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*ATP 3-55.4

Army Techniques Publication
No. 3-55.4

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 5 April 2016

Techniques for Information Collection During Operations Among Populations

Contents

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1: FUNDAMENTALS

Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Interaction with the Population

Legal Considerations

Human Intelligence Activities

Chapter 2: PLAN AND PREPARE

Pre-Deployment Planning and Preparation

Deployment Planning and Preparation

Chapter 3: EXECUTE

Execution

Interpreters

Local Populace

Soldier and Leader Engagement

Tactical Site Exploitation

Detainee Handling

Tactical Questioning

Reporting and Patrol Debriefing

Chapter 4: ASSESS

Assessment

Monitoring

Evaluating

Recommending or Directing Action

Providing Feedback

Appendix A: BLANK FORMATS

Appendix B: INTERPRETERS

Appendix C: MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES

Appendix D: CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS

Appendix E: LEVERAGING INFORMATION SOURCES

GLOSSARY

REFERENCES

INDEX

Figures

Figure 1-1. Tactical information flow

Figure 2-1. Sample of a mission checklist

Figure 2-2. Patrol briefing topics

Figure A-1. DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War [EPW] Capture Tag)

Figure A-2. Sample of a field expedient captured materials tag

Figure A-3. Sample of a captured materials log

Figure A-4. Spot Report [SPOTREP]

Figure A-5. Patrol Report [PATROLREP]

Tables

Table 3-1. Questioning references

Table 3-2. Potential indicators

Table 3-3. Captured materiel

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*This manual supersedes FM 2-91.6, dated 10 October 2007.

Preface

This publication provides time-tested, coherent, and easily understood techniques for Soldiers and Department of the Army (DA) Civilians who collect information while interacting with the public during the conduct of their duties. Many of the techniques described are designed specifically for patrols, checkpoints, roadblocks, cordon and searches, and other missions in which Soldiers interact with the populace. This manual––

• Is a compilation of techniques to help all Soldiers collect information while interacting with the population through voluntary questioning, detainee handling, tactical questioning, and document and equipment handling.

• Introduces the basics of interacting with the population and describes the reporting procedures while providing some tools for patrols and intelligence staffs (S-2s).

• Provides the doctrinal framework for Soldiers and leaders at all echelons and forms the foundation for Soldier sensor mission curricula within the Army Education System. Its audience is broad, from Soldiers and leaders to civilians.

Note. Questioning by law enforcement personnel and questioning as part of interrogation operations is beyond the scope of this publication. For information concerning law enforcement questioning, see FM 3-39. For information concerning interrogation questioning, see FM 2-22.3.

Interacting with the population as it relates to civil affairs mission sets is beyond the scope of this publication. For information concerning civil affairs operations, see FM 3-57.

The principal audience for ATP 3-55.4 is all Soldiers and DA Civilians in the Army profession. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning unified land operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army can also use this publication.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement, see FM 27-10.

ATP 3-55.4 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. This publication is not the proponent for any terms. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 3-55.4 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 3-55.4 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (ATP 3-55.4), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

Introduction

Every Soldier plays a role when it comes to situational awareness through reporting. Soldiers and DA Civilians have the obligation to collect, safeguard, and report information, which contributes to the commander’s situational understanding. Training instills all Soldiers with the obligation to report information obtained during the course of their activities.

All Soldiers and DA Civilians must understand how their daily observations feed into the bigger picture and help create a more favorable environment for U.S. success in a region. Interaction with the local populace enables Soldiers to obtain information of immediate value through conversation, helps build mutual understanding, and increases an understanding of the environment.

Soldiers observe and report information to facilitate decision making. The principal means of information collection are surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence operations, or security operations. For more information, see FM 3-55.

During operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DA staff implemented the Every Soldier is a Sensor program. This program emphasized the importance of information obtained by every Soldier in the course of their daily activities. The Every Soldier is a Sensor construct was captured in FM 3-55 as Soldier sensor missions. Soldier sensor mission training ensures Soldiers and leaders see information collection and reporting as everyone’s responsibility. All must strive for knowledge to gain and maintain greater situational awareness. At the heart of the Soldier sensor mission set is the art of collecting combat information. This process involves leaders directing and maximizing the collection of combat information by patrols. It also involves Soldiers who understand their role as information collectors, which contributes to answering information requirements and facilitates follow-on operations.

Soldier sensor mission training for information collection missions among the population results in leaders and Soldiers who are—

• Trained to observe actively for indicators related to collection tasks.

• Competent in reporting their experience, perception, and judgment concisely and accurately.

• Able to understand how to optimize the collection, processing, and dissemination of information to enable the generation of timely intelligence.

• Able to anticipate and requisition technology to leverage the intelligence process to enhance situational understanding and decision making.

Leaders and Soldiers must understand the tasks and considerations that facilitate training and developing leaders and Soldiers as efficient information collectors within the area of operations. This publication gives both leaders and Soldiers a framework in which to enhance situational awareness through observation and reporting. Leaders can anticipate training requirements and operational considerations, and evaluate the preparedness and performance of their Soldiers. Tasks utilized by the Soldier––such as tactical questioning, understanding cultural awareness, use of interpreters, patrol debriefing, and handling captured materials–– help to answer information requirements resulting in a clearer picture of the area of operations.

This publication contains four chapters and five appendixes.

Chapter 1 discusses the fundamentals of information collection. It first covers Soldier surveillance and reconnaissance. It discusses how Soldiers interact with the indigenous population. The chapter then provides legal considerations Soldiers require when planning for or collecting information. The chapter closes with a discussion of human intelligence activities.

Chapter 2 covers planning and preparing for information collection when operating among populations. It has two parts. It first explores planning and preparing during pre-deployment. It then discusses planning and preparing during deployment.

Chapter 3 discusses how Soldiers execute information collection when operating among populations. It first covers interpreters and the local populace. Then it discusses Soldier and leader engagement. The chapter then discusses tactical site exploitation and detainee handling. The chapter concludes with tactical questioning and debriefing after reporting and patrols.

Chapter 4 covers how to assess information collection when operating among populations. It begins with discussions on monitoring and evaluating. It then covers recommending or directing action. The chapter concludes with a discussion on providing feedback.

There are five appendixes in ATP 3-55.4. They discuss formats used for collecting information, interpreters, mission responsibilities, civil considerations, and leveraging information sources.

Chapter 1

Fundamentals

SOLDIER SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

1-1. Surveillance and reconnaissance missions are a principal means of information collection. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). Commanders use reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence missions to answer the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and support decision making.

1-2. While certain specialized units are tailored to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, leveraging the information collected by all Soldiers across an area of operations (AO) often results in maximizing the efficiency of an operation. Soldiers actively observe details related to information requirements as part of their duties and responsibilities. They must be competent in reporting their experience, perception, and judgment concisely and accurately. Leaders must create a climate and reporting architecture that allows all Soldiers to report freely on what they see and learn on a mission.

1-3. All Soldiers report their observations through their chains of command even when not specifically tasked to conduct surveillance or reconnaissance. The Soldier remains an indispensable source for much of the information needed by commanders. Observations and experiences of Soldiers, often working with the local population, provide depth and context to information collected. Commanders and staffs emphasize the integration of information collected from Soldiers in the AO into the intelligence warfighting function. This focus on integration contributes to more detailed and accurate intelligence.

1-4. Information reported through the proper channels helps ensure information flows up and down the chain of command from small units to their company intelligence support teams (when available) to the intelligence staff (S-2). This flow of information is a vital part of the intelligence warfighting function.

INTERACTION WITH THE POPULATION

1-5. All Soldiers and DA Civilians must understand how their daily observations feed into the bigger picture and help create a more favorable environment for United States (U.S.) success in a region. Interaction with the local populace enables Soldiers to obtain combat information of immediate value through conversation, helps build mutual trust and understanding, and increases understanding the environment. For detailed information on civil considerations, see Appendix D.

1-6. Combat information is unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user’s tactical intelligence requirements (JP 2-01). Whether collected in offensive, defensive, or stability operations, the discriminator for combat information is that it is unevaluated. It is vital that combat information not only be reported to a leader or commander, but also that it is reported to the S-2. The S-2 analyzes the information and includes it in intelligence production if substantiated.

1-7. Every Soldier provides useful information and is an essential component to the commander’s ability to achieve situational understanding. Every Soldier develops a special level of situational awareness simply due to exposure to events occurring in the AO and has the opportunity to collect information by observing and interacting with the local populace and environment. Soldiers serve as the commander’s eyes and ears when––

• Performing traditional offensive or defensive missions.

• Observing and reporting while patrolling.

• Manning a checkpoint or a roadblock.

• Participating in a cordon and search.

• Occupying an observation post.

• Conducting tactical site exploitation.

• Engaging or meeting with the indigenous population or other audiences in the AO.

• Passing through areas in convoys.

• Participating in debriefings after missions or patrols.

1-8. Soldiers interact with the local populace for various reasons. It may be to obtain information of immediate value, build mutual trust and understanding, or develop information concerning the environment. Soldiers interact based on the unit’s standard operating procedures (SOPs), rules of engagement (ROE), and the operation order (OPORD) for that mission including information collection tasks derived from the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). PIRs are answered by breaking them into specific information requirements tasked for collection as collection tasks. For further information on requirement development, see ATP 2-01. Specific SOPs or ROE may limit who interacts with the populace and how by rank, duty position, or additional training.

1-9. Small-unit leaders include specific guidance for interacting with the local populace and conducting Soldier and leader engagement in the mission briefing for appropriate missions. The brigade S-2, battalion S-2, S-3, and S-9 must provide appropriate specific guidance in the form of information collection tasks to a company, troop, or battery to help guide its interaction with the local populace. For detailed information concerning mission responsibilities of the various echelons, see Appendix C. The information the Soldier reports after interacting with the local populace and conducting Soldier and leader engagement will be passed up the chain of command through staff channels to the battalion S-3 and brigade S-2. This reporting forms a vital part of planning and operations.

1-10. Effective Soldiers ask clear and concise questions to facilitate understanding. They use conversational interaction or tactical questioning.

1-11. Conversational interaction is the least restrictive questioning. Soldiers conduct this interaction with the local population, Soldier and leader engagement, or tactical site exploitation. Soldiers ask direct questions in a conversational manner while treating the individual with respect and cultural sensitivity. Direct questions are basic questions normally beginning with an interrogative (who, what, when, where, how, or why) and requiring a narrative answer. Individuals can refuse to answer questions and are free to leave at any time.

1-12. Tactical questioning is a more restrictive questioning. Soldiers conduct this questioning once the unit deems the individual is a detainee. Detainees can refuse to answer questions but are not free to leave. Tactical questioning uses direct questions, is limited in duration, and is conducted at or near the point of capture by any Soldier trained in tactical questioning. Tactical questioning focuses on collecting information that is of immediate tactical value or will aid in filling out a detainee capture tag. Tactical questioning is not interrogation and does not use the techniques approved for interrogation.

Note. Interaction with the local populace never involves payment or reward from Soldiers or leaders to individuals for the information provided. Although it is appropriate to ask individuals or elements within the populace conversational questions, asking or tasking individuals within the populace to collect specific information constitutes source operations and is prohibited for any Soldier not trained and certified to conduct source operations. The battalion S-2 should maintain a record of those persons within the AO with whom subordinate units interact on a regular basis. Units closely control this record and regularly reconcile it with the brigade combat team counterintelligence and human intelligence staff officer or staff element (S-2X) records.

1-13. Every day, Soldiers talk and interact with the local populace and observe more relevant information than technical sensors can collect. Many activities, routinely conducted in support of Army operations, contribute to Soldier sensor missions. Emphasis and training on these tasks result in the most efficient execution of Soldier sensor missions, including––

• Patrols.

• Soldier and leader engagement.

• Tactical site exploitation.

• Detainee handling.

• Tactical questioning.

• Briefing, reporting, and debriefing.

PATROLS

1-14. The conduct of patrols and missions––whether for combat, reconnaissance, or logistics––provides an opportunity to observe and obtain information. Soldiers and leaders must keep the purpose of the mission in mind even as they plan to obtain usable information to support answering collection tasks. Planning to collect information in support of requirements contributes to the success of the unit’s mission.

1-15. Reconnaissance patrols and their presence and contact patrols, in particular, offer an opportunity for Soldiers—whether task-organized with infantry, human intelligence (HUMINT), civil affairs (CA), military information support operations (known as MISO), engineer, or other specialties––to specifically collect information related to the PIRs or for situational development. For further information on planning, preparing for, coordinating, and briefing on patrols, see Chapter 2. For further information of patrols in general, see FM 3-21.8.

SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT

1-16. Soldier and leader engagement is interpersonal interactions by Soldiers and leaders with audiences in an area of operations (FM 3-13). It is completely appropriate and essential for Soldiers and leaders of U.S. forces in a given AO to establish relationships with the leadership and important elements of the local population. These engagements can occur as an opportunity, a face-to-face encounter on the street, or a scheduled meeting. This interaction can also occur via telephone calls, video teleconference, or other audiovisual mediums. This engagement provides a venue for building relationships, solving conflicts, conveying information, calming fears, and refuting rumors, lies, or incorrect information. While Soldier and leader engagement is not conducted to support information collection, personnel still need to report any information of value in accordance with unit SOP. Effective integration of Soldier and leader engagement into operations increases the potential for commanders to mitigate unintended consequences, counters adversary information activities, and increases local support for friendly forces and their collective mission.

1-17. Information of operational and intelligence importance may be obtained through Soldier and leader engagement. An effective S-2 debriefs all those involved following a Soldier and leader engagement. Occasionally a command debriefing team will interview leaders as a part of their engagement. This debriefing facilitates coordination among Army leaders who have developed relationships with members of the local population in an AO and HUMINT operations. Coordination reduces the chance of multiple elements unnecessarily interacting with the same individuals and increases efficiency. For further information on Soldier and leader engagement, see FM 3-13 and FM 3-53.

TACTICAL SITE EXPLOITATION

1-18. Tactical site exploitation is a series of methodical actions taken to ensure that information and materials at the site are detected, collected, and processed. This information and these materials potentially answer collection tasks and facilitate future operations. See discussion beginning in paragraph 3-24 for execution of tactical site exploitation and ATP 3-90.15 for site exploitation.

1-19. Tactical site exploitation is composed of individual and collective tasks executed by Soldiers to establish facts. Those facts provide critical information that may support the answering of a collective task and subsequently a specific information requirement. Tactical site exploitation identifies information, materiel, and persons located on the objective following an operation such as a raid, or cordon and search.

1-20. Materials captured on the battlefield differ from those acquired from detainees. The different acquisition determines their proper handling during collection, tagging, and assessment as well as their appropriate destination for further processing and analysis. Generally collected during tactical operations, units carefully handle captured materials using forensically sound techniques to preserve both their potential intelligence value and evidentiary value.

1-21. Captured materials are documents, media, items of equipment, or materiel in the possession of enemy forces that subsequently end up in the control of friendly forces, regardless of origin, including U.S. or multinational documents or other items that were once in enemy hands. Captured materials include any equipment, documents, and materials captured on the battlefield, surrendered by locals, or obtained as a result of raids, cordon and search, or other operations. Items captured with a detainee are documented using DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War [EPW] Capture Tag), while items obtained on the battlefield require completion of DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document). Soldiers may also complete an expedited field expedient tag for items collected on the battlefield. See Appendix A.

1-22. Persons found on-site will be consolidated at a safe location and out of public view. Soldiers can voluntarily question persons found on-site. Once the leader decides to detain a person, Soldiers must apply the guidelines of tactical questioning. This questioning may be inside or outside a structure. All persons are searched, segregated, and not allowed to communicate or overhear any questioning. Soldiers also search for weapons and potentially exploitable material, to include personal property inside visible or hidden pockets. Males avoid searching females except as a last resort and when no other means are available. All individuals regardless of age and gender are capable of carrying improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or other hazardous items. Any individuals deemed a possible threat should be flex-cuffed or properly secured for their safety and the safety of others. Personnel enter all persons on-site into the biometric database in accordance with theater policy.

Note. All detainees shall be treated humanely at all times and in accordance with DODD 3115.09 and DODD 2310.01E. No person in the custody or under the control of Department of Defense (DOD), regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment as defined in U.S. law, including the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.

DETAINEE HANDLING

1-23. Detainees are critical sources of combat information. A detainee is any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control of Department of Defense personnel (JP 3-63). This does not include DOD personnel or DOD contractor personnel being held for law enforcement purposes.

1-24. Detainees are treated humanely but with firmness at all times. High standards of discipline are required not only of detainees but also of capturing and escort forces. The mistreatment or abuse of detainees is a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for which violators may be punished. Fraternization with detainees is not conducive to good discipline.

1-25. At the point of capture, the capturing element performs a search, silence, segregate, safeguard, speed, and tag, known as the 5Ss and T, on detainees. For detailed information on the handling of detainees, see discussion beginning in paragraph 3-30 and FM 3-63.

TACTICAL QUESTIONING

1-26. Tactical questioning is the field-expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value of a captured or detained person at or near the point of capture and before the individual is placed in a detention facility (JP 3-63). Tactical questioning is generally performed by members of patrols but can be done by any appropriately trained DOD personnel. Tactical questioning is limited to direct questioning per DODD 3115.09. Tactical questioning is not interrogation and does not use the techniques approved for interrogations.

1-27. HUMINT collectors within an organization are the best trainers on the conduct of tactical questioning. Every Soldier can collect and report important information, which may answer an information requirement completely or cue a more focused collection by HUMINT collection elements. Whether satisfying a collection task or not, information gained through tactical questioning adds to the commander’s situational awareness and helps to provide a clearer picture of the AO. For further information on the execution of tactical questioning, see discussion beginning in paragraph 3-40.

Note. When interacting with the local population one of the best practices is to have a human intelligence collection team (HCT), document and media exploitation team, or multifunctional team, when available, along with the maneuver force to assist, see figure 1-1.

Figure 1-1. Tactical information flow

MISSION BRIEFING, REPORTING, AND DEBRIEFING

1-28. At a minimum, briefings prior to departure include an intelligence assessment or a detailed intelligence briefing. Missions that may be considered routine, like convoy operations or presence patrols, may be preceded by an updated intelligence assessment including indicators of activity related to the specific information requirements and information collection tasks. Planned raids, combat patrols, or patrols that will likely result in tactical site exploitation will be preceded by a more detailed intelligence briefing, specific to the mission. This briefing will contain indicators related to the specific information requirements, information collection tasks, and instructions on handling captured materials. In all instances, pre-mission briefings cover report guidance for observed information.

1-29. Soldiers should report through the chain of command all information collected while in contact with the local population. Upon return from the mission, Soldiers should download photographs and lay out all material taken from the objective. Correspondence and information obtained during Soldier and leader engagement is generally reported during debriefing. See also the discussion beginning in paragraph 3-45.

1-30. Patrol debriefing is the process of questioning U.S. forces and DOD personnel returning from missions and patrols for information of value. Debriefings are conducted by the S-2, HUMINT collector, or designed command debriefing team, when task organized. Patrol debriefing operations are the systematic debriefings of U.S. forces to answer requirements. Intelligence is enhanced by analyzing what has been occurring within an AO. Debriefing also facilitates situational understanding of an operational environment. The purpose of a debriefing is to—

• Accurately capture what actually occurred.

• Analyze collected information concerning what occurred to determine why it occurred. This facilitates after action reviews as well as intelligence.

• Analyze collected information to provide context and a greater understanding of the environment.

