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Preface

ATP 3-05.2 provides the U.S. Army commanders and staffs information on the concept of planning and conducting foreign internal defense (FID). ATP 3-05.2 describes the fundamentals, activities, and considerations involved in the planning and execution of FID throughout the full range of military operations, and it emphasizes FID as a strategic policy option. This publication serves as the doctrinal foundation for subordinate Army FID doctrine, force integration, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training. This publication also serves as the Army’s description of FID, which will be useful in the larger joint and interagency environment.

The principal audience for ATP 3-05.2 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force (JTF) or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host nation (HN) laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement (ROE) (see FM 27-10).

ATP 3-05.2 does not add or modify any terminology found in the Army lexicon and is not the source document for any terms. ATP 3-05.2 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 3-05.2 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard and Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 3-05.2 is the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, USAJFKSWCS. The preparing agency is the Joint and Army Doctrine Integration Division. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-SWC-DTJ, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610 or by electronic DA Form 2028. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

Introduction

ATP 3-05.2 (formerly FM 3-05.2) was last published in 2011. This revision provides special operations forces (SOF) commanders; their staffs; other Services in the Department of Defense (DOD); and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational audiences, as well as supporting and supported agencies and organizations techniques for providing support to FID operations. The publication provides doctrinal guidance and outlines the necessary requirements for conducting, planning, preparing, and executing missions. ATP 3-05.2 has seven chapters and six appendixes, which are summarized in the following paragraphs.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the organization and functions of FID, including the HN internal defense and development (IDAD) program, a comprehensive approach of FID. It also describes the relationship with other operations and U.S. national objectives and policy throughout the range of military operations.

Chapter 2 discusses organization and responsibilities from national-level organizations to the U.S. diplomatic mission and country team and down to the JTF. Also covered is the role of conventional forces in FID and the multinational forces.

Chapter 3 discusses planning processes and considerations, with a focus on guidance, planning requirements, assessment, and other key operational considerations.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of requirements, organization, and support. This chapter includes a discussion of training, skills needed for success, training strategy, and advisory assistance to the HN.

Chapter 5 discusses employment considerations and provides an overview of employment factors for SOF and conventional forces, health service support (HSS), and site survey procedures.

Chapter 6 provides a discussion on overall operations, including indirect and direct support operations, combat operations, sustainment, and insurgency operations.

Chapter 7 discusses redeployment considerations, such as termination of operations, handoff procedures, and postmission debriefing procedures.

Appendix A covers legal, regulatory, and policy considerations; international law; U.S. and HN laws; treaties; and agreements. This appendix also covers United States Code (USC) for funding.

Appendix B discusses the HN’s IDAD strategy and program, including the four functions of IDAD and the principles that apply to the program.

Appendix C covers intelligence support operations, with discussions on the role of intelligence in FID and intelligence requirements.

Appendix D discusses the illustrative interagency plan, including the content, phases, joint, and Army planning and concerns.

Appendix E discusses security assistance operations and how the geographic combatant commander (GCC) uses security assistance to further FID activities.

Appendix F covers site survey considerations and checklist to help during the predeployment site survey.

Chapter 1

Overview

FID is a comprehensive approach, involving the interaction of multinational, joint, Army, and interagency efforts. Military efforts may involve multiple Services and conventional forces. Army efforts, in general, include Army special operations forces (ARSOF) units, particularly Civil Affairs (CA), military information support operations (MISO), and Special Forces (SF), because they are well suited to conduct or support FID operations. Army and ARSOF units possess the capability to support an HN in creating a military shield (through FID) in which interagency efforts can comprehensively operate to remove the root causes behind problems of subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. The Army critical tasks and resultant military occupational specialties (MOSs) provide the foundation for FID operations through a diverse offering of training (individual and collective) to assist an HN in achieving its IDAD military objectives and goals. Army cultural and language training enable and enhance the conduct of these operations. FID is a legislatively directed operation attributable to Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Section 212, Initial Review of Combatant Commands. The amendments to the Goldwater-Nichols Act established the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and Title 10 USC, Section 167, established the unified combatant command for SOF, to include activities in which FID is involved.

FID existed before the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but it was not included in doctrine until 1976. These operations included advisory roles in Southeast Asia to train and equip the civilian irregular defense groups and regular units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. The task of training and equipping the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam was colossal; therefore, conventional forces played a major role in training and equipping under the Military Assistance Program authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. In 1962, Army advisors were educated under the Military Assistance Training Advisor Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Because FID doctrine applies across the Army and joint range of military operations, the Army has retained this as a task during times of peace and war. Historically and in the future, Army forces have and will take part in these operations and, depending on the HN needs and operational environment, conventional forces may outnumber in-country SOF personnel. Army forces have a role in FID operations just as they do in stability or counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. In FID scenarios, native language abilities and cultural awareness are important to advisors and trainers, and the proper use of interpreters is also a viable mission option. These operations require Army personnel be trained for prolonged operations in austere environments. The Army practitioner must be a subject-matter expert to provide military education and training; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); advanced military education; or technical assistance. FID involves the ability to teach particular skills and to foster friendly relations with counterparts and agencies other than DOD. Army advisors teach their counterparts to perform tasks, develop processes, and implement procedures. Advisors must be adaptive problem solvers and creative thinkers. They must also possess the ability to work in a collaborative environment, building interagency and international partner capacity and applying a comprehensive approach.

GENERAL

1-1. The Army may conduct FID operations unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort or may support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts. The National Security Strategy of the United States (2010) establishes that the U.S. military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, to train and help security forces, and to pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments. U.S. policy currently deals with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. FID may include financial, intelligence, and law enforcement assistance authorized by the Department of State (DOS) and administered by the DOD. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem develops. Army forces are qualified to operate in a FID operation that takes place under a regional or global media and political microscope. Culturally and politically attuned ARSOF Soldiers know that, in the contemporary environment, the smallest misstep (or perceived misstep) in any arena can quickly expand into an international political media spectacle. In addition, ARSOF Soldiers, who are trained in the language and culture, are cross-trained on the culture and history of their unit’s aligned region. Therefore, ARSOF Soldiers are uniquely qualified to advise their HN counterparts and trainees on how best to approach regional or transnational rivalries and how to deal with outside pressures from potential transnational spoilers. Conventional force units conducting FID may require specific training not only for the local culture but also for the inherent political pitfalls of tactical operations having regional, transnational, or international implications. Planners must be mindful that all operations, to include small contingents, have the potential to move quickly from obscurity to the center stage of global media. Planners must also keep in mind that regional issues (and beyond) can be mitigated if properly identified.

1-2. The key differentiating factor between FID and many other operations is the involvement, engagement, and support of the HN government. Historically, because of some similarities between the TTP used to conduct FID and those used to conduct other ARSOF core activities, there has been confusion and incorrect usage of the term. FID involves the support of a standing government and its lawful military and paramilitary forces, and it is usually conducted in HNs in which the embassy country team is not only present but also frequently the lead agency in the operation. The American Embassy country team develops measures to promote security in conjunction with the HN through the development of a yearly theater security cooperation plan (TSCP). The TSCP is what links the GCC’s regional strategy to military operations. The country team coordinates synchronization of military operations with interagency initiatives and activities. The embassy country team validates the mission desired and determines manning requirements with the GCC. The comprehensive approach is represented by the country team as the ambassador’s first line of effort overseas to plan, direct, and integrate the policies of the United States Government (USG). Additional confusion has recently arisen between the complementary tasks relevant to both FID and security force assistance (SFA). Where applicable, the balance of this publication will discuss the intertwined nature of these operations. In addition to other FID operations in the HN region that require planning coordination to reduce concerns, SFA operations are inextricably connected to FID and, therefore, may have a tremendous impact on these operations. Such impact is inherently congruent with the result of contiguous and noncontiguous operations. Just as a robust operation conducted in a bordering nation rather than a nonbordering nation may affect the HN country team and task force planning, so too will SFA operations. SFA, whether using the brigade combat team concept, small conventional forces teams, or SOF, will require coordination between ongoing FID operations in a bordering HN. For instance, FID and SFA planners should collaborate for the use of the logistical enablers in the region. If planned for and used effectively, this is the comprehensive approach to regional security that facilitates the security cooperation plan.

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

1-3. The IDAD is a plan developed by the HN with the assistance of multiple USG departments and agencies. It is a whole-of-government approach supporting the multiple functions of an HN. The four primary functions of an IDAD plan include the following:

Balanced Development. Attempts to achieve national goals through political, social, and economic aspects of a nation-state.

Security. Protects the population from all threats.

Neutralization. Physically and psychologically separates the threatening elements from the populace.

Mobilization. Proposes that responsive governance and material resources supports the society.

1-4. The requirements proposed by HNs separate a centralized IDAD plan into multiple lines of effort by the DOS, DOD, and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The DOS has improved planning through an integrated country strategy—a collaborative planning process, known as diplomacy, development, and defense planning. The process coordinates various DOS, USAID, and DOD plans and strategies into the integrated country strategy. The DOS establishes an integrated country strategy that supports the governance, security, economy, and development of a supported nation. The developed strategy at the country level supports internal nation development, but it also supports a broader regional stability strategy. Both strategy and plans inform objectives and strategies for both integrated country strategy and IDAD documents. The USG’s current trend separates a centralized IDAD plan into an integrated country strategy of the various department and agency plans, which suggests a trend in which the USAID establishes a development plan. The chief of staff or DOD establishes a security plan, and the DOS synchronizes these plans into an integrated country strategy supporting the nation’s IDAD plan (for example, proposed goals and strategies).

1-5. Force is rarely the defining element that delivers success; instead, it is best used as an enabler of diplomacy. Complex problems of fragile states require comprehensive solutions—a full range of measures to promote HN growth and to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, and other threats to stability. Ultimately, such a strategy, developed by the HN for itself (or IDAD strategy), must focus on building viable political, economic, security, and social institutions that respond to the needs of society. The fundamental goal is to prevent a downward spiral of instability by forestalling and defeating threats and by working to correct conditions that may prompt violence. The construct of an IDAD program or strategy should integrate security force and civilian actions into a coherent, comprehensive effort. The strategy, therefore, includes measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place. Furthermore, the successful IDAD strategist must realize that the true nature of the threat to the government lies in the adversary’s political strength rather than military power. Military and paramilitary programs are necessary for success, but they are not sufficient alone.

1-6. According to JP 3-22, an IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats. Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, social, and economic programs, allowing all individuals and groups in the society to share in the rewards of development, thus alleviating frustration. The security function includes all activities implemented in order to protect the populace from violence and to provide a safe environment for national development. The security effort should establish an environment in which the HN can provide for its own security with limited U.S. support. Neutralization, a political concept, physically and psychologically separates an insurgent or criminal element from the population, thereby making threatening elements irrelevant to the political process. It includes all lawful measures (except those that degrade the government’s legitimacy) to discredit, disrupt, preempt, disorganize, and defeat the insurgent organization. Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources and includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support of the government. Mobilization promotes the government’s legitimacy and allows the government to strengthen existing institutions and to develop new ones to respond to demands.

1-7. Army FID support is only one component of an IDAD policy and program. Although always an important (and frequently critical) part of a nation’s IDAD strategy, this support may be one of the smaller programs within the strategy in terms of funding, focus, facilities, and number of personnel committed. The effect of a successful FID can be inversely proportional to the amount of resources expended. Equally true, however, is that an unsuccessful operation may cause the failure of far larger and more intensive programs conducted by other instruments of national power. For instance, an insurgency can destroy the progress of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Illicit Crop Monitoring Program; the U.S. DOS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Sustainable Development; and the USAID. The insurgency can also deny the area to future programs, resulting in the loss of major funds and perhaps years of effort. In nations in which the military has been the disproportional focus of national resources, to the detriment of civilian institutions and development, the FID portion of the IDAD strategy and program may be deliberately downsized. As a result, nations that have failed to donate adequate resources to military and paramilitary institutions may need a more intense program.

1-8. Internal defense and development is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). Collectively, threats that rise to levels with the potential to topple an HN’s government, economy, social structure, and, subsequently, the nation’s internal security are subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. The United States describes an internal threat as any person or organization that interferes with, disrupts, or damages the domestic, lawfully constituted economic, military, informational, or political institutions of a nation through illegal means or methods in an overt, covert, or clandestine manner. Examples include criminals, vigilantes, terrorists, insurgents, or separatists. Nations formulate a strategy not only to combat and curtail internal threats but also to prepare for external threats and to ensure a comprehensive approach and development plan that prevents the formation of disaffected domestic groups. IDAD focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, military, and social) that respond to the needs of the HN society. The HN has responsibility for and control of the IDAD program. It is the job of the country team to help shape the program, but ultimately it is the responsibility of the HN. The country team is defined as the senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission (JP 3-07.4). If the internal threat to the HN is primarily political and nonviolent, FID operations may or may not be required to support the program. Development programs that are carefully planned, carefully implemented, and properly publicized can serve the interests of population groups and deny exploitable issues to insurgents or other internal threats. IDAD programs provide an atmosphere of security in which development and building partner capacity can take place. Planners and executors may encounter serious security issues that the HN military must overcome, but they should remember at all times that IDAD is primarily a political program.

1-9. The IDAD strategy is founded on the assumption that the HN is responsible for the development and execution of its own programs to prevent or defeat subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. The fundamental thrust of the strategy is toward preventing the escalation of internal conflict. Anticipating and defeating the threat posed by specific organizations and working to correct conditions that prompt violence are effective means of prevention. If subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, or terrorism occurs, the emphasis is to hold down the level of violence. The population must be mobilized to participate in the strategy.

1-10. U.S. Army FID operations contribute to the overall IDAD strategy of the HN. These operations are based on integrated military and civilian programs (Figure 1-1, page 1-5). These operations can be conducted jointly with or complementary to programs undertaken by the DOS and its agencies, such as the USAID. Because IDAD often puts civilian programs in the lead over military programs, operations, such as medical civilian assistance programs, can sometimes be viewed as cogs in the greater machinery that is the civilian-led effort. As discussed in greater detail later in this publication, FID operations can be woven into the IDAD strategy not only by enhancing the security of the HN but also by complementing a myriad of civilian programs throughout the diplomatic, information, military, and economic arenas.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH OF FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

1-11. JP 3-22 states that for FID to be successful in meeting an HN’s needs, the USG must integrate the efforts of multiple government agencies. Such integration and coordination are essentially vertical between levels of commands and organizations and horizontal between USG agencies and HN military and civilian agencies. Management of the FID effort begins at the national level, with the selection of those nations the United States will support through FID efforts. This decision is made by the President with advice from the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and other officials. The United States will consider FID support when the existing or threatened internal disorder threatens U.S. national strategic goals or when the threatened nation requests and is capable of effectively using U.S. assistance.

1-12. In times of need, nations often look to other nations for assistance. Nations seeking assistance often struggle to quell unrest within their borders or look for ways to strengthen or promote professionalism within their militaries. Internal problems could stem from economic issues, public dissatisfaction with the government, social unrest, or terrorism. Unfortunately, these problems may also be exacerbated by shortcomings in the military, such as corruption, human rights abuses, and incompetence. The United States has historically promoted democracy and freedom in other nations by assisting nations in seeking solutions for improving security and suppressing unrest within their borders. Numerous U.S. civilian and military organizations support this effort.

1-13. Planners must consider all instruments of national power and how those elements produce the comprehensive approach of FID. Figure 1-2 uses the diplomatic, information, military, and economic model to structure and illustrate the comprehensive approach. FID fits into this framework as the chief operation and effort under the military element of national power. The National Security Council is responsible for planning guidance for FID at the strategic level. The DOS is normally designated as the lead agency for the execution of these programs up to the point that the President authorizes major combat operations. Military assistance is often required to provide a secure environment to accomplish HN goals, and the DOD provides personnel and equipment to help achieve objectives.

1-14. FID requirements include the identified needs of an HN along with a compilation of the national military strategy, the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), joint plans, and the theater campaign plans of the GCCs. These plans are based on U.S. policies developed with friends, allies, and partner nations. These strategic commitments may lead to enhanced security, greater cooperation, and stronger alliances with the nations involved. Commitments to other nations for providing more secure environments may lead to various programs to help build or enhance the HN IDAD program or may provide assistance in other areas. Military involvement in FID activities varies and ranges from training HN forces, with a goal of enabling them to internally secure strategic infrastructure facilities (such as ports), to providing training courses in specific activities (such as counterterrorism), to enabling the HN to render environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. FID could also be interrelated with other military operations or actual combat operations. One Army unit could have a task to train a force and, once completed, another military unit may advise or assist the trained HN force to conduct actual combat operations. A conventional military unit, such as an engineer company, might work permissively in a secure part of the HN by building a road with a civilian agency.

HOLISTIC INTERACTION

1-15. The concept of the diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of national power comes with the inherent implication that all elements share information to build partnerships. In some instances, conditions may require the adaptation of one element of national power to be the principal force wielded in IDAD support and participation in FID. This may seem contradictory, as FID is oriented toward security; however, a country team can accomplish a successful security improvement in an HN. This can be accomplished through diplomacy and the use of organic elements and perhaps United Nations police training organizations. Nevertheless, most actions to support FID use all of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power to some degree (JP 3-0). To cite a single example, economic support might include an active program to reduce corruption (which undermines the HN’s legitimacy) and human rights abuses at all levels in the HN. The method of holistic interaction ensures the differing instruments of national power are bound in a collaborative environment to facilitate the comprehensive approach. By applying all instruments of national power, along with the fundamental principles of joint operations, the traditional military principle of war is exponentially increased.

1-16. The following four points illustrate some of the actions of each element in this case:

The diplomatic element interfaces with the highest echelons of the HN government to bring pressure at the national level for change.

The informational element, through organic DOS elements and DOD MISO forces, assists the HN with both indirect and direct support to influence target audiences capable of reducing or reporting graft and corruption.

The military element (in addition to the information element) conducts active training with HN military members on the dangers of graft and corruption.

The economic element, in conjunction with the other instruments of national power, may bring pressure by denying contracts or improvement projects to known companies or agencies engaged in corrupt practices.

1-17. The holistic interaction does not imply that all instruments of national power are exercised to conduct every FID operation, but it rather conveys the required close coordination of all elements involved, regardless of the lead in a given operation. The lead may be the country team or a joint force commander; in either case, a comprehensive and collaborative approach is required. In a country whose IDAD plan is accomplished largely through a diplomatic presence, establishing or continuing some military-to-military missions continues to keep the military element in synchronization with the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic model of the other elements. The holistic interaction may be concentrated in any one or more of the instruments of national power. For instance, with incipient threats or thoroughly exhausted and interdicted threats, the military element of U.S. national power may play only a small role in the final interdiction of the internal threat. Conversely, the preponderance of effort against a powerful internal threat will typically rely heavily on the military instrument of national power. The key to successful use of the method of holistic interaction is adapting and achieving the right mix of USG support to the HN.

RULE OF LAW

1-18. ATP 3-07.5 states that “rule of law is a principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles.” In FID, the USG conducts foreign assistance within the rule of law. The end state is to enable foreign partners to conduct actions within an absolute legal basis. FID legal issues are governed by U.S. Federal law, international law, and HN law. Appendix A of this publication provides further guidance on law, authorities, and the legal aspects of operations. The judge advocate general should be consulted because activities conducted in rule of law involve the practice of law and, therefore by statute, are performed by judge advocates or other attorneys under the statutory technical supervision of the judge advocate general. FID operations are conducted in HNs to operate through the rule of law and to assist in applying modern codified law enforced by legitimate state actors and forces with an independent judiciary and respect for human rights. Legal constraints on operations and (at a minimum) the essential staff experts of the country team provide a framework of legal and diplomatic protection for the practitioner. If an HN has deficiencies in what the United States (and typically the global community) has identified in its concept of the just application of the rule of law, there will typically be a program of legal reform in place. Such reform may be slow.

1-19. As long as a country’s sovereign right to domestic authority and autonomous control from external intervention endures (Westphalian sovereignty), it is likely that the concept of rule of law will vary. The true rule of law varies even in current, economically powerful democracies. In democracies, the secular and the sacred comingle under the rule of law. One nation retains harsh criminal penalties, while another nation finds incarceration odious except in the worst of crimes. The FID practitioner, in both robust and small-scale operations, must be cognizant of the aims (if any) of the USG in reforming the HN rule of law. Soldiers conducting operations in remote areas must understand that they may witness far different legal practices than would be seen in an industrialized democracy. Their role can range from simply observing their counterparts during operations to actively instilling changes in the conduct of their counterparts commensurate with DOS and DOD directives based on the HN’s legal reform. The exact legal obligations of trainers and advisors are discussed in Appendix A of this manual.

RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER OPERATIONS

1-20. Ultimately, FID efforts are successful if they preclude the need to deploy large numbers of U.S. military personnel and equipment. (The absolute hallmark, of course, remains the use of nonmilitary instruments of national power to support HN threat eradication.) FID is among the operations within the irregular warfare construct. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle between state and nonstate actors for legitimacy with an influence over the relevant population. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode the power, influence, and will of the adversary. FID is one of the most prevalent irregular warfare subset operations; however, it may simultaneously be conducted with operations outside this construct. This operation takes place in an arena that invariably includes nation assistance and may also include greater or lesser degrees of operations, such as support to COIN, counterterrorism, peace operations, DOD support for counterdrug operations, and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). These categories may include FID operations as an integral component in supporting the fight against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to security. These operations are distinct and vary from country to country to support a country’s IDAD program.

1-21. FID may be intertwined with security assistance and building partner capacity under the umbrella of nation assistance as a joint action as acknowledged in JP 3-0. The operational concept frames how Army forces, operating as part of a joint force, conduct operations, to include FID operations. These operations may be conducted by Army forces as applicable doctrine to defeat an enemy or to establish conditions necessary to achieve the national strategic end state under the range of military operations—from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence to major operations and campaigns. Both FID and nation assistance are subsets of security cooperation with similarities at the tactical level in which advisory skills are applicable to both. At the strategic and operational levels, FID and security assistance are joint actions that are applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives. SFA includes the DOD’s contribution to unified action to develop foreign security forces capacity and capability from ministerial down to units of those forces. At operational and strategic levels, both SFA and the military instrument of FID focus on preparing foreign military and security forces. Building partner capacity includes USG interactions with foreign partners to develop that nation’s partner capability to govern effectively and securely. One of the DOD’s key mission areas is to build the security capacity of partner states. The goals of SFA, building partner capacity and conducting FID, have much overlap in that they all intend to enable partner nations to provide for their own security, with a collective goal of contributing effectively to broader regional or global security challenges by maintaining professional, civilian-led militaries that respect human rights. FID is established in U.S. law and involves application of the instruments of U.S. national power in support of a foreign nation confronted by threats. It focuses on the U.S. efforts within unified action to enhance the IDAD programs. FID is a core operation and the centerpiece of SOF’s regional and global efforts to proactively promote security. SFA may be an activity of SOF during FID operations. SFA encompasses joint force activities conducted within unified action to organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, and advise and assist foreign security forces in support of efforts to plan and resource, generate, employ, transition, and sustain local, HN, or regional security forces and their supporting institutions. SFA does not include direct combat by U.S. forces, as direct combat does not build the capacity or capability of foreign security forces; however, it could involve U.S. forces advising foreign security forces who engage in direct combat. FID will be intertwined across the Army and joint range of military operations. Operations can precede or evolve from deteriorating conditions in an HN, such as noncombatant evacuation operations. The likelihood remains that other operations, such as humanitarian demining operations, may be part of future operations. In addition, the increased internal and regional stability fostered by successful FID may reduce the likelihood of states either acquiring or proliferating weapons of mass destruction or possible delivery systems.

ANCILLARY EXTERNAL BENEFITS

1-22. The strategic end state of FID is an HN capable of successfully integrating military force with other instruments of national power to eradicate subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to security. Collaterally with this influence, the HN will also typically gain an ancillary benefit of achieving a much stronger capability and heightened confidence to defend its borders against external threats. This ancillary effect has been codified in FID doctrine since its inception and complements the focus of operations, deterring hostilities and enhancing stability in the theater of operations. An internal threat may have significant support and resources from neighboring nation-states, transnational actors, or globally displaced communities. In addition, one of the benefits in FID programs that cross over into the security assistance realm is the general professionalizing of HN military and law enforcement agencies. This benefit is realized as the HN military transfers to new assignments. The HN benefits from strengthening internally through the application of all instruments of national power and, ultimately, gains the ability to project power externally, if required, as regional stability equating to sovereign security.

TRANSITIONS FROM FAILED AND OCCUPIED STATES OPERATIONS

1-23. The likelihood of failed states requiring intervention by the world community may remain an issue for some time. Stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations move such states into more stable, functioning entities. FID is an integral subset of DOS stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations, as well as the U.S. Army unified land operations component—stability tasks. Amid the wide mix of strategic and operational challenges, Army units conduct decisive action that requires continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. Army design methodology creates a more thorough understanding of the operational environment and of the problems to be addressed. Within mission command, commanders build teams and establish themes and messages to drive processes and procedures. Mission command enables an operationally adaptive force that anticipates transitions; accepts risks to create opportunities; informs friendly and unified action partners; and influences neutrals, adversaries, and enemies. The exact point at which a stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operation evolves into a sole FID operation under a viable IDAD program remains highly variable and dependent upon the operational environment. Because this sort of transition will likely follow a major intervention by the United States or coalition forces, the change in characterization must be made at very high levels. Such a change in characterization is the province of the President or his designee. In the case of transitioning to an exclusively FID operation, the designee is normally the U.S. Ambassador. Such a transition can only happen when the U.S. country team is once again the lead agent in the country in question and the U.S. military presence in the HN is at levels commensurate with a robust operation. Although highly fluid and somewhat difficult to define, a robust operation might be characterized as being dominated by a limited number of SOF and conventional forces assisting the military of the HN in subduing residual security threats, coupled with a larger contingent of SOF and conventional trainers. This shift in balance from a majority of operational forces to a majority of trainers is a reasonable indicator of transition between stability, security, transition, and reconstruction.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

1-24. Security force assistance is defined as the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-22). Like FID, SFA is typically conducted by a joint, interagency force with the Army component made up of Regular Army, Army National Guard and Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve units. FID and SFA share similar TTP. FID has a narrative almost five decades old, whereas the SFA narrative is still emerging. There are some emerging maxims of note to FID and SFA planners, to include the following:

Neither FID nor SFA subsumes the other or negates the efficacy of the other.

Any strategic concept for HN security support could include either the simultaneous execution of both or exclusively one or the other.

ARSOF units operating to support SFA use their established FID TTP.

Conventional units supporting FID operations may need additional training if not proficient in SFA TTP.

1-25. SFA may be employed with a functional HN government and a U.S. country team lead, with an extremely dysfunctional or embryonic HN government and be under the DOD’s command, or be conducted with regional or indigenous forces under a legitimate authority. SFA may—

Develop regional forces.

Precede a regime change.

Follow a forced regime change.

Have less legal considerations and constraints than FID.

Develop a capability and capacity to counter external threats.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TOOLS

1-26. The DOD brings a host of conventional forces and SOF capabilities to support IDAD through FID. The Security Assistance Training Management Organization is another DOD tool available to provide support to a foreign request for defense articles or services. The Security Assistance Training Management Organization assists with price and availability data, letters of offer and acceptance, technical assistance, and training teams. When defense articles or services are required, the requesting country’s representative provides a letter of request to his U.S. counterpart. Copies of the request are sent to the DOS Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The DSCA is the principal DOD organization through which the SecDef carries out responsibilities for security assistance. Within the DOD, the military departments and other implementing agencies manage individual country programs, including the development of the letters of offer and acceptance and the delivery of defense articles and services under the letter of offer and acceptance contract. Financial management of accepted letters of offer and acceptance is a responsibility of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. A security cooperation organization (SCO), under the direction of the chief of mission (ambassador), conducts the in-country management of each recipient nation’s security assistance programs. In addition, in the majority of countries, the functions of an SCO are carried out under the direction of the senior defense official or defense attaché. The SCO is the most important FID-related military activity under the supervision of the ambassador. The SCO provides oversight in conjunction with its HN counterparts, the country team within the diplomatic mission, the Component Subordinate Command of the Geographic Combatant Command, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DSCA, and the military departments. The Security Assistance Training Management Organization coordinates with the security cooperation officer who coordinates activities of the security assistance teams to ensure compatibility with other DOD elements in or directly related to other ongoing in-country activities. The security cooperation officer ensures compliance with directives and keeps the GCC informed of security assistance activities and progress. The DOD conducts activities under a variety of programs established under security assistance within the USC that are regulated under the auspices of both DOD and civilian agencies. Appendix A provides additional legal, regulatory, and policy considerations for operations. All of these programs can be characterized as indirect support, direct support, or combat operations; however, U.S. forces may simultaneously conduct some degree of all three forms of support at different locations and times during operations. FID conveyed through the theme of irregular warfare may either involve economy of force and indirect support with SOF or direct support with the integration of SOF and conventional forces. The instruments of power are the ways, the security assistance resources are the means, and the regional strategic objectives are the ends that are achieved through FID.

Note: The DOS regulates and executes portions of some of the programs discussed in the following paragraphs, which provide details on these programs from the standpoint of tools available to the DOD.

INDIRECT SUPPORT

1-27. GCCs are active in the security assistance process by advising ambassadors through the SCO and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing security assistance efforts in their areas of responsibility (AORs). In addition, through coordination with HN military forces and supporting SCOs, the combatant commander can assist in building credible military assistance packages that best support long-term goals and objectives of regional programs. Joint and multinational exercises can enhance a FID program. They offer the advantage of training U.S. forces while simultaneously increasing interoperability with HN forces and offering limited HN training opportunities. Exchange programs foster greater mutual understanding and familiarize each force with the operations of the other. Exchange programs are another building block that can help commanders round out their plans. Some of these programs include reciprocal unit exchange programs, personnel exchange programs, individual exchange programs, and combination programs.

1-28. Indirect support emphasizes the principle of the self-sufficiency of the HN. Indirect support focuses on building strong national infrastructures through economic, military, and other capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. The U.S. military’s contribution to this type of support is derived from security cooperation guidance and is provided primarily through security assistance. Indirect support is supplemented by multinational exercises, exchange programs, and select joint exercises. Army units may simultaneously conduct indirect and direct support of the HN military. For instance, a MISO unit might train and advise the HN personnel on producing a specific product of their own, while simultaneously producing products of the same that directly support the psychological objective. An Army engineer unit may be training counterparts in one area while supporting road construction in another.

1-29. Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (JP 3-22). Security cooperation, security assistance, and FID are closely related. DOD Directive 5132.03 sets the policy and assigns responsibilities under the GEF, Title 10 USC, Title 22 USC, Executive Orders, Guidance for Development of the Force, and policies relating to the administration of security cooperation, to include security assistance. CJCSI 3141.01E states that the Joint Staff Director for Strategic Plans and Policy is responsible for developing recommendations on strategy, strategic concepts, and politico-military matters, to include security cooperation, security assistance, and stability operations.

1-30. The GEF consolidates and integrates the DOD planning guidance into an overarching document that supersedes security cooperation guidance. The GEF transitions DOD planning from a contingency-centric approach to a strategy-centric approach with a broader theater emphasis on the regional ends as opposed to the means. The guidance places emphasis on steady-state activities to achieve end states and objectives that reflect the centrality of security cooperation activities listed in national strategy documents. The centerpiece of the guidance is the requirement for combatant commanders to develop joint campaigns that translate national and theater strategy into joint operational concepts to ensure steady-state activities and operations are integrated and synchronized for achieving and attaining the regional or functional end states specified in the GEF (JP 5-0). Joint operation planning includes all activities that must be accomplished to develop courses of action (COAs) for contingency or anticipated operations—the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces. Planners recommend and commanders define criteria for the termination of joint operations, and they link these criteria to the transition to stabilization and achievement of the end state (JP 3-05). The Adaptive Planning and Execution system (APEX system) and the joint operation planning process promote coherent planning across all levels of war and command echelons, easing the transition to crisis action planning. Joint planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a specified end state. The military’s contribution to national strategic planning consists of joint strategic planning and its three subsets:

Security cooperation planning.

Joint operation planning.

Force planning.

1-31. The GEF provides goals and activities for specific regions and provides the overarching framework for many FID-related activities. Security cooperation tools and resources are as follows:

Multinational education.

Multinational exercises.

Multinational experimentation.

Multinational training.

Counternarcotics assistance.

Counterproliferation or nonproliferation.

Defense and military contracts.

Defense support to public diplomacy.

Facilities and infrastructure projects.

Humanitarian assistance.

Intelligence cooperation.

Information sharing.

International armaments cooperation.

Security assistance.

Other programs and activities.

1-32. Security assistance is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency (JP 3-22). Figure 1-3, page 1-13, depicts the relationship of security cooperation, security assistance, and FID. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by the DOS to be administered by the DOD and DSCA.

1-33. Security assistance is a principal instrument in the U.S. FID effort. Like FID, security assistance is a broad, encompassing topic and includes efforts of civilian agencies, as well as those of the military. Security assistance provides defense materiel, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales. The express goal of the USG security assistance is the expansion of U.S. national policies and objectives by enhancing the ability of lesser-developed nations to remain secure from primarily external but also internal threats. The post-Cold War paradigm in security assistance is for nations supported by the program to have regional parity to maintain balances of power and internal stability. Overall, only a portion (in terms of both numbers of programs and budgets) of the security assistance effort encompasses FID, but that portion is a large part of the overall effort. The FAA of 1961 (as amended) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 (as amended) authorize the security assistance program. The program is under the supervision and general direction of the DOS. Figure 1-3, page 1-13, shows security assistance as a complete subset of security cooperation.

1-34. The military component of security assistance is implemented by the DOD under the DSCA policy guidance and in conjunction with the DOS. DSCA Manual 5105.38-M and AR 12-1 describe the programs in detail. The major types of DOD Army security assistance programs and activities are—

Foreign military sales (FMS).

Note: FMS are funded either by the customer or through a foreign military financing arrangement, credit, or guaranteed loan.

Foreign military construction services.

FMS credit.

Leases.

Military Assistance Program.

International military education and training (IMET).

Drawdown.

1-35. The major types of DOS security assistance programs are—

Economic support fund.

Peacekeeping operations.

International narcotics control and law enforcement.

Nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs.

Commercial export sales licensed under the AECA of 1976 (as amended).

1-36. The DOS provides financial support to international peacekeeping operations, a subset of peace operations, through a peacekeeping operations fund. These components, combined with the economic support fund and commercial sales licensed under the AECA, are security assistance tools that the United States can use to further its national interests and support the overall FID effort.

1-37. FMS are authorized by the AECA and are conducted using formal contracts or agreements between the USG and an authorized foreign purchaser. This program provides help to nations with weak economies that would otherwise be unable to afford U.S. assistance. FMS enable foreign governments to purchase defense materiel, services, and training from the USG. Eligible nations can use this program to help build national security infrastructures. DSCA Manual 5105.38-M provides details for FMS eligibility criteria with charts depicting the region, country, and organization. A limitation of this program, especially in relationship to FID, is that many nations that need the benefits of this program lack the resources to purchase the materiel and training. The dilemma for those nations is that they need to take money from civilian programs to execute FMS, which may exacerbate the problems motivating an internal threat. When a foreign entity cannot finance a purchase by other means, credit financing can be extended if allowed by U.S. law or if allocated by the DOS within the annual foreign military financing ceiling imposed by U.S. law. When authorized, the foreign military financing program can provide funding for financing the procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services through loans or grants to eligible foreign countries and organizations. The foreign military financing program can be an extremely effective tool. Foreign governments and international organizations eligible for FMS are eligible for foreign military financing.

1-38. IMET contributes to the internal and external security of a country by providing training to selected foreign militaries and related civilian personnel. The IMET program offers training to foreign countries through DOD schools, which includes formal, informal, correspondence, and distance learning in the United States or overseas. Eligible foreign governments or international organizations may purchase training through the FMS program or foreign assistance appropriations, such as the IMET program, foreign military financing, or peacekeeping operations. The IMET program helps strengthen foreign militaries through U.S. military education with exposure to democratic values that are necessary for the functioning of a civilian-controlled, apolitical, professional military. AR 12-15 prescribes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for training foreign personnel. Chapter 10, Section C10.7, of DSCA Manual 5105.38-M, provides a list of other training programs, such as joint combined exchange training and many other programs. Training programs have long-term positive effects on U.S. and HN multinational relations. The USG may provide IMET funds to foreign governments to train and professionalize their militaries. IMET serves as an influential foreign policy tool in which the United States shapes doctrine, promotes self-sufficiency in maintaining and operating U.S.-acquired defense equipment, encourages Western values, and occasionally causes marked changes in the policies of the recipient governments. Foreign students—many of whom occupy the middle and upper echelons of their country’s military and political establishments—are taught U.S. defense doctrine and employment of U.S. weapon systems. The results of IMET are greater cooperation and interoperability between the United States and foreign partners.

1-39. The military component of security assistance funds U.S. peace operations, such as the multinational force and observers in the Sinai and the U.S. contribution to the United Nations Force in Cyprus. The five types of peace operations include—

Peacekeeping operations.

Peace enforcement operations.

Peacemaking.

Peace building.

Conflict prevention.

1-40. Although related to FID operations, peace operations are limited in scope and funding levels and generally considered separate activities with focused goals and objectives. FID may be conducted in HNs in which peace operations are ongoing, but this typically involves only liaison efforts and deconfliction by planners and executors.

1-41. Antiterrorism assistance, under the overall coordination of the Secretary of State, is designed to enhance the ability of foreign law enforcement personnel to deter terrorist acts, such as bombing, kidnapping, assassination, hostage-taking, and hijacking. DOD training of law enforcement personnel is significantly restricted by Section 660, Prohibiting Police Training, of the FAA; however, awareness of and liaison with HN and USG law enforcement agencies can only improve those FID programs that involve counterterrorism training, exercises, or actions. HN forces designated for the antiterrorism or counterterrorism role may be military or paramilitary forces.

1-42. Joint and multinational exercises strengthen U.S. and HN relations and interoperability of forces. These exercises are Joint- and Service-funded and complement security assistance and civil-military operations (CMO) by validating HN needs and capabilities and by providing a vehicle for the conduct of humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs. Their effect can be magnified through the lens of information operations (in particular MISO, public affairs, and defense support to public diplomacy) conducted unilaterally or bilaterally with the HN. There are very strict legal restrictions on the type of support that can be provided and on the monetary limits of such support. Chapter 6 and Appendix A provide additional information on legal restrictions and monetary limitations.

1-43. Military exchange programs also support the overall FID program by fostering mutual understanding between forces; familiarizing each force with the organization, administration, and operations of the other; and enhancing cultural awareness. Exchange programs, coupled with the IMET program, are extremely valuable in improving relations. These programs may have long-term implications for strengthening democratic ideals and respect for human rights among supported governments.

DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT OPERATIONS)

1-44. Direct support operations provide immediate assistance and are usually combined in a total program with indirect operations. Several types of direct operations are important to supporting FID. CMO span a very broad area and include activities, such as CA operations, FHA, HCA, and military civic action, across the range of military operations. Using CMO to support military activities in a program can enhance preventive measures, reconstruction efforts, and combat operations in support of an IDAD program. MISO provides support to the achievement of national objectives by influencing behaviors in select target foreign audiences. Military training to nation forces may focus on subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency problems encountered by the nation that may be beyond its capabilities to control. Logistic support operations are limited by U.S. law and usually consist of transportation or limited maintenance support, although an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement can allow additional support in other areas. Authorization for combatant commanders to provide logistic support to the HN military must be received from the President or SecDef. Intelligence and information sharing, although two separate areas, are closely related and have many of the same employment considerations. Assistance may be provided in terms of evaluation, training, limited information exchange, and equipment support.

1-45. Direct support operations involve the use of U.S. forces providing direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military. These operations differ from security assistance in that they are Joint- or Service-funded. In addition, these operations do not usually involve the transfer of arms and equipment. When direct support includes training local military forces, it is distinguished from indirect support in the immediacy with which the HN force uses their training operationally. In such cases, the unit may transition from training to combat. In other words, the HN, under unified land operations, could transition from stability training to defensive or offensive combat operations. Typically, such training represents the validation of units that may already be in a high state of readiness. Direct support operations normally are conducted when the HN is not yet self-sufficient and is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its handling capability. Assistance usually focuses on CMO (primarily the provision of services to the local populace), MISO, communications and intelligence sharing, and logistic support. In some cases, training of the military and the provision of new equipment may be warranted. In the case of direct support, the U.S. Ambassador and commanders use DOD personnel in roles that typically assume more risks than indirect support.

1-46. CMO are a variety of activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace. These operations are conducted in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations and to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. CA not only support a COIN program but also enhance all FID programs. CMO may be used in a preventive manner to address root causes of instability in a reconstructive manner after conflict or in support of disaster relief, consequence management, civil defense, counterdrug operations, and antiterrorism activities.

1-47. Civil Affairs operations (CAO) are defined as actions planned, executed, and assessed by Civil Affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government (JP 3-57). CAO serve as a critical link between U.S. forces providing support in an HN with the government, military force, and civilian population. CA facilitate the integration of U.S. military support into the overall IDAD programs of the supported nation.

1-48. Foreign humanitarian assistance is the Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation (JP 3-29). FHA is conducted to mitigate conditions that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by DOD forces is often limited in scope and duration. Nevertheless, these programs are often an integral part of an overall FID program.

1-49. HCA activities are designed to support the HN populace in conjunction with U.S. military operations. These activities are integrated into the overall FID program to enhance the stability of the GCC’s AOR, as well as to improve the readiness of U.S. forces deployed in the theater of operations.

1-50. Military civic action is the use of predominantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels, in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development. These programs also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. Activities may involve U.S. supervision and advice, but normally the local military conducts the activities. Military civic action is an essential part of military support to a FID program and assists the local government with developing capabilities to provide for the security and well-being of its own population. It may mitigate and eventually, when coupled with other activities, eliminate the ill will and mistrust of the populace toward the HN military.

1-51. The focus of MISO during FID operations is to support the U.S. national objectives, the GCC’s regional security strategy objectives, and the country team’s objectives. MISO are used to promote the ability of the HN to defend itself against threats in several ways. Successful use discredits and marginalizes threats while simultaneously fostering trust in HN institutions. MISO also introduce, clarify the position of, and then articulate the exit strategy for the United States and coalition forces. Much like other ARSOF, such as CA and SF, MISO elements often continue to have a presence and relevance in scaled-back activities well after a larger contingent of SOF and conventional forces have succeeded in achieving the main goals of FID.

1-52. U.S. military training support to FID should focus on assisting HNs in anticipating, precluding, and countering threats or potential threats. When organizing, planning, and executing military training support to a program, it is essential that the emphasis be on IDAD. This emphasis helps the HN address the root causes of instability in a preventive manner rather than reacting to threats. Training programs for the HN military and law enforcement may increase if an operation involves a transition from indirect to direct support.

1-53. U.S. military involvement in FID historically has been focused on COIN. Increasingly, however, U.S. programs may also aim at other threats to HN internal stability, such as civil disorder, corruption, human rights abuses, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. Many of these threats are increasingly intertwined. For instance, whereas the typical communist insurgency disdained illicit drugs (at least officially), modern threats feel little if any compunction to avoid this or any other criminal endeavor that furthers its goals. Religious extremism increasingly blurs the line between terrorism and insurgency. It is useful, however, to maintain a distinction between that part of FID that is counterterrorism and that part which is COIN. For instance, it may be highly counterproductive to the MISO effort to characterize insurgents who do not engage in terrorism or who are citizens of the HN as terrorists. U.S. military training, therefore, should focus on the specific threats present.

1-54. In FID operations, COIN operations or relevant TTP may represent a large or even a preponderance of these efforts. The likelihood that some sort of ideological-based insurgency will remain a perennial FID-focus in the future is high. In addition, insurgents and other threats may employ the same tactics and techniques against the HN, to include classic insurgency methods. In terms of operational focus, it is irrelevant if an internal threat is a true insurgent or is, for instance, a narcoterrorist group using political rhetoric to foster recruitment and gain legitimacy. The focus of such operations may be a mix of classic counterdrug operations and COIN techniques to separate the group from their base of support in the populace. Increasingly, threats of all types attempt to employ religious or political rhetoric to further their standing or fear in the HN and, sometimes even more importantly, in the United States and among third parties. Typically, this has been done through the regional and global media. It is irrelevant if the internal threat is actually ideologically based or is disingenuously using religious or political rhetoric to further its aims. The internal threat can, in effect, become legitimate if sufficient media exposure elicits a broad perception of legitimacy or even the inevitability of its victory. Therefore, a fundamental ethos of COIN remains a constant in FID—namely denying popular support to threats through a balance of lethal and nonlethal interdiction, as well as measures directed at winning the support of the populace for the HN.

1-55. The characterization of an operation as primarily FID with COIN elements is the province of the overall military commander and/or the country team. In an operation with significant U.S. military support committed for the interdiction of insurgents, major U.S. interests are typically at stake. As such, the decision to characterize an operation as COIN usually rests at the highest levels of the USG, up to and including Presidential visibility. Army commanders and Soldiers must be cognizant if an operation and an internal threat are deemed best interdicted by not characterizing the threat as an insurgency. This can be a challenge, when at the tactical and operational levels that interdiction is accomplished through COIN TTP. For Army commanders, the blend of COIN, counterterrorism, counterdrug, and other operations is accomplished on a case-by-case basis. The emphasis on one or another subset of irregular warfare techniques employed in FID is influenced by the conditions in the HN and the amount of resources available to combat an internal threat. Conventional forces or ARSOF commanders prioritize FID operations based on the threat, and that threat may evolve or devolve quickly. Comprehensive plans anticipate this change and respond to it proactively by adjusting the balance of COIN, counterterrorism, or other techniques.

1-56. During direct FID operations, U.S. military capabilities may be used to provide transportation or maintenance support to the HN military for operations that do not routinely expose U.S. personnel to hostile fire. Logistic support must be provided with consideration of the long-term effect on the capability of the local forces to become self-sufficient. It may be necessary to provide logistic support for a surge capacity if the HN is incapable of obtaining logistic support. This must be articulated as temporary and must be balanced with the ability of the HN to return to a stable situation afterward without permanently overextending their capabilities.

1-57. During tactical operations, U.S. intelligence and communication range from strategic analysis to current intelligence summaries and situation reporting. With the proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems, as well as other organic collection assets, the ability for Soldiers to support HN forces with timely intelligence and information continues to grow. As an adequate intelligence collection and dissemination capability is often one of the weakest links in the HN military capability, the ability to provide this support can prove decisive. The release of classified information to the HN is governed by national disclosure policy. Detailed guidance must be provided to the senior U.S. commander in the chain of command and distributed to subordinate commands supporting FID according to all statutory and regulatory guidance. Limited delegation of authority, where appropriate, can supplement detailed written guidance.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

1-58. Many considerations, including CMO and MISO, must be discussed and reviewed when employing combat forces in support of FID. They include—

Maintaining close coordination with the nation’s IDAD organization.

Tiering of forces.

Establishing transition points.

Maintaining a joint, interagency, and multinational focus.

Identifying and integrating logistics, intelligence, and other types of support means in U.S. combat operations.

Conducting combat operations only when directed by legal authority to stabilize the situation and to give the local government and nation’s military forces time to regain the initiative.

Following strict adherence to respect for human rights.

Following the ROE.

Preventing indiscriminate use of force.

Maintaining the U.S. joint intelligence network.

Integrating with other programs.

1-59. The command relationships will be modified based on the political, social, and military environment of the area. The HN government and security forces must remain in the forefront. Finally, sustainment of U.S. forces is essential to success. Political sensitivities and concern for HN legitimacy and minimum U.S. presence change the complexion of sustainment operations in FID.

1-60. The introduction or transition of U.S. forces into FID combat operations requires a Presidential decision. The use of U.S. forces in a combat role serves only as a temporary solution until the security situation is stabilized and HN forces are able to provide security for their populace. In all cases, U.S. combat operations support the IDAD program and remain strategically defensive. This stems from the fact that the HN is retaking its own sovereign soil and liberating its own people. However, offensive operations can be conducted by U.S. forces in FID operations that involve authorized combat. In addition, the HN forces should be encouraged and aided to gain the initiative for conducting offensive operations. Despite the goal of achieving a stable strategic defense, once combat operations are authorized, the HN is not restricted to its territories and may cross over into its neighboring states to defeat transnational threats. Combat operations may entail operations in cooperative bordering nations (for example, an active or passive coalition member) and may not include defensive action despite this strategic characterization. Although Joint- and Service-doctrine provide specific tactical procedures, there are certain principles that should guide employment of U.S. forces in a tactical or operational role to support FID combat operations. The presence of an uncooperative bordering nation unwilling or unable to curtail internal threats operating on its soil may require the escalation of combat operations outside the borders.

1-61. The primary role for U.S. military forces in tactical operations is to support, advise, and help HN forces through logistics, intelligence, or other support. This allows the force to concentrate on taking the offensive against hostile elements. If lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency reaches a level that HN forces cannot control, U.S. forces may need to engage the hostile elements directly. If possible, U.S. forces should avoid unilateral operations. In this case, the objective of U.S. operations is to protect or stabilize the political, economic, and social institutions until the HN can assume these responsibilities. In all cases, the strategic initiative and responsibility belong with the HN. To preserve its legitimacy and to ensure a lasting solution to the problem, the host government must bear this responsibility. Given the multinational and interagency impact of conducting combat operations supporting FID, commanders can expect complex command relationships in a collaborative environment that includes joint forces, multinational forces, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

1-62. The nature of U.S. tactical participation in HN internal conflicts requires judicious and prudent ROE and guidelines for the application of force. Inappropriate destruction and violence attributed to U.S. forces may easily reduce the legitimacy and sovereignty of the supported government. In addition, these incidents may be used by adversaries to fuel anti-American sentiments and to help the cause of the opposition. Conversely, failure to use sufficient force to gain and maintain security may doom FID operations and destroy the credibility of U.S. and HN forces to protect the populace. Civilians may endure hardship and accept collateral damage if an internal threat is completely interdicted. Army planners and executors must accept that a civil populace may expect nonlethal interdiction or that some populations may be satisfied only with lethal interdiction. The latter may be from either cultural imperatives or the simple desire (often stemming from fear) to be completely rid of a threat.

UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND POLICY

1-63. A basic premise of U.S. foreign policy is that the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions are best preserved and enhanced as part of a community of free and independent nations that adhere to the rule-of-law principle both within their borders and among the world community. In this regard, the United States encourages other countries to do their part in the preservation of freedom and independence for all nations. The objective of U.S. foreign policy is to support U.S. interests by means of a common effort. This common effort makes use of all instruments of national power to support an HN. The diplomatic instrument is often first used to show U.S. commitment. The political system within the HN is important in providing stability and must be willing to improve stability within its own borders. The economic instrument has influence across all aspects of FID.

1-64. In many cases, FID is incorporated into HN programs within nations that are less developed. These nations require a means to fundamentally improve their economies. Economic stressors, including government economic mismanagement, are often root causes of disaffection and unrest among the populations. U.S. support programs can range from development assistance and favorable trade arrangements to military financing. The informational instrument gets the message out to the public and portrays the positive efforts and accomplishments of the HN. These operations also publicize U.S. support and efforts to improve the HN. Although the focus of this publication is on the military instrument, the military instrument of national power is primarily a supporting role to the overall IDAD program.

1-65. Those governments that lack the will to address their social, economic, or political problems are unlikely to benefit from outside assistance. However, governments that mobilize their human and material resources may find that outside help, to include U.S. security assistance, makes a critical difference. Where significant U.S. national interests are involved, the United States may provide economic and military assistance to supplement the efforts of such governments.

1-66. The creation of a relatively stable internal environment, one in which economic growth can occur and the people are able to determine their own form of government, is a primary U.S. objective. Economic assistance, supplied either by the United States through bilateral agreements or by several nations through multilateral agreements, may help achieve this objective.

1-67. The threatened government is primarily responsible for creating a stable atmosphere through the commitment and use of all its internal resources. Just as the United States is committed to a comprehensive approach to supporting the HN, the HN should be equally committed to change. Under certain conditions, U.S. policy supports supplementing local efforts to maintain order and stability. These conditions are as follows:

The internal disorder is of such a nature as to pose a significant threat to U.S. national interests.

The threatened country is capable of effectively using U.S. assistance.

The threatened country requests U.S. assistance.

In addition, the magnitude of human suffering within a country may compel U.S. action in a country or region where national interests are not at stake.

1-68. The USG spends billions of dollars a year in programs to improve allied and friendly nations. There are numerous benefits to the U.S. military for conducting FID throughout the world. FID programs—

Bring diverse U.S. teams of Soldiers that embody the principles of freedom, fairness, and humanity to countries troubled by ethnic, racial, and religious strife and intolerance.

Help build and foster favorable relationships that promote U.S. interests. In many cases, programs lead to the establishment of personal and unit relationships.

Strengthen the capabilities of friendly nations, which ultimately strengthens U.S. security concerns.

Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access in many of the foreign areas aided by the United States.

Provide training exercises with foreign nations to increase the proficiency and skill of U.S. forces.

Improve U.S. forces’ regional knowledge of specific areas (environmental, geographical, social, political, economic, cultural, and spiritual), which can be disseminated throughout the force.

Improve the effectiveness of global operations against terrorist networks.

1-69. Subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency are the result of specific conditions within a nation. These conditions may stem from the population’s perception (often grounded to some degree in reality) that they are suffering from poverty, unemployment, religious disparity, political issues, crime, or tribal unrest that has been ignored or poorly dealt with by the HN government. These conditions have historically set the stage for lawlessness and insurgency against an established government. This type of internal strife or conflict within a nation’s borders may remain a local problem or it may expand, allowing an outside source to influence or create opposition toward the legitimate government. In some cases, outside sources may threaten the HN’s stability by exploiting the conditions within that nation to further their own cause. This outside influence may even establish itself within the HN to promote and support civil unrest. These types of conditions promote insurgencies and their violent methods, like terrorism.

1-70. Identification of the root cause of the problem, analysis of the environment, and identification of the specific needs of the HN are crucial in tailoring military support to help an IDAD program. The emphasis should be on helping the HN address the root cause of instability in a preventative manner rather than reacting to threats. Such reactionary strategies invariably fail. The United States supports specific nations, based on policy toward that nation or region, and implements programs to support those nations through the GCC’s security cooperation programs. Programs of all types, such as humanitarian assistance and counterterrorism programs, can prevent, reduce, or stop factors that contribute to the beginning or spread of subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. FID activities against an incipient, or even mature internal threats implemented through the GCC, may ultimately lead to stability within that nation or region and effectively reduce threats to the United States. In addition, even operations that escalate to combat operations reduce the number of U.S. casualties and the length of time committed to overcoming a virulent internal threat.

Chapter 2

Organization and Responsibilities

To help a country with its IDAD efforts, planners must understand the political climate, social attitudes, economic conditions, and cultural considerations; the threat to host government; and the local populace. In addition, within the globalized world, planners rarely have the luxury of discounting other local, regional, and even global influences. FID is primarily an instrument of the USG, with varying (and sometimes highly limited) degrees of support from other nations as partners to help the HN. When considering the IDAD effort and the role of FID in that effort, it is essential to realize that the DOD is only one organization fulfilling many of the support responsibilities. Appendix B provides additional information on IDAD strategy. International relationships are built along the continuum from peace to war between entities from all of the instruments of national power. All the power of the political entity in conflict must be brought to bear in a synchronized and mutually supportive role. This is true for FID operations and is of utmost importance for the HNs conducting an IDAD program. This chapter details the instruments of national power and their responsibilities with emphasis on how these other instruments synergize with the military arm of national power.

OVERVIEW

2-1. For FID to be successful in meeting HN needs, the United States must integrate the efforts of multiple government agencies. Interagency coordination during joint operations ensures that all diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments complement each other. This coordination also allows all available resources to be used in concert to build upon each other and avoid redundant and, therefore, wasteful efforts. Effective integration is difficult and consists of more than mere coordination. Rarely does a single instrument of national power accomplish an IDAD program component in the absence of other elements. Ideally, the FID program incorporates all instruments in a coordinated and supported manner that addresses HN requirements (military and, when possible, civilian). The military element must do this to support all U.S. national policies and interests. Such integration and coordination are essentially vertical between levels of commands and organizations and horizontal between USG agencies and HN military and civilian agencies.

SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES

2-2. The United States routinely aids nations around the world in varying capacities to foster stability in states that have few or low-level threats. However, U.S. support for IDAD that includes FID activities signals an environment in which the USG recognizes a viable threat. The United States then institutes a plan to support the IDAD strategy using the military element from the instruments of power. This may occur after long-term engagement solely or primarily through the other instruments of U.S. and HN national power if deemed as ineffective in providing comprehensive internal security. The USG may engage other instruments of national power under various criteria, but when FID is planned and executed, it is a planned approach, which is synchronized with regional end states and security cooperation strategies.

2-3. The President or SecDef decides the level and type of military assistance to support a FID program. Each program is distinct, even if regional similarities can provide potential best-practices planning suggestions. In addition, some programs can have coordinated activities when an internal threat operates in two or more bordering countries. However, each program is country-specific based on the IDAD strategy. The reality is that, even in a regional effort, the level of FID support in countries that are in close proximity or adjoining may differ greatly. Ordinarily, when FID limits support to minor levels of security assistance or CMO, there is no requirement for a special management program. In these cases, standard interagency coordination (typically under the chief of mission or designee) should be adequate. Major programs may demand levels of management and coordination beyond what is normally found at the interagency, combatant command, and country team levels.

THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

2-4. As evident in Figure 2-1, the lines of organization and command and control in a FID situation are complex. They follow the framework laid out in National Security Presidential Directive-1, which has had a lasting influence on the development and execution of complex contingency operation planning and execution. This directive mandates changes in procedures that continue to increase and improve interagency coordination and unity of effort. Planning and execution centers on the institutionalization of the National Security Council practices to manage a crisis and coordinate political-military plans.

2-5. In addition, National Security Presidential Directive-44 articulates the basic policy of U.S. efforts in stabilizing and reconstructing foreign states by various operations, including FID, when it states the United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.

DIPLOMATIC

2-6. The diplomatic instrument of national power makes extensive use of FID. A dysfunctional political system in a nation results in internal instability. This is especially true when government is dysfunctional down to the local level. Diplomacy is often the first instrument exercised by the United States in countries dealing with an internal threat. Depending upon the decision of the President or his designee, the diplomatic instrument of national power may be the only practical instrument of national power that can be brought to bear. Indirect and direct military support provided through training, logistics, or other support all make significant diplomatic statements by demonstrating U.S. commitment and resolve; therefore, the diplomatic instrument is always a complementary component of any involvement of U.S. military forces. In addition, the interaction of DOS and DOD personnel in the typical FID model, in which the DOS is the lead agency, reinforces the concept of civilian rule.

INFORMATION

2-7. Much like the diplomatic element of national power, the use of information may be the primary practical force that can be leveraged to support the IDAD plan. Effective use of public diplomacy, CMO, public affairs activities, and MISO are essential to a FID program. It is imperative that these elements work in a mutually supportive effort. The establishment of programs creates the possibility for public misunderstanding and for exploitation by elements hostile to the United States and its allies. U.S. foreign assistance that includes a military component may be met with skepticism (foreign and domestic). In the past, USG military foreign assistance has been the target for adversary propaganda. Use of MISO in the informational realm is sometimes a contentious issue between those who have a clear understanding of the role and function and those who erroneously equate all of MISO with deception.

2-8. FID offers a tremendous opportunity to portray U.S. support in a positive light but not at the expense of the supported nation that may be sensitive to accepting aid. Indeed, it may be counterproductive to exploit U.S. aid efforts if doing so creates the perception that the HN government or military is weak or incompetent. Those planning and conducting informational support must be continually mindful that information can travel to the majority of any population on the globe in minutes. Therefore, accurate portrayal of U.S. efforts through positive information programs can influence HN or regional perceptions of FID programs. Information programs can also highlight the HN desire to embrace the changes necessary to combat subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. Every program effort must be viewed in informational terms as a potential global media target. This means that Soldiers conducting operations must evaluate every action in terms of its informational (primarily psychological and political) impact to avoid negative third-order effects. In addition, this means that Soldiers and junior leaders must be empowered with the knowledge of how their tactical actions potentially affect operational or even strategic goals.

MILITARY

2-9. The military component of FID can vary greatly. Countless examples of small teams of ARSOF conducting generations of operations have created a proactive IDAD umbrella in many parts of the world. Typically, concurrent with these operations, successive conventional force trainers or advisors have also increased the competence and professionalism of the HN ground force. The civilian populace, internal threats, and neighboring states often view the entire trained HN force as elite. In terms of these internal threats and neighboring states, the capabilities of the HN force often far surpass the most competent cells or units employed against them.

2-10. FID is conveyed as a joint action under nation assistance and as one of the activities of irregular warfare. Historically, FID has not been the sole province of SOF, but it requires joint planning, preparation, and execution to integrate and focus the efforts of all Service and functional components.

2-11. FID is a core operation of ARSOF. An operation in which the inherent qualities and training of ARSOF Soldiers place them in a natural position to conduct (in joint environments with conventional forces) and command. FID by definition cannot take place without military support to the HN. It is, however, necessary to remain cognizant of the place of the military element in terms of the IDAD strategy as a whole. FID is a component of the military portion of national power used by the United States. It may be the smallest element (numerically and financially) of support to the HN. In addition, whether the operation is one with a small contingent of U.S. forces or a substantial force authorized to conduct combat operations, it is a multinational and interagency effort, which requires integration and synchronization of all instruments of national power. ARSOF may operate in a JTF, conduct planning to provide support to partners, prepare the environment, synchronize Army tasks with joint force partners, train and advise foreign security partners, assess FID effectiveness, and influence populations.

