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Preface

PURPOSE

This manual establishes the techniques used by individuals, teams, and units of United States (U.S.) Army and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Civil Affairs (CA) forces, as well as planners of civil-military operations (CMO) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The techniques prescribed in this manual are used when engaging other government agencies (OGAs), indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other military and nonmilitary entities in support of conventional and special operations missions. This manual elaborates on doctrine contained in Field Manual (FM) 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations.

SCOPE

As with all doctrinal manuals, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.20/Marine Corp Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-33.1C, Multi-Service Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, is authoritative, but not directive. It serves as a guide and does not preclude CA personnel or units from developing their own standing operating procedures. The techniques presented in this manual should not limit CA forces from using their civilian-acquired skills, training, and experience to meet the challenges they face while conducting Civil Affairs operations (CAO) and providing support to CMO. Appendixes A, B, and C provide the users of this manual with additional information.

APPLICABILITY

The principal audience for ATP 3-57.20/MCRP 3-33.1C is Army and USMC CA forces, officers, and noncommissioned officers who support joint and Army forces or serve on the staff that support commanders and operations at all levels of war. It is also an applicable reference to the civilian leadership of the United States (U.S.) interagency.

This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, United States Army Reserve, USMC, and Marine Corps Reserve unless otherwise stated.

Note for USMC: Some differences apply in clothing, equipment, vehicles, and aircraft (items the Marine Corps has that the Army does not and vice versa).

ATP 3-57.20/MCRP 3-33.1C uses joint terms where applicable. Most terms with joint or Army definitions are in both the glossary and the text. For definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

The proponent of this ATP is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Reviewers and users of this ATP should submit comments and recommended changes on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-CDI-CAD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610 or by electronic mail to: AOJK-DT-CA@soc.mil.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

Introduction

Joint Publication (JP) 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, defines foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) as Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation (HN) civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA.

Although U.S. military forces are primarily designed and structured to defend and protect U.S. national interests, they may be readily adapted to FHA requirements. Military organization, structure, and readiness enable commanders to rapidly and effectively respond when time is of the essence. In addition to, or sometimes in lieu of, HN humanitarian assistance (HA) efforts, literally hundreds of NGOs from around the world respond to disasters to provide HA in various forms and for varied durations. However, U.S. military forces are not the primary United States Government (USG) means of providing FHA. They normally supplement the activities of U.S. and foreign government authorities, NGOs, and IGOs. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the principal agency for U.S. bilateral development and HA to foreign countries. The National Security Council (NSC) coordinates foreign assistance policies and programs among all USG agencies.

Often, FHA operations are conducted simultaneously with other types of operations, such as stability operations, peace operations, nation assistance (NA), or noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Funding and legal authority for FHA will, in most cases, be a major concern for CA personnel, along with the conditions and standards of the end state, and transition and termination of the operations. Avoid overextending resources for programs of a long duration, such as NA. The environment of operations may be permissive, uncertain, or hostile, thus requiring attention to the principles of war, as well as stability operations and civil support operations. Regardless of the environment, Service members at all levels will institute protection measures that ensure the safety and security of all personnel.

A good example of the problems facing the planner in FHA is summarized below:

The joint task force (JTF) faced many significant challenges from the very beginning. The total joint operations area (JOA) spanned 100,357 square miles. The destruction in the region included 2,860 dead, over a thousand missing, and 1.04 million displaced people, as well as 172 damaged bridges. Since the United States had almost no military presence in any of the three countries in the JOA, the new JTF had to overcome problems in medical, logistical, engineering, aviation, and humanitarian assistance operations that the preexisting JTF did not face. The JTF also planned and coordinated for each of the ports, medical, base operations, airfield, and other support facilities that it occupied. Additionally, most of the personnel and units assigned to assist in the JOA came from the continental United States (CONUS) and had little expertise or knowledge in the region. The JTF staff was organized around a CONUS Corps Support Group headquarters, which had to quickly deploy, establish its base of operations, and begin support of arriving units. In addition to the many challenges the JTF faced, it also had some unique opportunities, such as improving U.S.-Nicaraguan relations through humanitarian assistance operations in Nicaragua, where no American troops have operated in decades.

Hurricane Mitch, 1998

Center for Army Lessons Learned

FHA operations are inherently complex operations that require a significant amount of interagency coordination. FHA is directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at the tactical level. FHA operations require centralized coordination and control.

Chapter 1

Types of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

FHA missions conducted by U.S. military forces span the full range of military operations but are most often crisis response and limited contingency operations. The following missions (Figure 1-1) are common in FHA operations, as discussed in JP 3-29 (a single FHA operation may contain more than one of these missions).

DISASTER RELIEF MISSIONS

1-1. Disaster relief missions are provided for under Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief. These missions include prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of disaster victims. Distribution of relief supplies has traditionally been the domain of NGOs and IGOs because of their charters, expertise, and experience. However, if the relief community is overwhelmed, or the security situation precludes it, U.S. military forces may be tasked to distribute these supplies. Potential relief roles for U.S. forces include immediate response to prevent loss of life and destruction of property, construction of basic sanitation facilities and shelters, and provision of food and medical care. The Department of Defense (DOD) normally supports the efforts of USAID and IGOs during FHA operations.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

1-2. Technical assistance and support functions are short-term tasks that generally include communication restoration, relief supply management, and provision of emergency medical care, humanitarian demining, and high-priority relief supply delivery. Based upon the geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) guidance, the FHA force commander should establish policy regarding technical advice and assistance to the affected country, United Nations (UN), NGOs, and IGOs as soon as possible. FM 3-57 defines this as technical assistance operations. The CA generalist should solicit the information from an expert rather than attempt to provide technical advice. CA functional specialists may have the ability to provide this technical assistance in many situations. FM 3-57 provides more information on CA functional specialty areas, functional specialists and their capabilities.

FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

1-3. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management, defines foreign consequence management (FCM) as the assistance provided by the United States Government to a host nation to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives attack or event and restore essential government services. Primary responsibility for FCM rests with the HN, unless otherwise stipulated under relevant international agreements or arrangements. Unless otherwise directed by the President, the Department of State (DOS) is the lead federal agency (LFA) for USG FCM operations and is responsible for coordinating the overall USG FCM response.

1-4. When requested by the LFA and directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), DOD will support USG FCM operations to the extent allowed by law and subject to the availability of forces. The response may include a number of agencies with specialized capabilities, in addition to forces provided by DOD. The ability of the USG to assist a HN government and its affected population is determined by the nature of the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives (CBRNE) event, the forces available to provide assistance, and the time required to deploy to the vicinity of the incident. The more rapidly FCM assistance is coordinated and applied, the better the chances of success in mitigating the effects of the CBRNE incident. JP 3-41 discusses in detail the operational requirements for FCM. CA forces conducting FCM will be focused on mitigating the effects of the event and restoring essential services to the HN.

1-5. Civil Affairs role in foreign consequence management operations include—

Assisting with the restoration of essential HN government services.

Assisting with the protection of HN public health and safety.

Assisting with the provision of emergency relief to HN government, businesses, and individuals.

Identifying and assessing the threat posed by hazardous materials.

Providing consultation to HN decision makers.

1-6. FM 3-11.21/MCRP 3-37.2C, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Operations, and CJCSI 3214.01D, Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory, provides additional information on foreign consequence management operations.

Chapter 2

Related Operations

Although FHA operations may be executed simultaneously with other types of operations (Figure 2-1), each type has unique characteristics. For example, FHA operations may be simultaneously conducted with peace operations, but each has its own strategic end state. Military commanders must be cautious not to commit their forces to projects and tasks that go beyond the FHA mission. Military commanders conducting FHA simultaneously with other operations must develop end state, transition, and termination objectives, as well as measures of effectiveness (MOEs) complementary to simultaneous military operations.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

2-1. Some military operations normally will continue after the conclusion of combat operations. An extended U.S. presence will be required to conduct stability operations to enable legitimate civil authority and attain the national strategic end state. These missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. To reach the national strategic end state and conclude the operation or campaign successfully, JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability operations with other operations (offense and defense) within each major operation or campaign phase. Stability operations that support USG plans for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations primarily support HN authorities, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs. Stability operations may be required during FHA operations to help rebuild HN capacity.

NATION ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

2-2. NA operations are often connected with FHA operations, but there are very distinct differences. NA refers to civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. NA programs (Figure 2-2) include, but are not limited to, security assistance (SA); foreign internal defense (FID); other Title 10, United States Code (USC) programs, to include humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) and military civic action (MCA); and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or IGOs. NA generally refers to a long-term commitment to promote sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. Most often, NA will be an important part of rebuilding after the completion of a disaster relief FHA mission.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

2-3. Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of U.S. national policies and objectives (for example, foreign military sales). Security assistance is a broad program aimed at enhancing regional security in areas of the world facing internal or external threats. Security assistance is under the supervision and general direction of the Department of State (DOS). The DOD administers military portions of the program under the direction of the Assistance Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). GCCs have the responsibility of planning FID operations for their area of responsibility (AOR); however, they interface directly with the SA process through the SA organization, which is located in the HN. This action is coordinated with the ambassador or the U.S. chief of mission (COM). GCCs are active in the SA process by advising the SA officer and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing SA efforts in their AORs. Security assistance can include training foreign military forces in CMO and civil-military relations.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

2-4. FID involves participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. FID is an umbrella concept that covers a broad range of activities. Its primary intent is always to help the legitimate host government address internal threats and their underlying causes. Commensurate with U.S. policy goals, the focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support the HN program of internal defense and development. FID is not restricted to times of conflict. It also can take place in the form of training exercises and other activities that show U.S. resolve to and for the region.

2-5. CA units conduct various CAO that support the internal development of a foreign nation or HN. CA may support other military forces and nonmilitary agencies through direct or indirect support of FID, but they must coordinate with the HN and the theater special operations command (TSOC) (GCC). These operations focus on the indigenous infrastructures and population in the operational areas.

2-6. CA forces supporting FID operations are normally assigned to the highest-level military elements supervising FID operations or to U.S. military advisory elements that train and aid foreign nation or HN military units. CA support to FID operations may include—

Reviewing U.S. SA program goals and HN internal defense and development goals, and planning CMO to support the HN plan.

Training HN military to plan, train for and conduct NA, populace and resources control, and other CAO appropriate to the internal defense and development of its country.

Training on tactics, techniques, and procedures required to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency; develop indigenous individual, leader, and organizational skills; isolate insurgents from the civil population; and protect the civil population.

Establishing and maintaining contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.

Identifying specific CMO missions the HN military can and should conduct.

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

2-7. HCA is assistance to the local populace provided in conjunction with authorized military operations. This assistance is specifically authorized by Section 401, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 401), Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions must promote the security interests of both the United States and the host country and the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the U.S. Armed Forces who participate in the activities. Military assistance is limited to—

Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.

Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

Detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war, including activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war.

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

2-8. MCA programs offer the JFC an opportunity to improve the HN infrastructure and the living conditions of the local populace, while enhancing the legitimacy of the HN government. These programs use predominantly indigenous military forces at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and other areas that contribute to the economic and social development of the nation. These programs can have excellent long-term benefits for the HN by enhancing the effectiveness of the host government, developing needed skills, and enhancing the legitimacy of the host government by showing the people that their government is capable of meeting the population’s basic needs. MCA may involve U.S. military supervision and advice but the visible effort should be conducted by the HN or foreign nation military.

2-9. It is important to understand the differences among HCA, MCA, and FHA. FHA focuses on the use of DOD support as necessary to alleviate urgent needs in an HN caused by some type of disaster or catastrophe. By contrast, HCA and MCA programs are typically preplanned military exercises designed to assist the HN. HCA is conducted for the primary purpose of training U.S. forces. Incidental to this purpose are the benefits received by the civilian population. No HCA support may be provided to HN military or paramilitary. MCA programs are conducted to enhance the legitimacy of HN governments. U.S. personnel are limited to training and advisory roles.

2-10. To avoid possible overlap or duplication and ensure sustainability, HCA and MCA projects must be coordinated with the country team (especially USAID) and the HN. For example, school construction should not be undertaken if there is not a sustainable plan by partners to provide teachers and administration, salaries, equipment, and books.

PEACE OPERATIONS

2-11. Peace operations encompass multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

2-12. NEOs are conducted to assist the DOS in evacuating U.S. citizens, DOD civilian personnel, and designated HN and third-country nationals whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven. Although normally considered in connection with hostile action, evacuation may also be conducted in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or man-made disaster.

Chapter 3

Civil Affairs Role in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

The CA role in FHA is one of support to the commander’s operational function and to the administration of certain aspects of the FHA operation. FHA operations are inherently complex and require a significant amount of interagency coordination. FHA is normally directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at the tactical level. On all levels, CA forces perform the tasks discussed in Figure 3-1. JP 3-29 contains additional details for the civil-military operations center (CMOC).

STRATEGIC LEVEL

3-1. At the strategic level (Figure 3-2), the CA force must understand the following:

DOS is the lead federal agency for FHA.

Approval authority for commitment of DOD component resources or services for foreign disaster relief operations rest with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance.

DOD supplies and services are provided for disaster and humanitarian purposes only after approval by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). DOD provides supplies and services from the most expedient source, which is normally the GCC from whose theater the FHA requests emanate.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

3-2. At the operational level (Figure 3-3), the CA force must understand the following:

DODD 5100.46 establishes the relationship between DOD, USAID, and OFDA. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs) is the primary point of contact (POC).

OFDA and USAID often have existing operational links and grants relationships with many NGOs and international organizations that have relief programs outside the United States.

TACTICAL LEVEL

3-3. At the tactical level (Figure 3-4), CA the force must understand the following:

Even in permissive environments, nonthreatening means such as demonstrations may be used to impair credibility or reduce the effectiveness of U.S. military activities.

HN authorities or combatants may use FHA and disaster relief as a tool for political gain.

Military commanders at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster are authorized to conduct prompt relief operations when time is of the essence.

Measures to ensure continuity of operations, troop survival, and the rehabilitation of essential military bases take precedence over military support of local communities.