1-31. Once the platoon returns from the objective or site, a detailed debriefing should begin. For detailed information concerning leveraging the various information sources, see Appendix E. Everyone participates in a debriefing session. A practical method for debriefing involves reviewing all patrol actions chronologically. Leaders should not release personnel or consider the mission complete until the S-2, HUMINT collector, or designed command debriefing team complete the debriefing. See also the discussion beginning in paragraph 3-54.

1-32. Soldier and leader engagement presents an opportunity to assimilate information provided by key individuals into the intelligence process quickly. Leaders plan for debriefing—by the S-2, HUMINT collector, or a command debriefing team—after completing one or more engagements. Often, the information provided offers insight into the civil considerations of the AO and provides indicators associated with specific information requirements and collection tasks. The information also illuminates the connectivity or disparity between the local leadership and the local populace when compared to Soldier observations and their interactions with the local populace.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

1-33. Soldiers conduct all tactical questioning to gain information from detainees in accordance with applicable U.S. laws and regulations, international law, orders including fragmentary orders, and other operationally specific guidelines. FM 2-22.3 states that all detainees shall be treated humanely, and in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, DODD 2310.01E, and DODD 3115.09. It also states that no person in the custody or under the control of DOD, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

GENEVA CONVENTIONS

1-34. The Geneva Conventions establish specific standards for humane care and treatment of enemy personnel captured, retained, or detained by signatories, including U.S. military and allied forces. All persons who have knowledge of suspected or alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions are obligated by regulation to report such matters through command channels or to designated individuals, such as the staff judge advocate or inspector general, if the person feels the chain of command itself is implicated.

1-35. Failure to report a suspected or alleged violation of the law of war may subject a Service member to disciplinary actions. Violations of the Geneva Conventions committed by U.S. personnel may constitute violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Leaders are responsible for ensuring that their forces comply with the Geneva Conventions. If violations occur in the conduct of warfare, commanders bear primary responsibility for reporting the alleged violations to higher headquarters, investigating the alleged violations, and taking appropriate action with respect to the violators. Violations of Army regulations and U.S. laws concerning intelligence activities are also reportable within guidelines of AR 380-10.

PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES

1-36. If leaders or Soldiers meet repeatedly with a person for collecting foreign, military, and military-related intelligence, then they may inadvertently be conducting military source operations. When, during the course of Soldier and leader engagement or interaction with the populace, this type of information is repeatedly discussed or collected, leaders or Soldiers should consult the S-2 or S-2X for additional guidance. Activities that are strictly prohibited by any U.S. Soldier or DOD civilian (except for trained HUMINT collectors) include––

• Paying a contact for information.

• Offering technology and equipment to a contact (for example, cameras, recording devices, and other items).

• Giving a contact a government-issued identification card.

• Referring to contacts as sources.

• Establishing a source network.

• Tasking a contact to collect information.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1-37. HUMINT is a discipline outlined in the United States Code and regulated by U.S. Government laws. Soldiers outside of the HUMINT discipline do not conduct HUMINT operations. Human intelligence is the collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities (FM 2-22.3). HUMINT uses a formal process to identify, recruit, manage, and handle humans developed into a tool for collection referred to as a source. Individuals trained in the HUMINT discipline use various collection methods, gather information to satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements, and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines. Non-HUMINT qualified Soldiers and leaders collect information from the population through observation, interaction, and tactical questioning.

1-38. HUMINT tasks include but are not limited to—

• Conducting military source operations. (Only HUMINT trained, qualified, and authorized individuals are permitted to develop, handle, manage, and conduct source operations as per the United States Code. Managing sources outside of HUMINT is punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.)

• Liaising with host-nation (HN) officials and allied counterparts.

• Eliciting information from select sources.

• Debriefing U.S. forces, allied forces, and civilians including refugees, displaced persons, third- country nationals, and local inhabitants.

• Interrogating enemy prisoners of war and other detainees when authorized by law, mission, training, and qualification.

1-39. For the Army, HUMINT collectors specifically include enlisted personnel in military occupational specialty 35M, or warrant officers in the 351M career field. These specially trained and certified individuals are the only personnel authorized to conduct HUMINT. For more information, see ATP 2-22.31.

Chapter 2‌

Plan and Prepare

PRE-DEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND PREPARATION

2-1. Planning and preparation are both leader and Soldier functions during pre-deployment. Leaders must be aware of the commander’s intent to synchronize forces and resources. In complex tactical environments, leaders and Soldiers must utilize more time for preparation. Planning and preparation create conditions within which friendly forces improve their chances for operational success. Situational awareness can change as forces receive new information. As situational awareness changes, leaders must apply judgment to determine the significance of the changes and their possible effects on the operation.

PRE-DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

2-2. Planning is the process by which Army leaders translate the commander’s visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results. A plan is a continuous, evolving framework of anticipated actions that maximizes opportunities. It guides Soldiers as they progress through each phase of the operation. Any plan is a framework from which to adapt, not a script followed to the letter. The measure of a good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned but whether the plan facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events. Good plans foster initiative.

2-3. Planning starts prior to deployment, even in small units. Planning and preparing Soldiers for interacting with the population begins with––

• Identifying the requirements within the anticipated AO.

• Assessing the unit’s capabilities to meet those requirements.

• Developing a methodology to train Soldiers to interact effectively with the population and obtain information to support information collection tasks.

2-4. In addition to the tasks that contribute to interacting effectively with the local population, training in cultural awareness, biometrics tactical collection devices, battlefield forensic support activities, and tracking can significantly enhance a unit’s information collection and subsequent intelligence production. Cumulatively, small elements within company and battalion units, trained in specific tasks, will exponentially increase the volume and quality of company information and battalion intelligence efforts.

2-5. In addition to identifying requirements and capabilities, planning to conduct Soldier surveillance and reconnaissance efficiently requires a concept of operations. Commanders and staff must determine how to task-organize their element to best fulfill their requirements. Additionally, commanders anticipating requirements their unit cannot fulfill must consider requesting specialized or uniquely trained units. Assigning these units to the requesting organization is one solution, but specialized units often are allocated to higher headquarters and are attached to requesting units based on availability and priority.

2-6. Prior to deployment, commanders provide training guidance for those tasks that contribute to Soldier sensor missions as well as the activities that enhance collection. Early identification of required education and training facilitates pre-deployment training.

2-7. Generally, intelligence personnel are not assigned to echelons below battalion. Therefore, battalion staffs plan for their subordinate units to observe and report information from patrols, logistics convoys, and Soldier and leader engagement. Units have two techniques to provide better intelligence below the battalion echelon. First, they can task-organize intelligence personnel as company intelligence support teams to company or platoon echelon. Second, they can train company or platoon personnel in specific debriefing and basic information recording and reporting techniques.

2-8. Commanders establish a plan that will enable them to collect information quickly and efficiently from the AO, assess the quality of the information collected, report the information back for further analysis, and take further actions when appropriate.

PRE-DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION

2-9. Preparation consists of activities performed by the unit before execution to improve its ability to conduct the operation including, but not limited to, the following: plan refinement, rehearsals, surveillance, reconnaissance, coordination, inspections, and movement. Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success; it facilitates and sustains transitions, including transitions to branches and sequels.

2-10. Preparation prior to deployment involves education, training, and practice. The tasks that contribute to interacting with the local population and other enabling tasks often require training at temporary duty locations or from mobile training teams. Successful companies and battalions identify the specialized training and skills some leaders and Soldiers will need to better enable the accomplishing information collection and interacting with the population as far in advance of the deployment as possible.

Risk Management

2-11. Integration of the risk management process begins with pre-deployment planning. Identifying hazards, assessing hazards, and developing controls for hazards well ahead of deployment allow the organization greater flexibility and reaction time once operations are underway. For details on the risk management process, see ATP 5-19.

Cultural Awareness

2-12. Commanders and leaders strive to increase the level of cultural understanding in themselves and their subordinate staffs and units. Properly conducted research prior to deployment prepares a unit with, at a minimum, a macro overview and sensitization to the culture of a given AO. The more research focuses on the identified AO, the better prepared the unit will be. Each AO has different social and regional considerations that affect communications and can affect the conduct of operations. These considerations may include social taboos, desired behaviors, customs, and courtesies. Pre-deployment training at all levels ensures that personnel are better equipped to interact with the local populace. The unit S-9 or supporting CA element can ensure that all cultural awareness training is current and relevant to the specific country or region and can provide additional updates prior to deployment.

2-13. The following questions can help guide research in support of stronger cultural awareness:

• What is the geographical area?

• What natural boundaries or areas exist?

• What manmade boundaries or areas exist?

• Which particular sector of the population affects the boundaries or areas (political, religious, and social status)?

• Which particular sector of the population controls each area?

• Which sectors compete for control within given areas?

• What languages are spoken?

◦ What is the national language?

◦ Which languages are predominant?

• What political groups exist?

• Which political groups cooperate with each other?

• What are the religious affiliations?

◦ Which religions co-exist peacefully?

◦ Which religions exist in conflict with each other?

• What is the main industry?

• What is the status of the criminal enterprise?

• What industry could be functioning with the help of U.S. forces?

• What is the typical education level?

• What are the differing social statuses?

Biometric Tactical Collection Devices

2-14. Commanders must identify which biometric tactical collection devices are available and appropriate for their echelon and mission. Biometrics facilitates personnel identity, whether identifying known threat personnel, registering local nationals in support of access control, or supporting detainee accountability. Biometrics is the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics (JP 2-0). Biometric data is the measurable physiological and behavioral characteristics that establish an individual’s identity with certainty. Biometric modalities (such as fingerprints, facial images, and iris scans) have become a critical capability for enabling U.S. and multinational forces to identify insurgents and adversaries. By collecting, storing, and accessing this data, U.S. forces can share information among multinational forces as well as national and international government agencies and organizations. This data enables partners to link an individual to past identities and activities, especially to criminal and terrorist acts.

2-15. Biometrics is instrumental for identifying adversaries who seek sanctuary among the local population, masking their identity through false identification or multiple identities. Fake or multiple identities allow adversaries to conduct operations among the populace and reduces their risk of detection. Accurately identifying individuals who conduct or associate with illicit operations requires positively associating them contextually (such as by location, activity, equipment, and documents in their possession) with threat activity. Units can enroll an individual using a tactical biometric collection device if that individual appears close to where an IED detonates. If, at a second detonation site, the unit encounters the same individual, but with a different name and a new set of identity papers, the unit may further scrutinize the individual.

2-16. Biometrics enables or supports the following activities:

• Identify an unknown individual during tactical operations.

• Locate a person of interest.

• Track a person of interest.

• Manage local populations during military operations.

• Authorize access to privileges.

• Control physical access.

• Enable information assurance.

• Collect forensic evidence.

• Manage emergencies during non-military operations.

• Share identity information.

Battlefield Forensic Support Activities

2-17. Forensics is conducted by highly trained personnel, often using sophisticated tools and facilities. Battlefield forensic support activities are actions on the objective that facilitate site exploitation, cordon and search, and the overall collection effort. Leaders and Soldiers must be familiar with properly assessing, prioritizing, and processing a combat scene to preserve it for combat forensic collection. During pre- deployment preparation, leaders and Soldiers practice how to collect evidence, fingerprint, and properly document and photograph the location of significant activities. This training is imperative, as there are a limited number of specialized units. In the absence of a specialized element, education and training will enable leaders to determine if and how to exploit the site, and which Soldiers to execute the mission.

2-18. Current operations require Soldiers to act quickly, ignore distractions, and focus on the mission. Mission accomplishment and Soldier safety are the key objectives in the decision to conduct battlefield forensic support activities or site exploitation.

Tracking

2-19. Tracking is a type of reconnaissance. Units can plan to track, but tracking often results from combat or reconnaissance patrolling, tactical site exploitation, or an IED event. Although any trained Soldier can perform tracking, a tracking patrol—normally a squad-size, possibly smaller element—often receives a tracking mission. It is tasked to follow the trail of a specific individual or enemy unit to determine its composition, final destination, and actions en route.

2-20. Members of a tracking patrol look for subtle signs left by the subject en route. As the tracking element tracks, it collects information about the individual or enemy unit, the route taken, and the surrounding terrain. Normally, a tracking patrol avoids direct fire contact with the tracked unit, but in many instances, detention is a result of tracking an individual. Tracking patrols often use tracker dog teams to help them maintain the track. For further information, see FM 3-90-2.

DEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND PREPARATION

2-21. Deployment planning and preparation are leader and Soldier functions. Leaders synchronize forces and resources to meet the commander’s intent for deployment planning and preparation.

DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

2-22. Planning for deployment involves planning for information collection. Units plan to collect information during deployment when they plan for patrols and intelligence.

Patrol Planning

2-23. Targeting and information collection planning as part of the military decisionmaking process often result in intelligence requirements that only patrols can answer. At the company level, commanders and leaders plan for patrols using troop leading procedures and the running estimate. The running estimate enables leaders to identify required actions on the objective (mission analysis), plan backward to departure from friendly lines, and plan forward to re-entry over friendly lines. Normally, the patrol leader receives the OPORD in the battalion or company command post where communications are good and key personnel are available for coordination. Coordination is continuous throughout planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. Because patrolling units act independently, move beyond the direct-fire support of the parent unit, and operate forward of friendly units, coordination must be thorough and detailed.

2-24. The military decisionmaking process or troop leading procedures often identify requirements to task- organize elements for a specific patrol or series of patrols. Task-organizing a patrol element to conduct actions on the objective is fundamental to Army operations. Task-organizing to maximize efficiency in collecting information from a planned raid site, or resulting from a reaction to ambush, may become a standard in certain environments.

2-25. In addition to task-organizing specific specialties to a patrol, leaders may need to request or task- organize specialties to a company or even to a platoon on a long-term basis. Direct coordination between the staff and elements conducting a mission or patrol is preferred. When commanders employ units away from a supporting staff, they may task-organize elements of the staff to the small unit to better facilitate coordination. This task organization provides subject matter expertise directly to the supported element, as well as creates an effective information conduit to the staff.

Intelligence Planning

2-26. As part of mission analysis, step 2 of the military decisionmaking process, the unit uses the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process to analyze the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. The IPB process identifies critical gaps in the commander’s knowledge of an operational environment. As a part of the initial planning guidance, commanders use these gaps as a guide to establish their initial intelligence requirements.

2-27. During mission analysis, the staff develops information requirements. An information requirement is any information element the commander and staff require to successfully conduct operations (ADRP 6-0). Some information requirements are of such importance to the commander that staffs nominate them to the commander to become a CCIR. A commander’s critical information requirement is an information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making (JP 3-0).

2-28. The staff incorporates CCIRs into the appropriate parts of the order. Information collection tasks derived from the CCIRs may be located in the body of the OPORD or in Annex L. This publication focuses on collection tasks derived from specific information requirements that in turn help answer PIRs. Reportable combat information appears in the coordinating instructions when no specific unit is tasked to collect it, but all units are tasked to report it as observed. Identifying reportable information in the OPORD and reviewing examples of combat information during briefings is particularly important at echelons company and below, as these echelons have the greatest opportunity to observe information on a routine basis. While most CCIRs, PIRs, and specific information requirements are developed and written by experienced and senior officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers, platoon and squad leaders need to understand which reportable information their unit is most likely to observe and then develop an effective way to communicate or translate this to their Soldiers.

DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION

2-29. Units prepare for deployment. When applied to information collection, this preparation includes—

• Patrol preparation.

• Patrol coordination.

• Adjacent unit coordination.

• Patrol briefing.

• Soldier and leader engagement preparation.

• Tactical site exploitation preparation.

• Walk-in preparation.

• Intelligence preparation.

• Cultural awareness and civil considerations.

Patrol Preparation

2-30. Each mission is conducted for an identified purpose. Whether organized for combat, reconnaissance, or a logistics package operation, these missions provide Soldiers access to critical information about an operational environment. Leaders and Soldiers must keep the purpose of the mission firmly in mind even as they prepare the means to obtain and report usable information.

2-31. Whether briefed by the S-3, commander, or platoon leader, the patrol leader is provided a clear task and purpose of the patrol. Patrols that depart the main body with the clear intent to make direct contact with the enemy are combat patrols. Those patrols that depart the main body with the intention of avoiding direct combat with the enemy while seeking out information or confirming the accuracy of previously collected information are reconnaissance patrols. Although not the main purpose, combat patrols can result in the collection of information, whereas reconnaissance patrols focus on collecting information. Successful patrol leaders must ensure that they understand a commander's expectations as well as how the patrol fits within the higher unit’s concept of operations. Failure to do so can result in collecting information that serves no purpose for the commander.

2-32. To maximize the effectiveness of every member of the patrol as a sensor, the patrol leader ensures the patrol understands the specific requirements and the purpose of the mission. The patrol’s mission is complete once it collects and reports information to the appropriate headquarters. The dissemination of information collected to all members of the patrol increases the likelihood of the information being accurately reported should the patrol suffer casualties.

Patrol Coordination

2-33. Leaders and Soldiers contribute to deployment preparation by understanding the unit’s concept of operations, its information requirements, and any potential risks. Planning and preparing questions for interacting with the local populace prior to the patrol can enhance the quality of information collected. Leader and Soldier activities—such as patrol coordination, patrol briefings, ROE review, and risk assessment that take place upon receiving the operation plan, OPORD, or warning order—improve the unit’s ability to perform tasks, accomplish missions, and survive on the battlefield. Often units determine success in observation, tactical questioning, and interacting with the populace before the Soldier goes on the mission.

2-34. Feedback mechanisms promote and help maintain Soldier commitment to a mission. Soldiers continue to provide reportable observations if they feel they are making an active contribution and having a positive impact to a collection mission. If a unit or patrol leader does not evaluate this reported information and fails to provide feedback, Soldiers’ commitment may start to wane or altogether cease once they feel this activity is not worth their time or effort.

2-35. Effective leaders use checklists to avoid omitting any items vital to accomplishing the mission. For example, while one unit provides security after a prolonged urban battle with insurgents, another conducts food distribution and support medical assistance in the aftermath. Figure 2-1 is a sample checklist leaders can use during deployment preparation.

• Review higher headquarters guidance regarding support to foreign humanitarian assistance activities in theater.

• Integrate military information support activities, civil affairs, and public affairs information campaigns to inform the population and encourage popular support of humanitarian efforts.

• Maintain awareness of the security environment.

• Understand that even in a permissive environment, non-threatening actions, such as demonstrations, may be employed to impair credibility or to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. military activities.

• In a hostile environment, employ sufficient forces to safeguard the populace, defend the perimeter, escort convoys, screen the local populace, and assist in personnel recovery operations.

• Understand that host-nation authorities or threat may use humanitarian and disaster relief as a tool for political gain.

• Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the history and infrastructure of the tactical area on humanitarian activities.

• Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the humanitarian activities on the future and infrastructure of the tactical area.

• Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the populace on humanitarian activities.

• Assess, monitor, and report the impact of humanitarian activities on the populace.

• Assess, monitor, and report the effectiveness of humanitarian activities.

Figure 2-1. Sample of a mission checklist

2-36. Prior to leading the patrol, successful leaders obtain updated information regarding the current operational picture of their patrol area. They also check for any updated civil requirements with the S-9 or CA element.

Adjacent Unit Coordination

2-37. Immediately after the OPORD or mission briefing, the leader checks with other platoon or squad leaders who will be operating in the same areas as well as with quick reaction force elements. If leaders are not aware of any other units operating in the area, they should check with the S-3 during the operations coordination. The S-3 can help arrange this coordination if necessary. Leaders exchange the following information with other units operating in the same area:

• Identification of the unit.

• Mission and size of unit.

• Planned times and points of departure and re-entry.

• Routes.

• Fire support coordination measures and other control measures.

• Casualty evacuation.

• Frequencies and call signs.

• Recognition signals and pyrotechnic plan.