ECONOMIC

2-12. Economic factors influence every aspect of FID support. Often, unfavorable economic conditions give rise to the internal strife a supported nation may be facing. Internal threats may further exacerbate economic hardships through violence and destruction, which results in a worsening spiral. The weakening of national infrastructures and increase of instability create or heighten the perception that the HN government is not able to meet the basic needs of the people. Internal threats may then begin to usurp authority by conducting a series of related activities to provide for the basic needs of the populace with a goal of undermining the legitimacy and ability of the HN to provide for the populace. This tactic has historically been combined with a continued, deliberate targeting of the infrastructure in other areas to heighten the perception of worsening conditions in government-controlled areas. The U.S. economic instrument of power is used in a variety of ways inside the HN, ranging from direct financial assistance and favorable trade arrangements to the provision of foreign military financing under security assistance. When an internal threat receives support from third-country or nonstate organizations, economic and financial sanctions can be used to cut support to insurgent or other elements in the HN. Direct financial actions, such as the freezing of assets, can also markedly hinder an internal threat’s capabilities.

NATIONAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS

2-13. The United States uses multiple national-level organizations to address IDAD issues. The successful interaction and synchronization of IDAD efforts among these many agencies is evolving as described in JP 3-08. This publication addresses the interagency, IGO, and NGO relationships and provides fundamental principles and guidance to facilitate coordination between all agencies and organizations in the region. It also describes key USG departments and agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and their relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States. This reference points out the reality that joint operations bring together a myriad of USG agencies—all with different doctrine, terminology, culture, and, most important, capabilities. The following paragraphs discuss some of the national-level organizations involved in supporting FID. This discussion presupposes substantial crossover portions of interagency coordination and activities conducted within the continental United States, HN, and third countries. In addition, unless specifically stipulated, these activities are conducted by various echelons (frequently to the lowest echelons during operations) of all the agencies mentioned.

NATIONAL-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

2-14. Intelligence is critical to the execution of FID. Beyond that, it is critical for planning and the decisionmaking process at national levels to either execute or refrain from beginning operations. One of the advantages available to planners and executors under global operations against terrorist networks is increased connectivity to collaborative and accessible national-level intelligence dissemination programs. The Director of National Intelligence is responsible to the President to oversee the intelligence assets of the USG. The Central Intelligence Agency is an integral part of the Director of National Intelligence’s arsenal of intelligence gatherers and analysts. This agency’s mission is to support the President, the National Security Council, and all officials who make and execute U.S. national security policy. Through personnel in the continental United States and in the HN, the Central Intelligence Agency provides invaluable (and in some cases otherwise unobtainable) support to intelligence for FID. The National Security Agency was established by Presidential directive in 1952 to provide signals intelligence and communications security activities for the government. Since then, the National Security Agency has gained the responsibility for information systems security and operations security training. Appendix C contains more information about intelligence organizations under the Director of National Intelligence and the specific products, means, and methods they provide.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2-15. The National Security Act of 1947 (amended in 1949) created the National Security Council. The formal members are the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and SecDef. The Director of National Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the President’s national security advisor (the assistant to the President for national security affairs, also National Security Council director), and the deputy advisor usually attend meetings. The council also has a civilian staff. The President appoints an executive secretary to head the staff. Determinations for FID operations to commence, escalate, and terminate often require a decision by the National Security Council body. Invariably, the progression from direct support to combat operations involves the council advising the President (the sole authority to authorize combat operations in FID).

ARMS TRANSFER MANAGEMENT GROUP

2-16. The Arms Transfer Management Group is an interagency board that advises the Secretary of State on matters relating to security assistance program funding levels and arms transfer policies. The Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology chairs the Arms Transfer Management Group. The group manages and coordinates weapons- and equipment-related security assistance matters. It includes representatives from agencies throughout the executive branch who deal in security assistance matters. Its members are frequently from but not limited to the—

National Security Council.

DOD.

Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Central Intelligence Agency.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Office of Management and Budget.

Department of Treasury.

DOS.

USAID.

2-17. The group coordinates military assistance and military-related support assistance. This coordination encourages mutually supporting programs and increases the efficiency of the security assistance program.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2-18. The DOS is the federal department in the United States that sets and maintains foreign policies. This department is normally the lead agency for execution of FID programs with overall responsibility for the security assistance programs. The DOD provides the personnel and equipment to achieve objectives. The DOS is involved with policy formulation and execution of programs from the national level to the lowest levels within the HN. FID is best achieved by the DOS at levels that avoid deployment of large numbers of U.S. military personnel. The DOS incorporates all instruments of national power as a true whole-of-government or comprehensive approach, which is applied across the continuum of operations including the range of military operations—from stable peace to general war. FID operations are applied as indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat operations—all with the primary role to support and advise the HN’s IDAD program under the direction and lead of the DOS COM.

2-19. The DOS and USAID Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2014 to 2017 sets forth the Secretary of State’s direction and priorities for both organizations. The plan presents how the DOS and USAID will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance. The strategic goals represent the core of the DOS and USAID transformational diplomacy efforts. Table 2-1 depicts the five joint strategic goals and the key strategic objectives.

BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS

2-20. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, led by an assistant secretary, is the principal link between the DOS and DOD. This bureau provides policy direction in the areas of international security, security assistance, military operations, and defense trade. It is instrumental in the DOS’s efforts to accomplish Joint Strategic Goals, which are anchored in the President’s National Security Strategy.

2-21. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs advances the DOS to DOD relationship by bringing “smart power” to U.S. foreign policy in six key ways:

Providing the secretary with a global perspective on political-military issues.

Supporting the DOD by negotiating basing agreements, reviewing military exercises, facilitating overseas operations, and providing embedded foreign policy advisors to Service branch chiefs and combatant commands worldwide.

Promoting regional stability by building partnership capacity and strengthening friends and allies through security assistance programs.

Reducing threats from conventional weapons through humanitarian demining and small arms destruction programs and setting the stage for postconflict recovery in more than 50 nations around the world.

Contributing to defense and political-military policy and planning.

Regulating arms transfers and U.S. defense trade.

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS

2-22. The coordinator for the Bureau of International Information Programs supports U.S. foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes in other nations. The coordinator for the Bureau of International Information Programs advises the President, his representatives abroad, and various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies, programs, and official statements. The DOD and DOS information program efforts must be mutually supportive. Close coordination among embassy public affairs officers and cultural attachés, military public affairs offices, and MISO elements is essential. The Bureau of International Information Programs uses various media and methods to—

Publicize U.S. policies.

Plan and conduct informative programs to support U.S. or host-government agencies.

Counter propaganda hostile to U.S. interests.

Coordinate and synchronize MISO with guidance from the DOS.

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS

2-23. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs advises the President, Secretary of State, other bureaus in the DOS, and other departments and agencies within the USG on the development of policies and programs to combat international narcotics and crime. A secretary who is under the direction of the Under Secretary of Political Affairs heads the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The bureau’s programs support two of the strategic goals of the DOS:

Reducing the entry of illegal drugs into the United States.

Minimizing the impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens.

2-24. Counternarcotics and anticrime programs also complement counterterrorism efforts, both directly and indirectly, by promoting modernization of and supporting operations by foreign criminal justice systems and law enforcement agencies charged with the counterterrorism mission.

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

2-25. The USAID is the USG’s lead organization for international development assistance. The USAID works closely with the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Justice, and other government agencies to carry out development programming. The USAID plans and implements overseas programs that improve long-range economic and social development assistance efforts, as well as strategic priorities. All USAID missions are required to develop and use Country Development Cooperation Strategies. These five-year, country-based strategies show how agency assistance is synchronized with other U.S. agencies’ efforts, as well as the HN’s goals. These country strategies incorporate—

Presidential initiatives.

USG policies and strategies.

USAID policies and strategies.

2-26. Once approved, the country strategies inform assistance planning, budgeting, and resource allocation. These strategies rely on thorough analysis and division of labor to set and achieve ambitious goals and objectives in close collaboration with host government and citizens. Importantly, these strategies are reflective of the development agenda of the HN and work to align U.S. efforts with HN, international, and other bilateral donor programs working in the country.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

2-27. The U.S. Army, in general, has a long history of working with various agencies under the Department of Justice in joint interagency operations. FID is certainly no exception; it involves both the military and civil goals of restoring justice and law enforcement services to ensure HN stabilization and reconstruction. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs can provide a bridge from military, to security, to civil justice. Internal threats frequently cannot be given precise, one-dimensional definitions. A political or religious-based insurgency may frequently have no problem acquiring funds through criminal activity, such as piracy (intellectual and maritime), narcotics trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. Narcotraffickers need only to slip Marxist rhetoric into a pseudoideology to cross the line into narcoterrorism. Counterdrug operations must involve the Drug Enforcement Administration, and other operations may involve extensive coordination and intelligence sharing with Department of Justice agencies. For instance, close cooperation between the DOD and Department of Justice on programs like the various Rewards for Justice programs has yielded positive results in operations. In addition, as more terrorist activity abroad has been directed at USG property, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has increasingly worked with DOD elements to prosecute global operations against terrorist networks.

2-28. The Department of Justice has several standing programs executed abroad that support the goals of FID where there is a criminal element, an untrained or corrupt judiciary and police, or both. The International Crime Investigative Training Assistance Program develops police and correctional institutions, while the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training develops prosecutorial and judicial institutions and legislative reform. The USAID funds and the Department of Justice manages senior law enforcement advisors or prosecutors known as Resident Legal Advisors. These advisors are stationed in a host country for at least 1 year. They provide full-time advice and technical assistance in establishing fair and professionally managed justice sector institutions and practices. Senior law enforcement advisors institutionalize best practices for justice and police capacity building and reform, with a goal of establishing security at the community level for the HN populace. Senior law enforcement advisors are also assigned for a minimum of 1 year, but many serve several years at one or more posts. Senior law enforcement advisors create a single point of contact for all areas of law enforcement-related training and technical assistance in a given country.

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

2-29. The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence was created within the Department of Treasury to address broad illicit financing concerns. The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence combines the department’s intelligence and enforcement functions with the twin aims of safeguarding the financial system against illicit use and combating rogue nations, terrorist facilitators, money launderers, drug traffickers, and other national and transnational security threats. The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence consists of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Terrorist Financing, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and the Office of Foreign Assets Control.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

2-30. The United States Department of Agriculture has an important role in the interagency FID framework. Historically, most insurgencies occur in countries where a majority of the population is dependent upon agriculture and the unemployed or underemployed rural youth are considered prime candidates for recruitment. Development of the agricultural sector and its institutions facilitate trade and increase incomes, thereby reducing recruitment to, or support for, an insurgency or other internal threat. The Foreign Agricultural Service has the primary responsibility for the Department of Agriculture’s international activities, including market development, trade agreements and negotiations, and the collection and analysis of statistics and market information. The Foreign Agricultural Service carries out a broad array of international training, technical assistance, and other collaborative activities with developing and transitioning countries to facilitate trade and promote food security.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

2-31. Within the DOD, the Office of the SecDef acts as a policy-making organization in most FID matters. Numerous activities at the Office of the SecDef level affect programs. The following are directly involved in the areas of security assistance and in the general areas of low-intensity conflict and FID-related issues:

The Under SecDef for Policy exercises overall direction, authority, and control concerning security assistance for Office of the SecDef through the various assistant secretaries. The Under SecDef for Policy serves as the principal advisor and assistant to the SecDef for all matters involving the integration of DOD plans and policies with overall national security objectives.

The Assistant SecDef of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities oversees DOD special operations and has far-reaching policy responsibilities that can affect all areas of FID policy and programs.

The Assistant SecDef of International Security Affairs establishes policy and supervises security assistance programs through the DSCA. Security cooperation activities are conducted with allies and friendly nations to build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests, build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access. Security assistance as a subset of security cooperation encompasses a group of programs, authorized by law, through which the DOD or commercial contractors provide defense articles and services in support of national policies and objectives. Security assistance programs allow the transfer of defense articles and services to international organizations and friendly foreign governments via sales, grants, leases, or loans to help friendly nations and allies deter and defend against aggression, to promote the sharing of common defense burdens, and to help foster regional stability. When the United States assists other nations in meeting their defense requirements, it contributes to the security of the USG. The DSCA partners with the U.S. State Department, the military departments, other USG organizations, U.S. industry, and foreign government customers to provide—

▪ FMS.

▪Foreign military financing.

▪Humanitarian assistance.

▪IMET.

▪Excess defense articles.

▪Mine action training (awareness and removal techniques).

The Assistant SecDef for Public Affairs supervises and establishes policy for public affairs programs with the DOD. Public affairs are an integral part of military support to FID programs.

The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff plays a key role in the security assistance effort through the joint planning process. Essential plans in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the Joint Strategic Planning Document, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning. In addition, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff continually reviews current and ongoing programs for specific countries and regions to ensure compatibility with U.S. global security interests.

COMBATANT COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS

2-32. The GCCs are responsible for planning and executing military operations in their AOR to support FHA programs. They integrate all military security assistance plans and activities with regional U.S. military plans. The role of the GCC is critical with a regional perspective at the operational and strategic levels of conflict. The commander identifies and applies military and certain HCA resources to achieve U.S. national strategic goals. With proper and timely employment, these resources minimize the likelihood of U.S. combat involvement.

2-33. GCCs integrate national and AOR strategy into strategic and operational objectives through the development of the theater campaign plan (JP 5-0). They use the security cooperation component of joint operation planning to coordinate FID activities. Because threats often operate regionally, security cooperation guidance may sometimes coordinate separate FHA operations in multiple countries within their AOR. In addition, the operation in one country in the GCC’s AOR may need to be coordinated with the irregular warfare effort in an adjacent country. Organizing for military operations may vary, but there are fundamental principles that apply when planning or executing FID operations:

Plans must reflect national security priorities and guidance; therefore, FID must be considered within the context of the priorities for the AOR as a whole.

Military activities that support FID are an integral part of the long-range strategic plans and objectives for the command’s AOR. Many of these activities are habitual and are likely to span the tenures of multiple GCCs.

Combatant commanders may coordinate to expand the military presence in the country team; for instance, the commitment of a MISO team or military liaison element.

In most instances, U.S. military resources that support the HN IDAD programs function through the framework of the American Embassy staff.

A JTF or joint special operations task force (JSOTF) coordinates the efforts to expand U.S. assistance to higher, direct support levels or to a combat role.

SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

2-34. Combatant commanders may form area and functional subordinate commands. An example of a regional subordinate command is U.S. Forces Korea, which falls under the U.S. Pacific Command. The responsibilities for FID support in these commands closely parallel those discussed for the combatant commands. The specific authority for planning and conducting FID depends on the level of authority delegated by the combatant commander. In addition, in some subordinate commands, ongoing programs to support the HN are, for all practical purposes, a large, ongoing FID operation.

2-35. Functional subordinate commands, such as United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) South, which is the theater special operations command (TSOC) for United States Southern Command, control a specific functional capability. These functional commands contribute to planning and execution through management of FID areas related to their functional areas of expertise. The TSOC normally has operational control (OPCON) of all SOF in the theater and has primary responsibility to plan and execute SOF operations that support FID. ARSOF assigned to a theater fall under the command authority of the GCC. The GCC normally exercises this authority through the commander of the TSOC. Coordination among the TSOC and the other component commands of the GCC is essential for effective management of military operations to support FID, including joint and multinational exercises, mobile training teams (MTTs), SOF integration with conventional forces, and other operations.

JOINT TASK FORCES

2-36. Combatant commanders may form a JTF to execute complex operations. The formation of a JTF signals a larger U.S. commitment and typically involves HNs of strategic importance to the United States or nations in which FID is necessitated by a grievous natural or man-made disaster.

2-37. Much of the training, CAO, and MISO conducted by a JTF may warrant the creation of a subordinate JSOTF, a joint CMO task force, or a joint military information support task force.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC MISSION AND COUNTRY TEAM

2-38. U.S. organizations within the HN may be responsible for coordinating, planning, and resourcing numerous activities, to include FID. These organizations include U.S. military and State Department personnel. The primary organizations within an HN involved with FID are described in the following paragraphs.

Joint Task Force

Joint Task Force–Bravo is one of the three subordinate commands under the United States Southern Command. Joint Task Force–Bravo was formed by the combatant commander for the primary mission of coordinating and supporting U.S. military training exercises in Honduras during a time when a U.S. forward presence in Central America was deemed necessary. The large number of training exercises and related HCA projects conducted were a primary factor in the decision to form the joint task force. Other joint task forces’ may be organized to accomplish specific functional missions, such as road construction and support for transportation and communications efforts. In global operations against terrorist networks, Joint Task Force–510 in the Philippines and Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa have provided proactive support of HN IDAD programs.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS

2-39. The U.S. diplomatic mission to an HN includes representatives of all departments and agencies physically present in the country. The COM, normally an ambassador, ensures all in-country activities best serve U.S. interests, as well as regional and international objectives. Depending upon the size or economic import of a country, the U.S. may maintain only an embassy but no consular offices; however, the United States may maintain one or more consular offices in some countries. Typically, Army elements conducting FID deal with embassy officials, even in nations with a consular office. Relationships with consular offices are determined on a case-by-case basis. The same basic entities and offices existing in the embassy are present or liaised at the consular offices.

COUNTRY TEAM

2-40. The country team is the point of coordination within the host country for the diplomatic mission. The members of the country team vary depending on the levels of coordination needed and the conditions within that country. The country team is usually led by the chief of mission and it is made up of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief. The country team informs various organizations of operations, coordinates elements, and achieves unity of effort. Usually, the primary military members are the defense attaché and the chief of the SCO. Army engagement with the country team may primarily be with the SCO and this organization is discussed below. However, several other attachés and offices may be integral to Army FID operations as well. Figure 2-2, page 2-12, shows the country team concept.

SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

2-41. The SCO is the in-country mechanism for ensuring that DOD security assistance management responsibilities, prescribed by law and executive direction, are properly executed. It oversees all foreign-based DOD elements with security assistance responsibilities. They assist HN security forces by planning and administering military aspects of the security assistance program. The SCO also helps the U.S. country team communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budget officials within the USG.

2-42. The SCO may differ in name and organization between countries by the number of personnel assigned, the functions performed, or the HN results desired. Typical designations include Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Joint U.S. Military Group, U.S. Military Training Mission, Defense Field Office, or Office of Defense Cooperation. The GCCs are active in the security assistance process by advising the ambassadors through the SCO and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing security assistance efforts in the AOR. Figure 2-3, page 2-13, shows the SCO departmental alignment, and Figure 2-4, page 2-13, shows the functional alignment.

United States Defense Attaché Office

2-43. The United States Defense Attaché Office performs representational functions on behalf of the SecDef, the Secretaries of the Military Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the U.S. Military Services, and the GCC. The United States Defense Attaché heads the defense attaché office in-country and is a member of the country team. The defense attaché serves as the military advisor to the COM, liaises with the HN military, and manages the U.S. security assistance and military-to-military programs. The defense attaché office assists the GCC and his staff with FID programs by exchanging information on the military, social, and political conditions of the HN.

United States Defense Representative

2-44. The U.S. defense representative is the SecDef’s and the appropriate subordinate commander’s representative for coordination of administrative and security matters for all DOD noncombatant command elements in the foreign country in which the representative is assigned. The representative is normally the senior military official assigned to permanent duty with the mission. The representative is the in-country focal point for planning, coordinating, and executing support to USG officials for in-country U.S. defense issues and activities that are not under purview of the parent DOD components. The responsibility of the U.S. defense representative is established for U.S. governmental administrative and security coordination only.

Other Department of State Officers and Agencies

2-45. The deputy chief of mission serves as executive officer and chief of staff for the ambassador and directs the diplomatic mission in the ambassador’s absence (then called the chargé d’affaires—French for “charged with [in charge of] matters”). MISO units involved in FID may work closely with the deputy chief of mission because the ambassador may delegate authority to approve or preview influence activities. The political counselor directs the political section and often fills the position of third in command of the mission. The political section may also contain a political or military officer to support the coordination of military activities supporting FID programs. The political counselor may have input on both MISO and CA activities.

2-46. The cultural attaché and the public affairs officer are DOS public diplomacy officers responsible for implementing the U.S. information program throughout the HN. This individual often serves as the chief of office for the Bureau of International Information Programs in the embassy. If an embassy has both a cultural attaché and a public affairs officer, the public affairs officer is typically responsible for the office of the Bureau of International Information Programs. All Army units can benefit from the latest information the cultural attaché has to offer. MISO personnel, in particular, frequently work closely with the public affairs office and/or the office of the Bureau of International Information Programs.

2-47. The USAID mission director supervises the nonmilitary U.S. developmental efforts in the HN. CAO that support FID should be closely coordinated with USAID efforts. Every relief or improvement project undertaken should be considered for its psychological effect and public affairs value. In addition, the USAID workforce may further the production of area assessments with knowledge they have already gained.

2-48. In addition to the above DOS officers and agencies, FID operations may require coordination with the following USG elements:

Commercial attaché.

Treasury attaché.

Agricultural attaché.

Labor attaché.

Air attaché.

Science attaché.

Drug Enforcement Administration representatives.

Director of the Peace Corps.

Legal attaché (representing the Department of Justice).

Central Intelligence Agency station chief.

Federal Bureau of Investigation representatives.

SUPPORTED HOST NATION

2-49. The HN IDAD program is always the centerpiece of any FID program. The entire effort is tailored to the needs of the individual nation and designed to support the IDAD strategy. Appendix B contains a more extensive explanation and details of a generic IDAD organizational structure. For Army planners, it is important to realize that HN agencies may hold widely divergent outlooks on the IDAD strategy and, particularly, any FID program. Significant internal opposition to the IDAD strategy and FID operations is by no means a guarantee of mission failure; however, strategies that do not address causes of poor governance or internal opposition frequently fail or degenerate into combat operations. Conversely, Army planners should capitalize on positive and legitimate governance that support the populace within the HN for the IDAD program and FID operations.

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES

2-50. Although IDAD organizations vary depending on the environment, resources available, and other factors, certain basic principles guide a successful program. These principles may seem overly simplistic and obvious; however, if they are not applied properly, the result may be a disjointed effort that damages the legitimacy and stability of the HN government. These principles include—

Responsive governments.

Unity of effort.

Maximum use of intelligence, information operations, and CA operations.

Minimum use of violence.

HOST-NATION ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

2-51. Just as the United States organizes to support a FID program, so must an HN organize to facilitate the extensive coordination required in a complex IDAD program. Planners must remember that the IDAD program may be somewhat disjointed because of departmental rivalries and a myriad of other causes. In addition, it is the HN program. Neither the IDAD concept nor the U.S. Ambassador’s interagency country strategies may translate into the same terms the United States uses. Ideally, the IDAD strategy provides a detailed view of the organizations and methods that facilitate control and coordination of programs, including FID. The concept typically requires an organization that is geographically divided into national and regional levels. Each of these levels should have its own functional structure. This concept facilitates management at both the macro and micro levels for those areas critical to accomplishing balanced development with the accompanying security, neutralization, and mobilization functions.

2-52. Different HNs have varying capabilities for forming and implementing IDAD strategies. The first challenge to implementing both IDAD cooperation and FID operations is assistance to the HN planners to formulate strategy plans. It is also useful to remember that U.S. forces and agencies may have both a better understanding of the IDAD plan and a greater sense of urgency in executing the plan.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE

2-53. Operations to support FID, both those that include combat and those that do not, are by definition multinational and at a minimum binational. These operations may frequently be multinational as the HN receives IDAD support from several nations besides the United States. Planners must be aware that other participating nations may have divergent or competing strategies and aims that are at odds with U.S. national policy and goals. Multinational coalitions in which the United States is an active participant are typically conducted within the structure of an alliance that is the result of a formal agreement or an ad hoc arrangement for common action. Such multinational operations require innovative command, control, and coordination procedures for planning and execution to facilitate unity of effort. Each multinational operation that supports FID is different. Key planning and execution considerations may vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization’s members.

ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

2-54. The U.S. Army has been relied on heavily since the inception of internal defense support. As the following vignette illustrates, conventional force participation in strengthening internal defense in the HN precedes the coining of the formal FID term. The Truman-Marshall Doctrine of Containment, promulgated soon after the close of World War II, mandated a commitment of significant conventional force trainers and advisors. Weapon systems evolve and tactics change either proactively or reactively through the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities process. Force structures also change and units may experience growth or downsizing, often at the turn of a technological breakthrough leading to overmatch, such as unmanned aircraft systems or a technological obsolescence, such as analog high frequency radios and high frequency managers.

2-55. The Army Capabilities Integration Center leads the development and integration of force capabilities across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities process for the Army. Army conventional forces and ARSOF complement each other by bringing core abilities together and synthesizing those abilities into a collaborative environment. Conventional forces may enable operations logistically and SOF may provide personnel as trainers or the other way around. Historically, the conventional force advisors and trainers in operations have seamlessly meshed with ARSOF, with both interacting and supporting the other instruments of national power. In addition, conventional forces have conducted FID without SOF and conversely, but through the full spectrum of security assistance, this is atypical. In general, operations involve individuals, teams, and units designated from the entire Army force generation strategy.

2-56. Conventional forces conduct and support FID operations across the warfighting functions and range of military of operations. This is true across the range of activities from indirect support to combat authorization. Although no two programs are exactly alike, the focus of U.S. assistance under FID is to assist an HN, if possible, in anticipating, precluding, and, as a last resort, countering an internal threat. Support in anticipating and precluding a threat is preventive in nature and is likely to require a mix of indirect and direct approaches without involving combat operations. An existing threat is likely to require responses that span all categories of FID support, to include U.S. combat operations. The level of training needed by a foreign security force and the operational environment are vital considerations. The assessment should be objectively used to examine individual and collective training strategies and mission-essential tasks. SFA tasks are actions that are taken by conventional forces or ARSOF units to develop the capability or capacity of a foreign security force. The actions taken while conducting FID include organizing, training, equipping, building or rebuilding infrastructure, and advising foreign security forces. Units and individual Soldiers (regardless of MOS) help the HN security force in common Soldier tasks, the professional warrior ethos, and often human rights. All forces, whether special operations or conventional, contribute to building partner capacity through the sharing of their technical and tactical proficiency specific to their MOS with their counterparts.

The Origins of Post-World War II U.S. Army Training and Advising of Host-Nation Militaries

The history of Army trainers and advisors working in foreign nations stretches back to the mid-nineteenth century. For example, War Department-sanctioned retired officers trained the Royal Egyptian Army in the 1870s. The modern embodiment of a formal organization for this purpose is the military assistance advisory group (MAAG). The MAAG concept has a narrative that stretches to some of the earliest days following World War II. MAAG Korea (typically called KMAG) was sometimes a scapegoat for the first dark days of the fight for South Korea’s freedom. Now, many military historians count KMAG as the defining resource that made the holding of the Busan perimeter possible. Without the KMAG-trained cadre in the Republic of Korea Army, the United States and other United Nations forces would not have been able to hold the defensive positions around Busan. In addition to KMAG, MAAG Greece is often cited, along with the country team’s well-executed application of the Truman Doctrine, with maintaining Greece in the community of free nations. Later, MAAG Vietnam provided the force to initiate the first dedicated advisor course, the military assistance training advisor (MATA) course at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Institute for Military Assistance (currently Special Warfare Center) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

The MATA course was conceived as an intensive 4-week course specifically focused on a common core curriculum of COIN, Psychological Operations, Vietnam country and area studies, and initial Vietnamese language training. In addition, all ranks conducted refresher to advanced training in demolitions and weapons. MOS individual training covered areas from artillery employment to field radio repair. In 1962, the MATA Department (also known as the MATA task force) was stood up with the benchmark of training over 600 officers and enlisted men specifically designated for duty with the MAAG in South Vietnam. Classes were composed of volunteers from a vast cross-section of Army conventional forces and SOF. Immediately following a further session of language training at the Presidio of Monterey for some graduates, the initial deployments were 2- to 5-man teams to train and advise the South Vietnamese Army at the battalion level. These initial deployments of MATA-trained advisors to MAAG Vietnam accompanied the deployment of MTTs from 5th and 7th Special Forces Groups.

The MATA course met its mandate and more by graduating over 800 officers and enlisted men in the first two classes. The course continued to mature in scope and expand in length as feedback revealed an increased need for more language and other training. Eventually, further production resulted in multiple in-depth handbooks in the areas taught in the MATA course program of instruction. The coordination of training and advising duties to diverse types of units in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam by U.S. Army personnel was coordinated and supervised by MAAG Vietnam. The teams of MATA-trained personnel were established in-country. As MAAG Vietnam formed under the larger command structures established after the introduction of U.S. combat forces, MATA-trained personnel and ARSOF personnel continued to train and advise South Vietnamese Army units.

2-57. In addition to the SFA tasks that are specific to training and advising, SFA-proficient units in the FID setting typically perform their standard unit functions to maintain the logistics, protection, and other warfighting functions of the overall Army force. In addition, when combat has been authorized, conventional force units, along with ARSOF counterparts, often fire and maneuver to interdict subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. This can be a unilateral U.S. effort; however, Army units should make every effort to make all operations combined. In FID operations, additional tasks to larger-scale SFA operations may emerge. These include limited air assets, greater cognizance and employment of information operations, logistical challenges that may be insurmountable for the HN (as well as limitations on U.S. resources allocated), U.S. force caps, and many others as further detailed in successive chapters. In short, the challenges of FID operations are common to all Army units.

ROLE OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

2-58. U.S. military involvement in FID has frequently focused on support of the COIN efforts of HNs and allies. COIN remains an important aspect of many FID operations; however, ARSOF involvement in FID operations is not limited to conducting COIN. Army operations may involve several other areas, including CAO, counterterrorism, and counterdrug operations. As subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats diversify and expand their range of indirect approaches to destabilizing HNs, ARSOF Soldiers must be adaptable and adjust to counter such threats and exercise command throughout the operation (planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment) to achieve success in unified land operations.

SPECIAL FORCES

2-59. COIN remains a cornerstone of many SF FID operations; however, the primary SF mission is to organize, train, advise, assist, and improve the tactical and technical proficiency of the HN forces. As a force multiplier, SF units maintain advanced skills and capabilities (such as language) that enable them to conduct advisory operations with the HN for extended periods. Improved proficiency enables HN forces to defeat threats, thereby limiting direct U.S. involvement. The emphasis is on training cadres that will, in turn, train other HN forces. The capabilities that SF employ to perform FID tasks are similar to those inherent to the unconventional warfare core task.

2-60. All SF personnel must understand the political and legal implications of the operational environment. Legal considerations in planning and implementing FID programs are complex and subject to changing U.S. legislation. Commanders must keep their legal advisors involved in the planning process. Appendix A summarizes key legal aspects of FID activities.

2-61. In the early stages of a nation’s need for assistance, the level of SF participation may be as small as one operational detachment–alpha. In the more advanced stages, a company or battalion may establish an operations base (within or outside of country) and exercise OPCON of SOF units. Operational and support elements may be assigned to the base on a rotational or permanent basis. In the case of small to moderate operations, these personnel may be organic. In the case of a robust operation, these personnel or a portion thereof, are likely to consist of large numbers of conventional force Soldiers. In the case of FID support for large SFA activities, the majority of those conducting certain portions of operations may likely be ARSOF personnel. When the entire SF group or battalion deploys to the country, it normally establishes a special operations task force (SOTF), who may then elect to establish one or more advanced operations bases. SF units participate in a variety of operations to accomplish the FID task. The HN needs and bilateral or multilateral agreements dictate the quantity and level of support required for the IDAD program.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

2-62. The proper use of CA assets in FID is essential during all phases of an insurgency to counter a resistance movement, as well as to combat other threats. A resistance movement is an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability (JP 3-05). CA commands provide expertise in six functional specialty areas:

Rule of law.

Economic stability.

Governance.

Public health and welfare.

Infrastructure.

Public education and information.

2-63. When used to its full potential, CMO can be crucial in preventing the escalation of an insurgency or strengthening of another internal threat. A national development program can solidify the position of the HN government and improve conditions for the people. CAO vary with the capabilities of the host government and with the level of internal threat activity.

2-64. CA units conduct various CAO that support the internal development of a nation. CAO are those military operations planned, supported, or executed by CA forces. These operations are coordinated through, planned with, and support the indigenous population, IGOs, NGOs, or other governmental agencies. The purpose of CAO is to enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities and to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society. This may involve application of CA functional specialty skills in areas of civil administration, stabilization, reconstruction, and development that are normally the responsibility of the HN civil government. These CMO activities establish, maintain, and influence relations between military forces, governmental agencies, nongovernmental civilian organizations, authorities, and the civilian populace in the environment to facilitate U.S. objectives. CA personnel, other Army forces, or a combination of the two conduct CMO that are fundamental to executing stability tasks. CA forces may support other military forces and nonmilitary agencies through direct or indirect support of FID; the CA forces must coordinate with the interagency, GCC, and HN. These operations focus on the indigenous infrastructures and populations in the operational areas. While maintaining coordination efforts through the central government supporting CMO objectives, forces conducting CAO build partnerships at the necessary levels of governance by providing stability, security, and services impacting the populace at village and district levels. CA forces support general infrastructure reconstruction programs and provide municipal and other services to the populace. These forces assist long-term stability by providing bottom-up programs that support central government public service goals that are top-down state building strategies. By partnering with legitimate local leaders, CA forces assist in village stability operations and local police programs to benefit the civilian populace and military by addressing economic, political, and social issues of the HN. FM 3-57 provides further information.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

2-65. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Soldiers assist HN personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter threat information activities, including propaganda. U.S. FID programs may address other threats to the internal stability of an HN, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, dominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. Increasingly, adversary elements and organizations employing subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats have learned to use, exploit, and produce media portraying their cause and actions in a favorable light. These elements are increasingly employing actions (typically violent) primarily for their psychological effect rather than military value. Initial MISO assistance to the HN may include analysis and recommendations for countering increasingly sophisticated use of information activities by internal threats and their regional or global supporters.

2-66. MISO support FID through both indirect and direct support to HN governments facing instability. They may simultaneously conduct direct support of operations with a MISO team working out of the embassy and indirect support through training opportunities provided by the joint combined training exercise program. In a larger operation, a MISO unit or task force typically conducts significant unilateral operations in addition to working with similar HN units. In some instances, an HN may not have previously developed a similar capability. Building an HN MISO-like capability must be balanced with the need to counter internal threat information activities and further U.S. and HN objectives through the application of the informational instrument of national power. In the early stages of operations, the emphasis may need to be on conducting MISO rather than building HN capacity.

2-67. MISO conducted as part of FID combat operations are also a critical force multiplier. Should combat operations be authorized, U.S. MISO forces are typically task-organized with a full range of production and dissemination capabilities that can extend to a task force or joint military information support task force for mission command purposes. In some instances of combat operations, the situation may degenerate rapidly. If the HN has an organized MISO-like force, it may be disorganized, reduced, or even destroyed. In addition, infrastructure damage in the HN may limit the ability to produce or disseminate MISO series, and U.S. MISO may be the only effective means of communicating with target audiences. Long-term involvement of U.S. MISO is frequently necessary after the end of combat operations until the HN can reconstitute its own capability.

ARMY SUPPORT TO COALITIONS

2-68. Many FID operations involve only U.S. and HN forces; however, a robust operation may be made up of a coalition of regional or major nations. When conducting FID in multinational coalitions, Army Soldiers with long-term FID or SFA experience frequently bring with them specific, deep-rooted training relationships with other military coalition members. For example, a Southeast Asian nation may experience a crisis and request assistance. The nation might have never before had FID operations conducted inside its borders. A regional coalition is formed that includes Army Soldiers, members of the Royal Thai Army, the South Korean Army, and personnel from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Because U.S. Army personnel have had routine training relationships with all members of this coalition, they bring cultural expertise, sensitivity, and language skills to the operation. Whether FID-trained Soldiers involved in a coalition have language skills corresponding to the other coalition partners, their inherent cultural awareness and sensitivity foster relationships and rapport.

Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines Foreign Internal Defense

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM–Philippines was successful because it maintained a small SOF U.S. Military footprint in a politically sensitive environment to be in agreement with the HN constitution. This operation applied interagency concepts because the operation was completely synchronized between the JSOTF-P Headquarters, U.S. country team, TSOC, and GCC.

In addition, the JSOTF-P staff operated in close coordination with the military assistance advisory group to interact with Philippine national-level headquarters to facilitate nation assistance. This mutual effort enabled the JSOTF-P to assist our partner nation along four lines of operations that were balanced and executed simultaneously.

First, JSOTF-P assisted Philippine Security Forces, which included military and law enforcement, by increasing their capacity to provide security and conduct COIN operations. This was conducted by SOF advisors working closely with Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) units in the field.

Second, JSOTF-P conducted CMO to remove the conditions that allowed insurgent groups to exist and foment their radical ideology. These efforts began with SOF detachments and their AFP counterparts that conducted local assessments of the operational environment and worked closely with local governmental units to identify development requirements, which ranged from medical support or livelihood training, to building schools and roads. The key to program success was through interagency coordination. There were numerous governmental, international, and nongovernmental agencies that had enormous capability and that wanted to provide assistance. ARSOF CA detachments, working side by side with USAID from the country team, synchronized all of these agencies’ efforts and ensured that the right development support went to the correct locations to assist the population and, more importantly, to remove conditions and core grievances that allowed for lawless activities.

Third, JSOTF-P provided intelligence support to the AFP to define the operational environment and assist in the execution of FID operations. Again, this was done through ARSOF detachments on the ground with their AFP counterparts. Intelligence requirements were identified and the JSOTF provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. This support was also closely coordinated with the country team to maximize the capabilities of interagency partners.

Fourth, JSOTF-P conducted MISO. JSOTF-P MISO teams worked closely with AFP public affairs and the country team public affairs section to enhance the legitimacy of the Philippine government by informing the populace of services provided by the HN concerning good governance, human rights, and security. All ARSOF personnel became part of this effort through interagency coordination and HN interaction and by working closely with their counterparts; they presented a disciplined, responsive military that supported the government and the local population through the rule of law. The U.S. commander of JSOTF-P was awarded the Gawad sa Kaunlaran Medal on 18 June 2010 from the AFP for contributions to nation building and FID in Western Mindanao. The Gawad sa Kaunlaran was an award given for acts that were geared toward development, which had been the cornerstone of the relationship of the two military commands, and for bringing about conditions conducive to nation building and peace, progress, and prosperity in the western Mindanao provinces.

Chapter 3

Planning

A major tenant of global operations against terrorist networks is the premise that terrorism will be defeated in large measure through the establishment of viable nations possessing the ability to preempt or defeat terrorist threats. FID is one of the primary vehicles for accomplishing this end state. Planners focus on an end state in which a terrorist threat or other internal threat is at a level manageable by the HN. Ideally, this state is at a point maintainable by HN law enforcement organizations rather than military forces. All planning presupposes that the HN internal defense capability must be raised. Planners face a broad continuum of HN capabilities. One HN may require training only at the upper echelons of relatively well-trained military and paramilitary organizations, yet another may require training and assistance at the lowest levels of their military force. The former may require short-duration operations; the latter may require long-term operations that may take several years, perhaps generations, to accomplish. The art of planning for FID is recognizing where the HN falls on this continuum and planning operations with realistic milestones and time frames.

OVERVIEW

3-1. FID operations are planned at the national, regional, and, especially, the local level. The effort should involve the integration of all instruments of national power down to the local level. Ideally, the HN IDAD goals can be met by skillful use of these other instruments without conducting military operations; however, historically this is not the case. FID operations fall under two major categories—those under the responsibility of the DOD and those under the responsibility of the DOS. Most DOD and DOS activities are incorporated into theater planning. Within theater planning, identified activities are intended to help shape the theater of operations in which the activities are conducted. The how, where, and at what level the planning, coordinating, and resourcing takes place is dependent on whether the mission has originated through the DOD or DOS. For example, Title 22 USC governs DOS programs and indicates that participants in these programs are noncombatants. Programs under Title 10 USC authorities do not restrict participants from being combatants. Appendix A of this publication provides further guidance on law, authorities, and the legal aspects of FID operations, to include funding authorizations for mission types. There are numerous types of authorities, and the judge advocate general should always be consulted to translate authorities—especially fiscal authorizations and appropriations.

PLANNING IMPERATIVES

3-2. FID has certain aspects that make planning complex. Some basic imperatives when integrating FID into strategies and plans are as follows:

Understand U.S. Foreign Policy. National Security Presidential Directive and National Security Council directives, plans, or policies are the guiding documents of this understanding. National Security Council directives also set forth U.S. FID policy. Joint Strategic Planning System documents reflect the military’s responsibilities for carrying out this broad guidance. The planners must be prepared to adjust plans as political conditions change in both the HN and the United States.

Maintain and Increase HN Sovereignty and Legitimacy. If U.S. military efforts that support FID undermine the sovereignty or legitimacy of the HN government through any action, then they have effectively sabotaged the IDAD program.

Understand Long-Term or Strategic Implications and Sustainability of all U.S. Assistance Efforts Before Implementing FID Programs. HN development and defense self-sufficiency, both of which may require large investments of time and materiel, are especially important in planning for FID. Army planners assess the following:

▪ End state of the IDAD strategy.

▪ Sustainability of development programs and defense improvements.

▪ Acceptability and the perceptions of fairness for development models across the range of the HN society.

▪ Impact of development programs on the distribution of resources within the HN, to include potential shortages and bottlenecks.

▪ Potential negative side effects of socioeconomic change.

▪ Potential resistors to socioeconomic change.

▪ Relationship between improved military forces and existing regional, ethnic, and religious groups in both the military and society as a whole.

▪ Impact of improved military forces on the regional balance of power.

▪ Impact of military development and operations on civil-military relations in the HN.

Tailor Military Support of FID Programs to the Environment and Specific HN Needs. Consider the threat, as well as local religious, social, economic, and political factors, when developing the military support plans. Failure to do so can result in equipment, training, and infrastructures that are either unsuitable or unusable by the HN.

Ensure Unity of Effort. FID is a national-level effort that involves numerous USG agencies. In all cases, the DOS plays a significant role in providing the content of FID plans. In most cases, the DOS’s role in planning is significant, because the ambassador is typically the final approval authority for the plan in all situations not involving combat operations. Even when planning involves combat operations, the ambassador remains a significant partner in planning operations. To reduce inefficiencies, contradictions, or redundancies in programs, other services, USG agencies, and allies must be coordinated using an integrated theater of operations effort that is joint, interagency, and (sometimes) multinational. Appendix D describes an interagency plan that provides a means for achieving unity of effort among USG agencies.

Assess HN Forces and Needs. To properly conduct the FID operation, Army units need to identify—

▪ The HN unit mission and its mission-essential task list and its capability to execute those tasks.

▪ The organizational tables for HN authorized personnel and equipment and for actual personnel and equipment on hand.

▪ Any past or present foreign military presence or influence in doctrine, training, or combat operations.

▪ The HN unit’s ability to retain and support acquired skills or training from past MTTs or foreign training missions.

▪ The organization and leadership level responsible for training the individual Soldier. Does the HN have institutional training established? Is it effective?

▪ Any operational deficiencies during recent combat operations or participation in combined or joint exercises with U.S. personnel.

▪ The maintenance status, to include maintenance training programs.

▪ The language or languages in which instructions are conducted.

▪ The religious, tribal, or other affiliations within the HN forces that need to be considered—notably differences between HN forces and the local populace.

▪ The potential security concerns with employing U.S. members (and allies) in the HN training areas.

▪ The local infrastructure and possible positive or negative impacts of training on the local populace.

▪ The attitudes of the local populace toward U.S. military and government personnel, as well as ordinary U.S. citizens (to include presence and behavior of expatriate U.S. populations).

▪ The prejudices or fears of the local populace.

▪ Any key local leaders, communicators, and potential spoilers.

▪ The presence, agendas, capabilities, influence, and attitudes of NGOs and IGOs.

▪ The need for local media infrastructure in the individual unit’s area in order to assess the best ways to communicate with the local populace and to facilitate MISO planning.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE GUIDANCE

3-3. In general, the DOS is the lead agency for approving the execution for the majority of FID programs. Under Title 22 USC, the DOS and DOD are responsible for security assistance to foreign countries. The DOS provides general program guidance, determines participating countries, approves specific projects, and integrates the military security assistance programs with other activities. Requirements for security assistance are resourced primarily by the HN and U.S. grants provided to DOD by executive transfers. The DOD executes the security assistance program, identifies and prioritizes requirements, procures and delivers military equipment, and provides services. Within DOD, the DSCA provides overall direction, implementation, and supervision of approved security assistance and defense sales.

3-4. Theater of operations strategic planning incorporates policy and implementation of security assistance programs, which includes planning specifically for military FID operations. However, because of the different aspects of congressional oversight and funding of security assistance, the DOS determines security assistance and DOD implements. Security assistance policy flows from the President and eventually converges at the SCO (Figure 3-1, page 3-4). In general, requirements for security assistance originate at the SCO in consultation with the HN and the GCC. The DOS issues policy to the embassies, and the embassies control the DOD-executed portion of Title 22 USC activities. Throughout the policy flow, agencies produce plans that support security assistance policy and issue additional guidance throughout the process (for example, interagency country strategies, the security cooperation portion of the GCC’s theater campaign plan, and training plans).

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE

3-5. DOD guidance ensures the force is focused on supporting the President’s policy set forth in the national security strategy, as well as any other specific directives or policies. The goal of a portion of this guidance is to accomplish security cooperation objectives without sacrificing combat readiness. Security cooperation planning links activities of combatant commanders with security cooperation objectives identified by the SecDef. Security cooperation activities include military contacts and exchange programs, nation assistance, FID, security assistance, multinational training, multinational exercises, multinational education, arms control, and treaty monitoring. Security cooperation is the DOD’s principal means of engagement with foreign defense establishments. In response to direction in the DOD Security Cooperation Guidance, combatant commanders, Service chiefs, and support agencies’ directors prepare security cooperation strategies in accordance with Security Cooperation Guidance objectives for the CJCS review and SecDef approval, with the GCCs as the supported entities. These strategies serve as the basis for security cooperation planning. The DSCA accomplishes its assigned responsibilities by executing statutory authorities in support of DOD GEF, Guidance for Development of the Force, GCCs, combatant commanders, or joint force commanders as appropriate, to conduct security cooperation programs and activities. The joint operation planning process is an integral tool useful in planning security cooperation activities. The DOD’s guidance for security cooperation may ultimately lead to military FID operations.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

3-6. The national military strategy is the master document containing the art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives across the continuum of operations, including the range of military operations—from stable peace to general war. This document articulates how the United States employs the military element of power to support the national security objectives found in the President’s national security strategy. The national military strategy establishes three military objectives that support the National Defense Strategy. The three national military strategy objectives are to—

Protect the United States against external attacks and aggression.

Prevent conflict and surprise attacks.

Prevail against adversaries.

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

3-7. Joint strategic planning provides strategic guidance and direction to friendly forces for security cooperation planning, joint operations planning, and force planning. As the principal military advisor to the President and the SecDef, the CJCS is responsible for a significant portion of developing the strategic direction, strategic plans, and resource requirements for the national defense. The Joint Strategic Planning System, supported by the joint warfighting capabilities assessment process, is the method used by the CJCS to achieve these objectives. The Joint Strategic Planning System process assists the CJCS in preparing strategic plans; preparing and reviewing contingency plans; advising the President and SecDef of requirements, programs, and budgets; and providing net assessments on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies compared with those of their potential adversaries. The JSCP is one of the products of the Joint Strategic Planning System.

JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN

3-8. The JSCP provides guidance to the combatant commanders and Service chiefs for accomplishing military tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. The JSCP is the primary vehicle through which the CJCS exercises responsibility to provide for the preparation of joint operation plans (OPLANs). The JSCP implements the strategic policy direction provided in the GEF. It also directs these agents to develop plans to support the strategy contained in the national military strategy and counter threats using current military capabilities. It allocates resources to GCCs according to military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions and intelligence assessments. The capabilities of available forces, intelligence information, and guidance issued by the SecDef determine the resources apportioned. The JSCP directs the development of contingency plans to support national security objectives by assigning planning tasks and apportioning major combat forces and strategic lift capability to the GCCs. As a capabilities planning document, it represents the last phase of resource management. The JSCP dedicates the resources provided by the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System to develop OPLANs. It provides guidance, missions, and resources to GCCs to develop concept plans and OPLANs to support FID operations. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the President and the SecDef.

ADAPTIVE PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

3-9. The Adaptive Planning and Execution system is defined as a Department of Defense system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and information technology, that is used by the joint planning and execution community to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations (JP 5-0).

3-10. Per JP 5-0, the APEX system facilitates iterative dialogue and collaborative planning between the multiple echelons of command to ensure that the military instrument of national power is employed in accordance with national priorities. Joint operation planning also identifies capabilities outside the DOD required for achieving the strategic objectives to reach the end state by providing a forum that facilitates the interorganizational coordination that enables unified action.

3-11. APEX promotes early, robust, and frequent discourse between DOD planners and their interagency and multinational counterparts throughout the planning process. Dialogue, collaboration, and integration with civilian agencies and multinational partners are essential to address the increasing complexity of national security challenges while incorporating multiple instruments of national power into planning and execution efforts. In addition, APEX formally integrates the planning activities of the joint planning and execution community and facilitates the JFC’s seamless transition from planning to execution during times of crisis.

ARMY INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION POLICY

3-12. The Army International Security Cooperation Policy establishes Department of the Army policy and prescribes responsibilities and procedures for the planning, integration, programming, budgeting, and execution of Army security cooperation activities. AR 11-31 provides further guidance. This regulation also authorizes the publication of an Army Security Cooperation Plan, which, in conjunction with the annual assessment of Army security cooperation activities, ensures that the Army’s security cooperation efforts are integrated and support guidance from higher authorities. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army is responsible for planning, integrating, and overseeing Army security cooperation activities. The Deputy Chief of Staff provides strategic guidance for the development, integration, and evaluation of Army security cooperation activities in accordance with guidance for the conduct of security cooperation activities, which is periodically issued by the SecDef through decisions reached in Quadrennial Defense Reviews and according to DOD contingency plans.

3-13. The Army Security Cooperation Plan is the Army’s plan to implement DOD security cooperation guidance, which promulgates guidance by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army for allocating security cooperation programs. The Deputy Chief of Staff oversees the development, coordination, and implementation of the Army Security Cooperation Plan. The purpose of the Army Security Cooperation Plan is to provide strategic guidance for all Army security cooperation activities and to influence the integration of international considerations into institutional Army programs and functions, such as acquisition programs or foreign area officer training.

THEATER OF OPERATIONS PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

3-14. GCCs focus joint strategic planning on their specific AORs as defined in the Unified Command Plan. The JSCP links the Joint Strategic Planning System to joint operation planning, identifies broad scenarios for plan development, specifies the type of joint OPLANs required, and provides additional planning guidance as necessary. Planning translates strategic guidance and direction into executable OPLANs and orders for contingency or crisis action response. The JSCP provides military strategic and operational guidance and direction to combatant commanders and Service chiefs for preparation of security cooperation plans based on current military capabilities. GCCs develop strategies that support taskings from the JSCP. The planning instruments used by GCCs vary; however, military activities that support FID requirements are integrated into concepts and plans from the strategic level down to the tactical level.

3-15. Theater of operations strategy translates into long-term, regionally focused priorities across the conflict continuum, including the range of military operations from major operations and campaigns to military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence. Peacetime goals normally focus on deterring hostilities, enhancing stability in-theater as a whole, and dealing with regional or specific nation problems. FID is an integral part of this strategy. ARSOF and conventional force units, notably United States Army Reserve units, frequently have long-term relationships with various HN militaries in a theater that spans the tenure of several combatant commanders and their theater strategies. Knowledge of past theater strategies and how those strategies have been translated into FID operations is typically relevant to current planning.

3-16. There is no specific format for developing or documenting the theater strategy. Some frequent common elements in the theater strategy include the—

Analysis of U.S. national policy and interests in the region.

Strategic assessment of the AOR.

Threat analysis.

GCC’s vision.

Theater missions and objectives.

3-17. The political advisor supplies information regarding DOS policy goals and objectives that are relevant to the combatant commander’s theater strategy and the subordinate joint force commander’s plans. An OPLAN for a theater is the operational extension of a combatant commander’s theater strategy. Planners from the TSOCs may have substantial input to theater planning in general and in FID planning in particular. The contingency planning process is typically employed for planning, as most programs should be planned as part of a larger strategy or theater campaign. In addition, ample lead time is usually available when other operations, such as stability, security, transition, reconstruction, and simultaneous stability operations become FID operations.

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

3-18. The TSCP is primarily a strategic planning document intended to link GCC-planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives. Direction for the GCC is provided through the security cooperation guidance of the SecDef and the JSCP. This guidance provides regional focus and security cooperation priorities. The TSCP implements the security cooperation guidance. The TSCP provides region-specific guidance, country guidance, and direction to further U.S. interests in the AOR. Service component commanders and the USSOCOM Commander develop supporting security cooperation strategies to support the TSCP.

3-19. The combatant command plans and supports operations and activities to produce multiple benefits in readiness, modernization, and security cooperation. Prioritizing peacetime military security cooperation activities ensures efforts focus on those that are of greatest importance without sacrificing warfighting capabilities. The TSCP identifies the synchronization of these activities on a regional basis and illustrates the efficiencies gained from GCC security cooperation activities that support national strategic objectives.

3-20. A combatant command typically conducts some type of annual (or more frequent) planning conference, working group, or meeting. The purpose of this meeting is to identify what type of security assistance, activities, and programs to implement for support of the security cooperation guidance. Guidance from this meeting prioritizes activities and allocates the activities to specific countries. Assessments can also be conducted on the previous year’s activities to ensure validity, support to current guidance, and required updates. Annual planning conferences can provide continuity for long-term FID efforts through the examination of assessments; therefore, a TSCP takes the strategic long-view. The result is a living document updated due to occasional small tactical changes within an HN.

3-21. The TSCP specifies all activities that are conducted in conjunction with security assistance; therefore, this plan includes not only FID, but also the application of all instruments of national power. Fundamentally, a TSCP represents the holistic method of interaction within the range of military operations embodied in the comprehensive approach to conflict resolution. It is inescapable that security cooperation in general and FID in particular must promote certain fundamental American values. A TSCP ensures, however, that this is done in a way culturally acceptable to the HN. Included within the TSCP are operational activities, combined exercises, combined training, security assistance, and humanitarian assistance. Planning, managing, and implementing a security cooperation plan within the command are not identical. Each command may use various methods to develop a security cooperation plan. The TSCP is a continuous process.

3-22. The GCC’s strategic concept is normally updated biennially, and the activity annex is developed for the year of execution and the following 7 years. The theater engagement planning process occurs in a four-phase process (Figure 3-2, page 3-8) that results in the production of a TSCP. The phases are described as follows:

In Phase I, initiation or continuation, the GCCs receive planning guidance and planning tasks from the JSCP and the SecDef security cooperation guidance.

In Phase II, strategic concept development, the GCC derives prioritized theater, regional, and country objectives and the strategic concept is developed. Resource requirements are identified to execute the strategy. The strategic concept is reviewed and integrated and then collectively approved by the CJCS.

Phase III is activity annex development. This phase identifies security cooperation activities. This phase describes the activities in detail, to include operations, security assistance, exercises, and humanitarian assistance. During this phase, forces and resources are identified, requirements are analyzed, and shortfalls are recognized. As required, the functional GCCs, Services, and other defense agencies prepare and submit supporting and coordinating plans. The completed product is a TSCP.

In Phase IV, the joint staff, Services, supporting GCCs, and the Office of the Under SecDef (Policy) review the TSCP. The TSCP is integrated into the strategic plans approved by the CJCS. Ultimately, all security cooperation planning is then forwarded to the Under SecDef (Policy). In a circuitous process, all security cooperation planning translates into the GEF.

PLANNING PROCEDURES AND CONSIDERATIONS

3-23. A FID plan must be completed at the joint level before individual Army units use the military decisionmaking process in ADRP 5-0 and/or FM 6-0 to develop supporting plans. As specified in CJCSM 3130.03, the APEX system provides the framework for planning functions. Unity of effort requires cooperation among all forces and agencies toward a commonly recognized objective regardless of the command or coordination structures of the participants. Planning should consider joint, SOF, conventional force, and interagency planners. Plans may be initiated in one of three ways:

From the top down through the Joint Strategic Planning System.

From the bottom up by the HN directly or, preferably, through the country team in the GCC’s AOR. The GCC may then forward these requests to the President through the SecDef for Title 10, Armed Forces, authorization or, more commonly, to the SecDef for Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse.

From the GCC. Military support to FID programs not directed under an existing, specified, or implied mission may be identified and authorized by the SecDef.

JOINT CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT OVERVIEW

3-24. Before beginning FID planning, the GCC’s staff conducts a thorough analysis of the operational environment and subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats in the AOR. This mission analysis establishes the comprehensive approach for concept development and planning. The following areas are considered during the concept development:

Threats to the HN internal defense.

HN social, economic, and political environment.

International aspects.

Mission analysis.

3-25. During the planning guidance phase, the commander outlines tentative COAs, additional assumptions, and a planning directive for the staff and subordinate commanders. Several important FID guidelines that may also significantly affect Army unit planning include—

Legal authorizations and restrictions, to include the regulatory and policy considerations outlined in Appendix A.

Third-country interests, which are outlined in detail below.

Restrictive use of force, which may turn the focus of some operations to CAO, MISO, and training and advising programs.

Maximum intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) capabilities, to include those outlined in Appendix C.

ROE and economy-of-force measures, which may limit the mobility and TTP availability of some Army units. Economy of force in operations has historically dictated that some operations be conducted by small contingents of all ARSOF personnel. This trend is likely to continue.

Sustainment. Army units may be engaged for years in some HNs.

Measures of effectiveness, which may be both long-term and difficult to quantify in operations.

3-26. The staff analyzes and refines tentative COAs during the running estimate process of concept development. Army planners and subject-matter experts frequently develop or provide vital input to the three running estimates given to the commander as a tool for selecting a final COA. The following are three estimates to facilitate an effective FID plan:

The intelligence estimate.

The CMO estimate.

The MISO estimate.

Note: Details of these estimates are covered in Appendix C.

JOINT PLAN DEVELOPMENT

3-27. Joint plan development begins after the GCC’s strategic concept is fully developed. Plan development balances mission requirements against available resources and regional priorities. This action is particularly important because a large portion of the force needed to conduct a particular FID operation may be made up of United States Army Reserve forces and, in most cases, are unavailable (short of using the Presidential Reserve Call-up Authority) for long-term operations. In major operations that support FID, the commander may face a shortage of Regular Army CA and MISO capabilities when developing the plan. In this case, use of Reserve Component CA or MISO units will involve complex planning for rotations over the duration of the operation. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that sufficient regional and language expertise is necessarily available in the Active Component.

JOINT PLAN REVIEW CRITERIA

3-28. The joint plan review criteria, according to JP 5-0, are a comprehensive review of the plan for adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with joint doctrine. Deconfliction of service and interagency doctrine and policy is accomplished at this stage as well. Although all joint planning includes interagency integration, FID operations inherently include greater degrees of such integration. Appendixes B and D address the complex environment of FID strategic and interagency planning. The review for adequacy determines the sufficiency of scope and content of operations to accomplish the assigned task, the validity of assumptions, and the degree of compliance with strategic guidance. The review for feasibility measures the ability to accomplish the assigned mission using available resources within the time frames of the plan. It considers both the appropriateness and the planned use of available resources. The review for acceptability ensures the plan is proportional and worth the expected costs. The section on completeness ensures the incorporation of all tasks to be accomplished. It includes forces required, deployment concept, employment concept, sustainment concept, time estimates for achieving objectives, mission success criteria, and military end state. The compliance with joint doctrine review ensures approved joint doctrine provides a baseline that facilitates both planning and execution.

3-29. Acceptable plans provide for accomplishment of the mission by maximizing all instruments of national power and minimizing the loss of personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. Incorporation of appropriate joint doctrine when preparing OPLANs facilitates crisis action planning and the execution of operations. Commanders and their staffs should consider that many FID objectives involve a long-term (sometimes generational) effort and that measures of effectiveness may be difficult to evaluate in the short term. For all Army units conducting operations (notably CA and MISO), effectiveness—and in particular quantifiable measures of effectiveness—as well as the direct cause-and-effect relationship above the tactical level will take time to gauge.

ARMY FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE SUPPORTING PLANS TO THE JOINT PLAN

3-30. FID operations are predominately planned within the TSCP. These operations apply a comprehensive approach to facilitate the interaction between interagency-supported endeavors directed through the DOS. Army conventional forces and ARSOF units who conduct planning typically work through and with the TSOCs. This is true of an operation with a preponderance of conventional force composition. TSOC representatives support the GCC by developing strategies to support the TSCP. TSOC representatives plan, coordinate, and recommend strategies that are then included in the TSCP activity annexes. Army planners must adapt to the format of the GCC staff planning conventions. As stated previously, this may include naming conventions other than TSCP.

Note: For purposes of brevity, this section uses the term JSOTF as the FID executing headquarters. A JTF is equally applicable unless specifically noted.

3-31. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as a JTF should also refer to applicable joint doctrine. JP 3-05 and JP 3-33 provide detailed JSOTF and JTF procedures and operations. The Army Service component headquarters for a JTF or a joint and multinational force is referred to as the Army Forces. The Army may designate a task force with the last name of the task force commander, a code name, or number. During larger FID operations involving a JSOTF, ARSOF units may support a plan implemented by conventional forces within the HN to accomplish the combined U.S. and HN goals. The JSOTF is typically tasked to plan and conduct HN training. Training can range from teaching advanced skills to focusing on a general professionalization of the Army as a whole (as shown in the following vignette). The higher headquarters may task the JSOTF to conduct specific training requirements or may set an end state requirement that must be planned and resourced independently. Missions vary in size and scope based on the combined U.S. and HN goals and the supporting role of Army units. Once JSOTF-level plans are developed, ARSOF units may need to establish a SOTF to develop training plans to support FID within their assigned area of operations. The JSOTF commander may designate and organize a single SOTF to provide operational direction of ARSOF. When the JSOTF commander has numerous and diverse missions and large numbers of Army forces, he may designate multiple SOTFs and exercise direct OPCON of each. Each SOTF is organized around the nucleus of an ARSOF unit and includes a mix of units and their support elements. The SF group and battalion (airborne) are extremely flexible organizations designed to have self-contained mission and support elements for long-duration missions. Because of this flexibility, they have the capability to form the nucleus of a SOTF, and the group is normally identified as the Army Service force component of a JSOTF.