Chapter 4

Planning Factors for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations

This chapter is designed to assist the CA force assigned to support FHA missions across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. When participating in an FHA operation, it is very likely that CA forces will deploy as part of a JTF. Therefore, it is essential for successful mission implementation to understand the structure of USG interagency coordination and collaboration. The chapter describes many of these agencies (Figure 4-1, page 4-2).

As stated earlier, U.S. military forces are not the primary USG means of providing FHA. They normally supplement the activities of U.S. and foreign government authorities, NGOs, and IGOs. USAID is the principal agency for U.S. bilateral development and HA to foreign countries. Within USAID, the Office of Military Affairs provides the focal point for USAID interaction with U.S. and foreign militaries, and OFDA is the primary office within USAID that facilitates and coordinates all non-food emergency assistance overseas. FHA missions conducted by U.S. military forces span the entire spectrum of conflict but are most often crisis response and limited contingency operations that are unilaterally or multinational coordinated. Multinational responses may or may not involve the UN.

A crisis response or limited contingency operation can be a single small-scale, limited duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. A limited contingency operation in response to a crisis includes all of those operations for which the joint operation planning process (JOPP) is required and a contingency or crisis action plan is developed. The level of complexity, duration, and resources is situational dependent. Included are operations to maintain and improve U.S. ability to operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors (for example, JTF Shining Hope in the spring of 1999 to support refugee humanitarian relief for hundreds of thousands of Albanians fleeing their homes in Kosovo). Many such operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities in close cooperation with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. The ability of the United States to respond rapidly with appropriate options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. Thus, joint operations may often be planned and executed as a crisis response or limited contingency. Crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically limited in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific objective in an AO. They may be conducted as stand-alone operations in response to a crisis or executed as an element of a larger, more complex campaign or operation.

KEY MILITARY ELEMENTS

4-1. The GCCs direct military operations, including FHA, within their AORs. Ideally, this should be done with the concurrence of the COM, also known as the ambassador. GCCs develop and maintain commander’s visualization, base plans, concept plans (CONPLANs), or operation plans (OPLANs) for FHA, disaster relief, and FCM. In response to a disaster, the supported GCC structures the force necessary to conduct and sustain the FHA operation, typically forming a JTF. Advisors on the GCC’s staff will be in close communications with various advisors and counterparts on the JTF staff. Additionally, other combatant commanders (CCDRs) may provide necessary support, including forces, transportation, and communications capabilities, as required.

CRISIS ACTION TEAM

4-2. Each CCDR has an organization designed to respond to immediate requirements, often called a crisis action or rapid deployment team. The initially deployed team serves as the immediate responder/assessor for the CCDR. The exact composition of this team and the subsequent follow-on assets will vary depending on the type and severity of the incident and, in some cases, restrictions placed on the COM by the HN (through a status-of-forces agreement [SOFA], treaties, or informal agreements) in limiting the number of foreign military permitted in-country. When an FHA operation has been or will likely be directed, the crisis action team can recommend to the CCDR priority issues (water, food, equipment, and so on) as well as how to organize for the most effective response. The crisis action team may form the nucleus of the FHA force headquarters (HQ) or the JTF command element.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE SURVEY TEAM

4-3. The supported CCDR may also organize and deploy a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) to acquire information required for planning. This information may include an assessment of existing conditions and requirements for FHA force structure. Before deploying, the HAST should be provided the current threat assessment; current relevant intelligence; geospatial information and services support; and American Embassy, DOS, and USAID points of contact. Due to the possibly dangerous nature of the environment at the site of a disaster, the HAST should include medical personnel who can conduct both a predeployment vulnerability assessment and an occupational and environmental health site assessment, documenting conditions in the AO. The DART and USAID mission can provide a great deal of this information to the HAST. Once deployed, the HAST can assess the relationship with and authority of the government of the affected country, identify primary points of contact for coordination and collaboration, determine the threat environment and survey facilities that may be used for protection purposes, and coordinate specific support arrangements for the delivery of food and medical supplies. Per Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2205.02, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, proper approval must be obtained prior to transfer or issue of U.S. medical supplies and equipment to the HN. The HAST works closely with the DART to prevent duplication of effort.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COORDINATION CENTER

4-4. The supported CCDR may establish a humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC) to assist with coordination and planning. Normally the HACC is a temporary organization that operates during the early planning and coordination stages of the operation. The HACC provides the critical link between the CCDR and OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs that may participate in the FHA operation at the theater strategic level. Once a CMOC or humanitarian operations center (HOC) has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the CCDR’s staff and crisis action organization. Staffing for the HACC should include a director appointed by the supported GCC, a CMO planner, and an OFDA advisor or liaison if available, a public affairs officer, an NGO advisor, and other augmentation (for example, a political advisor or a preventive medicine physician) when required. Liaisons from OGAs, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, key NGOs, IGOs, and HN agencies also may be members of the HACC in large-scale FHA operations.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

4-5. The supported CCDR may require the establishment of a CMOC to facilitate the FHA operations. The CMOC facilitates continuous coordination among the key participants with regard to CMO and CAO within a given AO, and aids in the development, management, and analysis of the civil inputs to the common operational picture (COP). CMOCs may be established at multiple command levels to facilitate unity of effort at different echelons. By definition, the CMOC is an organization normally comprised of CA forces, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the U.S. Armed Forces with IPI, the private sector, IGOs, NGOs, multinational forces, and OGAs in support of the commander.

4-6. Establishing a CMOC quickly at the onset of an FHA operation is critical to assist in the identification, coordination, and synchronization of resources available by all entities involved in the mission. This synchronization helps to ensure that all resources are used effectively and efficiently and are not duplicated by multiple entities. The CMOC can provide recommendations to the commander on the best courses of action (COAs) to support the HN. More than one CMOC may be established in an operational area, and each can be task-organized based on the FHA mission requirements. The CMOC during FHA generally works at the local level coordinating U.S. actions to achieve operational and tactical unity of effort. For additional information on Army CMOC capabilities and structure see FM 3-57.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS CENTER

4-7. A HOC may be established by the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN, or a USG agency during a U.S. unilateral operation. Because the HOC operates at the national level, it will normally consist of senior representatives from the affected country, assisting countries, the UN, NGOs, IGOs, and other major organizations in the operation. U.S. participation should include the COM (leading the U.S. representation), USAID representative, and representatives from the CCDR. The HOC is horizontally structured with no mission command authority and all members are ultimately responsible to their own organization or countries. The HOC is normally established under the direction of the HN government or the UN, or possibly the OFDA during a U.S. unilateral operation. Additionally, the HOC operates at senior-national level to coordinate strategic and operational unity of effort. JP 3-29 and JP 3-57 provide additional information on the HOC.

JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP

4-8. The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments (Figure 4-2, page 4-5). The primary role of the JIACG is to enhance interagency coordination. The JIACG complements the interagency coordination that takes place at the national level through DOD and the NSC. JIACG members participate in contingency, crisis action, security cooperation, and other operational planning. They provide a conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of OGAs. The JIACG may play an important role in contingency planning for FHA and in initial interagency coordination prior to establishment of a HACC or other coordination body.

Note: More information on the JIACG is contained in JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, and the Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group.

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY TEAM AND A JOINT TECHNICAL ADVISORY CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR ELEMENT

4-9. During a crisis involving CBRN materials, the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), at the request of a CCDR, and in coordination with the joint staff, may direct the immediate deployment of a supporting consequence management advisory team (CMAT). The CMAT provides task-organized, deployable, doctrinal, and technical consequence management expertise; support; advice; and hazard prediction modeling assistance for the DOD and other federal agencies during all phases of CBRN accidents or incidents.

4-10. When requested by combatant commands and directed by the SecDef, the United States Strategic Command can deploy a CBRN CM technical advice and assistance element (known as a joint technical advisory chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear element [JTACE]) to augment a CMAT with specialists in public affairs, legal counsel, radiobiology, and other fields pertinent to the mission. The JTACE will leverage DTRA’s reachback capability across DOD, the federal government, and academia to provide mission critical information to the supported organization.

KEY NON-UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PARTICIPANTS AND ORGANIZATIONS

4-11. The following paragraphs discuss non-U.S. organizations (Figure 4-3, page 4-6) that can play key roles in FHA missions.

HOST NATION

4-12. The HN is a nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of multinational nations, coalition partners, and/or an IGO, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. The HN will coordinate all relief efforts within its territory. U.S. forces conducting FHA do so with the permission of the HN under the guidance of formal and informal agreements. JFCs should become knowledgeable of all bilateral agreements for mutual support, and exercise these agreements to the maximum extent possible. If the necessary agreements are not in place, commanders must obtain authority to negotiate (through the joint staff) and then actively seek bilateral agreements to support the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of forces, equipment, and supplies. The country team will be critical to this effort. The American Embassy is the primary liaison with the HN government.

MULTINATIONAL FORCES

4-13. Other nations may deploy military forces to support the FHA effort. These forces may provide liaison officers to the combatant command, the JTF, and the CMOC.

UNITED NATIONS

4-14. The purposes of the UN, as set forth in the charter, are to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to cooperate in solving international economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these ends.

4-15. The UN coordinates its response to humanitarian crises through a committee of all the key humanitarian bodies, chaired by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator. The international community relies on the UN to respond to natural and man-made disasters that are beyond the capacity of national authorities alone. Today, the UN is a major provider of emergency relief and longer-term assistance, a catalyst for action by governments and relief agencies, and an advocate on behalf of people struck by emergencies.

4-16. During HA operations in which the UN is involved, the UN will form a United Nations disaster assessment and coordination team, and an on-site operations coordination center, or a humanitarian operations coordination center (HOCC). These operations centers assist the local emergency management authority of the HN to coordinate international relief efforts. The UN humanitarian coordinator is responsible for establishing and maintaining comprehensive coordination mechanisms based on facilitation and consensus building among actors involved at the country level in the provision of HA and protection, including cluster leads.

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

4-17. An NGO is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene before the U.S. military and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They may have a long-term established presence in the crisis area. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Working alone, alongside the U.S. military, or with other U.S. agencies, NGOs assist in the world’s trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. Whereas the military’s initial objective is stabilization and security for its own forces, NGOs seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to achievement of an end state, which they had no part in determining. The extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary considerably.

PRIVATE SECTOR

4-18. Private sector is an umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected NGOs. Increasingly, the resources of the international business community are being used to mitigate human suffering associated with disasters. Businesses donate talent or in-kind goods and services to disaster relief and recovery operations in developing countries and try to ensure that their help is delivered in a coordinated and effective manner.

PRIVATE CONTRACTORS

4-19. Although U.S. military contractors are addressed in other sections, commanders should be aware that private contractors are employed by a wide range of actors, inside and out of the USG. They are often employed to provide security, training, technical expertise, and logistical support. Commanders should be cognizant that the local population often views contractors as USG representatives and any negative behavior or interaction with the local population on the part of contractors can have an adverse impact on U.S. efforts. Commanders should consider developing guidance for the contractors in the humanitarian zone, and should consider the need to develop public affairs guidance that takes into account potential issues with private contractors, should they arise.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

4-20. An IGO is an organization created by a formal agreement (for example, a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. It is formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the UN, NATO, and the African Union. NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are regional security organizations, while the African Union and the Organization of American States are general regional organizations. A new trend toward subregional organizations is also evident, particularly in Africa where, for example, the Economic Community of West African States has taken on some security functions. These organizations have defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and may be equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and collaboration. The United States maintains formal or informal ties with some of the largest of these IGOs.

SIX STEPS IN THE CIVIL AFFAIRS METHODOLOGY

4-21. FHA is a core task for all CA forces. Therefore, it is important for each CA Soldier/Marine to know and understand operations at each level. In most FHA operations, a predeployment site survey (PDSS) would be hasty at best, but, knowing the important roles for CA Soldiers/Marines at each level are keys to success in mission planning, execution, and transition. This section of the ATP will highlight the roles of a CA Soldier/Marine at each level of operation using the six steps in the CA methodology as a guide (Figure 4-4). The first five steps—assess, decide, develop and detect, deliver, and evaluate—are known to CA forces as AD3E and apply the CA methodology at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. At each level, it supports the commander’s ability to visualize, describe, direct, and lead operations in his AO. Elements of the common problem-solving and decisionmaking processes used at various levels of command are embedded within the steps of the CA methodology. For additional information on problem-solving and the decisionmaking processes refer to FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations.

4-22. During an FHA operation, joint planners may use the crisis action planning (CAP) process of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) because of the time-sensitive nature of deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources.

4-23. In addition, research from lessons learned, such as Center for Army Lessons Learned:http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/index.asp or Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned:https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/, after-action reviews, and trip reports during previous FHA operations can provide valuable insight for commanders and staffs preparing for a similar operation.

4-24. Lessons learned from previous FHA operations have developed key questions that can provide valuable insight for commanders and staffs preparing for similar operations. These questions are:

Is the mission stated in terms of working towards restoration to pre-emergency status?

Is the situation at end state sustainable by the affected country and the organizations remaining in the operational area?

What is the legal authority for the operation?

Is there a SOFA in effect?

What are the command, coordination, and collaboration relationships?

Have civilian agencies involved in the operation been identified and included in planning?

What restrictions exist regarding the sharing of information (sensitive or otherwise) with other agencies and organizations?

Are liaison officers positioned in both higher and subordinate HQs as well as OGAs, medical facilities, NGOs, and IGOs, as required?

Will seaport and aerial port infrastructure be operational before forces begin to arrive?

Have the ports been deconflicted with HN, NGOs, and IGOs?

Are interpreters available for the JTF, GCC, and other U.S. agencies?

PLANNING FACTORS: ASSESS

4-25. The assessment begins at receipt of mission and continues through the mission analysis process focusing on defining the civil components of the supported commander’s AO. Within the Army, civil considerations are the “C” in METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations). The USMC uses the acronym METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available) during the conduct of mission analysis. USMC CA planners provide civil considerations analysis during the planning process. The Army’s memory aid—ASCOPE—area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events is the primary tool CA forces use when beginning the analysis of the civil component. (Army Doctrine Publication [ADP] 6-0, Mission Command and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication [MCWP] 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, provide additional information on ASCOPE and FM 3-57 provides information on how Army CA forces apply it.) This step (Figure 4-5) is conducted for each of the 14 CA functional specialties as well as the general aspect of the AO. In many cases, this information has already been consolidated. The product of this step is an initial estimate and restated mission statement.