• Challenge password, running password, and number combination.

• Any information that the unit may have about the enemy.

Patrol Briefing

2-38. An OPORD is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. A five-paragraph format shown in figure 2-2 organizes the order, ensures completeness, and helps subordinate leaders understand and follow the order. Leaders should use a terrain model or sketch along with a map to explain the order. The leader briefs the OPORD orally following the five-paragraph format. Refer to FM 6-0 for details concerning OPORDs.

1. SITUATION. Leaders ensure unit has complete and recent information on the three forces: enemy, friendly, and attachments and detachments. Explaining the status of all of these forces gives Soldiers a better situational awareness of what organizations are in their area of operations (both enemy and friendly). This will assist Soldiers in planning and preparing for the mission.

2. MISSION. When preparing to brief the mission, leaders include the 5 W’s: Who, What, Where, When, and Why. Soldiers will have a clearer picture of what they are expected to observe and report on when they are fully aware of the mission.

3. EXECUTION. Leaders ensure execution is briefed as concisely as possible, since briefing lengthy paragraphs may mask valuable details that Soldiers need to know. The concept of operations will explain how the unit will accomplish the mission from start to finish through an explanation of the maneuver and fires support. Through this section, Soldiers will see where their unit falls into place in the bigger scheme of the mission. If support is needed in handling detainees, Soldiers should know what units are supporting them from this paragraph.

4. SUSTAINMENT. Leaders ensure that Soldiers are aware of the detainee-handling method and the location of the collection point. This paragraph also draws attention to medical evacuation and hospitalization for both friendly and enemy personnel, which is essential for situational awareness.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL. This paragraph states the locations of the command and control facilities and key leaders during the mission. Soldiers must be aware of who is in command in the event that a key leader is indisposed. Leaders must ensure Soldiers are aware of signal items such as signal operating instructions, communications methods, code words, and recognition signals. The knowledge in this paragraph will effectively enable Soldiers to communicate internally and externally.

Figure 2-2. Patrol briefing topics

2-39. Leaders must check their unit SOP to see if they must follow additional checklists or procedures. In addition to the intelligence and operations staff, the patrol leader will often coordinate directly with other staff sections as appropriate. In other cases, staff information and coordination relative to a patrol is conveyed through the company commander or platoon leader. Failure to coordinate increases the risk of fratricide and may waste limited resources. The leader, to keep from overlooking anything that may be vital to the mission, may carry copies of these checklists. Refer to FM 3-21.8 for additional information concerning small-unit patrols, orders, and checklists formats.

Soldier and Leader Engagement Preparation

2-40. Preparation for Soldier and leader engagement includes reviewing biographical and historic information on the person or persons involved in the engagement (counterpart). The purpose of engagement is to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action between U.S. force leaders and their counterparts. Awareness of the goals and expectation of an engagement counterpart, as well as obstacles and enablers of those goals, will facilitate discussion.

2-41. Army leaders are sensitive to the information requirements necessary for military decisions within their AO. Soldier and leader engagement should not be confused with the HUMINT activity of military source operations. Soldier and leader engagement involves no tasking authority and is not intended as a means to purposely collect threat information from a counterpart. On the other hand, military source operations intend to elicit information from a source and—depending on the relationship—act as an authority to task the source. However, when a counterpart offers this information as part of Soldier and leader engagement, the conversation should continue to its logical conclusion. Soldiers and leaders must provide information obtained from these types of conversations to the S-2 or command debriefing team.

Tactical Site Exploitation Preparation

2-42. Tactical site exploitation is either planned or hasty. Preparation for a planned site exploitation involves detailed intelligence as part of the order. A planned site exploitation allows for rehearsals concerning the actions on the objective based on expected data, information, or evidence. When available, proper handling is rehearsed with specialized elements. Specialized elements may include, but are not limited to, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), engineers, HUMINT collectors, criminal investigation division personnel, military police, or multinational partners. Specialized units may be attached to the element conducting the mission or be tasked with an on-order mission to support the tactical site exploitation.

2-43. Hasty tactical site exploitation is often the result of an ambush, sniper, or IED event. Hasty ambushes or raids could also be the result of combat information that is deemed reliable and must be acted on immediately. In this instance, the last piece of information suddenly makes sense of other collected information and is later validated by current intelligence. Unit SOPs, previous education, training, and experience will determine the extent that individual units will perform tactical site exploitation during actions on the objective.

Walk-In Preparation

2-44. A walk-in is a one-time contact who volunteers information of value to U.S. forces on his own initiative. The walk-in source may volunteer information by approaching a base camp, patrol, or checkpoint, through tactical site exploitation, or by another interaction with the local population, U.S. forces, or civilian personnel anywhere in the AO. Each unit must have a program in place to identify, safeguard, and direct the walk-in to the appropriate collection asset for screening and debriefing as required. For example, a unit would direct a walk-in who wanted to report a crime to the provost marshal office. Conversely, a unit would direct a walk-in who wanted to report information of intelligence or counterintelligence value to a HUMINT collector or counterintelligence special agent.

Intelligence Preparation

2-45. Since everyone is involved in the collection of combat information, everyone must be familiar with the type of information that will help answer a CCIR. All Soldiers who have contact with the local population, routinely travel within the area, or frequently attend meetings with local organizations must understand their responsibility to observe and report. A Soldier must be aware of plans and procedures for reporting information that is of immediate tactical value.

2-46. The S-2 constantly coordinates with the S-3 to ensure patrols and collection assets are assigned in the most efficient manner to conduct information collection tasks. The unit should be briefed on what information needs to be immediately reported back to the S-2 versus waiting until the unit returns to be debriefed. As part of the patrol pre-briefing, the S-2 or designated representative should provide an intelligence assessment. The briefing should include the following:

• Information or observations that are time sensitive.

• Reporting formats that the Soldier must use.

• The person responsible to receive the information.

Cultural Awareness and Civil Considerations

2-47. Cultural awareness provides a general knowledge prior to deployment. However, knowledge of specific behaviors within an area is more fully understood after deployment. Commanders, leaders, and Soldiers must have a refined understanding of the local populace. The pre-deployment research facilitates identifying nuances within given AOs. Understanding the civil considerations of an AO is a long-term effort but ultimately can result in securing neutrality and eventually gaining the support of the local populace.

2-48. Competing influences that are more relevant to the specific population within the AO can influence the unit to modify expected norms learned prior to deployment. The sooner that leaders and Soldiers understand the truth on the ground, the sooner they can effectively assess the civil considerations and leverage those cultural nuances.

2-49. Soldiers must be familiar with their surroundings, to include people, infrastructure, and terrain, as well as recognize changes in that environment. Like a police officer patrolling on foot daily, effective leaders and Soldiers quickly recognize that something has changed and, if possible, determine why. Reporting the change can be critical to operations.

2-50. Additionally, leaders and Soldiers need to be familiar with the importance and significance of local or regional events and historical dates. By maintaining an awareness of these events, they can anticipate attitudes of the populace during these events.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

2-51. To protect units, leaders and Soldiers must be aware of the ROE in effect for the region. Operational requirements, policy, and law define the ROE. ROE always recognize the right of self-defense, the commander’s right and obligation to protect assigned personnel, and the national right to defend U.S. forces, allies, and coalition participants against armed attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff standing ROE provide baseline guidance as discussed in CJCSI 3121.01B.

2-52. Standing ROE may be tailored and supplemented for specific operations to meet the commanders’ needs. Effective ROE are enforceable, understandable, tactically sound, and legally sufficient. Further, effective ROE respond to the mission and permit subordinate commanders to exercise initiative when confronted by opportunities or unforeseen circumstances.

2-53. At corps, division, and brigade levels, ROE can be found in Appendix 11 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations) in an OPORD or operation plan. Examples of ROE that a Soldier may encounter include the following:

• Soldiers may not cross a specific geographic boundary.

• Male Soldiers may not handle female detainees.

• Soldiers may not enter places of worship.

• Soldiers may not attack or shoot at specific buildings.

RISK MITIGATION

2-54. A sustained Army force presence promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic and economic programs designed to reduce the causes of instability can succeed. This presence can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. An Army force presence often keeps unstable situations from escalating into war. Daily contact with the populace within the AO can enhance a favorable view of the U.S. military while providing an opportunity to collect information. The sustained presence of strong, capable ground forces is the most visible sign of U.S. commitment—to allies and adversaries alike.

2-55. With a prolonged Army force presence, the degree of contact with the population increases. As the degree of contact increases, so too should the quantity and quality of collected information. In many instances, there is a risk to the unit inherent with increased exposure to the local population. Commanders balance the risk to the unit with the need to collect information and to protect the force as a whole. The deployment and use of patrols may be severely curtailed by legal restrictions, ROE, status-of-forces agreements, threat conditions determined by higher headquarters, and the unit’s own threat assessment.

2-56. The unit’s situational awareness contributes to mitigating risk. Units enhance that situational awareness by quickly passing information through intelligence channels for consolidation. Units must plan and rehearse to readily react to any situation and take appropriate actions to develop or withdraw from difficult situations. Units must also plan and rehearse to observe and report information. It may become necessary to request assistance, such as adequate communications equipment, from higher or adjacent units.

2-57. Army forces execute operations in complex environments with many detailed operational considerations. All operations include risk. Leaders and Soldiers must report information that will relate specifically to each of these operational considerations in order to facilitate risk mitigation and operational efficiency. Observations concerning the introduction of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards; new instances of displaced civilians; and the emergence of new threat and new threat weapons, techniques, and procedures warrant immediate attention because they may significantly affect operations.

Chapter 3‌

Execute

EXECUTION

3-1. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP 5-0). It uses situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. Execution requires leaders to build and maintain momentum by continuously assessing and synchronizing operations. When executing tasks that contribute to identifying information of immediate tactical value, all the prior planning and preparation falls into place.

INTERPRETERS

3-2. Interpreters are often an integral part of patrols, essential to communication with foreign populaces, and in conducting Soldier and leader engagement. Even in instances where Army leaders or Soldiers speak the target language, or when the foreign populace or liaison counterpart speaks English, an interpreter may be aware of nuances in body language, spoken language, or variations in and around the discussion area.

3-3. Leaders and Soldiers need to assimilate interpreters into the unit or element they are supporting as much as possible. The more a unit uses an interpreter, the clearer the interpreter’s capabilities and limitations become. For more information on interpreters, see Appendix B.

3-4. The following lists some considerations when using an interpreter:

• Tell the interpreter any expectations.

• Tell the interpreter exactly what to translate. The interpreter should translate all conversations between the Soldier and the individual without adding anything.

• Consider the nationality and security clearance of the interpreter before revealing intelligence requirements to the interpreter.

• Brief the interpreter on actions to take at the halt or in the event of enemy contact.

LOCAL POPULACE

3-5. Some elements of communication can make a conversation more effective and productive. Each AO will have different social and regional considerations that affect communications and can affect the conduct of operations. These may include social taboos, desired behaviors, customs, and courtesies. Leaders must include this information in pre-deployment training at all levels to ensure that Soldiers are properly equipped to interact with the local populace and understand basic regional, national, and cultural characteristics. The S-9 or supporting CA element can provide in-depth information regarding these topics. Soldiers must also keep in mind safety considerations and possible dangers associated with their actions. Effective Soldiers must—

• Know as much as possible about the local culture and a few phrases in the local language.

• Be knowledgeable of and understand local customs and courtesies (for example, male Soldiers not speaking to women and female Soldiers not speaking to men).

• Be aware of other people’s body language.

• Approach people in normal surroundings to avoid suspicion.

• Be friendly and polite.

• Remove sunglasses when speaking to people with whom they are trying to create a favorable impression.

• Know the threat level and force protection measures in their AO. If security conditions permit, they position their weapons in the least intimidating position as possible.

• Know the threat level to determine how long a patrol is able to remain in a particular location.

3-6. Leaders and Soldiers must be mindful of generation and social-status gaps when interacting with the local populace. In many cultures, the oldest member of the community will only speak with another person of similar age. The highest ranking military officer may not necessarily be the oldest member of the unit. In this instance, it may be more effective to send the oldest member of the unit versus the highest ranking member of the unit to speak with a local elder. Leaders and Soldiers must be able to identify those members of the community who will yield the most reliable information. In some instances, the most unbiased information may be provided in statements or actions of children; however, it is inadvisable to directly approach children with the intent of soliciting information.

3-7. Personal observations of individuals may give clues as to how they will initially react. Soldiers observe individuals not only for recognition but also for condition of the clothing, or uniform, rank and insignia, and any observable behavior. Soldiers pay attention to how individuals interact with each other (two or more people in a vehicle, for example). By observing an individual’s mental and physical condition, Soldiers can determine the best posture to assume when conversing with this individual. If a person keeps looking around and has a worried expression, the person may be afraid to be seen with Army forces. Ending the conversation may be an option if the individual does not appear to be a threat.

3-8. Activities take place where information can be collected outside of traditional patrolling or cordon and search operations. These activities can include interaction with contractors (conducted by battalion or brigade logistics staff or resource management officers) while coordinating for water, food, or other classes of material from local populace. Vendors present an opportunity for information collection concerning the attitudes of the local populace. Information collected during the course of a business conversation can often add to situational awareness. Other Army activities that border between Soldier and leader engagement and interaction with the local populace include civil affairs operations and their interaction with the civil component, indigenous populations and institutions, and unified action partners; military police interactions with local populace and international and local law enforcement; and engineer cooperation with local civil or nongovernmental organization (NGO) reconstruction efforts.

QUESTIONS IN SUPPORT OF MISSION REQUIREMENTS

3-9. Leaders and Soldiers engaged with the population need to ask clear and concise questions to ensure understanding. All types of questioning employ direct questions. Table 3-1 provides a quick reference to identify similarities and differences between interaction with the public, Soldier and leader engagement, tactical site exploitation, and tactical questioning. The following considerations apply to all types of questioning:

• Ask only clear direct basic questions as described in this section.

• Do not pay money or compensate for information.

• Do not attempt to elicit, persuade, or convince a person to answer a question.

• Do not make promises to people being questioned.

• Do not attempt to recruit or task someone to go seek out information.

• Do not issue government equipment or identification in exchange for information.

• Do not refer to people questioned as “sources.”

• Do not establish a “source network.”

• Do not ask questions of noncombatants in an area where the questioning puts the noncombatant in danger. Be discreet, but not so discreet that you attract attention.

• Do not ask questions that make your unit’s mission or information requirements obvious.

• Do not take notes in front of the person after asking the question.

• Do not inform them of their rights to remain silent.

Table 3-1. Questioning references

Activity | Description | Conditions | Considerations | References

Interaction with the Public

Interaction with the local populace through conversation, building mutual understanding, and increasing understanding of the environment.

Conducted by all Soldiers.

Used to gather information on the population.

Used direct questions only.

Treat all individuals humanely.

Do not use coercion.

Once the individual ceases to answer freely or decides to leave, the conversation is over.

If the decision to detain is made, all rules of tactical questioning apply.

ATP 3-55.4

Soldier and Leader Engagement

Interpersonal interactions by Soldiers and leaders with audiences in an area of operations.

Conducted by all Soldiers.

Used to gather information on the population.

Used direct questions only.

Treat all individuals humanely.

Do not use coercion.

Once the individual ceases to answer freely or decides to leave, the conversation is over.

If the decision to detain is made, all rules of tactical questioning apply.

ATP 3-55.4

FM 3-13

Tactical Site Exploitation

A series of methodical actions taken to ensure that information and materiel at the site are detected, collected, and processed to answer information requirements and facilitate future operations.

Conducted by all Soldiers.

Used to gather information on mission requirements.

Used direct questions only.

Treat all individuals humanely.

Do not use coercion.

Once the individual ceases to answer freely or decides to leave, the conversation is over.

If the decision to detain is made, all rules of tactical questioning apply.

ATP 3-55.4

ATP 3-90.15

Tactical Questioning

The field- expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value from a detainee at or near the point of capture and before the individual is placed in a detention facility.

Conducted by all Soldiers.

Used to fill out the captive tag and gather information of immediate tactical value.

Used direct questions only.

Treat all individuals humanely.

Do not use coercion.

Conducted at or near the point of capture.

Do not attempt an approach technique.

5Ss and T apply.

ATP 3-55.4

FM 2-22.3

DODD 3115.09

Detainee Treatment Act

5Ss and T search, silence, segregate, safeguard, speed, and tag
ATP Army techniques publication

DODD Department of Defense directive
FM field manual

3-10. Interacting with the local populace enables Soldiers to obtain information by asking questions. Asking questions is the best way to open and maintain a conversation. Questions that open the lines of communications should center on the accepted small talk in that culture. For example, a simple question about family, work, or hobbies allows a person to talk freely since the topic is nonthreatening and one that they know about. By creating a conversational tone, these questions can help transition to topics more closely related to the collection requirement, often without the person realizing that the topic has changed.

3-11. Open-ended questions require more than a yes or no answer. An open-ended question normally begins with an interrogative (who, what, where, when, how, or why) and requires a narrative answer. Effective Soldiers interacting with the local populace use open-ended questions in conversations. Open-ended questions are brief and simply worded to avoid confusion. For example, “When was the last time an enemy patrol passed through here?” is a better question than “Have you seen the enemy?” The better question requires a narrative response and requests specific elements of information.

3-12. Well-crafted, open-ended questions meet the following considerations:

• Are broad in nature and serve as an invitation to talk. They require an answer other than yes or no.

• Result in the individual being allowed the freedom to answer. They do not offer a forced choice such as “Was the man tall or short?” Not only could the answer to that be confusing, but it also does not allow for responses such as “average height,” “medium,” or other descriptive responses.

• Encourage discussion. Open-ended questions encourage the person in the conversation to discuss opinions or observations freely.

• Allow the individual to talk and the Soldier to listen and observe. While the person answers, the Soldier has the opportunity to look for signs of nervousness or other nonverbal communication.

• Pose no or little threat to the individual. Not all questioning is targeted at information collection. Asking questions about neutral or safe topics can help build mutual trust.

• Are social but respectful at all times. Soldiers will not gain the respect, attention, and trust of an individual simply by asking a series of questions and writing down the responses.

Example Questions

3-13. Effective Soldiers have a basic list of example questions available. They can modify the following list of example questions based on the mission, unit guidance, and the situation:

• What is your name (verify this with identification papers and check the Detain/Of Interest/Protect Lists)?

• What is your home address (former residence if a dislocated civilian)?

• What is your occupation?

• Where were you going (get specifics)?

• Why are you going there (get specifics)?

• What route did you travel to arrive here?

• What obstacles (or hardships) did you encounter on your way here?

• What unusual activity did you notice on your way here?

• What route will you take to get to your final destination?

• Who do you (personally) know who actively opposes the U.S. (or multinational) forces? Follow this up with "who else?" If they know of anyone, ask what anti-U.S. (multinational force) activities they know of, where they happened, and similar type questions.

• Why do you believe U.S. (or multinational) forces are here?

• What do you think of the U.S. (or multinational) force presence here?

3-14. These questions may seem broad, when in fact they are pointed and specific. They do not allow the person being questioned room for misinterpretation or the chance to give a vague or misleading answer. Always keep the questions pertinent to the mission and report the answers per unit guidance. Information of critical tactical value does no good if it remains in one place or if it arrives after the battle or the event.

Maintaining the Conversation

3-15. Once Soldiers establish a conversation, they can maintain it using some common techniques. These techniques can include the following:

• Avoid use of military jargon and American-specific jargon, especially with civilians.

• Be prepared to discuss personal interests (hobbies, books, travel).

• Be sensitive to personal body language:

◦ Smile as long as it is appropriate.

◦ Avoid sitting with arms crossed.