3-32. FID operations involving a JSOTF may include support of a plan, which is implemented by conventional forces within a country to accomplish the combined goals of the United States and the HN. The JSOTF is tasked to plan and conduct HN training, which can range from teaching advanced skills, to training a force, to conducting personal security or protection missions. The higher echelon tasks the JSOTF to conduct specific training requirements or an end state requirement that the JSOTF must plan and resource independently. Once JSOTF plans are developed, the SOTF develops training plans to support the program within its assigned area of operations.

Foreign Internal Defense in El Salvador

In what is now often called the Salvadoran Civil War, low-key involvement by U.S. trainers and advisors began in the early 1980s with MTTs from 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Initial training focused on a COIN reaction force capable of countering the early tactical successes of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).

Training of five immediate-reaction infantry battalions (BIRI-Atlacatl, Belloso, Atonal, Bracamonte, and Arce) in-country, as well as at Fort Benning and Fort Bragg, helped stand up an initial COIN capability. Under the Reagan administration, a more formalized training and advisory structure was created through the Security Assistance Training Management Organization with the assignment of Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force advisors under the Operational Planning and Assistance Training Team and Extended Training Service Specialist programs to U.S. Military Group El Salvador.

Advisors served at each brigade and most military detachment headquarters, as well as at the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) National Headquarters (Estado Mayor). Although Army Special Forces constituted the majority of advisors, there were also advisors from intelligence, ground, naval and air operations; logistics; CA; and MISO backgrounds. Concern over expansion of the U.S. role in the COIN effort led to a 55-man cap on advisors in El Salvador—a restriction that was closely monitored by Congress.

This small cadre helped not only in training and advising the ESAF but also played a significant role in the professionalization of the armed forces in the face of accusations of human rights abuses throughout the 1980s—some factual and some blatant FMLN propaganda efforts. From training and advising on basic Soldier skills at the Centro de Entrenamiento Militar de la Fuerza Amada (the armed forces military training center near La Unión) to working with Salvadoran leadership at military detachment, brigade, and national levels, U.S. military personnel were instrumental in setting examples of professional military conduct and reinforcing the importance of respect for human rights. Through a concerted effort that included an emphasis on respect for private property during military operations, human rights cards for all new military trainees, and later officer professionalism seminars at each military headquarters, the ESAF overcame a reputation of unprofessional and abusive conduct in the 1980s. This ultimately turned public opinion against the FMLN and brought about a cease-fire and peace settlement in February 1992. The successful resolution of over 10 years of insurgency in El Salvador was brought about by a number of factors, but it can certainly be argued that the role of the U.S. advisor played a major part in the military success and peaceful transition of the ESAF to a peacetime army.

3-33. When an Army unit is tasked to conduct a FID mission, the unit plans that mission based on the military decisionmaking process. Units need to determine or identify—

The HN unit mission and mission-essential task list and its capability to execute them.

The HN organizational tables for authorized personnel and equipment and for personnel and equipment actually on hand.

Any past or present foreign influence on training and combat operations using MTTs, advisors, or available military equipment.

The ability of the unit to retain and support acquired skills or training from past MTTs or foreign training missions.

The organization and leadership level responsible for training the individual Soldier. Does the HN have institutional training established and is it effective?

Operational deficiencies during recent combat operations or participation in combined or joint exercises with U.S. personnel.

Maintenance status, to include maintenance training programs.

The language or languages in which instructions will be conducted.

The religious, tribal, or other affiliations within the HN forces that need to be considered.

The potential security concerns with employing U.S. members in the HN training areas.

The relationship between the HN unit and the local population.

The ability of the HN unit to satisfy its administrative and logistics requirements without a negative impact on the civilian populace.

3-34. During FID operations, other ARSOF units may either set up as or fall under other task forces or supporting agencies within the JTF structure. MISO units in a robust operation may set up as a joint military information support task force, while CA forces may plan out of a joint CMO task force. Although not a CA organization, the joint CMO task force may likely have CA units at its core or as subordinate elements and may be commanded by a CA commander.

REGIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS

3-35. With the advent of instant or nearly instant communications and media access in even the most remote regions, U.S. efforts in any HN may be scrutinized much closer within the region, surrounding regions, or even globally. In addition, operations may affect countries throughout the region or even cause international debate and opposition. Traditional rivalries and hostility toward the United States are factors in some theaters. For example, U.S. assistance to a nation with long-standing adversaries in the area may be perceived by those adversaries as upsetting the regional balance of power. Although it is increasingly an untenable position, some nations within a region or elsewhere internationally may consider the HN to be within its sphere of influence. The ethnic rivalries in the Balkans and the quasi-religious dogmas of the jihadists promulgating worldwide terrorism show that history, even a millennium old, can still foster fanatic resistance to U.S. FID efforts. These last examples also highlight the propensity of some internal threats to use revisionist history in their propaganda.

3-36. Regional, transnational, and even distant nations may see U.S. intervention in the area (or any area) as U.S. domination or outright imperialism. Some nations and nonstate actors may perceive this (and seek to portray it) as U.S. political, cultural, and economic imperialism. Regionally, a neighbor to the HN may fear increased economic competition from that nation should FID operations succeed. Globally, given the world of the digital age, opposition to a U.S. operation can come from virtually any corner of the world and any interest. Opposition, however, does not dictate U.S. policy but requires careful evaluation and consideration, as well as possible alternate planning.

3-37. Proactive public affairs programs can accurately depict U.S. efforts. Effective or believable adversary propaganda warrants a concerted and timely U.S. MISO program to defeat it quickly. The United States can pursue a proactive information effort in the HN and neighboring regional countries to prepare key target audiences for U.S. operations. In addition, MISO can exploit early successes in the HN. U.S. commanders must consider friendly, neutral, and hostile nations in the supported HN region and must envision how they perceive U.S. support. MISO and public affairs can be coordinated to address regional, transnational, and, if applicable, global audiences that may have (or perceive they have) a stake in any U.S. operation.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE ASSESSMENT

3-38. Primarily, planners within the theater responsible for conducting FID programs assess what programs to conduct. DOS representatives work with foreign governments and DOD representatives work with foreign military personnel to develop programs that are consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives and that are useful to the country concerned. The representatives developing programs use the TSCP process to assess currently implemented programs and exercises and to assess the previous programs (with the exception of the rare instances of countries first opening up to U.S. military assistance) for relevancy and success to the overall goals within the region. Assessments identify the effectiveness and strategic impact of the programs. To meet the goals of the U.S. security concerns and HN goals, the representatives review security assistance, exercises, training programs, and operational activities. These programs are assessed based on key trends, shortfalls, future opportunities, and challenges.

3-39. In instances of long-term success, a waning internal threat or initial insurgencies may be best countered in either the early stages or the endgame by nonmilitary instruments of national power with limited or no military FID involvement. In this instance, the assessment may conclude that HN training may be substituted with limited direct or indirect support by select Army units. Rarely will operations begin with combat authorized. Even if this is the case, however, long-term success must also include an immediate focus on assessing the environment and deciding which HN units to train while conducting combat operations using Army personnel.

ENVIRONMENT AND TRAINING ASSESSMENT

3-40. When FID programs are assessed as warranted, specific personnel or forces are allocated to programs approved for implementation within a region. Exercises can be planned through the CJCS and GCC or Service-sponsored training programs. The DSCA supports the implementation of approved U.S. security assistance programs.

3-41. Assessments to conduct a given mission or program can be completed at all levels of planning. At the tactical level, Army units conduct a training assessment before conducting a training mission. The unit assesses the training requirements, personnel manning shortages, individual training needs, and equipment shortfalls of the HN conventional force or SOF counterpart to be trained. Appendix A of this publication assists with guidance on authorities, to include funding authorizations for the type of mission. There are numerous types of authorities—Title 10 USC, Title 22 USC, or Title XII of the National Defense Authorization Act. The judge advocate general should always be consulted to translate authorities—especially fiscal authorizations and appropriations.

3-42. The DOS assesses the HN forces and personnel before conducting security assistance. Army units must implement procedures to help the DOS and country team in scrutinizing HN forces before they can receive training. Any personnel who are not vetted must be removed from training. The primary purpose of vetting is to ensure the identification of personnel with a history of human rights violations. The U.S. policy is to prevent U.S. cooperation with the government of any country that engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. Ideally, a site survey team gathers this information.

HANDOFF CONSIDERATIONS

3-43. Handoff considerations assist FID planners with a direct handoff between units or when there has been lag time between operations. The considerations listed below are intended primarily for a direct handoff between ARSOF or conventional force units. Leaders must consider these factors when handoff is made to a SFA trained conventional force unit or other governmental agencies. In addition, the considerations should be taken into account in a mature operation where there may be lag time between deployments. In this latter case, preparing an analysis of the considerations is an aid for the incoming commander on the next iteration. The lead representative of the incoming and outgoing commanders or other governmental agencies must take into consideration the following:

Mission.

Operational environment.

Adversary and enemy composition.

U.S. and/or multinational forces.

HN forces.

Civilian populace.

Terrain and weather.

Time.

Other governmental agencies.

Continued Army forces involvement.

MISSION

3-44. The incoming Army commander must make a detailed study of their unit’s mission statement and understand the present mission tasks and the implied mission tasks. The mission may also require a unit with additional skill sets, such as advanced special operations, near-real-time connectivity, CA functional specialists, or complex media production capability. Knowing the mission, commander’s concept of the mission, commander’s critical information requirements, priority intelligence requirements, and information requirements help the incoming commander understand the mission. After a complete in-depth study of the operational area, the incoming commander should complete the handoff in a manner that allows for continued, uninterrupted mission accomplishment. The changeover must not allow the adversary to gain any operational advantages.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3-45. The in-country Army unit provides continuous information updates to the incoming commander. Priority intelligence requirements and information requirements are established for the original mission along with operational, strategic, and tactical information. The incoming unit must become familiar with the ongoing and upcoming priority intelligence and information requirements along with their linkages to planned programs.

ADVERSARY AND ENEMY COMPOSITION

3-46. The incoming commander must have the latest available intelligence on all subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats that affect the mission. This intelligence includes comprehensive data on terrorists and terrorist-related incidents over the previous several months. In addition to the normal intelligence provided to the incoming unit commander on a regular basis, the situation may call for a liaison from the outgoing unit. Operations security is critical to prevent the enemy from discovering the impending relief and then exploiting the fluidity of the change and the concentration of U.S. forces.

UNITED STATES AND/OR MULTINATIONAL FORCES

3-47. To the incoming unit, learning about the friendly forces is as important as knowing the enemy situation. The unit must be familiar with the command structure it will deal with on a daily basis. The incoming unit must know all friendly units in adjacent operational areas and be aware of any specific or permanent party force units and the capabilities of their mission support base. The incoming unit must also know of other operations, units, and their capabilities. If U.S. logistic units are to be relieved, the relief should occur after the relief of the FID operational units they support.

HOST-NATION FORCES

3-48. The incoming Army unit plans and prepares for a quick and frictionless transition in counterpart relations; however, potential or anticipated friction between the HN unit and the incoming unit may cause the relief to take place more slowly than desired. Therefore, the incoming and outgoing units need a period of overlap to allow for in-country, face-to-face contact with their counterparts before the mission handoff.

3-49. If possible, the incoming unit members should receive biographical data on and photographs of their counterparts. This information allows unit members to become familiar with their counterparts before deployment and to determine which advisor techniques may need more emphasis. Execution of the mission must continue within the capabilities of the incoming unit, the HN unit, and the available supporting assets.

CIVILIAN POPULACE

3-50. All incoming Army units must complete an in-depth area study, paying close attention to local problems. General demographic data may be available from ARSOF units, notably CA and MISO, which can be expanded upon for unit-specific needs. Popular support for U.S. activities taking place within the operational area may directly influence changes in the mission statement. The outgoing unit must provide this critical information and describe in detail all completed civic action projects and those that are in progress. The incoming unit must understand the functioning of the HN government and the status of any international civilian or government agencies involved in or influencing the situation in its operational environment.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER

3-51. Terrain and weather affect all units conducting FID. Issues can range from minor to critical. An example of a minor to moderate concern is acclimation to extremes in temperature, altitude, or even urban pollution. At the other end of the spectrum, some handoff operations may require select ARSOF units, such as operational detachments–alpha or conventional force infantry with assault climbers, to move by foot or by animal mounts into and out of the operational area. In such instances, the outgoing unit plans and reconnoiters the routes used for infiltrating the incoming unit and those used for its exfiltration. These routes must provide the best possible cover and concealment. If possible, the units make this exchange during darkness or inclement weather. Units must consider significant terrain features or weather that may impede movement. In addition, weather conditions and significant elevations can greatly affect rotary-wing operations. These factors can critically affect resupply and HSS (notably medical evacuation procedures).

TIME

3-52. The depth and dispersion of units and the number of operations conducted determines the time required to rotate FID units. Ideally, there is an overlap period to allow the incoming unit to become familiar with the operational area and to establish rapport between the incoming unit personnel and their HN counterparts. However, the handoff operation must take place as quickly as possible. The longer the operation takes, the more personnel in the operational area become vulnerable and lucrative targets for adversarial forces. A quickly executed relief reduces the time available for the enemy to strike before the incoming unit has time to consolidate its position. The incoming unit should not sacrifice continued and uninterrupted execution of ongoing operations for speed. The incoming unit needs to have enough time to observe training techniques and procedures and to conduct debriefings on lessons learned.

OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES

3-53. For the unit or team being relieved of a function by another government agency handoff, procedures involve longer handoff times and more complex coordination. However, the other areas of consideration still apply and in fact may be a greater issue for another government agency. Outgoing Army units that have past, present, or future projects planned with other governmental agencies must provide for the transfer of these projects to new responsible agents in the incoming unit. Outgoing unit personnel need sufficient time to put incoming unit personnel in contact with other governmental agencies counterparts. In addition, the outgoing unit should brief the incoming unit on any other governmental agencies programs effecting operations.

CONTINUED ARMY FORCES INVOLVEMENT

3-54. The constant and unbroken presence of Army units in FID operations is not a foregone conclusion. In FID operations, gaps in deployments of units may be unavoidable. In addition, limited or single ARSOF disciplines or specific conventional force units (for example, engineers) may be present on an ongoing basis. In these instances, the Army units with a constant presence must maintain continuity and brief incoming force units on aspects of the operational environment relevant to their skill sets and mission. A JTF, JSOTF, or SOTF providing structure for continuity at the staff level during gaps or when forces are not available can ease transitions.

TRAINING PLAN

3-55. A key component of developing the training plan is an agreement (frequently referred to as a memorandum of agreement or letter of agreement) between the HN and the Army unit conducting the training. These are, in effect, signed contracts detailing the specifics of what is being provided by each party. Training plans at the operational level vary based on HN needs and unit training capabilities. An assessment for the training to be conducted should begin with some sort of premission site survey by all the practicable types of units that are deploying to the HN. In another case, a MISO unit may deploy an assessment team for a larger FID operation. In other cases, conventional force units may deploy a minimum of survey personnel.

3-56. After completing the training assessment, each unit analyzes the assessment and site survey and prepares a training plan. The unit develops tasks, conditions, and standards to train the HN forces. Units tasked to train HN forces use the appropriate U.S. doctrine as a template to attain the training goals. For example, they may use battle drills and Combined Arms Training Strategy training events, when applicable, to support HN training. Planners should examine HN doctrine for contradictions with U.S. doctrine, and they must develop useable, attainable training that the HN can adopt and codify into new doctrine. The training plan may have to address issues, such as constraints in resources, societal or military culture, or other concerns.

3-57. HN training strategies must include multiechelon training whenever it is feasible. Multiechelon techniques save time and achieve synchronized execution of mission-essential tasks throughout the HN force. However, constraints on both U.S. force commitment and the needs of the HN may dictate a concentration on one or two echelons. As an example, operational realities and constraints during FID operations might dictate that an operational detachment–alpha exclusively train a COIN field force at the company level, while a MISO unit might concentrate limited assets at the highest-strategic levels of HN government and military. Teams or units from the conventional force may be training simultaneously on critical areas, such as logistics or basic fire direction control. When planning training programs and field exercises, Soldier planners assess (among others) the factors listed below:

HN current level of training to determine if the training plan requires changes because of its level of proficiency or needs.

HN ability (or inability) to field systems or equipment.

Potential training facilities and areas based on projected training (for example, ranges and military operations in urban terrain sites).

Individual and unit proficiency in tactical operations and other skills required in IDAD operations involving intelligence, CMO, and populace and resources control. Because of varied missions and limited resources, individuals and units require cross-training.

An adaptive program of instruction and tasks adapted to specifically meet the needs of the HN. Avoid using template mission-essential task lists or programs of instruction from U.S. organic unit training.

Equipment availability (for example, radios, weapons, and vehicles).

Logistics procedures, to include medical treatment and evacuation that stress decentralized operations over large areas.

Cooperation level with U.S. and HN intelligence agencies during operations and training exercises.

CAO surveying and planning need. A realistic assessment of unit resources is necessary to ensure that the unit’s primary mission and HN sustainability are kept in mind.

Constraints on U.S. MISO in relation to HN history or miscues of a MISO-like capability.

Orientation on the terrain, climate, and unusual health requirements.

PLANNING FOR PROTECTION

3-58. In terms of risk to personnel, FID operations span a complete continuum of environments. Adequate personal security is always a critical mission factor. Commanders must address protection of Soldiers during all phases of operations—from planning through deployment, employment, and redeployment. Deploying Soldiers must receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and personnel-protection requirements before arrival in the operational area. Any updates to the situation in the HN must be briefed on arrival.

3-59. For the foreseeable future, the threat of terrorism is a constant factor in any nation, even those with advanced domestic security infrastructures. Operations, whether conducted in nations with high states of domestic security or those with little emphasis on security because of a lack of an internal threat, require proactive full-spectrum protection measures. Additional threats include but are not limited to—

Street or organized crime.

Foreign intelligence services, possibly including the HN intelligence collection community.

Local populace animosity or demonstrations (domestic or U.S.-directed).

HN regional transportation systems.

HN military equipment, training, and procedural deficiencies.

Weapons of mass destruction (to include regional nations and nonstate actors).

Weather, terrain, and environment.

Contaminants and pollution.

Health threats.

Mines and unexploded ordinance.

Political groups, parties, or individuals.

Regional cross-border threats.

Hostile media seeking to discredit individual Soldiers or collective units.

Chapter 4

Training

During FID operations, conventional force and ARSOF units routinely operate in austere environments and atypical cultural surroundings. FID programs may be conducted in areas where there has been little or no previous direct contact with Americans or outsiders in any form. This requires skill sets that may not routinely exist as organic skills and knowledge in conventional units; however, many operations require competency mainly in a Soldier’s MOS. In addition, with the proliferation of conventional units trained in SFA, further training in the nuances of FID declines. However, SOF (in general) and ARSOF units (in particular) remain uniquely trained and accustomed to filling roles that might otherwise be left vacant in some environments.

OVERVIEW

4-1. During operations, Army units may be the primary or sole trainers of HN military or paramilitary personnel, and a large number of forces and units may be involved in direct support (not involving combat operations). Training of HN military may continue while U.S. forces provide direct support and, to some degree, even during combat operations. In both instances, commanders are faced with a dual dynamic force. A commander must balance the need to use U.S. forces in direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military against the need to enable self-sufficiency of the HN. Regardless of the level of support the program gives the HN, the Soldiers’ role as a trainer remains constant.

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TRAINING

4-2. The CJCS is responsible for formulating policies for joint training, including FID operations. Some training for supporting programs consists of CJCS-directed exercises. The CJCS approves the GCC priorities for training, its exercise direction, and overall aspects of joint training of assigned forces. The Services, in turn, are responsible for providing trained forces that may be used to support these programs.

4-3. The USSOCOM Commander is charged by USC with training assigned forces to meet FID taskings and to ensure their interoperability with conventional forces, as well as other SOF. USSOCOM determines relevant unit sourcing to particular taskings with the support of the TSOCs. Taskings for Army units to conduct FID operations and training are forwarded through either U.S. Army Forces Command (via Joint Forces Command) or United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and are typically assigned to an appropriate unit or a regionally oriented ARSOF unit. In peacetime and in the circumstances of global operations against terrorist networks, the general cultural awareness of ARSOF is greater than the conventional force. ARSOF personnel are specifically trained in regional, cultural, and language skills, and in working with translators and conducting FID operations as a core task.

4-4. The ultimate responsibility for training an HN military or paramilitary force rests with the Army elements and Soldiers conducting FID operations. Preparing to train HN forces entails determining the extent of those responsibilities and assessing the HN military force capabilities. In the case of habitual relationships, this may translate into a detailed knowledge of the capability of the HN units following previous operations and perhaps through continual contact with those units through planning conferences or other means. At the other end of the spectrum of determining training responsibilities is the first-time or long-interim lag time of operations. Army trainers in this case must maximize their scrutiny of predeployment site surveys, organic and higher echelon intelligence assessments, and the American Embassy SCO. Military liaison elements, even in a neighboring country, may shed light on the HN military forces’ level of training. In all instances, Army units with a responsibility to conduct training of HN forces must seek the best picture of the current baseline training level of the relevant HN forces before beginning to develop training strategies and products.

TRAINING AND SKILLS NEEDED FOR SUCCESS

4-5. With the complex and intertwined environment of training and the skills necessary for the successful training of HN military forces for FID operations, it is quite possible to lose sight of the ultimate gauge of a successful program. That gauge is in fact when the military portion of the HN IDAD strategy is concluded and any remaining internal threats are well within the abilities of civilian agencies to combat.

Note: For ease of reading, the following section uses the term predeployment training exclusively. However, the areas of focus are relevant to all training and education products concerning FID.

COMMANDER’S INTENT

4-6. Ultimately, the commander’s intent drives the specific training units receive before conducting operations. In addition, the baseline, common training conducted for all operations is driven by the commander’s intent to emphasize or de-emphasize certain aspects of FID training. In predeployment training, the commander assesses the factors and skills necessary for a specific FID operation and the state of training and readiness of the deploying element. Based on this assessment, the commander formulates an intent that emphasizes blends of all the training and deployment factors listed in the paragraphs below. Planners and trainers base predeployment training on how best to train the unit in the areas this intent encompasses.

OVERALL UNITED STATES AND THEATER GOALS FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

4-7. The USG may have highly varying goals from one operation to another. One theater may have a general set of internal threats at variance with the common threat in another theater. In addition, the world is increasingly a global system and the conditions in one nation of a GCC can affect a counterpart a hemisphere away. Personnel engaged in military activities that support programs must understand the overall goals and objectives of the supported GCC and the potential impacts on other theaters, global operations against terrorist networks, or other U.S. national objectives and policies. An understanding of these goals provides a framework for Army units and personnel to determine if their actions and programs support overall theater objectives without compromising other national objectives. For the Soldier, whose any one action can potentially have strategic consequences, national and theater goals often take on a heightened importance compared to other operations.

COGNIZANCE OF POLITICAL REALITIES

4-8. Similar to understanding the goals within the theater and the relevant national goals and objectives, Soldiers require a detailed knowledge of potential political pitfalls in any operation. An agenda of HN military and civilian personnel may be to unwittingly draw support for political or diplomatic plans that are not supported by the United States by orchestrating visits, photo opportunities, or statements from Army commanders and Soldiers. In addition, Soldiers should be trained on domestic political agendas within the HN that may be counterproductive to FID operations or U.S. national interests. This may be heightened in areas outside the full control of the HN government where authorities may be more likely to commit human rights violations or simple practices that alienate the local populace.

JOINT, INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

4-9. The joint, multinational, intergovernmental, and NGOs in a collaborative environment are never going to be the same, even during different iterations of a long-running operation. Each deployment typically presents different mixes of agencies and forces constituting the collaborative environment.

4-10. The collaborative environment may include building partner capacity and coordination with the following organizations:

U.S. military forces.

Foreign military forces (multinational forces, HN forces, and allies).

DOD agencies.

Other government agencies.

State and local government agencies.

IGOs (those created by a formal agreement between two or more governments—for example, the United Nations).

International organizations (entities recognized by governments but not created by an agreement executed by governments—for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross).

NGOs (private, self-governing, not-for-profit).

Foreign government agencies.

4-11. Predeployment training needs to address building partner capacity. In addition, briefings or classes are given on the agencies or forces involved and how to operate through, with, or around those agencies or forces. Other agencies may have language and cultural differences; therefore, cross-cultural engagement skill training is recommended for building partner capacity. Typically, those differences are magnified when dealing with nonmilitary agencies.

4-12. In most cases, the partner capacity equation has a collective agenda and shared goals with units conducting FID. Nevertheless, training in moderate to even highly varied language (in particular acronyms or lack thereof) and culture may be required. Interagencies may have similar goals but highly different ways of attaining them. For instance, civilian agencies may hold (for valid reason) reservations about working around an armed force. Despite these differences, the typical challenges of the joint and interagency portion are a matter of training on coordination and deconfliction strategies.

4-13. Much like training for potential political pitfalls with the HN, Soldiers must train on recognizing and adapting to competing or contradictory agendas as well. Although more prevalent in some portions of building partner capacity (notably intergovernmental), other agencies may intentionally or unintentionally pursue policies and programs that oppose FID goals and objectives. Training on operating with these agencies may involve negotiation, conflict resolution, or even avoidance strategies. Training on recognizing political and media ploys may be necessary as well.

CULTURE, CUSTOMS, AND CONDUCT

4-14. An operation can be critically disabled within the first few moments of contact with HN military, civilian officials, or even ordinary citizens if vital cultural mores are violated by U.S. personnel. The United States is a highly diverse and open culture with relatively few baseline customs other than tolerance and an inherent belief in the rights of individuals and subcultures to practice any behavior or dress that does not infringe on the rights of others. Nations in which operations are conducted may be just the opposite with varying degrees of tolerance of a faux pas committed by outsiders. In addition, many nations still harbor legal, economic, or cultural disparities in their culture. These may in fact contribute to the need for a FID program.

4-15. FID-trained Soldiers are typically aware of the cultural conventions and customs of the HN. Refresher and new personnel training may well be necessary. In addition, when possible, providing cultural awareness training to conventional forces accompanying SOF on operations should be strongly suggested or (if applicable) mandated. All Soldiers deploying on FID operations must be forewarned and prepared for HN practices that may be unfamiliar. In addition, they must be prepared for treatment by HN personnel toward them and toward HN citizens that is harsh and offensive. Predeployment training is, therefore, sometimes necessary to discern between HN personnel behaviors that are simply cultural norms and those that degenerate into human rights abuses.

4-16. ARSOF Soldiers are either trained by virtue of their MOS or, if coming from the conventional force to an ARSOF unit, infused by the community to understand the importance of the image they project to the HN military and population. Projection of this impression has a significant impact on the ability of the United States to gain both short- and long-term support for the overall FID program. Infusing this into attachments and newly arrived Soldiers should be part of the predeployment train-up. Ideally, ARSOF and conventional force units conduct predeployment training together for at least some of the available train-up time. Specific potential issues that may arise in the HN should be covered for all personnel at this time as well, and training for potential conflict is sometimes necessary. During interaction with HN militaries, governments, and citizens who may operate in a culture of corruption, elitism, bigotry, or other unacceptable practices may often be unavoidable. Training on how best to approach these conflicts can provide Soldiers the tools to mitigate these situations.

LANGUAGE TRAINING AND INTERPRETER AND TRANSLATOR USE

4-17. Knowledge of the HN culture and language are an essential part of the operation. An understanding of the culture and language permit U.S. forces to adequately train, assist, and advise foreign partners confronting an insurgency. The ideal is for all personnel conducting operations to be able to communicate with HN personnel in the native language of the HN. In reality, interpreters and translators may need to effectively communicate political, military, cultural and language nuances in localized tribal languages. While proficiency using an interpreter can be substituted for language ability, interpreter usage always diminishes the capability to communicate effectively and confidently. The specifics on how to exercise, lead, and direct an interpreter are covered in ATP 3-07.10. Translators and interpreters are seldom native speakers of both languages (normally, they are native speakers of one language with training in the other); therefore, it is best to have sufficient understanding of the language to ensure that the interpreter or translator is not straying from the desired message. In general, an interpreter facilitates the oral communication from one language to another and goes beyond the word-for-word transference in an attempt to convey the speaker’s nuances. The interpreter also uses technical or colloquial language, as appropriate. If the target language has no exact word or phrase for a technical term, an experienced interpreter will give a brief explanation of the concept meaning. There are two methods of interpretation used as techniques according to FM 2-22.3:

Alternate.

Simultaneous.

4-18. Whereas translation performed by a translator generally refers to written language, a skilled translator attempts to match the tone set by the original document and has excellent writing skills. There is a strong tendency to translate messages literally (word-for-word) from the speaker’s language to the target language. This technique may work well, but it can lead to embarrassing situations. According to FM 2-22.3, there are three types of translations applied to document recovery, translation, and exploitation:

Full.

Extract.

Summary.

4-19. Some Army MOSs mandate minimum language proficiency for award of the MOS, and language proficiency building is part of the regular training for most units. Army enlisted linguists are managed through the following four groups:

Personnel in language-dependent MOSs.

Personnel in language-capable MOSs.

Personnel in non-language-dependent MOSs.

Personnel possessing a foreign language capability not related to their MOS.

Note: An Army language-dependent MOS (09L) consists of interpreter and/or translator. AR 11-6 contains detailed information on the Army Foreign Language Program, to include contract linguists.

4-20. The reality of the complexities of regional languages and changes in languages equates to frequent deficiencies in the capabilities of qualified personnel in certain HN languages. In addition, conventional and ARSOF units may conduct operations beyond the regions in which the primary language of the HN is spoken. Familiarity with and an attempt to use some basic phrases trained during predeployment, coupled with cultural sensitivity, can greatly enhance relations with HN personnel.

4-21. Language capabilities can significantly aid trainers and others who have daily contact with HN military personnel and the local population. Personnel can function more effectively if they conduct language training in the target language before deployment. Trainers from across the Army can focus on mastering or refreshing select words, phrases, and sentences for some instruction, such as battle drills. However, all ARSOF and highly technical conventional force disciplines invariably must teach at least some complex classes and, in some cases, an entire curriculum containing technical terms and advanced theory. In these instances, only conventional or ARSOF Soldiers possessing a native speaker language capability are sufficient. Cleared and vetted contract interpreters may be a necessary alternative.

4-22. Although language ability is important, it is equally important for personnel (even those proficient in one or more additional languages) to conduct training on the art of using interpreters while teaching and training. Refresher or initial training in the associated vetting and employment of translators and interpreters is also warranted. Personnel serving for the first time as managers of an interpreter pool should receive training as well.

AREA AND ENVIRONMENT

4-23. Detailed knowledge of the operational environment is required to maximize the effectiveness of military operations that support FID programs. Regionally oriented ARSOF units typically have detailed country and area data for the region they support; however, the possibility of conventional force or ARSOF Soldiers having boots on the ground for the first time in either one or more specific country or region remains a possibility. Training briefs based on the specifics of these areas should be developed from the predeployment site survey. Other specific aspects of area and population studies are addressed in detail in Chapter 5 under the CMO and MISO estimates of the situation.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

4-24. Because of their proximity and access to the local populace, personnel conducting military activities that support programs are passive information collectors and have valuable information to provide to the intelligence system. Army units and teams collect detailed information on the social, economic, and political situation that may collaterally be processed into essential intelligence by organic or higher-echelon intelligence units and agencies. Appendix C provides a detailed discussion of this process. To foster relationships with the HN and to maintain credibility, it often behooves all ARSOF and conventional force units (invariably in the case of CA and public affairs elements) to not be associated in the minds of the populace or their HN counterparts as intelligence collectors. This perception may be unavoidable; however, if Army units return with information determined to be of value after being vetted through intelligence cycles, the perception is irrelevant. Personnel involved in FID operations must know and understand their responsibilities in these areas.

SPECIFIC OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY ISSUES

4-25. FID programs are likely to interact at multiple levels with other governmental agencies from predeployment through postdeployment. ARSOF and select conventional force units have regular working relationships with multiple global operations against terrorist networks. Specific training or procedures may be required, since this type of coordination may be new to some personnel supporting a program. In other cases, predeployment training may be specific and detailed to include information on the specific global operations against terrorist network personnel and status of programs that Army units will interface, integrate, or work with. Home station global operations against terrorist network liaison officers can conduct some predeployment training.

LAW AND POLICY

4-26. Between rotations of a long-term FID operation, the legal, regulatory, and policy of either the United States or the HN may change. A single incident, even one occurring outside the HN, may change the conditions in the HN. Training on new restrictions or new latitude may be necessary. Refresher or initial training on the legal and regulatory concerns in the HN is warranted even if conditions remain unchanged. Central to this training are provisions of applicable status-of-forces agreements, as well as restrictions on the transfer of equipment and on other types of assistance that may be provided. A review of the ROE and rules of interaction to support FID must be included as well. Whether stand-alone or part of the ROE, changes in the rules of interaction can have a critical effect on some Army units, notably CA, public affairs, and MISO. Instituting or eliminating highly restrictive rules for interacting with the HN populace calls for extensive predeployment training. This training is especially important for operations involving recently opened or closed groups or areas.

FORCE PROTECTION TRAINING

4-27. FID operations often require small elements to deploy to isolated areas or complex urban geographies with highly varying threats and constraints. Army units face a myriad of different security measures within the range of operations. Predeployment training with the full range of weapons and concealment (if authorized) should be part of the protection train-up. Other areas covered in training should include—

Personal-protection lethal-force employment parameters.

HN-provided security.

Transportation.

CI threat brief.

Housing and local security.

Nonlethal options (if available or authorized).

Media procedures.

Disclosure and classification issues.

Private military contractors.

Medical threats and countermeasures.

TRAINING STRATEGY

4-28. Conventional forces that support FID are typically proficient in the essential tasks. ADP 7-0 emphasizes that the unit’s mission-essential task list must reflect to standard as part of a combined arms team. The Combined Arms Training Strategy development and management process supplements FID for corps, division, and brigade headquarters, and it consists of a descriptive collective task-based training strategy that is maintained in the Army’s Digital Training Management System, which is accessible to conventional forces. The strategy for training is expressed for each echelon within an organization in terms of training events.

4-29. USSOCOM is the only combatant command with a legislatively mandated FID task; however, this does not preclude conventional units from conducting these missions. Historically, conventional force trainers have often been in the majority in some operations. The legislative mandate outlines the two types of FID training: institutional and unit. SOF prepare for operations through institutional and unit training, whereas most conventional forces prepare for supporting operations through unit training. (This should not be construed to say that some conventional force MOSs do not come to FID operations with relevant training they received at the institutional level.) Training to support FID covers a broad range of areas. In some instances, ARSOF units may conduct all HN training in a small-scale operation; however, even a small-scale operation may contain a majority of conventional units. This probability is increasingly likely when the internal threat is not an insurgent or terrorist group. Therefore, training must often be designed to support a mix of personnel ranging from SOF that are language trained and culturally focused to forces that are untrained and unfamiliar with either the HN or the specific area in which the program is located.

INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING

4-30. ARSOF Soldiers—primarily CA, MISO, and SF—receive extensive institutional training in language, culture, regional studies, interpersonal skills, and instructional techniques as qualifications in their basic specialty. Although ARSOF Soldiers are not the only Army personnel to receive this sort of training at the institutional level, the core tasks that ARSOF units are assigned, including FID, mandate a broader and more in-depth level of training than conventional units currently receive. Some critical areas covered in ARSOF institutional training (in which conventional force units typically require cross-training) relating to FID include—

Overarching strategic and operational FID and IDAD principles.

Tactical FID TTP.

COIN techniques.

Guerrilla warfare (underground and resistance operations when applicable).

Security assistance and authorities.

IMET.

FMS.

Foreign military funding.

Foreign military construction services.

Foreign military exchange programs.

Counterpropaganda procedures.

Negotiation techniques.

Area, training, and morale assessments.

Partner capacity to integrate joint forces, multinational forces, IGOs, and NGOs in a collaborative environment.

UNIT TRAINING

4-31. Both conventional and SOF units conduct unit training for each new deployment. The unit can conduct much of the training necessary to prepare conventional unit personnel to support a program. A more extensive train-up for units may be necessary when they operate outside their normal region. Unit training may also be necessary when Army units are in an HN for the first time or after a long absence from the area. This training focuses on the individual or, in the case of unit-size participation, involves large-scale collective training. Training should conform to the tasks recorded on the memorandum of agreement signed by the ARSOF and HN personnel. In addition, the training should be adapted toward tasks that were identified during the predeployment site survey. The postmission debriefing of previous operations, if available, provides additional information to customize unit training.

4-32. Predeployment training with conventional units participating in operations should be pursued when possible. The presence of a country or area specialist to help in briefing and training cultural awareness and culturally sensitive techniques can be invaluable. When feasible, units should conduct operational rehearsals of the operation. These rehearsals allow participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. Such rehearsals should replicate, as much as possible, the potential situations that a unit may encounter during an operation. The use of role players can be invaluable, especially for personnel unfamiliar with dealing with emotionally charged situations involving indigenous populations and institutions.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

4-33. The role of language and cultural awareness is of high importance in global operations against terrorist networks. The operational environments of the future place an emphasis on language and cultural awareness that crosses boundaries between institutional and unit training. Clearly, the purpose of institutional training is to acquire in-depth language ability and cultural knowledge. ARSOF units working with conventional units or attachments can facilitate foreign language and cultural training. Except in those few cultures that disdain rudimentary attempts to communicate in their language, knowing a few polite and authoritative phrases is beneficial to Soldiers dealing with HN personnel. In addition, it is hard to conceive of an instance in which knowing the fundamentals of cultural norms would not be beneficial to Soldiers. Army personnel should endeavor to impart as much of their expertise in these areas as is practicable when training unfamiliar Soldiers.

4-34. It may be useful to evaluate and attempt to evenly distribute personnel with language and cultural expertise during development of a final predeployment training strategy. This can be accomplished by using the established guidelines of the CJCSI 3126.01A.

TRAINING AND ADVISORY ASSISTANCE TO THE HOST NATION

4-35. There is no distinct boundary between training assistance and advisory assistance. In broad-brush terms, training assistance is typically nonoperational in areas and under conditions where Army personnel are not likely to be forced to engage any armed internal threat. In equally broad-brush terms, advisory assistance may entail some operational advice and assistance beyond training in less secure areas. FID participants generally provide security assistance to relatively low-risk situations; however, the current global situation proves that any Soldier is, to some degree, in harm’s way. Advisory assistance (and to a lesser degree training assistance) may involve situations that require Soldiers to defend themselves; therefore, the commander and the American Embassy accept greater risk. The difficulty in putting exact and unqualified definitions on either type of security assistance is that both may take place through the entire range from indirect support to direct support not involving combat operations during the same operation. As long as the risk is clearly defined, planned for, mitigated where possible, and, most importantly, deemed worth the potential cost, this lack of definition causes no inherent problems. Mitigation, however, may translate into exclusion of trainers or advisors from certain areas.

Note: The above description does not abolish statutory concerns of U.S. military’s direct involvement with HN forces. The statutory concerns outlined earlier in this text and those in Appendix A still apply. The purpose of the above broad descriptions is merely to suggest possible areas of training emphasis.

4-36. Army elements typically develop, establish, and operate centralized training programs for the supported HN force. Soldiers can also conduct individual, leader, and collective training programs for specific HN units. Training subjects run the gamut of tasks, and training ranges from individual instruction through leader development to specialized collective training. Army personnel can provide both training and advisory assistance in two ways:

Small teams may provide training or give operational advice and assistance to HN civilian, military, or paramilitary organizations.

Individual Soldiers may be assigned or attached to the Security Assistance Training Management Organization to perform training and advisory assistance duties on a temporary or permanent basis. (Soldiers are typically assigned as advisors rather than trainers, as in the case of SF advisors working with HN operational forces.)

4-37. In either case, assistance may be provided under the OPCON of the SCO chief in his role as the in-country U.S. defense representative, other designated embassy official, or the TSOC, depending on the command and control arrangement.

TRAINING ASSISTANCE

4-38. The agreement negotiated between U.S. and HN officials provides the framework for the who, what, when, where, how, and why of military training assistance. Often, U.S. doctrine, as prescribed in applicable publications, must be modified to fit the specific requirements of the forces being trained. Procedures may vary, but the fundamental techniques and thought processes still apply. Training assistance should focus on the materiel, fiscal, and logistical realities of the HN.

4-39. In general, those skills, concepts, and procedures for FID taught to U.S. forces are also applicable to HN forces for IDAD. For some units (notably CA and MISO), the reality of other HN agencies benefiting more in their portion of the IDAD program than the HN military is a frequent by-product of the activities they conduct. Training emphasis varies according to the HN requirements, force composition, and U.S. and HN agreements. The training to be conducted depends on the situation and varies considerably. Existing military personnel, new military personnel, or paramilitary forces may receive training assistance.

4-40. The training assistance portion of security assistance can make a very significant impact on the IDAD program. The GCC is actively involved in coordinating, planning, and approving training support with the SCO and HN. Training assistance supports U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. Training assistance promotes U.S. military rapport with the armed and security forces of foreign countries to operate in multinational environments. The completion of the security assistance training contributes to the U.S. security interests and building partnership capacity objectives. HN counterpart personnel accompany U.S. security assistance trainers. The goal is for these counterparts to eventually conduct all instruction and training without guidance from U.S. personnel. Initially, U.S. personnel may present all or most of the instruction with as much HN assistance as is feasible. U.S. trainers use the train-the-trainer concept to foster the foreign country’s development of its own professional and technical training capability. The general objectives of training programs under security assistance consist of the following elements:

Professional Military Education. This training expands the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations that culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and the HN.

Operation and Maintenance Skills. This training objective creates skills needed for effective operation and maintenance of equipment acquired from the United States.

Effective Management. Effective management assists the foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for effective management of its defense establishment.

Development of Training Self-Sufficiency. This program fosters development by the HN of its own training capability.

Rapport and Understanding. Rapport and understanding are necessary for promoting military-to-military understanding, which leads to increased standardization and interoperability.

Increased Awareness. Increased awareness provides an opportunity to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to the basic principles of internationally recognized human rights.

4-41. Training assistance consists of all formal training conducted by Army units. ARSOF careerists as Army professionals conducting FID are trained to be adept in defense, diplomacy, and development. SF operators are trained in advisory functions, are diplomatically astute, and undergo extensive interpersonal training. All Army forces conducting FID must know the complexity of enhancing the military capabilities of allies and partner nations. The training usually follows or is connected to the equipping of a foreign military force for the specific reason to build the security capacity of partner states. All Soldiers engaged in training assistance must be cognizant that they are typically under the sharp, and sometimes magnified, scrutiny of HN government personnel, military, media, and ordinary citizens. Part of preparing Soldiers for providing training assistance is making them aware of the less tangible elements of training assistance that have a deep impact or third-order effect within the HN. Soldiers should know that, in many HNs, their mere presence alongside their counterparts often bolsters that counterpart’s prestige within their organization and among the populace. Those providing training assistance should be aware that many HNs have a domestic MISO-like capability and that exploiting the presence of highly skilled U.S. trainers may be part of their agenda. In general, none of the less tangible offshoots of providing training assistance are detrimental toward the mission or U.S. national policy as long as trainers are prepared and focus on the objective to build partner capacity.

ADVISORY ASSISTANCE

4-42. Within the DOD, the principal element charged with providing advisory assistance is the SCO. Army personnel may provide assistance in two ways:

As a unit providing advice and assistance to an HN military or paramilitary organization.

As an individual Soldier assigned or attached to the SCO.

4-43. Army units may be under OPCON of the SCO chief in his role as the in-country U.S. defense representative or under OPCON of a TSOC. The SCO includes all DOD elements, regardless of actual title, assigned in foreign countries to manage security assistance programs administered by the DOD. The U.S. advisor may often work and coordinate with civilians of other country team agencies. When he does, he must know their functions, responsibilities, and capabilities, because many activities cross jurisdictional borders. Together, the advisor and his counterpart must resolve problems by means appropriate to the HN without violating U.S. laws and policies in the process. Advisors operate under very specific ROE to ensure they remain advisors unless under threat of loss of life or limb.

4-44. The advisor must understand the scope of SCO activities. He also must know the functions, responsibilities, and capabilities of other U.S. agencies in the HN. Because many activities cross the jurisdictional boundaries or responsibilities of other country team members, the advisor seeks the members to coordinate his portion of the overall effort.

4-45. In some situations, the HN may refuse U.S. advisors. HN military leaders may instead request and receive other types of assistance, such as joint-air operations, movement and maneuver, or fires. To coordinate this assistance and to ensure its proper use, U.S. liaison teams accompany HN ground maneuver units receiving U.S. direct support involving combat operations. Language-qualified and area-oriented SF teams are especially suited for this mission. The HN government may refuse lethal support but eagerly accept support from MISO, CA, and various intelligence capabilities.

4-46. The role of the advisor is critical in the execution of FID. The advisor is the primary interface on the ground between the U.S. military forces and the HN forces. Due to language and cultural skills, ARSOF Soldiers have traditionally been a part of training, advising, and, if necessary, accompanying HN personnel to support efforts. Because there is no absolute guide to advisory assistance, each situation requires adaptability in working with embassy staff and HN personnel. The advisors, whether SOF or conventional forces, project skills to develop capabilities in HN personnel supporting the end state of a self-sufficient HN force.

Chapter 5

Employment Considerations

FID involves all instruments of national power. It is primarily a series of programs that support friendly nations operating against or threatened by hostile elements, and it promotes regional stability by helping a nation respond to the needs of its population, while maintaining security. FID is a significant mission, which requires joint planning, preparation, and execution to integrate and focus the efforts of all Service and functional components. Units conducting missions cannot dominate their environment unless they first gain a clear understanding of the theater of operations, including civilian influence, and adversarial and friendly capabilities. The employment considerations for conducting operations apply to SOF and conventional forces. Just as no two nations in the world are identical, the employment considerations in one nation may have little or no bearing on those in a bordering nation. Therefore, planners must take a detailed look at each operation on a case-by-case basis when deciding to employ forces in support of FID.

OVERVIEW

5-1. The overall U.S. theater strategy typically incorporates programs with other major peacetime training and maintenance functions as part of the comprehensive approach to promote the HN IDAD strategy. FID programs are frequently joint and are, by definition, multinational in nature. Even small tactical operations are usually multinational in terms of efforts with the supported HN. Planning and coordination, up to and including combat operations, are multinational endeavors with the HN. Although a single Service component may execute some operations, such as road building, these smaller efforts fit into the overall theater strategies and plans. Full coordination and visibility at the joint and multinational levels facilitate best-case employment of sometimes highly limited proficient personnel.

EMPLOYMENT FACTORS

5-2. Several areas deserve special attention when discussing employment of forces in operations. The joint force employment factors consist of—

SOF.

Conventional forces.

Psychological impact.

Public information programs.

Information operations impact.

Global operations against terrorist networks.

Counterdrug operations.

Intelligence support.

Logistic support.

Operations security.

Lessons learned.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

5-3. USSOCOM is the only combatant command with a legislatively mandated FID core operation. In fulfilling this core task, USSOCOM provides SOF to support GCCs. In addition to dedicated theater forces, ARSOF units typically contribute to the effort under OPCON of the TSOC, which has the primary responsibility to plan and supervise the execution of SOF operations to support FID. However, operations other than combat may have a direct command and control relationship with the chief of mission or his designee at the American Embassy. In smaller operations, ARSOF units may compose the majority of the force or may entirely make up the force. The opposite may be true as well. In a large operation, caps on total troop numbers may result in a disproportionally smaller number of ARSOF personnel than conventional forces; however, ARSOF units may still have a prominent supporting role, but their focus may shift to training HN SOF.

5-4. ARSOF units possess specialized capabilities for FID, including support for COIN and, when applicable, for unconventional warfare missions contingent to FID. Other support includes coordination and CAO, as well as MISO tactical teams. Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne), and Rangers may conduct training in specific areas as well, typically with HN SOF. Specialized training teams may train HN units for specific SOF tasks. In addition, ARSOF units may support combat operations by conducting highly specialized missions. However, the typical ARSOF role is to train, advise, and support HN military and paramilitary forces. ARSOF operations that support FID operations are frequently unilateral; however, they may support other ongoing U.S. military assistance efforts. When planning for the use of ARSOF units, command and control requirements among the combatant command, the country team, and the ARSOF unit must be assessed. In addition, communications requirements for command and control, administration, logistics, and emergencies must be coordinated and resourced.

5-5. CA forces may support other military forces and nonmilitary agencies through direct or indirect support and they must coordinate with the interagency, GCC, and HN. These operations focus on the indigenous infrastructures and population in the operational areas. CA forces supporting FID are normally assigned to the highest-level military elements supervising operations or to U.S. military advisory elements (usually ARSOF) that train and aid HN military units. Chapter 6 provides more information on CMO.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

5-6. Conventional force units whose directed essential task list is or has been SFA can conduct FID with some additional country-specific training if operating for the first time in that country. Conventional forces can play a limited role, provide a moderate presence, or, conversely, make up the majority of the effort. Planners and employers of forces conducting operations must be aware that operations may change rapidly in character and that their force structures may need to adapt as well. During global operations against terrorist networks, it has been shown that the integration of ARSOF units with the conventional force (and vice versa) is increasingly the norm. In FID, this may involve ARSOF personnel briefing and assisting in train-up for relieving units from the conventional force. For the conventional force, this may include nontraditional employment and ARSOF collective task execution.

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT

5-7. Every employment of an element of U.S. national power has a psychological impact on elements of the HN population and, sometimes, even the entire population. Regardless of whether the operation is supported by or is conducted to support MISO, all efforts supporting FID must be executed with the identified information engagement plan in mind. Failure to do so may derive short-term tactical benefits that have long-term negative strategic consequences. Psychological effects may be the collateral or unintended result of operations. However, most effects can be anticipated and should be the intended effects of general operations, specific MISO series, or the result of a psychological action (typically violent) specifically executed for its psychological effect. All Army forces are cognizant that their actions (operationally and incidentally) may have great psychological impact. MISO and other Army units are trained to manage, magnify, or mitigate this impact. When employed in a collaborative environment, it is typically incumbent upon MISO personnel as subject-matter experts to identify second- and third-order effects of HN joint forces, multinational forces, conventional forces, and ARSOF actions.

PUBLIC AND COMMAND INFORMATION PROGRAMS

5-8. Public information and command information are important during all phases of operations. The chief origin of public information, as a subset of public diplomacy, is the American Embassy in most operations. MISO, public affairs, and the entire force are either dynamic or passive practitioners of Army support to the designated embassy offices and personnel. Although it is important to correctly portray the FID effort to HN personnel through MISO, it is also important to employ an effective public affairs program to inform the HN, United States, and third-party audiences of current and, when operations security allows, planned actions, goals, and objectives. History has shown that without the support of these publics, it may be impossible to develop an effective FID program. At the U.S. national level, public diplomacy programs (typically through strategic communications often from the highest U.S. officials) accurately depict U.S. efforts.

5-9. U.S. international information programs are important to operations and are supported through the combatant commanders. Information programs require a sustained commitment over time and coordination with other elements of national power. Information programs disclose the maximum amount of information deemed best in the parameters of a synchronized information operations strategy within the applicable security restrictions and guidelines. Coordination is essential between the public affairs staff and the media, the country team, MISO units, and other information agencies within the HN and region.

IMPACT OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

5-10. Information operations involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while protecting one’s own information and information systems. Information operations apply across all phases of an operation ranging from major operations and campaigns to military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence. The operation disciplines employed must be closely integrated into all aspects of planning and execution. In small- or moderate-sized operations, Army forces may represent the only trained core, supporting, or related information operations capabilities. In these instances, it is incumbent upon Army personnel to determine the full spectrum of impact. The core and related information operations capabilities of MISO and CMO play a significant role in all operations. The potential exists for MISO and CMO to be the sole capabilities employed. In this instance, ARSOF and conventional force units may need to operationally mitigate the absence of other information operations capabilities. This may, for instance, include a work-around for activities, such as computer network operations and other complex technical core tasks.

GLOBAL OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORIST NETWORKS

5-11. Internal threats can contribute to the spread and growth of terrorists and terrorism. An ignored internal threat, such as an organized criminal element, may evolve into a terrorist organization or begin using terror tactics. FID programs complement global operations against terrorist networks by reducing the impact of internal threats and curtailing incipient insurgencies before they become capable of projecting terror outside the HN boundaries. Forces can conduct specific antiterrorism and counterterrorism efforts as part of the program. ARSOF units conduct counterterrorism operations when authorized and, along with conventional forces frequently support the antiterrorism and counterterrorism effort through training of counterterrorism forces along with MISO training.

5-12. The DOS is primarily responsible for strengthening the commitment of other states to fight terrorism. Army units can conduct and support efforts that can improve public perceptions in the HN of both their government and the USG. Success of an ARSOF counterterrorism force—combined with proactive MISO, CAO, and increased capacities of HN forces—can encourage larger, more extensive efforts to combat terrorism. Direct military-to-military contacts encourage HN officials to advocate initial and increased operations against terrorist capabilities. FID trainers and advisors stress how such measures also strengthen its overall IDAD program. These measures can include the following:

Decrease, interrupt, or break funding for internal threats.

Develop or enhance HN counterterrorism force equipment and training.

Increase border, airport, seaport, and other static entry-point security.

Enhance HN security and intelligence agencies, to include regional and international networks.

Develop effective judicial and law enforcement systems by minimizing corruption, favoritism, and political influence.

Deter potential recruits through balanced and targeted development programs.

Combat ideological motivators by promoting moderate views and personalities.

COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

5-13. Narcotics production or trafficking may be introduced or worsened by subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. This may be deliberate or incidental as internal threats break down HN infrastructure and institutions. Motivators for doing so can range from simple greed to a means of funding that an internal threat would not otherwise use. In addition, internal threats may tolerate or even encourage narcotics use in members or target groups to control or degrade unwanted opposition. In all instances, FID operations complement counterdrug efforts by reducing and reversing narcotics problems in target nations. Integrating and resourcing counterdrug-focused programs into theater strategies as a coordinated effort supports the HN IDAD program and worldwide interdiction of narcotics.

5-14. Within legal parameters, DOD resources may be used in connection with counterdrug activities in nations receiving military assistance to support a FID program. This military assistance often centers on production operations; however, it can involve in-transit counterdrug operations. In addition, the DOD, as the lead USG agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, may conduct nonconfrontational intercepts. This is further augmented by the U.S. Coast Guard’s power to arrest traffickers at sea. The DOD may also gather and process tactical intelligence from a variety of sources for intelligence or communication purposes. Army units may provide limited support for such missions and should know the intelligence derived from such efforts. Direct support is typically limited to surveillance and intelligence, as well as MISO and CAO. HN and U.S. MISO programs may seek to reduce narcotics users, producers, smugglers, or dealers. CAO may seek to improve living conditions in areas of production and attempt to reduce financial and social motivators.

5-15. In a counterdrug support role (subject to national policy and legislative guidance), the DOD may offer certain direct support to HN counterdrug personnel and certain enhanced support to U.S. civilian law enforcement agencies that may be operating in the HN and the DOS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. When direction from the SecDef is absent, Soldiers engaged in counterdrug activities are prohibited from engaging in direct law enforcement activity. Soldiers may not directly participate in an arrest, search, seizure, or other similar activity. DOD personnel are not authorized to accompany HN forces on actual counterdrug field operations or to participate in any activities where hostilities are likely to occur.

5-16. As directed by the SecDef through the CJCS, GCCs are given the authority to plan and execute programs using a combination of security assistance, training and advisory assistance (not funded by security assistance), intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support, and FHA. These efforts are designed to bolster the HN capability to operate against the infrastructure of drug production. In FID operations, lines may be blurred between purely criminal elements, narcoterrorists, and internal threats using narcotics as a financial means to an end. A comprehensive approach to support FID programs may target all these elements. Units may coordinate closely with the country team, Drug Enforcement Administration, and representatives of the DOS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

5-17. Army forces conducting operations require in-depth intelligence on both general and specific elements of the populace and infrastructure. In some instances, ARSOF intelligence requirements are specific to individual units. For example, MISO elements may be the only portion of the U.S. force that need details of radio station frequencies and program formats in a given province or other provincial area. In another case, an operational detachment–alpha may need detailed knowledge of the customs, taboos, and mores of an isolated tribe or group.

5-18. A thorough intelligence analysis for FID operations must focus on the political, social, scientific, technical, medical, and economic (among other) aspects of the area, as well as on an analysis of hostile elements. A continuous intelligence effort determines the effects of U.S. efforts on the infrastructure, as well as evaluates the strengths, weaknesses, and disposition of opposition groups in the area. An intelligence analysis effort also supports determining the baseline views and reactions of population elements to programs. Organic, in-country U.S. forces, theater, national, and HN intelligence assets must all be resourced to provide intelligence. Appendix C provides intelligence considerations and a format for intelligence preparation of the operational area.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

5-19. Logistic operations during FID programs support U.S. forces and primary operational missions with medical, construction, maintenance, supply, or transportation capabilities. Conventional forces typically operate in small force packages (for instance, company) in austere environments or in typical brigade combat teams in robust operations. In the latter, conventional forces typically have large logistical assets (notably, the capability to move logistical items for the U.S. and partner forces). In the former, conventional units are typically under the same austere sustainment paradigms as ARSOF units. ARSOF logistical TTP provide an enduring method of overcoming the challenges of such environments. Conversely, ARSOF units may have the benefit during robust operations of conventional force units and their logistical support capability. ARSOF units must liaise with those conventional units in predeployment and fully integrate the full capability of logistical support into planning.

5-20. Some general guidelines for logistic issues that support small force packages conducting operations include the following:

Maximize the use of HN support capabilities. Minimize logistic support requirements when reliance on the HN is not feasible.

Balance the advantages of using HN support with the danger of establishing dependence on potentially unreliable sources.

Task-organize logistic operations according to mission parameters:

▪ Joint operations service logistic support elements are integrated into the overall joint force.

▪ Logistic support for the deployed forces remains a Service responsibility.

Realize HN limitations. HNs often require support beyond their own capabilities; therefore—

▪ Multinational logistic support agreements must be reached.

▪ Support positions must be identified to fill in the planning phase with organic positions or equivalent.

▪ Needs must be met before participation in the operation.

▪ Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements negotiated with multinational partners may be beneficial to the effort.

▪ Authority to negotiate and execute these agreements is typically delegated to the GCC by the SecDef.

Recognize logistical needs that are not available through HN support and, in some instances, through theater logistical assets for ARSOF-specific equipment or operations.

Recognize logistical needs in select areas, though available in limited quantity through HN support, may be insufficient for Army units.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

5-21. FID programs may be degraded or even preempted if critical information about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities reach the insurgency, terrorist, or other threats. Frequently, before and during operations, a select number of officials and the populace have prior knowledge of some activities. In some instances, far more knowledge of activities may exist than in other operations. Internal threats, particularly an active insurgency, may attempt to place (and in some cases succeed in placing) members in positions in which they can obtain information about operations and spread misinformation and disinformation. In addition, the internal threats may have sympathizers within HN institutions that could be informants. Some corrupt officials may attempt to capitalize on one or more opportunities to sell information. It can be particularly difficult to detect officials who engage in such activities selectively or on a one-time basis. All personnel employed during operations must remain vigilant to maintain operations security, report possible violations, or suggest procedural changes that better safeguard the IDAD effort.

LESSONS LEARNED

5-22. As programs are implemented, it is critical to document lessons learned to allow the commander to modify the program to fit special circumstances and environments. Comprehensive after action reviews and after action reports focusing on the specifics of operations should be conducted to gather lessons learned information as soon as possible after mission execution. Lessons learned databases are available to all planners and operators. The United States Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, maintains a Center for Army Lessons Learned Web site (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/index.asp). Through this Web site, users can either access a database of lessons learned or submit a request for information. The Center for Army Lessons Learned maintains a liaison at USASOC, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to facilitate the dissemination of SOF lessons learned. The Web site also maintains links to other lessons learned databases and centers, to include the Joint Lessons Learned Information System, which is accessible to all Services.

5-23. Special Operations Debrief and Retrieval System (or more commonly known as SODARS) is a database system accessible to SOF that includes intelligence information derived from previous FID and other SOF core activities. This system is accessible via a SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network on the USSOCOM portal. In addition, open-source intelligence can provide useful after action lessons following an operation. Networking with counterparts and communicating with them after an operation may provide not only continuous feedback, but also an opportunity to continue mentoring them. It should be noted that open-source intelligence is vetted and processed. Open-source information, as with counterpart information, should not be considered anything other than anecdotal before it is processed. The Joint Center for International SFA has the mission to capture, analyze, and document SFA observations, insights, and lessons from contemporary operations, and to serve as an additional resource for observations and recommendations.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

5-24. The purpose of a CMO estimate is to provide information and recommend COAs on the civil considerations of the current operational environment in the HN. This estimate may be used in a range of circumstances from indirect support to combat operations. The content must be tailored to the country, region(s) of operations, and mission. Relevant infrastructure facts in the HN and the degree of anticipated CMO and the supporting CAO dictate the level of detail and length of the estimate. The combatant command’s civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff (J-9), in close collaboration with the other staff sections and subordinate commanders or CA site survey team, usually prepares the estimate. If time allows, the preparer can make a detailed written estimate, or the format may be used as a mental checklist to ensure that all elements of the civil situation are considered. A major mission for CAO in the FID environment is to support and facilitate other CMO; therefore, any analysis of CAO must include an analysis of the mission. In many paragraphs of the estimate, both CAO and CMO missions are examined together.

5-25. Ultimately, the supported commander dictates the format of the CMO estimate. The estimate is derived from other CA planning and evaluation documents in addition to outside sources. Key among these is the estimate of the situation as presented in FM 3-57 and all relevant annexes and appendixes. Supporting documents and resources include—

Areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) and civil considerations analyses.

Measure of effectiveness spreadsheets.

Trend analysis spreadsheets.

Trend analysis charts.

Impact analysis charts.