Planning Factors: Assess at the Strategic Level

4-26. Planning at the GCC and higher levels (DOD and Joint Chiefs of Staff) is based on national policy directives and strategies. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Contingency Planning Guidance, prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), task the GCCs to develop plans for potential operational contingencies and deterrence. The JSCP tasks the development of GCC-prepared OPLANs, selected CONPLANs (with or without time-phased force and deployment data), and FUNCPLANs. The JOPES formalizes the planning process and provides for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decisionmaking in two related but distinct categories—contingency planning and CAP—which differ primarily in the amount of available planning time.

4-27. The CAPT of the regionally aligned Civil Affairs commands (CACOMs) support the strategic CMO planning at the theater level. These teams develop complete CA plans, policies, and programs that support the GCC’s strategic plan. Individual CA functional specialists from the CACOM’s organic functional specialty cells support the CAPTs. To transition to CAP, CMO planners must examine contingency planning assumptions and the plans adjusted accordingly to account for any differences between assumptions and the actual circumstances at the time of the crisis. Additionally, if there is a CMO planner working with the country team, they can provide more specific details to the overall plan.

Planning Factors: Assess at the Operational Level

4-28. Operational-level planning concentrates on developing supporting plans for campaigns that accomplish multinational, national, and theater strategic objectives. The CA brigade CAPT supports CAO and CMO G-9 planning staff at the corps or the division HQ (acting as a JTF). In crises requiring rapidly deployable CA forces, an Active Army CA brigade CAPT normally provides this support. Transition may occur with follow-on United States Army Reserve CA forces, NGOs or the HN. CAO and CMO operational planning concentrates on the civil components of the supported commander’s AO at the regional and provincial level. National-level CAO and CMO analysis data developed at the theater level is refined and validated as it pertains to the assigned corps and JTF AO.

4-29. The G-9 (usually designated as the J-9 during joint operations) staff has the primary responsibility for the planning and integration of CAO and CMO at the operational level. During the operational-level military decisionmaking process (MDMP)/Marine Corps planning process (MCPP), the G-9 staff is proactive. The staff integrates CAO and CMO planning considerations with the other staff elements.

Planning Factors: Assess at the Tactical Level

4-30. At the tactical level, CAO and CMO planners concentrate their analysis and planning efforts on the unit AO described in the higher HQ OPLAN and the supported commander’s areas of interest. Tactical planning will encompass guidance and information developed during systems analysis at corps and JTF levels, and operational-level CMO objectives described in the OPLAN received from higher HQ. In addition, they will receive prioritized CA tasks, measures of performance (MOPs), and MOEs.

Note: Additional MOPs and MOEs can be developed at this time to better support the specific mission guidance.

4-31. Tactical-level CAO and CMO planning requires the application of METT-TC (METT-T for USMC) factors, concentrating on the civil considerations aspect of the AO during the conduct of MDMP/MCPP. Using the ASCOPE model will assist in the analysis of civil considerations.

4-32. During FHA operations, CA forces at the tactical level should become aware of other organizations operating in their AO. During the beginning of a crisis situation where the international response is high, a coordinated response may not be fully developed. CA forces should always make contact with these organizations throughout the initial phases and locate the civilian coordination center. In many cases, this may be the UN HOCC (or Humanitarian Information Center). The World Health Organization may be operating in tandem with the UN but based elsewhere. Valuable information can be exchanged through coordination and collaboration.

4-33. In addition to the planning of operations, each tactical-level unit (CAT, CMOC, CLT, or individual) must prepare to operate independently. CA missions are effected by factors, such as survivability, sustainability, communication (with supported units, interpreters, and cultural knowledge), monetary information, and mobility. Preparing for missions at the tactical level requires a detailed understanding of these factors.

PLANNING FACTORS: DECIDE

4-34. Decide who, what, when, where, why, and how to focus CA assets and actions that support the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and concept of operations (CONOPS). This step (Figure 4-6, page 4-11) encompasses integrating CAO into the unit’s COA development, and then analyzing the COA and providing recommendations to the commander for a COA decision based on a CA perspective. Updating the CMO estimate is a continuous process. Upon the commander’s COA decision, CA leaders refine the CAO/CMO CONOPS and the CAO/CMO plan. The plan directs task-organized CA elements and non-CA forces to create or observe those conditions or events that would either mitigate or trigger a specific CAO/CMO response. It also addresses all CAO/CMO from initial response through transition to other authorities, whether they are military or civilian. The products of this step include the commander’s concept for CMO, CAO priorities, and the CMO annex. In addition, MOPs and MOEs for the various related objectives and tasks are identified. During the decide step of the CA methodology MOEs and MOPs are established. MOEs and MOPs will then be evaluated in the evaluate step later in the methodology process. A detailed discussion on MOEs and MOPs can be found in Chapter 4 of FM 3-57.

Planning Factors: Decide at the Strategic Level

4-35. The CMO planning staff at the strategic level provides the operational-level staffs the proper guidance in accordance with (IAW) the GCC-prepared OPLANs, CONOPS, CONPLANs, and the commander’s intent.

Planning Factors: Decide at the Operational Level

4-36. As the G-9 staff integrates CAO and CMO planning considerations with the other staff elements, COAs are evaluated and recommended to the JFC. This will result in formulating the commander’s CMO objectives supporting the attainment of strategic goals, prioritized CA tasks required to meet CMO objectives, MOPs that are focused on task accomplishment, and MOEs focused on effects attainment. Approval authority for validating and approving effects must be decided during this phase. Approval authority may be a commander, HN authorities, organized representatives of the international community, or some other entity.

Planning Factors: Decide at the Tactical Level

4-37. In conjunction with the supported commander’s guidance, tactical planning will analyze and validate a COA as it applies to specific named areas of interest, identify and recommend other CAO/CMO responses, and facilitate the integration of CAO/CMO into the unit COA. During this phase, planning at the higher levels can be a lengthy process that may hinder the deployment of tactical CA forces. It is important for planners to know that CA integration with the supported units at the earliest possible moment is essential for conducting successful CAO/CMO. The amount of integration with the supported units will vary based on threat levels and time constraints. Some CATs will be allowed to operate independently, while others may require security escort. However, CA forces must convey a high level of patience and flexibility during the integration period.

PLANNING FACTORS: DEVELOP AND DETECT

4-38. Develop rapport and relationships with the nonmilitary participants of the operation (including IPI) and detect those conditions or events that would call for a specific CAO/CMO response. CA accomplishes this step (Figure 4-7) through numerous actions and operations, such as facilitating the interagency process in the CMOC, hosting meetings, participating in selected DC operations, conducting civil reconnaissance in support of civil information management (CIM), and monitoring public information programs and CAO/CMO-related reports from the field. The products of this step include continuous assessments, revised or updated plans, formalized CMOC terms of reference, and fragmentary orders.

Planning Factors: Develop and Detect at the Geographic Combatant Commander Strategic Level

4-39. The CMO staff at the GCC strategic level (usually the J-9 or J-3/5) can assist in the mission planning at the operational level by facilitating higher-level coordination and collaboration efforts. In times of disaster, the ambassador requests federal assistance from DOD and a federal disaster is declared by the President, support goes immediately from planning to execution in the way of a running assessment (situational dependent). Ambassadors will refer to their staff to identify force and equipment requirements and apply HN restrictions. A CA planner working for the country team may be at an advantage during this decisionmaking process. CA planners working for the country team should prioritize their time to (1) provide planning support to the COM and (2) collaborate with USAID DARTs that may have already gone to the affected areas to build situational awareness. CA planners should utilize available resources before taking it upon themselves to conduct the on-the-ground CAO. Follow-on forces will depend on their guidance upon entry into country. At this point, most of the directed task-organized CA forces are beginning to move into the Deliver phase of the crisis (for example, food, water, transportation assets, and medical assistance support). The CMO staff or element must prepare to deploy if directed and it will task a CACOM element to provide CMO tracking. Incoming reports and progress from the operators in-country continue to provide visibility of the civil considerations to a rapidly changing operational environment in support of the GCC’s JOPP and execution thereof. Depending on the magnitude of the crisis, this action may require the establishment of an in-country CMOC and/or a joint civil-military operations task force.

Note: DOS is in the lead when the ambassador or COM is the decisionmaker in-country.

Planning Factors: Develop and Detect at the Operational Level

4-40. CA units at the operational level must form CMOCs to support the G-9. The CMOC (CLTs) will develop rapport with the various nonmilitary participants of the operation to facilitate coordination and collaboration. If the AO is in more than one country, additional CMOCs should be established. CMOCs will also provide a clearinghouse for tactical CA units. CMO staffs will designate the criteria to measure CAO/CMO effectiveness and performances (who, when, where, what, and how). Using this information, the G-9 staff and the CMOC (CIM cell) can confirm or deny the conditions, standards of care, and attitudes, which serve to either cancel or trigger planned and on-call CAO and CMO branches and sequels to the operation plan.

Planning Factors: Develop and Detect at the Tactical Level

4-41. Rapport-building skills at the tactical level can ensure smooth transition with the NGOs, IPI, HN, or OGAs operating within the AO. In addition, these organizations will be a large resource in providing accurate and current information to update the COP and assist in detecting any key events that may trigger a specific CAO/CMO response.

4-42. Developing rapport does not end with the civilian populace and organizations, but continues with the supported unit. In many FHA cases, CA forces deploy to support U.S. forces from a different Service. Understanding the needs and requirements to interact with different Services may increase the level of success obtained in accomplishing the directed missions.

PLANNING FACTORS: DELIVER

4-43. Engage the civil component with planned or on-call CAO as appropriate. This step (Figure 4-8, page 4-13) is executed according to synchronized plans by CA forces, non-CA forces, IGOs, NGOs, and HN assets. The product of this step is an executed mission.

Planning Factors: Deliver at the Strategic Level

4-44. Mission execution at the strategic level involves the facilitation and synchronization of plans with the higher-level counterparts of the IGOs, NGOs, and HN involved in the FHA mission in order to assist operational-level CA/CMO staffs. During this time, the strategic-level CMO staff is consolidating reports from the operational level through a possible CMOC structure.

Planning Factors: Deliver at the Operational Level

4-45. The ability of the CMO staff/CMOC to accurately track MOEs and MOPs is essential during the deliver phase. As tactical CAO produce relationships and civil reconnaissance products, the CIM cell must keep a detailed record and conduct a 360-degree information exchange (strategic levels, the JTF, NGOs, IGOs, HN, other CMOCs, and subordinate CA units). The JTF may require current input to the COP; CLTs may need to share information to assist NGOs, IGOs, and the HN; and the CMO staff will rely on the data to perform evaluations to the MOPs and MOEs.

Planning Factors: Deliver at the Tactical Level

4-46. The tactical-level CA force will execute CAO IAW guidance from higher HQ. During this phase, all raw data and observations should be consolidated accurately and then sent to the CMOCs supporting the tactical operations. Information pulled from the raw data and observations is essential for the CMO staff to evaluate the MOEs and MOPs. It is at this point that CAO at the tactical level becomes indispensable. The CAT or CMOC is the executor of CAO and will provide the first indicators of the effectiveness of the planned mission.

PLANNING FACTORS: EVALUATE

4-47. Evaluate the results of the executed mission. This step (Figure 4-9) validates the CAO/CMO CONOPS and supports the management of MOPs and MOEs to assess task accomplishment and attainment of objectives. As the evaluation phase progresses and satisfaction of MOEs indicates an operation is nearing completion, CAO and CMO planners on all levels will finalize transition plans and begin executing termination or transition timelines.

Planning Factors: Evaluate at the Strategic Level

4-48. As the reports begin flowing in from the operational levels, the CMO staff (augmented as necessary with a CMOC) can begin evaluating mission execution and validating the CAO/CMO CONOPS.

4-49. Evaluators analyze the effects of the operation (both desirable and undesirable) based on each of the 14 CA functional specialties, determine the sustainability of any projects or programs initiated during the execution phase, and recommend follow-on action. At this point, the CMO staff should also reinforce the working relationships with their high-level counterparts in select organizations in preparation for transition.

Planning Factors: Evaluate at the Operational Level

4-50. Measuring effects will enhance the unity of effort between joint, multinational, and interagency organizations via the CIM process. Utilizing the data collected through the CIM cell from the CATs or CLTs, CMO staffs and CMOCs will be able to determine how well or poorly an operation is proceeding in achieving CMO objectives according to the commander’s mission statement and intent. During this phase, CMO staffs and CMOCs will also evaluate the capacities of the HN, NGOs, IGOs, and IPI to sustain any projects or programs initiated, and recommend follow-on action.

Planning Factors: Evaluate at the Tactical Level

4-51. Input from the tactical level in the evaluation phase is crucial as it will be the priority intelligence requirement at its rawest form. During this phase, tactical CA forces will continue to conduct CAO and support CMO. They will also have the advantage of seeing firsthand the effects of each COA and make educated recommendations to mitigate undesirable effects. CA forces will have the visibility to evaluate the capacities of the HN, NGOs, IGOs, and IPI to sustain any projects or programs initiated.

PLANNING FACTORS: TRANSITION

4-52. Transition CAO or CMO to follow-on agencies (CA units, other military units, HN assets, UN organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and other civilian agencies). This step (Figure 4-10, page 4-15) is CA forces’ direct contribution to a sustainable solution, and the commander’s ability to secure the victory. This step is executed according to synchronized transition plans. The outcome of this step includes successful transition of authority or relief in place, and programs that are durable and sustainable by the follow on forces or organizations.

4-53. Based on the supported GCC’s intent, the JFC determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to create desired effects and accomplish the assigned mission. This arrangement is broken into phases. The need to move into another phase is normally identified by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or that the situation has evolved in a manner that requires a major change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven. Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or even the design of the AO. This challenge demands an agile shift in joint force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and mental outlooks, and coordination and collaboration with a wider range of other organizations. OGAs, multinational partners, IGOs, and NGOs provide those capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific factors.