◦ Avoid showing the bottom of feet in a Middle Eastern culture.

◦ Keep hands away from mouth.

◦ Lean forward and nod.

◦ Make frequent eye contact (if culturally appropriate).

◦ Keep body posture relaxed, but alert.

• Use the person's name, position title, rank, and other verbal expressions of respect.

• Avoid judging the person by age, gender, or appearance by U.S. standards. Instead, consider those standards of the specific culture.

• Use humor carefully. Some cultures consider excessive humor to be offensive or a sign of deceit.

• Understand and account for the significance of holidays and religious days or times of the day or week.

• Remember, a person's favorite topic is himself.

• Have a second person listen to the conversation and to take notes (but not blatantly). Later, compare notes for accuracy of recall.

INDICATORS

3-16. Soldiers are often the first to notice changes in the AO in which they work. Early identification of indicators safeguards other Soldiers and prompts more focused collection. An individual Soldier’s situational awareness is valuable because it provides insight into the environment in which forces operate. Often, the characterization of this environment is violent, uncertain, complex, and focuses on the asymmetric methods employed by the threat. Individual Soldier observations in the midst of an ongoing situation may provide a key piece of information. The increased situational awareness that Soldiers develop through personal contact and observation is a critical element of the friendly force’s ability to more fully understand an operational environment.

3-17. Soldiers report the information they obtain that answers the specified and implied information collection tasks involved with the execution of their assigned mission. They also report potential indicators that analysts might be able to use to produce intelligence. See table 3-2 on page 3-6 for a list of potential indicators.

SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT

3-18. The purpose of Soldier and leader engagement is to build relationships, solve conflicts, convey information, calm fears, and refute rumors, lies, or incorrect information. Since the main purpose is not to collect information, the use of prepared questions is up to the leader. However, information obtained as a result of these relationships should be reported in accordance with unit SOPs. Local populace leaders, political officials, and military officials can confirm, deny, or mitigate the assessment of higher echelons or the information collected from lower or adjacent echelons.

3-19. Access to information collected during Soldier and leader engagement helps analysts identify discrepancies in reported information about the AO, and subsequently generate requirements that, when answered, will facilitate better situational understanding. Soldier and leader engagement is a key contributor during assessment. Chapter 4 discusses assessment.

Table 3-2. Potential indicators

Sight | Hearing | Touch | Smell

A Soldier looks for—

• Enemy personnel, vehicles, and aircraft.

• Sudden or unusual movement.

• New local inhabitants.

• Smoke or dust.

• Unusual movement of farm or wild animals.

• Unusual activity or lack of activity by local inhabitants, especially at times and places normally inactive or active.

• Vehicle or personnel tracks.

• Movement of local inhabitants along uncleared areas, routes, or paths.

• Signs or evidence of enemy occupation or threat trends.

• Recently cut foliage or vegetation.

• Muzzle flashes, lights, fires, or reflections.

• Amount and type of trash.

A Soldier listens for—

• Running engines or track sounds.

• Voices.

• Metallic sounds.

• Gunfire (by type of weapon).

• Unusual calm or silence.

• Dismounted movement.

• Aircraft.

A Soldier feels for—

• Warmth of coals and materiel from fires.

• Freshness of tracks.

• Age of food or trash.

A Soldier smells for—

• Vehicle exhaust.

• Burning petroleum products.

• Cooking food.

• Age of food or trash.

• Human waste.

Other Considerations Soldiers Note:

• Armed elements: Location of factional forces, minefields, and potential threats.

• Homes and buildings: Condition of the roofs, doors, windows, lights, power lines, water, sanitation, roads, bridges, crops, and livestock.

• Infrastructure: Presence of functioning stores, service stations, other.

• People: Numbers, sex, age, residence or refugee status, visible health, clothing, daily activities, and leaders.

• Contrasts: Note if anything changed. For example, are there new locks on buildings? Are windows boarded up or previously boarded- up windows now open, indicating a change of use of a building? Have buildings been defaced with graffiti?

3-20. Soldier and leader engagement between a battalion commander and a local district governor may result in information that has not previously been reported and thus is not validated through other reports or the patrol debriefings from subordinate companies. Discrepancies may exist for numerous reasons:

• The district governor could be purposely misleading the battalion commander.

• The district governor advisors could purposely be misleading the district governor.

• The units may be dealing with AOs that differ geographically, politically, economically, or religiously from the unit AO in which the district governor is located.

• The district governor may not know or understand the attitude, intents, or actions of the population governed.

3-21. Units should verify all information prior to accepting it as fact, with the exception of information of immediate tactical value. If the unit does not validate information collected through Soldier and leader engagement, the resulting decisions may bring about unexpected effects.

3-22. Soldiers need to apply caution when meeting repeatedly with any one individual. If an opposing force or enemy faction observes a local meeting with a Soldier repeatedly, the local’s life and Soldier’s life may be in danger. Any ongoing relationship with a local who provides information must be reconciled with the brigade combat team 2-X. Soldiers need to report repeated contacts with the same individual immediately to their S-2 who will contact the brigade combat team S-2 or S-2X for appropriate action.

3-23. For example, a commander repeatedly met with an individual to gain information on who was responsible for emplacing IEDs along a main supply route. The individual continued to meet with members of the unit and was not processed and protected through the HUMINT operations cell. After repeated meetings, the individual was found murdered. This put the individual’s family in grave danger and jeopardized any future potential HUMINT sources in the area.

TACTICAL SITE EXPLOITATION

3-24. Generally, tactical site exploitation includes activities performed at or near a specific location. Tactical site exploitation is a series of methodical actions taken to ensure that materiel at the site is detected, collected, and processed. For the purposes of site exploitation, materiel includes, but is not limited to, information, documents, electronic data storage multimedia, weapons, personal property, and monies associated with the threat. The materiel is used to answer information requirements and facilitate future operations. Presumptive analyses of materiel are conducted if trained Soldiers and the appropriate equipment are available. For further information on site exploitation, see ATP 3-90.15.

3-25. Units with a site exploitation mission know the tasks involved to conduct tactical site exploitation effectively. A skilled unit yields an effective and thorough exploitation of the site by conducting an initial non-intrusive examination to extract information of immediate tactical value. Units need to recognize new threat techniques or first-seen items of high value for technical interest. A skilled unit is able to assess and record the tactical context in which items were collected, properly handle and tag the materiel, and evacuate the materiel through the appropriate channels. When required, units also coordinate proper transportation of materiel collected.

3-26. Outputs of tactical site exploitation include, but are not limited to, information of immediate tactical value, information from individuals, and materiel collected. Information of immediate tactical value includes information regarding threat tactics, techniques, and procedures of interest to the tactical command. Information obtained from individuals (for example, pocket contents or biometric enrollment) provides additional information that is otherwise overlooked if not done correctly. The handling of individuals is, at all times, conducted in a humane manner, with respect, and in accordance with international law. The capturing unit or various specialized exploitation personnel such as multifunctional teams and exploitation teams capture materiel. Units document the physical condition of individuals in writing and by photographic means as soon as possible. Materiel is collected through tactical site exploitation, is handled in a forensically sound manner, and follows the chain-of-custody protocols according to AR 195-5. Units scan documents located on the site for their potential immediate tactical value. Units may capture materiel—

• From detainees or in immediate association with detainees.

• From refugees or local civilians.

• In abandoned enemy positions in the AO.

3-27. For the purposes of site exploitation, material refers to a substance from which something is made or can be made, or a substance that has a particular quality. Properly documented materials can provide information, intelligence, and evidence needed to interdict the threat. Target sets and techniques are redefined using the information and intelligence gained through documented materials from the tactical site exploitation. Units use materials and documented information to link biometric data collected from the individuals present at or near the location of the site exploitation.

3-28. A unit must properly tag all materiel secured as a result of tactical site exploitation so that they can be handled correctly. Units annotate information obtained during tactical site exploitation. Appendix A contains a sample of each report or reporting format. These reports can include the following:

• A DD Form 2745 as the primary documentation for tagging detainees and their associated captured materials.

• A field expedient captured materials tag to attach to all documents and materials secured at the tactical site exploitation.

• A field expedient captured materials log to account for all the material removed from the site.

• A spot report (known as a SPOTREP) to report information of immediate tactical value.

• A DA Form 4137.

3-29. Table 3-3 on page 3-8 is a summary description of captured materiel and considerations for processing. For more information on the handling of captured materiel, see ATP 2-91.8.

Table 3-3. Captured materiel

Material | Description | Handling Instructions | Reporting Disposition | References

Captured Enemy Documents and Media

Any piece of recorded information previously under enemy control regardless of its form— written, printed, engraved, and photographic matter as well as recorded media and media devices—that pertains to the enemy, weather, or terrain that are under the U.S. Government’s physical control and are not publicly available.

Tag all captured documents and media (use a DD Form 2745 if associated with a detainee; otherwise, use a field expedient CED capture tag).

Do not access electronic media.

Do not mark on or otherwise alter captured documents.

Report information of immediate tactical value via spot report.

Evacuate captured documents and media through the S-2 (G-2) to higher echelons exploitation facilities.

ATP 2-91.8

Captured Materiel

Captured enemy materiel includes foreign warfighting equipment and associated equipment—for example, weapons, weapons systems, and weapon components such as IEDs. Captured enemy materiel also includes all types of foreign and non- foreign equipment—

• Identified on the collection requirements list within Annex B (Intelligence) of the operation order.

• That is unidentified, appears modified, or is otherwise out of the ordinary or unexpected.

Tag all captured materiel (use a DD Form 2745 if associated with a detainee; otherwise, use a field expedient CED capture tag).

Do not attempt to handle suspected explosive devices or WMD.

Do not handle chemical or other suspected agents.

Report information of immediate tactical value via spot report.

Evacuate captured materials through the S-2 (G-2) to higher echelons exploitation facilities.

Coordinate with the S-3 (G-3) for specialized teams.

Coordinate with the S-4 (G-4) when additional transportation requirements are necessary.

ATP 2-22.4

ATP | Army techniques publication | IED | improvised explosive device
CED | captured enemy document | S-2 | battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
DD | Department of Defense | S-3 | battalion or brigade operation staff office
G-2 | assistant chief of staff, intelligence | S-4 | battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
G-3 | assistant chief of staff, operations | WMD | weapons of mass destruction
G-4 | assistant chief of staff, logistics |  |

DETAINEE HANDLING

3-30. Soldiers treat detainees humanely but with firmness at all times. High standards of discipline are required not only of detainees but also of capturing and escorting forces. Fraternization with detainees or mistreatment or abuse of them is not only a violation but also is not conducive to good discipline. Moreover, the mistreatment or abuse of detainees violates the Uniform Code of Military Justice for which violators may be punished. Units control detainees by issuing and firmly enforcing necessary instructions in their own language to the greatest extent possible. Instructions relating to their control during evacuation from the combat zone should be as brief as possible. Leaders and Soldiers must take care to ensure that detainees clearly understand all instructions.

3-31. The unit’s respectful handling of detainees has differing impacts. First, respectful handling significantly impacts interrogations. Second, it has a long-lasting impact after the unit releases the detainees who shared their experiences to their community. As a reflection of the United States, the unit’s credibility and reputation is paramount when trying to earn the support of a community.

3-32. The first step in handling detainees is to implement search, silence, segregate, safeguard, speed, and tag, known as the 5Ss and T. This implementation is usually associated with the handling of detainees. It implies the legal obligation that each Soldier has to treat an individual in custody of, or under the protection of, U.S. Soldiers humanely. At the capture point, the capturing element performs the following steps on detainees:

• Search.

• Silence.

• Segregate.

• Safeguard.

• Speed.

• Tag.

3-33. The capturing element searches detainees. It neutralizes a detainee and confiscates weapons, personal items, and items of potential intelligence or evidentiary value.

3-34. The capturing element silences detainees. It prevents detainees from communicating with one another or making an audible clamor such as chanting, singing, or praying. Units silence uncooperative detainees by muffling them with a soft, clean cloth tied around their mouths and fastened at the backs of their heads. Soldiers do not use duct tape or other adhesives, place a cloth or other objects inside the mouth, or apply physical force to silence detainees.

3-35. The capturing element segregates detainees. It segregates detainees according to policy and SOPs (segregation requirements differ from operation to operation). The ability to segregate detainees may be limited by the availability of manpower and resources at the point of capture. At a minimum, units try to segregate detainees by grade, gender, age (keeping adults from juveniles and small children with mothers), and security risk. Military intelligence and military police personnel can provide additional guidance and support in determining the appropriate segregation criteria.

3-36. The capturing element safeguards detainees. It protects detainees and ensures the custody and integrity of all confiscated items. Soldiers safeguard detainees from combat risk, harm caused by other detainees, and improper treatment or care. Soldiers report all injuries as well as correct and report violations of U.S. military policy that occur while safeguarding detainees. Acts or omissions that constitute inhumane treatment are violations of the law of war and, as such, must be corrected immediately. Simply reporting violations is insufficient. If a violation is ongoing, a Soldier has an obligation to stop the violation and report it.

3-37. The capturing element speedily attends to detainees. It quickly removes detainees from the continuing risks associated with other combatants or sympathizers who may still be in the area of capture. If there are more detainees than the Soldiers can control, the Soldiers call for additional support, search the detainees, and hold them in place until reinforcements arrive.

3-38. The capturing element tags detainees. After the capturing unit searches and segregates detainees, it prepares a capture tag and puts one on each detainee. It is very important that the capturing unit fill out the capture tag as accurately and completely as possible. Soldiers ensure that each detainee is tagged using DD Form 2745. Confiscated equipment, personal items, and evidence will be linked to the detainee using the DD Form 2745 control number.

3-39. For more information on search, silence, segregate, safeguard, speed, and tag (known as the 5Ss and T), see FM 3-63.

TACTICAL QUESTIONING

3-40. The most important qualifier to use when determining the need to institute tactical questioning is whether the person is considered captured or detained. The moment friendly forces have control of the person and the intent is to detain the person, they are considered a detainee. Once a person is a detainee, voluntary questioning ceases and tactical questioning rules apply. It is important to comply with the intent and theater specific requirements associated with a detainee.

3-41. All persons being questioned, regardless of the purpose, will be treated humanely and will not be subjected to cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment. If an HCT is not available, people under the control of U.S. forces can be questioned on site using direct questions to determine information of immediate tactical value and to support site exploitation when necessary. Once the intent or decision is made to send an individual to a detention or holding facility, the unit implements search, silence, segregate, safeguard, speed, and issues a capture tag. Because DOD trained and certified interrogators are the only personnel authorized to transition between tactical questioning and interrogation, commanders may consider employing interrogators as tactical questioners as long as such employment does not detract from higher- priority HUMINT missions. Intelligence interrogators must follow the guidance in FM 2-22.3 and the requirements of AR 381-100, DODD 3115.09, and other relevant policies and regulations. Any questioning of a detainee that is not conducted by a DOD trained and certified intelligence interrogator must carefully follow the specific guidelines for tactical questioning.

3-42. Since tactical questioning is the field-expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value of a detainee at or near the point of capture and before the individual is placed in a detention facility, leaders must include clear guidance for tactical questioning in the OPORD for missions likely to include the need for tactical questioning. The brigade and battalion S-2s and S-3s must provide appropriate specific guidance in the form of information collection tasks down to company, troop, or battery level to help guide tactical questioning. The information that the Soldier reports as a result of tactical questioning will be reported up the chain of command and is a vital part of planning and operations.

3-43. When conducting tactical questioning, it is imperative that Soldiers follow the provisions of the Geneva Conventions (as discussed in FM 27-10) at all times. Prior to the mission, commanders contact their servicing judge advocate for detailed training and guidance. Effective units obtain as much information as needed through tactical questioning to exploit perishable information (for example, another insurgent operation occurring at the same time, the current location of a known high-value target). Detainees are not to be mistreated in any way.

REPORTING AND PATROL DEBRIEFING

3-44. Units use reports and patrol debriefings to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions.

REPORTING

3-45. Various reports ensure information collected by Soldier observations and patrols are prioritized and entered into official reporting channels to be used by the staff and the intelligence warfighting function. See FM 6-99 for all reports and messages. When collecting information, units use spot reports, patrol reports, and debriefing reports.

3-46. A spot report relays combat information. Combat information—information of immediate tactical value—is reported in accordance with the unit SOP while the Soldiers are still on patrol. This information should be processed and shared with the S-2 section. These reports are sent via channels prescribed in the unit SOP.

3-47. Immediately upon return from patrol, the patrol will conduct an after action review and write a patrol report. The patrol can modify the format to more thoroughly capture AO and mission-specific information. This report is passed to the S-2 section prior to a formal debriefing. Patrol leaders must report as completely and accurately as possible since this report will form the basis of the debriefing by the S-2 section that will follow.

3-48. A debriefing report follows a patrol report. After receiving the initial patrol report, the S-2 section will debrief the patrol for further details and address PIRs not already covered in the patrol report.

3-49. Clear reporting procedures facilitate the unit recording and disseminating information to the higher headquarters S-2 (G-2) and command post. Such information includes all the subtle and important details for all-source intelligence analysis and future planning. Reporting this information to the higher headquarters provides that headquarters with a broad range of information and intelligence and allows them to disseminate intelligence back to the Soldier’s unit and to higher echelons. Information reported through a debriefing must be disseminated to the entire staff. The S-2 section ensures that information of HUMINT and counterintelligence value is reported to the S-2X as well as cues the other appropriate staffs and warfighting functions.

3-50. Report formats require brief entries that subsequently require the collector to break information into basic elements: who, what, where, when, how, and why. This allows for efficient reporting via electronic or hardcopy medium. It also allows the analyst to scan multiple reports quickly to find specific information. Reporting formats need to be consistent from lower to higher echelon units in order to facilitate information flow.

Note. United States message text format messages are the standard reporting format. Technology inserts facilitate automated reporting beyond United States message text format capabilities. If Force XXI Battle Command, brigade and below is being used at the higher echelons, then it should be used as the reporting system down to the maneuver units. The software applications in the Distributed Common Ground Station–Army provide Web-enabled reporting, so leaders and Soldiers with access to the Web can update reports while still on patrol. Refer to FM 6-99 for report and message formats.

3-51. Patrols use a spot report to transmit information of immediate tactical value while they are still out on their mission. They transmit information of immediate interest to the commander to the S-2 as soon as the tactical situation allows. Other information is reported to the S-2 during the patrol debriefing and upon the patrol’s return to base as part of normal reporting. The S-2 submits follow-up reports after the S-2 section performs the debriefing.

3-52. All information collected by patrols or others in contact with locals is reported in accordance with unit SOPs through the chain of command to the unit S-2. The S-2 is responsible for transmitting the information through intelligence channels to the supported military intelligence elements according to unit SOPs and the OPORD for the current mission. These elements may include the HCT (if attached), supported brigade S-2, division G-2, or operational management team.

3-53. In the absence of a debriefing, reporting is the final and most vital part of information sharing. Observed information that is reported accurately, in a timely manner, in the proper format, and to the correct recipients becomes part of the all-source intelligence product in time to affect operational decisions.

PATROL DEBRIEFING

3-54. Immediately after the unit returns, the S-2 or command-designated personnel conducts a thorough debriefing. Since every Soldier is a potential source of information, the S-2 debriefing is one way that information collected by these Soldiers gets into the intelligence process. This debriefing should include all members of the patrol and any attached personnel, not just the leaders. In the event that the returning patrol splits into different locations, the S-2 then visits all locations to debrief all the patrol members. Debriefings are oral and normally result in a written report. Information on the written report should include the following:

• Size and composition of the unit conducting the patrol.

• Mission of the unit (type of patrol, location, and purpose).

• Departure and return times.