All relevant intelligence products.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

5-26. The purpose of a MISO estimate is to provide information on all psychological and some informational aspects of military operations to aid the commander in accomplishing the mission. This estimate is important to any plan, but it is particularly critical to successfully integrating operations. The estimate is usually prepared at the joint level by the MISO staff element in close coordination with the other coordinating staff sections and subordinate commanders, to include the supporting MISO unit commander. The site survey team prepares the estimate. Any estimate should use the documentation of the site survey in conjunction with any other references. Once completed, the estimate becomes an annex to the operations officer’s estimate of the situation. FM 3-53 provides additional details.

5-27. A detailed written estimate may be made if time allows, or the format may serve as a mental checklist to ensure that all elements of the situation are considered. The detail varies with the level and type of command.

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

5-28. HSS is generally a noncontroversial and a cost-effective means of using the military element to support U.S. national interests in another country. Initiatives for HSS cannot realistically improve the entire health care system for the HN; instead, long-term developmental programs that are sustainable by the HN are stressed. Short-term surge support of critical areas to the FID program can be pursued and immediate action in a humanitarian crisis may be the temporary focus of HSS. Routine activities are targeted toward the health problems facing the military and, in conjunction with other U.S. agencies and civilian health initiatives through CAO and FHA. An additional best practice is to provide HSS in remote or urban areas in which health care is poor or nonexistent. Possible activities include providing public health activities, to include preventive medicine and veterinary care, food hygiene, immunizations of humans and animals, childcare, preventive dental hygiene, and paramedic procedures. This includes—

Providing medical civic action programs.

Providing dental civic action programs.

Providing veterinary civic action programs.

Providing triage, diagnostic, and treatment training.

Developing logistic programs.

Developing education programs.

Developing intelligence and health threat analysis.

Developing HN military field HSS system for treatment and evacuation.

Assisting in the upgrade, staffing, and supplying of existing HSS facilities.

Developing wellness and preventative care, including public information programs.

5-29. Army forces should be employed in HSS programs that are affordable and sustainable by the HN. This includes pursuing realistic training and acquisition programs. In addition to training HN personnel during operations, medical education opportunities for personnel through international military exchange training may be pursued. Following a course of realistic HSS, measures and programs may also entail mitigating unrealistic expectations among the populace. Other effects can emerge from HSS as well, such as a real or perceived imbalance in health care development. Resources should be shifted to areas where imbalance exists.

5-30. Army units, even when operating in a robust FID operation, typically can provide only a small portion of the HSS needs of the HN; therefore, close cooperation with other governmental agencies, IGOs, and NGOs can enhance the support provided by Army units. Commanders should seek to increase the effectiveness of other USG agency programs, such as USAID, whenever possible. Working with or near IGOs and NGOs may be untenable due to the desire to preserve the reality or perception of neutrality. Units may have to settle for awareness of IGO and NGO activities and employ themselves so as not to duplicate efforts.

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT IN INDIRECT SUPPORT

5-31. HSS indirect support to FID programs is generally accomplished by medical training teams and advisors. The focus is on identification of medical threats that affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the HN military forces and the design of programs to train and equip those forces. Typically, the main effort of such training has been conducted by SF with support from other ARSOF units. However, conventional force medical personnel often have higher levels of training and may bring greater resources to operations. MISO has historically supported and advised HN counterparts in programs to support HSS. If public affairs personnel are available, they too can provide public information on HSS. Wellness and instructional MISO can seek to increase participation in medical or veterinary programs that some portions of the populace may be reluctant to use because of their cultural bias. In addition, introduction of new behaviors, such as sanitary food or water practices, can be pursued. HSS can cross boundaries into direct support as well because FID operations may involve simultaneous conduct of both indirect and direct support.

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT IN DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT OPERATIONS)

5-32. Direct HSS is provided when the HN lacks the capability to provide specific types of care or general care in a localized area that rises to a level of possibly fueling recruitment, fund-raising, or propaganda for an internal threat. Army units may provide direct HSS in both small-scale and large-scale programs. Typically this is accomplished by training and by providing direct health care for the military and, when authorized, for the civilian population. Army units may be the only U.S. forces able to provide direct HSS in operations through minimal and inexpensive HCA. FID operational personnel may provide varying degrees of transportation, logistics, and informational support to such HSS activities.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

5-33. FHA programs are conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions, such as disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided by U.S. forces supplements the efforts of the HN civil authorities and international organizations that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA programs allow U.S. military medical personnel to provide care during disasters or to support nonmilitary objectives. Activities may include any type and level of care based on HN conditions. Some typical areas include—

Triage, emergency, and trauma care in ongoing medical crises.

Epidemic prevention and immunizations.

Displaced person care and preventative measures.

Dental and veterinary screening programs.

Health care infrastructure repair.

Wellness education.

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

5-34. A special condition of HCA operations is to fulfill valid U.S. military unit training requirements. Although all operations should strive to meet desired measures of effectiveness, the benefit to the local populace is secondary to meeting the training requirements prescribed under law for any such operation. Assistance provided to HSS under these provisions is limited to—

Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in HN rural areas.

Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems that increase access to health care.

Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

Rudimentary construction and repair of health care facilities.

Detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war, including activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war.

5-35. Many countries’ IDAD programs lack the resources to reach their entire population. HCA combines HN military, civilian, and international health agencies and U.S. military efforts to provide care and to enhance legitimacy and visibility of the HN government. The mandate to train Army personnel as the primary goal of HCA will entail planning and detailed employment coordination. Coordination is critical and the use of site surveys is imperative to effectively use all assets to derive a primary training benefit for the U.S. Army personnel involved.

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT IN COMBAT OPERATIONS

5-36. HSS in combat operations generally consists of the support provided by U.S. military forces. Army personnel may advise the military on HSS concerns in conjunction with combat- or rear-echelon operations. In addition, Army units, notably CA and MISO, may be tasked with supporting HSS to displaced persons. Limited training can occur during lulls or in secure areas in combat operations, provided security can be maintained. Training of HN personnel may be necessary before they can provide sufficient HSS to relieve ARSOF or conventional units. As experienced trainers, SF and other ARSOF medics and HSS-trained personnel may be tasked to provide this training. During authorized combat operations, the force structure is typically sufficient for allowing conventional force medical personnel to be provided with adequate security. MISO during combat operations may include supporting objectives that target health-related behaviors. Teams may also disseminate series of products in the mission of supporting enemy prisoner of war and civilian internee camps.

PLANNING FOR HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

5-37. HSS to FID programs must be an integral part of all U.S. military planning in order to successfully employ Army units to the greatest effect. In that units can support HN civilian, as well as military HSS, planning may be broader and more in-depth than operations, such as noncombatant evacuation operations or peacekeeping operations. HSS planning is driven by the specific issues of each HN, but the following requirements should be considered:

Patient movement.

Hospitalization.

HSS logistics.

Laboratory services.

Blood management.

Dental services.

Veterinary services.

Preventive medicine services.

Administration and mission command.

Facilities and maintenance.

FACTORS IN HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT EMPLOYMENT

5-38. The goal of employment of HSS to support FID programs is to achieve a state of development where the HN can sufficiently provide care to its own population. While providing direct HSS to the HN, units conducting these operations should emphasize the development of internal capacity to meet its needs. Army units should seek to maximize the effects of their employment in support activities through coordinated and synchronized programs with other Service medical personnel, United States Army Reserve forces, and other Service reserve forces, when available. Army units may also use American Embassy resources.

5-39. In addition to organic resources of conventional forces and ARSOF units, the HSS capacity of the Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) may be used to support operations. Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) force health protection personnel perform the following functions:

Treat patients with diseases, noncombat injuries, combat stress or battle fatigue, and trauma injuries.

Provide limited sick call, triage of mass casualties, limited advanced trauma management, and surgical resuscitation and stabilization (with surgical augmentation).

Provide operational, emergency, and essential dental care.

Maintain Class VIII resupply and medical equipment for supported units.

Provide medical laboratory and radiology services commensurate with Level II ARSOF medical treatment.

Provide veterinary augmentation to supported SOF and conventional units.

Provide extended patient holding for up to 20 patients (full team) until evacuation assets become available.

Afford limited reinforcement and augmentation to supported battalion medical platoons.

Coordinate with the unit ministry team for required religious support.

Provide preventive medicine consultation and augmentation for supported units.

SITE SURVEY PROCEDURES

5-40. All Army units conducting operations need a detailed site survey of the area or areas to which they are deploying. All site surveys contain some of the same basic information, but the level of detail and the specific data varies by unit and within each unit by mission. For a variety of reasons, the number of personnel in a site survey team should be as small as possible. When practical, cross-trained personnel may assess more than one subject; however, the inclusion of some MOSs is desirable. The products of the site survey vary, but all surveys need to answer the questions deemed necessary to mission success by the unit during its preparation for deployment. Various tools, including checklists or electronic templates, may be used. A suggested site survey checklist is shown in Appendix F. Paperless copies of surveys may be used as long as data is both backed up and safeguarded. Although site surveys are typically overt, the product of the survey may be designated as classified information and should always be treated as sensitive information.

SITE SURVEY TEAM MISSION

5-41. The mission of the site survey team is to accurately report the existing HN mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations, along with any specific data designated by the commander to its parent unit. The team may establish in-country mission command systems and logistics relationships for the follow-on unit mission execution, coordinate the reception of the main body (sometimes termed an advance echelon), and, in all cases, assess these systems. In some cases, units may redeploy a site survey team or a portion of it to brief commanders and the main body. Typically, such personnel deploy again with the main body.

SITE SURVEY TEAM PROCEDURES

5-42. Specific areas of concern may arise before any operation, but all site survey teams conduct some common activities before departure. Among others, the site survey team conducts predeployment activities in order to—

Secure required travel documents by—

▪ Obtaining visas and passports.

▪ Furnishing a copy of the country clearance message sent by the American Embassy, if required.

Update medical and immunization records by—

▪ Obtaining any pharmaceutical prophylaxis.

▪ Receiving a medical threat brief.

Conduct finance briefs and obtain (if issued) Class A funds and designated fund sites.

Receive, when applicable, the Security Assistance Training Management Organization briefing.

Confirm with the U.S. HN team that all agencies concerned with the site survey have been briefed on the team’s itinerary. Ensure the agencies are available for coordination.

Receive updated threat briefing and review the ROE and status-of-forces agreement.

Conduct mission analysis and briefback as directed.

Note: The larger the force package deploying to an operation, the more likely that the site survey team will be acting for and briefing several units or teams.

COORDINATION WITH UNITED STATES AGENCIES AND HEADQUARTERS

5-43. Upon arrival in the HN, the site survey team informs the SCO of its arrival and status. The team makes immediate contact with the senior military headquarters in-country or the predesignated lower headquarters. Because conditions in the HN may have changed during transit, the team should obtain updated threat information. The survey team should arrive ready to brief the mission and program of instruction to the SCO and any other designated agents for approval or modification.

5-44. The survey team commander and battalion or brigade operations staff officer (S-3) (if deployed) establish the command relationship with the next-higher in-country U.S. commander if he is not in the team’s normal chain of command. The team commander also briefs the next-higher in-country U.S. commander on the planned execution of the survey and the required preparations for the main body.

5-45. The survey team commander also obtains any additional guidance from the higher in-country U.S. commander or the country team for the follow-on forces’ mission execution. At a minimum, this guidance includes confirmation of the ROE, evasion and personnel recovery support, and any limitations on relationships with HN counterparts. The survey team commander discusses the following areas with the SCO:

Training objectives.

Terms of reference.

Political situation.

Guidelines for official and personal associations with foreign personnel.

Currency control.

Intelligence support procedures.

Administrative support.

Legal issues and status changes.

Procedures for obtaining in-country logistics.

Information gaps remaining on the operational environment.

5-46. The team commander confirms or establishes communications and reporting procedures among the next-higher in-country U.S. commander, the American Embassy, the survey team, and the follow-on unit. The team commander must also identify the availability of communications equipment needed to support the mission. The team commander confirms or establishes procedures for obtaining logistics. He identifies a point of contact at the country team crisis management element or at the emergency operations center of the U.S. military staff. The point of contact then informs the survey team of necessary actions during times of increased threats or emergencies that require evacuation of U.S. personnel from the HN. The team commander establishes the procedures to obtain intelligence support from the next-higher in-country commander and other U.S. agencies.

5-47. The survey team establishes direct working relationships with its next-higher in-country or out-of-country support element. The survey team—

Identifies the supporting element location.

Contacts the supporting element to determine the limitations of the available support and the expected reaction time between the initiation of the support request and its fulfillment.

Requests support for the in-country reception of the main body.

Confirms or establishes communications procedures among the supporting element, the survey team, and the follow-on unit.

Identifies, at a minimum, primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communications procedures, all available logistics, and medical evacuation.

Reports the established communications support requesting procedures for the follow-on unit(s).

5-48. The survey team establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation and to synchronize operations. The survey team should use the implementation matrix for an interagency plan as a tool to identify the location of all HN or U.S. agencies planned for operations in a collaborative environment. Appendix D provides detailed information on interagency coordination. Initial contact with concerned agencies to establish coordination is invariably a high priority. Some common areas of coordination are the—

Exchange of information and intelligence.

Confirmation or establishment of communications procedures.

Confirmation or establishment of other coordination protocols, which include—

▪ Approved themes to stress and avoid.

▪ Approval authority of the MISO program.

▪ Parameters of acceptable civil information management and reporting procedures.

▪ Area’s diplomatic constraints and procedures.

▪ Established IGO and NGO coordination procedures.

▪ Multinational (other than HN) coordination mechanisms.

5-49. The site survey team then reports any newly established or changed procedures for inclusion into the future plans.

COORDINATION WITH HOST-NATION AGENCIES AND UNITS

5-50. The survey team commander or specified subordinates establish direct working relationships and rapport with the HN commander or agency director and any key personnel deemed necessary. The survey team—

Briefs the HN commander or agency director on the survey mission and the restrictions and limitations.

Obtains the HN commander’s or agency director’s assistance to develop the tentative objectives for training and advisory assistance.

Deduces or solicits the HN commander’s or agency director’s actual estimate of his unit capabilities and perceived training, advisory assistance, and materiel requirements including—

▪ Training plans.

▪ Current training status and needs.

▪ Units available for training.

▪ Training facilities.

Obtains the HN approval of the plan and requests linkup with counterparts.

5-51. Lacking any specific authorizations to do so, the team does not make any promises (or any statements that could be construed as promises) to the HN commander or agency director about commitments to provide assistance or fulfill materiel requirements. If authorized to communicate any planned and resourced aid, the team stays strictly within the parameters of resourced aid. In particular, the survey team does not make any comment to the host government on the possible availability of USG resources in any form. In addition, the team cannot provide any kind of independent assessment or confirmation of an external threat, as perceived by the HN; however, internal threats may be assessed by their external support and are typically releasable to the HN to the degree of intelligence shared. Providing advice on strategy, doctrine, basing, combat planning, or operations may also be prohibited.

ANALYZING TRAINING NEEDS

5-52. The survey team analyzes the status of the HN unit to determine their requirements for training and advisory assistance. The survey team—

Collects enough information to confirm the validity of current intelligence and selects tentative training and advisory assistance COAs.

Prepares written estimates for training and advisory assistance COAs that are prioritized in order of desirability.

Determines the unit location and its effect on the populace.

Collects and analyzes all information affecting force protection.

Determines the HN unit’s existing logistics and maintenance support shortfalls and capabilities.

Determines the compatibility of recommended equipment with equipment in the HN inventory.

5-53. The survey team helps the HN unit prepare facilities (training, security, and administrative) for the execution of the mission. The survey team inspects the facilities that the unit and its counterparts use during the mission. The survey team identifies any deficiencies that prevent the execution of the tentatively selected training and advisory assistance COAs.

5-54. After the inspection, the survey team commander recommends to the HN commander or agency director the most desirable COAs to correct any deficiencies found, and the commander also emphasizes how to achieve the desired training and advisory assistance objectives. The survey team commander—

Ensures the HN understands that the desired COAs are still tentative and contingent on the U.S. commander’s decision.

Ensures the higher in-country U.S. commander and country team are informed of significant findings in the survey of the HN unit.

Selects the COAs to be recommended to the follow-on units after obtaining HN input.

5-55. The survey team may not be able to finalize some crucial items of the survey before traveling to the operational area, such as the HSS site survey. The site survey team gathers information to complete a detailed HSS threat assessment. This assessment is the base document for HSS planning and subsequent employment to support the program. Other areas could include detailed infrastructure, media, and local perception assessments. Finally, before departing from the HN, the survey team again visits all concerned U.S. and HN staff agencies to clarify any unresolved problem areas. All parties, including the main body at the home station, must be apprised of issues that could deter or substantially limit the Army’s participation in the mission.

ADVISING THE HOST-NATION MILITARY

5-56. Influencing HN military institutions to support a democratic process can only be done practically and effectually with the long-term presence of U.S. military personnel working alongside HN forces. Personnel who arrive for short visits typically are treated as visitors and are not able to penetrate the fabric of the HN culture or its institutions. Although short visits (such as most joint combined exchange visits for training) can serve other useful purposes, the long-term presence of U.S. military personnel is required to strengthen HN democratic institutions and effect individual and institutional reform in the HN military. Although the historical precedent among ARSOF disciplines for long-term dedicated advisors has typically rested with SF, the possibility also exists of other ARSOF disciplines and conventional force Soldiers providing advisors on a long-term basis. This chance increases when combat operations are authorized.

DEMOCRATIC HOST-NATION MILITARY CONCEPT

5-57. An advisor must strive to transmit the concept of democratization and a subservient military to his counterpart. These concepts are often considered inherent in the American way and are so basic in the United States that they are not discussed much in training. The most important mission of an advisor is to enhance the military professionalism of his counterpart. He must influence the HN military and prepare it to deal with a changing and typically unfamiliar environment by emphasizing civilian control over the military and demonstrating the advantages of a democratic system of government. In addition, HN officials are not normally confused over moral rules; however, because of the dangerous situation confronting the nation, they may be convinced that their only effectual recourse is to ignore these rules. Therefore, building professionalism and strictly adhering to the moral rules of a professional Soldier are critical to this process.

5-58. A major cause of an advisor’s failure is his inability to maintain a good working relationship with his counterpart. The unsuccessful advisor often fails to understand why his counterparts may not feel the sense of urgency that he does. He is unable to realize that his counterpart may remain and continue to fight the enemy long after his tour is over and he returns to the safety and comfort of the United States. This lack of a sense of urgency may be cultural as well. The counterpart may be part of a deliberating culture that is averse to instituting quick change or quick action.

5-59. The advisor must know the scope and limitations of the principal security assistance programs authorized by the FAA and AECA. The ROE determine if and how security assistance personnel may perform their duties near a known combat area, to include any duties related to training and advising that may result in U.S. personnel engaging in combat activities. It is not prohibited for trainers and advisors to defend themselves regardless if combat operations have been authorized by the President. Historically and realistically, for the foreseeable future, all operations assume risk. The environment plays a big factor in an advisor’s role. The GCC and the country team assume the level of risk necessary and practicable for the specific environment in the HN relative to the importance of the country to national security and interests.

ADVISOR EMPLOYMENT FACTORS

5-60. In addition to many situational concerns, there are four major advisor employment factors:

The HN stage of development.

The military organizational makeup.

The status of the advisor.

Rapport.

5-61. Along with proven techniques and certain personal and professional qualities that are typically a catalyst to successful advising, these factors are key to understanding the challenges an advisor faces. Advisors must rely on a combination of the predeployment information, intelligence available on the above factors, and observations of the specifics of the unit being advised. Perhaps most importantly, this combination includes a read of the personality, professionalism, and competence of the advisor’s counterpart.

Host-Nation Stage of Development

5-62. The administrative machinery may still be developing in situations where the HN government may have been in existence in its present form for centuries or independent only for a short time. The advisor must know of such situations and not be overly critical. In an insurgency or other major internal threat, the HN government is experiencing major problems. For instance, the money needed for social and economic programs is mostly directed toward security needs. In an ideal situation, the HN government would use this money to help restore the society’s economic and social problems. In addition, the new HN government can be dealing with problems of a previously failed government or with policies that favored the nation from which they achieved independence. The advisor must be aware that some changes are of a magnitude that may require change that is only finalized in a generational timeline.

Host-Nation Military Organizational Makeup

5-63. The advisor must know HN sociopolitical and military organizations and their interrelationships, to include personalities, political movements, and forces involved. Social, political, and economic factors must also be assessed. Advisors must impress upon their counterparts the need for an integrated civil-military effort to defeat an internal threat. Counterparts must learn that military actions are subordinate to and supportive of the economic and social actions required for removing the internal threat’s causes and sustainers.

5-64. The advisor must be aware that other military organizations are more stratified than the U.S. military. The advisor may have a counterpart or trainees that began as recruits. In addition, to a much greater degree, socioeconomic status can vary greatly at each level of the HN military. Many militaries throughout the world have far less opportunity to advance, especially from enlisted to officer status. Services in the HN can have varying degrees of support from the government and populace with the possibility of considerable bias for or against one particular service.

Status of the Advisor

5-65. The advisor must fully understand his status as spelled out in agreements between the United States and the HN. These agreements may provide full or very little diplomatic immunity. Without an agreement, the advisor is subject to local laws, customs, and the jurisdiction of local courts. Regardless of the diplomatic immunity afforded him, the advisor observes local laws, applicable laws of war, Army regulations, and directives. Indeed, because of scrutiny, the advisor may need to visibly exceed the observance of laws and regulations. This can be particularly true when advising an HN military traditionally plagued with corruption or infidelity to civilian authority.

Rapport

5-66. Rapport is a sympathetic relationship between people based on mutual trust, understanding, and respect. Personal dislike, animosity, and other forms of friction characterize a lack of rapport. The need to establish rapport with counterparts is the result of a specific military position in which the advisor has no direct authority or control over the HN unit or individual actions. However, an advisor can influence or motivate his counterpart to act in certain ways by establishing and maintaining rapport.

5-67. Rapport occurs when each individual perceives the other as competent, mature, responsible, and willing to work toward a common goal. If the advisor can convey this attitude to his counterpart, long-lasting and effective rapport is possible, and effective rapport must exist to gain the control needed to execute the mission. The successful advisor establishes rapport that allows influence over the counterpart’s actions despite the absence of formal authority. Effective advisors also overcome the resentment that might otherwise arise when advisors substantially or completely change the HN standard operating procedures and TTP.

Level of Support

5-68. Advisors may be active at all levels of support including combat operations. Advisors must be cognizant that the level of training or operational advising they provide is at either higher or lower levels of intensity than the other operations going on elsewhere in the HN. Wide ranges of possibilities confront an advisor in this regard. An advisor may be working with elite military or paramilitary forces at a high degree of readiness. This same unit may then be part of a very selective use of lethal force used in an operation primarily focused on nonlethal programs. Conversely, the greatest need for Army advisors during combat operations may be with conventional units far from a state of readiness sufficient to be operationally deployed. In addition, advisors can be active with HN units in and around U.S. indirect and direct support not involving combat. Combat operations may concurrently be ongoing elsewhere in the HN as well. In general, advisors train and advise the unit toward a goal of readiness.

ADVISOR TECHNIQUES

5-69. An advisor must always remember that he is an advisor and not a commander. He is not there to lead troops and may alienate both commanders and the rank and file if he acts as if he is in command. The art of advising involves empowering commanders and their personnel as much as the tactical situation allows. The techniques of advising a counterpart successfully are detailed and nuanced. Several sources provide detailed discussions of advisor techniques and procedures.

PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL QUALITIES

5-70. The traits of a successful advisor encompass all the traits of leadership plus the ability to adapt to the environment. This environment changes with the assignment area. To gain acceptance, the advisor must prove his value and present a favorable personality in the eyes of his counterpart. This selling typically occurs over time by gradually demonstrating his capabilities in an unassuming but firm manner; however, an advisor may experience the phenomenon of instant credibility. The pitfall of this is that an expectation of perfection cannot be fulfilled, because inevitably the advised force may suffer a shortcoming or defeat.

5-71. Persistence, balanced with patience, is a favorable trait of an advisor. An advisor must be extremely flexible, patient, and willing to admit mistakes. He must persevere in providing sound advice. He must also possess the ability to be highly diplomatic and possess a high degree of tact. The advisor avoids rushing personal acceptance by the counterpart and does not oversell himself as this may arouse suspicion and delay acceptance.

5-72. The advisor must thoroughly know the organization, equipment, and tactics of the unit he advises. He must demonstrate an awareness of his counterpart’s problems. The advisor must be unwavering, but not dogmatic, in his approach to any subject. If, however, the advisor is not sure of the subject matter, he says so and takes the steps to obtain the correct information rather than trying to bluff his way through a problem. A successful advisor must have subject-matter expertise, the ability to demonstrate his capabilities in an unassuming but convincing manner, and the clear indication of his desire to get along with counterparts and other associates. Receptiveness to learning from a counterpart typically aids this process.

ADVISING DURING COMBAT OPERATIONS

5-73. In general, personnel participating in advisory activities that fall under security assistance are, by law, restricted from combat. The AECA (Section 21, Sales from Stocks) prohibits personnel from being directly or purposefully tasked with providing defense services (including training) or from performing duties of a combatant nature. Nevertheless, advisors retain the right to defend themselves. This prohibition does not mean that advisors cannot be deployed to an HN in which combat is taking place, but rather it means that advisors must deploy to secure locations. Realistically, under the scope of terrorist tactics and other aggressive threats, absolute security for U.S. personnel is neither possible nor mandated by statute. Therefore, security assistance teams shall not engage in or provide assistance or advice to foreign forces while that unit is engaged in a planned combat operation or in an operation with anticipated contact with an adversary. However, Soldiers who advise and assist the HN unit are not restricted in secure areas before or after combat operations. Security assistance teams are further prohibited from performing operational duties of any kind except as may be required in the conduct of on-the-job training in the operation and maintenance of equipment, weapons, and supporting systems.

5-74. Once the President has approved combat authorizations, advisors frequently work with HN units conducting operations. Advising units who are conducting or preparing for imminent combat operations create a specific and challenging opportunity. Advisors habitually help counterparts at levels above their U.S. rank. In general, HN commanders accept this disparity if the advisor uses the above advisor techniques judiciously. HN commanders generally recognize the subject-matter expertise of U.S. advisors, recognizing that it is not equal to but greater than a member of the HN military with commensurate rank. The advisor tactfully advises the commander but never usurps his command or authority. Ideally and typically, this is an established relationship. The advisor does most of his advising while preparing for combat. He bases his advice on his observations or those of his subordinates during past operations. He holds a private critique with the commander upon completion of an operation.

5-75. Although less frequent in FID than in major combat operations, the possibility exists for Soldiers to have formal command of an HN unit as established by a bilateral agreement. In FID, this arrangement typically is also a vehicle for advising and mentoring a counterpart so that he can take command of the unit. For instance, the advisor may lead a company and simultaneously mentor and evaluate the senior platoon leader for company command. Advising and mentoring in this case should be conducted primarily or exclusively during planning and after action. Advisors should allow for as much autonomy as possible with HN subordinates as long as mission success does not suffer. To accomplish the latter, an advisor may progress from a more directive leadership style to a less directive one or may selectively employ a more directive leadership style as the situation allows.

5-76. Regardless of the exact circumstances of the unit being advised, the advisor blends the above techniques with personal experience and informed judgment to help the HN commander and unit in improving their state of readiness and their execution of operations.

Chapter 6

Operations

Within FID, the military instrument falls into three categories—indirect support, direct support, and combat operations. The levels are not constrained to a specific level of involvement. All levels of support can occur independently or simultaneously, and a specific level of escalation is not required. U.S. support of successful programs consists of many of the elements listed in this chapter synchronized to fit the situation of a particular country. The type of support is based on an HN and USG agreement; however, combat operations require Presidential approval. Combat operations may represent an escalation of previous support or may be authorized from the outset.

OVERVIEW

6-1. Indirect support and direct support make up the majority of Army participation in FID. This reflects the majority of USG security assistance training and direct participation in the IDAD programs of friendly and allied nations. The ultimate goal of IDAD is to empower the HN to effectively deal with any internal threat using its own resources and to eventually eliminate any subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. For ARSOF and conventional forces, the goal is to provide assistance that negates threats and avoids the need for a higher level of support. Ultimately, U.S. involvement with the military should only be comprised of routine peacetime military-to-military training. In general, the chance of personnel facing hostile fire is less for indirect support than direct support, but when supporting the suppression of an armed internal threat, the security posture and ROE should always be considered for the most dangerous COA available to that internal threat.

INDIRECT SUPPORT

6-2. When Army units enter an operation to provide only indirect support, the goal is to avoid escalation of the conflict between the internal threat and the HN and to enable the HN to function effectively through its own military instrument of power, thereby eliminating the need for further U.S. military support. As stated previously, building partner capacity, collaborative participation, and often command authorities are the rule. During indirect support, embassy offices and resources may well be the bulk of the effort; however, indirect support is not necessarily a stage in a continuum of conflict. Indirect support is also generally going to be a significant part of operations involving direct support or combat operations. The goal of indirect support is to build strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. These can include unit exchange programs, personnel exchange programs, individual exchange programs, and combination programs. Indirect support, whether a part of a program providing other support or a stand-alone program, enhances the ability of the HN to conduct its own operations.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

6-3. Security assistance is a principal military instrument of the USG in assisting a friendly country along with other programs to support a country with subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. The chief agencies involved in U.S. security assistance activities are the province of the State Department, Arms Transfer Management Group, DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, relevant GCC of the subordinate commands, and SCO. These agencies are typically under the auspices and authorities of U.S. diplomatic missions. Activities associated with indirect support to operations include introductory equipment training, general services, and training across the spectrum of units. Army personnel may need to support many of these programs and exercises.

6-4. Security assistance provides equipment, services, and training to support HN forces. The equipment needs to execute a successful program are identified in a comprehensive IDAD strategy. Each SCO coordinates the resulting military equipment requests with the combatant commander’s staff and the country team. Finally, the combatant commander endorses equipment requirements and provides recommendations to the SecDef. Services support includes any contract, test, inspection, repair, training, publication, technical or other assistance, or defense information used for furnishing military assistance. Services support does not include military education and training activities. Services support is usually integrated with equipment support. FID planners should be aware that contract-funded security assistance programs under the supervision of an SCO could be substituted for DOD personnel when necessary and feasible. Contracted support activities may only affect units outside the training and support plans of conventional forces or ARSOF or may need to be factored into overall indirect support. Army units may support the equipping and servicing arms of security assistance with a primary focus on the training aspects of security assistance as detailed in the following paragraphs.

Note: Further information on security assistance is in Appendix E.

FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM

6-5. The principal means of ensuring America’s security is through the deterrence of potential aggressors that would threaten the United States or its allies. Foreign military financing is the USG’s program for financing through grants or loans to acquire U.S. military articles, services, and training. This program supports U.S. regional stability goals and enables friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities. FMS are made available under the authority of the AECA of 1976 (as amended). Congress appropriates FMS funds in the International Affairs Budget; the DOS allocates the funds for eligible friends and allies; and the DOD executes the program. The FMS program helps foreign partners meet their legitimate defense needs, promotes U.S. national security interests by strengthening coalitions with friends and allies constructing cooperative bilateral military relationships, and enhances interoperability with U.S. forces.

6-6. The Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Management and Budget, annually makes specific requests to Congress for the security assistance budget. The annual request is published in the Congressional Budget Justification. The Congressional Budget Justification, prepared by the DOS, in coordination with the DSCA and other U.S. agencies, is presented to the Congress for those countries for which U.S. assistance is proposed. Congress reviews those requests and appropriates the funds for various international assistance programs (for example, economic support fund; foreign military financing; defense administration costs; voluntary peacekeeping operations; IMET; and nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs).

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

6-7. FMS is that portion of U.S. security assistance authorized by the FAA of 1961 (as amended) and the AECA of 1976 (as amended). This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the IMET program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. The FMS program is the government-to-government method for selling U.S. defense equipment, services, and training. Responsible arms sales further national security and foreign policy objectives by strengthening bilateral defense relations, supporting coalition building, and enhancing interoperability between U.S. forces and militaries of friends and allies. These sales also contribute to American prosperity by improving the U.S. balance of trade position, sustaining highly skilled jobs in the defense industrial base, extending production lines, and lowering unit costs for key weapon systems. This program also fosters training opportunities for U.S. forces.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

6-8. The IMET program is an instrument of U.S. national security and foreign policy and a key component of the U.S. security assistance program. The program provides training and education on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. In addition to improving defense capabilities, it facilitates the development of important professional and personal relationships. These relationships provide U.S. access and influence in a critical sector of society that often plays a pivotal role in supporting or transitioning to democratic governments. By promoting more professional militaries around the world through training, this program has taken on greater importance as an effective means to strengthen military alliances and the international coalition against terrorism.

COUNTERTERRORISM ASSISTANCE

6-9. One program designed to help nations in counterterrorism is the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program. It is designed to aid GCCs with their counterterrorism programs by providing funds for foreign military officers and selected civilians to attend U.S. military educational institutions, mobile education and MTT courses outside the continental United States, selected regional centers for nonlethal training, or other training and education permitted by Presidential and Congressional authorities. The Counterterrorism Fellowship Program is designed to educate foreign military officers and selected civilian officials directly involved in global operations against terrorist networks to build counterterrorism capabilities. This program is also intended to provide friendly nations with the tools to enable them to sustain and grow their internal counterterrorism capabilities.

HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAM

6-10. The Humanitarian Mine Action Program assists countries that are experiencing the adverse effects of land mines and other explosive remnants of war. Modern U.S. humanitarian mine action began in 1986, when U.S. Army SF teams in southern Honduras trained Honduran Army engineers to clear land mines from agricultural land, north of the Nicaraguan border. Since then, the Army has been involved in humanitarian mine action around the globe. The GCCs directly manage this program. It contributes to unit and individual readiness by providing specific in-country training opportunities that cannot be duplicated in the United States. A DOD component of the program is a train-the-trainer program for training indigenous personnel on mine-clearing procedures. Training teams, among others, can include SF, MISO, CA, explosive ordnance disposal, and conventional force engineers.

NONPROLIFERATION

6-11. A major component of U.S. security strategy is the deterrence of countries and nonstate actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction or, if they already possess them, from distributing them to other countries or agents. The possibility of an internal threat acquiring weapons of mass destruction is increasing. Counterproliferation refers to those actions taken to defeat the risks posed by extant weapons of mass destruction to the United States, allies, and partners (JP 3-40). Army-provided training may encompass active defense, passive defense, and consequence-management training for HN forces. In addition, education and influence of HN military personnel to encourage conventional approaches rather than reliance on weapons of mass destruction can be an effective means of curtailing the incipient stages of a weapons of mass destruction mindset. In FID, particularly those with a large COIN subset, improvised or poor man’s weapons of mass destruction enter into insurgent tactics (primarily terror tactics), such as the use of a chlorine-carrier in a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in Iraq.

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES

6-12. Joint and multinational exercises are designed to support the GCC’s objectives within a specific theater or region. These exercises are conducted to improve relations, enforce U.S. commitment to the region, improve interoperability with forces, and enhance U.S. warfighting skills. These exercises can be CJCS-, GCC-, and Service-sponsored events. Such exercises can positively affect the program of the HN in which it is conducted and the participating regional countries. Intentional public information and public diplomacy programs, as well as unavoidable media coverage of large-scale exercises, can bolster programs within an entire region by demonstrating U.S. commitment to allies and friendly nations. In many instances, unit involvement in exercises involves working with counterparts from the HN.

JOINT COMBINED EXCHANGE TRAINING

6-13. The joint combined exchange training program is conducted overseas to fulfill U.S. forces training requirements and at the same time to exchange the sharing of skills between U.S. forces and HN counterparts. The joint combined exchange program has provided SOF a stage to train in austere and culturally and politically sensitive operational environments. The program’s primary goal is to train the SOF of the combatant command. The program is authorized under Title 10 USC, Section 2011, Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces. The DOS, through the Leahy human rights vetting guidance and international and security tracking procedures, ensures that the joint combined exchange training program is conducted within a partner nation or with a partner that has no credible evidence of gross violations of human rights. A historical mission of ARSOF units has been the training of foreign forces. ARSOF units derive considerable institutional and individual experience from training forces through the joint combined exchange training program. The joint combined exchange training program enhances SOF skills, such as instructor skills, language proficiency, and cultural immersion—critical to required missions. ARSOF gain regional familiarity, cross-cultural understanding, and intensive language training. Friendly forces gain incidental training benefits from the joint combined exchange training program. The release or disclosure of classified military information including special operations TTP is governed by U.S. law and must be reviewed along with unclassified official government information before disclosure to non-USG personnel. All components conducting operations and training activities with foreign units or foreign nationals must abide by applicable foreign disclosure requirements. The joint combined exchange training program provides access to numerous countries and regions throughout the world. Combatant commanders will determine if adequate status-of-forces agreement protections are in effect for all joint combined exchange training program activities. Recurring joint combined exchanges for training develop habitual relationships with foreign military personnel for all Army personnel and foreign SOF (in general) and for ARSOF units (in particular). USSOCOM addresses SOF-specific guidance and references DOS guidance.

6-14. One requirement of a joint combined exercise for training is that the HN provides the majority of training to the U.S. unit, while the U.S. unit provides a lesser amount of training. Qualitatively, however, the HN may derive considerable, if not more, benefit than ARSOF elements. The goal of the joint training program is not to eliminate this qualitative advantage but rather to derive the maximum overall benefit for both forces. In addition, successive joint combined exercises for training, especially those involving the same HN units over a period of years, have a cumulative effect. Although not pronounced with new members of the unit, this effect is often highly pronounced with professional officers and noncommissioned officers. Both the HN and the United States derive the successive benefit of wargaming multiple scenarios that might arise.

MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS

6-15. MTTs are a tailored and typically task-organized element defined, in part by JP 1-02, as a team consisting of one or more U.S. military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. This broad definition indicates what MTTs have become—any Service or civilian element conducting training at the trainees’ home station. Originally pioneered by ARSOF, the term MTT is now used broadly by other USG agencies, as well as by civilian industry and enterprises. ARSOF MTTs are specific in the capabilities they train, with the common exception of training general light infantry tactics and some other combat arms tasks. Frequently, MTTs train selective or elite military or paramilitary elements. All Army units fall under the funding laws and regulations of either the FAA or AECA.

6-16. MTTs are used to train an HN element that requires on-site instruction and to conduct surveys and assessments of training requirements. An MTT may be single-Service or joint, special operations, or conventional forces. Employment is on a temporary-duty basis for a period not to exceed 179 days, including travel; however, an MTT may deploy for shorter periods, to include deploying and training select units during a joint combined exercise for training. It can teach one or more iterations of the many short, intensive conventional force or ARSOF-specific courses. If forces require training for longer than 179 days, training in the United States should be considered as an alternative. Frequently, in-country training is under the supervision of the country team and is generally under OPCON or administrative control of the SCO. Preexisting joint and Army command relationships are maintained in cases where a GCC is on the ground.

6-17. JP 1-02 states the mission of an MTT is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. In general, an MTT trains a unit in more than one area, to include self-sufficiency in some specific tasks. Shorter MTTs tend to train one specific area or mission set. Several factors may be considered in deciding to employ an MTT, and deploying an MTT may not be the best option to accomplish training. Frequently, the decision to deploy is based on the following factors:

The training must take place as rapidly as possible or in response to a specific threat or adverse condition affecting the security of the HN.

The training is inclusive and accomplishable within the time mandated.

The training reaches either large numbers of trainees or critical upper-tier or elite HN forces to materially affect the situation in the HN.

The training is in specific tasks or common tasks trained to a high level.

The training requires use of language-qualified Soldiers or expertise in the use of interpreters in a teaching environment.

The training can only practically be executed (typically because of the HN fiscal situation) in the HN.

6-18. MTTs follow the same principles as all FID trainers and ideally have linguistic and regional cultural experience. Typically, the MTT coordinates with the SCO or regional security officer for logistic, training, security, and other needs. Under the legal guidelines, some portion of the costs associated with MTTs may be funded by the embassy or the HN. Some of these expenses can legally be satisfied by several agencies; coordination is done on a case-by-case basis.

EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

6-19. Exchange programs primarily increase military contacts and military-to-military understanding and interoperability. Exchange programs can range from the exchange of a single person to a battalion. Exchange programs allow for the use of operations and maintenance money for the exchange of units or individuals. They may be used to enhance the efforts of the security assistance programs funded under IMET that allow personnel to train in the United States.

6-20. These exchange programs foster greater mutual understanding and familiarize each force with the operations of the other. Exchange programs include the following:

Reciprocal Unit Exchange Program. This program is for squad- to battalion-sized elements. Each force trains the other nation’s force in their respective TTP. The proficiency of the units must be comparable to preclude exchanging fully trained U.S. forces for untrained HN forces. This requirement may preclude involvement.

Personnel Exchange Program. The personnel exchange program is a 1- to 3-year program in which one person from the HN is exchanged with a U.S. member. This program, like reciprocal unit exchanges, requires that the exchanged personnel be of comparable proficiency in their area of expertise.

Individual Exchange Program. This program is similar to the personnel exchange program. The difference is that it is a temporary duty assignment in-theater. The shorter duration of this assignment may make it a more viable option to commanders than the personnel exchange program.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

6-21. ARSOF’s role as trainers increases the likelihood that they are the first U.S. forces to begin conducting direct support. Because of the nature of ARSOF’s capabilities and core tasks, these units may be the only units conducting direct support in some operations. Conversely, the units may also be the only elements conducting indirect support (training) during operations involving combat operations. The most frequent combination of types of support by ARSOF units is the instance of simultaneously training HN personnel while conducting activities, such as minimal HCA, civic action programs, and MISO. ARSOF personnel in these instances train and participate in the action. For instance, a joint combined exercise for training may train toward and culminate in a medical civilian assistance program that involves U.S., HN, SF, CA, Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and MISO personnel.

DIRECT SUPPORT

6-22. In the course of direct support, U.S. forces provide direct assistance to the HN by actually conducting operations to support the civilian populace or the military. This support can be evaluation, training, limited information exchange, and equipment support. Title 10 USC authorities usually fund direct support. Direct support may continue to include training local military forces, as well as logistic, intelligence, or MISO conducted by Army forces. The intent of direct support is to increase support to the HN, which may be in conjunction with indirect support. Typically, direct support is conducted when the HN is not yet self-sufficient against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats or when it faces a security challenge beyond its ability to overcome. Direct support may not involve combat operations conducted with HN forces, which may stem from either domestic or international political concerns. The goal may be to keep U.S. forces from participating in combat operations to ensure the HN remains in the forefront of all operations to ensure or gain legitimacy. Strict ROE guide U.S. forces should they become involved in unplanned combat operations when conducting direct support activities. Typically, without the authorization of combat operations at the Presidential level, Army units are constrained to self-defense actions in the event of hostile action.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

6-23. JP 3-57 defines CMO. These operations include assisting host or friendly countries in bringing about political, economic, and social stability while encouraging the development of a country’s material and human resources. CMO are a range of possible activities that are considered based on the desired level of civilian support, availability of resources, and inadvertent interference by the local population.

6-24. The purpose of CMO is to facilitate military operations and to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. CMO integrate civil and military actions while conducting support to civil administration, populace and resources control, FHA, nation assistance, and civil information management. CMO support the internal development of the HN during operations with focus on the indigenous infrastructure and population. Successful CMO support the development of favorable attitudes, feelings, or behaviors among the populace toward the HN IDAD projects.

6-25. Soldiers, other than CA personnel, frequently become involved with CMO activities because of their association with civil and military leaders within their operational area through the conduct of their missions. In general, other Army elements can aid CA units to help military forces develop effective civil programs that generate interest in the populace to support the IDAD programs of the HN government. In some instances, CA units may be more effective, more credible, or both if the population perceives them as independent of other Army activities.

6-26. During mission analysis, the overall commander of operations may determine the need for augmentation by one or more CA teams. A large-scale operation could involve a much larger force structure and possibly the standing up of a CMO center. Any such contingency is likely to involve some United States Army Reserve CA units.

6-27. Early CA augmentation builds on the unit’s understanding of the political, economic, social, religious, and cultural factors that influence their operations in the HN. CA teams are responsible for producing the unit CMO estimate and CA annex to the unit OPLAN. These teams also help the unit with a postdeployment area assessment to update area studies.

6-28. CA personnel working with other units on a mission provide expertise and advisory capabilities in the area of CMO. They—

Review U.S. security assistance program and HN IDAD goals.

Plan CMO to support the HN plan.

Plan CMO in accordance with JP 3-24.

Train HN military to plan, prepare for, and conduct military civic action programs, populace and resources control operations, nation assistance, and other CMO appropriate to the IDAD of its country.

Establish and maintain contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.

Identify specific CMO missions conducted by the HN military.

Train on the TTP required to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats.

Develop indigenous individual leader and organizational skills to isolate insurgents from the civil population and protect the civil population.

6-29. CMO are the responsibility of military commanders at all levels. The successful military unit establishes a good working relationship with appropriate civil authorities and nonmilitary agencies. Army units must demonstrate how supported HN forces can integrate CMO into their military operations.

Populace and Resources Control

6-30. Military operations are not conducted in a vacuum that is free of civilian presence or influence. No matter the situation, operations can be disrupted by the movement of frightened civilians in the environment, as well as movement of civilians conducting legitimate activities. Populace and resources control operations consist of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. These controls are normally a responsibility of indigenous civil governments. For practical and security reasons, military forces use populace and resources control measures of some type and to varying degrees across all operations. Populace and resources control operations can be executed in conjunction with and as an integral part of all military operations.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

6-31. FHA encompasses short-range programs, such as disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, HCA, nation assistance, and dislocated civilian operations, aimed at ending or alleviating present human suffering. FHA is usually conducted in response to natural or man-made disasters, including combat. It is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance in their country. The GCC’s military strategy may include FHA to support operations as a component of the overall program to bolster the IDAD capability.

6-32. HCA programs can be valuable to the GCC’s support of programs and in training U.S. forces. HCA programs are specific programs with funding authorized under Title 10 USC, Section 401, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations. HCA programs, in conjunction with a military exercise, help the HN population.

6-33. FID units, in conjunction with HN units, may be directly involved in providing FHA to a needy populace. Title 10 USC 401 governs the use of U.S. military forces in HCA. Some forms of FHA may not extend to individuals or groups engaged in military or paramilitary activities.

6-34. In operations, units may also act as the coordinating or facilitating activity for FHA provided by the NGOs that respond to the emergency needs of a community. The unit should get its military counterparts involved in this activity as early as possible to foster public support for the HN military. Exploitation of FHA completed by the HN military through MISO, public affairs, and public diplomacy is generally beneficial.

Nation Assistance

6-35. Host-nation support (nation assistance) is civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations (JP 4-0). Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, FID, other Title 10 USC programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or IGOs. Nation assistance operations support by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. All nation assistance activities are usually coordinated with the U.S. Ambassador through the country team. Nation assistance subtasks are security assistance, FID, and military civic action.

6-36. Successful military civic action projects win support of the local population for government objectives and for the military forces in the area. Projects must conform to the national plan and fit the development program for the area. Examples of these projects are farm-to-market roads, bridges, short-range education programs, basic hygiene, medical immunization programs, and simple irrigation projects. Military civic action employs mostly indigenous military forces for these short-term projects.

6-37. For a military civic action program to be successful, the local populace, benefiting from the projects, must have a voice in the selection of projects and the establishment of priorities. Units must review (pretest) all projects with the populace before the project begins. They must also conduct a posttest with the local people to determine whether the project met the objectives. Failure to follow up can negatively impact the overall IDAD mission in the area.

Support to Civil Administration

6-38. Support to civil administration encompasses military operations that help stabilize or continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Support to civil administration occurs most often in stability operations. Some civil administration support is accomplished as an adjunct to other CAO, namely populace and resources control, FHA, and nation assistance. Support to civil administration consists of two distinct mission activities—civil administration in friendly territory and civil administration in occupied territory.

Civil Information Management

6-39. Civil information management is the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, and other agencies in the collaborative environment. Civil information is developed from data relating to civil ASCOPE within the civil component of the commander’s operational environment. This data can be fused or processed to increase the situational awareness, situational understanding, or situational dominance of the DOD, interagency, international organizations, NGOs, and indigenous populations and institutions. Civil information management ensures the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to both military and nonmilitary partners. Civil information management subtasks are civil reconnaissance and the civil information grid.

Note: The civil information grid provides the capability to coordinate, collaborate, and communicate to develop the civil components of the common operational picture. The civil information grid increases the situational understanding for the supported commander by vertically and horizontally integrating the technical lines of communication. This framework links every CA Soldier as a sensor and consumer to the civil information management cell of the CMO center and the CMO cell.

Other Considerations

6-40. Cultural characteristics in the operational environment are important to the local populace and require protection from military operations. Units may need to tactfully approach HN forces to locate and identify religious buildings, shrines, and consecrated places and to seek recommendations against using them for military purposes. This may be a sensitive subject if either the HN or an internal threat has violated religious or historic sites in past operations. It is incumbent upon the unit to help the HN forces determine methods and operational techniques that are most acceptable to the populace and still allow for completion of the military mission.

6-41. If required, Army units with CA support may support civil administration missions with the HN government. Typically, this support is in areas reclaimed from the control of the insurgency or other internal threat. Direct support helps HN military forces plan and conduct military civic action. Since military civic action is part of the overall U.S. security assistance program, formal agreements between the HN and the United States govern this support.

6-42. Public affairs support to CMO primarily informs the populace about the many things the HN government and military are doing for the people. Public affairs products can also keep the people abreast of the political, economic, and social situation in other parts of the country and tactical and strategic successes of the government over insurgent forces. In addition, MISO may use such successes to encourage or discourage behaviors in target audiences at other locales. Various media, such as loudspeakers, leaflets, and radio broadcasts, may be used to prepare, induce, or exploit the populace to obtain answers to questions such as—

How effective are the populace and resources control measures that are in use?

What behaviors will bring populace and resources control measures to an end?

What civic action projects are being conducted in the area?

How can target audiences access or support programs?

How effective is encouraging the reporting of threats at interfering with or sabotaging programs?

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

6-43. MISO typically must be an integral and vital part of an HN IDAD program. The only exception to this rule would be if the HN has employed MISO in the past and lost credibility with target audiences or with the majority of the population as a whole. However, this may not preclude U.S. MISO forces from executing programs in the HN if they have credibility with intended target audiences. At the other extreme, Soldiers may have to educate their HN counterparts in the value and role of MISO in FID. PSYOP Soldiers then must advise and help HN forces in developing and implementing an effective plan. An effective plan depends on timely information, as well as intelligence, that includes knowledge of the—

History, culture, background, current environment, and attitudes of potential target audiences.

Organization, motivation, and sources of personnel and materiel supply of the internal threat.

Strengths and weaknesses of ideological and political proponents and opponents.

6-44. MISO can be used to gain the cooperation or noninterference of critical target audiences within the populace. These programs target not only internal threats or foreign groups but also target audiences within the HN. Planners tailor MISO to meet specific needs for each area and operation. They evaluate the psychological impact of all military actions. A strict approval process governs MISO programs. In FID, approval may be maintained at the highest levels, namely at the Presidential or SecDef levels. However, even in a politically sensitive or volatile operation, approval is frequently delegated at least to the chief of mission or GCC. Approval can be delegated as low as brigade level. Soldiers, as a whole, must be aware that MISO are sensitive, strictly controlled activities that produce mid- to long-range results. They must communicate these facts to the HN chain of command and any unfamiliar elements within the collaborative environment of the operations.

6-45. MISO sustain the achievement of U.S. national objectives and target specific audiences. A common misconception is that they can target mass audiences with blanket programs. They target specific audiences to induce a specific behavioral change. Mass public information programs are a function of public affairs; however, MISO can support in the dissemination of command information. MISO are employed to influence adversary decisionmakers or groups.

6-46. MISO can support the mission by seeking to encourage or reinforce behaviors that discredit the internal threat to the supporting or neutral groups. They can also induce withdrawal of support for subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to prevent recruitment of new members from neutral target audiences. Other frequent and supporting information operations objectives intend to provoke dissension among the internal threats and to encourage defections at all levels of support for and within the threat. Divisive programs create or exploit dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within the internal threat. Target audience analysis may show that internal threats are susceptible to national programs to win insurgents over to the government’s side with offers of amnesty or rewards. Typically, this target audience analysis reveals potential motives for returning to lawful participation in society or government that can range from personal rivalries and bitterness to disillusionment and discouragement. Target audience analysis may also reveal that pressure from the security forces is exploitable as a persuasive agent.

6-47. MISO should ultimately strive to identify the cause of internal threat behaviors or the contributing factors that drive those behaviors. By isolating the cause, MISO can target the perceptions and beliefs that fuel the internal threat’s operations. These programs can also influence and change behaviors to indirectly deal with an insurgency or other internal threat, such as the reporting of internal threat activity through various means.

Civilian Population

6-48. Various target audiences in the civilian populace are frequently the main or critical target audiences to the overall MISO program during FID. Sometimes these are large target audiences or several large target audiences with similar vulnerabilities and susceptibilities. Conversely, sometimes only a small proportion of the populace confined in a limited number of target audiences are the base of support for an internal threat, such as in a minority ethnic separatist movement. In such instances, target audiences may be less susceptible to MISO directed toward them and may require programs of longer duration. Other goals for civilian target audiences may be to actively demonstrate the resolve of the HN and U.S. forces to prevent mistrustful behaviors, such as giving false reports. MISO may also seek to gain the civilian population target audiences’ support of curfews, checkpoints, and other security measures that restrict the population.

Host-Nation Military and Paramilitary Forces

6-49. The HN military or paramilitary forces may be an important target audience in the overall MISO program. The loyalty, discipline, and motivation of these forces are critical factors in FID operations. Programs can emphasize building the morale and professionalism of military and paramilitary forces by encouraging or discouraging specific behaviors. Frequently, these programs are double-edged; for instance, a military target audience might be exposed to discouraging graft and corruption while simultaneously being exposed to other programs that encourage participation in off-duty charitable or community programs.

Neutral and Third-Party Elements

6-50. Information operations support FID operations by encouraging participation in activities that project a favorable image of the HN government and the United States. This support can include programs that seek to induce a behavior in neutral target audiences and concurrently highlight the successes or benefits incurred by other participants. MISO can indirectly inform the international community of U.S. and HN intent and goodwill through such programs. The effects can be multiplied through coordination with public affairs activities that have the express goal of informing only. These programs can also gain the support of uncommitted groups inside and outside the threatened nation by revealing the nature of the internal threat’s subversive activities.

External Hostile or Enabling Powers

6-51. Strategic MISO can seek to bring international pressure to bear on any external hostile or enabling power sponsoring or condoning internal threats or enabling powers that supply materiel or services for a profit. These programs are designed to cause any hostile or enabling power or organization supporting the internal threat to cease supporting them. The comprehensive approach dictates diplomatic pressure as well, and this pressure typically can be very effective against those nation-states pursuing financial motives.

Assessment

6-52. PSYOP Soldiers conduct a psychological assessment for all operations, which is completed when a MISO unit is deployed. In the event PSYOP Soldiers are not part of the deployment package, a thorough predeployment assessment should be provided and augmented with site survey data; however, this solution is not preferable. Units facing this second situation should consider requesting assets from the regionally oriented PSYOP battalion during predeployment or isolation to help in mission analysis. To determine requirements during mission analysis, the unit assesses the psychological impact of its presence, activities, and operations. The unit reviews the OPLAN or operation order to ensure it supports U.S. and HN psychological objectives. This factor is critical. Unit personnel analyze all official duties and consider the psychological impact on the populace when an Army unit participates in events, such as military ceremonies, religious services, and social gatherings. In addition, units must determine the practicality of planning and conducting direct support during national or religious holidays.

Coordinated Efforts in the Host Nation

6-53. The potential exists for all units to integrate relevant approved themes into their normal activities with civilians and military. Trained MISO personnel conduct face-to-face communications, and all units can reinforce these products by repeating the same core ideas to their counterparts or to the public they are dealing with. In a JSOTF or SOTF setting, this can be highly synchronized with the MISO staff or element providing coordinated talking points to other Army units. In addition, other elements can disseminate approved products to target audiences they may encounter.

Protocol

6-54. During operations, all deployed personnel must conduct themselves in a culturally appropriate, professional manner. They must observe local customs and local traditions and properly balance them so as not to violate U.S. Army standards of conduct. All units conducting FID must understand HN and local customs, courtesies, and taboos. It is frequently incumbent upon ARSOF Soldiers as the knowledgeable regional specialists to impart this knowledge to conventional forces and partners in the collaborative environment of operations. As U.S. representatives, Americans can have a psychological impact on the mission by their actions (whether good or bad, or on- or off-duty). The supporting regional PSYOP battalion, along with the appropriate country team offices, can help ARSOF and conventional units with cultural mores and development of a rapport-building program.

Host-Nation Considerations

6-55. In addition to MISO units, all units may have to advise or help HN forces in gaining or retaining the support of the local populace by discrediting the internal threats and isolating the insurgents or other threats from the populace. In this instance, unit personnel can greatly influence the HN forces in conducting themselves in accordance with acceptable military norms, mores, and professionalism. ARSOF personnel and conventional force officers may train the HN military or government leadership in the advantages and techniques of maximizing public opinion. However, this may entail first correcting obvious behaviors in these leaders that are alienating potential supporters among the HN civil populace.

6-56. The use of MISO assets and techniques greatly enhance the effectiveness of FID programs. However, it is necessary to have a planned, proactive approach in MISO units, other Army units, and any partner agencies. All units potentially may advise and help HN forces in how to use MISO to assist their FID and IDAD objectives and to integrate MISO capabilities. In some instances, the first step in this process may be to curtail behaviors in the HN military or government that contradict the program.

MILITARY TRAINING TO HOST-NATION FORCES

6-57. During direct support to FID operations, training of HN military does not completely cease. On the contrary, the HN situation typically represents an escalation of internal threat capability or, at a minimum, an increase in the intensity and frequency of internal threat attacks. Therefore, an increased need for military training beyond that of indirect support may emerge. This may translate into a greater focus on training HN SOF and elite paramilitary forces as conventional forces step up training of their HN counterparts. Situational realities dictate the proper allocation of types of units to be trained.

6-58. During an escalating situation, an increased emphasis on IDAD becomes important and training may focus on specific subversion, insurgency, or other complex internal threat-incited situations encountered by the HN that may be beyond its capabilities to control. At this point, units may increase forces or reconfigure current deployment packages to both continue training of forces and to conduct direct support in areas that the HN is unable to execute or does not have sufficient resources to execute at adequate levels. Deployment of additional capabilities may be necessary to train and conduct more complex direct support operations.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

6-59. FID direct support (not involving combat operations) typically involves some increase in logistic support to the HN military. The logistic support discussed here does not include activities authorized under security assistance. United States law limits these logistic support operations, which usually consist of transportation or limited maintenance support. Appendix A provides detailed legal and policy concerns. Authorization to provide this type of support is contingent upon a major emergency that threatens the internal security of the HN. Normally, this type of support is authorized for limited periods to accomplish very narrow objectives. In some cases, the President or SecDef may direct a show of force exercise to demonstrate support for the HN and to exercise the mechanisms and processes of logistic support. ARSOF may provide expertise, intelligence, security, CAO, MISO, or other direct support for aspects of such a show of force, especially if the situation has not previously escalated to direct support. However, such a show of force is typically most efficacious with a demonstration of considerable conventional force power.

6-60. Planners integrate logistic support into the overall theater plan. This planning is even more important if the supported nation is involved in an active conflict with U.S. forces conducting direct support. Major employment considerations that should be considered when providing logistic support as part of the theater program (both indirect and direct support) include the following:

Review and update definitive ROE and protection measures.

Educate all members of the command on permissible activities for the logistic support mission.

Determine whether more- or less-restrictive protection measures and site security are necessary.

Determine new or heightened operations security and essential elements of information.

Ensure understanding that equipment and supplies may not be transferred to the HN military.

Ensure understanding of procedures and limitations of logistic support allowed.

Update a logistics assessment file on logistic resources available in-country, including any changes in—

▪ Local supply availability.

▪ Warehousing and maintenance facilities.

▪ Transportation assets and lines of communication.

▪ Labor force availability.

▪ ARSOF and other unit-specific equipment and supply issues.

Ensure equipment maintenance and training packages meet the needs of the HN and are sustainable.

INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS SHARING

6-61. An active intelligence liaison should be ongoing among the HN, country team, interagency, and DOD intelligence staff. The sharing of U.S. intelligence is always a sensitive area that must be evaluated based on each situation. Cooperative intelligence liaisons between the United States and HN are vital; however, disclosure of classified information to the HN or other multinational forces must be authorized. Any element within the collaborative environment can restrict intelligence sharing to lower levels. FID operators should strive to include the HN as much as possible. This may be easier to accomplish with HN-specific intelligence than with regional or global intelligence. Similarly, CI elements can provide support to HN counterparts, security service, and police forces when deployed to support operations.

ASSISTING THE HOST NATION FROM INDIRECT TO DIRECT SUPPORT

6-62. The initial focus of assistance in this area is to evaluate intelligence and communications architecture. The United States considers the needs of the HN, as well as its technical expertise and equipment, when evaluating HN systems. The intelligence and communications systems must reflect the environment, threats, and resources.

6-63. Following the evaluation, the United States determines how the FID program may help. The assessment identifies HN equipment deficiencies. During indirect support, the security assistance process normally provides U.S. assistance in equipment; however, this may change during direct support to the greater use of U.S. equipment and expertise.

6-64. Security assistance normally requires training support for intelligence operations, which is indirect support. Exchange programs and daily interaction with HN military intelligence and communications assets may provide some limited informal training benefits. During direct support, a similar training support of other HN military personnel may take place with personnel dividing efforts between conducting direct support operations and training select intelligence specialties. If U.S. assets, such as unmanned aerial platforms, are used, restrictions on training HN personnel may apply even when the data (for example, video feed) is releasable.

CONSIDERATIONS

6-65. The following items summarize the major considerations that commanders and planners must know as they conduct intelligence- and communications-sharing activities in direct support of the FID program:

Evaluate the effectiveness of HN intelligence systems to determine if assisting or rebuilding existing intelligence systems is necessary.

Assess and determine what works best for the HN and, if legal, use those systems. Forcing U.S. systems on the HN may not be the best COA.