4-54. Termination of operations must be considered from the outset of planning and should be a coordinated OGA, IGO, NGO, and multinational effort. Properly conceived termination criteria are key to ensuring that achieved military objectives endure. Further, development of a military end state is complementary to and supports attaining the specified termination criteria and national strategic end state. Commanders are cautioned that the end state conditions could change during the operations and that the end state envisioned by other participating organizations may differ.

4-55. Because FHA is largely a civilian endeavor, with the military in a supporting role, the termination of U.S. or multinational military FHA operations will not necessarily coincide with the termination of international efforts. Normally, military forces operate in the initial stages of disaster relief to fill immediate gaps in assistance; military objectives will be to enable civilian control of disaster relief efforts (HN, international, or USG agency).

4-56. The transition of humanitarian efforts to HN authorities will not occur by default. Planning of FHA must involve extensive international and interagency coordination from the very beginning in order to ensure a successful transition. FHA efforts by the joint force should focus on the capacity of the HN, as well as OGAs and IGOs; the goal is to transition all efforts to HN, OGA, IGO, or NGO ownership to allow rapid redeployment of the joint force. MOEs, end state, transition, and termination planning should all reflect this goal.

Planning Factors: Transition at the Strategic Level

4-57. As stated above, termination of operations must be considered from the outset of planning and should be a coordinated OGA, IGO, NGO, and multinational effort. Having analyzed and validated various COAs throughout the FHA mission, the strategic-level CMO staff can assist in providing consolidated information that is critical to successful transition of authority or relief in place, and programs that are durable and sustainable by the follow-on forces or organizations. Information flow should be well established between subordinate units and high-level leaders in each organization involved in the transition.

Planning Factors: Transition at the Operational Level

4-58. As stated above, FHA efforts by the joint force should focus on the capacity of the HN, as well as OGAs and IGOs. At the operational level, the goal of transitioning all efforts to HN, OGA, IGO, or NGO ownership to allow rapid redeployment of the joint force is most tangible and therefore planners should be closely involved. Based on information gathered through evaluation, the CMO staff and the CMOC can provide accurate advice to the transition organization in order to assist them in conducting sustainable projects or programs.

Planning Factors: Transition at the Tactical Level

4-59. Building on the Assess, Develop and Detect, and Deliver phases, the tactical-level transition should become the most time intensive, yet the most tangible. CATs, CMOCs, and individual CA Service members at the tactical level will ensure that transition operations are seamless with the designated organizations.

CIVIL AFFAIRS COORDINATION IN THE HOST NATION

4-60. This section is designed to assist the CA forces when deployed and working in foreign countries for missions, such as FHA, or related missions—humanitarian mine action, CM, counter-narcoterrorism, and emerging operations. It addresses activities that may take place during predeployment, mission execution, or redeployment.

4-61. Some missions conducted by CA are done in conjunction with special operations forces (SOF). In some cases, another element is in command of the mission and will provide interface between the unit and the American Embassy. CA forces must be prepared to coordinate with the American Embassy and HN personnel.

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY

4-62. Before any deployment, a PDSS should be conducted. This PDSS is the opportunity for the mission commander or his designated representative to interface with American Embassy personnel, the TSOC, and the HN personnel. The PDSS checklist is a tool the mission commander uses to answer all mission-related questions.

AMERICAN EMBASSY COORDINATION

4-63. The CA element should coordinate with the American Embassy as soon as appropriate guidance has been given. The element should not wait until arrival in-country to begin coordination. Some members in the American Embassy to coordinate with include the following:

Defense attaché (DATT) officer. At a minimum, brief the team composition and mission to the DATT officer and, if required, the deputy COM or even the ambassador. Confirm the SOFA and any memorandums of agreement and/or memorandums of understanding. A thorough understanding of the SOFA or similar document is important as it will cover issues such as claims, taxation, and criminal jurisdiction. Explain or confirm the training plans, schedules, and locations, all of which will require approval prior to implementation.

Regional security officer (RSO). Receive threat brief from the RSO. Confirm the emergency action plan (EAP). This plan details the evacuation of U.S. personnel out-of-country if the situation so dictates. Personnel should know assembly locations closest to their lodging and work areas, especially if the locations are different. Ensure good contact information is provided to the RSO for protection updates.

Financial management officer (FMO). Meet the FMO. Confirm what specific requirements the FMO has directed for the team’s intended purchases or contracts. Establishing a good working relationship with the FMO is the key for mission success.

Political officer (PO). Meet with the PO. Ask for an informal briefing of the latest developments in-country.

Governmental supply officer. Meet with the government supply officer. Ask him to assist in purchases, vehicle rentals, and other contracts.

Country team members and all other collocated personnel. Brief all the team members and all other collocated personnel. Confirm the internal communications notification plan, friendly assembly areas, and actions upon the notification of the EAP. Ensure all members are aware of the potential threats and emergency procedures advised by the RSO or PO. Advise members of the addresses and contact numbers of key personnel and medical facilities.

HOST NATION COORDINATION

4-64. CAT personnel should coordinate with the following:

Key HN leaders involved in the mission (military and nonmilitary).

Local contractors.

Pertinent local and international NGOs.

Authorized private organizations.

Note: This list is not all-inclusive.

REDEPLOYMENT

4-65. At the completion of each mission, coordination and updating information with other entities assisting in the FHA operation is important. This information flow provides updates to country information and provides feedback for better synchronization of efforts in future operations CA personnel should coordinate with and update the following entities—

COM/ambassador.

DATT.

Country team.

USAID.

IGO/NGO counterparts.

Note: This list is not all-inclusive.

Chapter 5

Conducting Assessments

CA forces conduct assessments as part of any mission. During FHA operations, assessments from the ground level will serve to confirm or deny any assumptions early on in the planning stage. The unique requirements of an FHA operation may entail a level of flexibility and understanding of reporting formats as published by different agencies collaborating in the AO. The U.S. military will usually play a supporting role to the DOS during an FHA operation, in addition to or in lieu of the HN, NGOs, and/or world response to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions. Although the CA unit’s primary reporting responsibility is to the supported commander, an effort should be made to assist follow-on forces or agencies that will become the transition element by providing accurate data in formats ideal for them and appropriately packaged to meet necessary military restrictions.

ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION AND IMPACT ON RECOVERY

5-1. The recommendations made by the assessment team should not have a detrimental effect on the long-term recovery efforts of an affected country. Relief programs can set the stage for rapid recovery or prolong the length of the recovery period. Every action in an emergency response will have a direct effect on the manner and cost of reconstruction.

5-2. Many common relief programs can create dependencies and severely reduce the survivors’ ability to cope with the next disaster. For example, food commodities brought into a disaster area without consideration for the local agricultural system can be detrimental to the local market system and cause future food shortages where self-sufficiency had been the norm.

5-3. Sustainable recovery depends on restoring the affected populations’ own capacity to meet their basic food, shelter, water, and sanitation requirements. Understanding the priorities and providing assistance that supports the affected population’s efforts to restore viable socioeconomic systems is critical to achieving a long-lasting, sustainable recovery.

5-4. Recommendations made by the assessment team should be simple and support the use of local materials, food and water sources, distribution systems, and locations of health or medical priority. The recommender should always be considerate of the affected country and its way of life. He should not discount alternative interventions that may be against “conventional wisdom,” or collide with bureaucratic obstacles. Some recommendations may require an increased relief agency capacity. In the end, this may be more cost effective and sustainable.

5-5. When ordered to do an assessment, there are some main points that a CA Service member must understand, as shown in Figure 5-1, page 5-2. Once critical factors have been assessed, a matrix of needs can be created that generates an assessment of the proposed military contribution in each area. The following recommended formats may assist in the assessment process. Format requirements may vary with each operation and no two operations will be the same. The important matter is that the CA assessment provides accurate and timely civil data that assists the supported commander in successfully identifying the immediate needs of the affected populace.

5-6. The format (Figure 5-2, pages 5-2 through 5-4) on the following pages is compatible with the OFDA Disaster Assessment Handbook, which makes it compatible with the majority of the relief community.

PREPARATION FOR EXIT (TRANSITION OPERATIONS)

5-7. Following are some specific questions linked to essential tasks that will help identify exit criteria:

Who will take over the function, and how long will it take to do so?

How will the transfer of responsibility and authority occur between the outgoing and incoming parties?

Have efforts been coordinated in such a way as to ensure that everyone involved has a clear understanding of who is in charge at all times?

When will temporary functions no longer be necessary, and how will we measure it?

What is the agreed-upon MOE that indicates when the desired end state is achieved?

What are the activities that should not be conducted by U.S. forces?

DOS AND DO NOTS OF ASSESSMENTS

5-8. The CA Service member conducting the assessment should consider the following items:

Do try to quickly plug into existing disaster relief mechanisms.

Do attempt to learn predisaster norms in AO.

Do attempt to coordinate some relief.

Do be an effective listener.

Do not sign up to any binding missions before your assessment has been approved by higher.

Do not monopolize meetings with your views.

Do learn capabilities and resources of other interagency, HN, and NGO partners.

FOCUSED QUESTIONS

5-9. The questions below will assist the commander when conducting an assessment:

What is the security situation? Is anyone threatening you?

What is your source of water? Has it been polluted by the disaster?

How many people are without food?

How many families are without shelter? Culturally, how are families taken care of—by family clan, community, or so on?

What relief agencies are in place?

Who are they?

How can we contact them?

Who is in charge of local relief efforts?

Have any unusual diseases been noted, particularly among children?

How many health care professionals do you have? Are they adequate?

What is our normal source of electrical power? Has it been disrupted?

What was the crude mortality rate before the disaster? What is it now?

What locally contracted services and equipment can be provided?

What is the situation in terms of—

Water?

Food?

Shelter?

Medical support?

Electrical power?

Sewage?

Lines of communications: rail, water, road, and air?

5-10. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assessment format is provided in Figure 5-3, pages 5-6 and 5-7.

5-11. The key emergency indicators chart (Figure 5-4) is a good structured baseline tool that should be taken into consideration.

5-12. The comparison of Sphere Project and UNHCR standards and indicators (Figure 5-5, pages 5-9 through 5-12) highlight an important matter when attempting to accurately report an assessment. It is important for a CA Service member to identify and verify the appropriate standards and indicators. Although reporting requirements from higher may require a specific standard or indicator, it is up to the CA force on the ground to be able to verify and recommend the appropriate standard.

5-13. For example: UNHCR standard for water: system/delivery equals at least one tap per 80 to 100 DCs and no more than 200 DCs per hand pump or well with one rope and bucket.

5-14. This standard is appropriate for urban areas with pipe systems or areas where the water table is sufficient to drill a well. However, in rural areas at sea level where the local population draws water from streams or freshwater springs, it would be inappropriate.

SUMMARY

5-15. Assessments play a major role in all CAO. During FHA operations, ground-level assessments should be accurate and timely as they will serve to confirm or deny any assumptions early on in the planning stage. The assessment team should be mindful that its recommendations should not have a detrimental effect on the long-term recovery efforts of an affected country. In FHA, the U.S. military’s role will usually be of support to the DOS in addition to or in lieu of the HN, NGOs, and/or world response. The CA units should be prepared to provide 360-degree reporting. The civil information available from the CA unit should be made available not only to the commander of whom that unit supports, but also to agencies above, below, and adjacent. This information can assist follow-on forces or agencies that will become the transition element. CA forces will collect, analyze and disseminate accurate data through the CIM process in formats usable by other agencies and meet the necessary military information requirements and restrictions. FM 3-57 provides additional information on CA assessments and formats.

Chapter 6

Funding Sources for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations

Every FHA operation is unique. The goal of this section is to familiarize the CA forces with the funding options that are available to them for an FHA or related operation. Because FHA can be conducted decisive action/range of military operations, either as a part of a larger operation or as the sole mission, CA forces need to know how to utilize or apply these sources to support the commander’s CMO objectives. For further references on funding sources for all types of CMO, refer to JP 3-29, Appendix B.

Funding for HA may originate from within the DOD, DOS, or OGAs as appropriated by Congress through the enactment of public law. The DOD must satisfy criteria as laid out in the USC Appropriations. Sections of Title 10, USC provide the authority for commanders to conduct humanitarian operations. However, foreign aid and SA are the primary responsibility of DOS, not DOD. The funds used for such programs normally come from Congressional appropriations to the DOS, with their expenditures being authorized under Title 22, USC rather than Title 10 USC. The DOD has limited authority to engage disaster assistance. The President may direct DOD through the SecDef to respond to man-made or natural disasters with concurrence from DOS. (Executive Order 12966, Foreign Disaster Assistance, Federal Register 36949 has more information.)

With regards to the DOD’s limited authority to engage in disaster assistance mentioned above. DODD 5100.46 specifically states that “nothing in this directive should be construed as preventing a military commander at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from undertaking prompt relief operations when time is of the essence and when humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so. The commander should report at once the action taken and request guidance IAW the provisions of this directive.” DODD 5100.46 also contains guidelines for DOD elements to bill for cost reimbursement for supplies and/or services provided in support of foreign disaster relief.

Figure 6-1, page 6-2, illustrates the approval authority for DOD funding for foreign disaster relief (except in cases of emergencies where the on-site commander determines immediate response is required). DOD components will participate in foreign disaster relief operations only after the affected country requests assistance and DOS or USAID determines that assistance will be provided. The Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Global Security Affairs is the normal approval authority for DOD resource and services commitment to foreign disaster relief. The DOD lead for management of budget allocations in this area is the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The main point of contact for the joint staff is the J-4 Joint Logistics Operations Center (JP 3-29, Appendix B). The J-4 provides coordination among combatant command, Service, and defense agency response cells or teams, as appropriate.

The following paragraphs discuss the sections of the USC that are appropriate for FHA and related operations.

TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

6-1. 10 USC 401 establishes the HCA program. As stated in the first chapter of this ATP/Marine Corps reference publication (MCRP), HCA programs are related to FHA. HCA is generally a long-term commitment to promote sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. Most often, HCA will be an important part of rebuilding after the completion of a disaster relief FHA mission or part of the HN’s internal defense and development program (Figure 6-2, page 6-3).