• Routes. Use checkpoints and grid coordinates for each leg or include an overlay.

• Detailed description of terrain and enemy positions that were identified.

• Results of any contact with the enemy.

• Unit status at the conclusion of the patrol mission, including the disposition of dead or wounded Soldiers.

• Conclusions or recommendations.

3-55. The battalion S-2 section is responsible for debriefing returning patrols, leaders who have traveled to meetings, returning HCTs, helicopter pilots, and others who have obtained information that may be of intelligence value. The S-2 section debriefs personnel, writes and submits reports, or reports information verbally, as appropriate. The requirement for a debriefing by the S-2 section following each mission should be a part of the mission pre-brief. Leaders should not consider the mission complete and the personnel released until the reporting and debriefings are done.

3-56. When company, platoon, or smaller elements deploy to remote locations, debriefings by the S-2 may not be possible. Platoon and company leaders conduct debriefings in accordance with battalion SOPs to ensure reports are available to the intelligence section and staff. Reporting by the most expeditious means possible ensures that patrol reports and additional notes from the debriefings are available for timely intelligence analysis. A viable method of enhancing unit support to intelligence when subordinate elements are not in proximity to the battalion staff is to task-organize intelligence personnel to companies and platoons. A second method is cross-training company and platoon personnel to perform basic intelligence tasks, including patrol debriefing.

3-57. The S-2 section debriefing should follow along the lines of the mission briefing––review the route traveled, collection objectives of the patrol, and methods employed. By the time the S-2 section conducts its debriefing, it should possess the patrol report. Having the patrol report will streamline the S-2 debriefing process, allowing the S-2 section to concentrate on filling in gaps and following up on reported information.

3-58. A practical method for the S-2 to use for the debriefing is to review the patrol actions chronologically. Soldiers can more easily recall and record information when broken into smaller pieces that flow logically. For example, the S-2 can—

• Use a map to determine segments of the route traveled. Coordination points, checkpoints, phase lines, or significant events may divide segments. The S-2 starts at the beginning of the patrol route and lets the patrol leader use the map to show the route traveled.

• Ask the patrol leader: “From here (Checkpoint 1) to here (Checkpoint 2), what did you see (or hear or learn about)?” The goal is to extract information of intelligence value. The S-2 avoids asking only for PIRs. Asking for PIRs tends to limit the patrol leader’s answers and the S-2 might miss something of significance. Instead, the S-2 lets the patrol leader tell everything the patrol learned while on that segment of the trip. The S-2 uses follow-up questions to get complete information, always remembering to ask “What else” or “What other” before leaving a topic.

• Look at pictures, if available. If the patrol had digital cameras, the S-2 can use the pictures Soldiers took during the debriefing.

• Move chronologically through the questions. Once the S-2 has fully exploited a segment of travel, the debriefing moves on to the next segment. The S-2 questions the patrol from the second checkpoint to the third checkpoint and continues the process until the entire route has been exploited.

3-59. The following are generic topics for debriefings:

• Military (faction) activities.

• Civilian activities (indigenous personnel and institutions).

• Infrastructure.

3-60. Military (faction) activities answer the following questions:

• What threat characteristic information was collected? Threat characteristics include—

◦ Composition: the identification and organization of a threat.

◦ Disposition: the array of threat forces on the battlefield, to include the recent, current, and projected movements or locations of the tactical force.

◦ Strength: the amount of threat personnel, weapons, and equipment.

◦ Combat effectiveness: the abilities and fighting quality of a unit.

◦ Doctrine and tactics: tactical doctrine as well as tactics employed by specific units.

◦ Support and relationships: organizations or individuals providing support to the threat.

◦ Electronic technical data: threat communications and noncommunications equipment parameters, such as emitter type and nomenclature, modulation, multiplex capability, pulse duration, pulse repetition frequency, bandwidth, associated weapons systems, and other technical characteristics of electronic emissions.

◦ Capabilities and limitations: activities the threat can and cannot accomplish.

◦ Current operations: activities the threat is currently engaged in.

◦ Historical data: all relevant information regarding the threat.

◦ Miscellaneous data: supporting information to develop threat force characteristics, for example, biographic data, personalities, culture, biometric data, as well as other information important to mission accomplishment.

• What was the reaction (if any) to the presence of a U.S. or multinational force patrol?

• Do any of the above represent a change from the norm?

3-61. Civilian activities (indigenous personnel and institutions) answer the following questions:

• What are the names of the civilians talked to during the patrol?

• What is the ethnic makeup of the population?

• How are disparate ethnic groups congregating together?

• What usual civilian activities (for example, markets) are ongoing?

• Where are there unusually large gatherings of people present?

• Where are normal gatherings missing or significantly smaller than usual?

• What graffiti is present and what message does it convey?

• Where are the Internet cafes?

• Where are the places of worship (formal and informal)?

• Where are the political party offices?

3-62. Infrastructure answers the following questions:

• What changes are there with the road conditions?

• Which areas do the populace avoid?

• What are the conditions of buildings?

• How are utilities (water, electricity, sewer) functioning and are they adequate?

• Which radio stations are broadcasting anti- or pro-U.S. statements?

• When are schools, hospitals, and post offices open? Which are being rebuilt?

• Which intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and NGOs are operating in the area?

• What is their mission?

• What interference are the IGOs or NGOs experiencing? If so, by whom?

• Are IGOs or NGOs interfering with military or civil activities?

• What shortages of food are there? Where are these shortages?

3-63. Without clear reporting, or deliberate debriefing, observed information may be lost. The information must be conveyed in a manner that meets both the needs of a leader’s requirements as well as facilitates intelligence production to answer the PIRs. Reporting and debriefing—whether verbal, written, or automated—are the two means that meet both requirements.

Chapter 4‌

Assess

ASSESSMENT

4-1. An information collection plan evolves. Multiple patrols and observers collect information through observation. An observation gathered from a patrol or Soldier is not a static, one-time effort that achieves a goal and then stops. After observing and collecting information, the patrol transmits the information to the S-2. Upon return from patrol, the S-2 debriefs the patrol. The staff then modifies the information collection plan to account for new information and periodically recommends adjusting operations to the S-3. Commanders and staffs continuously review intelligence products and synchronize their surveillance and reconnaissance efforts within the information collection plan. They focus on the most important remaining gaps, emphasizing the established or revised CCIRs. Commanders balance several factors against their need for relevant information: the ability of patrol units and observers to collect information, risk to patrol or observer assets during collecting, ability to sustain the observation effort over time, and requirement to have observation assets available at critical times and places.

4-2. Assessment is not a final step in a process. Assessment is referred to as the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an operation. It involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes to actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. The dynamic interactions among friendly forces, adaptable enemies, and the local population make assessing many aspects of operations difficult. This is especially true of operations in which stability operations predominate. For detailed information on the assessment process, see FM 6-0. Leaders drive successful assessment at all echelons by—

• Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.

• Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.

• Recommending or directing action for improvement.

MONITORING

4-3. Monitoring refers to the continuous observation of the current situation to identify opportunities for the force, threats to the force, gaps in information, and progress according to the plan or order. Monitoring is a foundation of situational awareness, which leads to situational understanding.

4-4. By monitoring the results of patrol debriefs and reports, the S-2 and S-3 may find that they need to reassess the current patrol routes due to risk management issues or a change in mission. This can result in a change noted within an operational environment. In this case, leaders would start a new planning process and the staff would inform Soldiers of what to look for as the missions within the AO are adjusted.

4-5. The information collection plan is constantly changing in response to the information feeding into the intelligence warfighting function through Soldier observations and reports. If leaders are finding individuals in the local populace who seem to have a lot of reliable information on enemy activities, the S-2 and S-3 can plan for a HCT and integrate the team into the information collection plan.

4-6. The S-2 and S-3 coordinate and monitor the information they receive through Soldier observations. Once a pattern or a major change is recognized, the S-2 and S-3 must quickly articulate what operational changes are necessary or what assistance is needed. For example, if on routine patrol, multiple Soldiers are reporting that a section of a town that was once abandoned is now inhabited by dislocated civilians, the S-2 and S-3 may quickly change certain operations and notify CA elements. Subordinate units may be tasked to conduct reconnaissance of the area including interaction with the local populace, or establish Soldier and leader engagement with representatives of the population. This situation may also call for the S-3 to increase or decrease patrols or to redraw sector boundaries due to the influx of dislocated civilians.

EVALUATING

4-7. Evaluate is to compare relevant information on the situation or operation against criteria to judge success or progress. Evaluation allows leaders to identify variances, confirm or invalidate assumptions, and forecast trends. Answers to these questions can serve as a way to assess an operation’s success:

• Can the force achieve the commander’s intent?

• Where is the enemy? Doing what? How?

• Where are the friendly forces? Doing what? How?

• What is the enemy force’s posture now?

4-8. Leaders need to assess changes in behavior, capability, or an operational environment tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. To assess these changes, leaders ask the following types of questions:

• Are patrols in a specific village effectively lowering violence against villagers?

• Is a public works project in a town completed? If not, what is keeping the project from completion?

• Why are two or more ethnic groups not working together, when previously they had been working together?

4-9. Leaders need to assess friendly actions tied to measuring task accomplishment. Leaders can ask questions like—

• Are the observations or actions made by patrols satisfying the objective information requirements?

• Through interacting with the population and tactical questioning, are Soldiers creating a favorable environment among the local population?

• Is the S-2 briefing program being conducted consistently throughout the sector?

EVALUATIONS

4-10. By having Soldier observations feeding the intelligence process, the information affects not only the clarity of the threat picture but also military missions, orders, and plans along with civil-military operations. By being a part of the intelligence and operations processes through observation and interacting with the population, leaders and Soldiers can be aware of and potentially articulate the rationale for mission changes. Leaders and Soldiers must be aware of their responsibilities to observe and report all relevant information in their AO.

4-11. Evaluation can be difficult. Although changes in an operational environment may be observable, the relationship between that change and Army operations may not be readily apparent. Leaders and Soldiers can support assessment using measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs).

MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

4-12. Commanders and staff develop MOPs and MOEs to facilitate assessment. Not all criteria are easily represented as MOPs or MOEs. Commanders should not use MOPs or MOEs when they are inappropriate. In those exceptional cases, commanders should develop criteria that fit the situation. Occasionally MOPs and MOEs are based off the same data, especially when data that is a MOE at one echelon is considered a MOP by the higher echelon. It is important to maintain a standard in the measured data. The target audience, commander, or staff determines how to analyze and apply the data.

Measures of Performance

4-13. A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 3-0). MOPs answer the question: Was the task or action performed as the commander intended? MOPs confirm or deny that the unit correctly performed the task. MOPs are concerned with accomplishment and accuracy of the Army task performed.

4-14. A company commander who has the responsibility of conducting Soldier and leader engagement with a village mayor, police chief, and the owner of a consolidated water and electrical provider can measure performance by the number of visits conducted in a given period. An increase in the number of meetings or the amount of time his counterparts are willing to spend with him is data that can be used to measure performance. The introduction of new counterparts or the refusal of a counterpart to meet is another MOP. Improving cultural etiquette or providing needed resources or support may improve interaction with or accessibility to counterparts. Resources and gifts are measurable from a monetary perspective as well.

4-15. The information collected during Soldier and leader engagement, the changes that occur in the environment as a result of Soldier and leader engagement, or the measurable increase in counterpart cooperation and interaction could be measured from a task performance perspective, MOP perspective, or MOE perspective. The MOP is measured against the commander’s intent; the MOE is measured against a mission end state or effect.

Measures of Effectiveness

4-16. A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). MOEs focus on the results or consequences of friendly actions taken. They answer the question: Is the force doing the right things, or are additional or alternative actions required? Often an effect cannot be measured directly. If direct measurement is not possible, then indicators of achieving the effect are measured. Staffs then apply analysis and judgment to develop conclusions about achieving the effect. Measuring indirectly requires great care in selecting and measuring indicators.

4-17. Increased availability of electricity from 4 hours a day to 7 hours a day is a measurable criteria. The commander’s intent of Soldier and leader engagement was to open a dialogue between village leaders to convince them to improve living conditions. The objective was to reduce the number of violent protests concerning the village’s disintegrating conditions and dissatisfaction with the political and security leaders. The desired effect is to reduce the number of violent protests and the end state is security.

4-18. Effectiveness can be measured by several distinguishable criteria which, when compared, can indicate elements of performance that are more or less successful. One MOE is the amount of time electricity is available to the population. Meeting with the owner of the utility provider revealed a lack of expensive equipment which, when provided, improved reliability of continuous flow of electricity. This MOE is directly related to the contact with the owner of the utility provider. A second MOE is the increase of violence between a demographic whose electricity service had not improved and a second demographic that did.

4-19. Measuring MOPs and MOEs requires a clear understanding of the commander’s intent related to the task and the commander’s desired end state. It also requires an identification of indicators that can be measured against the success of that end state. If performing tactical site exploitation is a task that the commander expects to increase the number of detainees successfully prosecuted for criminal offenses, then the MOP is related to the number of sites exploited and the MOE is related to the types and amounts of evidence contributing to conviction. Multiple exploitations with minimal convictions may indicate a need to improve performance in the collecting and processing requirements associated with tactical site exploitation.

RECOMMENDING OR DIRECTING ACTION

4-20. Monitoring and evaluating are critical activities; however, assessment is incomplete without recommending or directing action. Assessment may diagnose problems, but unless it results in recommended adjustments, its use to the commander is limited.

4-21. When developing recommendations, staffs draw from many sources and consider their recommendations within the larger context of the operation. While several ways to improve a particular aspect of the operation might exist, some recommendations could impact other aspects of the operation. As with all recommendations, staffs should address any future implications.

PROVIDING FEEDBACK

4-22. Feedback helps maintain the Soldier’s situational understanding, reinforces the importance of the Soldier’s observations and reporting, and gives the Soldier an idea what has and what has not been effective.

4-23. It is just as important to assess the performance of sensors on the battlefield. Technical sensors are adjusted and recalibrated. Algorithms are improved and software upgraded. Mechanical sensors have no need to know if the data provided had any effect on the operation; however, Soldiers need feedback that will not only improve their performance as collectors but also assure them of the relevance of their observations and reporting. Conducting training on the tasks that contribute to Soldier sensor missions—as well as the activities that enable better collection and reporting—are actions taken based on feedback.

Appendix A‌

Blank Formats

A-1. This appendix discusses formats that facilitate and expedite reporting, data collection, and data processing. Units record the information required by the situation in the theater of operations in accordance with their SOPs, (see ATP 2-91.8). It is imperative for accuracy and completeness that units document the proper information. This appendix discusses means to record information to facilitate debriefing, reporting, and automated data processing. This in turn increases the efficiency of data basing information for retrieval by operations and intelligence personnel. This appendix discusses—

• DD Form 2745.

• A field expedient captured materials tag.

• A captured materials log.

• A spot report (known as a SPOTREP).

• A patrol report (known as a PATROLREP).

• Civil Information Management Data Processing System (CIMDPS) Civilian Engagement.

• CIMDPS Health and Agricultural Professionals Survey.

A-2. A DD Form 2745 is the primary documentation for tagging detainees and their associated documents and equipment. (See figure A-1 on page A-2.) Users can request the form from Media Distribution Division, Directorate of Logistics, in Saint Louis, Missouri. Users can also call Defense Switched Network (known as DSN) 892-0900 or commercial (314) 592-0900, extension 8350 to request the form. For detailed information concerning DD Form 2745, see AR 190-8.

Figure A-1. DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War [EPW] Capture Tag)

A-3. Units develop field expedient documents formatted to collect that information in accordance with unit SOPs. Figure A-2 illustrates a sample field expedient captured materials tag created by a unit. These tags and any like tags are reproduced at the unit.

Figure A-2. Sample of a field expedient captured materials tag

A-4. Like the field expedient captured materials tag, units develop a captured materials log formatted to collect that information in accordance with unit SOPs. Figure A-3 on page A-4 illustrates a sample captured materials log. The unit reproduces these logs. A captured materials log is an accountability document that a unit strictly maintains and controls at all times. Local or unit SOPs dictate the format for a captured materials log.

Figure A-3. Sample of a captured materials log

A-5. Units use a spot report to report information or status regarding events that could have an immediate and significant effort on current and future operations. This is the initial means for reporting troops in contact and event information. (See figure A-4.) (See FM 6-99 for more information on completing a spot report.)

Figure A-4. Spot Report [SPOTREP]

A-6. Units use a patrol report to report information and combat actions obtained on mounted and dismounted patrols. (See figure A-5.) (See FM 6-99 for more information on completing patrol reports.)

Figure A-5. Patrol Report [PATROLREP]

A-7. Units use the CIMDPS Civilian Engagement Survey to document circumstances and information. The Civilian Engagement Survey is an example recording format used by units after interacting with the local population. (The survey is only available from USSOCOM Program of Record CIMDPS at https://cimdps.socom.mil.)

Note. In 2010, the CIMDPS was approved as a USSOCOM program of record. CIMDPS resides on the Special Operations Forces Information Enterprise to assist civil affairs collection, collation, processing, production, and dissemination of civil information and analysis products in support of military operations. CIMDPS provides a structure and a common framework for civil information management of both classified and unclassified data.

A-8. Units also use the CIMDPS Health and Agricultural Professionals Survey to document circumstances and information. The Health and Agricultural Professionals Survey is an example of a recording format used to document circumstances and information obtained as a result of interacting with health and agricultural professionals. (The survey is only available from USSOCOM Program of Record CIMDPS at https://cimdps.socom.mil.)

A-9. The DA Form 4137 is the military’s foundation document in establishing the chain of custody for any seized, captured, or otherwise collected piece of evidence. During tactical site exploitation, the chain of custody refers to the chronological documentation and paper trail showing the seizure, custody, control, transfer, analysis, and disposition of evidence, physical or electronic. Because evidence can be used in court, Soldiers must handle it in a scrupulously careful manner to avoid later allegations of tampering or misconduct. Even if legal personnel do not use evidence in criminal or terrorist prosecution, a DA Form 4137 can become critical in providing time-sensitive intelligence on the battlefield or in establishing links within the intelligence network for almost any organization, to include terrorism.

A-10. See AR 195-5 for preparing a DA Form 4137.

Appendix B

Interpreters

WORKING WITH INTERPRETERS

B-1. Interpreters are a vital link between Soldiers and the local population. Without cooperative and supportive interpreters, the mission could be in jeopardy. Effective teamwork requires mutual respect and understanding. Soldiers must establish mutual respect early in the relationship and maintain it throughout the operation. Most of the time the difficulty of establishing mutual respect stems from the lack of personal contact.

B-2. Interpreters provide an immediate understanding of the spoken word in another language. It should not be confused with translating, which deals with written language. Interpretation and translation are complementary but different skills.

B-3. Soldiers working with an interpreter should find out about the interpreter’s background. Soldiers should show a genuine concern for the interpreter’s family, aspirations, career, education, and so on. Many cultures place great emphasis on family, so Soldiers working with a non-U.S. interpreter may want to ask about the interpreter’s home life. Soldiers should also research cultural traditions to find out more about the host nation. Although Soldiers should gain as much information on the culture as possible before entering a host nation, their interpreters can be valuable sources to fill gaps. Showing interest is a good way to build mutual respect.

B-4. Soldiers should gain an interpreter’s trust and confidence before embarking on sensitive issues, such as religion, likes, dislikes, and prejudices. Soldiers should approach these areas carefully and tactfully. Although deeply personal beliefs may be revealing and useful in the professional relationship, Soldiers must gently and tactfully draw these out of their interpreters. Above all, Soldiers must maintain a level of objectivity. The Soldier-interpreter relationship is a professional relationship first.