Direct most U.S. intelligence and communications assistance efforts toward creating a self-sufficient HN intelligence and communications capability. United States assistance that creates a long-term reliance on U.S. capabilities may damage the overall HN intelligence and communications system.

Scrutinize any training assistance provided to ensure it is within legal authorizations and ensure that information or processes are not revealed without authorization.

Use conventional force and ARSOF-specific assets and capabilities appropriately and in situations beyond the capabilities of the HN.

Tailor assistance to the level of the threat, equipment, and technology within the HN.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

6-66. If the situation of the HN government deteriorates during operations to the point that vital U.S. interests are in jeopardy, the President may commit U.S. forces in a combat role to effect a decisive change in the conflict. If combat operations become necessary in the course of operations, it represents an escalation of internal threat capability or a deterioration of the HN ability to counter an insurgency or other virulent internal threat. Combat operations (by U.S. forces) are not the norm in FID operations; however, FID operations that involve combat operations have historically also been long-term and expended a great amount of resources in defense of essential U.S. interests or grievous violations of basic human rights.

6-67. It is unlikely that FID operations begin with combat operations. Nevertheless, operations that have grown out of a successfully completed stability, security, transition, and reconstruction contingency may again degenerate to the point of U.S. involvement. Regardless of the process by which combat operations come about, it represents the extreme edge of operations where the situation in the HN can decrease in intensity or escalate from FID up the continuum to major combat operations and, perhaps, regional conflict. Application of decisive but simultaneously discriminate U.S. combat power can prevent this latter contingency. Units can provide a vital component of combat power and engage the threat discriminately.

6-68. Direct U.S. military intervention can provide HN forces with the time and space to regain the strategic initiative and resume control of tactical operations. In this situation, the committed U.S. combat force is likely to find in-country conventional forces, SF, MISO, CA, and other ARSOF teams with a myriad of formal and informal arrangements and relationships. The GCC fully exploits this experience and relationships during the critical transition period when a larger force is deploying into the country. Incoming forces immediately exchange liaison personnel with the headquarters (which may be relatively small in a rapid escalation of threat) to exploit their advice and assistance. In addition, in an escalating situation, these liaisons can help the GCC in determining the total Army force structures needed and then request those assets. The headquarters provides all possible advice and assistance, to include providing—

Situation and intelligence updates for incoming SOF and conventional force commanders and their staffs.

In-place FID elements for initial coordination with HN and U.S. mission agencies.

Coalition support teams to facilitate integration of the HN forces into the overall plan.

Real-time intelligence and operational reporting along with training status and operational capability assessment of HN units.

Advisors to HN units to facilitate relief-in-place once specific objectives are met in selected sectors within the HN.

Supervision of HCA efforts in remote areas to support the HN IDAD strategy.

FID headquarters staff assistance to plan coordinate and liaise for broad CMO and CAO to alleviate civilian crises or interference.

Preparation of friendly and neutral target audiences in the HN or region for greater U.S. or coalition presence through shaping of the environment.

Counterpropaganda support.

Aggressive MISO programs and psychological actions planning that stress the inevitability of dismal failure and defeat of the internal threat.

Immediate MISO that outline methods of defection and surrender.

Time-sensitive interdiction of strategic and operationally critical targets through direct action by SF, Rangers, or national forces.

Immediate capability to support personnel recovery.

6-69. In general, personnel participating in activities that fall under security assistance are restricted by law from combat. The AECA (Section 21, Sales from Stocks) prohibits personnel who provide defense services (including training) from performing duties of a combatant nature. Training and advising activities that may engage U.S. personnel in combat activities outside the United States are prohibited. Specifically, security assistance teams shall not engage in or provide assistance or advice to foreign forces in a combat situation. Security assistance teams are prohibited from performing operational duties of any kind except as may be required in the conduct of on-the-job training in the operation and maintenance of equipment, weapons, and supporting systems. Therefore, even if combat operations are ongoing in the HN, security assistance teams will continue security assistance operations. Security assistance teams would have to be formally relieved from security assistance duties and be reassigned under Title 10 USC authorities to conduct combat operations.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

6-70. The manner in which U.S. forces conduct combat operations does not change in FID operations. Nevertheless, the United States must consider certain areas at the operational and strategic levels of war when conducting combat operations that support an HN IDAD program. Many of the considerations discussed in indirect and direct support remain important in tactical operations. Because the civilian populace remains a focus in FID operations even during authorized combat, the United States considers the coordinated use of MISO and CA, along with SF or conventional force advisors, during coordination with partner agencies operating within the HN.

HOST-NATION ORGANIZATION

6-71. If a nation receiving support reaches a point in its internal affairs that requires direct support involving combat operations from the United States, it may typically already have a comprehensive IDAD strategy. In addition, the country team, the GCC, and Army units usually also have long histories of supporting the IDAD program and interacting with the relevant IDAD organizations. At this point, these organizations must maximize all instruments of power to defeat the subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. USG agencies, including Army elements, must be involved in this coordination and control process at the appropriate levels. The IDAD organization may become broader and larger at the point that the President authorizes combat operations.

Force Structures

6-72. Historically, SOF elements (principally ARSOF with a majority of SF, MISO, and CA) initially lead COIN efforts, including those in FID operations. In some instances, this force structure, when released to conduct combat operations, may be sufficient to put the HN back in a dominant position. If the situation takes a rapid turn toward favoring the threats (for instance, if there is a sudden influx of new armed elements across a porous border) or the internal threats continue to gain strength, the deployment of additional SOF elements and typically larger units from the conventional forces may be required. This typically includes a surge type capacity that is normally a joint force. Army aviation and brigade combat teams, as well as select additional logistic and intelligence support, are typically part of this force structure. Conversely, as opposed to a surge, SOF units on the ground may only require an increased air interdiction capacity.

Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Focus

6-73. When FID includes combat operations, it is probable that these operations may be joint-oriented (perhaps from the outset) and include multinational operations involving the HN and the United States. If the HN requests broader support from mutual defense partners, regional defense associations, or the United Nations, other multinational forces may be involved at this point as well. An increase in interagency coordination should also be anticipated, with the possibility of the involvement of more government agencies than in indirect or direct support operations.

Transition Points

6-74. United States forces establish transition points for combat operations. These are situation-dependent rather than time-dependent. Transition points establish conditions for the return of combat operations to the HN forces. These can be different in various geographic locations. One subnational area or city of the HN may be entirely under government control while another would be in serious peril of falling under internal threat control without U.S. forces to help restore control and maintaining security.

COMBAT OPERATION PRIORITIES

6-75. An early priority for U.S. combat operations is to identify, integrate, and, where necessary, restore mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. In an undeveloped operation, this may be a chief issue, as the HN may not yet have built these capabilities to the levels set out in their IDAD program. Although Army trainers and advisors may have had limited to no involvement in assisting the HN in these areas, they may have evaluated the need and shortcomings. When tactically feasible, HN forces should conduct the irregular warfare activities and warfighting functions. This increases the legitimacy of the HN government and reduces its dependency on U.S. forces to conduct both combined arms maneuver and wide-area security. Internal threat attacks may affect all of warfighting functions, notably protection and sustainment.

Offensive Operations

6-76. Army FID units conduct combat operations with the same goal as indirect and direct support operations; namely, to help local governments and military forces gain self-sufficiency against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. Combat operations provide time and security to regroup and refit as necessary and then regain the initiative. In most cases, the objective of FID is protection operations rather than destruction of adversary forces. Gaining the strategic initiative is the responsibility of the HN. Proactive control of the psychological fight shapes a perception that the HN is—

Capable of defeating threats.

Not subservient to the United States or the coalition.

Responsive to its citizens.

Committed to defending its citizens.

6-77. In addition, commanders must evaluate all operations to ensure they do not create the impression that the United States is executing a war for a nation that has neither the will nor the public support to defeat subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. For instance, commanders plan operations in which HN counterparts are either a significant player or a lead player. If not, units operate unilaterally until counterparts can fulfill this role. Unilateral action in combat operations is, however, the least desirable COA. It is better for HN forces to execute combat actions tolerably than for FID advisors to execute them perfectly, because it is the HN’s war.

Human Rights Considerations

6-78. Human rights considerations are central to all FID operations. Successfully deterring abuses typically requires greater vigilance during combat operations. Forces must maintain strict respect for human rights. This includes U.S., HN, and other participating multinational forces. Repression and abuses of the local population by the legitimate government reduces the credibility of and popular support for the HN government and causes the consideration for withdrawing U.S. support. Therefore, commanders must consistently reinforce human rights policies. In many combat situations, the moral high ground may be just as important as the tactical high ground.

Use of Force

6-79. Because of their universal proximity to civilians, carefully balanced ROE are required in all irregular warfare operations. ROE for combat operations may be the most restrictive of any irregular warfare operation. Forces must reach a balance between protection, danger to innocent civilians, and damage to nonmilitary areas. Close contact with civilians requires that Soldiers be trained on when to use force and what type of force and the degree of force to use. This training is a great enabler of successful combat operations. Balanced responses to internal threat attacks can be achieved with Soldier training, coupled with leaders cognizant of the need for proportional and, when tactically feasible, minimal force.

6-80. Balanced force requires restraint. ROE that are too lenient may quickly destroy the infrastructure gains of previous IDAD development programs and cause civilian casualties that alienate the HN government and military from the people. Commanders must prevent the indiscriminate use of force. Army commanders may not only have to find precise methods of interdiction, but may frequently have to advise frustrated HN commanders against reacting with disproportional force.

6-81. Balanced force requires resolve. ROE that are too restrictive may unnecessarily limit interdiction of subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats that have no self-imposed restrictions on the use of violence. If the ROE prevent effective self-protection of U.S. and HN forces, they further an insurgency or other undermining threat in the goal of wearing down those forces. In this situation, the internal threat begins to win the battle of perception with the civilian populace that the U.S. and HN military cannot provide a secure environment. Commanders, therefore, must closely monitor the operational environment and provide subordinate commanders with clear and enforceable ROE, as well as the flexibility to modify these ROE as the situation changes. Local populations in many cultures may expect grievously disproportional violence in the interdiction of subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. Skillful use of MISO, public diplomacy, and public affairs before and after lethal and, perhaps more important, nonlethal interdictions may improve this feeling in the populace.

Intelligence

6-82. The U.S. intelligence network must tie into the country team, the local HN military, paramilitary, and police intelligence capabilities, as well as the intelligence assets of other nations participating in the operation. Deployed military CI elements can provide liaison with local HN military CI and security and police services.

6-83. Typically, information required for combat operations places a greater emphasis on human intelligence efforts than on technical collection capabilities. In addition, large portions of the intelligence process in combat operations focuses on determining key personalities and cells for lethal interdiction. Nevertheless, the intelligence process cannot neglect social, economic, and political information because the needs, perceptions, and sympathies of the civilian populace are similar to key terrain in operations. Units must know of changes in the operational environment that might require a change in tactics, not only in the lethal sphere, but also in the nonlethal area.

Defensive Operations

6-84. Under decisive action, offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities occur simultaneously. FID advises the HN to address the civil situation directly and continuously, combining tasks directed at the populace with tactical tasks directed against adversaries. The nature of the mission and operational environment determine the appropriate weighting and combination of tasks. Experience has shown that many HN militaries or portions thereof are more effective in the defense than on the offense. In addition, the mindset of civilian populations is inherently defensive. Civilians typically seek security. They may be willing to participate in activities that secure their own neighborhoods or homes but may never be willing to participate in anything other than home defense. Establishing secure areas using HN forces, civilian watches, and other static means can be balanced with Army units and select HN (typically designated elite) forces conducting patrols and offensive operations. In addition, MISO actions and messages can influence the HN to adopt behaviors and attitudes that gain popular support for offensive operations; however, this may have to be accomplished in stages.

Ongoing Foreign Internal Defense Programs

6-85. The initiation of combat operations does not equal the suspension of other FID programs. In actuality, MISO, CMO, security assistance, FHA, intelligence, and logistic support are all likely to increase dramatically. Training of HN SOF and conventional elements by SF and other Army teams, along with additional deployments of trainers, may actually increase as well. In addition, during combat operations, the distinction between trainer and advisor is nullified by Title 10 USC. The planning imperatives of taking the long-term approach, tailoring support to the needs, and bearing IDAD responsibility remain important throughout the combat operations phase. One way of infusing others with this belief in self-reliance is to create a sense of urgency and accomplishment by increasing the goals of previously initiated programs. However, even if the HN seeks to do so, this must not be done by compromising training standards in the interest of speed. Culturally, some nations may still possess the mindset that rapidly conscripting and mobilizing a large force equates to capability, but an unskilled force is problematic. FID programs (with advisors assisting in equipping and training the foreign forces) mitigate humanitarian violations or other problems associated with unskilled forces, furthering legitimacy for the HN political leadership and military.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

6-86. In combat operations, as in all operations, the chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field remains intact. The President retains command authority over U.S. forces. In some instances, it may be beneficial to place appropriate U.S. forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. This is typically a commander from the HN, but it conceivably could be from another coalition partner to demonstrate regional resolve to back the legitimate HN government. In making that determination, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed U.S. force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE. In addition, the choice typically also serves to delegitimize the insurgency or other internal threat as much as possible.

6-87. Planners tailor command and support relationships for combat operations to the situation based on the size and composition of the U.S. force committed and the political, social, and military environment of the HN. Whether holding the top command of combat operations or not, the HN government and security forces must remain in the forefront. HN security forces must establish strategic policy and objectives. Typically, these will have evolved from an earlier IDAD strategy and will have involved input from U.S. planners or advisors. Planners should establish a single multinational headquarters to control combat operations. Planners help the integration of Army elements into a JTF or a JSOTF or other established command and control structure. It is also possible that some or all Army units remain under U.S. command while other U.S. forces remain part of a combined command under HN command. ARSOF and conventional forces in FID must tolerate and plan for adaptable command relationships; however, all command relationships must be clearly and unequivocally established before Army units conduct combat operations.

SUSTAINMENT

6-88. The sustainment requirements of combat operations are similar to those for other types of operations. Like all irregular warfare operations, the chief variable in FID operations is the support available from and in the HN. Political sensitivities, concern for HN legitimacy, and the overall desirability of a minimum U.S. presence affect the complexion of sustainment operations in FID. These general principles should be considered in planning and executing sustainment of combat operations:

Maximize the use of HN capabilities, including routine services, supplies, facilities, and transportation. This approach reduces U.S. overhead and the number of U.S. and third-nation personnel required in the HN.

Maximize the use of existing facilities, such as ports, airfields, and communications sites. New or expanded facilities, if built, should be in keeping with the original development portion of the IDAD plan.

Minimize the handling of supplies for short duration operations (90 days or less). Provide support through existing organic support packages and through air lines of communication.

Establish medical self-sufficiency. Many areas of the world where the United States is likely to conduct operations do not have adequate medical capabilities. Since commanders typically cannot rely on local capabilities, they must plan for self-sufficient HSS for combat operations. At a minimum, commanders must establish adequate hospitalization, medical logistics resupply, patient movement, and preventive medicine to support these operations.

Optimize the use of mobile maintenance capabilities that stress repair as far forward as possible.

Minimize the evacuation of equipment for repair.

Use both intertheater and intratheater airlift routinely to deliver supplies.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

6-89. Counterinsurgency is the comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes (JP 3-24). U.S. combat involvement in FID operations has traditionally focused on COIN. Although the potential exists for other threats to become dangerous enough to require combat operations to be conducted against them, generally only an ideologically motivated insurgency sufficiently unites and draws enough support for this possibility. In addition, this ideological motivation can be based in political, religious, or cultural identifiers. Insurgents by definition are willing to use violence to secure their goals; however, insurgents are willing to use a broad continuum for degrees of violence. The United States may authorize combat operations against insurgencies that strike principally military targets or those that deliberately target innocent civilians. The principal center of gravity and most common lapse in focus for COIN forces is the HN civilian populace. The insurgency that loses focus of this center of gravity quickly fails.

6-90. An insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself (JP 3-24). Insurgents who target civilians generally do so for three reasons:

To lead the HN populace or portions of it to erroneously believe that HN or U.S. forces deliberately target civilians.

To demonstrate that the HN does not have the capacity to provide adequate security to the populace.

To promote sectarian violence.

6-91. Insurgencies target civilians either as a general destabilizing tactic or as genuine partisans of one subgroup of the population. Quite often, the latter is a historically disenfranchised group. Army elements conducting COIN during FID combat operations must constantly track and counter sectarianism by all parties. As the situation deteriorates in the early stage of combat operations, this may mainly consist of preventing HN counterparts from becoming sectarian in their words or actions. It should be noted that al Qaeda has adopted a third form of dividing homogenous populations. The tactic was adopted from Soviet World War II countercollaboration and resistance recruiter units that deliberately targeted their own citizenry to cause distrust and destroyed working infrastructure in occupied areas to drive citizens to partisan camps. This tactic necessarily recognizes the inherent probability of counterproductivity and attrition of its own citizens.

6-92. Although COIN is executed in numerous operations, COIN techniques to some degree are an inherent subset of all FID operations. Clearly, not all COIN techniques are going to translate directly to an internal threat that is predominantly motivated by and pursuing crime. Should such an internal threat attempt to take on the trappings of a political or religious ideology, it is frequently useful in the influence fight to characterize the internal threat as to what it truly is—a criminal element masquerading as revolutionaries or holy warriors. At the tactical level, interdicting criminal elements may closely resemble COIN techniques against a classic insurgency. Detailed information concerning insurgents and the ideological narrative behind insurgencies is located in FM 3-24.

6-93. The underlying principles of FID operations and the TTP for them do not change during combat operations. Such is also the case when those combat operations involve COIN. The primary pitfall for Army units engaged in COIN during combat operations is to shift from a balanced FID program to an over-allocation of resources on lethal COIN at the expense of separating the insurgents from the civil populace and, more importantly, securing the support of the populace for their government.

TERRORISM

6-94. If a nation is susceptible to any one type of internal threat, the possibility of terrorism or organizations intent on conducting terrorist activities occurring in conjunction with that internal threat or independent of it exists. As stated above, although much of the FID effort remains focused on COIN, U.S. programs may aim at other threats to the internal stability of an HN, such as terrorism. It must be noted that terrorism is a tactic, not a strategy. For instance, narcoterrorism, which is linked to illicit drug trafficking, often uses both acts of terror on individuals and full terrorist assaults on large targets. Emphasis should be on helping the HN address the root cause of instability in a preventative manner rather than reacting to threats. Unemployment, drug trafficking, violent crime, social unrest, and internal conflicts all promote violent tactics like terrorism. Terrorism affects all aspects of a nation’s defense and development. FID programs of all types—such as humanitarian assistance, antiterrorism programs, and especially counterterrorism—can prevent, reduce, or stop mitigating factors that can contribute to the start or spread of terrorist tactics.

6-95. Fighting global operations against terrorist networks is an effort the United States cannot do alone. It must be a global, collaborative effort. The DOS leads this collaborative effort and the DOD supports it through numerous programs, which include FID operations. These programs either directly or indirectly deter threats of terrorism within an HN or prevent the spread of a global threat by—

Training and advising HN forces to deter crime and subversive activities.

Sharing intelligence and communication to increase international awareness of terrorist organizations.

Supporting counterdrug (programs, initiatives) to stop or minimize narcoterrorism.

6-96. FID programs combat secondary enablers of terrorism as well. An HN involved in combat operations against an internal threat, such as an insurgency, continues or steps up programs that make the internal environment less favorable to terrorists. Programs that reduce incidents of corruption, increase opportunities for employment, or even decrease the theft of intellectual property can make the HN less attractive to terrorists and more attractive to foreign direct investment. Just as all instruments for the national power of an HN may be targeted by terrorists, all instruments of national power should be used against groups using terror tactics. In combat operations that typically also includes lethal and nonlethal targeting of terrorist elements, whether they are part of the principal internal threat or not.

Chapter 7

Redeployment

Redeployment of Army units conducting FID operations does not typically indicate the end of all operations. In long-term operations, as security and other conditions improve and internal threats become manageable for HN personnel, direct military-to-military training by Army and sister-Service units continues; however, this training may become more intermittent with gaps between regular exercises. In ongoing operations, continuous coverage by units generally involves, whenever possible, mission handoff from one unit to its replacement unit. Redeployment, if conducted haphazardly or prematurely, can set operations back substantially. Ideally, an internal threat becomes a law enforcement issue or is completely interdicted. However, FID-relevant military-to-military training (for example, a joint combined exercise for training) should continue. In the case of key strategic partners, operations may continue to make a strong ally stronger. In most instances, the term redeployment is a misnomer. This chapter, therefore, deals with a general continuum of individual units redeploying from FID operations.

OVERVIEW

7-1. Commonalities exist between redeployments that involve direct handoff and redeployments that involve intermittent deployments. In the latter case, the possibility always exists that situations during routine training and military-to-military contact may arise, causing handoff to a relieving force. Typically, this involves the original unit or select members of it, who extend their presence in-country to provide continuity or to stay in place as part of a more robust force. Redeployment may also involve a transition from DOD execution of programs to DOS or other governmental departments and agencies execution. Capturing lessons learned (thorough observations, insights, and lessons), after action reviews, and debriefings is essential in both immediate, continuous-mission handoffs, and intermittent operations to continue to build institutional Army knowledge and refine keystone doctrine, TTP, and training.

TERMINATION OF OPERATIONS

7-2. The nature of the termination shapes the future of the HN and regional countries. It is essential to understand that termination of operations is a vital link between national security strategy, national defense strategy, national military strategy, and the national strategic end state. A poorly conducted termination of operations can have a long-term impact on USG relations in the HN, the region, and, potentially, in more than one region. Some level of operations normally continues well after intensive FID support has ended. The possibility of an extended presence by U.S. military forces to help operations should be considered during the initial planning and recommendation for execution.

TERMINATION APPROACHES

7-3. There are three approaches for achieving national strategic objectives by military force:

The first approach forces an imposed settlement by the threat of or the actual occupation of an enemy’s land, resources, or people. Destroying critical functions and assets, such as mission command or infrastructure or making the adversary unable to resist the imposition of the United States, supports the threat of occupation or actual occupation. In FID, this approach is typically only taken with intransigent threats, and the approach differs from other operations in that it still involves a preponderance of HN effort in any imposed settlement.

The second approach seeks a negotiated settlement through coordinated political, diplomatic, military, and economic actions, which convince an adversary that to yield will be less painful than to continue resistance. In FID, military power alone rarely compels an internal threat to consider a negotiated conclusion. A political settlement may be unacceptable to both HN and U.S. national policy objectives. Rather, military success in providing security to the majority of the populace, coupled with the other functions of the HN IDAD program, may induce an internal threat to negotiate under terms acceptable to the HN government. Negotiating an advantageous conclusion to operations requires time, power, and the demonstrated will to use both. Nevertheless, some internal threats by nature may not be viable candidates for negotiation. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there may be an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated intermission in operations, not an agreement or peace. In effect, it is a device to buy time pending the negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of operations. The efficacy of a truce must be weighed against the potential damage done by legitimizing an internal threat. In short, enfranchisement of an internal threat may remain impossible.

The third approach for achieving national security objectives in relation to the irregular challenges posed by nonstate actors is an indirect approach that erodes an adversary’s power, influence, and will, thereby undermining the credibility and legitimacy of his political authority. In addition, undermining an internal threat’s influence and control over and support by the indigenous population is also affected. This approach is necessary with an internal threat unwilling to enter into discussion.

7-4. These approaches to termination of operations represent a commitment of time, resources, and potentially U.S. Soldiers’ lives. The paradox of this brief discussion of termination of operations is, again, the lack of operational and tactical closure in which there is effectively strategic closure. Termination of operations typically involves a somewhat nebulous end state for a large commitment that meets U.S. national strategic objectives (at least nominally) without a final interdiction of an internal threat.

NATIONAL STRATEGIC END STATE

7-5. The first and primary political task regarding termination of intensive operations is to determine an achievable national strategic end state based on clear national strategic objectives. For specific situations that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated major operations), the President and SecDef typically establish a set of national strategic objectives. Achieving these objectives is necessary to attain the national strategic end state—the broadly expressed diplomatic, informational, military, and economic conditions that should exist after the conclusion of an operation. In IDAD, this is determined with the HN leadership to ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state that is mutually beneficial. Specified standards are approved by the President or the SecDef that must be met before an operation can be concluded or transitioned to a less intensive level of support.

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

7-6. In its strategic context, military success is measured in the attainment of military objectives that support the national strategic end state and associated termination criteria. The termination criteria for a negotiated settlement may differ significantly from those of an imposed settlement. Military strategic advice to USG and HN leadership regarding termination criteria should be reviewed for military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability; as well as estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to reach the criteria. An essential consideration is ensuring that the longer-term stabilization and the enabling of civil authority needed to achieve national strategic objectives continue upon the conclusion of sustained operations. Premature reduction of support can trigger a rapid and dramatic upsurge in internal threat activity, strength, and political viability. Proper use of the informational instrument of national power mitigates the possibility of any undeveloped internal threat elements characterizing a reduction in military commitment to a U.S. or HN strategic or tactical reversal.

MISSION HANDOFF PROCEDURES

7-7. During long-term continuous operations, Army commanders may elect to replace teams and units for a variety of reasons. Time is not the only governing factor. Changes in the HN political or military dynamic may require reshaping force packages as situations change for better or worse. In addition, internal administrative concerns might prompt or support a commander’s decision to rotate teams or units; for example, new equipment may be fielded to an incoming unit that the outgoing unit lacks. Regardless of reason, mission handoff is necessary and is defined as the process of passing an ongoing mission from one unit to another with no discernible loss of continuity.

7-8. The overall authority for the handoff and assumption of command rests with the commander ordering the change. The authority for determining the handoff process lies with the incoming commander since he assumes responsibility for the mission. This changeover process may affect the conditions under which the mission continues. In IDAD, this may not entail an in-country relief transition of authority. In small operations, work-arounds for direct continuity can be virtual, video teleconferences, or preferably commander and staff meetings between transitioning teams or units. Ideally, all Army units execute these procedures in the HN and unit to unit. During episodic engagements with a gap and indirect handoff between FID units, the considerations list is used as an aid for planning, and the postmission debriefing provides a historical record that assists in bridging the gap between operations. During the operation, units are encouraged to populate the debriefing checklist while information is relevant as a guide for incoming units. The postmission debriefing can serve as an inbriefing for incoming units. The postmission debriefing should be reviewed before a predeployment site survey; in combination with the considerations list and the training plan, these serve to assist an incoming unit with episodic or indirect handoff of IDAD engagements. Commanders and staffs must be adaptive in their thinking when portions of or the entire mission handoff is indirect (for example, from the historical record).

Note: The following discussion is based on a high-threat environment. All measures, however, are applicable to a low-threat FID operation as well.

7-9. The outgoing commander advises the incoming commander on the tentative handoff process and the assumption of the mission directly or through a liaison. If this advice conflicts with the mission statement or the incoming commander’s intent and design and the conflict cannot be resolved with the authority established for the incoming commander, the commander ordering the relief resolves the issue.

7-10. As a rule, the commander ordering the change does not automatically place the outgoing unit under the incoming unit’s OPCON during the changeover process. Although this procedure would present a clear and easily defined solution for establishing the incoming commander’s authority, it is not the most effective control for U.S. forces should hostile contact occur during the process. A break in U.S. troop presence in FID also routinely makes this process a less desirable COA.

7-11. If the incoming Army unit or the HN unit is in direct-fire contact with insurgents or another internal threat during the handoff, the advisory team or unit immediately notifies the higher headquarters ordering the exchange. If the incoming unit commander has not assumed responsibility, his unit immediately comes under OPCON of the outgoing unit and is absorbed into that unit position. (Possible exceptions include a rapidly evolving noncombatant evacuation operation or the underlying crisis that triggers it.) The outgoing unit commander and his HN counterpart control the battle. If the outgoing unit commander has passed responsibility to the incoming unit commander, the outgoing unit comes under the OPCON of the incoming unit and the HN unit coordinates its movements with the new unit. Army units in advisory or FID direct support involving combat operations roles may need to follow these same procedures.

POSTMISSION DEBRIEFING PROCEDURES

7-12. Commanders conduct a debriefing that provides an overview of the mission and all relevant informational subsets. The range of topics can include—

Military geography.

Political parties.

Military forces.

Insurgents.

Security forces.

Underground, lethal, and nonlethal targets and target audiences.

Ongoing CAO.

Logistic and HSS issues.

Ongoing joint, multinational, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental partner projects or operations.

Survival, evasion, resistance, escape, and recovery of personnel.

7-13. In addition, HN-specific concerns that are relevant in one operation may not be relevant in another. The commander should also codify and debrief any informational subset that may affect mission success.

POSTMISSION DEBRIEFING

7-14. Redeployment is not the end of the mission. Upon arrival at the redeployment location, units undergo an extensive debriefing. The assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2), or battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) officer typically organizes and conducts the debriefing subject to unit standard operating procedures. The G-2 or S-2 coordinates with higher-level intelligence organizations to take part in the returning unit’s debriefing, particularly if other organizations tasked the unit to obtain information. All deployed personnel, to include attachments, must be available for the debriefing. In addition, an operational debrief should be conducted by the assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3), or S-3 to continue to build best practices to the shifting conditions in the operational area and the HN.

DOCUMENTATION

7-15. After the debriefing, the unit or team commander with the assistance of other members of the team and attachments prepares two documents: an after action report and a report of lessons learned. The unit historian or other designated person prepares a third document—the unit history of the operation. Leaders conduct after action reviews following the completion of operations and intermediate tasks to capture lessons learned for future operations. An after action review is a guided analysis of an organization’s performance. The review is normally conducted after a training event or an operation with the objective of improving future performance. The Center for Army Lessons Learned has developed an After Action Final Report Guide that can be used to assist in documenting after action reviews or lessons learned. CJCSI 3150.25F provides additional information.

7-16. The after action report states the who, what, when, where, and how of the operation. It is a permanent record of the major activities of the team or unit from receipt of mission to debriefing. As such, it is an extremely important template to compare past missions and to plan future missions. Organizations conduct after action reviews and reports to identify successes and challenges and to apply observations, insights, and lessons learned to future training and operations. If necessary, organizations conduct after action reviews and reports after intermediate actions are completed, not just at the end of the event. Soon after being debriefed, the SOF element normally submits an after action report through command channels to the higher command. The intelligence and operations officers at each echelon keep copies of team or unit after action reports. The unit historian also reviews the after action report and prepares a draft report for entry into the unit history. Commanders are responsible for the creation, collection, and preservation of historical records and for the preparation and publication of historical reports. The operations data report is an annotated chronology of the unit’s operations that will be fully supported by an indexed set of key historical documents. AR 11-33 establishes a system for the collection, analysis, archiving, and dissemination of observations, insights, and lessons; TTP; after action reviews; operational records; and lessons learned from actual Army operations, experiments, and training events. ARSOF units refer to the appropriate USASOC regulation for details on submission of written after action reports.

7-17. Shortly after completion of the after action review or simultaneously with its submission, the leader submits a report of lessons learned. This report is the leader’s reflection on his most recent operation and his recommendation for the future. One preparation method is to organize the lessons according to the elements of combat power:

Mission command.

Movement and maneuver.

Intelligence.

Fires.

Sustainment.

Protection.

Leadership.

Information.

The six warfighting functions, multiplied by leadership and complemented by information, make up the eight elements of combat power.

7-18. This preparation method addresses what worked and what did not work on the operation, why it did or did not work, and what changes or substitutions are needed for existing TTP in the unit.

7-19. The unit historian researches reports and lessons learned and then documents the unit history for the operation to be reviewed by the commander. The historian issues an official historical report of the operation in classified and unclassified versions, as appropriate, within 90 days after the completion of the operation.

7-20. Figure 7-1, pages 7-5 through 7-12, provides a general mission debriefing checklist. It is intended as an overview of areas of interest to all Army units. It might serve as the basis for the combined ARSOF or conventional forces mission debrief in which the efforts of units or teams are inbriefed to incoming units in a JTF, JSOTF, or SOTF. In such instances, the briefing can be tailored as needed, including by echelon, to cover relevant areas for the incoming units. The checklist is not considered proscriptive, limiting, or definitive.

Appendix A

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

This appendix provides general guidance on legal, regulatory, and policy considerations for FID operations. Army forces must accept legal and political constraints to avoid strategic failure. This guidance serves as a base document of law and policy existing as of the publishing of this manual. Precedents and USC citations are also those in existence and in force at the time of publication. Law and policy are subject to rapid change because of new U.S. congressional legislation, the National Defense Authorization Act, and Presidential executive policy changes. In addition, the concept of international law is even more fluid and far less codified outside the realm of certain international treaties, such as the Geneva and Hague Conventions. Law and policy concerns have potential long-term organizational impact for the Army. A single violation, real or perceived, can have a profound impact on multiple areas of concern in FID operations. This situation may warrant the building of a hedge around the letter of the law with plans and policies that exceed minimum standards. Aggressive pursuit, prosecution, and interdiction of subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats must be conducted lawfully, thereby enabling the commander to project legitimacy throughout the HN. Commanders must draw on the expertise of their legal staff and the organic or attached sociopolitical expertise of SF, MISO, and CA personnel, as well as the law enforcement expertise of military police before establishing plans and policy. Army legal advisors must review all sensitive aspects of planning and execution. Constant monitoring of the legal ramifications of operations is also necessary. This is ultimately not only because of compliance with the letter of the law but also because of the impact on the perceptions of the HN populace.

JUST WAR AND HOST-NATION PERCEPTIONS

A-1. The concept of a just war has likely had as many interpretations as there have been combatants throughout the history of conflict. In the West the concept of jus ad bellum (war that is started for just reasons) and jus in bello (just conduct by combatants waging a war) was first articulated by Saint Augustine in the 5th century and systematically outlined by Saint Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. In the West, however, both liberators and tyrants have used these writings. Typically, all just war theory in all cultures has an ideological or theological component and often becomes very fluid, even in the course of a single conflict. Frequently, an internal threat tries to use the concept that it is conducting a just war by reasonable means. This is especially true with insurgents or other internal threats. As FID is conducted in a highly political milieu that relies on securing the support of a populace, the perceptions of the local populace are often a key enabler.

A-2. During the conduct of FID, perceptions of the populace can be a center of gravity. Although perceptions are not law or policy, the USG must ensure the United States and the HN uphold legitimacy and rule of law. U.S. law, policy, and regulations are always directive to U.S. forces; however, they are often not mirrored in all HN law and policy. As operations may have a very small footprint in a host country, leaders must be empowered with a comprehensive body of knowledge and skills to execute day-to-day operations in an environment where tactical decisions may well have strategic implications. Ultimately, international and HN law must be interwoven with a plan to secure positive perceptions that the HN is, with U.S. or coalition support, justly restoring the rule of law. Many rule-of-law activities occur as components of stability operations, irregular warfare, and FID and help to establish or reestablish the HN capacity to maintain the rule of law. Many activities conducted in the rule of law involve the practice of law; therefore, by statute, they are performed by judge advocates or other attorneys under the statutory technical supervision of the judge advocate general. Thus, in addition to the input from the staff judge advocate to a commander’s legal planning, a combined team of staff and attachment subject-matter experts may be helpful in the development of a legal perceptions management plan.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

A-3. The term international law bears the inherent connotation of being hierarchically above national law. In practice, this is rarely practicable if a nation remains intransigent. Conceptually, much of the developed world looks at the ideal of international law as functioning much like Federal and State law function in the United States. Jurists, political scientists, and members of the legal academic community attempt to define what international law should consist of, and various bodies debate how international law might be enforced. New standards of law and policy may emerge very quickly on a conceptual level. However, the historical precedent is that international treaties regarded as having the weight of law are often difficult to develop, slow to gain widespread acceptance, and largely unenforceable until after a conflict. In FID, the USG conducts foreign assistance within the rule of law. The USG can equip and train foreign partners under security cooperation or security assistance programs and, through these programs, the USG demonstrates the legitimacy and sovereignty of the HN. The concept is for the USG to build partners and enable those partners through foreign assistance to defeat subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats with internal military capabilities. The end state is to enable foreign partners to conduct actions within an absolute legal basis. The HN has a legal basis as a sovereign state with laws and the responsibility to police frontiers. Enabling the HN to uphold the rule of law through indirect FID is far superior to the USG conducting direct FID or combat operations. The goal is a self-sufficient lawful HN that abides human rights.

DISTINGUISHING SENTIMENT, POLICY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

A-4. The underlying international sentiment as to what is acceptable behavior in conflict and war often rapidly outpaces formal treaty adoption and ratification. In short, the collective, largely unwritten will of a majority of the international community can become de facto international law long before it is codified. In addition, the USG often formulates and upholds this emerging law and policy. In the current global operations against terrorist networks, international policy and sentiment have been debated among the legitimate nation-states of the world. Violent extremist or transnational criminal organizations and sympathizers have attempted to shape and exploit that debate to their advantage. According to FM 1-04, FID is a principal operation of irregular warfare. Legal issues with irregular warfare are numerous and complex because U.S. forces participate in operations with HN consent and sometimes among the civilian population. Legal issues are governed by U.S. Federal law, international law, and HN law. Commanders conducting operations face convoluted and controversial legal issues until international law definitively codifies terrorism, insurgency, transnational criminal organizations, and other forms of violent lawlessness. Even as such codes, laws, and conventions emerge, units conducting operations will likely face disinformation and propaganda that vilifies legitimate military, reconstruction, and law enforcement efforts as violations of what the adversary refers to as international law.

TREATIES WITH THE WEIGHT OF LAW

A-5. The unit Staff Judge Advocate can provide authoritative guidance to U.S. military personnel on the customary and treaty law applicable to the conduct of warfare on land and to the relationships between belligerents and neutral states. The Hague Convention developed the branch of law concerned with armed conflict. The purpose of the law of war is to regulate by law (written and unwritten) warfare, to include protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded, sick, and civilians; and facilitating the restoration of peace. The Lieber Code of 1863, prepared by Francis Lieber for President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War between the states, was an order entitled “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field.” Francis Lieber was an international lawyer who immigrated to America. The Lieber Code provided detailed rules on the conduct of land warfare and the treatment of the civilian population, to include prisoners of war. The Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868 (the predecessor of the Hague), along with the Lieber Code, formed the foundation for the discussion of peace and war at The Hague Convention in 1899. The laws of humanity are attributed to the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 for inclusion in The Hague. The International Committee of the Red Cross was formed from the International Committee for Aid to the Wounded in 1863, and a diplomatic conference was held in Geneva Switzerland in 1864 that adopted the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. The second Hague Peace Conference convened in 1907 and addressed naval warfare. By invitation of the Swiss Government and instigation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the law of Geneva in 1949 addressed the protection of civilian persons in time of war during internal armed conflict—not just wars between states. More than any other documents, the Geneva and Hague accords and their protocols hold acceptance as international law. This has not prevented rogue elements and nations from ignoring the basic humanitarian precepts of these conventions. According to JP 1-04, the joint force staff judge advocate advises the joint force commander and staff on legal authority, to include the Geneva Convention. There is no guarantee that international law of armed conflict will be applied or upheld just because it exists. It is likely that selective violation of these international law conventions will continue for some time to come. However, even when faced with adversaries who ignore the principles and codes of international law, like the Geneva and Hague Conventions, the United States has remained steadfastly committed to upholding the conventions since their inception.

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

A-6. A declaration of war and an invasion of one country by the armed forces of another clearly result in international conflict. United Nations enforcement of a resolution authorizing armed intervention in an offending nation also carries this weight in law. However, the definition of an international conflict is broader. As a rule, if the combat effects of a conflict go beyond a nation’s boundaries and seriously impact other countries, the conflict is international. All the customary laws of war on hostilities between states govern international armed conflicts. The Geneva Convention and all other treaties that make up the laws of war also apply. An important concern of the Soldier fighting in this type of war is his right to prisoner of war status if captured.

NONINTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

A-7. Noninternational conflicts are typically called insurgencies. Insurgent forces are often covert or clandestine, although they may adopt the overt trappings of a legitimate armed force, such as rudimentary uniforms. Their purpose is not to hold fixed territory or to engage government troops in direct combat but to wage a guerrilla-type war. In this war, they can hide in the civilian populace by posing as noncombatants. Insurgents, therefore, are organized bodies of people who, for public political purposes, are in a state of armed hostility against the established government. An important legal aspect of a noninternational conflict is that captured, illegal combatants do not attain the rights of a prisoner of war. The HN can prosecute these combatants as criminals. The fact that an insurgent follows the rules of war or is in uniform will not give him prisoner of war status under international law. Article 3 of Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides the primary source of rights and duties of persons involved in noninternational conflicts. Article 3 has two parts.

Article 3: Part One

A-8. The first part of Article 3 provides that persons who take no active part in the hostilities, including members of the Armed Forces who have laid down their arms and those out of combat because of sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely. Humane treatment specifically excludes—

Committing violence to life and person; in particular, murder, mutilation, torture, or any cruel treatment.

Hostage-taking.

Conducting outrages upon personal dignity; in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.

Subjecting anyone to any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth, wealth, or any other similar criteria.

Passing of sentences and carrying out executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees that are recognized as vital.

Article 3: Part Two

A-9. The second part of Article 3 requires collecting and caring for the wounded and sick. As previously stated, Article 3 does not grant prisoner of war status to insurgents; however, it requires the government to grant them a fair trial in a regularly constituted court before carrying out the court’s sentence after a guilty verdict. There is a legal gray area for determining whether an HN could execute a lawful capital sentence on an insurgent or other inactive duty training personnel who may be either ill or wounded. Army Soldiers should advise HN counterparts of the potential propaganda value of such an action to a threat organization.

ARMY PLANNING CONCERNS

A-10. Army planners and Soldiers conducting FID operations may often need detailed knowledge of international law, such as the Geneva Convention, for two principal reasons. The first is to educate HN military staff and Soldiers. The second is to counter very specific points of adversary disinformation and propaganda. Army advisors and trainers may have to build either a knowledge base on international law in HN military personnel or an adherence to portions that the HN military has routinely ignored in the past. In addition, this may carry over to transgressions of their own laws or building acceptance of new laws safeguarding human rights. International humanitarian law, reaching out into the areas of human rights, has expanded in scope since it was developed as treaty law during the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The expansion includes two protocols that were adopted in 1977 during the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts; Protocol I has 102 articles, and Protocol II has 28 articles. In 1987, President Ronald Reagan rejected Protocol I and stated that the United States should not ratify Protocol I, thereby reaffirming its support for traditional humanitarian law and its opposition to the politicization of that law by groups that employ terrorist practices.

A-11. The Charter of the United Nations as successor to the League of Nations in 1945 legitimizes the authorization of use of the Armed Forces by the Security Council in order to restore peace. The United Nations does not hold a monopoly on the use of force and leaves the possibility for individual actors to have recourse to armed action.

A-12. In the 1960s and 1970s, the United Nations began to take interest in the development of the law of armed conflict, under the heading human rights in armed conflict. According to JP 3-29, the purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security and promote human rights. Human rights are discussed in Chapter IV of the United Nations Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General. In 1948, the United Nations formally defined human rights by adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is a bulwark against oppression defined in 30 concise articles. Article 1 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights upholds that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Article 7 promotes all being equal before the law, upholding that equal protection is an essential component of the rule of law. The DOS speaks of promoting human rights, the rule of law, and good governance as a form of security assistance. On 11 March 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, “Human rights will always be central to our foreign policy.” The DOS publication Principles of Democracy states for much of human history, rulers and law were synonymous—law was simply the will of the ruler. A first step away from such tyranny was the notion of rule by law, including the notion that even a ruler is under the law and should rule by virtue of legal means. Democracies went further by establishing the rule of law.

A-13. The DOS is the lead agency in the executive branch for foreign affairs. According to JP 3-07.3, the peacekeeping objective is that the HN will establish a self-sustaining public law-and-order system in accordance with internationally recognized standards with respect for human rights. FM 1-04 describes human rights vetting and how Congress limits funding for training or equipment for foreign security forces. Congress prohibits funding if the DOS has credible information that the foreign security force (to receive training or equipment) has committed a gross violation of human rights. The DOS and DOD must vet proposed recipient units against a database of credible reports of human rights violations. Because of the concerns of international and U.S. law, U.S. personnel who notice suspected violations of basic human rights must report the facts to their chain of command. Under U.S. law, the President makes the decision whether to cut off security assistance to any country with a documented pattern of human rights abuses. JP 1-04, Chapter II, Legal Support to Joint Operation Planning, explains the role of the legal advisors in the planning process in detail. Security cooperation planning is a subset of joint strategic planning, and legal advisors are necessary in assisting decisionmakers in translating policy decisions into legally acceptable plans and orders that support national security objectives.

A-14. Internal threat propagandists increasingly use factual, partially factual, or fictitious violations of international law, policy, or even sentiment to discredit HN governments and U.S. forces. These attempts are frequently graphic to have the maximum incendiary effect. They often address third countries or international agencies and may cite specific articles of the Geneva Conventions. If successful, they appear to have legitimate status as a state actor and they make the HN look like a nation that ignores civil rights and the laws of war. Soldiers must infuse an acceptance of the basic tenants of international law among the HN personnel they work with, advise, and train.

A-15. Treaties and international law dealing primarily or solely with nonmilitary matters can be contributory factors to an internal defense issue that necessitates conducting operations as well. An internal threat can arise or grow substantially more dangerous from something as innocuous as the HN becoming a signatory to environmental or economic treaties that adversely affect one sector of the economy. Planners must develop a comprehensive plan that psychologically and economically mitigates these effects. Anticipating security threats to symbolic targets of these treaties, such as compliance or monitoring offices or their personnel, and developing proactive security measures for such sites is a necessity.

A-16. The global operations against terrorist networks have demonstrated significant deficiencies in the concept of what constitutes lawful combatant status. The need to further codify the concept of lawful combat, as well as the collective international policing of armed belligerent forces, violent extremist organizations, and transnational criminal organizations by nation-states, continues to lag behind efforts of the international community to eradicate those elements. Army commanders and planners must constantly communicate the status of subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats through the application of MISO during interdiction. Certain TTP may be appropriate against armed belligerent forces but not transnational criminal organizations and vice versa.

HOST-NATION LAW

A-17. The laws of the HN in which operations are conducted can greatly impact plans, deployment, and operations. In most cases, HN law is applicable to U.S. personnel and units conducting FID operations. Beyond this, the political mechanisms, parties, and other influencing agents within the HN can have considerable impact on planning and execution.

A-18. Commanders need in-depth, timely information on HN law across a broad range of issues, to include—

Civil liberties.

Criminal justice.

Fiscal law.

Graft and corruption.

Gray and black economies.

Environmental law.

Military law.

Emergency and martial law powers.

Intellectual property law.

Narcotics law.

Special interest groups.

Shadow governments and leaders.

Political front groups.

Unwritten law and political conventions.

Political history of the HN.

Religious or social policing powers.

HN international treaty participation.

Agreements and treaties with the United States and third parties.

A-19. Army commanders must be apprised of recent changes to HN law that have come about to support the IDAD strategy. Such changes may be in the early stages of implementation in the beginning of operations. As the HN implements these legal measures, security situations may change dramatically. Planners must anticipate the reaction of the public to political, social, or economic changes in the HN because of new laws or policies. Opposition or widespread acceptance of new laws can create problems with military significance. For instance, an amnesty program that generates large numbers of defectors from an insurgent group can present logistical and administrative challenges.

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM–Philippines

In January 2002, Joint Task Force (JTF) 510, made up in large part by special operations forces personnel, deployed to the southern Philippines to assist the Republic of the Philippines Government in the destruction of the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group. The initiation of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM–Philippines was only accomplished after considerable debate within the Republic of the Philippines Government and in the national press. The issue was debated on a constitutional level as the Republic of the Philippines constitution banned foreign soldiers on Philippine soil except in time of war. Despite the ardent support of President Corazon Aquino and much of the government and with widespread public support, there was still considerable opposition to the presence of U.S. troops. An eventual compromise had operational effects on JTF 510. A cap was placed on the number of U.S. troops who could deploy, and troops were prohibited from conducting anything other than self-defense. Supplemental understandings to existing agreements were necessary.

Early in the operation, political sensitivities among the populace were challenged when U.S. personnel (in uniform and carrying weapons) used an automated teller machine outside their base in Zamboanga City, Mindanao, while being photographed by the Philippine media. Further restrictions on U.S. personnel were necessary to placate those politically opposed to the presence of the United States. A culturally attuned approach allowed JTF 510 to assist and advise the Armed Forces of the Philippines in early tactical and operational successes against the Abu Sayyaf Group. Slowly, an expansion of the role of U.S. forces, to include combined Civil Affairs operations, was possible because of early sensitivity to host-nation laws and political realities.

A-20. Changes in HN law or the enforcement of existing law may require drastic changes in how intelligence, military, paramilitary, or police forces operate. Planning for training to address the changes in HN standard operating procedures may be an early priority for all elements conducting FID. Documentation of HN violations of their own law is necessary along with specific guidelines and procedures to react to such violations. Such violations may remain an internal matter for the HN; however, violations that also constitute a human rights violation will have consequences for Army elements, up to and including terminating operations. Such violations may constitute an unacceptable breach of the imperative to ensure the legitimacy and credibility of U.S. forces. The purpose of legitimacy is to develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the national strategic end state. Legitimacy is based on the legality, morality, and suitability of the actions undertaken, as well as the will of the U.S. public to support the actions. FID operations must sustain the legitimacy of the host government, where applicable. Communicating U.S. intent to the civilian populace is critical to establishing and maintaining legitimacy. MISO, in conjunction with public affairs, help communicate the U.S. humanitarian intent and emphasize the role of the HN government. Security actions must be balanced with legitimacy concerns so that actions of forces on the ground match the stated intent. Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support, and consistency in legitimacy lends credibility to the United States and the HN.

UNITED STATES AND HOST-NATION TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

A-21. The status of Army personnel and units is one of the most important legal concerns. Usually, anyone present in a nation’s territory is subject to its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the legal power a sovereign nation makes and uses to enforce its laws without foreign dictation. When a nation’s troops enter a friendly foreign country, international law subjects them to the territorial jurisdiction of that nation and any jurisdiction that the sending state wishes to exercise. U.S. military forces are always subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. U.S. policy is to maximize U.S. jurisdiction over the Armed Forces it may deploy to an HN. However, U.S. forces performing an operation are not automatically immune from HN jurisdiction. The legal status of U.S. forces with a partner is usually defined in one or more of the following types of international agreements:

Emergency wartime agreements.

SCO agreements.

Status-of-forces agreements.

Status-of-mission agreements.

Diplomatic notes.

A-22. During military emergencies, the United States normally obtains exclusive jurisdiction over its troops in foreign countries. Emergency agreements have normally been short and uncomplicated.

A-23. SCO agreements provide a degree of diplomatic immunity to U.S. troops stationed in countries under these agreements. The United States negotiates each agreement individually with the country in question; therefore, each agreement is usually different. Usually, the United States attaches Soldiers on temporary duty in these countries (for example, a FID operation) to the SCO and automatically accords them the same protection as SCO personnel. Agreements of this type normally provide diplomatic immunity for anything done in the performance of official duty. Personnel performing an operation may come within the scope of the SCO agreement itself or be included by the terms of a security assistance contract entered into between the United States and the HN.

A-24. Status-of-forces agreements and status-of-mission agreements are the most comprehensive type of international agreement. Status-of-forces agreements are usually used where the United States has stationed many forces for an extended period (Germany and Korea). Because of current operations, several status-of-forces agreements are in place in countries without U.S. bases.

A-25. Status-of-forces agreements usually provide for a sharing of jurisdiction over U.S. forces, with the United States having the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over offenses solely involving—

U.S. citizens, military forces, or property.

Security of U.S. forces.

Actions occurring in the performance of official duty.

A-26. Status-of-mission agreements typically cover the same points as status-of-forces agreements. The term status-of-mission agreements is used frequently in the case of international monitoring or peace operations. It may be used in United Nations, European Union, or other internationally sponsored operations.

A-27. In any given mission, there may be agreements short of status-of-forces agreements or status-of-mission agreements, such as diplomatic notes. Diplomatic notes cover a wide range of issues, which typically address a specific situation that has arisen between nations. This may include the sort of natural or man-made crises that spark the need for operations. Coordination with the American Embassy reveals the existence of relevant diplomatic notes.

A-28. Planners must be familiar with any agreements that may be applicable. It is not always easy to locate all the relevant international documents affecting a mission. Planners may start by researching State Department publications, such as Treaties in Force. In addition to the relevant GCC’s or subordinate command’s legal office, the defense attaché, the SCO, or the military assistance group at the embassy can also provide HN or other relevant agreements. Army planners often need the details of not only the status-of-forces agreements and agreements in force but also knowledge of the genesis of such agreements, because points within them may reflect long-held sensitivities of the HN populace and government to the presence of U.S. or other outside forces in their country. This is often true in any nation that has been under colonial rule.

UNITED STATES LAW AND POLICY

A-29. FID is authorized without receiving a deployment or execution order from the President or SecDef. U.S. forces may be authorized to make limited contributions during operations if the Secretary of State requests and the SecDef approves. The request and approval go through standing statutory authorities in Title 22 USC because it contains the FAA, the AECA, and other laws that authorize security assistance, developmental assistance, and other forms of bilateral aid. The request and approval might also occur under Title 10 USC to authorize certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of HCA in coordination with the U.S. Ambassador to the HN. In such operations, the U.S. forces work as administrative and technical personnel as part of the U.S. diplomatic mission pursuant to a status-of-forces agreement or an exchange of letters with the HN. The U.S. Army has been subordinate and subject to civilian authority slightly longer than the United States has been a nation. Unlike many nations of the world, the Army and other Services have never attempted to intervene in the political processes of our nation. During operations, the HN military may have the opposite history. In fact, the HN military may still be undergoing transition from holding some sort of political power in the country. The attitude and words of Army professionals as they speak about the U.S. political system is a subtle but nonetheless powerful training tool for any HN military, as is the manner in which they speak and act in an interagency environment. Commanders and Soldiers, therefore, must have a good layman’s understanding of sometimes complex USC, Presidential directives, and congressional legislation. ARSOF careerists are Army professionals trained to be diplomatically astute.

MONEY AS A WEAPON SYSTEM

A-30. The historical precedents of countries using monetary resources in warfare go back to ancient times. In our own history, evidence suggests that the British Government covertly introduced counterfeit Colonial currency into the fight against the American Revolution. In addition, the British Armed Forces used the carrot (in part) of money to win away American patriots from the cause of liberty, notably Benedict Arnold. By World War II, the U.S. Army fully used the power of currency applied directly to individuals and more commonly through collective reconstruction through CA. Lessons learned in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM have produced the contemporary maxim that economics are indeed an influencing instrument of power. Resources, particularly money, have a central role in military operations. FID operations have long been intertwined legally and in terms of TTP in the use of resources. Operations employ money as a weapons system with the ultimate goal of winning the population through legitimacy to facilitate defeating the insurgents. As stated before, operations clearly delineate Title 10 USC and Title 22 USC, the National Defense Authorization Act, and other USC authorities within the HN. Title 10 USC authorities include the potential of combat operations. The complex mix of the FID operational framework can include Title 22 USC authorities and National Defense Authorization Act temporary authorities as well. Much of the following discussion details primarily on the funding and authorities of utilizing monies in operations.

FISCAL LAW CONCERNS

A-31. Security cooperation programs are governed by U.S. statute. The primary laws of concern are the AECA of 1976 (as amended), the FAA of 1961 (as amended), and various sections of Title 10 USC and Title 22 USC. A central legal consideration for commanders conducting operations is using the proper funding authorizations for the type of mission. There are numerous types of authorities—Title 10 USC, Title 22 USC, or Title XII of the National Defense Authorization Act (Matters Relating to Foreign Nations). In most instances, commanders encounter problems in this area when they use operations and maintenance funds for projects that require FAA funding. The judge advocate general should always be consulted to translate authorities, especially fiscal authorizations and appropriations. FM 1-06 is a good source for fiscal law, appropriations, authorities, and agreements, to include the principles of time, purpose, and amount. Commanders must operate within the constraints of fiscal law and understand funding sources to avoid Antideficiency Act violations, accomplish the mission, and be able to maximize all resourcing options. The U.S. Government Accountability Office publishes the Principles of Federal Appropriations Law (commonly referred to as the Red Book), which explains the power of Congress to appropriate funds and how that power was derived from Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States. Title 31 of the USC presents permanent funding statutes that show how Congress exercises its control of the “power of the purse” and its design to prevent abuses. Budget authority is not money but rather the authority to spend money that has been appropriated. A statute will not be construed as making an appropriation unless it expressly so states. The following key statutory directives should be observed when conducting FID operations to ensure that all activities are conducted within the limits of authority:

Title 31 USC, Section 1301(d) (Title 31 USC, Chapter 13, Appropriations).

Title 31 USC, Section 1341, Limitations on Expending and Obligating Amounts (commonly referred to as the Antideficiency Act). Agencies may not spend, or commit themselves to spend, in advance of or in excess of appropriations.

Title 31 USC, Section 1301(a). Appropriations may be used only for their intended purposes.

Title 31 USC, Section 1502(a) (Title 31 USC Chapter 15, Appropriation Accounting). Appropriations made for a definite period of time may be used only for expenses properly incurred during that time.

Title 31 USC, Section 3302(b) (Title 31 USC, Chapter 33, Depositing, Keeping, and Paying Money). Unless authorized by law, an agency may not keep money it receives from sources other than congressional appropriations but must deposit the money in the Treasury.

TITLE 10 UNITED STATES CODE, ARMED FORCES

A-32. FID operations in which U.S. forces employ lethal force to further national objectives fall under the same Title 10 USC authorities as any other employment of U.S. forces. The United States ultimately derives all ROE from Title 10 USC. Typically, Army units receive existing ROE before conducting operations. The President or SecDef may apply specific applications or cautions regarding Title 10 USC provisions for operations on a case-by-case basis to best support U.S. national objectives in the HN.

Note: Title 10 governs the form, function, duties, and responsibilities of all U.S. Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, as well as the Reserves. Title 10 is organized into five subtitles and 1,805 chapters. Each subtitle includes provisions on force structure, personnel, training and education, service, supply, and procurement.

A-33. The following paragraphs discuss Title 10 USC and other DOD-pertinent authorities for specific programs and activities. In the course of operations, monies and authorities authorized for use in some countries and operations may not apply to other HNs or FID operations and are subject to change annually through the appropriations process in Congress.

Operations and Maintenance Funds

A-34. The USG appropriates these funds for day-to-day expenses of the Army, to include garrison, exercises, deployments, and military operations. The DOD has a good deal of discretion in how to spend these general-purpose funds; however, there are threshold dollar limitations for certain types of expenditures, such as purchases of major end items of equipment and construction of permanent facilities. Under fiscal law principles, defense cannot spend general-purpose funds for any foreign assistance activity for which Congress has specifically appropriated funds. Some operations and maintenance-funded DOD activities are on the periphery of security assistance programs. Commanders must be alert to the differences between operations and maintenance and security assistance activities.

Coalition Operations

A-35. Coalition operations—knowing how to fight alongside the armed forces of friendly countries—are conducted by forces of two or more nations. The U.S. Comptroller General has established the following fiscal law principles on combined training:

Combined exercises that provide overseas training opportunities for U.S. personnel and support the goals of U.S. coalition operations may use operations and maintenance funds despite providing training to HN forces.

The permissible scope of HN training includes safety, familiarization, and interoperability training.

Combined exercises assume the involvement of comparably proficient units. Operations and maintenance funds may not be used to provide the level of training available through security assistance programs.

Operations and maintenance funds are provided for U.S. forces to take advantage of opportunities to train with foreign forces. Security assistance funds are intended for U.S. forces to provide concentrated training for foreign forces.

Special Operations Forces Exception

A-36. Title 10 USC, Section 2011, is directed toward funding expenses of training SOF assigned to the command in conjunction with training, and training with, armed forces and other security forces of a friendly foreign country. The Comptroller General has acknowledged that SOF Soldiers have a mission to train foreign forces. The United States must pay the incremental expenses incurred by a country as the direct result of training, to include reasonable and proper cost of rations, fuel, training ammunition, transportation, and other goods and services consumed, with the exception of pay or allowance of a country’s personnel. SOF may train a foreign military force to test their ability to accomplish their mission. The primary goal or benefit must be to test SOF training capabilities. The purpose of the training shall be to train the SOF of the combatant command. This training is permissible as long as it is not comparable to or intended as security assistance training; that is, the training must be conducted to benefit SOF.

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid

A-37. Title 10 USC, Sections 402, 404, 407, 2557, and 2561, and Public Law 110-329, Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Title II, Other Supplemental Appropriations, enable the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid appropriation funds for the Humanitarian Assistance Program, the Humanitarian Mine Action Program, and the Foreign Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Program. The Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funds are used to purchase humanitarian daily rations, and inventories of rations are stored in anticipation of their need in a disaster relief situation. Funds are provided to the U.S. Transportation Command for delivering humanitarian daily rations. The Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funds provide unfunded space-available transport of privately donated relief supplies, foreign disaster relief to nations in need, excess nonlethal DOD property, humanitarian assistance projects and activities, and training for eligible personnel in demining techniques and mine risk education. The Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action manages, coordinates, and monitors execution of the DOD Humanitarian Mine Action training operations and related program activities. The Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action Division assists the CJCS, USSOCOM, GCCs, HNs, and other organizations in planning for, establishing, and executing mine action programs. The Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action Division, in coordination with the Assistant SecDef for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, reviews budget proposals for all demining related activities. The Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action Division provides program management and general oversight of the DOD Humanitarian Assistance projects executed by Combatant Commands worldwide. The Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action Division also provides program management oversight, procurement, storage, and transportation of DOD nonlethal excess property and the total program. The Comptroller (Business Operations Directorate) provides total financial management of this program as part of the DSCA DOD baseline budget. The lead is the Deputy Assistant SecDef for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations for policy and guidance. The DSCA manages, and the GCCs implement.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction With Military Operations

A-38. Title 10 USC 401 and Public Law 110-329, Title VIII, General Provisions, Section 8012, authorizes projects that are among the most effective instruments for dealing with HN conditions conducive to the emergence of internal threats. Until the fiscal year 1987 DOD Authorization Act, HCA was not a DOD mission. Instead, HCA was funded as a form of security assistance undertaken by USAID. DOD authority was limited to HCA provided from defense assets to USAID on a reimbursable basis or to HCA provided incidental to exercises directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the Authorization Act, Congress specifically authorized DOD-provided HCA activities. Humanitarian assistance operations use defense personnel, equipment, and supplies to promote welfare, to reduce pain and suffering, and to prevent loss of life or destruction of property from the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters. HCA is a subset of humanitarian assistance. HCA activities require USAID review and either formal concurrence or nonconcurrence and shall promote the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States and the specific operational readiness skills of the Armed Forces of the United States who participate in the activities. The Deputy Assistant SecDef for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations and the DSCA Centers Management Office, Programs Directorate, are responsible for HCA activities, to include the following:

Earmarked activities are funded (using specifically appropriated funds) in conjunction with authorized military operations in a foreign country in order to promote security interests of the United States and the foreign country and to improve specific operational readiness skills of U.S. Armed Forces members who participate in the activities. The Secretary of State must specifically approve the HCA to be given to any foreign country, and the SecDef has to report activities to Congress no later than 1 March each year.