6-2. The HCA program is administered by the GCC directly, with coordination and approval authority vested in the Office of the ASD for Global Security Affairs and DSCA. The goal of this program is to promote regional security objectives by providing basic HCA. Army operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts fund the building materials and other incremental costs incurred for projects performed under 10 USC 401 authority. In contrast to other HA programs discussed, HCA activities are authorized by 10 USC 401 in conjunction with authorized military operations of the Armed Forces if they promote the—

Security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out.

Specific operational readiness skills of the members of the Armed Forces who participate in the activities.

6-3. Deploying units normally use generic O&M funds to support their operations. Although the term is not restricted to mission funding under 10 USC 401, it has explicit authorized uses. O&M appropriations pay for the day-to-day expenses of training, exercises, contingency missions, and other deployments. 10 USC 401(c)(4) describes funds appropriated to the DOD for O&M that may be obligated for HCA under this section only for incidental costs of carrying out such assistance. Also known as minimal HCA, O&M funds can be used when unplanned HCA activities or projects occur. The DOD has an inherent authority to undertake HCA activities that, by chance, create HN benefits and are carried out to fulfill the training requirements of the unit involved. Minimal HCA can apply to the following examples:

A unit doctor’s or medic’s examination of villagers for a few hours or giving inoculations and issuing some medicines. However, de minimis HCA would not include the dispatch of a medical team for mass inoculations.

The opening of an access road through trees and underbrush for several hundred yards, but not the asphalting of a roadway.

6-4. HCA is defined in 10 USC 401(e) as—

Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or are underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.

Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

6-5. Any assistance provided under this program should first undergo legal review. CA forces should consult with the Staff Judge Advocate’s Fund Proponent DOD/DA Annual Budget for Legal Authority.

6-6. Section 166a, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 166a), Combatant Commands: Funding Through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund. The CJCS may provide funds to the commander of a combatant command, upon the request of the commander, or with respect to a geographic area or areas not within the AOR of a commander of a combatant command. This section provides the CCDRs with a great deal of legal flexibility to conduct activities that include—

Force training.

Contingencies.

Selected operations.

Mission command.

Joint exercises.

HCA, to include urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.

Military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses).

Personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral or regional cooperation programs.

Protection.

Joint warfighting capabilities.

6-7. 10 USC 166a is significant to FHA and related operations. In relationship to other funding (such as 10 USC 401 which restricts duplicate funding for an operation), any amount provided by the CJCS during any fiscal year out of the Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund for an activity shall be in addition to amounts otherwise available for that activity for that fiscal year.

6-8. Section 402, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 402), Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries (commonly known as the Denton Amendment). 10 USC 402 authorizes the transportation of nongovernmental, privately donated relief supplies. The DOS and DSCA administer this. The relief supplies are transported on a space-available basis under certain conditions:

The transportation of such supplies is consistent with the foreign policy of the United States.

The supplies to be transported are suitable for humanitarian purposes and are in usable condition.

There is a legitimate humanitarian need for such supplies by the people or entity for whom they are intended.

The supplies will in fact be used for humanitarian purposes.

Adequate arrangements have been made for the distribution or use of such supplies in the destination country.

PRIORITY FOR DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE

6-9. In processing applications for the transportation of HA abroad under 10 USC 402, the USAID administrator shall afford a priority to applications for the transportation of disaster relief assistance. In reality, this is sometimes a slow process from the start to materials on the ground.

MODIFICATION OF APPLICATIONS

6-10. The USAID administrator shall take all possible actions to assist applicants for the transportation of HA abroad under 10 USC 402 in modifying or completing applications submitted under such section to meet applicable requirements under such section. The actions shall include efforts to contact applicants for purposes of the modification or completion of these applications.

6-11. Section 404, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 404), Foreign Disaster Assistance, addresses Foreign Disaster Assistance. In consultation with the Secretary of State, USAID is the lead agency for foreign disaster relief. The President may direct the SecDef to provide disaster assistance outside the United States to respond to man-made or natural disasters when necessary to prevent loss of lives or serious harm to the environment. Assistance may be provided in the form of transportation, supplies, services, and equipment. Assistance should take the form of support to the overall civilian effort. Amounts appropriated to the DOD for any fiscal year for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) programs shall be available for organizing general policies and programs for disaster relief programs.

6-12. 10 USC 404 is rarely used because there is no implementing guidance. As a result, the DOD relies on the broad authority of Section 2561, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 2561), Humanitarian Assistance, to conduct the foreign disaster assistance contemplated under 10 USC 404.

6-13. Section 407, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 407), Humanitarian Demining Assistance: Authority; Limitations, outlines the specific use of funds for humanitarian demining assistance. Regardless of how it is defined in relation to FHA, 10 USC 407 is the authority and outlines limitations for members of the Armed Forces. The assistance must promote either the security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out or the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the Armed Forces who participate in the activities.

6-14. Humanitarian demining assistance can be conducted as an FHA operation under technical assistance and support functions. Under FHA, humanitarian demining must be a short-tem project, in support of and facilitating the contingency emergency relief operations. Humanitarian demining can also be conducted under NA operations as an HCA project. Under NA/HCA, humanitarian demining is planned in advance and designed to increase the long-term capacity of the HN to provide for the health and well-being of its populace. Humanitarian demining assistance in accordance with 10 USC 407, is related to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war. No member of the Armed Forces, while providing humanitarian demining assistance under 10 USC 407, should engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines or other explosive remnants of war (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a U.S. military operation). 10 USC 407 provides detailed information regarding demining operation regulations.

6-15. Under FHA, humanitarian demining must be a short term project in support of, and facilitating, the relief operations. During FHA mission were demining is required to achieve mission goals, the extent of the demining support is based upon Presidential and/or SecDef and GCC guidance. The FHA force commander should establish policy regarding technical advice and assistance to the affected country, IGOs, and NGOs as soon as possible.

6-16. Humanitarian demining assistance, IAW 10 USC 407, Chapter 20, relates to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearances of land mines and other explosive remnants of war. No member of the Armed Forces, while providing humanitarian demining assistance under 10 USC 407, Chapter 20, should engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines or other explosive remnant of war (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting U.S. military operations); or, provides such assistance as part of a military operation that does not involve the Armed Forces. Additional information regarding demining operations can be found in 10 USC 407, Chapter 20.

6-17. Section 2557, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 2257), Excess Nonlethal Supplies: Availability for Homeless Veteran Initiatives and Humanitarian Relief, provides the authority to make available for humanitarian relief purposes, through the State Department, any nonlethal excess supplies of the DOD. The identified excess property inventory normally transfers to USAID, as agent for the DOS, for distribution to the target nation.

6-18. 10 USC 2561 authorizes use of funds for transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide. The statute does not define “other” humanitarian purposes worldwide. This allows the DOD to carry out broader, more extensive HA projects. Projects that use contractors, to include the purchase of end items other than those used in connection with 10 USC 401 HCA activities, or involve the provision of training or technical assistance for humanitarian purposes, are carried out under this authority. It also allows for flexibility in emergencies, to include natural or man-made disasters. CA units may provide and coordinate FHA. 10 USC 2561 does not require the promotion of operational readiness skills of the U.S. military participants and allows contracting for goods and services if necessary for mission execution. In addition, unlike HCA, which must be conducted in conjunction with an exercise or ongoing military operation, FHA can be conducted as a stand-alone project. The transport of USG-donated goods to a country in need often falls under this authority. 10 USC 402 applies when relief supplies are provided by NGOs.

6-19. The SecDef may use the authority provided by 10 USC 2561, Chapter 152, to transport supplies intended for use to respond to, or mitigate the effects of, an event or condition that threatens serious harm to the environment, but only if other sources to provide such transportation are not readily available. The SecDef may require reimbursement for costs incurred by the DOD to transport supplies under this paragraph.

6-20. OHDACA is a DOD account to which Congress appropriates funds. OHDACA funds are generally used to pay for operations and activities that are authorized by 10 USC 2561, HA, and demining under 10 USC 401. Even though the law specifically lists HCA and disaster relief as appropriate uses for the fund, the actual practice is that OHDACA funds are used to pay for activities authorized by 10 USC 2561.

TITLE 22, UNITED STATES CODE

6-21. Section 2292 through 2292k, Title 22, United States Code (22 USC 2292 through 2292k), Foreign Assistance: Subchapter I-International Development: Part IX-International Disaster Assistance, is the International Disaster Assistance Fund. The President may direct the DOD through the SecDef to respond to man-made or natural disasters. The President delegated disaster relief authority to the SecDef with concurrence of the DOS (except in emergencies). The DOD has limited authority to engage in disaster assistance. Through 10 USC 2292, Congress and the President provide the authorization for the United States to provide assistance to certain countries. Generally, each section after 10 USC 2292(b) will indicate particular countries that will be the intended recipient of this aid and additional countries will undoubtedly be added to the list as time goes on. In addition to funds mentioned in Title 10 USC, the bulk of FHA operations may be funded IAW 22 USC 2292.

6-22. Section 2151, Title 22, United States Code (22 USC 2151), Foreign Assistance: Subchapter I-International Development; Part-Declaration of Policy; Development Assistance Authorizations, is the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). The FAA is designed to focus on developing countries and provides economic, agricultural, medical, disaster relief, and other forms of assistance. The FAA also assists foreign countries in fighting internal and external aggression by providing various forms of military assistance upon request (and subject to Congressional approval). Despite a large DOD role in providing defense-related articles and services, the DOS controls the FAA. The FAA mandates close coordination and cooperation between the DOD and U.S. civilian agencies at all levels of the security SA process.

6-23. Fiscal Law. A central legal consideration for commanders conducting FHA operations is using the proper funding authorizations for the type of mission. The two major types of funding are FAA funds (see Title 22 USC discussion above) and O&M funds (see Title 10 USC discussion above). In most instances, commanders encounter problems in this area when they use O&M funds for projects that require FAA funding. The following fiscal principles should be observed when conducting FHA operations to ensure that all activities are conducted within the limits of U.S. law:

Commanders must be aware of fiscal law principles to avoid possible violation of Anti-Deficiency Act (Section 1341, Title 31, United States Code [31 USC 1341], Limitations on Expending and Obligating Amounts). The Anti-Deficiency Act violations are reportable to Congress and carry both civil and criminal penalties. Commanders cannot make expenditures in advance or in excess of available appropriations.

Commanders must ensure expenditures reasonably relate to the purpose of the appropriation.

Commanders must not allow expenditures prohibited by law.

Commanders must make sure the expenditure does not fall specifically within the scope of some other category of appropriation.

Commanders must know that if two appropriations permit the expenditure, either may be used, but not in combination or interchangeably.

6-24. CA personnel assigned at all levels in an FHA operation will support the commander’s CMO objectives by becoming familiar with the intricacies of these funding sources.

Appendix A

Funding Considerations

As stated previously, every FHA operation is unique. The goal of this appendix is to familiarize the CA forces with some of the funding options that are available to them for an FHA or related operation. Because FHA can be conducted inside decisive action/range of military operations, either as a part of a larger operation or as the sole mission, CA forces need to know how to utilize or apply these sources to support the commander’s CMO objectives.

DEFINITION AND PURPOSE

A-1. FHA is a USG activity designed to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation by the population of a foreign country. FHA is normally conducted in support of the USAID or DOS.

A-2. Generally, all FHA activities are funded by DOS appropriations under Title 22 USC (for example, the FAA). The DOD has permanent authority within Title 10 USC, to conduct HA activities and is a primary contributor to many FHA missions. DOD annual appropriations normally provide only limited and very narrow in scope funding levels for FHA.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

A-3. There are two types of legal authority for the conduct of FHA activities by the USG, permanent and temporary. Congress provides permanent statutory authority to conduct FHA in Title 22 USC (Foreign Relations Section) and Title 10, USC (Armed Forces Section). Congress will provide a temporary authority in an appropriations act to conduct FHA. An example would be an express provision to conduct FHA in the National Defense Authorization Act.

A-4. Statutory authority for USG agencies to provide FHA is contained in the FAA of 1961, as amended, in Title 22, USC. This legislation provides a blueprint for USG engagement with friendly nations. The FAA designated DOS to provide policy guidance and supervision of programs created within the FAA. Various sections of Title 10, USC and Title 22, USC give specific authorizations for various types of military assistance. In addition, the annual DOD appropriations acts provide funding levels for various authorizations. Taken together these provisions are very narrow in scope and generally still require prior coordination with DOS.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDING OF FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

A-5. There are two primary sources for funds that DOD can use to fund FHA missions, O&M and OHDACA funds.

OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE FUNDS

A-6. O&M funds are the primary funds used to pay for day-to-day military operations. However, DOD use of O&M funds for FHA is significantly restricted by law and policy. O&M funds may be used in limited circumstances, and only by exception. The use of O&M funds for FHA requires prior Congressional approval. Congressional approval must be stated in legislation and appropriate funds necessary to conduct the activity.

OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN, DISASTER, AND CIVIC AID FUNDS

A-7. The primary purpose of the OHDACA appropriation is for DOD to conduct worldwide HA and demining operations. The DSCA manages the OHDACA appropriation. Guidance for DOD’s HA programs is found in DOD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM).

Note: OHDACA funding is 24 month funding, it can cross fiscal years. Request for OHDACA must be requested online and be recommended by the theater commander (J-4) before the Office of the Secretary of Defense will consider the request. To initiate a request for funding, an organization must first request an account at: https://www.ohasis.org/Login.aspx

A-8. OHDACA funds several statutorily authorized programs, including humanitarian and civic assistance under 10 USC 401. The primary purposes of Section 401, HCA are to provide for—

Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care in rural or underserved areas (included is training of such care).

Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

Well drilling and construction of rudimentary sanitation facilities.

Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

Detection and clearance of land mines, including education, training, and technical assistance.

A-9. Section 401, HCA authorization has multiple funding sources. The 2010 Department of Defense Appropriation Act authorizes OHDACA appropriations to carry out Section 401, HCA. Additionally, the 2010 Department of Defense Appropriation Act authorizes the use of Service O&M funds to finance Section 401, HCA projects. Section 401, HCA funding that comes from O&M is called preplanned or budgeted HCA, its use is regulated by DODI 2205.02 and DOD 5105.38-M, Chapter 12, Humanitarian Assistance and Mine Action Programs.

