-3, B-7

I

information requirement, 1-4, 1-10, 2-2, 3-1, 3-4, 3-5, 3-7, 3-8, 3-10, 4-2 through 4-4, 6-3, 6-4, 7-1 through 7-3, A-9

internal defense and development, 1-13, 3-1, 3-8, A-3

J

joint task force, 6-16, A-3

K

knowledge, 1-5, 3-7, 5-1, 6-2, 6-3, 7-1, 8-2

L

link, 1-13, 1-15, 5-2, 6-6 through 6-9, 6-11, 6-15, 7-1, 7-2, 8-3, B-4

M

measure of effectiveness, 1-4, 1-8, 1-9, 1-12, 3-4, 3-6, 3-9, 6-8, 6-14, A-2, A-4, A-8

measure of performance, 1-8, 3-6, 3-9, 6-8, 6-14, A-2 through A-4, A-8

measure of performance measure of performance, 1-9

military civic action, 1-12, 1-13

N

nation assistance, 1-7, 1-12, 1-13, 2-1, 3-10

O

operational environment, iv, v, 1-1, 1-3, 1-14 through 1-16, 2-5, 3-1, 3-2, 3-10, 4-1, 4-3, 4-4, 5-1, 5-5, 6-4, 6-6, 6-7, 6-12 through 6-15, 7-3, 8-2, A-1 through A-3, A-5, A-7, A-8, B-1 through B-7

S

support to civil administration, 1-7, 1-13, 2-1, 3-10

T

terrorism, A-6

threat, 1-9 through 1-12, 1-15, 3-5, A-6, A-9

transition, v, 1-1, 1-13, 1-14, 2-1 through 2-5, 2-7, 3-5, 4-1, 4-2, 4-4, 5-1, 6-15, 7-1, 8-1, A-4, A-5, A-8

troop leading procedures, 3-1

U

United Nations, 2-1, 6-2, A-6, A-7, B-5

United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, iv

United States Code, 1-12, 3-1

unity of effort, 1-15

W

weapons of mass destruction, 1-11

Z

zulu, A-5

ATP 3-57.50

6 September 2013

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1319202

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: Not to be distributed; electronic media only.