The DOD may spend minimal operations and maintenance funds for de minimis HCA. Defense can use other funding (not clearly specified) for minimal expenditures incurred in furnishing funded HCA. However, operations and maintenance funds may only be obligated for “incidental costs” of carrying out funded HCA. Normally expenses incurred as a direct result of providing HCA to a foreign country shall be paid for out of funds specifically appropriated for such purpose. Minimal expenditures by the DOD for the purposes of HCA out of funds other than appropriated for such assistance may be obligated for incidental costs of carrying out such assistance only. The following statements describe incidental cost in relation to de minimis HCA:

▪ It has to meet the “reasonability” standard; therefore, a reasonable person would consider it “incidental to the exercise.”

▪ In general, it cannot be the sort of foreign assistance provided by the USAID. However, in certain cases, U.S. forces can perform assistance and be reimbursed by USAID under the Economy Act.

▪ These activities should not significantly impact the readiness training of the deploying unit.

▪ Operations and maintenance funds expended for de minimis HCA should represent only a minor or reasonably small percentage of the total operation and maintenance funds for the exercise.

Note: A congressional example of de minimis HCA is a unit doctor’s exam of local villagers for a few hours with administration of several shots and issuance of some medication would be appropriate, but it would not be appropriate to dispatch a medical team for mass inoculations.

Note: Another congressional example of HCA is the opening of an access road through trees and underbrush for several hundred yards would be appropriate, but asphalting of any roadway would not be appropriate.

DOD Instruction 2205.02 discusses HCA activities for DOD in detail. HCA activities shall be conducted in conjunction with authorized military operations of the U.S. Armed Forces in a foreign country (including deployments for training). HCA shall be conducted with the approval of the HN national and local civilian authorities. HCA shall complement, not duplicate, other forms of social or economic assistance provided to the HN by other U.S. departments or agencies.

DSCA Manual 5105.38-M, Chapter 12, Humanitarian Assistance and Mine Action Programs, defines HCA programs for DOD in detail. The DSCA Humanitarian Assistance and Mine Action programs are aimed at alleviating economic or infrastructure deficiencies or other endemic conditions, including disease, hunger, pain, or privation that threaten human life, damage to or loss of property, or social or political stability in developing nations. The programs are designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authority and support U.S. forces in their efforts to enhance regional security stability, promote positive public relations and goodwill, improve access and influence the HN counterparts, and bolster the indigenous capacity to respond to disasters. These programs also provide an example of how a professional military can positively impact the civilian population of the HN and provide training opportunities in operational skills of U.S. forces.

Interagency transactions. Under Title 31 USC, Section 1535, Agency Agreements (commonly referred to as the Economy Act), DOD personnel may conduct humanitarian activities for another Federal agency, primarily, but not limited to, the DOS. The DOD must make prior arrangements for the DOS to reimburse it for any costs incurred.

Title 10 USC 401 specifically authorizes the DOD to provide HCA. HCA is specifically defined as medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved areas of a country, to include—

▪ Education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.

▪ Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

▪ Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

▪ Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

Title 10 USC, Section 407, Humanitarian Demining Assistance and Stockpiled Conventional Munitions Assistance: Authority; Limitations, specifically authorizes the secretary of a military department to carry out humanitarian demining assistance in a country to promote the security interests of both the United States and the HN or the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the Armed Forces who participate in the activities. Humanitarian demining assistance is limited. No member of the Armed Forces, while providing humanitarian demining assistance under this section, shall engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines or other explosive remnants of war (unless done in support of U.S. military operations). No member of the Armed Forces, while providing humanitarian demining assistance under this section, shall provide assistance as part of a military operation that does not involve the Armed Forces. Under 10 USC 407, the term humanitarian demining assistance as it relates to training and support, means detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war, including activities related to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war.

Title 10 USC, Section 2557, Excess Nonlethal Supplies: Availability for Humanitarian Relief, Domestic Emergency Assistance, and Homeless Veterans Assistance, specifically authorizes the SecDef to transfer excess nonlethal supplies to the Secretary of State for distribution of such supplies to foreign governments for humanitarian relief purposes when requested by the local American Embassy. The DOD processes, refurbishes, stores, and transports the property, and the DOS (American Embassy in the HN) distributes the property to the intended recipients for humanitarian purposes. Examples of property available through this program include medical equipment and supplies, construction equipment, trucks and other vehicles, generators and other electrical equipment, school supplies, tools, furniture, tents, blankets, and clothing. Excess nonlethal supplies must primarily benefit the recipient country civilians. These supplies are donated with no warranties or guarantees and without any postdonation support. The excess nonlethal supplies cannot be sold by the recipient government but can be donated to the HN military if used for civilian purposes.

A-39. The SecDef and Secretary of State must specifically approve in advance HCA rendered pursuant to this authority. An important limitation is that HCA may not be provided to any military or paramilitary individual, group, or organization. However, incidental or ancillary benefits that improve the quality of life of military families also living in the community being rendered humanitarian and civic aid does not preclude HCA projects.

Humanitarian Assistance

A-40. Title 10 USC 2561, Humanitarian Assistance, authorizes use of funds for transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide. FID operations may be triggered by humanitarian crises, or such instances may arise during the course of operations. If so, CA units may provide and coordinate humanitarian assistance that supports FID operations. Although not necessarily factored into an IDAD strategy, timely humanitarian experience may greatly facilitate internal security. The statute does not define other humanitarian purposes worldwide. The most common types of humanitarian cargo moved in this program are medical and hospital supplies, educational supplies, food items, clothing and shoes, household items, tools and machinery, and other quality-of-life items. Cargo must be humanitarian in nature and may not include any hazardous, political, or religious material. Cargo cannot be sent to a military or paramilitary organization unless the organization provides a specific service to the civilian population.

A-41. Title 10 USC 2561 gives a much broader authority than Title 10 USC 401 and allows more flexibility in emergencies, to include natural or man-made disasters. However, HCA generally require preplanned activities that promote operational readiness skills of the U.S. participants. In general, if the contemplated activity falls within the parameters of HCA under Title 10 USC 401, the more specific authority is used.

A-42. Title 10 USC 2561 does not require the promotion of operational readiness skills of the U.S. military participants and allows contracting for goods and services if necessary for mission execution. In addition, unlike HCA, which must be conducted in conjunction with an exercise or ongoing military operation, humanitarian assistance can be conducted as a stand-alone project.

A-43. The transport of USG-donated goods to a country in need often falls under this authority. Title 10 USC 2561 has been amended to allow the SecDef to use this authority to transport supplies intended for use to respond to or mitigate the effects of an event or condition that seriously threatens the environment (such as an oil spill) if other sources of transportation are not readily available. CA Soldiers and their servicing judge advocates must obtain and review current DOD guidance for humanitarian assistance activities.

Note: Title 10 USC 402, Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries, (commonly called the Denton Amendment or Space Available Program) applies when relief supplies are supplied by NGOs.

Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries

A-44. Title 10 USC 402 authorizes the transportation of nongovernmental, privately donated humanitarian relief supplies on a space-available basis. DOD resources provide the space-available transportation, primarily by air, on U.S. Air Force aircraft from an aerial port in the continental United States to the aerial port in the recipient country at no cost to the donor or recipient.

A-45. The State Department and DSCA administer the program. Relief supplies are transported on a space-available basis under the following conditions:

The transportation of such supplies is consistent with the foreign policy of the United States.

The supplies to be transported are suitable for humanitarian purposes and are in usable condition.

There is a legitimate humanitarian need for such supplies by the people or entity for which they are intended.

The supplies are in fact to be used for humanitarian purposes.

Adequate arrangements have been made for the distribution or use of such supplies in the destination country.

A-46. The DOD may not use this authority to supply a military or paramilitary group. Since transportation of the supplies is on a space-available basis, no separate funding is necessary. However, the DOD must submit reports to Congress.

A-47. Title 10 USC 402 has been amended to allow the SecDef to use this authority to transport supplies intended for use to respond to or mitigate the effects of an event or condition that threatens serious harm to the environment if other sources of transportation are not readily available.

Foreign Disaster Assistance

A-48. Under Title 10 USC 404, Foreign Disaster Assistance, the President may direct the SecDef to provide disaster assistance outside the United States to respond to man-made or natural disasters when necessary to prevent loss of lives or serious harm to the environment. The President delegated disaster relief authority to the SecDef with concurrence of the DOS (except in emergencies). Executive Order 12966 of 14 July 1995, Foreign Disaster Assistance, provides additional information. The SecDef shall provide disaster assistance only at the direction of the President, with concurrence of the Secretary of State, or in emergency situations in order to save human lives. In situations where there is not sufficient time to seek the prior initial concurrence of the Secretary of State, the SecDef shall advise and seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State as soon as practicable thereafter. The SecDef shall consult with the Administrator of the USAID. USAID is the lead agency for foreign disaster relief, with the primary source of authorization and appropriations being under Title 22 USC, Section 2292a, Authorization of Appropriations. The DOD has limited authority to engage in disaster assistance. Assistance should take the form of support to the overall civilian effort. Transportation services are authorized in response to a man-made natural disaster to prevent serious harm to the environment, when human lives are not at risk, only if other sources to provide such transportation are not readily available.

Personnel Recovery Assistance

A-49. Title 10 USC, Section 408, Equipment and Training of Foreign Personnel to Assist in Department of Defense Accounting for Missing United States Government Personnel, authorizes the SecDef to provide assistance to any foreign nation to assist the DOD with recovery of and accounting for missing USG personnel. The assistance may include equipment, supplies, services, and training of personnel. The Secretary of State must also approve the assistance, and the amount may not exceed $1,000,000 in any fiscal year.

Combatant Commander Initiative Funds

A-50. Title 10 USC, Section 166a, Combatant Commands: Funding Through the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides the combatant commanders with a great deal of legal flexibility to conduct activities from funds made available in any fiscal year for the budget account in DOD known as the “Combatant Commander Initiative Fund.” The CJCS may provide funds to the commander of a combatant command, upon request. FID-related authorized activities for the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund include—

Joint exercises (including activities in participating foreign countries).

HCA, in coordination with the relevant chief of mission to the extent practicable, to include urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.

Military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses).

Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements

A-51. Title 10 USC, Sections 2341–2350, Subchapter I, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, provides logistics support, supplies, and services on a reciprocal basis to foreign military forces, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or other organizations as set out in law. Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements must not circumvent FMS or other established processes. There is an annual fiscal year dollar ceiling, except during a period of active hostilities involving the Armed Forces or when used to support contingencies, humanitarian assistance, and foreign disaster assistance efforts. The peacetime ceilings do not apply to petroleum, oils, and lubricants agreements. Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements cannot be used to provide significant military equipment, with the exception of ammunition. Flexible reimbursements include cash, replacement-in-kind, or exchange of supplies or services of equal value. The Office of the Under SecDef for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Office of International Cooperation is the lead office, and the SecDef, in consultation with the Secretary of State, designates countries eligible for agreements. The CJCS authorizes GCCs to negotiate and implement the Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements.

Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program

A-52. Title 10 USC, Section 2249c, Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program: Authority to use Appropriated Funds for Costs Associated with Education and Training of Foreign Officials; Public Law 110-417, Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 1209, Increase in Amount Available for Costs of Education and Training of Foreign Military Forces Under Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, authorizes a tailored operational and strategic level education and training program to international partners in support of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. In addition, the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program was developed to help counter ideological support for terrorism and to create a global community of counterterrorism experts and practitioners who share values and a common language in the fight against terrorism. The lead for management and execution is the Deputy Assistant SecDef for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism. The DSCA manages the finances.

Defense Institution Reform

A-53. Title 10 USC, Section 168, Military-to-Military Contacts and Comparable Activities, and Title 10 USC, Section 1051, Multilateral, Bilateral or Regional Cooperation Programs: Payment of Personnel Expenses, provide for the Defense Institution Reform framework to develop effective, accountable, professional, and transparent partner defense establishments in partner countries that can manage, sustain, and employ national forces. The Defense Institution Reform program helps ensure institutional reform requirements are prioritized across the department on a global basis and that resources applied to Defense Institution Reform are utilized in the most efficient and effective manner to induce positive change in partner defense institutions. The Defense Institution Reform incorporates DOD, GCC, and country team goals to develop integrated execution plans that achieve shared objectives. The lead is the Deputy Assistant SecDef for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations—the DSCA Centers Management Office, Programs Directorate. The Defense Institution Reform principally focuses on six critical areas for building partner institutional capacity:

Defense policy and strategy.

Human resource management.

Defense planning, budgeting, and resource management.

Logistics and infrastructure.

Civil-military relations and interagency coordination.

Professional defense education.

Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services

A-54. As authorized in Title 10 USC, Section 127d, Allied Forces Participating in Combined Operations: Authority to Provide Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services, the SecDef may provide logistic support, supplies, and services to allied forces participating in a combined operation with the Armed Forces, used in accordance with the AECA and other export control laws of the United States. This subsection may only be used for a combined operation that is carried out during active hostilities or as a part of a contingency operation or a noncombat operation (including an operation in support of the provision of humanitarian or foreign disaster assistance, a country stabilization operation, or a peacekeeping operation). The SecDef must decide whether the allied forces to be provided logistic support, supplies, and services are essential to the success of the combined operation.

Warsaw Initiative Funds Supporting Partnership for Peace

A-55. Title 10 USC 168; Title 10 USC 1051; Title 10 USC, Section 2010, Participation of Developing Countries in Combined Exercises: Payment of Incremental Expenses; and Public Law 108-375, Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Section 1224, Availability of Warsaw Initiative Funds for New NATO Members, provide funds as the primary DOD tool to bilaterally support NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Warsaw Initiative Fund objectives are based on the goals of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document and are as follows:

Assist Partnership for Peace partners in building defense institutions that are transparent, accountable, and professional.

Improve U.S. and NATO Partnership for Peace interoperability to enhance partner contributions to coalition operations.

Support Partnership for Peace partner integration with NATO.

A-56. Partnership for Peace activities include seminars and workshops that support defense reform initiatives, functional seminars, and events to assist partner nations to build capacity, develop capabilities, and improve interoperability with NATO and U.S. coalition forces. Partnership for Peace funds can be used for transportation costs to and from Partnership for Peace exercises, incremental expenses in combined exercises, and conferences (seminars, exchanges, and studies). The lead is the Deputy Assistant SecDef for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations for policy, and the DSCA for plans and execution.

Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies

A-57. Public Law 110-417, Section 941, Enhancement of Authorities Relating to Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies, amended Title 10 USC, Section 184, Regional Centers for Security Studies. The Deputy SecDef Memorandum of 29 September 2005 established the DOD Regional Centers for Security Studies. These centers serve as forums for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, and the exchange of ideas involving military and civilian participants.

A-58. In accordance with the Office of the SecDef Policy Guidance, the core tasks are to—

Counter ideological support for terrorism.

Harmonize views on common security threats.

Build the capacity of partners’ national security institutions consistent with the norms of civil-military relations.

A-59. The five regional centers include the–

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

Near East–South Asia Center for Strategic Studies.

A-60. The lead for directing policy is the Deputy Assistant SecDef for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, and GCCs identify requirements in coordination with the embassy country team. The DSCA serves as the Executive Agent. DOD Directive 5101.1 and DOD Directive 5200.41 provide detailed direction and information.

TITLE 22 UNITED STATES CODE, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE

A-61. Title 22 USC covers the entire range of instruments of national power. Of particular relevance to planners is Chapter 32, Foreign Assistance, which covers aspects of funding FID operations. The following paragraphs cover parameters of Title 22 USC funding and other DOD pertinent authorities for programs and activities. In the course of operations, monies and authorities authorized for use in some countries and operations may not apply to other HNs or FID operations and are subject to change annually through the appropriations process in Congress.

Note: Title 22 governs how the United States conducts its foreign diplomatic relations and includes provisions on the DOS, foreign assistance, and public diplomacy efforts.

Title 22 Funding and Other Authorities

A-62. The legislative authorities for security assistance are provided primarily under public laws, the FAA of 1961 (as amended), the AECA of 1976 (as amended), and The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002. Many aspects of FID operations fall under the FAA and AECA. Each year, the administration submits a security assistance appropriations budget request as part of the President’s budget submission. Congress reviews the request, authorizes and appropriates funds, and enacts necessary legislative amendments for carrying out security assistance programs. In the event appropriations are not enacted before the beginning of the fiscal year, essential activities are usually carried out under a continuing resolution authority as a temporary stopgap appropriation made by Congress. Each year, the DSCA solicits input from the military departments, other defense agencies, and combatant commands, through the CJCS, regarding the security assistance legislative initiatives for the upcoming year. Annual foreign aid and defense legislation is forwarded to the Office of the General Counsel of the DOD that submits the initiatives to the Office of Management and Budget for approval before being submitted to Congress. Detailed security assistance requirements are also found in Executive Order 11958, which allocates authority and responsibility for security assistance principally to the SecDef and the Secretary of State. The SecDef authority is further delegated to the Under SecDef, Policy, and to the Director, DSCA, in DOD Directive 5105.65. Security assistance programs and activities must be in compliance with law, the DSCA Manual 5105.38-M, and policy guidance issued by the DSCA, the SecDef, and the Secretary of State.

Foreign Assistance Act

A-63. The FAA provides economic, agricultural, medical, and disaster relief, as well as other forms of assistance to developing countries. The act also assists foreign countries in fighting internal and external aggression by providing various forms of military assistance upon request (and subject to Congressional approval). Despite a large DOD role in providing defense-related articles and services, the DOS administers the act. The act mandates close coordination and cooperation between the DOD and U.S. civilian agencies at all levels of the security assistance process.

Arms Export Control Act

A-64. The AECA provides for the transfer of arms and other military equipment, as well as various defense services (such as training), through government-to-government agreements. This program sells defense articles and services. It does not give them away. The law prohibits personnel providing services under this program from engaging in any duties of a combat nature. This prohibition includes any duties related to training and advising that may engage U.S. personnel in combat activities. Although they may engage any hostile force in self-defense, training teams or personnel should withdraw as soon as possible.

Direct Commercial Sales

A-65. Direct commercial sales authority under the AECA is delegated to the Secretary of State, with the SecDef concurrence for the designation of items as defense articles and services. Direct commercial sales are sales by U.S. industry directly to a foreign buyer. These sales are not administered by the DOD and do not require a government-to-government agreement, but they require Congressional oversight and technology release similar to FMS. Direct commercial sales are executed by U.S. industry with the DOS, and the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls administers licenses.

Leases of Defense Articles

A-66. Under the AECA, Chapter 6, the President may lease DOD articles to eligible foreign countries for international organizations for a period not to exceed 5 years and a specified period of time required to complete major refurbishment work before delivery. The President has delegated this authority to the DOD. There must be compelling foreign policy and national security reasons for providing such articles on a lease basis, and the articles must not be needed for public use at the time. A lease may provide defense articles for testing purposes, assist foreign countries in determining whether to purchase defense articles, allow the USG to respond to an urgent foreign requirement, or for other purposes as approved by the DSCA. The Building Partnership Capacity programs director manages program execution.

End-Use Monitoring

A-67. In 2001, Golden Sentry was established in the DSCA as a result of Congress’ 1996 enactment of Section 40A of the AECA. Section 40A requires the President to establish a program for end-use monitoring of defense articles sold, leased, or exported under the AECA or the FAA. The program must provide reasonable assurance that recipients comply with U.S. export control requirements regarding the use, transfer, and security of defense articles and services and ensures end-use verification of defense articles and services for sensitive technology. The focus of the Golden Sentry Program is on government-to-government transfers. U.S. personnel, assigned to SCOs, perform routine end-use monitoring as part of their normal security assistance functions and interaction with HN personnel. This function is performed through visits to the HN installations and is documented on embassy and interagency reports. For specified defense articles, the DSCA has established a regime of physical security and inventory checks, referred to as enhanced end-use monitoring. SCO personnel conduct enhanced end-use monitoring through planned and coordinated visits to the HN installations. The agency works with the combatant command to train end-use monitoring personnel through regional end-use monitoring forums and conducts several compliance assessment visits annually. The lead is the Directorate of Building Partnership Capacity.

Security Assistance Programs

A-68. Security assistance is a group of programs, authorized by law, that allows the transfer of military articles and services to friendly foreign governments. Security assistance transfers may be carried out via sales, grants, leases, or loans and are authorized under the premise that if these transfers are essential to the security and economic well-being of allied governments and international organizations, they are equally vital to the security and economic well-being of the United States. The programs support U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. Security assistance programs increase the ability of U.S. friends and allies to deter and defend against possible aggression, promote the sharing of common defense burdens, and help foster regional stability. When assisting other nations in meeting their defense requirements, the United States contributes to its own security. Security assistance can be—

The delivery of defense weapon systems to foreign governments.

U.S. Service schools training international students.

U.S. personnel advising other governments on ways to improve their internal defense capabilities.

U.S. personnel providing guidance and assistance in establishing infrastructure and economic bases to achieve and maintain regional stability.

Security Assistance Programs and Activities

A-69. The major types of security assistance programs with the respective department for administration are—

FMS (DOD).

Foreign military construction services (DOD).

Leases (DOD).

Military Assistance Program (DOD).

IMET program (DOD).

Economic Support Fund (DOS).

Peacekeeping operations (DOS).

International narcotics control and law enforcement (DOS).

Nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs (DOS).

Commercial export sales licensed under the AECA (DOS).

Foreign Military Sales

A-70. Title 22 USC, Section 2761, Sales from Stocks; Title 22 USC, Section 2762, Procurement for Cash Sales; Title 22 USC, Section 2769, Foreign Military Construction Sales; and AECA, Sections 21 and 22, authorize FMS as a nonappropriated program administered by the DSCA through which eligible foreign governments purchase defense articles, services, and training from the USG. The purchasing government pays all costs that may be associated with a sale. In essence, there is a signed government-to-government agreement, normally documented on a letter of offer and acceptance between the USG and a foreign government. Each letter is commonly referred to as a case and is assigned a unique case identifier for accounting purposes. Under the FMS program, military articles and services, including training, may be provided from DOD stocks (AECA, Section 21) or from new procurement (AECA, Section 22). The program promotes responsible arms sales to further national security and foreign policy objectives by enabling allies and friends to better defend themselves. The program also establishes long-term relationships between U.S. forces and militaries of friends and allies that convey U.S. values and develop relationships and interoperability necessary for coalition building and operations. The DOS provides policy supervision and must approve all FMS that the DOD and the DSCA execute.

Foreign Military Financing

A-71. Title 22 USC, Section 2763, Credit Sales, and AECA, Section 23, authorize foreign military financing to provide grant dollars to partner countries or organizations, which can be used for FMS purchases (articles, services, training, and design and construction services). Ten countries are authorized to use foreign military financing for direct commercial contracts with DSCA approval:

Israel.

Egypt.

Jordan.

Morocco.

Tunisia.

Turkey.

Portugal.

Pakistan.

Yemen.

Greece.

International Military Education and Training

A-72. Title 22 USC, Section 2347, General Authority (Part V: International Military Education and Training); Public Law 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Chapter 5, International Military Education and Training, Section 541, General Authority; Public Law 111-8, Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009; Public Law 111-32, Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, and the DOS International Affairs Budget authorize the IMET program to provide grant funding to approximately 133 specific countries to purchase U.S. military education and training.

A-73. The DOS allocates with DOD input, and the DSCA executes. The objectives of the program are to—

Further regional stability through mutually beneficial military-to-military relations that increase understanding and defense cooperation between the USG and foreign countries.

Provide training that augments the capabilities of participant nations’ military forces to support multinational operations and interoperability with U.S. forces.

Increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain basic democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights in their own government and military.

Expanded IMET programs—

Promote effective defense resource management.

Foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military and the proper role of the military in a civilian-led democratic government.

Contribute to cooperation between military and law enforcement personnel with respect to counternarcotics law enforcement efforts.

Promote improved and effective military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.

Coalition Solidarity Funds

A-74. Title 22 USC, Section 2392, Government Agencies; Public Law 109-13, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005; entered into pursuant to Section 632(b) of the FAA of 1961 (as amended), provide coalition solidarity funds. In accordance with the policies and procedures, terms, and conditions set out in the DOS-DSCA cosigned grant agreement, these funds may only be used to finance the purchase of defense articles and services by the grant recipient through a letter of offer and acceptance with the USG. Coalition funds may only be used for military and other security assistance to coalition partners in Iraq and Afghanistan as set out in Public Law 109-13, under the heading “Peacekeeping Operations.” Funds appropriated under this heading shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the committees on appropriations, except that such notifications shall be submitted at least 5 days before the obligation of funds. The lead is the DOS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis.

Drawdowns

A-75. Title 22 USC, Section 2318, Special Authority; FAA, 506; Title 22 USC, Section 2348, General Authorization (Part VI, Peacekeeping Operations); and FAA, 552(c)(2), authorize the President to draw down up to $200 million of commodities and services annually from DOD stocks. Funds may be used to address emergencies and nonemergencies relating to disaster, counternarcotics, and refugee assistance; peacekeeping operations; antiterrorism and nonproliferation assistance; and other contingencies deemed in the national interest. The FAA can also include training by SOF personnel. The President may also direct drawdowns under other special legislative authorities that are outside the FAA ceiling. The President issues a presidential determination, the DOS processes, and the DSCA and other Federal agencies execute drawdowns.

Peacekeeping Operations

A-76. Title 22 USC, Section 2348d, Data on Costs Incurred in Support of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, FAA, Section 551, and Public Law 111-8 authorize peacekeeping operations to promote human rights, democracy, and regional security, and to facilitate humanitarian responses to natural disasters. Peacekeeping operations also promote increased involvement in conflict resolution, multilateral peace operations, and sanctions enforcement. Peacekeeping operations leverage fair-share contributions to peacekeeping efforts from those countries with greater potential to pay, while facilitating increased participation of poorer countries with resource constraints. The focus is on regional security operations, multilateral peace operations, and other programs carried out in furtherance of the national security interests of the United States. The DOS is the overall program manager.

Global Peace Operations Initiative

A-77. Title 22 USC, Part VI, Peacekeeping Operations, Sections 2348–2348d; FAA, Sections 551–554; and Public Law 111-8 authorize the Global Peace Operations Initiative providing for funds to increase the capacity of countries to participate in and deploy to international peace support operations. The Global Peace Operations Initiative addresses gaps in global peacekeeping capacity by—

Training 75,000 peace support troops worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa.

Increasing the number of stability police units for peace operations through support to the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units.

Facilitating deployment of peace support operation units through a transportation and logistics support arrangement.

A-78. The Global Peace Operations Initiative incorporates the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Program. The DOS manages with support from the Deputy Assistant SecDef for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations. The DSCA executes a portion of the funds.

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

A-79. Title 22 USC, Section 2348; Title 22 USC, Section 2349aa–10, Part VIII, Antiterrorism Assistance; Title 22 USC, Section 2349bb, Part IX, Nonproliferation and Export Control Assistance; FAA, Sections 551, 571–575, 581–586; Public Law 102-511, Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992, Section 503, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Activities in the Independent States, and Section 504, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund; and Public Law 111-8 authorize nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs as appropriated grant programs administered by the DOS and provide resources to support critical security and humanitarian-related foreign policy objectives. Nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs support demining activities, the clearance of unexploded ordnance, the destruction of small arms, border security, and related activities. Related defense articles, services, and training can be provided through this program. One of the objectives is to reduce civilian land mine casualties through mine awareness, mine clearance training, and the development and deployment of demining technology to establish an indigenous, sustainable humanitarian demining capability that will continue after the U.S. involvement is complete. Destruction of man-portable air defense systems, a weapon sought after and used by terrorist groups, is the priority. The lead is the DOS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis.

TITLE 50 UNITED STATES CODE, WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

A-80. Title 50 USC is a far-reaching document covering areas as diverse as the establishment and scope of the Council of National Defense and the disclosure of classified information. Chapter 22 of Title 50 contains the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Title 50 also covers several legal aspects of the intelligence warfighting function. Planners should coordinate with the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2), G-2, and/or S-2s, as well as staff legal personnel, to ensure that communications regarding Army personnel executing Title 50 responsibilities are properly classified.

Note: Title 50 governs how the United States declares and conducts its wars and how it ensures national security. It is composed of 43 chapters, focusing on intelligence operations, espionage, military equipment and assets, emergency powers, and nuclear security, among other issues.

MONIES AND AUTHORITIES FROM ANNUAL BUDGETARY SOURCES

A-81. The President may request special monies and authorities in the annual defense appropriations bill through the National Defense Authorization Act. If Congress passes such budgetary proposals, the resultant measures are initially temporary and require annual renewal. Typically, such monies and authorities are both requested and enacted to allow higher levels of security assistance to key partners and allies facing a particular threat. The other typical situation in which such budget measures are made is during times of intense and far-reaching conflict. FID operations and the planning for them should use such special monies and authorities whenever possible. However, like legal, political, and informational constraints, operations against terrorist networks in countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines have been empowered through the renewal of several such sections of the National Defense Authorization Act (as amended). In the course of operations, National Defense Authorization Act monies and authorities approved for use in some countries and operations may not apply to other HNs or FID operations and are subject to change annually through the appropriations process in Congress.

Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements—Significant Military Equipment

A-82. In Public Law 110-417, Section 1204, Congress grants temporary authority to extend and expand the acquisition and cross-servicing agreements to lend military equipment for personnel protection and survivability. The temporary authority includes nations’ participation in multinational operations with the United States in peacekeeping operations under United Nations Charter or another international agreement. This authority was extended to 30 September 2011. Section 1204 amended Section 1202 to add a requirement for semiannual reports on equipment not returned to the United States with a description of the terms of disposition of the equipment provided to the foreign forces. The Office of the Under SecDef for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Office of International Cooperation is the lead office. The SecDef, in consultation with the Secretary of State, designates countries eligible for agreements. The CJCS authorizes GCCs to negotiate and implement the acquisition and cross-servicing agreements.

Global Train and Equip (1206)

A-83. Public Law 110-417, Section 1206, extends Public Law 109-163, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Section 1206, Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces. Collectively, these laws allow the SecDef the authority to provide equipment, supplies, and training for building the capacity of foreign national military forces, to conduct counterterrorist operations, and to support military and stability operations in which U.S. forces participate. All programs must promote human rights and respect for legitimate civilian authority. Section 1206 is funded via defensewide operation and maintenance funds. Both the SecDef and the Secretary of State must approve funding. A quarterly report to Congressional Defense Committees is required. The DOD and DOS form the lead for this program jointly—the Deputy Assistant SecDef for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia leads—the DSCA executes. Illustrative training and equipment include—

Training (not exhaustive): counterterrorism; air assault training and doctrine; CMO; infrastructure security; intelligence analysis and sharing; maritime operations, security, and interdiction; equipment maintenance; border security; and operator training.

Equipment (not exhaustive): coastal surveillance stations, patrol boats, various spares and replacement parts, avionics and communications upgrades, small arms weapons, small and large caliber ammunition, radios, computers, night vision devices, riverine assault and support craft, and utility vehicles.

Security and Stabilization Assistance (1207)

A-84. Public Law 110-417, Section 1207, clarifies Public Law 109-163, Section 1207, Security and Stabilization Assistance, by prohibiting use of funds for budget support to any foreign country. The SecDef may provide services to, and transfer defense articles and services to, the Secretary of State to facilitate the DOS’s provision of reconstruction, security, and stabilization assistance to a foreign country that involves the provision of services or transfer of defense articles or funds, bringing civilian expertise to bear alongside or in lieu of U.S. military forces. This is a flexible authority with no earmarks. The lead is the Deputy Assistant SecDef for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, and it is executed by the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

Support of Special Operations to Combat Terrorism

A-85. Section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act extended and expanded the authority for support of special operations to combat terrorism with foreign partners. The work of USSOCOM in this very important area includes the development of policy and legislative proposals to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international military assistance programs. One method by which the USSOCOM is now able to assist in the development of foreign special operations capabilities is through the reallocation of funds under Section 1208 authorities.

A-86. The period of authority for Public Law 108-375, Section 1208, Support of Military Operations to Combat Terrorism, was from 2005 through 2007; Public Law 110-417, Section 1208, Extension and Expansion of Authority for Support of Special Operations to Combat Terrorism, extended the period of authority from 2008 through 2013. These laws were further amended by Public Law 111-84, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 1202, Expansion of Authority and Modification of Notification and Reporting Requirements for use of Authority for Support of Special Operations to Combat Terrorism.

Department of Defense Counterdrug Program

A-87. The following public laws and various National Defense Authorization Act provisions provide the DOD Counterdrug Program support to foreign countries to stop the flow of illegal drugs:

Public Law 101-510, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Section 1004.

Public Law 105-85, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Section 1033.

Authority to Provide Additional Support for Counter-Drug Activities of Peru and Colombia.

Public Law 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Title X, General Provisions, Subtitle C, Counter-Drug Activities, Sections 1021 through 1023; Title XIV, Other Authorizations, Section 1405, Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-Wide.

Public Law 110-417, Sections 1021 through 1026, and Section 1405.

Public Law 111-84, Sections 1011 through 1016, Section 1404, and Section 1515.

Public Law 111-383, Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Sections 1011 through 1015, Section 1407, and Section 1514.

A-88. The program is designed to manage drug detection and monitoring; maintenance of counterdrug equipment; training; counterdrug training facilities; command, control, and communications networks; and aerial and ground reconnaissance. The program also provides support for the counterdrug activities of federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies. The lead is the Deputy Assistant SecDef for Counternarcotics and Global Threats; the DSCA executes a portion of the funds via FMS system.

United States Department of Defense Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Prevention Program

A-89. Public Law 108-25, United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, and Public Law 108-287, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005, enable the DOD human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) prevention program, based at the Naval Health Research Center in San Diego, California. The Naval Health Research Center is the DOD executive agent for the technical assistance, management, and administrative support of the global HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment for foreign militaries. The DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program administers funding, directly conducts training, and provides technical assistance for focus countries and other bilateral countries. The staff actively serves on most of the technical working groups and core teams through the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator. The DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program oversees the contributions to the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief of a variety of DOD organizations, which fall under the various regional military commands, as well as specialized DOD institutions whose primary mission falls within the continental United States. The lead is the Secretary of the Navy as the DOD Executive Agent. The Assistant SecDef for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities provides policy guidance.

Note: In the course of FID operations, National Defense Authorization Act monies and authorities authorized for use in some countries and operations may not apply to other HNs or FID operations and are subject to change annually through the appropriations process in Congress.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS LEGAL AND REGULATORY CONCERNS

A-90. In addition to the USC constraints listed above, MISO units operate under Presidential and DOD regulatory constraints. Three principal areas of concern for MISO in FID operations are relevant intellectual property statutes, exposure of U.S. citizens to friendly influence efforts, and the authority to approve MISO messages.

A-91. The United States has well-established intellectual property laws, such as copyright and trademark. Typically, U.S. intellectual property law has driven international intellectual property law. USG agencies, including the DOD, rigidly comply with copyright and other intellectual property laws. The HN in which FID operations take place may have different internal intellectual property laws. The staff legal team conducting planning needs to identify HN intellectual property issues that may affect messaging parameters. In addition, many subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats routinely disregard intellectual property rights to further their propaganda products and to raise funds. Both of these actions may be exploitable through MISO series. Care must be taken to not violate intellectual property laws in countering internal threat propaganda or exploiting the distribution of pirated goods by internal threats.

A-92. Title 22 USC, Section 1461(a), Dissemination of Information Abroad; Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities; DOD Directive S-3321.1; and National Security Decision Directive-130, United States International Information Policy, direct that U.S. MISO forces will not target U.S. citizens at any time, in any location globally, or under any circumstances. Ancillary exposure of U.S. citizens in the HN to influential messages targeting HN audiences does not constitute a violation of these directives.

A-93. The precedent for the limited use of MISO forces to present public information to a U.S. audience was set during the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992. There was no challenge to this precedent during the support provided after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. If a noncombatant evacuation operation should become necessary during FID operations, information support by MISO forces to provide evacuation information to U.S. nationals would also adhere to the order.

A-94. The majority of MISO aid during FID operations falls under the normal parameters of influencing and, more importantly, changes foreign target-audience behavior. Clearly delineated approval authority for MISO themes and series begins at the SecDef level; however, the SecDef can delegate approval of series and actions to the respective GCC. Subdelegation of series and action approval by the GCC to subordinate component or joint force commanders may be authorized by the SecDef. Further information on MISO approval is found in CJCSI 3110.05 (currently CJCSI 3110.05E). In FID operations, approval authority may be retained at high levels because of the potential political ramifications of any U.S.-produced informational product.

A-95. In all MISO activities, commanders need to know the levels of approval. The levels and differences are as follows:

Themes and Objectives. The key to centralized planning and decentralized execution of MISO is clarity in the statement of objectives and themes. Broad objectives and themes establish the parameters for the development of series that reach foreign target audiences. They also ensure products reflect national and theater policy and strategy. Approval of objectives and broad themes are reserved by policies and the JSCP at levels where the interagency process can implement MISO plans under a broad range of considerations (for example, the SecDef, combatant command, joint force command, and U.S. country team).

Series. A series consists of all the MISO products and actions to change one behavior of one target audience. Commanders subordinate to the JTF or the JSOTF can use an approved series to achieve their specific objectives. Approval authority to modify an existing series or to develop a new series may be delegated to the division commander level.

Attribution. U.S. attribution openly acknowledges U.S. involvement. This disclosure may be made through the content of the product, means of dissemination, or in the initial phase of engaging in online exchanges. Concurring HN attribution allows MISO products and activities to be attributable to a concurring HN. Both the HN and the appropriate chief of mission must agree to this attribution method before it is used. Delayed attribution allows a combatant commander to disseminate information without clear attribution. When asked if the USG or DOD is the source of the specific activity, the DOD will acknowledge its involvement as soon as operationally feasible as determined by the combatant commander. If a combatant commander believes that it will not be possible to attribute the activity to the DOD because of operational considerations, he will request an exception to policy. This method is only authorized from named operations or when specified in orders.

A-96. In many FID operations, the MISO approval authority will be the U.S. Ambassador. Normally, the U.S. Ambassador designates a country team member as approval authority for dissemination of series developed by MISO forces deployed in support of FID. This representative is normally the deputy COM, with reviewing authority to appropriate country team members, such as the SCO chief, public affairs officer, and the Drug Enforcement Administration representative.

A-97. During FID operations in which a combined JTF or JSOTF has been stood up, the SecDef normally delegates MISO approval authority to the supported GCC in the Joint Chiefs of Staff execution order and, in accordance with the JSCP, the GCC retains approval authority following the approval of the MISO program by the SecDef. The supported GCC may, if specifically authorized by the SecDef, subdelegate approval authority to the designated task force and even down to a maneuver commander (a division or brigade combat team commander) for certain message categories and product types.

INTERAGENCY REGULATIONS, POLICIES, AND PROTOCOLS

A-98. Army units may or may not conduct FID operations with other Service personnel depending on the scale of operations. Typically, some aspect (other than transportation in and out of the HN) of even a small-scale operation will be a joint operation. Invariably, FID operations involve interagency cooperation to some degree. Interagency regulations may be directive in nature, applicable to all USG agencies, and based on policy or law. Protocols may not be based on policy or law. The general maxim is to adhere to another USG agency’s policies and protocols to the greatest extent possible as long ARSOF policy is followed and mission success is not compromised. Interagency cooperation is affected through a joint interagency task force, joint interagency coordination group, or the American Embassy country team.

Appendix B

Internal Defense and Development Strategy

The IDAD strategy is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Every nation’s strategy is specific, but the end state is universal—a responsible and accountable local, state or provincial, and national government that ensures the personal safety of its citizens by providing a climate and institutions that demonstrate the ability to improve their material well-being. In addition, those governments must ensure the basic freedoms that the world community has come to regard as fundamental. For the Army planner who has been born in or naturalized into a nation founded on those principles, one of the fundamental truths he must remember is that the above end state is frequently contradictory to the government the HN has experienced in the past or even from its inception. In some cases, one of the objectives may be to help formulate an appropriate IDAD strategy. This may mean instilling values that heretofore have not been present.

CONCEPT

B-1. An internal threat in the HN or changing conditions that may produce internal threats require an IDAD strategy. IDAD is ideally a proactive and preemptive strategy in which the HN must win and motivate the population to participate in the local efforts that are part of the larger strategy. In developing nations, a strategy may focus on preventing regression to a previous state of instability. However, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or other threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. Planners must understand the HN strategy if they are to plan effectively to support it, and they must be prepared to help build that strategy from the ground up. Common pitfalls for planners are to ignore the HN naming convention for the plan and to downplay military support to the IDAD plan. Planners should place greater emphasis on HN and State Department development plans as the primary focus of the program.

B-2. The IDAD strategy should integrate security force and civilian programs into a coherent, comprehensive effort. The success of both security and civilian programs hinges on the ability of the HN to gain and maintain the support of its citizens. Security force actions provide a level of internal security that permits and supports growth through development that the populace regards as balanced and secular. This development may require change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may in turn promote unrest in the society. The concept, therefore, includes measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place.

B-3. Often a government must overcome the inertia and shortcomings of its own political system before it can cope with the internal threats it may be facing. This may involve the adoption of reforms during a time of crisis when pressures limit flexibility and make implementation difficult. During the adoption and implementation of previously nonexistent institutions and procedures, a freely elected and constitutional government may face mistrust and fear among the electorate, particularly in the case of any minority. A history of authoritarian minority rule can exacerbate this situation. The successful IDAD strategist must realize that the true nature of the threat to the government lies in the adversary’s political strength and will to persevere rather than in military power. Although the government must contain the armed elements, concentration on the military aspect of the threat does not address the real danger. Short of regression to or development of authoritarian or sectarian government, any strategy that does not redress the political claims and demands of the opposition is at best severely handicapped. This is not to say that complete compliance with the demands of the opposition, especially an armed insurgency, is necessary, but allowing dialog with unarmed elements of the opposition, however contentious, is typically warranted. Military and paramilitary programs are necessary for success, but if employed in an environment deprived of the other instruments of national power, military force alone will fail. These programs are in fact a means to the greater political ends with FID gaining the political buy-in of not only HN military and paramilitary personnel, but a majority of the population.

FUNCTIONS

B-4. The IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats (Figure B-1). The functions are executed simultaneously, and a single project conducted during FID operations may exercise all four functions. No function is ever executed in a vacuum, because all actions the HN and U.S. personnel take will have a psychological impact on some portion of the population.

BALANCED DEVELOPMENT

B-5. The people of the HN must perceive the balanced development as equitable. Its end state is a society with an egalitarian ethos and basic political, economic, and social institutions and mechanisms in place to achieve equality of access. Realistically, this is not something achieved overnight, especially in terms of economic disparity between groups. Nevertheless, a successful strategy does not have to produce an instant balance, but it does have to begin addressing unreasonable inequalities between groups, races, or ethnicities within the nation. The perception must be that the HN is making positive strides to resolve disparities and discrimination. FID planners and executors must stress to officials they are advising and training that this perception will only come if development truly is balanced.

B-6. Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, social, and economic programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society to share in the rewards of development, thus alleviating some frustration. Difficulties typically arise when a tide of rising expectations among the populace triggers an expectation of quick or even instant gratification of their demands for change. This can be further complicated when success in one arena (for instance, national politics) is accomplished quickly. Afterward, correcting the remaining conditions that make a society vulnerable is still a long-term process. The challenge for Army planners and Soldiers is to communicate to individuals and groups that results in other areas (typically economic progress) may be slow in coming. Failure to adequately prepare societies, groups, and individuals (in particular key communicators) for a long period of slow change may doom a nation to lose the support of the population it governs, including individuals who previously supported it. This can be even truer if supporters have made concessions or sacrifices to support an IDAD strategy.

SECURITY

B-7. Security in FID operations represents a return to a state of physical security that is acceptable to the populace. An acceptable security situation for a populace, intimidated by insurgents at the village or district level, may well be a level of physical security superior to that present before an escalation in violence. To gain the support of the populace, the populace must be convinced that the local district or central government can protect their social or business interests better than that of the insurgency or other threats. Planners must remember that, although FID and any strategy may typically fail if hard targets are not destroyed effectively, it is virtually impossible to successfully achieve security without the support of the populace.

B-8. Security in FID operations encompasses all activities implemented to protect the populace from the threat and to provide a safe environment for national development. It involves success on the military, paramilitary, and criminal justice fronts. Security can be difficult to achieve because of a reactive focus on interdicting adversaries, amassing captured weaponry, or reducing the number of successful employments of particular adversary TTP. The linchpin to obtaining security for the populace is to involve its members in providing their own security.

B-9. Successful interdictions against those who perpetrate violence must be reinforced by a concerted effort to involve the populace in the following:

Denying internal threats with safe havens and support.

Identifying threats with the full knowledge and confidence of their elimination.

Securing buy-in that the elimination may involve lethal force.

Instilling a belief that any sacrifice to eliminate internal threats is beneficial in the long term to their physical, economic, or even spiritual security.

B-10. ARSOF Soldiers are uniquely qualified to provide this sense of security, because this effect may only be achieved when HN security forces and ARSOF personnel are collocated with the populace and share the same basic hazards that the populace shares. In this way, ARSOF Soldiers and HN forces instill an us-versus-them mentality that includes the civilian populace in the us. Responsible use of civil defense, neighborhood watch, home guard, or any otherwise irregular force from the populace may be considered as long as they are employed commensurate with their abilities. This may mean the contribution of the force is negligible in military terms; however, the psychological effect of the force can be great.

Note: Civil defense or other citizen guard or watch organizations should not be confused or affiliated with the civilian advisory councils described in paragraphs B-47 through B-48, page B-11.

B-11. The end state of the security effort should be an environment in which the local populace can provide for its own security with limited government support at the national level. The local police or constables should be a viable deterrent to the residue of an internal threat organization, and the civilian populace must have a continued, reliable, and safe means to report internal threats. Although each situation is specific, the types, magnitude, and prevalence of crimes and security threats that are handled in the United States by Federal law enforcement agencies provide a general baseline for what sort of security situation must exist at the local level and what basic Federal agencies and capabilities must be in place.

NEUTRALIZATION

B-12. Neutralization is a political concept that sufficiently marginalizes an insurgent or criminal element so that it is effectively irrelevant to and unable to affect the process of governance. Neutralization applies to elements of the insurgencies deemed unfit to enter into dialog. In addition, entire organizations that corporately hold a wholly irreconcilable position must be neutralized. A good example of sufficient marginalization is the white supremacist movement in the United States or the Communist Party in Japan. Both exist and have at times garnered headlines and small numbers of fanatic loyalists through tactics, such as inflammatory rallies, but both lie beyond even the fringe of legitimate politics. Enfranchisement of former insurgents into the mainstream political life of the HN falls under the function of mobilization.

B-13. Neutralization accomplishes several goals. It—

Makes an insurgent or criminal force irrelevant to the political process.

Separates the threatening elements (physical and psychological) from the population.

Includes all lawful activities (except those that degrade the government’s legitimacy) to disrupt, preempt, disorganize, and defeat the internal threat.

Involves public exposure and the discrediting of leaders during a period of low-level unrest with little political violence.

Involves arrest and prosecution when laws have been broken.

Involves combat action when the adversary’s violent activities escalate.

B-14. All neutralization efforts must be legal. They must carefully observe constitutional or other codified provisions regarding rights and authority. This is particularly true of a nation operating under the provision of legislated or imposed martial law or other extraordinary powers. The HN may need to exceed the minimum standards of the letter of the law and to set the moral and ethical standard for conduct. This may include foregoing some special powers. For instance, President Abraham Lincoln was well within the (then) perceived letter of constitutional law when he suspended habeas corpus in selected instances during the American Civil War; however, political opposition and criticism for doing so extended even to members of his own political party. Some supporters perceived this action as excessive, and some detractors attempted to capitalize politically on this action.

B-15. In the case of President Lincoln, the legitimate use of duly authorized emergency powers caused friction in some quarters and bolstered support for his administration in others. There are numerous instances when governments or government officials have exceeded and abused emergency powers around the globe. Some of those instances have been disastrous to the governments under which the abuse happened. The need for officials and agencies to act lawfully and morally is essential not only for humanitarian reasons, but also because this reinforces government legitimacy while denying the adversary an exploitable issue. Denying the adversary an opportunity to seize on and exploit legitimate issues against the government disarms the leaders and propagandists of an internal threat. Army planners and trainers must begin indoctrinating this ideal at the lowest levels of the HN government and military. In an environment that may include the presence of international news or entertainment media with a real-time audiovisual transmission capability, the excesses of a single, low-ranking policeman or military member may be as damaging as the misstep of a national-level politician.

MOBILIZATION

B-16. Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources and includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support of the government. This support is essential for a successful IDAD program. If successful, mobilization maximizes manpower and other resources available to the government while it minimizes those available to the internal threat. This effect may not be directly proportional. Organized crime, a sectarian insurgency, and other entities may continue to maintain viability even as their base of support erodes. Subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats receiving aid from a third party can magnify this effect. This effect is further magnified when the third-party support is effectively immune to interdiction at its source. Mobilization seeks to—

Strengthen existing government, economic, military, and social institutions in processes, procedures, and capabilities.

Legitimize and, if necessary, reform those institutions.

Develop new institutions to respond to demands.

Enlist and enfranchise all members of society to contribute in some way.

Discredit and belittle internal threats permanently.

Assess and adjust program emphasis continuously.

Instill the sense that the change is permanent.

Create a national vision toward achieving greater goals, if necessary.

B-17. Mobilization runs hand-in-hand with enfranchisement of the population. Mobilization is of limited value if it excludes any portion of the population other than internal threats; however, defectors from internal threat ranks should not be marginalized but rather reintegrated through a reconciliation and integration plan. Those who have been reconciled and reintegrated can aid in the further development of recruiting and reintegration of former insurgents. Mobilization can include members of the population who traditionally or statutorily have not been part of the institutions they are now party to. This is particularly true of the many societies around the globe that are polarized on sectarian lines. Planners must recognize that the mobilization of the population can require cultural upheaval. It is now inconceivable in the United States that increased access to a well or a market could have major social implications that could threaten to spark violence for years, but this is the reality in many countries around the world. Ideologically, the vast majority of Americans and U.S. military, DOD civilians, and contractors have difficulty even imagining such conditions in our national past as racial segregation. Army planners and Soldiers must remain culturally attuned to the fact that many members of the HNs in which Soldiers conduct FID operations may be part of a legacy that includes unfounded prejudices for races, ethnicities, tribes, or religious affiliations in their country.

ASSESSING THE FUNCTIONS

B-18. The HN begins with established measures of effectiveness that are a series of benchmarks for its program. It should have a way to collect feedback for future planning, refinement of strategy, and continued formulation of strategic national policy, and then it should continually analyze this feedback. However, U.S. Army forces supporting the IDAD program may have to initially institute and conduct this process at various levels. Until HN personnel become proficient, U.S. personnel must fully use advisor techniques in this instance. This is the case not only to efficiently build the skill of HN personnel but also to foster the perception (based on fact) that HN personnel are proficient and legitimate rather than mere functionaries or lackeys to U.S. national interests. Soldiers in the trainer-mentor function may need to bolster the warrior ethos of their counterparts during this constant examination of feedback as they critically assess themselves and potentially deal with temporary reversals or gains that develop slowly.

PRINCIPLES

B-19. Although each situation is specific, certain principles guide efforts in the four functional areas to prevent or defeat an internal threat. Planners must apply the IDAD strategy and these principles to each specific situation. The principles are—

Responsive government.

Unity of effort.

Maximum use of intelligence, MISO, and CAO.

Minimum use of violence.

RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT

B-20. The fundamental goal of operations is to prevent an insurgency or other form of lawlessness or subversion by forestalling and defeating the threat and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. Subversion includes actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority (JP 3-24). At the core of the FID task is the ability to develop an effective, responsive government to prevent the actions of subversion from creating a failed state. Positive measures are necessary to ensure responsive government at all levels with the ability to mobilize manpower and resources and to distribute them equitably. These governments must foster a view in the populace that they are administratively, managerially, and technically competent.

B-21. Typically, HNs build responsive government from the top down (for example, national levels down to local levels); however, it is measured by its success at the local level. An HN can have a legitimately elected national government that is highly effective at national-level reconciliation and legislation; nevertheless, the government fails because it does not translate this down to the local level in the form of increased security and improved materiel conditions. Although an oversimplification, the term responsive local government may best describe this principle. IDAD strategy developers should keep this idea in mind.

UNITY OF EFFORT

B-22. Unity of effort is essential to prevent or defeat any internal threat. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces and agencies toward a commonly recognized objective regardless of the command or coordination structures of the participants. In IDAD strategy development, a necessary precursor to unity of effort is recognizing the disparate or conflicting goals between portions of the populace and, more important, from an organizational standpoint between government agencies. Although this is typically accomplished by non-DOD agencies before the participation of Army elements, it is necessary for Soldiers to be cognizant of the essential points of the strategy as it is and understand the genesis of that strategy and any residual conflicts associated with the current strategy. One of the first hurdles planners must consider is overcoming reluctance, or even opposition, on the part of their military counterparts to the government’s plan or from civilian agencies toward portions of strategy championed by the military. The specific capability and institutional knowledge of CA Soldiers to mediate and negotiate should be used to anticipate, plan for, and overcome these conflicts.

MAXIMUM USE OF INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION, AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

B-23. All operations require detailed and often specialized intelligence to achieve the desired effects from employment of forces. FID operations require the flexible applications of all sources and disciplines within the intelligence warfighting function to support conventional and SOF units.

B-24. FID operations invariably have a strong emphasis on human intelligence and CI. Operations conform to this model and, like other irregular warfare, may place a disproportional emphasis on CI and human intelligence out of operational necessity. Cellular organizations will likely remain impenetrable (at least in some cases) by means other than CI and human intelligence in the foreseeable future. As adversaries become aware of the full reach of other U.S. intelligence disciplines, it is reasonable to assume that their countermeasures will include more and more compartmentalization that relies on decidedly nontechnological answers to trafficking information within and between cells. Total success in operations may not be won exclusively through human intelligence, but abject failure through its exclusion is a planning reality.

B-25. Planners must balance operational security and CI programs and procedures to protect friendly operations with the inherent risks of sharing intelligence with the HN. Countering or penetrating opposing force intelligence collection operations may build on DOD success before the commitment of forces. Intelligence and CI operations must accurately assess the capabilities of subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to provide timely warnings to HN and U.S. forces and to penetrate and be prepared to compromise hostile operations on order.

B-26. Planners must provide for sufficient assets to support the IDAD strategy and the FID operation. Typically, the HN is not fully capable of performing these missions effectively upon the commitment of U.S. forces. In this case, the United States must deploy additional intelligence assets to accomplish these missions. Planning maximizes the coordination lines with and use of assets under the purview of the chief of mission and any that may be present under the GCC. Army personnel may be the chief trainers of HN internal intelligence and security forces developed to overcome intelligence capability gaps, enhance existing capabilities, and educate the HN military on using these assets in operational and tactical planning. Personnel conduct this training within the confines of USG directives and instructions of the chief of mission and as deemed appropriate by the supporting GCC.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

B-27. The principal battleground of operations is the human environment—the HN citizens and the human elements that can affect the nation. The key of this battleground is the human will. Army principles encompass disciplines that are dedicated to or familiar with shaping the human environment. They strengthen the will of allies and break the will of adversaries. All operations accomplish one of these polar opposites. Maximum use of MISO complements and exploits the success of special operations and conventional units, as well as USG and HN government agencies conducting IDAD support operations. The battle for influence begins before commencement of operations and extends throughout the existence of the nation program. Failure to analyze and plan the fight to persuade in the formulation of IDAD strategy almost guarantees mission failure.

B-28. The use of the informational component of national power often predates the formulation of an IDAD strategy and the commencement of activities. Typically, the American Embassy will already be addressing the conditions that elevated into the need for conducting FID. The embassy public affairs officer—either singly or with additional support from the Bureau of International Information Programs—articulates the USG’s position on conditions within the HN through press releases, public comments, and media products. MISO forces may deploy to support this effort and be present early in the formation of a strategy. If not, early entry of MISO planners into the process of program planning is critical. Some of the specific tasks units can plan to conduct include the following:

Articulate the conditions and mandate for the entry of U.S. or multinational forces.

Communicate the end state of operations.

Communicate the planned exit (even if indefinite) of U.S. or multinational forces.

Reduce civil interference with military operations.

Support civil order programs and HN law enforcement.

Support and exploit CMO.

Prepare the populace for elections.

Reduce the effectiveness of rumors and disinformation.

Support the countering of domestic (within the borders of the nation) and international propaganda.

Promote the legitimacy of the government.

Reduce sectarian strife.

Civil Affairs Operations

B-29. CA planners are a driving force behind the analysis of the current physical conditions affecting the HN citizenry. After assessment, CA planners should be at the forefront of integrating the balanced development function of the IDAD program. CA units, although not the only agent of project development to improve the material conditions of the population, may constitute the center of a coordinated development plan including U.S., HN, IGO, and NGO assets. In addition, the coordinated use of civil information management provides another avenue to shape the information environment. Some of the CA tasks within the strategy include the following:

Promote U.S. policy objectives before, during, and after combat operations by influencing the civil component of the operational area.

Fulfill responsibilities of the military under U.S. domestic and international laws relevant to civilian populations.

Reduce civil interference with military operations.

Coordinate military operations with civilian agencies of the USG, indigenous populations and institutions, IGO, and NGOs.

Exercise civil administration in liberated areas until HN authorities can assume control.

Provide direct assistance to the HN.

Support civilian efforts to provide assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population.

Provide expertise and advice in rehabilitating or restoring civil-sector functions.

MINIMUM USE OF VIOLENCE

B-30. Throughout human history, civil conflicts have proved to be some of the most violent of any war or strife. Even in civil strife that has primarily been fought observing the laws, rules, and codes of conflict acceptable at the time, pockets of excessive and sometimes wanton violence have existed. For instance, the violence in parts of Kentucky and along the Kansas-Missouri border during the American Civil War rose to heights far above those in any other theater, and that violence was widely condemned. A rapid escalation of violence that far exceeds necessary force may happen on both sides of a civil conflict. The challenge in the formulation and execution of a strategy is to—

Examine all COAs carefully in response to the internal violence.

Choose strategies that can best minimize violence.

Formulate clear ROE.

Develop means and methods to enforce the ROE.

Publish how ROE violators are disciplined.

Determine if additional, specific criminal statutes are necessary to deal with threats.

Plan for the potential of escalation and determine the thresholds for de-escalation.

Assess the maximum potential for detainee levels.

Determine if an amnesty program is feasible.

Distance the current government psychologically from past abuses.

Punish past abusers, if practicable.

Anticipate deception, disinformation, and propaganda.

Assess the potential benefit or detriment of a demonstration of overwhelming force.

B-31. The IDAD strategy stresses the minimum use of violence in maintaining order and communicates that intention from the highest levels. The strategy should consciously seek to seize the moral high ground in the earliest stages of operations. This does not necessarily prohibit the use of overwhelming force. The confidence the populace has in the government’s ability to provide security is invariably derived from the belief that the government possesses strength superior to the internal threat. However, the populace loses confidence in the government or coalition forces if it perceives that strength as uncontrolled or ineffective. Therefore, claims of inevitable success may often be detrimental. In addition, collateral damage, even if perceived as necessary, erodes support over time. In other instances, it is necessary to proceed with caution, extending the duration, but limiting the intensity or scope of violence. A balance of the discreet use of force as a rule and the atypical use of force that is deliberately overt and overwhelming to maximize its psychological effect must be achieved.

ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDANCE

B-32. The following discussion provides a model for an organization to coordinate, plan, and conduct IDAD activities. Actual organizations may vary from country to country to adapt to existing conditions, and the organizational model for planning may evolve into a different form for execution. Organizations should follow the established political organization of the nation concerned. The organization should provide centralized planning and direction and facilitate decentralized execution of the plan. The organization should be structured and chartered so that it can coordinate and direct the efforts of existing government agencies; however, it should minimize interference with those normal functions of those agencies. Building new agencies or organizations in the HN government presents profound challenges, but studying the feasibility of this may be necessary. Modification or expansion of existing institutions invariably presents fewer challenges. Examples of national and subnational organizations show how to achieve a coordinated and unified effort at each level.

NATIONAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATION

B-33. An internal threat planning and coordination office is a national-level organization that formulates and facilitates the program. Its major offices normally correspond to branches and agencies of the HN government, taking into consideration the type of internal threat or insurgency. Figure B-2, page B-9, depicts an example of a planning and coordination organization at the national level.

B-34. The planning office is responsible for long-range planning to prevent or defeat the threat. Its plans provide the chief executive with a basis for delineating authority, establishing responsibility, designating objectives, and allocating resources. Civilian control of this office is not a foregone conclusion in some nations. Planners and advisors may need to stand ready to explain the necessity of civilian oversight.

B-35. The intelligence office develops concepts, directs programs, and plans and provides general guidance on intelligence related to national security. The intelligence office also coordinates intelligence production activities and correlates, evaluates, interprets, and disseminates intelligence. Representatives from intelligence agencies and police and military intelligence staff this office. At a minimum, units conducting FID must have access to the products of this office either directly or through their supported or higher unit. In addition, subject-matter experts may be attached to this office to provide input in their areas of expertise.