Preplanned HCA

A-10. Under this program, the concerned Secretary may carry out HCA in conjunction with authorized military operations of the Armed Forces in a country if the Secretary determines the activities will promote (1) the security interests of the U.S. and the country where the activities will be carried out; and (2) the specific operational readiness skills of the service members who will participate in activities. Preplanned HCA is restricted by the following:

It may not duplicate other forms of U.S. economic assistance.

It may not be provided (directly or indirectly) to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activities.

The Secretary of State must specifically approve assistance.

It must be paid out of funds budgeted for HCA as part of the Service O&M appropriations.

U.S. personnel may not engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines (except concurrent with U.S. military operation), or provide, such assistance as part of a military operation not involving U.S. forces.

Expenses funded as HCA shall include the costs of consumable materials, supplies, and services reasonably necessary to provide the HCA. They shall not include costs associated with the military operation (for example, transportation, personnel expenses, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants) that probably would have been incurred whether or not the HCA was provided.

Minimal Cost HCA

A-11. Minimal cost HCA funds provide authority for local commanders to react to HCA targets of opportunity during the course of a military operation. Such activities must be modest in scope and involve only minimal cost HCA; the maximum amount that may be obligated by a local commander on a minimal cost HCA target is $2,500. Commanders have authority to restrict that further. All material and supply costs incurred in executing a minimal cost HCA project are funded from the unit’s O&M account because the unit uses resources it currently has on hand. Other authorizations for the OHDACA are discussed in the following paragraphs.

10 USC 402, Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies for Nongovernmental Organizations

A-12. Under 10 USC 402, the SecDef may transport to any country, without charge, supplies furnished by NGOs intended for HA. Transport is permitted only on a space-available basis. Supplies may be distributed by U.S. agencies, foreign governments, international organizations, or nonprofit relief organizations. Supplies may not be distributed (directly or indirectly) to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activities. Before transporting supplies under 10 USC 402, the SecDef must determine if—

The transportation of supplies is consistent with U.S. foreign policy.

The supplies to be transported are suitable for humanitarian purposes and are in usable condition.

A legitimate humanitarian need exists for the supplies by the people for whom the supplies are intended.

The supplies will, in fact, be used for humanitarian purposes.

Adequate arrangements have been made for the distribution of the supplies in the destination country.

10 USC 404, Foreign Disaster Assistance

A-13. Under 10 USC 404, the President may direct the SecDef to provide disaster assistance outside the U.S. in response to manmade or natural disasters when necessary to prevent the loss of life. The funds appropriated to DOD for OHDACA are available for organizing general policies and programs for disaster relief programs. Assistance under 10 USC 404 may include transportation, supplies, services, and equipment.

A-14. The President delegates to the SecDef the authority to provide disaster relief, with the Secretary of State’s concurrence. In emergencies when there is insufficient time to seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State, the SecDef may authorize the disaster relief and begin execution, provided the SecDef seeks Secretary of State concurrence as soon as possible. Executive Order 12966, Federal Register 36949, provides additional information. Within 48 hours of commencing relief activities, the President must transmit a report to Congress.

10 USC 407, Humanitarian Demining Assistance

A-15. Under 10 USC 407, the Armed Forces may carry out humanitarian demining activities when such assistance will promote either (1) both the U.S. and the country where the demining activities will be carried out, or (2) operational readiness skills of members of the Armed Forces who participate in activities.

A-16. Humanitarian demining has a broad definition. JP 1-02 defines it as the activities related to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war.

A-17. 10 USC 407 contains a statutory cap of no more than $10 million for equipment, services, and supplies for humanitarian demining activities per year. However, the statute permits DOD to pay for expenses associated with providing humanitarian demining assistance to a foreign country.

10 USC 2557, Excess Nonlethal Supplies for Humanitarian Relief

A-18. The SecDef may make available for humanitarian relief purposes any DOD nonlethal excess supplies. Excess supplies furnished under this authority are transferred to DOS, which is responsible for distributing the supplies. Nonlethal excess supplies means property that is excess under DOD regulations and is not a weapon, ammunition, or other equipment or material designed to inflict serious bodily harm or death.

10 USC 2561, Humanitarian Assistance

A-19. To the extent provided in authorization acts, funds appropriated to DOD for HA shall be used for providing transportation of humanitarian relief and other humanitarian purposes worldwide. Programs under 10 USC 2561 may be carried out by contractors.

TEMPORARY AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

A-20. As discussed above, if Congress desires, it can allow DOD to use O&M funds to conduct FHA missions. The authority provided must be explicit and must be accompanied by appropriate funds. Such operations are of limited duration and scope. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have relied heavily upon such authorizations. Examples of Congressionally authorized temporary FHA programs are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Commanders’ Emergency Response Program

A-21. The statutory purpose for the U.S.-funded Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) is “[to enable] military commanders in Iraq [and Afghanistan] to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their AOR by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi [and Afghan] people.” CERP is a critical capability in the commander’s toolbox for stability operations. CERP was originally funded with seized Iraqi funds, but Congress later authorized funds to continue the programs to provide urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction. CERP funds apply only to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD 7000.14-R Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Special Accounts, Funds and Programs, Chapter 27, Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) provides additional information.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUTHORIZATIONS

A-22. DOS and USAID finance a number of development assistance programs, including—agriculture and nutrition, population control, health, education, energy, and environment improvement. Most of these projects are financed with direct grants or loans from DOS or USAID to the developing country. These are large-scale projects and normally do not involve DOD. There are a few DOS development assistance programs, however, that do involve DOD. Most notably are the Economic Support Fund and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Criminal Law Enforcement, both provide DOS funds to provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. Proper coordination for, and execution of DOS appropriations and authorizations is critical for the synchronization of CMO and unity of effort supporting the commander’s intent and end states. DOD 5105.38-M provides guidance pertaining to these programs.

SECTION 2346, TITLE 22, UNITED STATES CODE, ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

A-23. The DOS finances some provincial reconstruction team missions in Iraq and Afghanistan with this fund. The primary function of the fund is to build capacity for governance in a foreign country. Provincial reconstruction teams are organizations staffed by USG civilian personnel, and sometimes augmented with military personnel, to assist foreign provincial governments with their reconstruction efforts; their security and rule of law efforts; and their political and economic development.

A-24. The FAA authorizes economic support fund assistance to promote the economic or political stability of foreign countries. The Economic Support Fund provides financial assistance to programs all over the world; its application is not limited to efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

SECTION 2291, TITLE 22, UNITED STATES CODE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS, AND CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNDS

A-25. The DOS has statutory authority to furnish assistance to any country or international organization for the control of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances, or for other anticrime purposes.

Appendix B

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Vignettes

The vignettes included in this appendix were collected from various locations. They are based on actual missions and should be used only as examples of the best practices.

Stabilization Partnership Development Alternatives, Incorporated Local Governance and Community Development (DAI-LGCD), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United States Military, Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and Local Villages

In the province of Uruzgan, in the Shahi Hassia District of Afghanistan, DAI-LGCD implemented a local stability initiative small grant project. It was a collaborative effort between the DAI-LGCD, USAID, U.S. military, ANA, ANP, Afghan villagers, and Shuras.

This particular small grant project provided funds for recent returnees from the Pasaw and Dosang villages. The funds allowed the villages to purchase flour and cooking oil. Their homes had been damaged due to fighting between the Taliban and coalition and ANA forces. In addition to the flour and oil that DIA-LGCD supplied, the U.S. military provided them with green tea, school supplies for the children, hygiene kits, and prayer rugs. The project involved all actors of the project cycle—from the vendors where the food was purchased locally in the Oshay bazaar to the district government who oversaw the project and distributed the food in coordination with village elders.

The area was previously a Taliban stronghold. An alliance of U.S. military, ANA, and ANP forces defeated the Taliban. Villagers who had fled the area came back to their homes; but, they arrived to total devastation. Their houses had been destroyed by fire, and food was scarce. They had been unable to plant crops during the last planting season due to the attacks. By providing basic provisions, the grant helped 100 families and included assistance to orphans and widows who had lost loved ones during the conflict.

This, however, was not a one day affair. For a month prior, USAID and the DAILGCD team, along with the U.S. military, were on the ground talking to the villagers while assessing their particular needs. Once an understanding of their needs was obtained an implementation plan was prepared. One U.S. Soldier working on the distribution commented, “the Taliban was watching as the drop went on. We intercepted some ICOM traffic stating that they were watching us and that we were giving the villagers food. The insurgents said that the villagers now openly welcome the infidels and that they are no longer able to enter the villages freely like they could in the past. One of the best parts of the mission is that it completely had an Afghani face. The ANA and ANP did an outstanding job, and you could see that the villagers had pride in their security forces.”

This particular project not only built trust between the communities both the ANA and ANP, but also encouraged villagers: especially from Dosang village to return to their homes It gave the district administration much needed authority and boosted the local economy. The emergency provisions that were provided curtailed pain and suffering. Families were able to sustain themselves through to the spring.

Building Trust and Partnerships in the Horn of Africa: United States Navy Maritime Civil Affairs Team Uses Facebook to Build Trust Among Nongovernmental Organizations

Relationships with military and NGOs are a challenge—NGOs are typically uncomfortable when approached by the military and leery of their intentions. The Navy maritime Civil Affairs team (MCAT) created a Facebook site to illustrate their mission and past accomplishments through words and images.

During initial guarded discussions with NGOs, the MCAT referenced the Facebook site to obtain more information. The level of transparency shown on Facebook positively affected the impressions the NGOs had about the Navy and provided an open door to establish successful working relationships. Because of bandwidth and security issues, Facebook Inbox messages became a primary means to interface with people the MCAT met in Rwanda and Uganda, Africa. These contacts followed the MCAT’s travels throughout the continent and commented on their progress.

The MCAT also used Facebook to keep in touch with contacts and friends they have made throughout their travels in Africa. The MCAT had nearly 400 fans in the region (spanning the Republics of Uganda, Rwanda, and Djibouti, as well as other countries) and received an average of 24 interactions on Facebook per week.

United States Army Civil Affairs Teams Making a Difference in Hinche, Haiti

A Civil Affairs team from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command along with UN officials and NGOs helped facilitate the distribution of food and medical aid for more than 380 families from the Haitian city of Hinche. The distribution was the first since the formation of a local humanitarian aid coordination committee organized by the Hinche city government. The food, which consisted of a two-week supply of rice, beans, flour, and cooking oil was distributed to the community by local Haitian volunteers from World Vision.

“The food distribution is a promising step in the right direction, though organizations need to be preparing for long-term solutions as well,” said an Army Civil Affairs team leader based out of Hinche. “We're trying to make sure NGOs and the local government work together to request assistance through the system the UN has in place so we get the right aid and assistance to those in need.”

Civil Affairs Soldiers also assisted a team of doctors from an NGO in treating approximately 50 children at a Hinche orphanage. More than 200 children lived at the orphanage, which was run by a Haitian outreach organization. The supporting doctors were from the Haiti Endowment Fund, an organization that provides food and medical aid, as well as educational services for Haitian citizens. Prior to the engagement, the NGOs were working separately and were unaware of each other’s presence. But thanks to the work of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs teams on the ground, the two organizations were able to link up and perform services as a single entity.

The team leader said “I'm glad we were able to connect two different organizations that are doing so much good here in Hinche, and now we are seeing the effects that these organizations are providing for so many kids in need. It’s very encouraging.”

Civil Affairs Team Delivers Supplies, Provides Vital Aid to Village of El Sauce

A Civil Affairs team from Special Operations Command South, based out of Homestead, Florida, provided vital aid to the small village of El Sauce by dropping off more than 5,000 total pounds of food and water.

U.S. Southern Command and the U.S. military group in El Salvador requested the team's visit to conduct rapid assessments of the most disaster torn areas and provide much needed relief supplies to an area that could not be reached by land vehicles. El Sauce, with a population of 1,500 was so disconnected that the team had to take a boat ride from Apulo, along the edge of Lake Ilopango, to get there.

Once the team arrived they made contact with the community leaders and started the initial assessment of the devastated area. Within minutes of being in the village, they learned that the community’s potable water source was severely damaged—a huge problem that required quick action by the team. The team then initiated contact with the Salvadoran government and military, to start the ball rolling in obtaining much needed supplies. This was a combined effort by Salvadoran government and military, the people of El Sauce, USAID, Civil Affairs, and Joint Task Force-Bravo.

The assessment team identified an area that would be used for the landing zone. Salvadoran military and U.S. Soldiers then loaded a UH-60 Blackhawk with supplies near Ilopango International Airport. Because the area around El Sauce was so badly damaged by mudslides that the landing zone was about a quarter of a mile from the village. Once the supplies were dropped off, the villagers had to carry more than 5,000 pound of food and water back to the village.

The team submitted a proposal to USAID for repair of the village’s water sources, which would provide a long-term solution.

Civil Affairs Team Helps Strengthen U.N., Government of Haiti, NGO Network in St. Marc

A Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command Civil Affairs team assigned to St. Marc achieved success in strengthening the network of NGOs, MINUSTAH and Government of Haiti members that continued to operate as the U.S. military reduced its role.

The team helped coordinate and facilitate meetings between the various organizations focused on HA after the 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Port-au-Prince on January 12, 2010. Their primary task was to be a facilitator of the system already in place that mirrored the cluster system in Port au Prince.

The relationships formed in this network helped HA more effectively reach the citizens of the coastal town, as locations with needs were linked to organizations with supplies.

MINUSTAH representatives were still gathering information on the numbers of people who migrated to the outlying communes of the city. "I hope it's going to strengthen our system," said a MINUSTAH representative, referring to the efforts of the Civil Affairs team to help gather information and communicate with the government in Port-au-Prince.

In addition to working with members of MINUSTAH and the local government, the team collaborated with NGOs at hospitals and camps of internally displaced persons to assess their needs. Doctors from an NGO working in St. Marc expressed their appreciation for the Civil Affairs team's work to connect their organization with other agencies in the area.