PLANNING FOR INTERPRETER USE

B-5. Units planning to conduct overseas operations should research the language, dialects, and ethnic and cultural aspects of the local populace. Understanding the local populace enables units to better identify their interpreter requirements:

• The primary users of the interpreter. This could include the commander and staff, military intelligence, military police or security forces; CA; base operations or security; special operations; unit patrols; or medical personnel.

• The mission requirements (is a security clearance needed).

B-6. In the initial stages of conflict, leaders should contact the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 regarding interpreter support, being prepared to provide their organization’s anticipated requirements.

SELECTING INTERPRETER

B-7. When possible, interpreters should be U.S. military personnel, or at least U.S. citizens. In some operational or training settings abroad, Soldiers are not faced with the problem of selecting an interpreter; they are assigned one by the chain of command or HN government. In other cases, interpreters are chosen from a pool provided by the HN government. Finally, in many operational situations, interpreters are hired from the general HN population under Army contracts that have strict counterintelligence and security screening requirements. Whatever the case, certain guidelines are critical to mission accomplishment.

B-8. If given a choice, units select interpreters based on the following criteria:

• Native speaker. Interpreters should be native speakers of the socially or geographically determined dialect. Their speech, background, and mannerisms should be completely acceptable to the target audience so that no attention is given to the way they talk, only to what they say.

• Social status. In some situations and cultures, interpreters may be limited in their effectiveness with a target audience if their social standing is considerably lower than that of the audience. Examples include significant differences in military rank or membership in an ethnic or religious group. Regardless of Soldiers’ personal feelings on social status, they should remember their duty is to accomplish the mission, not to act as agents for social reform. Soldiers must tolerate local social biases as the current norm.

• English fluency. An often-overlooked consideration is how well the interpreter speaks English. As a rule, if the interpreter understands the Soldier and the Soldier understands the interpreter, then the interpreter’s command of English is satisfactory. A Soldier can check that understanding by asking the interpreter to paraphrase, in English, something the Soldier said. The Soldier then restates the interpreter’s comments to ensure that both understand each other. In addition, interpreting goes both ways. Interpreters must be able to convey information expressed by interviewees or the target audience.

• Intellect. Interpreters should be quick, alert, and responsive to changing conditions and situations. They should be able to grasp complex concepts and discuss them without confusion in a reasonably logical sequence. Although education does not equate to intelligence, generally speaking, the better educated the interpreter, the better the performance due to increased exposure to diverse concepts.

• Technical ability. In certain situations, Soldiers may need interpreters with technical training or experience in special subject areas. This type of interpreter can translate the meaning as well as the words. For instance, if the subject is nuclear physics, background knowledge is useful.

• Reliability. Soldiers should beware of a potential interpreter who arrives late. Throughout the world, the concept of time varies widely. In many less-developed countries, time is relatively unimportant. Soldiers should make sure that interpreters understand the importance of punctuality.

• Loyalty. If interpreters are local nationals, it is possible that their first loyalty is to the host nation or ethnic group, not to the U.S. military. The security implications are clear. Soldiers must be very cautious in how they explain concepts. Additionally, some interpreters, for political or personal reasons, may have ulterior motives or a hidden agenda when they apply for an interpreting job. Soldiers who detect or suspect such motives must tell the commander or security manager.

• Gender and culture. Certain cultures prohibit interactions by people of certain genders or cultural status. In predominantly Muslim countries, cultural prohibitions may render a female interpreter ineffective in certain circumstances. In the Balkans, ethnic divisions may limit the effectiveness of an interpreter from outside the target audience. Since traditions, values, and biases vary from country to country, it is important to check with the in-country assets or area studies for specific taboos or favorable characteristics.

• Compatibility. Soldiers and interpreters work as teams. For interpreters to be most effective, they should become an extension of the Soldiers. The target audience will be quick to recognize personality conflicts between Soldiers and interpreters. Such conflicts can undermine the effectiveness of the communication effort. If possible, when selecting interpreters, Soldiers should look for compatible traits and strive for a smooth and effective work relationship.

B-9. If several qualified interpreters are available, Soldiers should select at least two. This practice is of particular importance if the interpreter will be used during long conferences or courses of instruction. When two interpreters are available, they should work for one-half hour periods. Due to the mental strain associated with this type job, four hours of active interpreting is usually the approximate maximum for peak effectiveness. In the case of short duration meetings and conversations, when two or more interpreters are available, one can provide quality control and assistance to the active interpreter.

B-10. Additionally, two or more interpreters are useful when conducting coordination or negotiation meetings. In these instances, one interpreter is used in an active role and the other pays attention to the body language and side conversations of the others present. Many times, Soldiers can gain important auxiliary information that assists in negotiations from listening to what others say among themselves outside the main discussion.

SOURCES OF INTERPRETERS

B-11. Units rarely have a sufficient number of interpreters to meet all unit mission requirements. Interpreters are obtained from within the military, from the U.S. and local civilian populations, or from other English- speaking countries.

MILITARY

B-12. Many Soldiers, including non-U.S. citizens, have native language abilities due to their upbringing. Their parent unit may identify these language abilities, or these Soldiers may volunteer their abilities when a contingency arises. The Army National Guard, United States Army Reserve, and other U.S. military Services, and even coalition militaries, have language-trained and certified personnel in military intelligence military occupational specialties, such as 35P or 09L, who may be called upon to serve as interpreters.

CIVILIAN

B-13. The military sometimes contracts with civilian corporations to provide interpreters for an operation. There are three categories associated with civilian interpreters:

• Category (CAT) I linguists.

• CAT II linguists.

• CAT III linguists.

B-14. CAT I linguists are individuals with the requisite language skills who are not eligible for a security clearance; they may be locally hired personnel with an understanding of the English language. These personnel are screened and hired in-theater and do not possess a security clearance. During most operations, CAT I linguists are required to be re-screened by counterintelligence personnel on a scheduled basis. HUMINT source operations are classified as secret/no foreign (known as S/NF) and must not use CAT I linguists since CAT I linguists possess no security clearance.

B-15. CAT II linguists have been granted an equivalent of a secret collateral clearance after undergoing a screening process that includes a background check and counterintelligence screening. They typically have a native command of the target language and at least near-native abilities in English.

B-16. CAT III linguists have been granted a top secret/sensitive compartmented information (known as TS/SCI) clearance as a result of a screening process that includes a special background investigation. Ideally, they have a native command of both the target language and English. CAT III linguists are used mostly for high-ranking official meetings and by strategic collectors.

PREPARING YOUR INTERPRETER

B-17. Leaders and Soldiers must be aware of operations security issues at all times when working with an interpreter. They should use the following steps to ensure the safety of the operation and the personal safety of the interpreter:

• Once briefed on the mission plan, the unit integrates the interpreter in unit activities until the mission is complete.

• The interpreter should remain with the Soldiers to be supported.

• The interpreter should not engage in conversation with other locals unless it is for providing information to support the mission.

• The interpreter should not have access to phone or e-mail.

• Cleared and uncleared interpreters should have separate living quarters, as should military versus contract interpreters.

B-18. Once the unit identifies an interpreter, that person may need information on technical vocabulary requirements. Those requirements can include—

• Technical terms.

• Medical terms.

• Military terms.

• Contractual terms.

B-19. Early in the relationship with interpreters, Soldiers should ensure that interpreters are briefed on their duties and responsibilities. Soldiers should orient interpreters as to the nature of the interpreters’ duties, standards of conduct expected, and any other requirements. The orientation may include the following:

• Current tactical situation.

• Importance of the orientation.

• Background information obtained on the source or target audience.

• Specific objectives and the plan for the meeting.

• Copy of the questions, if applicable. Special attention should be given to develop language proficiency in the technical fields in which the interpreters are expected to be employed. In general, a copy of the material will give the interpreter time to look up unfamiliar words or ask questions to clarify anything confusing.

• Copies of handout material and glossary of terms, if applicable.

• Need for interpreters to avoid injecting their own personality, ideas, or questions into the meeting.

• Need for interpreter to inform Soldier of inconsistencies in language used. An example would be someone who claims to be a college professor, yet speaks like an uneducated person.

B-20. As part of the initial training with interpreters, Soldiers should tactfully convey that they direct the discussion. Soldiers should put the interpreter’s role in proper perspective and stress the interpreter’s importance as a vital communication link between Soldiers and the target audience. Soldiers should appeal to interpreters’ professional pride by clearly describing how the quality and quantity of the information sent and received depends upon an interpreter’s skills. In addition, Soldiers should mention how interpreters function solely as a conduit between Soldiers and subjects.

B-21. Soldiers should be aware that some interpreters, because of cultural differences, might attempt to save face by purposely concealing their lack of understanding. They may attempt to translate what they think the Soldier or subject said or meant without asking for clarification. Because this situation can result in misinformation, confusion, and impact on credibility, Soldiers should let interpreters know that, when in doubt, they should always ask for clarification. Soldiers should create a safe environment for this situation as early as possible.

USING INTERPRETERS

B-22. Soldiers should follow these techniques when using an interpreter:

• Soldiers should speak for a minute or less in a neutral, relaxed manner. They should speak directly to the individual and not to the interpreter.

• The interpreter should watch the Soldier carefully and, during the translation, mimic the Soldier’s body language as well as interpret the verbal meaning. Soldiers should observe interpreters closely to detect any inconsistencies between the interpreter’s and the Soldier’s manners. Soldiers should be careful not to force an interpreter into a literal translation by being too brief. Effective Soldiers present one major thought in its entirety and allow the interpreter to reconstruct it in the native language and culture.

• Although interpreters perform some editing as a function of the interpreting process, it is imperative that they transmit the exact meaning without additions or deletions. Soldiers need to insist that interpreters always ask for clarification prior to interpreting whenever they are not certain of the Soldier’s meaning. However, be aware that a good interpreter, especially one who is local, can be invaluable in translating subtleties and hidden meanings.

• During a meeting, if questions are asked, interpreters should immediately relay them for an answer. Interpreters should never attempt to answer questions even though they may know the correct answer. Additionally, neither Soldiers nor interpreters should correct each other in front of others; all differences should be settled in private.

• Just as establishing a good relationship with the civilian population is vitally important, establishing mutual respect with the interpreter is equally important. Soldiers and interpreters should concentrate on relationship building. To establish a good relationship, all people should be treated as mature, important human beings who are capable and worthy.

CONSIDERATIONS WITH INTERPRETERS

B-23. Soldiers follow general considerations to enable clear and appropriate communication.

B-24. An important first step for Soldiers in communicating in a foreign language is to polish their English language skills. These skills are important, even if no attempt is made to learn the indigenous language. The more clearly Soldiers speak in English, including using clear, correct words, the easier it is for interpreters to translate. For instance, Soldiers may want to use complete words, rather than those used in colloquial English, such as airplane rather than plane, to ensure that they are not misinterpreted as referring to the Great Plains or a carpenter’s plane.

B-25. Second, Soldiers avoid using profanity at all as well as slang and colloquialisms. In many cases, interpreters cannot translate such expressions. Even those that can be translated do not always retain the desired meaning. Military jargon and terms such as “freak out” or “bro” are hard to translate.

B-26. Third, Soldiers avoid using acronyms. While these have become part of everyday military language, in most cases, interpreters and local populations will not be familiar with them, and it will be necessary for the interpreter to interrupt the interview to get clarification regarding the expanded form of the acronym. This can disrupt the rhythm of the conversation. Moreover, if interpreters must constantly interrupt for clarification, they could lose credibility, which could jeopardize the goals of the conversation. In addition, if Soldiers must use a technical term or expression, they must be sure interpreters convey the proper meaning.

B-27. When speaking unrehearsed, Soldiers think about what they want to say. They need to break their thoughts into logical bits and say them a piece at a time, using short, simple words and sentences, which can be translated quickly and easily. As a rule of thumb, Soldiers should never say more in one sentence than they can easily repeat word for word immediately after saying it. Each sentence should contain a complete thought without additional verbiage. Additionally, transitional phrases and qualifiers tend to confuse non- native speakers and waste valuable time. Examples are “for example,” “in most cases,” “maybe,” and “perhaps.”

B-28. Fifth, Soldiers avoid folk and culture-specific references. Local populations may have no idea what is being talked about. Even if interpreters understand the reference, they may find it extremely difficult to quickly identify an appropriate equivalent in the target audience’s cultural frame of reference.

B-29. Soldiers should be cautious of using American humor, since humor does not translate well between cultures. The local population can misinterpret cultural and language differences. Effective Soldiers determine early what their interpreters find easiest to understand and translate meaningfully.

B-30. In summary, Soldiers should—

• Keep presentations as simple as possible.

• Use short sentences and simple words (low context).

• Avoid idiomatic English.

• Avoid flowery language.

• Avoid slang and colloquial expressions.

• Avoid folk and culture-specific references.

DO’S AND DON’TS

B-31. Soldiers consider some do’s and don’ts when working with interpreters. Soldiers do the following:

• Always look at and talk directly to the person with whom they are conversing. Soldiers guard against the tendency to talk to the interpreter.

• Speak slowly and clearly. Repeat as often as necessary.

• Speak to the individual as if they understand English. Be enthusiastic and employ the gestures, movements, voice intonations, and inflections they would normally use before an English- speaking group. Considerable nonverbal meaning can be conveyed through voice and body movements. Encourage interpreters to mimic the same delivery.

• Periodically check an interpreter’s accuracy, consistency, and clarity. Have an American fluent enough in the language listen in to ensure that the interpreter does not distort the translation, intentionally or unintentionally.

• Check with the person with whom they are speaking whenever misunderstandings are suspected and clarify immediately. Using the interpreter, ask questions to elicit answers that will tell whether the point is clear. If it is not, rephrase and illustrate the point again.

• Make interpreters feel like valuable members of the team. Give them recognition commensurate with the importance of their contributions.

B-32. Soldiers do not do the following:

• Address the person with whom they are talking in the third person through the interpreter. Avoid saying, for example, “Tell them I’m glad to meet them.” Instead say, “I’m glad to meet you.” Soldiers address the person directly and make continual eye contact. Soldiers watch the person with whom they are speaking, not the interpreter.

• Make side comments to the interpreter that are not interpreted. This action tends to create the wrong atmosphere for communication and is rude.

• Be a distraction while the interpreter is translating and the person is listening.

• Soldiers should not pace, drink beverages, or carry on any other distracting activity while the interpreter is interpreting.

Appendix C

Mission Responsibilities‌

EXPLOITATION OF INFORMATION

C-1. Soldiers on patrol, or other missions that put them in contact with the local population, are a potentially valuable source of information. A serious effort must be made at each echelon of command to fully exploit this potential. Effective leaders can enhance this effort by ensuring that collection and reporting tasks as well as debriefing policies, techniques, and procedures are trained and carried out at each echelon of activity.

SQUAD, SECTION, PATROL, OR CONVOY LEADER

C-2. A squad, section, patrol, or convoy leader accomplishes missions that involve contact with the local population. At this echelon of command, the leader—

• Trains on and integrates specific tactical questioning, interactions with the local populace, and Soldier and leader engagement questions in planning, preparing, and executing of patrols, checkpoints roadblocks, convoys, or other interactions with the local populace based on unit tasking and guidance.

• Fully prepares for and participates in the unit S-2’s debriefing program after all patrols, checkpoints or roadblocks, convoys, or other interactions with the local population.

• Reports information based on visual observations, tactical questioning, interactions with the local populace, and Soldier and leader engagement either in preparation for the debriefing or immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.

• Carefully carries out detainee and document handling during patrols, checkpoints or roadblocks, convoys, and other missions.

• Conducts captured materials handling in accordance with Chapter 3 and local SOPs or OPORDs.

PLATOON LEADER

C-3. A platoon leader conducts missions that involve contact with the local population. At this echelon of command, the platoon leader—

• Provides tasking and guidance to squad, section, patrol, checkpoints or roadblocks, and convoy leaders on topic areas for interacting with the population and tactical questioning based on unit tasking and guidance.

• Fully supports the unit S-2’s debriefing program and ensures that all patrols, checkpoints or roadblocks, and convoy Soldiers participate in the debriefing.

• Reinforces the importance of the procedures for immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.

COMPANY, TROOP, OR BATTERY COMMANDER

C-4. A company, troop, or battery commander leads Soldiers on missions that involve contact with the local population. At this echelon of command, the commander—

• Provides tasking and guidance to platoon leaders on topic areas for interacting with the population and tactical questioning based on unit tasking and guidance.

• Reviews IPB products (especially those specific to an AO) and passes information to the battalion S-2 or brigade S-2 sections to improve their knowledge of the enemy and other aspects of an operational environment.

• Fully supports the unit S-2’s debriefing program and ensures that all patrols, checkpoints or roadblocks, and convoy Soldiers participate in the debriefing.

• Reinforces the importance of the procedures for immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.

• Acts with caution on information reported by patrols and HCTs. Single-source, unanalyzed information can be misleading. When possible, the commander confirms the information through all-source analysis.

BATTALION S-2 SECTION

C-5. A battalion S-2 section prepares and follows up with Soldiers on missions that involve contact with the local population. At this echelon of command, the section—

• Provides tasking and guidance to company, troop, or battery commanders on topic areas for interacting with the population and tactical questioning based on unit PIRs.

• Provides intelligence and information focused on the company, troop, or battery to improve Soldiers’ cultural knowledge and situational awareness to facilitate interactions with the local population and tactical questioning.

• Establishes a program so that all patrols, checkpoints or roadblocks, convoys, or other interactions with the local populace are debriefed.

• Establishes procedures for immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.

• Coordinates HCTs and other intelligence support as appropriate.

BATTALION S-3 SECTION

C-6. A battalion S-3 section prepares and follows up with Soldiers on missions that involve contact with the local population. At this echelon of command, the section—

• Establishes a program so that all patrols, checkpoints or roadblocks, convoys, or other interactions with the local populace are debriefed.

• Briefs friendly maneuver unit dispositions, including security forces.

• Helps develop the initial information collection plan through close coordination with S-2 and the other staff members.

• Regularly disseminates information requirements as collection requirements or information collection tasks to patrols and subordinate units.

• Synchronizes operations support to intelligence and to information collection asset integration through close coordination with the commander, chief of staff (executive officer), S-2, and other staff members.

• Accepts recommendations from the S-2 to refocus and retask assigned, attached, and supporting information collection assets.

• Adjusts the production and dissemination portion of the information collection plan.

Appendix D

Civil Considerations

INFLUENCES ON CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS

D-1. Civil considerations reflect the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an operational environment on the conduct of military operations. Soldiers should focus on these as daily observations since the attitude of the civilian populace greatly influences the outcome of military operations. For additional information on civil considerations, see ATP 2-01.3.

D-2. An appreciation of civil considerations––the ability to analyze their impact on operations––enhances several aspects of operations: the selection of objectives; location, movement, and control of forces; use of weapons; and force protection measures. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in the memory aid, ASCOPE—areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. Paragraphs D-3 through D-8 illustrate the type of information Soldiers should consider obtaining while interacting with the civil population.

AREAS

D-3. Soldiers should consider obtaining the following information concerning areas while interacting with the civil population:

• The location of the government center and its condition.

• The location of the agricultural, mining, and industrial regions and their conditions.

• The location of trade routes and their conditions.

• The possible location for a dislocated civilian resettlement.

• The location of enemy strongholds.

STRUCTURES

D-4. While interacting with the civil population, Soldiers should consider obtaining the following information concerning structures:

• The location, conditions, and controllers of bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams.

• The location of churches, mosques, national libraries, hospitals, and other cultural sites.

• The location of jails, warehouses, television and radio stations, and print plants.

• The location of stored toxic industrial materials.

• The condition of the communication routes.

• The condition of the supply routes.