B-36. The population and resources control office develops economic policies and plans and provides general operational guidance for all forces in the security field. Representatives of government branches concerned with commerce, as well as law enforcement and justice, staff this office. CA personnel should be tasked to coordinate with and support this office. In addition, a planning or liaison element from the deployed MISO unit can augment civil information management activities.

B-37. The military affairs office develops and coordinates general plans for the mobilization and allocation of the regular armed and paramilitary forces. Representatives from all major components of the regular and paramilitary forces staff this office.

B-38. Five separate offices covering MISO, information, economic affairs, cultural affairs, and political affairs represent their parent national-level branches or agencies, and develop operational concepts and policies for inclusion in the national plan. The social and political sensitivities of the HN must be taken into account when designating a MISO-based office. Characterizing this office in less military terms may be necessary; however, even the appearance of deception can be catastrophic to the future legitimacy of products. Truthful representations of the composition, mandate, and legal parameters of the office must be sociopolitically acceptable to the HN populace.

B-39. The administration office performs support activities for the national organization and other duties as directed. It typically serves as the communication hub of the organization and provides the necessary logistical resources from the national organization. The administration office may be tasked with receiving all requests and communications from the HN population and routing them to their appropriate office.

SUBNATIONAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATION

B-40. Area coordination centers may function as combined civil-military headquarters at subnational, state, and local levels. Area coordination centers plan, coordinate, and exercise OPCON over all military forces, and they may direct civilian government organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. The center does not replace unit tactical operations centers or the normal government administrative organization in the joint operations area.

B-41. Area coordination centers perform a two-fold mission: (1) they provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction for all internal defense efforts, and (2) they ensure an immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements. These centers should conduct continuous operations and communications. Senior government officials supervise and coordinate the activities of the staffs responsible for formulating internal defense plans and operations in their areas of interest or regional commands. The staffs contain selected representatives of major forces and agencies assigned to or operating in the center’s area of operations. Each area coordination center includes members from the—

Area military command.

Area police agency.

Local and national intelligence organization.

Public information and MISO-like agencies.

Paramilitary forces.

Local and national government offices involved in the economic, social, and political aspects of IDAD.

B-42. There are two types of subnational coordination centers that a government may form—regional and urban. The choice depends upon the environment in which the center operates.

B-43. Regional centers normally locate with the nation’s first subnational political subdivision with a fully developed governmental template (state, province, or other). These government subdivisions are usually well established, having exercised government functions in their areas before the emergence of an internal threat. However, during FID operations in which a natural disaster has occurred or where an insurgency or other force has been operating unchecked, the apparatus of government may exist in little more than name only.

B-44. Regional centers often are the lowest level of administration able to coordinate all IDAD programs. A full range of developmental, informational, and military capabilities may exist at this level. Those that are not part of the normal government organization should be added when the coordination centers activate. This augmentation enables the area coordination centers to coordinate their activities better by using the existing structure.

B-45. Select urban areas may require separate coordination centers in order to plan, coordinate, and direct IDAD efforts. Urban coordination centers are appropriate for cities and heavily populated areas that might tend to overtax a regional center or become the focus of efforts at the expense of less populated areas in the subnational division. In some instances, this may require the collocation of a regional center and a separate urban area coordination center in the same city. The decision to physically collocate or share personnel or resources is controlled by the government according to its statutes and protocols. Urban centers organize like the centers previously described and perform the same functions. They contain elements from national-level organizations, but the urban area coordination centers also include representatives from local government and public service agencies.

B-46. If the urban area comprises several separate political subdivisions with no overall political control, the area coordination centers establish the control necessary for proper planning and coordination. This generally includes suburbs and communities within a greater metropolitan area. If the urban area has sufficiently advanced transportation, this may be defined as the area within the range of commuting workers. Although the urban area coordination centers may be delineated by the beginning of agricultural lands, this may be problematic in countries with high population densities, since small-scale agriculture may be intermingled with urban socioeconomic features. The incorporation of shantytowns, refugee camps, or other fluid populations within the jurisdiction of an urban coordination center may be warranted. Conversely, certain advantages may be gained with such populations in fostering a continued sense of identification with their original communities by bringing them under the authority of the regional coordination center. Operationally this can make the transition of such populations back to those original homes easier.

CIVILIAN ADVISORY COMMITTEES

B-47. Committees comprised of influential citizens help coordination centers at all levels monitor the success of their activities and gain popular support. These committees evaluate actions affecting civilians, communicate with the people, and they provide feedback for future operational planning. Involvement of leading citizens in committees increases their stake in and commitment to government programs and social mobilization objectives.

B-48. The organization of a civilian committee varies according to local needs; changing situations require flexibility in structure. The chair of the committee should be a prominent figure either appointed by the government or (preferably) elected by the membership. In some instances, it may be useful to select a nonvoting moderator who is perceived as neutral. In this case, such a moderator should not be a coalition, HN, or U.S. official. An IGO or NGO official is one example of such a moderator. General committee membership includes leaders in civilian organizations and other community groups who have influence with the target population. These leaders may include—

Political leaders, to include—

▪ Retired government officials.

▪ Former dissenters or dissidents.

▪ Returned expatriates.

Religious leaders.

Credible sports, arts, and entertainment stars.

Education officials (distinguished professors and teachers).

Respected medical personalities.

Minority group representatives.

Labor officials.

Leaders of domestic charities.

Heads of local news media, distinguished writers, journalists, and editors.

Business and commercial leaders.

Fraternal order leaders.

Wildcards (unanticipated new popular figures).

B-49. In addition to the list given above, it may be useful to consider placing former insurgents on civilian committees to effect reconciliation. Planners must balance the possible benefits of enfranchising the former insurgent and providing him with a nonbinding forum to redress grievances with the risk of the committee becoming mired in sectarian issues. The general maxim, however, is that inclusion rather than exclusion is the goal, because the success of a committee hinges on including leading participants from all major political and cultural groupings, including minorities.

Appendix C

Intelligence Support Operations

Intelligence support is an integral part of all operations. As a result of the common tactic of cellular organizations to compartmentalize information, there is a near certainty that information gaps will exist because of the covert or clandestine nature of subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. This challenge is not insurmountable for organic intelligence personnel, but it clearly places the burden on confirming that information processed into user-level intelligence is correct. FID operations, like all subsets of irregular warfare, require intelligence personnel to collect and analyze information that typically would not be of such great importance in a conventional operation against the nation-state’s military forces. The challenges of intelligence support to FID operations require unconventional and critical thinking to counter an adaptive adversary that is indistinct and often unpredictable using an irregular and unbalanced approach as an advantage.

Intelligence analysis in FID environments is a key factor in enabling the HN in becoming proactive in its attempt to predict the future impact of the threat, terrain and weather, and civil considerations on operations. Actionable intelligence is an example of bringing the characteristics of effective intelligence together with information that answers operational requirements. Intelligence operations for FID comprise the use of intelligence products and frequently emphasize human intelligence collection and CI. The nature of the threat typically places great emphasis on human factors; however, they are not the only relevant intelligence disciplines to operations. However, all means of available information gathering should be used and, somewhat paradoxically, open-source intelligence may provide large portions of the intelligence necessary for operations. For instance, open-source intelligence may provide the vast majority of necessary infrastructure intelligence or provide a coherent and complete picture of the last elections held in the nation. In short, despite its emphasis on human factors, operators should use all disciplines when analyzing subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats.

ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

C-1. The primary duty of intelligence personnel engaged in operations is to produce intelligence to prevent or defeat subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. Army units must be ready to train, advise, and help HN personnel in intelligence operations. The effect of HN intelligence support to operations will benefit U.S. security goals. Intelligence personnel must collect information and produce intelligence on almost all aspects of the environment. When insurgents, terrorists, or common criminals receive aid from an external power, intelligence personnel must determine the degree of the external power’s role and seek out vulnerabilities in this connection for exploitation. In the contemporary environment, intelligence personnel cannot assume that an entity, even nation-states, have traditional motivators or values. Since the end of the Cold War, former client states of the United States and the former Soviet Union (feeling they lacked alternatives or as an augmentative strategy) have sought advantage through criminal enterprises, such as counterfeiting and drug trafficking. Many internal threats are influenced by the examples of nation-states. Information is needed not only on internal threats but also on their infrastructure organizations and their relationships with the populace. These relationships make the populace a lucrative source of information.

C-2. A sound collection program and proper use of the various collection agencies and information sources result in a heavy volume of information flowing into the intelligence production element. Because of the complexities of the social environment, politics, and military tactics, intelligence personnel frequently can only meet intelligence requirements by reporting minute and sometimes technical details on a great variety of subject areas. Each detail may appear unrelated to others and may seem insignificant by itself. Nevertheless, when mapped and chronologically recorded over long periods and analyzed with other reported details, these details may lead to definitive and predictable patterns of insurgent or other internal threat activity.

C-3. Even in a cellular organization, the threat leadership recognizes the shortcomings in their security (for example, viral targeting) and military posture. Therefore, the leader minimizes the weaknesses inherent in using and supporting isolated, unsophisticated forces (such as adversaries with lesser technological assets) that may use ponderous and primitive logistics systems. In addition, although sophisticated communications systems may be employed at times, circumstances may force the internal threat leader to rely on the most basic form of communications—a human courier. A leader uses the weather, terrain (including complex urban geometry), and populace to employ deception, secrecy, surprise, and simplicity. The plans and actions these unsophisticated forces generally carry out must be simple, comprehensive, and repetitive if they are to develop a pattern of success. Most internal threats must demonstrate perseverance and focus on the attrition of HN and U.S. forces when prosecuting the insurgency. Consequently, subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats often seek a solution that diametrically opposes TTP that a conventional force would use. Although much of an internal threat’s structure may be relatively simplistic, such as cellular and improvised weaponry, they may also use the complexities of the Internet to recruit, propagandize, and even send message traffic that may be, in essence, encoded.

Note: Viral targeting is a type of defeat mechanism that disrupts the human element around rare and valuable skills of insurgent groups, with minimal civil impacts.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

C-4. In FID operations, the adversary is compromised of the populace, either civilian supporters or members of an internal threat. The differences between supporters and members are usually ill-defined at best. A complete awareness and intimate knowledge of the environment is essential to conducting current intelligence operations. The basic nature of the internal security problem requires an intensive initial intelligence effort to pinpoint the roots of subversion, criminality, or other antigovernment behavior.

C-5. In conventional operations, a force may succeed in capturing a military objective by attacking with overwhelming strength. A force can sometimes attain success in this situation without timely and detailed intelligence. Such success is not the likely case in FID operations. An internal threat seldom holds terrain. Even in an urban environment, they may move from location to location. Typically, an internal threat will commit overtly only when cornered or when the odds heavily favor its chances of winning. The one exception would be a target of such high value or high payoff in terms of its psychological or strategic import that it is determined to be worth the expenditure of lives and resources. It is critical, regardless of an internal threat’s actions, to remember that its base of operations is the populace itself. The internal threat, therefore, cannot be easily detected and overwhelmed as long as it maintains the cooperation of the populace or continues to successfully coerce a sufficient portion of the populace to support it. Internal threats require scrutiny, delicate and discriminating analysis, and aggressive and accurate countermeasures.

INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

C-6. The intelligence process (Figure C-1, page C-3) does not change across the range of military operations or the specific type of operation. FID operations require intelligence that adheres to the basic principle of the intelligence process; namely, that it is not linear, just as the adversary is not linear. Army personnel can simultaneously conduct or support all steps and activities of the intelligence process during operations.

C-7. Army intelligence operations are conducted by performing four steps that constitute the intelligence process:

Plan.

Prepare.

Collect.

Produce.

C-8. In addition, there are four continuing activities that occur across the four intelligence process steps:

Generate intelligence knowledge.

Analyze.

Assess.

Disseminate.

C-9. Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is vital to successful operations. This dependence on intelligence and CI can be greater in FID operations than in other operations. The intelligence required is of the type, quantity, and quality that—

Supports the deduction of motivators and other human factors to understand the adversary.

Provides goals for daily or major operations (for example, intelligence that locates guerrillas for tactical counterguerrilla operations).

Enables nation forces to retain or regain the initiative.

Enables nation forces to continuously increase the pressure on an internal threat’s security and life support.

PLAN

C-10. Planning the intelligence process in operations turns general intelligence requirements and the specific requirements of FID into a clear collection plan. During these operations, this generally begins with identifying gaps in HN and U.S. intelligence. The internal threat is often a patchwork quilt with several patches missing in intelligence terms at the beginning of the operation. Planning may also have to answer how to mitigate limited collection assets as well. Direction of the plan in the case of these operations is more complex because of joint, multinational, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental partner considerations and possibly classification issues. Intelligence personnel may face limitations on the ability to release products or disclose sources and, as a result, they will have to deal with extra directional hurdles.

PREPARE

C-11. Preparation is the key to successful intelligence analysis and collection. SOF preparation of the environment may include activities conducted by selectively trained SOF to develop an environment for potential future special operations, to include FID. The prepare step requires adherence to those tasks articulated in ADRP 2-0, Chapter 4; however, the specific situation arises that proper preparation typically involves (ideally) military intelligence (Soldiers’ participation) in the predeployment site survey. Intelligence analysts must use a collection plan to prepare products and produce orders for the commander and his staff. Failure to properly prepare for intelligence collection and the development of intelligence products can cause many avenues of counterproductive or inefficient use of limited resources. The prepare step includes those staff, leader, and Soldier activities that take place upon receiving the relevant plan, order, or commander’s intent to improve the unit’s ability to execute. The preparation for operations may include preliminary surveillance and reconnaissance necessary to determine the methodology and assets for a collection plan. In addition, in an operation (particularly in an austere environment), the prepare step typically focuses on identifying any likely and potential collection and processing shortfalls. Operations in remote locations typically present less-than-ideal manning and equipment levels. These situations present risks but can be properly mitigated or assumed based on operational priorities.

COLLECT

C-12. In FID operations, the problem is to identify and locate the adversary. In an insurgency, the front is everywhere. The same is generally true for other threats, such as criminal elements. Even after identifying and establishing operational patterns of members and patterns of life on key members of the internal threat, the local police or security force must find and fix a location on these adversaries before they can plan a capture. There are essentially three methods of obtaining contact intelligence:

Patrols. After developing some knowledge of the behavioral patterns of the internal threat from a study of their past movements, patrols or police squads can search for physical evidence (tracks, campsites, safe houses, abandoned vehicles, and so on). If there is a consistent pattern, patrols can be selectively dispatched based on anticipated movements. Unmanned aircraft systems conducting surveillance, both with and without Soldiers on the ground, are the equivalents of patrols in some cases. Unmanned aerial systems cannot be considered as a substitute for Soldier-based reconnaissance in other salient areas of interest, such as caves, thick vegetative areas, areas of intentional deception, urban undergrounds, or hydrographic surveys.

Forced Contacts. When internal threats are separated from the populace, their normal supply channels are cut off, and this separation forces the guerrillas or other internal threat members into the open to contact their command or support elements. After identifying members, the police can arrest them. The remaining threats will then have to visit the fewer members of their support elements, thus further narrowing the targeting of remaining support.

Informants. Using informants is a reliable and quick means of obtaining specific data required in contact intelligence. Through a process designed to protect their identity, informants pass information about movements, positions, and activities of the subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats almost immediately. If the local security force receives this information, its commander should be authorized to take immediate action on his own authority with no requirement to seek approval from higher authorities. It must be noted that, barring voluntary information by a member of the populace, only specially trained Soldiers are authorized to solicit or use informants.

C-13. Intelligence personnel must consider the parameters within which an internal threat operates. For example, insurgents frequently establish a centralized intelligence-processing center to collect and coordinate the amount of information required to make long-range intelligence estimates. Army and HN long-range intelligence efforts focus on the stable factors existing in an insurgency or other ongoing internal threat. For example, various demographic factors (ethnic, racial, social, economic, religious, and political characteristics of the area in which the underground movement takes place) are useful in identifying the members of the underground, criminal hierarchy, or other internal threat structure. Discerning multiple parallel and competing structures may be necessary as well. Information about the internal threat’s organization at the national, district, and local levels is fundamental to operations.

C-14. Collection of specific short-range intelligence about the rapidly changing variables of a local situation is critical. Intelligence personnel must gather information on members of the internal threat, their movements, and their methods. Biographies and photos of suspected members and detailed information on their homes, families, education, work history, and associates are important elements of short-range intelligence.

C-15. Destroying insurgent threat tactical units is not enough to defeat the typical adversary. Focusing on this myopic approach rather than a comprehensive approach may aggravate the root causes, actually fostering larger numbers of armed resistors, and trigger the need for operations to gain support of the populace. Nevertheless, tactical success against armed elements is an integral part of a comprehensive program. Initially, however, forces must neutralize the internal threat’s underground cells or infrastructure, because this infrastructure is the main source of tactical intelligence and populace control. Eliminating the infrastructure within an area achieves two goals:

Ensures government control of the area.

Cuts off the enemy’s main source of intelligence.

C-16. FID operations need an intelligence and operations command center at the district or province level. This organization accomplishes a fusion of actionable intelligence for operations against the internal threat infrastructure with feedback from the operational element. In addition to U.S. informational and intelligence sources, information on internal threat infrastructure targets should come from sources, such as the national police and other established intelligence nets, agents, and individuals (informants). In addition, operators should use all electronic intelligence available to track activities, such as cell phone use.

C-17. Security forces can induce individuals among the general populace to become informants. Security forces use various motives (civic-mindedness, patriotism, fear, punishment avoidance, gratitude, revenge or jealousy, and financial rewards) as persuasive influence. The motivation of the informant should be taken into account when determining trustworthiness and whether the HN should act on the information. They use the assurance of protection from reprisal as a major inducement. Security forces must maintain the informant’s anonymity and must conceal the transfer of information from the source to the security agent. The security agent and the informant may prearrange signals to coincide with everyday behavior.

C-18. Surveillance, the covert observation of persons and places, is a principal method of gaining and confirming intelligence information. Surveillance techniques naturally vary with the requirements of different situations. The basic procedures include electronic observation (for example, video, wiretaps, or concealed microphones), observation from fixed locations, and physical surveillance of subjects.

C-19. Whenever security forces apprehend a suspect during an operation, a hasty interrogation by qualified personnel or tactical questioning by any Soldier takes place to gain immediate information that could be of tactical value. An interpreter briefed beforehand is used if the interrogator or questioner is unable to speak the detainee’s language. Recording devices may also help the interrogator, but at a minimum, a notetaker should record all sessions. The recorder allows the interrogator a more free-flowing interrogation. The recorder allows a knowledgeable interpreter to elaborate on points the detainee has mentioned without the interrogator or questioner interrupting the continuity established during a given sequence. The interpreter and the interrogator or questioner must be well trained to work as a team. The interpreter has to be familiar with all procedures, and his preinterrogation briefings must cover the current situation, background information on the detainee, administrative particulars, and any other specific information required. Successful interrogation or tactical questioning is contingent upon continuity and a well-trained interpreter.

C-20. Documenting ongoing collection in operations is similar to conventional tactical situations. FID operations require large amounts of information on a continuous basis; therefore, most records contain everything from raw information to processed intelligence. All records, therefore, are living documents that may simultaneously have analysts executing more than one category of the intelligence process.

C-21. Typical ongoing collection files consist of—

Incident overlay.

Internal threat situation overlay.

Trap overlay.

Personalities and contacts overlay.

Individual local personality and organization file.

General military intelligence worksheet.

Internal threat analysis worksheet.

Hot file.

Propaganda file and overlay.

Area studies file.

C-22. Intelligence analysts promptly compare new information with existing information and intelligence to determine its significance. To a large degree, the extent of the recording effort depends upon the internal threat activity in the area.

C-23. Depending on the echelon of responsibility, the state of internal threat activity in the area, and the degree of knowledge of the adversary, the current intelligence graphic requires at least two annotated maps:

Incident overlay.

Internal threat situation overlay.

C-24. The incident overlay provides historic, cumulative information on insurgent activity trends or patterns. These should be maintained regardless of databases—similar to how geographic profiles in law enforcement are recorded on maps. Properly maintained entries allow the intelligence analyst to make judgments about the—

Nature and location of internal threat targets.

Relative intensity of internal threat interest in specific areas.

Internal threat’s control over or support from the populace.

Potential areas of internal threat operations.

C-25. The internal threat situation overlay represents intelligence. Analysts build much of the situation overlay around the information recorded on the incident map. They find it difficult to pinpoint internal threat installations and dispositions with the same degree of confidence as in a conventional, tactical situation. Many internal threats can displace on short notice, which can make a report outdated before it can be confirmed. The situation overlay can graphically substantiate the trends or patterns derived from the incident overlay, which improves the economy and effectiveness of the collection effort. The situation overlay provides a ready guide for briefing the commander, civil authorities, or other interested parties.

C-26. Other annotated maps include the trap overlay and the personalities and contacts overlay. The trap overlay is used if the internal threat is capable of sabotage or terrorist action. It portrays particularly attractive target locations for sabotage or terrorism. The trap overlay is used by the operations and intelligence sections to predict where threat organizations may strike. When used in conjunction with the line of communications overlay, it provides the operations section with a template for planning interdiction points along likely egress routes. Targets may be road and railroad bridges, communications centers, theaters and assembly halls, governance and security buildings, relief centers, and places where the terrain is a target for ambushes and raids. The trap overlay was derived from the operations in low-intensity conflict and can be facilitated by development of the terrorist trends overlay. The terrorist trends overlay can be used in lieu of a situation template. Security forces should use the technique that graphically illustrates the threat or adversary COA and options. ATP 2-01.3 provides more information on situation templates and techniques to help develop a list of high-value targets. Another memory aid that may be helpful is the six categories of civil considerations—ASCOPE, which provides an in-depth analysis of the civil considerations that are vital for the long-term success against an insurgency. Detailed information on the analysis of civil considerations using ASCOPE can be found in FM 3-24.2. ASCOPE overlays and matrices should be conducted in partnership with HN security forces and local government officials. Recent experience with improvised explosive devices has shown that, apart from being on a likely route of travel for HN or U.S. forces, their placement is otherwise irrelevant or purposefully misleading (similar to military deception) and illogical. These areas are plainly marked on the overlay maps, directing attention to possible internal threat access and escape routes.

C-27. Initial intelligence about the internal threat situation may be information on locations and activities of individual agents (espionage, agitation, organization, and liaison). Personality is a critical factor when analyzing the threat or adversary. Attention often must be focused on individuals in an attempt to link them to other known or unknown elements of the group. This process takes time. Threat or adversary organizations can be depicted through multidimensional link analysis (determining relationships between critical personalities, interests, and then their group association). FM 2-22.2 provides detailed information on link analysis diagrams. The personalities and contacts overlay records the appearances, movements, meetings, and disappearances of these agents. A large-scale city street map or town plan is required to track the individuals. Dated symbols indicate observations, electromagnetic intercepts, and incidents. Depending on the amount of internal threat activity, intelligence analysts can combine this overlay with the incident overlay. A good reference manual for detailed information on source coverage overlays or matrices, to include pattern analysis, is FM 2-22.3.

C-28. Each identifiable internal threat personality also has an individual local personality and organization file, whether named or not. (Filing by a nickname, alias, or number is acceptable in the latter case.) If the local police force carries out surveillance, it can transfer basic identifying and biographical information from archives to an electronic or, if necessary, card file. This file helps train friendly forces to recognize key personalities on sight. The organization section of this file contains information on the—

History and activities of the internal threat organization.

Other subversive or suspected groups and their leaders.

Overlapping directorates of, membership in, and liaison among different internal threat groups or local organizations.

C-29. A general military intelligence worksheet and the annotated maps serve to isolate problem areas and establish links between items of information and intelligence collected. In the early phase of an insurgency, the enemy builds its own organization; therefore, the organizational procedures and tactics are specific. The intelligence analyst must study personalities and analyze incidents.

C-30. An internal threat analysis worksheet helps identify information and intelligence needed to satisfy priority intelligence requirements and information requirements. It provides a guide for analysis of an environment for operations short of war.

C-31. The hot file, designated by multiple names, is the most important working file. It includes all available materiel pertaining to an incident or groups of possibly related incidents of current interest. This file contains information on persons, agents, suspects, or places likely to be involved in internal threat activity.

C-32. If adversary or threat information, including propaganda, is a part of the internal threat effort in the area, a current adversary information file and resultant overlay should contain items pertaining to the grievances and resultant vulnerabilities and susceptibilities the internal threats exploit. Figure C-2, page C-8, shows an example of characteristics of the information environment that affect friendly MISO and threat information activities. The MISO planner focuses on defining the information environment. Overlays are used to enhance visualization of the information environment.

C-33. There is no set format for the characteristics overlay, as significant characteristics vary widely based on the operational environment and type of operation or mission. Items in such a file include—

Any hard copies of adversary information products.

Background material includes—

▪ Photographs and recordings of adversary information products.

▪ Adversary information analyses.

▪ Any past counteradversary information measures.

Analyses of local grievances includes—

▪ Target audience analyses.

▪ Lists of other grievances by nontargeted audiences.

▪ Upcoming counteradversary information measures.

C-34. Area study files provide a baseline of important data that acts as a starting point for any detailed information requests. The files are also updated as new intelligence is made available. The files contain data on—

Demographics.

Geography.

Hydrography.

Climate.

Political and economic characteristics.

HN military and paramilitary forces.

Internal threat organization.

Targets.

C-35. Finally, a resource or archival file contains all information collected but assessed not of immediate value. This file may include inactive incident files, inactive personality and organization files, and photography. Information later judged to be of no value or erroneous can be maintained, possibly only in digitized form, to aid in lessons learned for future collection plans and to possibly discern adversary misinformation or disinformation operations.

PRODUCE

C-36. Production is the category of the intelligence process through which information begins to become intelligence. Production includes first-phase imagery exploitation, data conversion and correlation, document translation, and signal decryption, as well as reporting the results of these actions to analysis and production elements. Certain factors are specific to the FID environment. Intelligence analysts must apply these factors to determine internal threat capabilities and COAs and provide the intelligence needed for all facets of the operations. An often-overlooked technique of determining what the internal threat is doing to influence the population can be found in open-source media. Analysts must make a concerted effort to review and capture any propaganda found on the Internet, television, radio broadcast, and newspapers, as well as signs or graffiti. Once propaganda is collected, intelligence analysts must track and measure the propaganda against future actions of the internal threat and population. These messages support understanding of the internal threat’s thought process that planners can consider in counteractions.

C-37. Intelligence production happens only after intelligence analysts have compared it with other information and interpreted it to determine its significance. All-source analysts primarily conduct analysis and production. These analysts fuse information from all intelligence disciplines. This multidiscipline fusion effort results in all-source intelligence. All-source intelligence deduces the probable meaning of new information and determines its implications for future internal threat activities. The meaning of the information is determined in relation to the internal threat situation and probable COAs. The intelligence analyst, in his search for related information, checks the incident file, the friendly and suspect personality files, and the organizational file. After obtaining all related items of information from the intelligence files, the intelligence analyst begins to assemble the available information to form as many logical pictures or hypotheses as possible. Alternative methods of assembly are an essential prerequisite to any valid all-source interpretation. The assembly of information to develop logical hypotheses requires good judgment and considerable background knowledge. In formulating hypotheses, the intelligence analyst must avoid limitations resulting from preconceived opinions.

C-38. At a joint command, the intelligence analyst uses the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. At a SOTF or other Army command, the analyst uses the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process for intelligence production. The staff develops other intelligence preparation of the battlefield products during mission analysis. That collaboration should result in the drafting of initial priority intelligence requirements, the production of a complete modified combined obstacles overlay, a list of high-value targets, and unrefined event templates and matrices. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield should provide a clearer understanding of the threat’s or adversary’s center of gravity, which then can be exploited by friendly forces. ATP 2-01.3 provides detailed information. Intelligence preparation of the operational environment supports commanders and their staffs in the decisionmaking process. The commander directs the intelligence preparation of the operational environment effort through the commander’s critical information requirement. All other staff elements are active participants in the intelligence preparation of the operational environment.

GENERATE INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE

C-39. Generate intelligence knowledge is a continuous and user-defined continuing activity driven by the commander. It begins before mission receipt and continues throughout an operation. This activity occurs whenever there is a need to analyze and understand the broad scope of the operational environment beyond the narrow focus of a specific mission. The purpose of generating intelligence knowledge is to provide the intelligence staff with relevant knowledge required to conduct operations. It serves as the foundation for performing intelligence preparation of the battlefield and mission analysis. The primary products of generating intelligence knowledge are the initial data files and the initial intelligence survey.

C-40. Generating intelligence knowledge is essentially the same as in other operations; however, FID operations generate information that may take extremely long time frames to be vetted. In fact, information, such as CA- or MISO-specific demographic information may have a generational shelf life. In generating intelligence knowledge, the products from processed information may be catalogued within a larger repository of information that cannot be processed without further input.

ANALYZE

C-41. Analysis is the examination of information to determine its intelligence value. The intelligence analyst’s knowledge and judgment play a major role in analyzing information; therefore, he must know the theory of insurgency and the mindset of antigovernment internal threats. In considering if a fact or event is possible, he must realize that certain events are possible, even if they have not previously occurred and have been thought unlikely to occur. Intelligence analysis takes confirmed intelligence and puts it into a form usable by the requestor. All available processed information is evaluated, analyzed, and interpreted to create products that satisfy the commander’s priority intelligence requirements or requests for information.

ASSESS

C-42. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation (ADP 3-0). Assessment plays an integral role in all aspects of the intelligence process. Assessing the situation and available information begins upon receipt of the mission and continues throughout the intelligence process. The continual assessment of intelligence operations is to—

Ensure the information requirements are answered.

Ensure intelligence requirements are met.

Redirect collection assets to support changing requirements.

Ensure operations run effectively and efficiently.

Ensure proper use of information and intelligence.

Identify enemy efforts at deception and denial.

DISSEMINATE

C-43. The final step of the intelligence cycle is integrating and sharing the intelligence that was processed. Intelligence and combat information are of little value if not delivered when needed. Failure to disseminate this intelligence defeats a thorough and successful collection and processing effort. Because of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, the senior intelligence officer produces a variety of templates, overlays, association and event matrices, and flowcharts appropriate to the operational environment. The intelligence products are presented in a timely manner for approval and guidance. The senior intelligence officer promptly provides the correct products to the right consumers and also ensures these products are adequate for and properly used by the consumers. Where appropriate, the senior intelligence officer must advise and coach nonintelligence personnel in the use of the products. He must also use intelligence products to identify gaps in the intelligence database and to redirect collection efforts.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION

C-44. Whether using the fundamentally similar joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment or intelligence preparation of the battlefield, certain categories of information stand out as critical to obtaining a complete intelligence picture. JP 3-22 divides joint intelligence preparation for FID operations into five categories:

Operational environment evaluation.

Geographic analysis.

Climatology analysis.

Population analysis.

Threat analysis.

C-45. Information requirements fall under those five categories; however, information requirements may require more detail and specificity than those of other operations. The following sections describe the five joint categories highlighting FID-specific characteristics, as well as those relevant to the entire force, whether joint, multinational, or intergovernmental. Intelligence products (for example, the incident overlay) share information with the Army living collection files, and others receive input from other files. All collaborative partner elements engaged in operations are represented in these categories, and personnel must include terms that place all relevant intelligence on the final products, not just data compiled by Army units. SOF-specific subcategories of files and overlays are included under the five categories of intelligence preparation analysis and evaluations. Reciprocation of higher-echelon or joint, multinational, and intergovernmental analysis products and Army products with other collaborative partners in operations is essential for a complete picture of the operational environment.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT EVALUATION

C-46. During the evaluation of the operational environment, information is collected to satisfy basic intelligence requirements across a comprehensive spectrum that includes political, military, economic, religious, social, geographic, psychological, cultural, friendly forces, adversaries, third-party forces, and the health status of the local population. Area study files can contribute greatly to this evaluation. Depending on the conditions in the country, notably the maturity of the threat groups, the basic level for any area may comprise large amounts of data. One of these areas is the civil considerations; hence, of particular interest in this category is the evaluation of MISO and CMO situations.

Military Information Support Operations Evaluation

C-47. The MISO assessment and any available studies identify potential target audiences, available and needed media, themes and symbols, and adversary propaganda capability. This information is analyzed by MISO personnel with the support of fulfilled information requirements from organic and higher-echelon intelligence assets. Analysts developing an environment evaluation also focus on, but do not limit themselves to identifying the—

Ethnic, racial, social, economic, religious, and linguistic groups of the area and the location and density of each group.

Key leaders and communicators in the area, such as politicians and government officials, clergy, labor leaders, media personalities, business people, and so on.

Cohesive and divisive issues within the nation and select areas.

Literacy rates and levels of education of the local population.

Types of media consumed by potential target audiences and its level of credibility.

Third-country organizations or nationals in the nation, their stated purpose, their actual actions, their truthfulness, and their effects on the populace.

Production and trade, including significant trade agreements, restrictions, and sanctions or lack thereof.

Issues of use and ownership of natural resources, industry, and agriculture of the nation.

Intended national programs and target audiences.

Types of adversary information encountered and any background on the source.

C-48. In the course of the operational environment evaluation, the planners (with HN counterparts, if available) coordinate with military and embassy target audience personnel to prepare a matrix or other graphic identifying groups, their leaders, preferred media, and key issues that should be developed. Planners also identify target groups and potential target audiences. In addition, MISO and public affairs programs must accomplish deconfliction to prevent information destruction. The locations of mass and local media facilities in the area that can be used for the dissemination of programs and public affairs products and the identification of the operational characteristics and capacities of these media outlets are important in the selection of the best dissemination vehicle for these products.

C-49. In addition, guerrilla or underground media facilities (or products if facilities are obscured or covert) are also assessed. In particular, the planner must evaluate—

Studios and transmitters for radio and television and their operational characteristics (wattage, frequency, programming, and costs).

Heavy and light printing facilities, including locations, types, and capacities of equipment that can provide or supplement the capabilities of MISO units.

Accessibility of such facilities to U.S. forces; for example, who controls them and whether they will cooperate with the United States.

Possible national media donors and contributors in the program.

Adversary information outlets ranked from immediate to lesser concern.

Civil-Military Operations Evaluation

C-50. Operational environment evaluation of CMO in FID operations comprises an evaluation of national civic action programs, populace and resources control, civilian labor, and materiel procurement. The planner also evaluates future sites and programs for civic action undertaken by the nation unilaterally or with U.S. support through CAO, such as FHA and HCA. In making the overarching evaluation, the planner uses local and regional assets of the nation and the supported command to obtain an accurate feel for the internal threats that may exist. SOF units conducting site surveys supplement these assets at the national and local levels. If deployed, a CA planning team assists and provides data for this evaluation.

C-51. Typically, CA support to the evaluation of the operational environment uses the ASCOPE model to determine what, when, where, and why civilians might be encountered in the operational area. This helps to determine what civilian activities in the area of operations might affect military operation (and vice versa) and what the commander must do to support and interact with those activities. The model also aids in nonlethal targeting within the civilian component of the operational environment. Other data is typically derived from area studies and assessments.

GEOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS

C-52. The next intelligence preparation category to support operations is the geographic analysis, which considers the terrain’s effect on a wide range of factors that include the political, military, economic, religious, social, psychological, and cultural significance of the area. Normally, the seven map overlays described below are a result of the geographic analysis.

Cover and Concealment Overlay

C-53. The cover and concealment overlay graphically depicts the availability, density, type, and location of cover and concealment from the ground, as well as from the air. In areas of significant threat of aerial attack or observation, overhead cover and concealment may be important considerations for threat selection of base camps, mission support sites, drug laboratories, or other adversary areas. Surface configuration primarily determines cover, including natural and man-made features, such as mines, bunkers, tunnels, and fighting positions. Vegetation is the primary feature that provides concealment. The canopy closure overlay is critical for the determination of areas that offer concealment from aerial observation, particularly in tropical rain forests, and it is incorporated into the cover and concealment overlay for rural and other forested areas. In built-up areas, man-made structures are also assessed for the cover and concealment offered. When used with the population status overlay, the cover and concealment overlay can be used to determine dwelling and work places, safe houses, routes of movement, and meeting places.

C-54. It is worthy to note that both cover and concealment for an internal threat member may be hiding in plain sight as he blends back into and is indistinguishable from ordinary citizens and he, therefore, may obtain cover and concealment outside a vegetated terrain. Skillful use of canyons, washes, man-made objects (particularly subterranean features, such as the underground irrigation canals of the Middle East) and other physical features can provide improvised, although less-than-desirable, concealment with perhaps adequate cover.

Logistics Sustainability Overlay

C-55. Logistics are essential to friendly and internal threat operations. The detection and location of supply lines and bases are critical to finding and defeating hostile activities. Attention is given to basic food, water, medicine, and materiel supply; however, the search may extend to irregular and highly technical means. For example, insurgencies, criminal enterprises, and terrorists have used the Internet to conduct fund-raising from expatriates (notably the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka before its defeat), foreign and domestic criminal activity (Hezbollah in the United States and domestic internal threats in Columbia and the Philippines), intellectual and maritime piracy (Paraguay and Indonesia), and complicated international financial fraud. Such activity may necessitate a separate supplemental overlay, and nation-states may help funding and logistics through ideological parity with the internal threat or out of simple self-interest. Criminal organizations may help toward purely mercenary ends.

C-56. In rural areas, the logistics sustainability overlay depicts potable water supplies, farms, orchards, growing seasons, and other relevant items. In built-up areas, this overlay depicts markets, food warehouses, pharmacies, hospitals, clinics, and residences of doctors and other key medical personnel. In some nations, religious institutions can also serve as care providers. Vital to preparing this overlay is knowledge of the internal threat and friendly forces, their logistic requirements, and the availability and location of materiel and personnel to meet these requirements. Included in this analysis and overlay is any third-party logistics sources. For instance, an NGO may not wittingly support an armed combatant; however, they may not detect (or even attempt to detect) a combatant who has left his weaponry elsewhere and joined in with civilians seeking relief supplies or medical aid.

Target Overlay

C-57. The target overlay graphically portrays the location of possible adversary targets within the area. In FID environments, this overlay depicts banks, bridges, electric power installations, bulk petroleum and chemical facilities, military and government facilities, the residences and work places of key friendly personnel, and other specific points most susceptible to lethal attack based on threat capabilities and intentions. Increasingly, threats willing to use terror tactics have savagely targeted civilian market places, schools, playgrounds, and sports facilities. Increasingly, sacred buildings—such as temples, churches, and mosques—have also been targeted, typically during significant holy days.

C-58. Hazard estimates are prepared for those targets with collateral damage potential. For example, the threat to a large air base may focus on airframes; crew billets; and petroleum, oils, and lubricants storage—as opposed to runways, aprons, or the control tower. The target overlay is significant to the friendly commander’s defensive planning because it shows where defenses need to be concentrated and, conversely, where defenses can be diffused. It also provides CI personnel with a focus for indicators of threat preparation to attack (for example, to discover an indigenous worker pacing off the distances between perimeter fences and critical nodes). The target overlay is useful in disaster relief operations by identifying likely locations for rioting, pilfering, looting, or areas of potential collateral damage. Nonlethal targeting can be included in one overlay, a second target overlay, or in the MISO and CAO overlays.

Line of Communication Overlay

C-59. The line of communication overlay highlights transportation systems and nodes within the area, such as railways, roads, trails, navigable waterways, airfields, drop zones, and landing zones. In urban environments, mass public transit routes and schedules; underground sewage, drainage, and utility tunnels; ditches; culverts; and large open areas that could be used for drop zones and landings are shown. Where applicable, this overlay also shows seasonal variations. Personnel should carefully compare recent imagery and other geospatial intelligence, adding any new lines of communications to the final product. In many situations, lines of communications products may be readily available from the HN or other local sources. The preparer annotates internal threat lines of communications (or known portions thereof) on one overlay or on a supplemental overlay for clarity.

Incident Overlay

C-60. The incident overlay plots security-related incidents by type and location. Clusters of similar incidents represent a geographic pattern of activity. Operators further analyze these incidents for time patterns, proximity to population grouping, lines of communications, targets, and areas of cover and concealment. This analysis assists in the day-to-day application of security resources. The preparer of the joint overlay should combine the Army incident overlay and internal threat situation overlay whenever practicable and releasable in a collaborative environment with joint, multinational, and intergovernmental partners.

Military Information Support Operations and Civil-Military Operations Geographical Overlays

C-61. MISO and CMO considerations also affect the geographic analysis and produce several possible overlays that are dependent upon geography rather than internal threat activity. Typically, MISO and CA units produce these overlays, but commanders and staffs may use them in commanders and staffs briefings, as well as in daily, weekly, or other scheduled briefs.

C-62. MISO in a geographic analysis focus on how geography affects the population of the area and the dissemination of products. This step may include preparation of a radio line-of-sight overlay for radio and television stations derived from an obstacle overlay depicting elevations and line-of-sight information. For example, terrain analysis focuses on determining the respective broadcast footprints and signal strength from the significant broadcast stations identified during operational environment evaluation. Adversary threat and treaties with or the stated desires of neighboring countries can dictate denied areas for leaflet dissemination, Commando Solo orbits, or no-broadcast spillover areas. Increasingly, areas of cell phone and wireless connectivity and hard-line Internet connectivity are relevant, as well as terrain-limiting loudspeaker broadcasts.

C-63. CMO considerations in geographic analysis include the identification of critical threats to government and governance mechanisms and infrastructures, other threats to food and water storage facilities, toxic industrial material sites, resupply routes, and base locations. In addition, a primary consideration in operations is how terrain affects the ability of U.S. and HN forces to conduct CMO. For example, extremely rugged or thickly vegetated areas may be unsuited to some projects because of inaccessibility to the necessary manpower and equipment needed to run such projects.

CLIMATOLOGY ANALYSIS

C-64. Climatology can greatly affect Army and internal threat operations. Periods of dangerously low visibility, such as dust storms, gale-force or higher winds, or severe blizzard conditions, can affect air operations. Weather conditions and altitude can affect other means of infiltration; exfiltration; and survival, evasion, resistance, escape, and personnel recovery. High winds, acoustic shadow, or precipitation can grievously affect CAO, as well as MISO dissemination. Weather conditions affect subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats as well but not always adversely. Having essentially interior lines of communications, internal threats may capitalize on climate effects that limit one or more Army fires or modes of mobility. Internal threats may also capitalize on the acclimatization phase of incoming units. In addition, insurgents or other internal threats may have traditional operational seasons. For instance, in a nation with harsh winters, internal threats may go to ground in sheltered areas. A climatology analysis may produce one or more overlays as appropriate and as directed by the commander.

POPULATION ANALYSIS

C-65. In FID operations as in unconventional warfare operations, the local population is the key element to the successful execution of the operation. Consequently, planners must conduct a population analysis of the operational environment. During this analysis, the planner identifies, evaluates, and produces overlays and other products as appropriate for the following factors:

Social organization.

Economic organization and dynamics.

Political organization and dynamics.

History of the society.

Nature of the internal threat.

Nature of the government.

Effects on noncombatants.

COAs of the insurgents, the HN government, and the noncombatants.

C-66. The generic population status overlay graphically represents the sectors of the population that are progovernment, antigovernment, prothreat, antithreat, and uncommitted or neutral. This overlay is important because the population can provide support and security to friendly or threat forces. This graphic may also display educational, religious, ethnic, or economic aspects of the population. A more refined product in an urban environment may display the home and work places of key friendly and threat military or civilian personnel and their relatives. In this instance, large-scale maps or imagery are used to accurately plot information by marking rooftops of buildings. Planners should cross-reference a refined product with the defined threat characteristics that are similar to the represented data, such as personality files or faction and organization files.

C-67. In evaluating social organization, planners examine—

Density and distribution of population by groups; balance between urban and rural groups; sparsely populated areas; and concentrations of primary racial, linguistic, religious, or cultural groups.

Race, religion, national origin, tribe, caste, economic class, political party and affiliation, ideology, education level, union membership, management class, occupation, and median age of the populace.

Any overlaps among classes and splits within them, such as the number and types of religious and racial groups that union members belong to and ideological divisions within a profession.

Composite groups based on their political behavior and the component and composite strengths of each (those that actively or passively support the government or the threat and those that are neutral).

Active or potential issues motivating the political, economic, social, or military behavior of each group and subgroup.

Population growth or decline, age distribution (notably significant indentions in the population pyramid), and changes in location by groups.

Potential and identified MISO target audiences.

Factor analysis to determine which activities and programs accommodate the goals of most of the politically and socially active groups and which groups and composite groups support are inclined to support or remain neutral toward the government.

C-68. In evaluating economic organization and performance, planners specifically analyze—

The principal economic ideology of the society and local innovations or adaptations in the operational area, including—

▪ The enforcement of intellectual property rights.

▪ The existence and characteristics of shadow economies.

▪ The nature of foreign investment.

▪ Corruption—both incidental and de facto taxation to meet local officials’ salaries.

The economic infrastructure, such as resource locations, scientific and technical capabilities, electric power production and distribution, transport facilities, and communications networks.

Economic performance, such as gross national product, gross domestic product, foreign trade balance, per capita income, inflation rate, and annual growth rate.

Major industries and their sustainability, including the depth and soundness of the economic base, maximum peak production levels and duration, and storage capacity.

Performance of productive segments, such as public and private ownership patterns; concentration and dispersal; and distribution of wealth in agriculture, manufacturing, forestry, information, professional services, mining, and transportation.

Public health factors that include, but are not limited to, birth and death rates, diet and nutrition, water supply, sanitation, health care availability, endemic diseases, health of farm animals, and availability of veterinary services.

Foreign trade patterns, such as domestic and foreign indebtedness (public and private) and resource dependencies.

Availability of education, including access by individuals and groups; sufficiency for individual needs; groupings by scientific technical, professional, liberal arts, and crafts training; and surpluses and shortages of skills.

Unemployment, underemployment, and exclusion of groups, as well as horizontal and vertical career mobility, including—

▪ Taxing authorities, rates, rate determination, disproportional burdens, graft, and corruption.

▪ Economic benefit and distribution, occurrence of poverty, and concentration of wealth.

▪ Population shifts and their causes and effects (for example, rural-to-urban, agriculture-to-manufacturing, and manufacturing-to-service).

▪ Economic program values and resources that might generate favorable support, stabilize neutral groups, or neutralize threat groups.

▪ Nepotism, party monopolies, and other inequitable criteria for employment.

C-69. In evaluating political organization and dynamics, planners specifically look at—

The formal political structure of the government and the sources of its power (pluralist democracy based on the consensus of the voters or strongman rule supported by the military).

The informal political structure of the government and its comparison with the formal structure (deciding if the government is nominally a democracy but in reality a theocracy, kleptocracy, or one party oligarchy).

Legal and illegal political parties and their programs, strengths, and prospects for success, as well as the prospects for partnerships and coalitions between the parties.

Nonparty political organizations, motivating issues, strengths, and parties or programs they support, such as political action groups.

Nonpolitical interest groups and the correlation of their interests with political parties or nonparty organizations, such as churches, cultural and professional organizations, and unions.

The mechanism for government succession, the integrity of the process, roles of the populace and those in power, regularity of elections, systematic exclusion of identifiable groups, voting blocs, and patron-client determinants of voting.

Independence or subordination and effectiveness of the judiciary. Does the judiciary have the power of legislative and executive review? Does the judiciary support constitutionally guaranteed rights and international concepts of human rights? Are there multiple channels of judicial redress and authority; for instance, secular and sacred law in parallel?

Independence or control of the press and other mass media and the alternatives for the dissemination of information and opinion.

Centralization or diffusion of essential decisionmaking and patterns of inclusion or inclusion of specific individuals or groups in the process.

Administrative competence of the bureaucracy. Are bureaucrats egalitarian in practice or in words only? Can individuals and groups make their voices heard within the bureaucracy? Are the bureaucracies merely inept, antiquated, overburdened, or without resources?

Political, economic, and social groups and identification of political programs to neutralize opposing groups, as well as to provide programs favorable to friendly groups.

C-70. In evaluating the history of the society, planners specifically examine—

The origin of the incumbent government and its leadership, to include the following:

▪ Was it elected?

▪ Does it have a long history?

▪ Have there been multiple peaceful successions of government?

The history of political violence, to include the following:

▪ Is violence a common means for the resolution of political problems?

▪ Is there precedent for revolution, coup d’état, assassination, or terrorism?

▪ Does the country have a history of consensus-building?

▪ Does the present insurgency have causes and aspirations in common with historic political violence?

The legitimacy of the government, acceptance of violent and nonviolent remedies to political problems by the populace, the type and level of violence to be used by friendly and threat forces, and the groups or subgroups that support or oppose the use of violence, to include the following:

▪ Is there an enduring figurehead (for example a monarch or religious prelate) in the country?

▪ Do they have any real political power?

▪ Do they have a bully pulpit?

▪ Can the figurehead be leveraged against an internal threat?

C-71. In evaluating the nature of the insurgency or other internal threat, planners specifically examine—

The ideology or lack thereof of the internal threat and determine if it is—

▪ Political or religious.

▪ Criminal.

▪ Disingenuous (for instance, pseudopolitical narcoterrorists).

The desired end state of the internal threat, clarity of its formulation, openness of its articulation, commonality of the point-of-view among the elements of the internal threat, and differences between the internal threat and the government.

The stated dogma versus tangible actions.

The groups and subgroups supporting the general objectives of the internal threat.

The divisions, minority views, and dissension within the internal threat.

The groups that may have been deceived by the threat concerning the desired end state of the internal threat.

The organizational and operational patterns used by the internal threat, variations and combinations of such, and shifts and trends.

C-72. Finally, analysts determine the stage and phase of the insurgency or other internal threat, as well as how far and how long it has progressed and regressed over time. The analysts also identify unity and disagreement with front groups, leadership, tactics, primary targets, doctrine (if any), training, morale, discipline, operational capabilities, and materiel resources. They evaluate external support, to include political, financial, and logistical assistance. The evaluation should include not only the sources of support but also specific means by which support is provided and critical points through which the HN could slow, reduce, negate, or stop this support. The planners determine whether rigid commitment to a method or ideological tenet or other factor constitute an exploitable vulnerability or a weakness on which the government can build strength.

C-73. When examining hostile groups, planners examine the following from hostile perspectives:

The leadership and staff structure and its psychological characteristics, skills, and mission command resources.

The patterns of lawless activities (for example, illicit drug trafficking, extortion, piracy, and smuggling) or insurgent operations, base areas, lines of communications, and supporters outside the country concerned.

The intelligence, operations security, deception, media exploitation, and propaganda capabilities of the hostile groups. This should include all media in league with or sympathetic to the internal threat.

The appeal of the hostile groups to those who support them.

C-74. In evaluating the nature of the government response, planners specifically examine—

General planning or lack of planning for countering the insurgency, lawlessness, or subversion, as well as planning comprehensiveness and correctness of definitions and conclusions.

Organization and methods for strategic and operational planning and execution of plans, such as resource requirements, constraints, and realistic priorities.

Population and resources and the effects on each group.

Organization, equipment, and tactical doctrine for security forces; for example, how the government protects its economic and political infrastructure.

Areas where the government has maintained the initiative.

Populace and resources control measures.

MISO and public affairs programs.

Economic development programs.

HN irregular or niche capacity for countering subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats.

Government and internal threat strengths and weaknesses and identification of necessary changes in friendly programs, plans, organization, and doctrine.

C-75. Finally, planners determine the strengths and weaknesses of the noncombatants, the depth of their commitment to retain their inertia, and the requirements to make them remain or become neutral or to support friendly forces.

C-76. In evaluating the effects on noncombatants, planners specifically answer the following questions:

What are the categories of noncombatants?

What are mechanisms for monitoring noncombatant attitudes and responses?

What are common objectives of groups neither supporting nor opposing the internal threat?

What are the effects on the populace of government military, political, economic, and social operations and programs, to include the following:

▪ Does the government often kill or wound civilians in its operations?

▪ Does the government often cause collateral damage to neutral or friendly civilians?

▪ Are the government and military credible in either words or deeds?

▪ Are benefits of government aid programs evenly distributed?

▪ To whom is the populace inclined to provide intelligence?

C-77. Analysts evaluate COAs for threat forces, the government, and noncombatants with the above factors to determine probable outcomes for each element.

THREAT ANALYSIS

C-78. Threat analysis focuses on the examination of the threat’s ends, ways, means, vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, and friendly methods for gaining the initiative, exploiting success, and achieving early victories (even if only of limited tactical reward). Subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats are potentially quite vulnerable in some areas. Internal threats typically—

Are normally outnumbered and outgunned by the security forces, although they may have local fire superiority.

Are deficient in mobility, communications, medical, and logistical support.

Are considered illegal by the government in power, the United States, and part of the world community.

Lack a stable political, economic, and territorial base.

Suffer from fragmentation and internal competition.

Suffer leadership problems. Examples are—

▪ Cult of personality susceptible to decapitation of the leader.

▪ Too many chiefs.

▪ Many members that may have more loyalty to self-aggrandizement than group loyalty.

▪ Many co-opted or coerced members that are vulnerable to defection appeals.

▪ Many monetarily motivated members subject to buy off or the financial interdiction of the internal threat.

C-79. Subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats are generally aware of their difficult situation; therefore, they must protect and overcome their vulnerabilities. They must maintain security while building strength and support. They can do this by—

Developing a niche capability.

Developing underground cellular organizations and support systems.

Infiltrating government organizations for intelligence and political purposes.

Persuading the willing or coercing the unwilling from the populace for intelligence, logistics, and manpower support.

Establishing remote and fluid base areas within the nation or in a bordering nation.

Using multiple routes.

Using caches.

Maintaining small but constant attrition to HN and U.S. forces through low-risk attacks or improvised explosive devices, mines, and booby traps.

Maintaining psychological pressure through tactically dubious but, nonetheless, harassing actions.

Exploiting all avenues of propaganda and media exposure.

Building external support.

Striking the HN or supporting nation’s assets abroad in lower-risk operations.

Combining or switching tactics.

C-80. Subversives, insurgents, terrorists, and other threats must gain and maintain the initiative by carrying out actions that distract security forces—forcing them to take a defensive posture. This is accomplished by a need to form what are essentially fixed fortifications (at least in terms of dedicated security personnel), which have long been proven counterproductive to interdiction. Internal threats also can gain and maintain the initiative by carrying out actions that weaken the government’s power. They weaken the government by attacking its political and economic infrastructure through acts of terror, armed attacks against economic targets, and the skillful use of propaganda. In addition, subversives, insurgents, terrorists, and other threats increasingly and deliberately target innocent civilians rather than hard targets, such as police or military forces.

C-81. Security is essential for the internal threat’s success, providing the time necessary to make a long-term strategy work. Therefore, they must protect their vulnerabilities and maintain the ability to exercise initiative. Security is the internal threat’s true center of gravity. Internal threats cannot maintain security without significant support from the populace, and co-opting of their supporters is a chief thrust of operations. The government must use intelligence to expose vulnerabilities, regain the initiative, and destroy the internal threat-developed intelligence-oriented strategy. HN forces must focus their efforts on planning and conducting operations that reduce the insurgents’ freedom of action and attack the internal threat’s vulnerabilities. A common mistake is to reduce this to a manhunt in the mistaken belief that liquidating the right personality will end an insurgency or stop a national criminal enterprise. Although decidedly utilitarian, this manhunt is secondary to the goal of separating the internal threat from its supporters. In addition, the potential short- and long-term repercussions of decapitation interdiction must be considered.

Threat Characteristics Intelligence in a Battle Without Order

C-82. Threat characteristics are as important in FID operations as in combat operations. The intelligence section obtains this information from sources that include intelligence reach; research; data mining; database access; academic studies, products, or materials; intelligence archives; and open-source intelligence. Nevertheless, the intelligence analyst must recognize that in most operations, with the exception of a mature operation with significant internal threat forces, wide variances in equipment and organizational approaches will occur within the internal threat. Threat characteristics factors in FID environments differ from other operations. For instance, subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to security are typically cellular organizations to at least some degree and, whether these are political or criminal, it may be difficult to develop detailed organizational charts that assist in the analysis of threat characteristics. This can be mitigated, however, as additional cells are identified and consistencies in gaps indicate typical numbers within cells or other subgroup members. As part of the analysis, the intelligence section should develop a threat capabilities matrix to determine how the threat is organized and equipped, what the threat capabilities are, and how the threat has employed forces in the past. A recent dangerous phenomenon, expressed by al Qaeda as the independent jihad, is the spontaneous sole actor of small-cell operations acting without specific coordination or instruction. Typically, a local target of opportunity is chosen; however, intelligence protocols and TTP for other cellular organizations are useful against this sort of threat as well.

C-83. There may be organizational variants in different areas where internal threats possess greater or lesser influence. These can differ greatly; however, information on one of the elements often leads to a reevaluation or alteration of information previously received on another element. The normal practice of developing and maintaining threat characteristics may not apply to FID in which a new or less defined threat or adversary exists. The nature of the internal threat and the phased development (or lack thereof as in a criminal internal threat that only seeks a status quo to maintain incomes and influence) of its forces require a more detailed threat characteristics analysis down to the cell level. The following paragraphs address the characteristics analysis of the threat or adversary factors and explain their applicability to FID situations to determine how the threat or adversary normally conducts operations under similar circumstances.

Composition

C-84. In some threat organizations, the armed forces of the HN are only one of several instruments through which the subversives, insurgents, terrorists, and other threats seek power. Development of an armed force has the lowest priority during the early stages of an insurgency. For instance, narcoterrorists may rely on selective terrorist acts (for example, targeting police and the judiciary), only as long as the government attempts to curtail trafficking. As long as the party core and civil organizations are established and move effectively toward the goal of the internal threat, the armed or military arm may either be dormant or exist in cadre form until needed as a support arm. A military wing can exist primarily as a political bargaining chip. A prime example is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines. Although a virulent insurgent force for several years, when the Philippine government entered into peace talks with the group, members of the armed resistance stood down from armed action. Eventually some members were assimilated into the Philippine military.

Political Structures

C-85. There may be tightly disciplined party organization, formally structured to parallel the existing government hierarchy, at the center of some subversives, insurgents, terrorists, and other threats. In most instances, this organizational structure consists of committed organizations at the village, district, province, and national levels. Within major divisions and sections of an insurgent military headquarters, totally distinct but parallel command channels may exist. Such a model usually exists in the leftist threat from which the model originated. The party ensures complete domination over the military structure by using its own parallel organization. The party dominates through a political division in an insurgent military headquarters or a party cell or group in an insurgent military unit.

C-86. Conversely, other threats can have a political character far different from the classic communist model. A theocratic internal threat may implant political beliefs within a similar command structure. In global operations against terrorist networks, the same approach has typically been used by radical Islamists where political, military, and theological leaders are one in the same and may run a shadow political organization that acts as the department of justice through sharia as the jurisprudence of law. A radical religious belief is not a basis for any real organizational outline. The Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland used religion as a point of rhetoric and propaganda, but they maintained a secular command structure. In addition, religion was a point of dogma rather than the fundamental cause of the Irish insurgency, which rested primarily with the economic disparity of many Catholics in Northern Ireland. In addition, the Irish Republican Army maintained a separate and legal political arm in the Irish Republic, namely Sinn Fein. Other internal threats may also follow this model. Political and military structure in a criminal internal threat is often synonymous as well. The organization of such an internal threat is akin to a feudalist structure; however, a criminal internal threat can use political organizations to further its control. Typically, this is through co-opting legitimate politicians, law enforcement officials, and jurists through intimidation and bribery.

Armed Units

C-87. The organization of internal armed threats is dependent on the needs, tactics, and availability of personnel and equipment. Frequently, internal armed threat units employ subordinate elements of smaller units independently. The ambiguity of decentralization of command and control is often a comfortable operational theme for subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. In some instances, this autonomy can be chaotic, with little central control, which presents difficulties in producing predictive intelligence; however, it may help in tactical successes against uncoordinated action by internal threats. The intelligence analyst who receives a confirmed report of an internal threat unit operating in their area cannot assume that a parent unit or even a leader acting as a liaison from a higher echelon is present.

Disposition

C-88. Determining the disposition of the internal threats involves locating their operational training and supply bases, lines of communications, and areas of political control. The intelligence analyst can arrive at the internal threats’ potential dispositions by developing patterns of activity for cells and patterns of life for individuals. These patterns originate from map study, signals intelligence, human intelligence, time-distance analysis, and knowledge of internal threat tactics. Internal threat base areas, for instance, are normally near areas they control through politics, intimidation, or bribery, thereby providing an early warning system. Ideological commitment, fear, or the perception of material gain can bolster this in the populace. The intelligence analyst can select possible enemy dispositions and possible areas of tactical deployment by plotting internal threat sightings and combining this information with weather conditions, time factors, propaganda clues, symbolic dates or targets, detailed investigation of internal threat incidents, and after action reports. These areas, while appearing to be under the control of internal defense forces, may be under the political or otherwise de facto control of the insurgents. A necessary factor in analyzing disposition of internal threats is the fact that these threats very frequently have an effect far greater than their actual numbers.

Strength

C-89. Intelligence analysts must understand that the strength of the insurgent forces is a combination of armed units, political cadres (if any), foreign backing, and domestic popular support. The intelligence analyst can apply some aspects of conventional methods of strength computation to determine internal threat strength. For instance, raw numbers and weaponry are tangible, measurable, and relevant in a conventional battle. However, subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats need only to endure the ability to conduct sporadic small-scale attacks to maintain credibility in the realm of domestic and international perceptions. In addition to the classic analysis of real combat power, analysts should track the perceived strength of threats.

C-90. Subversives, insurgents, terrorists, and other threats ideally try to have their strengths overestimated by the HN security elements. Underestimation of strength affords the use of deception in drawing nation forces into a fight where the internal threat has localized superiority. To give this false impression, the subversives, insurgents, terrorists, and other threats may rapidly move their units and use multiple designations for a single element. The possibility also exists for an internal threat to develop ghost or phantom units. Subversives, insurgents, terrorists, and other threats may use deceptive communications as well. In addition, as internal threats are often capable of completely blending in with the populace, they may deliberately conduct understrength attacks. An understrength attack is a high casualty or even suicidal attack launched purely for its potential effects to lure national or U.S. forces to other locales before launching full-strength attacks. The intelligence analyst views reports from the populace on internal threat strengths with caution and stresses the importance of actual counts of adversary personnel. He may find it more difficult to determine the popular support for the internal threats—although a guide may be the percentage of an area functioning under government control as opposed to the percentage under internal threat control. Indicators in determining the extent of internal threat control is the willingness of the populace to report information on internal threats or the ability of the nation to exercise authority in a specific area.