The U.S. military is an organization we know we can trust,” said a spokesperson from, an emergency physician from Temple, Texas volunteering in St. Marc. “They have been instrumental in setting up the network and dealing with other agencies—things we don't know much about as physicians.” Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command Civil Affairs teams also worked to strengthen networks in Cap-Haitien, Hinche, and Gonaives.

Civil Affairs Teams Continue to Assist NGOs as Capabilities Improve

A Civil Affairs team along with Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division partnered with the NGO “Tzu-Chi” to help facilitate the delivery of blankets and shelter for more than 2,000 citizens in Port au-Prince, Haiti during a humanitarian aid distribution operation. The U.S. military assisted NGOs, the U.N., and other agencies with delivery of humanitarian aid. As coordination efforts continued to improve and infrastructure gains strengthen, Civil Affairs teams were seeing their roles diminish.

“We are here to help facilitate in this distribution, but this NGO has a very organized method of delivery, so everything pretty much runs by itself,” said a Civil Affairs team sergeant. “We are seeing more of this every day when we go out. The NGOs are making better partnerships with the people.”

An NGO member from Maryland made the trip to Haiti and said he was appreciative of the involvement U.S. Soldiers were taking in the country. “We’re all there to serve and help people, I’m glad we were able to partner with the U.S. military for this operation. I think we can learn a little bit from each other about helping the people of Haiti.”

The Civil Affairs team leader said the relationship with Tzu-Chi is typical of the partnerships built between the U.S. military and relief organizations in Haiti. “We fill in where we can to assist them, but then we step back and let them lead the effort. These organizations are becoming more capable, and they are increasingly helping more people, and that’s going to make an impact on the long term.” “Everyone here makes an impact. I believe we are all making a difference for people in Haiti by doing the things we’re doing here today.”

Five Nations Join in Romania for Civil Affairs Symposium

Military representatives from five nations joined together in the Romanian port city of Constanta, 24–27 May 2010, to discuss the best practices for conducting civil-military operations. Civil Affairs staffs from Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine joined U.S. Marines and Soldiers in a four-day symposium, the purpose of which was to allow the nations’ representatives to learn from each other.

“Each country has a different way, with a different focus on how they do Civil Affairs,” said the staff noncommissioned officer in charge of Civil Affairs for the Black Sea Rotational Force. “It was great to have the different countries here, especially with the diversity of knowledge they brought.”

The symposium was designed as an open forum, so that attendees could freely share their opinions and experiences on subjects ranging from combat operations to HA. “For example in combat operations, Civil Affairs serves as the liaison for the commanding officer to leaders in the local community in order to minimize the impact of military operations on the civilian population,” said the Civil Affairs officer for the Black Sea Rotational Force. “But in disaster relief, Civil Affairs forces provide expedient assistance to the civilian population and assist in coordinating with relief organizations.”

Items covered during the symposium included discussions on dislocated individuals, peacekeeping operations, and nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, as well as case studies on military operations in Sierra Leone and Darfur, Sudan, and HA in Bangladesh. “The plan for the symposium was perfect,” said the civil-military cooperation chief for the general staff of the Bulgarian armed forces. “The atmosphere was very open. We could clearly see and speak to each other and discuss what we felt was important.” He also said he planned to take back some of what he learned at the symposium in the hopes of creating a more integrated Civil Affairs community in the Bulgarian armed forces.

Rapid Response: The U.S. Military’s Haiti Relief Surge

The humanitarian relief effort in Haiti began January 12, 2010, immediately after the island nation was rocked by a 7.0 magnitude earthquake. The U.S. military immediately took the lead in opening a logistics chain enabling medical and rescue personnel, food, water, temporary shelter and other necessities to reach Haiti despite the near total destruction of the island’s air and seaport facilities.

Working in concert under the direction of the U.S. Transportation Command, the Navy’s Military Sealift Command set up temporary off-loading capabilities for seaborne supplies while working to reopen the harbor at Port-au-Prince; the Air Force Air Mobility Command did the same with the capital city’s small, and devastated, airport; and the Army’s Military Surface Distribution and Deployment Command played a major role in both efforts, especially in the initial hours after the earthquake, and was the primary logistics interface with USAID to move relief supplies inland.

Within 12 hours the airfield was opened, and working with the Air Force, the Surface Distribution and Deployment Command’s 688th Rapid Port Opening Element moved cargo coming in by air to a distribution site. The 832d Transportation Battalion out of Jacksonville, Florida, opened up the seaport in 36 hours at Port-au-Prince to receive humanitarian supplies. Joint logistics over the shore also was set up, using a trident pier for containers.

While the initial response was by air, sealift was required for a lot of the heavier equipment needed to clear debris and search for survivors. Military Sealift Command responded with a wide variety of capabilities from 21 vessels, including the U.S. military hospital ship Comfort, two 673-foot maritime prepositioning ships (the United States Naval Ship (USNS) PFC Dewayne T. Williams and the USNS 1st Lt. Jack Lummus), two T-AKE dry cargo/ammunition ships (the Lewis and Clark and the Sacagawea), the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force fleet replenishment oiler Big Horn, four Maritime Administration Ready Reserve force ships (the Cornhusker State and Gopher State crane ships, the Cape May heavy-lift ship and the aviation maintenance logistics ship Wright) and the Military Sealift Command Special Mission program oceanographic survey ship Henson, which surveyed the harbor floor and identified potential hazards to ships bringing relief supplies.

The Navy also sent the USS Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group and USS Bataan and USS Nassau Amphibious Ready Groups to support the relief effort, and Maritime Administration activated two high-speed ferries from the National Defense Reserve Fleet—MV Huakai and MV Alakai—to ferry personnel, vehicles and supplies between Jacksonville and Haiti.

The Comfort is maintained in a five-day readiness-to-sea status, fully manned with civilian mariners and a Navy medical team and all supplies, including helicopters and boats. It is the equivalent of an entire city hospital. The journey from Baltimore to Haiti took 77 hours.

The effort was closely coordinated among all the Service components, with U.S. Transportation Command overseeing the combined mission, working closely with Southern Command and the Joint Task Force, but all of the military logistics commands initially responded even before orders were issued. Some assets that had been scheduled for use in the drawdown in Iraq and build-up in Afghanistan were retasked to Haiti, but the Service commanders say neither the war effort nor Haitian relief were short-changed because U.S. Transportation Command had effectively preplanned for such contingencies.

U.S. Military Helped Search and Rescue Efforts in Haiti

You have only to look at what are called “crush” injuries of earthquake victims in Haiti to realize that the flattening effect of collapsed concrete buildings leaves little chance for survival. Despite that gruesome fact, search-and-rescue (SAR) teams deployed by the U.S. military and working alongside civilian units from around the world did have some success following the January 12, 2010, disaster that killed more than 100,000 people. Within days of the devastating earthquake U.S. military engineers and pararescue units in Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE worked feverishly with SAR teams from the United States as well as units from Taiwan, Turkey, France, Israel and other countries to rescue trapped survivors, many suffering horrific crush injuries to arms and legs; necessitating immediate amputation.

The 1,700 members of 43 SAR teams used 161 body-sniffing dogs and sophisticated seismic listening devices to locate and pull survivors from the rubble of collapsed structures. Six of the teams were from the United States; their 511 members came from California, Florida, New York, and Virginia.

They were helped by U.S. military units that used heavy equipment to clear rubble obstructing rescue sites and assessed the stability of damaged structures.

While focusing on the restoration of essential public services like electricity and water, U.S. military engineers also had an important role to play in SAR activities. The collapsed sites were extremely dangerous, and removing the wrong beam or section of concrete could cause the entire remaining structure to collapse, so the U.S. military engineers leveraged the expertise of SAR personnel by identifying which pieces or components (of the mass of concrete rubble) needed to be removed next. That care paid off when U.S. Air Force pararescue specialists from the 23d Special Tactics Squadron worked with members of various rescue teams to rescue a 25-year-old woman who had been trapped in a collapsed building for seven days.

Within 48 hours of the disaster, despite the aftershocks and chaos that followed the initial quake, a French SAR team pulled 8 survivors out of the ruins of the Montana Hotel outside Port-au-Prince, including seven Americans.

The Fairfax County, Virginia, Task Force Urban Search and Rescue Team that arrived in Haiti less than 24 hours after the disaster reported it had pulled 14 survivors from collapsed buildings. The buildings included a large home whose owner survived the collapse but whose family was trapped inside. Four family members were saved by the SAR team that the Haitian owner said was “sent from heaven.”

Note: This vignette came from http://www.america.gov.

Maritime Civil Affairs Team Aboard Bataan Coordinates Aid Distribution

Members from the U.S. Navy Maritime Civil Affairs Team (MCAT) 207, embarked aboard the multipurpose amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5), and met with members of the Haitian Coast Guard in Carrefour, Haiti, to facilitate the distribution of U.S.-provided humanitarian relief supplies through Haitian authorities. The U.S. military was the primary distributor of aid in Killick, and discussions centered on the transfer of aid distribution responsibilities to the Haitian military and NGOs.

The reason for the visit to the Haitian Coast Guard was to maintain contact between the MCAT and the Haitian military. Open lines of communication helped ensure that aid was distributed where it would have a greater impact.

The team coordinated with the larger NGOs in the Carrefour area to provide relief supplies to the community. The ideal situation was to have the larger NGOs receive the aid supplied to the Haitian government and then distribute those supplies to smaller relief organizations, giving the aid a much wider reach.

Once the mayor of Carrefour approved the primary group of NGOs, the plan went into effect. MCAT members from the amphibious dock-landing ship the USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44) had been coordinating with the World Food Programme (UN) to provide aid that was dispersed by the Haitian government and NGOs. The USS Bataan's MCAT resumed those talks as the USS Gunston Hall prepared to depart the waters of Haiti to begin their Africa Partnership Station deployment.

The USS Gunston Hall officially completed her Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE mission on February 11, 2010. The USS Bataan arrived off; the coast of Haiti on January 18, 2010, and immediately began providing HA and disaster relief in support of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE.

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE was part of a larger U.S. response to a request from the government of Haiti for urgent humanitarian aid. U.S. Southern Command worked closely with the Department of State, USAID, and the international community to provide life-sustaining services to the people of Haiti. All military efforts were in support of USAID, which orchestrated the U.S. Government’s contributions to the relief.

Note: This vignette came from http://www.navy.mil.

Continuing Promise 2009 (CP09) NGOs Partner With U.S. Military to Provide Aid in the Dominican Republic

U.S. military and international partners on board the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) delivered more than $500,000 in donations to several recipients in the Dominican Republic during the Comfort's second stop as part of CP09.

Through CP09, the USNS Comfort combined U.S. military and interagency personnel, NGOs, civil service mariners, academic and partner nations to provide medical, dental, veterinary, and engineering services afloat and ashore alongside HN personnel.

The maritime Civil Affairs team on board the USNS Comfort worked closely with the NGOs to coordinate the mission. The NGOs involved in this donation were Project Handclasp, Project Hope, Latter Day Saints Charities, and Rotary International. They donated items ranging from medical supplies to hygiene items, as well as cribs, first-aid equipment, and school supplies.

“This partnership is something we definitely want to continue,” said a spokesperson from the Latter Day Saints liaison on board the USNS Comfort. “We are building a foundation for future work together not only in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, but in other countries as well.”

Several organizations in the local area benefited from the donations. A few of the clinics were Otto Martinez, Hospital Amigos de las Ninez y las Madres and the Pabellon de balman sports complex, as well as several others.

The USNS Comfort delivered related charitable goods throughout its four month humanitarian mission in Latin America and the Caribbean region during CP09. The USNS Comfort visited five other countries—Antigua and Barbuda, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama—as part of CP09.

Note: This vignette came from http://www.navy.mil.

Appendix C

Generic Civil Affairs Operations Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Appendix 5

Army plans, orders, and attachments follow the five-paragraph order format (Situation, Mission, Execution, Sustainment, and Command and Signal). Marine Corp doctrine follows the five-paragraph order format (Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, and Command and Control). Attachments (annexes, appendixes, tabs, and exhibits) are information management tools. Using them increases the base order’s clarity and usefulness by keeping it short. Attachments include information, such as sustainment, administrative support details, and instructions that expand upon the base order. As identified in ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, the Civil Affairs operations Annex is titled Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations). FM 3-57 in support of previous references specifies supporting appendixes to the CAO Annex. Additional references for the Marine Corps doctrine are MCWP 5-1 and MCRP 3-33.1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations. Just as the annex expands the information contained in the base order, appendixes contain information necessary to expand annexes; and tabs expand appendixes. The supporting CAO appendixes are:

Appendix 1–Execution Matrix.

Appendix 2–Assessment Matrix.

Appendix 3–Cultural Briefing.

Appendix 4–Populace and Resources Control Plan:

Tab A–DC Plan.

Tab B–NEO Plan.

Appendix 5–FHA Plan.

Appendix 6–NA Plan.

Appendix 7–CIM Plan.

Appendix 8–Support to Civil Administration Plan.

Appendix 9–Transition Plan.

Note: Additional appendixes, as required (for example: project management, funding, and so on).

The G-9/S-9 staff is responsible for the preparation of the CAO annex and its attachments. Figure C-1, pages C-2 though C-7, provides an example of Appendix 5, FHA Plan.