• The location of the supply points.

CAPABILITIES

D-5. Soldiers should consider obtaining the following information concerning capabilities while interacting with the civil population:

• The methods local authorities use to provide the populace with key services such as food, emergency services, public safety, and public administration.

• Any crime conducive conditions with the potential to impact military operations.

• The numbers of interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment.

• The status of the water supply.

• The status of food, medicine, and other supplies.

• The condition of roads, bridges, and alternate routes.

• The status of lines of communications.

ORGANIZATIONS

D-6. While interacting with the civil population, Soldiers should consider obtaining the following information concerning organizations:

• The political boundaries within a city.

• The tribal delineations within an AO.

• The nonmilitary groups functioning in the AO.

• The church groups, fraternal groups, patriotic or service organizations, labor unions, criminal organizations, and community watch groups operating in the AO. The determination if these groups help or hinder the situation.

• The NGOs functioning in the AO or area of interest. The determination if these groups help or hinder the situation.

PEOPLE

D-7. Soldiers should consider obtaining the following information concerning people:

• The nonmilitary people located in the AO. The ability of these people to influence actions, opinions, and politics.

• The key communicators.

• The morale of the civilian populace.

• The morale of troops.

• The health of the populace and their access to medical care. If they lack access to medical care, the reasons for lacking it.

• The skill of local medical personnel.

• Incidences of mass sickness or epidemics.

• Any forced evacuations of civilians.

• Any voluntary evacuations of civilians.

• Incidences of civilians exposed to propaganda and those whose spread it. Incidences of any counter-propaganda activities.

EVENTS

D-8. While interacting with the civil population, Soldiers should consider obtaining the following information concerning events:

• Dates of the national and religious holidays.

• The livestock, agricultural, and market cycles.

• Dates of elections, civil disturbances, and celebrations.

• Propensity of the area to natural, manmade, or technological disasters.

Appendix E

Leveraging Information Sources

BRIEFS

E-1. Soldiers and leaders in all branches interact with the local population. Prior to their missions, the S-2 properly briefs these personnel so that they are aware of the information requirements. The S-2 also immediately debriefs the personnel upon completion of their missions while the information is still current in their minds. Debriefing helps to ensure that timely information they may provide is available for further action. This debriefing cycle (brief-mission-debrief-intelligence and situation awareness) is continuous throughout operations. The S-2 leverages personnel from the different branches to gather information.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

E-2. Air defense artillery personnel perform multiple missions, especially when the enemy air threat is assessed as low or nonexistent. Air and missile defense units can provide an awareness of the air picture either with their organic systems or indirectly through adjacent air and missile defense units. The air picture can provide an understanding of the current threat posed by enemy unmanned aircraft systems, cruise missiles and rockets, mortars, and missiles. Air defense artillery personnel provide air defense protection and may have secondary non-air and missile defense missions such as observing named areas of interest or conducting patrols.

E-3. Air and missile defense systems, such as the Avenger, have acquisition systems and capabilities employable for other purposes. For example, the forward-looking infrared system on the Avenger may be employed along parts of the perimeter of forward operating bases to detect unusual or unauthorized traffic into, out of, or near the forward operating bases at night. Examples of unauthorized traffic could include insurgent or special operations forces (SOF) attacks and black-market smuggling operations.

AVIATION

E-4. When determining enemy capabilities and courses of action, aviation units can provide information on what air operations are feasible in a given AO. During operations, gun camera tapes and surveillance systems carried by aircraft can provide timely, thorough, and on-demand information. The stand-off capability of most aircrafts can allow observation of threat forces and activities ranging from tracking individual vehicles to determining locations of enemy obstacles.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

E-5. During the planning process, chemical corps personnel can provide estimates on the effects of CBRN use in AOs as well as the location, types, and potential effects of toxic industrial materials. Due to the prevalence of toxic industrial materials in many urban areas, chemical corps personnel may be crucial in identifying CBRN hazards that Soldiers may not normally recognize as a threat. CBRN personnel can also assist in determining if a CBRN hazard within the AO is a deliberate weaponized attack.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

E-6. CA personnel are a key asset in any operation undertaken among the populations. The missions of CA personnel keep them constantly interacting with the indigenous populations and institutions. CA personnel develop area studies, conduct various assessments, and maintain running estimates. These studies, assessments, and running estimates focus on the civil component of an area or operation.

E-7. CA forces collect, collate, process, and analyze civil information as part of the civil information management process. The basic evaluation of an area is the CA area study. The area study is produced in advance of the need, and it establishes baseline information relating to the civil components of the area in question in a format that corresponds to CA functional areas and functional specialties. CA assessments provide a precise means to fill identified information gaps to inform the decision-making process. CA Soldiers perform three types of assessments: the initial assessment, the deliberate assessment, and the survey. For more information on CA area studies and assessments, see FM 3-57 and ATP 3-57.60.

E-8. The CA operations running estimate feeds directly into the military decisionmaking process, whether conducted unilaterally as part of CA-only operations or integrated into the supported unit’s planning process and development of the common operational picture. During course of action development and war-gaming, CA staff officers—the S-9 and G-9—ensure each course of action effectively integrates civil considerations (the “C” of the mission variables, sometimes called METT-TC). These CA staff officers also present a summary of their running estimate to describe how their findings impact or are impacted by other staff functions. For more information on the CA running estimate, see ATP 3-57.60.

E-9. CA units conduct civil information management as a core competency. Civil information management is the process whereby civil information is collected, collated, processed, analyzed, produced into information products, and disseminated in order to be fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, and other U.S. Government and DOD agencies, IGOs, and NGOs. This process ensures the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to unified action partners throughout the AO. For more information on civil information management, see ATP 3-57.50.

E-10. Although CA teams constantly travel throughout the AO to conduct their missions, commanders should never use CA forces as information collection assets. If the S-2 or G-2 section properly briefs the CA team, the team can still provide good information. Intelligence personnel should ask their local CA team for their area studies and assessments. Additionally, trained analysts within the intelligence community conduct in-depth analyses of civil information for the CA community. These analyses are part of the civil information management cycle and aim to provide commanders with a better situational understanding.

ENGINEERS

E-11. Engineers can provide significant amounts of information. They support mobility, countermobility, and survivability by providing maneuver and engineer commanders with information about the terrain, threat engineer activity, obstacles, and weather effects within the AO. During the planning process, engineers can provide specific information on the urban environment such as information on the effects that structures within the AO may have on the operation, bridge weight class and conditions, and information on most likely obstacle locations and composition.

E-12. Engineers provide a range of capabilities that enhance collection efforts. Each of the engineer functions may provide varying degrees of technical expertise in support of any given assigned mission and task. These capabilities are derived from and are organized by both combat and general engineer units with overarching support from geospatial means.

E-13. Topographic teams can provide both standard urban IPB products and operational decision aids. They can create or assist staffs in creating such products as no-fire area overlays (hospitals, churches), trafficability overlays, target packages, refugee tracking products, line-of-sight surveys, reverse line-of-sight overlays, slope overlays, and critical infrastructure overlays. Additionally, topographic teams––

• Can provide specialized maps in the scales needed for operations in complex terrain.

• Can assist in creating special enemy decision support template products with the intelligence staff including those that contribute to IED defeat.

• May create products in either vector or digital format. Vector products can be disseminated digitally and are much smaller than digital products.

• Function as a conduit for the broader range of geospatial products that may be available to the unit from joint, DOD, and other sources.

Further information on topographic engineer products and services is available at the Army Geospatial Center Web site: http://www.agc.army.mil.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

E-14. EOD personnel can provide valuable information on the types of munitions that threat forces may use as well as their effects, recommended stand-off distances, and possible methods of employment. EOD may provide trends regarding the type and origin of explosives found on objectives. These munitions may range from conventional land mines to all sorts of IEDs such as car bombs, booby-trapped artillery shells, remotely detonated homemade bombs, and suicide vests. EOD personnel can be a valuable asset during information collection planning.

FIELD ARTILLERY

E-15. The brigade’s field artillery battalion has a variety of units that support target acquisition and combat assessment. The target acquisition radars (AN/TPQ 36 and AN/TPQ 37/47) of the target acquisition sections detect, identify, and locate threat artillery and mortar firing positions in the division AO or area of interest.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

E-16. IGOs will often have a presence in areas in which U.S. forces may conduct operations, especially if those areas experience some type of unrest or upheaval prior to U.S. operations. These IGOs include such agencies as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (known as NATO). When providing support or considering offering support to the local populace, IGOs usually conduct assessments of the local areas. These assessments focus on understanding the needs of the local populace, the ability of the infrastructure to enable their support or aid to be effectively provided, and the general security situation and stability of the area.

E-17. Understandably, urban areas will be a primary focus of these reports since they are the central locations through which intergovernmental support will flow into an area. Copies of these reports may be available upon request from respective IGOs.

E-18. During U.S. operations, IGOs may continue to maintain a presence. If they are willing to continue to provide copies of their assessments, their third-party view of the situation may provide Soldiers and leaders with valuable insights. This sharing of information––in both directions––could be integral for the success and legitimacy of friendly operations.

HOST-NATION AUTHORITIES

E-19. HN authorities and former local national authorities know their populations and local infrastructure best. Units can gain key information from cooperative local national authorities or former authorities. Staffs must always carefully consider any bias these authorities have. Some types of information that local national authorities can provide are as follows:

• Politicians usually know their populations very well. They can provide detailed socio-cultural information on the populace within their region of control (for example, economic strengths and weaknesses or religious, ethnic, and tribal breakdowns). They are also usually aware of the infrastructure. Information provided by these persons generally will be biased and almost certainly slanted in the long-term favor of that individual.

• Police can provide information on local criminal organizations, local ethnic breakdowns, and key terrain within their AOs. During stability operations, units should pay attention to the local police precinct boundaries when designating unit boundaries within an urban area. Dividing local national police boundaries between multiple U.S. unit boundaries can cause problems and confusion on both sides whenever U.S. forces have to work with local national police forces.

• Fire department personnel often have ready access to blueprints of the structures within their precincts, information on fire escapes, and other building safety-related information as well as detailed information on their structural composition (and the fire threat in individual buildings or whole blocks of a city).

• Public works personnel are uniquely familiar with the infrastructure of the city. They can provide information on the critical points in the city that forces must secure to maintain public services; these personnel can provide key information on avenues of approach throughout the city (especially underground service passages, sewers, and drainage systems).

• City halls in many parts of the world are also repositories of key records on the infrastructure of the city. They may contain detailed maps of the city, key city infrastructure information, and blueprints of city buildings.

MEDICAL

E-20. Health issues are always a potential threat, and the commander must be advised of potential health threats that may influence operations. Outbreaks of disease may not only affect friendly and enemy personnel directly but also require U.S. forces to provide medical support to civilians within the AO. Providing care can potentially drain or even require the re-allocation of resources.

E-21. The National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI) is responsible for producing finished intelligence on foreign military and civilian medical capabilities, infectious disease and environmental health risks, and science and technology developments in biotechnology and biomedical subjects of military importance. Staffs can obtain medical intelligence information through their intelligence channels or directly from NCMI via their Web site http://www.ncmi.detrick.army.mil/

E-22. Medical intelligence elements and NCMI can provide the following reports:

• Medical capabilities studies.

• Disease occurrence—worldwide reports.

• Foreign medical materiel studies.

• A disease and environmental alert report.

• A foreign medical facilities handbook.

• Scientific and threat intelligence studies.

• Foreign medical materiel exploitation reports.

• Quick reaction responses.

E-23. During the planning process, medical support personnel at individual units can provide information on the nature of local health risks associated with the AO and preventive measures that the unit or unit personnel may take to mitigate or avoid these risks. Medical personnel can also help coordinate a medical survey to pinpoint existing hospitals, clinics, sanitariums, blood banks, pharmaceutical industries, medical supply warehouses, and veterinary and public health facilities, as well as identify key indigenous medical personnel in the AO.

E-24. During an operation, medical personnel monitor and report any new health risks that emerge using medical intelligence elements and NCMI. Intelligence on the enemy medical status is also valuable. Not only does it disclose enemy strengths and weaknesses, but it also can alert friendly medical units as to what diseases and conditions for which detainees might require treatment.

E-25. Medical personnel are a prime source of information if they are trained on how to observe and report pertinent data. Types and frequency of wounds and disease, type and utility of captured enemy medical supplies, and observations of the local populace are all important sources of information that medical personnel should provide.

E-26. Medical personnel can also be invaluable in detecting the use of chemical or biological weapons by seeing their effects on people. These agents may be more difficult to detect in urban areas specifically because of the closeness of the population, the sanitary problems associated with cities, and the general breakdown of support services and infrastructure.

MILITARY POLICE

E-27. Military police are generally trained better in the art of observation than other Soldiers. When conducting police operations, detention operations, or security and mobility support, military police personnel normally have a presence across large parts of the AO. During operations, they normally maintain a relationship with local national law enforcement officials. In some cases, they may temporarily assume customs duties, as they did at the main airport outside Panama City during Operation JUST CAUSE. With their presence at critical locations in the AO, they can provide a wealth of information if they are properly briefed on current intelligence requirements.

E-28. Military police conduct police engagement while performing police operations. Police engagement is a type of Soldier and leader engagement specific to police operations. Military police and USACIDC personnel conduct police engagement to engage local, HN, and multinational police partners; police agencies; civil leaders; and local populations. Police engagement also passes and obtains critical information relevant to police operations to influence internal and external audiences. Police engagement enables successful police operations and can influence broader military operations or affect an AO.

E-29. Police engagement aims to develop routine and reliable networks and relationships through which police information and police intelligence can flow to military police and USACIDC personnel and into the operations process. Police engagement is conducted—

• Between law enforcement agencies.

• With non-law enforcement organizations.

• With the general population.

E-30. Police engagement is an activity with two distinct purposes. First, units use it to inform the populace or other agencies and organizations of specific data points and themes in an effort to persuade the population; mitigate potential or occurring discontent or animosity; provide advanced notification of program, policy, or procedural changes to mitigate potential problems; or gain support and develop a sense of community involvement. Second, police engagement is also a means to interact with, and gain valuable information from, the population or other agencies and organizations. It is enhanced by regular contact and the subsequent development of trust.

MULTINATIONAL FORCES

E-31. The unique perspective of some multinational forces may provide Soldiers with key insights. For example, during the Vietnam War, Korean forces who were accustomed to living in environments similar to Vietnamese villages often noticed anomalies that Americans missed, such as too much rice cooking in the pots for the number of people visible in the village. Likewise, few countries have the sophisticated information collection assets available to U.S. forces, and information that the U.S. may provide could be critical both to their mission success and to their force protection.

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

E-32. As with IGOs, NGOs will often have a presence in areas in which U.S. forces may conduct operations. Since most of these organizations are concerned with providing support to the local populace, their presence tends to be especially prominent in areas experiencing or that recently experienced some type of unrest or upheaval prior to U.S. operations, during U.S. operations, or following U.S. operations. These organizations include such agencies as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), and the Red Crescent.

E-33. When providing or preparing to provide support to the local populace, these organizations usually assess local areas. These assessments focus on understanding the needs of the local populace, the ability of the infrastructure to enable their support or provide aid, and the general security situation or stability of the area. As with IGOs, NGOs usually focus on urban areas as the hubs into which their support will flow. Urban hubs enable NGOs to efficiently distribute support to the areas with the most urgent need.

E-34. NGOs strive to protect their shield of neutrality in all situations and do not generally offer copies of their assessments to government organizations. However, it is often in their interest to make U.S. forces aware of their operations in areas under U.S. control. Representatives of individual NGOs operating in areas under U.S. control may provide U.S. forces with their detailed assessments of those areas. They do this to gain U.S. support either in the form of additional material aid for the local populace or for security.

OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION

E-35. Open-source information is information available to the public. Open-source information is of great value in preparing for and conducting operations. The Open Source Center (previously known as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service) monitors foreign media and provides summaries to authorized U.S. Government personnel. The Open Source Center operates an open-source portal on the Internet for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency at https://www.opensource.gov. Users must request an account and password the first time they log on to the site.

E-36. The DOD also publishes a daily (weekday) summary of U.S. print media stories of interest to DOD personnel. These summaries can provide staffs with insight into the views of local nationals and a government in an AO, as well as the views of other countries and factions within the region that could influence those operations.

E-37. The Internet offers quick access to numerous types of information. Soldiers can find information, especially during the initial IPB conducted immediately following a warning order that identifies a potential AO. Maps and general information are available for most areas of the world. Available open-source information ranges from tourist-type information to detailed governmental and military information, as well as detailed studies. For further information, see ATP 2-22.9.

E-38. The Department of the Army Intelligence Information Services maintains several open-source intelligence Web sites. The country research portal on the Army Knowledge Online Web site is located at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/132281. The country research portal has links to news media Web sites, intelligence community Web sites, analyst reference Web sites, and unified command Web sites.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

E-39. Due to the nature of military information support operations (known as MISO), psychological operations (PSYOP) Soldiers must thoroughly understand the local populace to include cultural information and the effects that their operations have on the local populace. These Soldiers must inform the supported commander about the psychological effects that U.S. military activities may have on the local populace. Soldiers and leaders can leverage this information, which can provide key insights into the current mood of local nationals.

E-40. PSYOP studies are prepared by the U.S. Army 4th Psychological Operations Group, strategic studies detachments, and the National Ground Intelligence Center. Three types of PSYOP studies exist:

• The PSYOP Annex to Military Capabilities Study, which summarizes PSYOP relevant issues.

• The Special PSYOP Study, which addresses such subjects as specific target groups, regional or geographical areas, social institutions, and media analysis. The Special PSYOP Study may also discuss perceptions towards the U.S. or issues important to specific population groups.

• The Special PSYOP Assessment is a time-sensitive intelligence memorandum (usually an electronic message) that provides assessments of significant crisis situations, events, or issues from a PSYOP standpoint.

E-41. Units make requests for any of the three PYSOP studies through PSYOP units, SOF units, or staff liaison elements supporting a joint forces command. Some of these studies are also available from the intelligence link of the Special Operations Command Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System.

RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS

E-42. Scouts, snipers, and other reconnaissance assets can provide valuable information on enemy forces and about an operational environment. Traditionally, units use scouts, snipers, and other reconnaissance assets in surveillance roles (passive collection) from a stand-off position. Stability operations may require a more active role (reconnaissance) such as patrolling for some of these assets, especially in complex terrain. When employed in a reconnaissance role (active collection), these assets are most useful when accompanied by an interpreter who allows them to interact with people they encounter, allowing them to better assess the situation.

E-43. The reconnaissance squadron is the brigade’s primary information collection asset. It consists of a headquarters and headquarters troop and three reconnaissance troops.

E-44. A scout platoon is organic to each infantry battalion. The platoon is capable of ground reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, or screening in support of battalion operations. The battalions also use their infantry and armor units to conduct patrols and establish checkpoints, listening posts, and observation posts.

E-45. The presence of patrols, particularly in stability operations, may directly influence what members of the patrol observe. Insurgents or local nationals may change their habits or actions either consciously or subconsciously when friendly forces patrol their area.

E-46. Scouts and reconnaissance patrols can also provide the grid coordinate of key locations for future use. It is often useful to have 10-digit military grid reference system coordinates for key locations within the AO for contingency operations. However, without a physical description of the location, a 10-digit grid can be useless when sending personnel or delivering remote weapons fire to that location. Because of complexities within some AOs, a physical description of the key location is essential to ensure accuracy. Additionally, the use of landmarks––preferably ones that are visible from overhead (such as road intersections, bridges)—are highly desirable to confirm the location.