Tactics

C-91. Subversives, insurgents, terrorists, and other threats may be more flexible in their application of doctrine than regular military organizations. Indeed, in the absence of centralized training and codified doctrine or procedures, actual tactics may vary from location to location and commander to commander. Execution of tactics may be highly dependent on the ability of the leader and individual. The friendly forces must know and understand the doctrine (or lack thereof) that guides the internal threat if they are to counter adversary efforts effectively. The choice and application of internal threat tactics is an appraisal of HN and U.S. vulnerabilities against localized or situational internal threat strengths. Internal threat tactics typically involve political, military, psychological, and economic approaches—all closely integrated. This is a matter of necessity rather than choice. Countering any one section of this unified approach weakens the others. Speed, surprise, and heavy application of available firepower and mobility describe an internal threat’s military tactics. The likelihood of threats using terror tactics is a distinct possibility. Suicide bombings, for instance, are not the sole province of Islamic terrorists. Until their interdiction, members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam used such tactics for many years against the government of Sri Lanka.

Training

C-92. Internal threat training levels can vary greatly. In general, internal threat training closely relates to the tactics used because the capacity and resources to train personnel is often limited. An internal threat may rely on recruiting members already trained with specialty skills and concentrate on developing baseline capacity with rank-and-file members. Typically, training includes vigorous political and psychological indoctrination. Internal threat training can couple this with vetting the potential member for zeal or loyalty. Analysts should seek to gain knowledge of the price of failure to any recruit. The combat groups and people within an area under the internal threat’s political domination receive training as the situation allows, and internal threats carefully plan and train for individual operations and phases of movements. An internal threat using the Maoist approach to insurgency may well have a completely different approach to building a trained force. Specifically, they (as with all phases) protract the development and training of cadre and rank-and-file in order to develop more combat power before striking.

Logistics

C-93. In FID operations, as in conventional warfare, an internal threat’s effectiveness is dependent on its logistical support. In the early stages of an operation, the requirements for military equipment and supplies are typically less than in later stages. Accurate intelligence of the internal threat’s sources and availability of supplies and equipment are essential to determine its capability to maintain and expand its struggle against the HN. Planners should assess the internal threat’s capability to capture or cannibalize HN equipment.

Effectiveness

C-94. Effectiveness describes the qualitative capability of the internal threat to achieve its economic, political, or military purposes. One measure of internal threat effectiveness is the type and number of operations it is able to perform. Empirical polling of the HN populace as to the internal threat’s support, as well as anecdotal evidence of popular support, can also gauge the effectiveness of the internal threat. The ability to garner international support or deter other nations from intervening on behalf of the nation shows effectiveness as well. In addition, economic barometers can provide evidence of an internal threat’s success. An example would be the pullout of foreign investors. The type and sophistication of internal threat propaganda may show effectiveness as well.

Personalities

C-95. Planners do not list personalities as a separate threat characteristics factor in a conventional situation, but they do list detailed organizational charts to assist in analysis. Planners, however, list them in FID operations along with recruitment and support because of the increased importance. Recruitment deals not only with selecting people to become members of the cell but also with developing a network of supporters of the organization who may or may not claim membership. Threat or adversary support includes local, regional, national, international, and popular support. ADP 2-0 and ADRP 2-0 provide further information. Overemphasizing analysis of personalities detracts from analysis of root causes for operations. Underemphasizing personality analysis potentially misses the ability to turn, neutralize by nonlethal means, or lethally interdict critical leaders or members of an internal threat.

Communications and Intelligence

C-96. In the early stages of threat characteristics, there is often either a lack of uniform communications procedures by the internal threat or an overreliance on one means of communication. The latter situation may typically be highly exploitable but temporary in nature as the internal threat learns the danger of one means of communication. The former generally prevents the development of an extensive electronic technical database. Very-high-frequency citizens band sets may play a role in early internal threat operations. Equipment available to an internal threat ranges from the most primitive to the most modern. Information may be passed using high-frequency short-wave radios, cellular phones, the Internet, mail, couriers, face-to-face meetings, citizens band sets, the drop system, or ham radio sets. Even equipment not generally available in the armed forces of major world powers, such as spread spectrum and frequency hoppers, can be easily obtained if the internal threat possesses the financial means. Cell phones and Internet communications, to include social media, have become prevalent with subversives, insurgents, terrorists, and other threats due to increased access. Internal threats conduct a variety of intelligence tasks in preparation for insurgent activities with intelligence personnel and leaders.

INTERNAL THREAT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

C-97. Because FID is one of the principal arms of the IDAD program for restoration of internal security in the HN, it demands a vigorous and coordinated effort to win over, neutralize, or, as a last resort, lethally interdict internal threats. Subversives, insurgents, terrorists, and other threats may generate broad, sophisticated, and ruthless CI and security programs to thwart government penetrations. Because they are also citizens of the nation, they have an inherent understanding of the agents who would try to penetrate their organization; therefore, they set up security and early warning nets in rural and urban areas. These systems are composed of carefully recruited individuals chosen primarily because their work places them near sensitive internal threat installations and, in some cases, individuals or command cells. Typically, lookouts may be newspaper vendors, building janitors, young students, farmers, small shopkeepers, or even indigent street people. As internal threats increase their organization and sophistication, they may focus on persuading or co-opting persons of status to help CI efforts, especially members of the national intelligence or police organizations.

C-98. Lookouts report possible government raids or other operations to liaison men and women chosen because they can travel without attracting attention. Men are often letter carriers, taxi drivers, or traveling vendors who pass the information to internal threat officials. Higher-level sources may have a dedicated contact instead of an ordinary liaison. Internal threats that are more sophisticated may employ drops.

C-99. The security and CI wing of the internal threat’s political organization produces false birth certificates, identification papers, and travel permits that the agents require for travel, jobs, and other activities. To make it difficult for the police to check the authenticity of a forged document, the fictitious birthplace listed is often in a difficult location to verify. Identity papers frequently list the bearer as a peddler, freelance writer, or artist because these occupations are difficult for the police to check. Insurgents sometimes avoid the forgery problem by stealing or buying genuine documents from some individual who they then may kill.

C-100. Meeting sites are a security problem. Subversives, insurgents, terrorists, and other threats prefer sites in which the arrival of several persons at about the same time may not attract attention or arouse suspicion. They may use woods, parks, and other secluded areas. When they must hold meetings at a house or apartment, they try to avoid those neighborhoods in which well-known antigovernment agitators live; such areas may be under surveillance. They change meeting places frequently. When possible, they arrange meetings to coincide with some outwardly legal, proper reason for bringing individuals together. They stagger the arrivals and departures, and family members answer the door. Guards stay after the meeting to look for incriminating items left behind.

C-101. Internal threat groups routinely conduct security checks of members, potential members, and collaborators. Normally, they do not accept a recruit until they have investigated his present and past family, jobs, political activities, and close associates. A probationary period follows. If they urgently need a person with special skills, the internal threat group may bring in a person but assign him or her very limited tasks until the investigation is completed. Internal threats may also employ an incrimination process where prospective members must earn trust through a verifiable act of murder, sabotage, kidnapping, or other offense against the nation.

C-102. Subversives, insurgents, terrorists, and other threats may test clandestine agents regularly. The internal threat’s security personnel may summon, without warning, an individual to test his reaction. If he is guilty of disloyalty, he may sense possible exposure and desert. The internal threat’s security personnel may keep a suspect ignorant of a change in meeting place. If government security forces show up at the original site, the internal threat organization knows the suspect is a government informant. Strict conformance with security procedures is required. Cell members are almost invariably subject to punishment if they do not report violations. Typically, security sections liquidate hostile agents. Beyond this, reprisals against the agent’s family may serve as an intimidation technique as well. The security section spends as much time, if not more, watching their own personnel as they do the HN personnel.

FRIENDLY FORCES SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

C-103. The techniques pertaining to friendly clandestine collection operations also apply to covert CI activities. The emphasis, however, is on information of CI interest rather than intelligence interest. Nevertheless, operations may uncover information of intelligence interest. Personnel should pass this information to interested agencies.

C-104. Most of the measures used are overt in nature and aimed at protecting installations, units, and information and detecting espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Examples of CI measures used include—

Conducting background investigations and record checks of persons in sensitive positions, as well as persons whose loyalty may be questionable.

Maintaining files on organizations, locations, and individuals of interest.

Conducting internal security inspections of installations and units.

Maintaining control of civilian movement within government-controlled areas.

Creating identification systems that minimize the chance of insurgents gaining access to installations and moving freely on installations.

Conducting unannounced searches and raids on suspected meeting places.

Conducting censorship of outgoing personal and official communications.

Appendix D

Illustrative Interagency Plan

Agencies conducting FID operations use several planning and execution documents, including those used by special operation units covered within this manual. Other governmental departments and agencies use other types of planning and execution documents that may be in different formats than those used by the DOD units involved in operations. In addition, acronyms and terms may either vary or be unfamiliar to another USG agency. An illustrative interagency plan for FID is a coordinating and synchronizing document that ensures unity of effort between all U.S., HN, and coalition agencies by placing the planned actions of all agencies in chronological order. JP 3-08 provides details on further aspects of interagency and interorganizational coordination.

PURPOSE

D-1. Illustrative interagency plans are typically prepared by one designated agency or coordinating group. Each agency must submit all planning and synchronization documents to the designated agency or group developing the plan. Before launch of operations, the plan can facilitate planners and agencies in final coordination to ensure that all agencies have full visibility on all the activities planned to support the nation’s IDAD effort. It can also serve as a final scrub to ensure that all agencies have a common understanding of terms, acronyms, and any possible impediments to standardized communication between agencies. Illustrative interagency plan for operations accomplish the following:

Ensure the agencies fully use all the instruments of U.S. national power available to support the nation in concert with each other.

Establish clear criteria for transition of phases.

Identify and sequence a checklist of taskings for each USG agency over time.

Provide a mechanism for USG programs to be mutually supporting.

Provide a final deconfliction of disparate or contradictory actions by individual agencies.

Include clear measures of effectiveness and measures of performance working toward clearly defined goals.

Integrate USG activities with those of the HN and other interested parties.

Ensure all agencies communicate the same policies and strategic communication themes.

Justify future budget requirements.

Inform and guide future strategies and plans.

CONTENT

D-2. Because there is no set format for an illustrative interagency plan, the commander or the lead agent for operations will dictate the exact form to use. Certain items, however, are critical to developing a comprehensive and effective plan. This plan includes the following minimum components.

POLICY PLANNING GUIDANCE

D-3. The policy planning guidance section summarizes guidance provided by the President or other national security decisions pertaining to the situation. This section may include the guidance of the U.S. Ambassador as the direct representative of the USG. Limiting treaties or further policy guidance from HN policy makers or coalition partners (as endorsed by the President or his designee) should be included in this section as well.

UNITED STATES INTERESTS AT STAKE

D-4. This section states the U.S. interests at stake that warrant assistance. The preparer does not need to be wordy in this section, and this section should include all U.S. national interests at stake. Clearly stated, transparent motives devoid of any unstated or hidden agendas greatly facilitate the application of the informational and diplomatic instruments of national power. Examples that warrant U.S. assistance may include interests in the reduction of transnational crime or the promotion and spread of human rights and democracy.

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC PURPOSE

D-5. The United States conducts operations in a nation with strategic purpose. Increasingly, the strategic purpose of FID transcends the borders of the nation to encompass a regional or global strategic purpose. This is especially true of operations that help the prosecution of global operations against terrorist networks. FID extends regionally and globally in the persistent engagement of adaptive adversaries. FID builds partner capacity to increase legitimacy of the HN and provides a sustained effort against terrorists, insurgents, and transnational criminal networks. Legitimacy enables the HN to overcome internal threats over the long-term nature of conflict. The U.S. strategic purpose includes stabilizing a country for the sake of regional stability, countering narcotrafficking or narcoterrorism to provide economic security, and providing security assistance to reduce the potential for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

MISSION STATEMENT

D-6. This mission statement should provide answers to the interrogatives (who, what, where, when, how, and why) of a USG operation. The mission statement should be in sufficient detail to encompass generalities on how the instruments of national power are going to be applied so that each agency involved in operations can infer its level of participation. The mission statement is a comprehensive overview of significant operations with scheduling. For instance, the mission statement may include mention that during the operation, national elections will occur on a specified date. The why should be one of the most complete and least general portions of the mission statement and should comply with and encapsulate U.S. policy, interests, and strategic purpose in the context of the HN IDAD needs.

DESIRED END STATE

D-7. This section describes the desired outcome of all assistance. The preparer should describe the end state in measurable and quantifiable terms rather than generalities. An example might be a situation where a nation is stabilized to the point that an insurgency is reduced from a national security threat to a moderate to minor law enforcement problem. In this case, the level of insurgents might be quantified by a specific number (expressed in an acceptable plus or minus range) coupled with an objectively verifiable metric, such as the actual number of insurgent attacks.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

D-8. This section describes in broad terms how the USG will employ the instruments of national power in the operation. The operational concept is not the equivalent of a military concept of operation. The level of detail within an illustrative interagency plan’s operational concept will typically be less than the details in a concept of operation. The operational concept focuses on a description of the interaction and coordination required of agencies involved in the operation to leverage all instruments of national power to effect political-military conditions in the nation.

PHASES

D-9. This section describes phases of USG assistance to a nation. Examples might be support to a nation’s transition to a new strategy, support to an operation to regain the initiative, support to an offensive operation, support to a consolidation of COIN gains, and rehabilitation. Each phase includes triggers or transition points for movement to the next phase.

D-10. Another approach to phasing is to outline phases in terms of significant steps in the type of support given by the United States to the nation as shown in Table D-1. Yet another alternative type of phasing is geographical; for instance, pacifying the eastern three regions of a country, then the center, then the west.

Table D-1. Phase model based on significant U.S. operational focus shifts

Phase | End Event and Trigger
I—Operational Assessment | All provincial assessments complete. Host nation (HN) military, national police, and intelligence services assessments complete.
II—Train and Equip | HN counterinsurgency brigade trained and conventional force at not less than 80 percent of target manning and equipping.
III—Direct Support | Insurgent hotbed provinces X, Y, and Z reduced to not more than two insurgent attacks per month and all safe havens identified in operational assessment destroyed.
IV—Indirect Support | All provinces and capital insurgent incidents down 85 percent and HN intelligence services capacity sufficient for unsupported collection and analysis.
V—Transition | Duty of countering remaining insurgent cells transferred from HN military to national and provincial police.
VI—Redeployment* | Return of HN military to garrison locations.
*Indirect and direct foreign internal defense support typically continues as necessary.

Indirect and direct foreign internal defense support typically continues as necessary.

LINES OF OPERATION AND POLITICAL-MILITARY OBJECTIVES

D-11. This section describes activities that the USG will conduct and the objectives within activities. An example of a line of operation is support to a nation’s security forces to enhance their capacity to deal with insurgency. Political-military objectives of a primarily military nature within that line of operation could include training and equipping a COIN brigade, supplying 100 helicopters to a nation, conducting intelligence sharing, and training the national police to defend their stations against insurgent attacks. Political-military objectives of a primarily political nature within that line of operation might include reducing corruption within the HN military and government, rallying popular support for the nation’s COIN efforts, and capitalizing on improvements of the nation’s military capacity to combat insurgents through MISO and HN public information programs. In addition, lines of operation may embrace both political and military factors. An example is a tip-and-rewards program that may include lethal or nonlethal interdiction. Supporting efforts are derivative, complementary, and synchronized with main efforts. As stated in ADP 3-0, Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their concept of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. The operational framework does not restrict Army leaders to a specific conceptual framework when organizing operations. FID and irregular warfare require prioritizing main and supporting efforts within the framework. The main effort may be decisive political-military objectives, and the supporting efforts may be shaping through training and equipping the HN forces.

AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES

D-12. This section of the illustrative interagency plan outlines the primary responsibilities of each USG agency involved in FID operation. In the case of multiple agencies having areas of commonality, limiting or delineating points may be established. This section includes information on the lead and coordinating agency for a line of operation or effort that involves multiple agencies.

IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX

D-13. This section of the illustrative interagency plan displays the political-military objectives for each phase in a sample format to be used as a guide. The implementation matrix is for individual use and varies substantially for each operation; therefore, no record or transmission of data is required. Figure D-1, page D-4, shows one possible sample implementation matrix.

LINES OF OPERATION ANNEXES

D-14. Annexes contain key tasks, each with its measures of effectiveness, measures of performance, costs, and issues for each line of action. Annexes may be annotated by agency or line of operation. If the annex is annotated by agency, all relevant lines of operations for that agency should be listed.

ARMY FORCES INPUT AND CONCERNS

D-15. Army involvement runs the gamut of being the only DOD unit involved in operations to being a component of a large, joint DOD force executing operations. Special operations units involved early in FID will be engaged substantially throughout and may be the sole agent of action in some areas, and these units may remain after redeployment of conventional forces. Contingency or habitual FID roles for special operations units may develop in certain countries in which conventional military units rarely take part. For instance, in the United States Southern Command operational area, SF personnel have had a long-term presence in several countries supporting the IDADs of those nations conducting counterdrug, counterinsurgent, and counterterrorist operations. Even in a large-scale operation involving SOF and conventional forces, the contribution of special operations units remain of such significant proportions that failure to include these units in the plan is problematic.

D-16. ARSOF units frequently bear specific mention under the agency responsibilities section of the illustrative interagency plan. SOF may have a greater responsibility for training HN military personnel, even in operations that also employ robust conventional forces. A small MISO element may be the sole agent for MISO; however, the agency with approval authority or responsibility for MISO resides with the chief of mission or designee, or the combatant commander or his delegated subordinate. In addition to these examples, units may have agency responsibilities in many other political-military actions. Planners must also be proactive in identifying potential taskings and ramifications for their units in relation to lines of operations for which other agencies are the responsible agent.

D-17. Army units almost invariably operate in close contact with the populace and tailor training products and projects to be culturally attuned, relevant, and acceptable to the trainees. A driving factor in understanding and operating within a cultural context that maximizes the effectiveness of Soldiers and units is to understand the political-military factors that shape the operational environment within the nation. Indeed, political-military factors may be the driving or even the sole stimuli for the insurgent movement that causes the need for FID operations. All sections within the plan—like the U.S. strategic purpose or the policy planning guidance—are considered by all units. These sections are not necessarily restated or communicated to the populace by the unit. However, it may be the day-to-day operational task of units to instill the ideas represented within these sections to HN personnel being trained or to broadcast these ideas to the populace through multimedia.

D-18. Normally at some point during operations, operational units or liaisons will operate in an interagency environment. Frequently, interaction occurs at the lowest echelons. In addition, this interaction may continue past the redeployment of a larger force. A thorough illustrative interagency plan not only serves to liaise and synchronize the effort of all the agencies involved, but it also provides a planning tool that can ensure that the effects of all instruments of national power reinforce and magnify one another. If necessary, Army commanders should initiate the discussion of generating an interagency plan early in the planning process.

RELATIONSHIP OF JOINT AND ARMY PLANNING

D-19. Typically, a joint force conducts operations. In the case of large-scale operations, the joint interagency task force or other joint interagency structure may generate the illustrative interagency plan. During joint operations, the joint interagency task force provides the combatant commander and subordinate joint force commanders with an increased capability to coordinate with other USG agencies and departments. If the JSOTF is the senior or stand-alone JTF, then the JSOTF assumes the primary responsibility as the focal point in the interagency process. If the illustrative interagency plan is the product of a joint interagency task force or other joint interagency working group, it may precede or follow the production of the relevant OPLAN’s Annex V, Interagency Coordination. In either case, the illustrative interagency plan should reflect and agree with Annex V. In addition, although no portion of an OPLAN should be overlooked in producing an interagency plan, scrutiny must ensure that no line of operation conflicts with Annex Y, Strategic Communication, or Annex G, Civil-Military Operations. Likewise, an illustrative interagency plan must be synchronized and deconflicted with the relevant operation order.

STABILITY OPERATIONS INFORMATION CENTER CONCEPT

D-20. A new idea that emerged from COIN operations and lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan on how to better gather, exchange, and merge data is the Stability Operations Information Center concept. It is meant to capture the broad civil-military information sharing charter, active operations, and proactive shaping in the COIN environment. The concept is a collaborative effort that ensures a population-centric focus. The situational awareness required in COIN and FID goes beyond the six civil considerations or factors known by the memory aid ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events) expressed in FM 6-0. The stability operations information center concept would fuse information from military and civil entities under one tent, enabling all relevant parties and information to interact and create a comprehensive and shared understanding of complex operations.

Appendix E

Security Assistance

This section discusses specific military security assistance operations and how the GCC may use this tool to further support FID activities. The military primarily provide equipment, services, and training to the supported nation forces (Figure E-1). In the security assistance arena, GCCs and subordinate joint force commanders do not have authority over the program, but they have responsibility for planning and executing military activities to support within the security assistance process.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

E-1. GCCs are active in the security assistance process by advising ambassadors through the SCO and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing efforts. In addition, through coordination with HN military forces and supporting SCOs, the GCC can assist in building credible military assistance packages that best support long-term goals and objectives of regional operations. The following paragraphs describe the security assistance support areas of equipment, services, and training, as well as the employment considerations for each.

EQUIPMENT

E-2. The GCC and subordinate joint force commander can have the greatest impact in this area during the planning and resource identification phase of developing the theater strategy. Regional threats identified and level of HN technology will determine the general equipment needs of the supported nations in the theater. Each SCO will coordinate resultant military equipment requests with the GCC’s staff and country team. Finally, the HN provides a letter of request to the SCO, who forwards it to the appropriate military department to determine price and availability. Throughout this process, the country’s needs must be evaluated in terms of the threat and existing social, political, and economic conditions. Care must be taken to guard against a U.S. solution or to support unnecessary requests, as explained below.

E-3. The FID planning imperative to tailor support to HN needs is extremely important in providing equipment support. Environmental factors, level of training, ability to maintain equipment, infrastructure, and a myriad of other factors will determine what equipment is appropriate to the nation’s needs. If equipment in the U.S. inventory is not appropriate for use, the commander may recommend a nonstandard item to fill the requirement. Sustainability of nonstandard equipment, as well as interoperability with existing equipment, must be considered.

E-4. HNs may request expensive equipment as a status symbol of regional military power. This is often done in spite of the fact that the overall strength of the military would be best enhanced by improved training and professionalism among the existing force. This is a delicate political situation, but it is one that the ambassador and the GCC may be able to influence.

SERVICES

E-5. Services support includes any service, test, inspection, repair, training, publication, technical or other assistance, or defense information used for furnishing military assistance, but it does not include military education and training activities. Services support is usually integrated with equipment support. The combatant commander has oversight to ensure that the equipment is suitable for HN needs and that they are capable of maintaining it. These types of services will almost always be required to ensure an effective logistic plan for the acquired equipment. There are two common types of service teams: quality assurance teams and technical assistance teams. Quality assurance teams are short-term and are used to ensure that equipment is in usable condition. Technical assistance teams are used when the nation experiences difficulty with U.S.-supplied equipment. Detailed information on teams available for initial and follow-on equipment support can be found in DSCA Manual 5105.38-M.

TRAINING

E-6. The training portion of security assistance can make a very significant impact on the IDAD program. The GCC is actively involved in coordinating, planning, and approving training support with the SCO and HN. The Services, through their security assistance training organizations, are the coordinators for security assistance-funded training. The following are the general objectives of training programs under security assistance:

Professional Military Education. To further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations, which culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and the HN.

Operation and Maintenance Skills. To create skills needed for effective operation and maintenance of equipment acquired from the United States.

Effective Management. To assist the foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for effective management of its defense establishment.

Development of Training Self-Sufficiency. To foster development by the HN of its own training capability.

Rapport and Understanding. To promote military-to-military understanding leading to increased standardization and interoperability.

Increased Awareness. To provide an opportunity to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the basic principles of internationally recognized human rights.

E-7. The following force structure, training plan, and training activities considerations should be understood before implementing a training program:

Training Force Structure. Services administer security assistance training with a combination of military and contracted trainers. SOF may be preferred for some types of training if the situation requires language or regional skills. HN forces can also receive education or training in U.S. schools or contractor facilities.

Training Plan. The training portion of security assistance is identified and coordinated by the SCO with the HN military. GCCs and subordinate joint force commanders incorporate the training, planning, and requirements into the overall military planning to support operations. The following are the general objectives:

▪ The SCO will develop a 2-year plan, known as the combined training and education plan, which consolidates HN needs from a joint perspective, taking into consideration all sources of training and funding. The appropriate combatant command approves these plans.

▪ Each year the GCCs will host a security cooperation education and training working group. During this working group, the SCO and Service training coordinators (along with the GCC, DOD, and DOS), will refine and coordinate the previously approved combined training and education plan, finalize the budget year training program, and announce and discuss changes in the command’s training policy or procedures.

▪ The SCO must ensure that the HN looks beyond its current needs toward the future. A tool to accomplish this is the 2-year plan.

▪ Commanders and their staffs must also ensure that U.S. forces involved in providing security assistance-funded training to personnel in-country are fully aware of restrictions on their involvement in combat operations and that they employ vigilant force protection measures. U.S. training teams should be considered likely targets of attack if supported forces are facing an active armed threat.

Training Activities. The GCC has a number of training activities that should be considered when reviewing individual country training plans. These programs may be carried out by HN personnel attending military schools in the United States or by deploying teams of SOF, conventional forces, or a combination of both. When selecting forces, consideration should be given to language capabilities, cultural orientation, theater objectives, complexity of tasks or missions to be performed, and the supported nation’s IDAD program. The following are the primary types of training that may be employed as part of military support to the security assistance program:

▪ MTTs. These teams are used when an HN element requires on-site training and to conduct surveys and assessments of training requirements. An MTT may be single-Service or joint, SOF or conventional forces, but it is tailored for the training required. An MTT is employed on a temporary duty basis for a designated period of time. If HN forces require training for a longer period, training in the United States should be considered as an alternative.

▪ Extended Training Service Specialists. Extended training service specialists teams are employed on a permanent change of station basis (usually for 1 year) in order to assist the nation in attaining readiness on weapons or other equipment. These teams train the HN’s initial instructor cadre so that they can assume the responsibility for training their own personnel. They consist of DOD military and civilian personnel technically qualified to provide advice, instruction, and training in the installation, operation, and maintenance of weapons, equipment, and systems to HN personnel.

▪ Technical Assistance Field Teams. Technical assistance field teams consist of DOD personnel in a permanent change of station status, assigned to provide technical or maintenance assistance to HN personnel. These teams are also deployed on a permanent change of station basis and train personnel in equipment-specific military skills.

▪ International Education and Training. The U.S. international education and training program provides HN personnel with military education and training opportunities in the United States. This type of training not only meets the immediate requirement of increased training, but it also has a longer term impact of improving U.S.-HN relations.

▪ Contractors. Contractor personnel can be utilized in the execution of security assistance as outlined in the DSCA Manual 5105.38-M. The provisions of DOD Instruction 1100.22 should be fully understood should a situation escalate from indirect to direct support.

▪ The Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program. This program is a critical tool for the DOD to provide grant aid education and training to support regional nations in collective efforts in support of combating terrorism. It offers education and training to foreign military officers, ministry of defense civilians, and other foreign civilian security force personnel. The DOD-funded program is implemented through the U.S. Services’ security assistance training management systems.

▪ Medical CMO in Indirect Support. Medical CMO in indirect support to FID operations is generally accomplished by medical training teams and advisors. The focus is on identification of health threats that affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the HN military forces and designing programs to train and equip those forces. Typically, the main effort of such training has been conducted by SF with support from other ARSOF units. MISO has historically supported and advised HN counterparts in programs and series to support medical CMO missions. Wellness and instructional MISO series can seek to simply increase participation in medical or veterinary programs that some target audiences may be reluctant to use due to cultural bias. The introduction of new behaviors, such as sanitary food or water practices, can be pursued as well. This type of support can cross boundaries into the realm of direct support and may involve simultaneously conducting both indirect and direct support.

Appendix F

Site Survey, Trainer, and Advisor Checklist

The checklist and considerations included in this appendix were collected from various locations. They should be used only as examples of the best practices.

SITE SURVEY CONSIDERATIONS

F-1. A site survey team gathers information to properly conduct the training. Units assigned to FID operations need to determine or identify—

The HN unit’s mission, execution capabilities, and mission-essential task list.

The organizational tables for authorized personnel and equipment and for those actually on hand.

Any past or present foreign military presence or influence in doctrine, training, or combat operations.

The unit’s ability to retain and support acquired skills or training from past MTTs or foreign training missions.

The organization and leadership level that is responsible for training the individual Soldier. Does the HN have institutional training established? Is it effective?

Any operational deficiencies during recent combat operations or participation in joint or multinational exercises with U.S. personnel.

The maintenance status, to include maintenance training programs.

The language or languages in which training will be conducted.

The religious, tribal, or other affiliations within the HN forces that need to be considered (notably the differences between HN forces and the local populace, like attitudes, customs, and dangers).

The potential security concerns with employing U.S. members (and allies) in the HN training areas.

The local infrastructure and possible positive or negative impacts of training on the local populace.

FID personnel facilities, such as—

▪ Barracks.

▪ Latrines.

▪ Mess facilities.

▪ Secure storage areas.

▪ Electrical power facilities.

▪ Fuel facilities.

FID personnel needs, such as—

▪ Drinking water.

▪ Fuel.

▪ Rations.

F-2. The predeployment site survey leader—along with any subordinates he may specify—establishes effective initial rapport with the HN unit commander. The predeployment site survey leader—

Conducts introductions in a businesslike, congenial manner using the HN language.

Briefs the commander on the joint force advisors’ mission and the restrictions and limitations imposed on the unit by the higher U.S. commander. The leader should use the HN language and, if required, visual aids translated into the HN language.

Assures the commander that all team members are fully supportive of the HN’s position and that they firmly believe a joint and HN-unit effort will be successful.

Assures the commander that his assistance is needed to develop the tentative objectives for advisory assistance, to include agreements with the commander on training objectives and plans.

Deduces or solicits the commander’s actual estimate of his unit’s capabilities and perceived advisory assistance and material requirements.

Explains the team’s initial plan for establishing counterpart relationships, obtains approval from the commander for the plan, and requests to conduct the counterpart linkup under the mutual supervision of the leader and the commander.

Supervises the linkup between team members and their counterparts to determine if the HN personnel understand the purpose of the counterpart relationship and their responsibilities within it.

Identifies reach-back support requirements.

Identifies aviation support requirements tentatively available (hours and type of aircraft).

Identifies transportation requirements and other special equipment requirements.

F-3. The leader should not make any statements that could be construed as promises to the HN commander regarding commitments to provide the advisory assistance or fulfill material requirements.

F-4. The team members analyze the HN unit’s status according to their area of expertise for the purpose of determining the requirements for advisory assistance. The team members—

Explain the purpose of the analysis to counterparts.

Encourage counterparts to assist in the analysis, the preparation of estimates, and the briefing of the analysis to the advisory team and unit commanders.

Collect sufficient information to confirm the validity of current intelligence and tentative advisory assistance COAs selected before deployment.

Collect and analyze all information relating to force protection, including restricted and off-limits areas.

Prepare written, prioritized estimates for COAs.

Brief, with their counterparts, the estimates to the team and unit commander.

Inspect, with their counterparts, the HN facilities that will be used during the assistance mission.

Identify deficiencies in the facilities that will prevent execution of the tentatively selected COAs.

Prepare written or verbal estimates that will correct the deficiencies or negate their effects on the tentatively selected COAs.

Supervise the preparation of the facilities and inform the joint force commander of the status of the preparations compared to the plans for them.

F-5. Once received, the leader supervises the processing of the survey results. The leader then—

Recommends to the HN unit commander the most desirable COAs, emphasizing how they satisfy actual conditions and will achieve the desired advisory assistance objectives.

Ensures that his counterpart understands that the desired COAs are still tentative contingent on the tasking U.S. commander’s decision.

Selects the COAs to be recommended to the follow-on units after obtaining input from the HN unit commander.

Ensures the higher in-country U.S. commander is informed of significant findings in the team survey for HN assistance.

F-6. The predeployment site survey team plans its security in accordance with the anticipated threat. Adjustments are made as required by the situation on the ground. The team members—

Fortify their positions (quarters, communications, medical, command) in accordance with the available means and requirements to maintain low visibility.

Maintain a team internal guard system in order to be aware of the locations of all other force advisors and to be ready to react to an emergency by following the alert plan and starting defensive actions.

Maintain a team internal alert plan that will notify all team members of an emergency.

Maintain communications with all subordinate team members deployed outside of the immediate area controlled by the team.

Establish plans for immediate team defensive actions in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack or a loss of HN rapport with hostile reaction.

Discuss visible team security measures with counterparts to ensure their understanding and to maintain effective rapport.

Encourage the unit, through counterparts, to adopt additional security measures that have been identified as necessary during the analysis of the HN unit status and the inspection of its facilities.

Establish mutual plans with the unit, through counterparts, for defensive actions in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack.

Rehearse team alert and defensive plans.

Encourage the unit, through counterparts, to conduct mutual, full-force rehearsals of defensive plans.

TRAINER AND ADVISOR CONSIDERATIONS

F-7. Trainers and advisors—

Adhere to the lesson outlines consistent with the cooperation from the HN forces and changes in the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations.

State clearly the task, conditions, and standards to be achieved during each lesson at the beginning of the training (to include training exercises) and ensure the HN students understand them. (Human rights should be emphasized in the appropriate period of instruction.)

Demonstrate the execution or show the desired end result to clearly illustrate the task.

Stress the execution of the task as a step-by-step process, when possible.

Monitor the HN students’ progress during practice and correct mistakes as they are observed.

State (at a minimum) all applicable warning and safety instructions in the HN language.

Monitor periodically instructions given through HN interpreters to ensure accurate translations using HN-language-qualified force personnel.

F-8. The force ensures the security of the training sites. Advisors or designated security personnel—

Analyze the threat to determine any capabilities to attack or collect intelligence on the HN unit’s training at each site.

Prepare estimates of COAs that would deny the training sites to the insurgents or terrorists.

Recommend to the HN unit commander that he order the adoption of the most desirable COA, stressing how it best satisfies the identified need.

Ensure before each training session (using, as a minimum, briefback rehearsal) that all personnel—both U.S. and HN—understand the defensive actions to be taken in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack and any operations security measures to be executed.

F-9. Designated advisory and training team members maintain written administrative training records. These members—

Encourage HN counterparts to assist.

Record all HN personnel and units who receive training and identify the type of training they receive.

Organize records to identify training deficiencies and overall level of HN proficiency.

Identify specific HN personnel or units who demonstrate noteworthy (good or bad) performance.

Identify to the force and HN unit commanders the noted training deficiencies, noteworthy performances, and required additional or remedial training.

Glossary

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP | Army doctrine publication
ADRP | Army doctrine reference publication
AECA | Arms Export Control Act
AIDS | acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
AOR | area of responsibility
APEX | Adaptive Planning and Execution
AR | Army regulation
ARSOF | Army special operations forces
ASCOPE | areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ATP | Army techniques publication
CA | Civil Affairs
CAO | Civil Affairs operations
CI | counterintelligence
CJCS | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CMO | civil-military operations
COA | course of action
COIN | counterinsurgency
DA | Department of the Army
DOD | Department of Defense
DOS | Department of State
DSCA | Defense Security Cooperation Agency
FAA | Foreign Assistance Act
FHA | foreign humanitarian assistance
FID | foreign internal defense
FM | field manual
FMS | foreign military sales
G-2 | assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 | assistant chief of staff, operations
GCC | geographic combatant commander
GEF | Guidance for Employment of the Force
HCA | humanitarian and civic assistance
HIV | human immunodeficiency virus
HN | host nation
HSS | health service support
IDAD | internal defense and development
IGO | intergovernmental organization
IMET | international military education and training
J-2 | intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-9 | civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff
JP | joint publication
JSCP | Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOTF | joint special operations task force
JTF | joint task force
MISO | military information support operations
MOS | military occupational specialty
MTT | mobile training team
NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO | nongovernmental organization
OPCON | operational control
OPLAN | operation plan
PSYOP | Psychological Operations
ROE | rules of engagement
S-2 | battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 | battalion or brigade operations staff officer
SCO | security cooperation organization
SecDef | Secretary of Defense
SF | Special Forces
SFA | security force assistance
SOF | special operations forces
SOTF | special operations task force
TSCP | theater security cooperation plan
TSOC | theater special operations command
TTP | tactics, techniques, and procedures
USAID | United States Agency for International Development
USAJFKSWCS | United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USASOC | United States Army Special Operations Command
USC | United States Code
USG | United States Government
USSOCOM | United States Special Operations Command

SECTION II – TERMS

Adaptive Planning and Execution system

A Department of Defense system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and information technology, that is used by the joint planning and execution community to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. Also called APEX system. (JP 5-0)

Civil Affairs operations

Actions planned, executed, and assessed by Civil Affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called CAO. (JP 3-57)

counterinsurgency

Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Also called COIN. (JP 3-24)

counterproliferation

Those actions taken to defeat the risks posed by extant weapons of mass destruction to the United States, allies, and partners. (JP 3-40)

country team

The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission. (JP 3-07.4)

foreign humanitarian assistance

Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA. (JP 3-29)

foreign internal defense

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (JP 3-22)

host nation

A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 3-57)

host-nation support

Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 4-0)

humanitarian and civic assistance

Assistance to the local populace, specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities, provided by predominately United States forces in conjunction with military operations. Also called HCA. (JP 3-29)

insurgency

The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24)

interagency coordination

Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged U.S. Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

intergovernmental organization

An organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Also called IGO. (JP 3-08)

internal defense and development

The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called IDAD. (JP 3-22)

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

overt operation

An operation conducted openly, without concealment. (JP 2-01.2)

preparation of the environment

An umbrella term for operations and activities conducted by selectively trained special operations forces to develop an environment for potential future special operations. (JP 3-05)

resistance movement

An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. (JP 3-05)

security assistance

Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (JP 3-22)

security cooperation

All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 3-22)

security cooperation organization

All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance/cooperation management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance/cooperation functions. Also called SCO. (JP 3-22)

security force assistance

The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called SFA. (JP 3-22)

security forces

Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state. (JP 3-22)

special operations

Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. (JP 3-05)

subversion

Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority. (JP 3-24)

terrorism

The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political. (JP 3-07.2)

theater special operations command

A subordinate unified command established by a combatant commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations. Also called TSOC. (JP 3-05)

weapons of mass destruction

Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, and excluding the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. (JP 3-40)

References

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, 2 February 2015.

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site (www.apd.army.mil).

ADP 2-0, Intelligence, 31 August 2012.

ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011.

ADP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, 23 August 2012.

ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, 31 August 2012.

ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.

AR 11-6, Army Foreign Language Program, 31 August 2009.

AR 11-31, Army Security Cooperation Policy, 21 March 2013.

AR 11-33, Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP), 17 October 2006.

AR 12-1, Security Assistance, Training, and Export Policy, 23 July 2010.

AR 12-15, Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training, 3 January 2011.

ATP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace, 10 November 2014.

ATP 3-07.5, Stability Techniques, 31 August 2012.

ATP 3-07.10, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces, 1 November 2014.

FM 1-04, Legal Support to the Operational Army, 18 March 2013.

FM 1-06, Financial Management Operations, 15 April 2014.

FM 2-22.2, Counterintelligence, 21 October 2009.

FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, 6 September 2006.

FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 13 May 2014.

FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 21 April 2009.

FM 3-53, Military Information Support Operations, 4 January 2013.

FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, 31 October 2011.

FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 5 May 2014.

FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, 18 July 1956.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

Most DOD issuances are available online at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/index.html.

DOD Directive S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War, 26 July 1984.

DOD Directive 5101.1, DOD Executive Agent, 3 September 2002.

DOD Directive 5105.65, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), 26 October 2012.

DOD Directive 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, 24 October 2008.

DOD Directive 5200.41, DOD Centers for Regional Security Studies, 30 July 2004.

DOD Instruction 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, 12 April 2010.

DOD Instruction 2205.02, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities, 23 June 2014.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

Most JPs are available online at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.

CJCSI 3110.05E, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), 30 September 2011.
https://ca.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/limited/3110_05.pdf

CJCSI 3126.01A, Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability Identification, Planning, and Sourcing, 31 January 2013.

CJCSI 3141.01E, Management and Review of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)-Tasked Plans, 15 September 2011.

CJCSI 3150.25F, Joint Lessons Learned Program, 26 June 2015.

CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance, 18 October 2012. https://ca.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/limited/m313003.pdf

Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning.
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3100_01.pdf

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3100_01.pdf

Joint Strategic Planning System. http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3100_01.pdf

JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations, 17 August 2011.

JP 2-01.2, (S//NF) Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations (U), 7 October 2014. (This classified publication is available on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network. Contact the preparing agency of this manual for access instructions.)

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.

JP 3-05, Special Operations, 16 July 2014.

JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 14 March 2014.

JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 1 August 2012.

JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations, 14 August 2013.

JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 June 2011.

JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010.

JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 22 November 2013.

JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 3 January 2014.

JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, 30 July 2012.

JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 October 2014.

JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 11 September 2013.

JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, 16 October 2013.

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

AECA of 1976. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=1630

Constitution of the United States.
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html

Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1987.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/99th-congress/senate-bill/2199

Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 29 September 2005.
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/dsd050929regional.pdf

DOS and USAID Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2014–2017.

http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/State%20USAID%20Joint%20Strategic%20Plan%202014-04-02.pdf

DSCA Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), 3 October 2003.
http://www.samm.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/2003%20SAMM/2003-10-03%20-%202003%20SAMM.pdf.

FAA of 1961. http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/faa.pdf

Section 660, Prohibiting Police Training.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002.
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ115/pdf/PLAW-107publ115.pdf

Geneva Conventions of 1949. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-I.pdf

Hague Conventions of 1899. https://archive.org/details/hagueconventions00inteuoft

Lieber Code, 24 April 1863. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp

National Defense Authorization Act. https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/99/hr4428

National Security Act, 26 July 1947. https://research.archives.gov/id/299856

Principles of Democracy.
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CC0QFjACahUKEwi7iZ-z6vHGAhUDzYAKHZDNC2E&url=http%3A%2F%2Fguangzhou.usembassy-china.org.cn%2Fuploads%2Fimages%2Fepbwa8KlPc2j20PlUj4j3A%2FPrinciples_of_Democracy.doc&ei=hiuxVbuuKYOagwSQm6-IBg&usg=AFQjCNHOVbHMYaKifZ2p03Fjl2jPcmEx8g&bvm=bv.98476267,d.cWw

Principles of Federal Appropriations Law. http://www.gao.gov/legal/red-book/current-edition

Protocol I, Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts.
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC-records_Vol-3.pdf

Protocol II, Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts.
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC-records_Vol-4.pdf

The Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868. https://archive.org/details/jstor-2212370

United Nations Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General.
https://treaties.un.org/pages/participationstatus.aspx

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/

Most Presidential directives, Executive orders, and public laws are available online at http://www.gpo.gov.

Executive Order 11958, Administration of Arms Export Controls, 18 January 1977.
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/11958.html

Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981.
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html

Executive Order 12966, Foreign Disaster Assistance, 14 July 1995.
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/1995.html#12966

National Security Decision Directive-130, United States International Information Policy, 6 March 1984. https://research.archives.gov/id/6879728

National Security Presidential Directive-1, Organization of the National Security Council System, 13 February 2001.
http://rcnsc.dodlive.mil/files/2013/11/National_Security_Presidential_Directive_1.pdf

National Security Presidential Directive-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, 7 December 2005.
http://www.irisc.net/site/Library/nspd-44.pdf

National Security Strategy of the United States, May 2010.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf

Public Law 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Chapter 5, International Military Education and Training, 4 September 1961.

Section 541, General Authority.

Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 1 October 1986.

Section 212, Initial Review of Combatant Commands.

Public Law 101-510, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, 5 November 1990.

Section 1004, Additional Support for Counter-Drug Activities.

Public Law 102-511, Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992, 24 October 1992.

Section 503, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Activities in the Independent States.

Section 504, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.

Public Law 105-85, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, 18 November 1997.

Section 1033. Authority to Provide Additional Support for Counter-Drug Activities of Peru and Columbia.

Public Law 108-25, United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, 27 May 2003.

Public Law 108-287, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005, 5 August 2004.

Public Law 108-375, Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 28 October 2004.

Section 1208, Support of Military Operations to Combat Terrorism.

Section 1224, Availability of Warsaw Initiative Funds for New NATO Members.

Public Law 109-13, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, 11 May 2005.

Public Law 109-163, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 6 January 2006.

Section 1206, Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces.

Section 1207, Security and Stabilization Assistance.

Public Law 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Title X, General Provisions, Subtitle C, Counter-Drug Activities, 28 January 2008.

Sections 1021 through 1023; Title XIV, Other Authorizations.

Section 1405, Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-Wide.

Public Law 110-329, Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Title II, Other Supplemental Appropriations and Title VIII, General Provisions, 30 September 2008.

Public Law 110-417, Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, 14 October 2008.

Section 941, Enhancement of Authorities Relating to Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies.

Section 1021, Extension of Reporting Requirement Regarding Department of Defense Expenditures to Support Foreign Counter-Drug Activities.

Section 1022, Extension of Authority for Joint Task Forces to Provide Support to Law Enforcement Agencies Conducting Counter-Terrorism Activities.

Section 1023, Extension of Authority to Support Unified Counter-Drug and Counterterrorism Campaign in Colombia and Continuation of Numerical Limitation on Assignment of United States Personnel.

Section 1024, Expansion and Extension of Authority to Provide Additional Support for Counter-Drug Activities of Certain Foreign Governments.

Section 1025, Comprehensive Department of Defense Strategy for Counter-Narcotics Efforts for United States Africa Command.

Section 1026, Comprehensive Department of Defense Strategy for Counter-Narcotics Efforts in South and Central Asian Regions.

Section 1202, Availability Across Fiscal Years of Funds for Military-to-Military Contacts and Comparable Activities.

Section 1204, Extension of Temporary Authority to Use Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements to Lend Military Equipment for Personnel Protection and Survivability.

Section 1206, Modification and Extension of Authorities Relating to Program to Build the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces.

Section 1207, Extension of Authority and Increased Funding for Security and Stabilization Assistance.

Section 1208, Extension and Expansion of Authority for Support of Special Operations to Combat Terrorism.

Section 1209, Increase in Amount Available for Costs of Education and Training of Foreign Military Forces Under Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program.

Section 1405, Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-Wide.

Public Law 111-8, Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, 11 March 2009.

Public Law 111-32, Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, 24 June 2009.

Public Law 111-84, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, 28 October 2009.

Title X-Subtitle B-Counter-Drug Activities, Sections 1011 through 1016.

Section 1202, Expansion of Authority and Modification of Notification and Reporting Requirements for use of Authority for Support of Special Operations to Combat Terrorism.

Section 1404, Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-Wide.

Section 1515, Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-Wide.

Public Law 111-383, Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, 7 January 2011.

Title X-Subtitle B-Counter-Drug Activities, Sections 1011 through 1015.

Section 1407, Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-wide.

Section 1514, Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-wide.

Title 10, USC, Armed Forces, < http://uscode.house.gov/>

Section 127d, Allied Forces Participating in Combined Operations: Authority to Provide Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services.

Section 166a, Combatant Commands: Funding Through the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Section 167, Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces.

Section 168, Military-to-Military Contacts and Comparable Activities.

Section 184, Regional Centers for Security Studies.

Section 401, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations.

Section 402, Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries.

Section 404, Foreign Disaster Assistance.

Section 407, Humanitarian Demining Assistance and Stockpiled Conventional Munitions Assistance: Authority; Limitations.

Section 408, Equipment and Training of Foreign Personnel to Assist in Department of Defense Accounting for Missing United States Government Personnel.

Section 1051, Multilateral, Bilateral or Regional Cooperation Programs: Payment of Personnel Expenses.

Section 2010, Participation of Developing Countries in Combined Exercises: Payment of Incremental Expenses.

Section 2011, Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces.

Section 2249c, Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program: Authority to use Appropriated Funds for Costs Associated with Education and Training of Foreign Officials.

Sections 2341-2350, Subchapter I, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.

Section 2557, Excess Nonlethal Supplies: Availability for Humanitarian Relief, Domestic Emergency Assistance, and Homeless Veterans Assistance.

Section 2561, Humanitarian Assistance.

Title 22, USC, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, < http://uscode.house.gov/>

Section 1461(a), Dissemination of Information Abroad.

Section 2292a, Authorization of Appropriations.

Section 2318, Special Authority (Part II–Military Assistance).

Section 2347, General Authority (Part V–International Military Education and Training).

Section 2348, General Authorization (Part VI–Peacekeeping Operations).

Section 2348d, Data on Costs Incurred in Support of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

Section 2349aa–10, General Authority (Part VIII–Antiterrorism Assistance).

Section 2349bb, Purposes (Part IX–Nonproliferation and Export Control Assistance).

Section 2392, Government Agencies (Part II–Administrative Provisions).

Section 2761, Sales from Stocks.

Section 2762, Procurement for Cash Sales.

Section 2763, Credit Sales.

Section 2769, Foreign Military Construction Sales.

Title 31, USC, Money and Finance, < http://uscode.house.gov/>

Section 1301(a) and Section 1301(d) (Chapter 13, Appropriations).

Section 1341, Limitations on Expending and Obligating Amounts.

Section 1502(a), Balances Available, (Chapter 15, Appropriation Accounting).

Section 1535, Agency Agreements.

Section 3302(b), Custodians of Money (Chapter 33, Depositing, Keeping, and Paying Money).

Title 50, USC, War and National Defense, < http://uscode.house.gov/>

Chapter 22, Uniform Code of Military Justice.

PRESCRIBED FORMS

None

REFERENCED FORMS

Printed forms are available through normal forms supply channels.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FORMS

Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site (www.apd.army.mil).

DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

Index

A

advising, 1-9, 1-11, 2-5, 2-11, 2-15, 2-16, 3-4, 3-9, 3-11, 4-10, 5-13 through 5-16, 6-14, 6-19, A-17, A-18, B-2, E-1

advisory assistance, v, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 5-4, 5-12, 5-13, F-2

annual defense appropriations, A-21

Arms Transfer Management Group, 2-5, 6-1

assessment, v, 2-15, 2-17, 3-4 through 3-6, 3-13, 3-15, 3-16, 4-2, 5-12, 5-13, 6-6, 6-10, 6-12, 6-14, A-18, B-7, C-10, C-11, D-3

B

Bureau of International Information Programs, 2-7, 2-13, B-7

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 1-4, 2-7, 5-4

C

chief of mission, 1-10, 2-2, 2-11, 2-12, 5-2, 6-9, A-14, A-24, B-6, D-5

Civil Affairs (CA), 1-1, 1-15, 1-16, 2-12, 2-14, 2-17 through 2-19, 3-9 through 3-12, 3-14, 4-5, 4-6, 4-8, 4-10, 5-2, 5-6, 5-9, 6-3, 6-6, 6-8, 6-13, 6-14, 7-11, 7-12, A-1, A-8, A-13, B-6, B-7, B-9, C-9, C-12, C-14

Civil-Military Operations (CMO), 1-15, 1-17, 2-2, 2-3, 2-10, 2-17 through 2-19, 3-9, 3-12, 3-16, 4-5, 5-2, 5-3, 5-6, 6-6 through 6-9, 6-14, 6-17, A-22, B-7, C-11 through C-14, E-4

coalitions, 2-15, 2-19, 6-2, C-16

combat operations, v, 1-6, 1-7, 1-11, 1-15, 1-17, 1-18, 1-20, 2-4, 2-5, 2-14, 2-15, 2-18, 3-2, 3-11, 3-13, 4-1, 4-8, 4-10, 5-1, 5-2, 5-6, 5-9, 5-13, 5-15, 5-16, 6-1, 6-5, 6-6, 6-12 through 6-19, 7-3, A-2, A-8, B-7, C-19, E-3, F-1

conventional forces, v, 1-1, 1-2, 1-10, 1-16, 2-4, 2-10, 2-15, 2-16, 3-10, 4-1, 4-3, 4-6, 4-10, 5-1 through 5-3, 5-5, 5-9, 6-1, 6-2, 6-4, 6-11, 6-13, 6-15, 6-17, 7-5, D-5, E-3

counterdrug operations, 1-8, 1-15, 1-17, 2-17, 5-4

Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, 6-3

country team, v, 1-2, 1-4, 1-7 through 1-10, 1-16, 1-17, 2-2, 2-10 through 2-12, 2-16, 2-19, 2-20, 3-8, 3-13, 4-9, 4-10, 5-2 through 5-4, 5-11, 5-13, 6-2, 6-4, 6-8, 6-11, 6-12, 6-14, 6-16, A-15, A-16, A-24, A-25, E-1

cultural attaché, 2-13

culture, 2-4, 3-16, 4-3, 4-4, 4-6, 5-13, 6-9

D

defense attaché, 1-10, 2-11, 2-12, A-7

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), 1-10, 1-12 through 1-14, 2-9, 3-3, 3-13, 6-2, A-10 through A-13, A-15 through A-20, A-22, A-23, E-2, E-3

Department of Agriculture, 2-8

Department of Justice, 2-8, 2-14

Department of State (DOS), 1-2 through 1-4, 1-6 through 1-14, 2-3, 2-5 through 2-7, 2-13, 2-14, 3-1 through 3-3, 3-6, 3-10, 3-12, 3-13, 5-3, 5-4, 6-2, 6-4, 6-19, 7-1, A-4, A-12, A-14, A-16 through A-22, E-3

Department of Treasury, 2-5, 2-8

direct support, v, 1-7, 1-11, 1-15, 1-16, 2-5, 2-10, 2-18, 4-1, 4-8, 4-10, 5-4, 5-8, 5-15, 6-1, 6-5, 6-6, 6-11 through 6-15, 7-3, E-3, E-4

E

exchange programs, 1-11, 1-15, 6-5, 6-13

F

fiscal law, A-5

foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), 1-8, 1-15, 1-16, 2-9, 5-4, 5-7, 5-8, 6-6 through 6-8, 6-17, C-12

foreign military financing program, 1-14

foreign military sales (FMS), 1-13, 1-14, 2-9, 4-7, 6-2, A-14, A-17 through A-19, A-23

H

health service support (HSS), v, 3-15, 5-7 through 5-9, 5-13, 6-18, 7-4

holistic interaction, 1-7

host nation (HN), iv, v, 1-1 through 1-4, 1-6 through 1-11, 1-14 through 1-20, 2-1, 2-3 through 2-5, 2-7, 2-8, 2-10 through 2-20, 3-1 through 3-3, 3-6 through 3-8, 3-10 through 3-17, 4-1 through 4-10, 5-1 through 5-16, 6-1 through 6-19, 7-1 through 7-8, 7-11, A-1 through A-12, A-18, A-23 through A-25, B-1 through B-9, B-11, C-1 through C-8, C-11, C-13, C-14, C-17 through C-23, D-1 through D-3, D-5, E-1 through E-4, F-1 through F-3

humanitarian and civic action (HCA), 1-15, 1-16, 2-9, 2-11, 5-8, 6-5, 6-7, 6-14, A-8, A-11 through A-14, C-12

I

indirect support, 1-11, 1-15, 2-5, 2-15, 2-18, 3-13, 4-8, 5-2, 5-6, 5-7, 6-1, 6-2, 6-5, 6-6, 6-11 through 6-13, E-4

instruments of national power, 1-2, 1-4, 1-6 through 1-9, 1-12, 1-18, 2-1, 2-4, 2-5, 2-15, 3-1, 3-5, 3-7, 3-10, 3-12, 5-1, 6-19, A-16, B-2, D-2, D-5

insurgency and counterinsurgency, 6-18

intelligence support, v, 2-19, 5-11, 6-15, C-1

interagency plan, v, 3-2, 5-11, D-1 through D-5

internal defense and development (IDAD), v, 1-1, 1-3, 1-4, 1-6 through 1-10,1-15 through 1-20, 2-1, 2-3 through 2-5, 2-10, 2-11, 2-14, 2-15, 2-17, 3-1, 3-2, 3-16, 4-2, 4-7 through 4-9, 5-1, 5-3 through 5-5, 5-8, 6-1, 6-2, 6-6 through 6-9, 6-11, 6-14 through 6-18, 7-2, 7-3, 7-7, A-6, A-13, B-1, B-2, B-4 through B-8, B-10, C-23, D-1, D-2, E-2, E-3

international law, v, 1-7, A-1, A-2 through A-5, A-7

International Military Education and Training (IMET), 1-13 through 1-15, 2-9, 4-7, 6-2, 6-5, A-18, A-19

International Security Affairs, 2-9

J

joint combined exchange training, 1-14, 6-4

L

language, 1-1, 1-2, 2-16, 2-17, 2-19, 3-2, 3-9, 3-11, 4-1, 4-3 through 4-8, 4-10, 6-4, 6-5, 7-7, A-15, C-5, E-2, E-3, F-1, F-3

language and culture, 1-2

letter of offer and acceptance, 1-10, A-19, A-20

M

military information support operations (MISO), 1-1, 1-7, 1-11, 1-15 through 1-17, 2-3, 2-7, 2-10, 2-12, 2-13, 2-18, 2-20, 3-3, 3-9 through 3-12, 3-14 through 3-16, 4-5, 4-6, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 5-2 through 5-4, 5-6 through 5-9, 5-11, 6-3, 6-5 through 6-7, 6-9, 6-10 through 6-14, 6-16, 6-17, 7-7, 7-8, 7-11, A-1, A-5, A-6, A-23, A-24, B-5 through B-7, B-9, B-10, C-7, C-9, C-11, C-13 through C-15, C-17, D-3, D-5, E-4

mission handoff, 3-14, 7-1, 7-3

mobile training team (MTT), 2-10, 2-16, 3-2, 3-11, 6-3 through 6-5, E-3, F-1

multinational force, 1-14, 3-10

N

nation assistance, 1-8, 2-3, 2-19, 3-3, 6-6 through 6-8

National Defense Authorization Act, 3-13, A-1, A-8, A-15, A-21 through A-23

national objectives and policy, v

National Security Council, 1-6, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5, 3-1

nonproliferation, 1-12, 6-2, A-20, A-21

O

operational environment, 1-1, 1-9, 1-16, 2-15, 2-17, 2-19, 3-8, 3-14, 3-15, 4-5, 5-6, 5-11, 6-8, 6-16, 6-17, C-7, C-9 through C-12, C-14, D-5

P

postmission debriefing, v, 4-7, 7-3

R

rule of law, 1-7, 1-8, 2-3, 2-20, A-1, A-2, A-4

rules of engagement (ROE), iv, 1-18, 3-9, 4-6, 4-10, 5-10, 5-11, 5-13, 6-1, 6-6, 6-12, 6-16, 6-17, A-9, B-8

S

security assistance, v, 1-8 through 1-15, 1-19, 2-2, 2-4 through 2-7, 2-9, 2-11, 2-12, 2-15, 3-3, 3-7, 3-12, 3-13, 4-8, 4-9, 5-4, 5-13, 5-15, 6-1, 6-2, 6-5 through 6-7, 6-9,6-12, 6-14, 6-17, A-2, A-4, A-5, A-7 through A-11, A-17, A-18, A-20, A-21, D-2, E-1 through E-4

security assistance programs, 1-10, 1-13, 2-5, 2-7, 2-9, 3-3, 3-13, 4-9, 5-13, 6-2, 6-5, A-2, A-9, A-10, A-17, A-18

Security Assistance Training Management Organization, 1-10, 3-11, 4-8, 5-10

security cooperation organization (SCO), 1-10, 1-11, 2-11, 3-3, 4-1, 4-8 through 4-10, 5-10, 5-11, 6-1, 6-2, 6-4, 6-5, A-7, A-18, A-24, E-1 through E-3

security cooperation planning, 1-12, 3-3, A-5

security force assistance (SFA), 1-2, 1-8 through 1-10, 2-15 through 2-17, 2-19, 3-13, 4-1, 5-2, 5-6

site survey, v, 3-13, 3-15, 3-16, 4-5, 4-7, 5-6, 5-7, 5-10, 5-12, 5-13, 6-10, 7-3, C-4, F-1, F-2

Special Forces (SF), 1-1, 1-16, 2-17, 3-10, 4-6, 4-8 through 4-10, 5-7, 5-9, 5-13, 6-3, 6-6, 6-13, 6-14, 6-17, A-1, D-5, E-4

sustainment, v, 1-12, 1-18, 3-5, 3-9, 5-5, 6-15, 6-18

T

terrorism, 1-1, 1-4, 1-5, 1-8,1-9, 1-16, 1-20, 2-3, 2-16 through 2-18, 3-1, 3-8, 3-12,3-14, 3-16, 5-3, 5-4, 6-1, 6-3, 6-6, 6-7, 6-9, 6-14 through 6-16, 6-19, A-1, A-2, A-5, A-15, A-16, A-22, A-23, B-2, B-4, B-6, C-1, C-2, C-4, C-6, C-14, C-16 through C-21, E-3

Title 10, 1-1, 1-11, 3-1, 3-8,3-13, 6-4, 6-6, 6-7, 6-14, 6-17, A-8 through A-16

Title 22, 1-11, 3-1, 3-3, 3-8, 3-13, A-8, A-14, A-16 through A-21, A-24

Title 50, A-21

U

U.S. defense representative, 2-12, 4-8, 4-9

U.S. diplomatic mission, v, 2-11, A-8

U.S. law, 1-9, 1-14, 1-15, 6-4, A-1, A-5

United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 1-3, 1-4, 2-5 through 2-8, 2-13, 2-19, 5-7, A-11, A-14

W

weapons of mass destruction, 1-9, 6-3, D-2

ATP 3-05.2

19 August 2015

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

MARK A. MILLEY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1521708

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media only (EMO).