Glossary

United States Marine Corps users will comply with acronym, term, and definition usage verbatim from JP 1-02 and MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AD3E | assess, decide, develop and detect, deliver, and evaluate
AO | area of operation
AOR | areas of responsibility
ASCOPE | areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ASD | Assistant Secretary of Defense
ATP | Army techniques publication
CA | Civil Affairs
CACOM | Civil Affairs commands
CAO | Civil Affairs operations
CAP | crisis action planning
CAPT | Civil Affairs planning team
CAT | Civil Affairs team
CBRN | chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE | chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives
CCDR | combatant commander
CERP | Commanders’ Emergency Response Program
CIM | civil information management
CJCS | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CLT | civil liaison team
CM | consequence management
CMAT | consequence management advisory team
CMO | civil-military operations
CMOC | civil-military operations center
COA | course of action
COM | chief of mission
CONOPS | concept of operations
CONPLAN | concept plan
CONUS | continental United States
COP | common operational picture
DA | Department of the Army
DART | disaster assistance response team
DATT | defense attaché
DC | dislocated civilian
DOD | Department of Defense
DODI | Department of Defense Instruction
DODD | Department of Defense Directive
DOS | Department of State
DSCA | Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DTRA | Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EAP | emergency action plan
FAA | Foreign Assistance Act
FCM | foreign consequence management
FHA | foreign humanitarian assistance
FID | foreign internal defense
FM | field manual
FMO | financial management officer
FUNCPLAN | functional plan
G-2 | assistant chief of staff, Intelligence
G-9 | assistant chief of staff, Civil Affairs operations
GCC | geographic combatant commander
HA | humanitarian assistance
HACC | humanitarian assistance coordination center
HAST | humanitarian assistance survey team
HCA | humanitarian civic assistance
HN | host nation
HOCC | humanitarian operations coordination center
HOC | humanitarian operations center
HQ | headquarters
IAW | in accordance with
IGO | intergovernmental organizations
IPI | indigenous populations and institutions
J-3 | operations staff section
J-4 | logistics staff section
J-5 | plans staff section
J-9 | civil-military operations staff section
JFC | joint force commander
JIACG | joint interagency coordination group
JOA | joint operations area
JOPES | Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPP | joint operation planning process
JP | joint publication
JSCP | Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JTACE | joint technical advisory chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear element
JTF | joint task force
MCA | military civic action
MCPP | Marine Corps planning process
MCRP | Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP | Marine Corps warfighting publication
MDMP | military decisionmaking process
METT-T | mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available
METT-TC | mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations
MOE | measure of effectiveness
MOP | measure of performance
NA | nation assistance
NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO | noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO | nongovernmental organization
NSC | National Security Council
O&M | operation and maintenance
OFDA | Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OGA | other government agency
OHDACA | Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
OPLAN | operation plan
OPORD | operation order
PDSS | predeployment site survey
PO | political officer
POC | point of contact
RSO | regional security officer
S-9 | Civil Affairs operations staff officer
SA | security assistance
SAR | search and rescue
SecDef | Secretary of Defense
SOF | special operations forces
SOFA | status-of-forces agreement
TSOC | theater special operations command
UN | United Nations
UNHCR | United Nations Office for the High Commissioner for Refugees
U.S. | United States
USAID | United States Agency for International Development
USC | United States Code
USG | United States Government
USMC | United States Marine Corps
USNS | United States Naval Ship

SECTION II – TERMS

civil administration

An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the are concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislation, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 3-05)

Civil Affairs

Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil military operations. Also called CA. (JP 3-57)

Civil Affairs operations

Those military operations conducted by Civil Affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Also called CAO. (JP 3-57)

civil information

Information developed from data with relation to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organization, people, and events within the civil component of the commander’s operational environment that can be fused or processed to increase Department of Defense/Interagency/intergovernmental organizations/nongovernmental organizations/indigenous populations and institutions situational awareness, situational understanding, or situational dominance. (FM 3-57)

civil information management

Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other United States Government and Department of Defense agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Also called CIM. (FM 3-57)

civil-military operations

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military operations. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated Civil Affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of Civil Affairs and other forces. Also known as CMO. (JP 3-57)

civil-military operations center

An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called CMOC. (JP 3-57)

consequence management

Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. (JP 3-28)

country team

The senior, in-country U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (JP 3-07.4)

foreign disaster relief

Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally, it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. (JP 3-29)

foreign humanitarian assistance

Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA. (JP 3-29)

foreign internal defense

(Joint) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (JP 3-22)

host nation

A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also known as HN. (JP 3-57)

humanitarian and civic assistance

Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Also called HCA. (JP 3-29)

indigenous populations and institutions

The civilian construct of an area of operations, to include its population (legal citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians), governmental, tribal, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called IPI. (FM 3-57)

interagency

Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 3-08)

interagency coordination

Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

intergovernmental organization

An organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Also called IGO. (JP 3-08)

internal defense and development

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also known as IDAD. (JP 3-22)

measure of effectiveness

A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. (JP 3-0)

measure of performance

A criterion used to assess friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (JP 3-0)

military civic action

The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 3-57)

mission command

The exercise of authority and direction by the commander, using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. It is commander-led and blends the art of command and the science of control to integrate the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission.

nation assistance

Assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations.

nongovernmental organization

A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human right, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 3-08)

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operation order

A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD. (JP 5-0)

operation plan

1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. 2. A complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. Also called OPLAN. (JP 5-0)

other government agency

Within the context of interagency coordination, a non-Department of Defense agency of the United States Government. Also called OGA.

partner nation

Those nations that the United States works with to disrupt the production, transportation, distribution, and sale of illicit drugs, as well as the money involved with this illicit activity. Also called PN. (JP 1-02)

private sector

An umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organization. (JP 3-57)

security asssitance

Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statues by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related series, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Also called SA. (JP 3-22)

special operations forces

Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support operations. Also called SOF. (JP 3-05.1)

support to civil administration

Assistance given by U.S. Armed Forces to stabilize or to continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Also called SCA. (FM 3-57)

theater

The geographical area for which a commander of a geographic combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1-02)

References

SOURCES USED:

These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

CJCSI 3207.01B, Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Actions, 1 November 2008.

CJCSI 3214.01D, Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory, 31 December 2011.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVES

DOD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM). 3 October 2003.

DOD 7000.14-R Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Special Accounts, Funds and Programs, Chapter 27, Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP), January 2009.

DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, 6 July 2012.

DODI 2205.02, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, 2 December 2008.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.

ADP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.

FM 3-11.21, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Operation, 1 April 2008.

FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, 30 October 2011.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 15 December 2012.

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.

JP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 April 2011

JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, 26 April 2007.

JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, 13 June 2007.

JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 June 2011.

JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010.

JP 3-28, Civil Support, 14 September 2007.

JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 17 March 2009.

JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management, 21 June 2012.

JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 8 July 2008.

JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 11 August 2011.

MARINE CORPS MANUALS

MCRP 3-33.1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations, 7 April 2003.

MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 16 November 2011.

MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, 24 August 2010.

OTHERS

Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group, 1 March 2007.

Executive Order 12966, Federal Regulation 36949, Foreign Disaster Assistance, 14 July 1995.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 166a, Combatant Commands: Funding Through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 2010.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, 1 February 2010.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 402, Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries, 1 February 2010.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 404, Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1 February 2010.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 407, Humanitarian Demining Assistance: Authority; Limitations, 1 February 2010.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 2011, Special Operations Forces: Training With Friendly Foreign Forces, 1 February 2010.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 2557, Excess Nonlethal Supplies: Availability for Homeless Veteran Initiatives and Humanitarian Relief, 1 February 2010.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 2561, Humanitarian Assistance, 1 February 2010.

Title 22, United States Code, Section 2151-1, Foreign Assistance: Subchapter I-International Development; Part-Declaration of Policy; Development Assistance Authorizations, 1 February 2010.

Title 22, United States Code, Section 2292, Foreign Assistance: Subchapter I-International Development: Part IX-International Disaster Assistance, 1 February 2010.

REFERENCED FORMS

DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

Index

A

area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE), 4-10, 4-11, C-3

Army techniques publication (ATP), iv, 4-9, 5-4, 6-2

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD), 6-2, 6-3

C

chief of mission (COM), 2-3, 4-3, 4-4, 4-14, 4-19

Civil Affairs Command (CACOM), 4-10, 4-14

Civil Affairs operations (CAO), iv, 1-3, 2-3, 4-4, 4-11 through 4-16, 5-17, C-1 through C-2, C-3, C-5, C-6, C-8

Civil Affairs planning team (CAPT), 4-10, 4-11

Civil Affairs team (CAT), 4-12, 4-15, 4-19

civil information management (CIM), 4-13 through 4-16, 5-18, C-1

civil liaison team (CLT), 4-12

civil reconnaissance, 4-13, 4-15

civil support operations, vii

civil-military operations (CMO), iv, 1-3, 2-3, 4-4, 4-10 through 4-16, 4-18, 6-1, 6-8, A-1, A-5, C-5, C-6

civil-military operations center (CMOC), 3-1, 4-4, 4-7, 4-12 through 4-16, 4-18, C-5

combatant command, 4-7, 6-2, 6-4

combatant commander (CCDR), 4-3 through 4-6

consequence management (CM), 1-2, 1-3, 4-6, 4-18

country team, C-8

D

Department of Defense (DOD), 1-2, 2-3 through 2-5, 3-2, 3-3, 4-5, 4-6, 4-10, 4-13, 6-1, 6-2, 6-4 through 6-7, A-1 through A-5

Department of State (DOS), 2-3, 2-5, 3-2, 4-3, 4-14, 5-1, 5-17, 6-1, 6-2, 6-5 through 6-7, A-1, A-4, A-5, C-6

disaster assistance, 1-2, 6-1, 6-5, 6-7, A-3

disaster assistance response team (DART), 4-3

disaster relief, 1-2, 2-2, 3-2, 3-4, 4-3, 4-8, 4-17, 5-4, 5-5, 6-1, 6-2, 6-5, 6-7, A-3, A-4, B-5, B-8

dislocated civilian (DC), 4-13, C-1, C-9

E

effects, 1-2, 1-3, 4-13, 4-16, 4-17, 6-6, B-3, C-6, C-7

embassy, 4-3, 4-7

emergency action plan (EAP), 4-19

F

Fiscal Law, 6-7

FMO, 4-19

Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), 6-7, A-1, A-5

foreign consequence management (FCM), 1-3, 4-3

foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), 1-1, 1-2, 2-1, 2-2, 2-4, 3-1, 3-2, 3-4, 4-1, 4-3 through 4-7, 4-9, 4-11, 4-14, 4-15, 4-17, 4-18, 5-1, 5-17, 6-1, 6-2, 6-4 through 6-8, A-1, A-2, A-4, C-1 through C-3, C-5 through C-7

foreign internal defense (FID), 2-2, 2-3

functional area, C-8

functional specialty, 4-10

G

G-9 staff, 4-11, 4-12, 4-14, C-1, C-6

geographic combatant commander (GCC), 1-2, 2-3, 3-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-10, 4-12, 4-13, 4-17, 6-3, 6-6, C-8

H

humanitarian civic assistance (HCA), 2-2, 2-4, 6-2 through 6-7, A-2, A-3

host nation (HN), 1-2, 2-2 through 2-5, 3-4, 4-3 through 4-5, 4-7, 4-8, 4-10, 4-11, 4-13 through 4-19, 5-1, 5-4, 5-5, 5-17, 6-3, 6-4, 6-6, B-9, C-3, C-5, C-8

humanitarian assistance (HA), 4-1, 4-7, 4-8, 6-1, 6-3, 6-5 through 6-7, A-1 through A-4, B-3 through B-5, B-8

humanitarian assistance coordiantion center (HACC), 4-4, 4-5

humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST), 4-3

humanitarian operations coordiantion center (HOCC), 4-7, 4-11

I

indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), 4-4, 4-13, 4-14, 4-16, C-3

interagency, 4-2, 4-5, C-3

intergovernmental organization (IGO), 4-7 through 4-9, 4-17, 4-18, C-8

J

joint force commander (JFC), 2-4, 4-12, 4-17

joint interagency coordination group (JIACG), 4-5

joint operation planning process (JOPP), 4-1, 4-14

joint strategic capabilities plan (JSCP), 4-10

L

law, 1-2, 6-1, 6-7, A-2, A-5, C-5

logistics, 5-3, 6-2, C-1

M

Marine Corps planning process (MCPP), 4-11

Marine Corps reference publication (MCRP), 6-2, C-1

measure of effectiveness (MOE), 5-5

military civic action (MCA), 2-2, 2-4

military decisionmaking process (MDMP), 4-11

mission analysis, 4-10

mission planning, 4-9, 4-13

N

nation assistance (NA), 2-2, 2-3, 6-5, C-1

National Security Council (NSC), 4-5

noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), C-1

nongovernmental organization (NGO), 4-4, 4-8, 4-9, 4-17, 4-18, 5-5, B-2 through B-4, C-8

O

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), 1-2, 3-3, 4-1, 4-4, 4-5, 5-2

operation and maintenance (O&M), 6-3, 6-4, 6-7, A-2 through A-4

operation order (OPORD), C-2, C-3, C-5, C-6, C-8, C-9

other government agency (OGA), 4-17, 4-18

P

point of contact (POC), 3-3, C-8

political officer (PO), 4-19

principles of war, vii

public affairs, 4-4, 4-6, 4-8

R

refugee, 3-3, 4-1, 5-9, 5-15, 5-17

regional security officer (RSO), 4-19

S

S-9 staff, C-1, C-6

search and rescure (SAR), B-6, B-7

security assistance (SA), 2-2, 2-3, 6-1, 6-7, C-8

stability operations, vii, 2-2, A-4

status of forces agreement (SOFA), 4-3, 4-9, 4-19

synchronization, 4-4, 4-15, A-5

T

theater special operations command (TSOC), 2-3, 4-18

Title 10, U.S. Code, 2-4, 6-1 through 6-7, A-1 through A-4

Title 22, U.S. Code, 6-7, A-1

transfer, 4-3, 5-5, B-8, C-5

Transition, 4-11, 4-16 through 4-18, 5-5, C-1

U

United Nations Office for the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 5-6, 5-11, 5-13, 5-15, 5-17

United States Agency for International Development (USAID), vii, 1-2, 2-4, 3-3, 4-1, 4-3, 4-5, 4-14, 4-19, 6-2, 6-5, 6-6, A-1, A-5, B-1, B-3, B-5, B-8, C-6

United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), iv

United States Marine Corps (USMC), iv

unity of effort, 4-4, 4-5, 4-16, A-5

W

warfighting, 6-4

ATP 3-57.20 (MCRP 3-33.1C)

15 February 2013

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW

Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

1214205

By Direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps:

RICHARD P. MILLS

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for

Combat Development and Integration

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Not to be distributed; electronic media only.

United States Marine Corps: To be distributed in accordance with PCN 144 000206 00, requirements for MCRP 3-33.1C.