E-47. Snipers are trained observers who can provide clear spot reports that may help clarify a situation. Sniper teams operate in a stealthier mode with the intent that they remain unobserved. For example, in a gathering of people, snipers can identify probable leaders, sexes of individuals, the size of the group, and any equipment individuals may be carrying. Additionally, specialized optics and night vision devices make snipers valuable information collectors in a wide range of conditions. Snipers are also trained as trackers and may be able to use those skills to give the commander valuable information on which to act immediately.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

E-48. SOF usually enters a theater prior to the deployment of conventional Army units. In such instances, the joint special operations task force commander may elect to employ a special operations command and control element (SOCCE) to coordinate special operations with conventional ground force headquarters. Sometimes, if supporting another command, the SOCCE facilitates the supporting commander’s responsibilities. The SOF’s ability to observe and report can provide invaluable information on the current situation in the AO. SOF usually live among the local nationals. They must get to know and understand in detail the culture of the local national population within the AO.

E-49. SOCCE and other SOF liaisons can provide the commander and staff with access to this information as well as valuable real-time intelligence. The SOCCE is augmented with a communications package, equipment, and selected personnel as required by the mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available – time available and civil considerations).

E-50. The mission of the SOCCE is to synchronize and deconflict operations between SOF and other forces. There is no strict task organization or size requirement. Additionally, the USASOC maintains a historical database of after action reviews and lessons learned––the Special Operations Debrief and Retrieval System— or every mission that a SOF team conducts. This database is accessible from the USASOC homepage on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (known as SIPRNET).

TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS

E-51. Transportation and logistics personnel are constantly moving personnel and supplies up and down lines of communications and throughout the AO. For that reason, they are valuable sources of current information. These personnel provide information regarding the status of lines of communications, civilian population movements, the impact of weather on movement, and notable activity in populated areas. These assets can provide information that assists in understanding the AO, especially in stability operations.

E-52. To leverage these sources for information collection purposes, the S-2 must ensure that procedures are in place to brief transportation personnel on the current intelligence picture, the intelligence requirements, reporting procedures for getting critical information into the unit intelligence channels. The S-2 also ensures that transportation personnel are debriefed as soon as possible upon completing their missions.

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. The proponent manual for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AO | area of operations
AR | Army regulation
ATP | Army techniques publication
CA | civil affairs
CAT | category
CIMDPS | Civil Information Management Data Processing System
CBRN | chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCIR | commander’s critical information requirement
CJCSI | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
DA | Department of the Army
DD | Department of Defense (forms only)
DOD | Department of Defense
DODD | Department of Defense directive
EOD | explosive ordnance disposal
FM | field manual
G-2 | assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 | assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4 | assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-9 | assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
HCT | human intelligence collection team
HN | host-nation
HUMINT | human intelligence
IED | improvised explosive device
IGO | intergovernmental organization
IPB | intelligence preparation of the battlefield
JP | joint publication
MOE | measure of effectiveness
MOP | measure of performance
NCMI | National Center for Medical Intelligence
NGO | nongovernmental organization
OPORD | operation order
PIR | priority intelligence requirement
PSYOP | psychological operations
ROE | rules of engagement
S-2 | battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer or staff element
S-2X | battalion or brigade counterintelligence and human intelligence staff officer or staff element
S-3 | battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-9 | battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
SOCCE | special operations command and control element
SOF | special operations forces
SOP | standard operating procedure
U.S. | United States
USACIDC | United States Army Criminal Investigation Command
USASOC | United States Army Special Operations Command
USSOCOM | United States Special Operations Command

SECTION II – TERMS

SECTION II – TERMS

biometrics

The process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics. (JP 2-0)

combat information

Unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user’s tactical intelligence requirements. (JP 2-01)

commander’s critical information requirement

An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making. (JP 3-0)

debriefing

The systematic questioning of individuals to procure information to answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques. (FM 2-22.3)

detainee

Any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control of Department of Defense personnel. (JP 3-63)

execution

Putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission. (ADP 5-0)

human intelligence

(Army) The collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities. (FM 2-22.3)

information collection

An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. (FM 3-55)

information requirement

(Army) Any information element the commander and staff require to successfully conduct operations. (ADRP 6-0)

measure of effectiveness

A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 3-0)

measure of performance

A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)

Soldier and leader engagement

Interpersonal interactions by Soldiers and leaders with audiences in an area of operations. (FM 3-13)

tactical questioning

The field-expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value of a captured or detained person at or near the point of capture and before the individual is placed in a detention facility. (JP 3-63)

References

All URLs accessed on 09 February 2016.

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to the intended user of this publication.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.

JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 08 November 2010.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: www.apd.army.mil.

ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 07 December 2015.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These sources contain relevant supplemental information.

JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.

Most DOD publications are available at the DOD Issuances Web site: www.dtic.mil/whs/directives

CJCSI 3121.01B. (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces. 13 June 2005 (S). This is a classified publication available online on the Intelligence Knowledge Network–Secret (classified). For access instructions, contact usarmy.huachuca.icoe.mbx.doctrine@mail.mil.

DODD 2310.01E. DOD Detainee Program. 19 August 2014.

DODD 3115.09. DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning. 11 October 2012.

JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013.

JP 2-01. Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 05 January 2012.

JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011.

JP 3-63. Detainee Operations. 13 November 2014.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: www.apd.army.mil.

ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

AR 190-8. Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees. 01 October 1997.

AR 195-5. Evidence Procedures. 22 February 2013.

AR 380-10. Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives. 14 July 2015.

AR 381-100. The Army Human Intelligence Collection Program. 22 February 2016. This classified publication is available online at “The Army G-2 Homepage” (SIPRNET): www.dami.army.smil.mil. Select the HUMINT link, then the National, DOD, and Service Policy, Regulations and Doctrine link.

ATP 2-01. Plan Requirements and Assess Collection. 19 August 2014.

ATP 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 10 November 2014.

ATP 2-22.4. Technical Intelligence. 04 November 2013.

ATP 2-22.9. Open-Source Intelligence. 10 July 2012.

ATP 2-22.31. (U) Human Intelligence Military Source Operations Techniques. 16 April 2015 (S//NF). This is a classified publication available online on the Intelligence Knowledge Network– Secret (classified). Contact usarmy.huachuca.icoe.mbx.doctrine@mail.mil for access instructions.

ATP 2-91.8. Techniques for Document and Media Exploitation. 05 May 2015.

ATP 3-20.98. Reconnaissance Platoon. 05 April 2013.

ATP 3-57.50. Civil Affairs Civil Information Management. 06 September 2013.

ATP 3-57.60. Civil Affairs Planning. 27 April 2014.

ATP 3-90.15. Site Exploitation. 28 July 2015.

ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014.

FM 2-22.3. Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 06 September 2006.

FM 3-13. Inform and Influence Activities. 25 January 2013.

FM 3-21.8. The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 28 March 2007.

FM 3-39. Military Police Operations. 26 August 2013.

FM 3-53. Military Information Support Operations. 04 January 2013.

FM 3-55. Information Collection. 03 May 2013.

FM 3-57. Civil Affairs Operations. 31 October 2011.

FM 3-63. Detainee Operations. 28 April 2014.

FM 3-90-2. Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks, Volume 2. 22 March 2013.

FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 05 May 2014.

FM 6-99. U.S. Army Report and Message Formats. 19 August 2013.

FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-bill/2901.

The Geneva Conventions. https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm.

Uniform Code of Military Justice. http://www.ucmj.us/about-ucmj.shtml.

WEB SITES

U.S. Army. “Army Geospatial Center.” http://www.agc.army.mil.

U.S. Army. “Army Knowledge Online.” http://www.us.army.mil.

U.S. Army. “Civil Information Management Data Processing System.” https://cimdps.socom.mil.

U.S. Army. “National Center for Medical Intelligence.” http://www.ncmi.detrick.army.mil/.

U.S. Army. “Department of the Army Intelligence Information Service.” https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/132281.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. “The Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center.” https://www.opensource.gov.

PRESCRIBED FORMS

This section contains no entries.

REFERENCED FORMS

Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site: http://www.apd.army.mil/. DD forms are available on the Office of the Secretary of Defense Web site: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/forms/index.htm. Printed forms are available through normal forms supply channels.

DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

DA Form 4137. Evidence/Property Custody Document.

DD Form 2745. Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag.

Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

A

acronyms, Soldiers use of, B-26

action, disciplinary, 1-35

friendly, 4-9, 4-13

recommending or directing, 4-20–4-21

tactical site exploitation, 1-18

activities, battlefield forensic support, 2-17–2-18

human intelligence, 1-37–1-39

information collection and, 3-8

preparation, 2-9

prohibited, 1-36

Soldier sensor mission and, 1-13

supported, 2-16

tactical site exploitation, 3-24

adversary, identifying, 2-15

after action review, 3-47

air and missile defense, information from, E-2 E-3

ambush, hasty, 2-43

area, civil considerations and, D-3

area of operations, changes in, 3-16

communications in, 3-5

considerations of, 2-12, 3-5

influences on, 2-48

area study, E-7

assessment, 4-1–4-2

by nongovernmental organization, E-33 E-34

evaluation and, 4-7

intelligence, 1-28

process and, 4-2

recommending or directing action, 4-20

Soldier and leader engagement, 3-19

assimilation, information, 1-32

interpreters, 3-3

aviation, information from, E-4

B

battlefield forensic support, activities for, 2-17–2-18

behavior, assessment of changes, 4-8

knowledge of, 2-47

observed, 3-7

biometrics, defined, 2-14

support from, 2-16

tactical collection devices, 2-14–2-16

use of, 2-15

briefing, mission, 1-9, 1-28, 2-37, 3-57

patrol, 2-38–2-39, 2-46

C

capabilities, civil considerations and, D-5

captured materials, 1-20–1-21

log, A-4

tag, A-3

change, evaluation of, 4-11

indicators of, 3-16–3-17

recognizing, 2-49, 3-16, 4-6

checklist, mission, 2-35

patrol, 2-39

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, information from, E-5

civil affairs, information from, E-6 E-10

missions, E-6

teams, E-10

civil considerations, D-1 D-8

cultural awareness and, 2-47–2-50

effects from, D-2

influences on, D-1 D-2

civil information management, conducting, E-9

process of, E-7

civilian, dislocated, 4-6

interpreter, B-13 B-16

civilian activities, debriefing for, 3-61

Civilian Engagement Survey, A-7

collective task, 1-19

combat information, defined, 1-6

commander, CA considerations of, E-10

needs of, 2-52

responsibility of, 2-5–2-7, 2-12, 2-14, 2-31, 4-12, 4-14, C-4

commander’s critical information requirement, defined, 2-27

commander’s intent, 2-1

achieving, 4-19

communications, considerations, 3-5

effects on, 3-5

enabling, B-23 B-30

interpreters, 3-2, B-20

considerations, legal, 1-34–1-36

contact, prohibited activities with, 1-36

walk-in, 2-44

conversation, 3-5

interaction, 1-11

maintaining, 3-10, 3-15

techniques of, 3-15

coordination, direct, 2-25

information, 4-6

meeting, B-10

patrol, 2-33–2-36, 2-39

special operations forces and, E-48

tasks, 2-46

unit, 2-37

cultural awareness, 2-12–2-13

civil considerations and, 2-47–2-50

questions, 2-13

culture, bias in, 3-6

considerations of, 3-6

conversations, 3-10

differences, B-21

effects of, B-3

frame of reference, B-29

D

DA Form 4137, A-9 A-10

DD Form 2745, A-2

debriefing, 1-30–1-33

absence of, 3-53

chronological, 3-58

civilian activities questions, 3-61

importance of, 3-64

infrastructure questions, 3-63

military activities questions, 3-60

monitoring of, 4-4

patrol, 3-54–3-63

questions for, 3-60–3-62

reporting, 3-45–3-53

responsibility of, 3-55

topics of, 3-59

written details, 3-54

deployment, planning, 2-22–2-29

preparation, 2-22, 2-29–2-57

detainee, defined, 1-23

handling, 1-23–1-25, 3-30–3-39

legal considerations of, 1-34

questioning of, 1-12

safeguard, 3-36

search, 3-33

segregate, 3-35

silence, 3-34

tag, 3-37

discrepancies, information, 3-20

documents, handling of, 1-21, 3-26

sources of, 3-26

E

engineers, capabilities of, E-12

information from, E-11 E-13

environment, changes in, 2-49, 4-15

indicators in, 3-16

influencing, 1-5

information from, E-42

information on, E-11

secure, 2-54

evaluating, 4-7–4-19

evaluation, 4-10–4-12

area study, E-7

events, civil considerations and, D-8

significance, 2-50

execution, defined, 3-1

site exploitation and, 3-24–3-29

exploit, information, C-1

exploitation. See tactical site exploitation.

explosive ordnance disposal, information from, E-14

F

feedback, 4-22–4-23

effects of, 2-34

field artillery, information from, E-15

force, presence of, 2-54

forensics, activities of, 2-17

friendly actions, assessment of, 4-9

G

Geneva Conventions, 1-34–1-35

tactical questioning applied to, 3-43

violations of, 1-35

guidance, forms of, 1-9

necessity of, 3-42

training, 2-6

H

handling, specialized elements, 2-42

health, threats to, E-20

Health and Agricultural Professionals Survey, A-8

host-nation authority, information from, E-19

human intelligence, activities, 1-37–1-39

collectors, 1-27

defined, 1-37

personnel, 1-39

tasks, 1-38

humor, translating, B-29

I

indicators, changes, 3-16–3-17

measures of effectiveness, 4-19

individual, handling of, 3-26

identifying, 2-14–2-15

meeting with, 3-22

observing, 3-7

questioning, 3-42

information, civil affairs and, E-7

civil information management and, E-8 E-9

collection of, 3-8

coordination of, 2-37, 4-6

discrepancies of, 3-19

documenting, A-1 A-10

exploitation of, C-1

flow of, 1-4

leveraging sources of, E-1 E-52

observation and, 4-1

obtained from Soldier and leader engagement, 1-17

open-source, E-35 E-38

patrols and, 3-52

prioritizing, 3-45

reporting, 3-17

risk mitigation and, 2-57

Soldier and leader engagement, 4-15

sources of, 1-3, 3-26

value of, 2-45

verify, 3-21

volunteer of, 2-44

information collection, assets, E-10

contact and, 2-55

defined, 1-1

means, 1-1

patrol and, 2-23

planning, 2-23

responsibilities, C-1 C-6

tasks, 2-28, 2-46

information collection plan, 4-1, 4-5

information requirement, 2-41

answering, 1-27

briefs and, E-1

defined, 2-27

information sharing, 3-53

infrastructure, civil considerations and, E-19

debriefing for, 3-62, 3-63

intelligence. See also human intelligence.

briefings and, 1-28

medical, E-22

personnel, E-10

planning, 2-26–2-28

preparation of, 2-45–2-46

process, 4-10

provide, 2-7

reporting, 3-49

interactions, conversational, 1-11

effects from, 1-5, 3-10

guidance for, 1-9

populace and, 1-5–1-32, 3-8, 3-22

reasons for, 1-8

Soldiers and, 1-5–1-32

tasks for, 2-4

intergovernmental organizations, information from, E-16 E-18

interpreter, 3-2–3-4

assimilation of, 3-3

background, B-3

bad practices with, B-32

civilian categories, B-13 B-16

considerations, 3-4, B-21, B-23 B-30

criteria, B-8

good practices with, B-31

military, B-12

orientation for, B-19

planning for, B-6

preparing for, B-17 B-21

requirements for, B-5

safety for, B-17

selecting, B-7 B-10

sources of, B-7, B-11 B-16

technical terms for, B-18

techniques with, B-22

training of, B-20

translator versus, B-2

using, B-22 B-32

working with, B-1 B-4

L

language, Soldiers, B-24

leader, activities, 2-33

checklist for, 2-39

consideration of, E-1

patrol, 2-31

patrol responsibility of, C-2

platoon responsibility of, C-3

responsibility of, 4-8–4-9

small-unit, 1-9

legal considerations, 1-34–1-36

liaisons, special operations forces and, E-49

lines of communications, opening, 3-10

using, E-51

linguists, category I, B-14

category II, B-15

category III, B-16

logistics, information from, E-51 E-52

M

materials, 3-27

acquisition of, 1-20

documenting acquisition of, 1-21

materiel, 3-24

handling, 3-28

tagging, 3-28

measure of effectiveness, assessment and, 4-16–4-19

criteria, 4-17–4-18

defined, 4-16

measure of performance,

assessment and, 4-13–4-15

defined, 4-13

mechanical sensor, feedback and, 4-23

media, summary by, E-36

medical, information from units, E-20 E-26

responsibility of personnel, E-24

meetings, interpreters and, B-9 B-10

military, debriefing for activities, 3-60

interpreter, B-12

source operations, 1-36

military decisionmaking process, civil affairs and, E-8

intelligence planning, 2-26

patrol and, 2-23–2-24

military information support operations, information from, E-39 E-41

military police, information from, E-27 E-30

mission, checklist, 2-35

mission briefing, debriefing and, 3-57

monitoring, 4-3–4-6

debriefings, 4-4

patrol reports, 4-4

multinational forces, information from, E-31

N

National Center for Medical Intelligence, E-21

nongovernmental organizations, information from, E-32 E-34

O

observation, clues from, 3-7

daily, 1-5, D-1

effects of, 4-10

indicators from, 3-16

information and, 4-1

military police, E-27

monitoring and, 4-3

reporting, 1-3

sniper, E-47

Open Source Center, E-35

open-source information, E-35 E-38

operation, evaluation of, 4-7

operation order, 2-38

rules of engagement in, 2-53

operational environment, understanding, 3-16

operations security, interpreter and, B-17

organizations, civil considerations and, D-6

intergovernmental, E-16 E-18

nongovernmental, E-32 E-34

P

patrol, 1-14–1-15

briefing, 2-38–2-39

contact, 1-15

coordination, 2-33–2-36

debriefing, 3-54–3-63

effects by, E-45

information from, 3-52, E-46

leader responsibility, C-2

planning, 2-23–2-25

preparation for, 2-30–2-32

reconnaissance, 1-15

requirements, 2-23

tasks, 2-31

tracking, 2-19–2-20

patrol report, 3-47, A-8

spot report and, 3-51

people, category of, 3-40

civil considerations and, D-7

handling of, 1-25

information on, 2-40

interacting with, E-1

personnel, debriefing of, 3-55

intelligence, 2-7

plan, establish, 2-8

information collection, 4-5

planning, deployment, 2-22–2-29

health concerns during, E-23

information collection, 2-23

interpreter use, B-5 B-6

patrol, 2-23–2-25

pre-deployment, 2-1–2-8

process of, 2-2

platoon, leader responsibility, C-3

scout, E-44

police engagement, E-28 E-30

purposes of, E-30

populace, influences on, 2-48

interactions with, 1-5–1-32, 2-55, 3-10, 3-22

local, 3-5–3-17

observations of, 3-7

questioning of, 1-22

understanding, 2-47, E-39

pre-deployment, 2-1–2-20

preparation for, 2-9–2-10

risk management, 2-11

train, 2-6

preparation, activities, 2-9, 2-29

deployment, 2-22, 2-29–2-57

patrol, 2-30–2-32

pre-deployment, 2-9–2-20

site exploitation, 2-42–2-43

Soldier and leader engagement, 2-40–2-41

procedures, reporting, 3-49

psychological operations, studies, E-40

Q

questioning, 1-22

intent of, 3-41

tactical, 1-12, 1-26–1-27, 3-40–3-43

questions, considerations, 3-9–3-15

cultural awareness, 2-13

guidance for, 3-14

open-ended, 3-11

samples of, 3-13

R

reconnaissance, information from asset, E-42 E-47

squadron, E-43

references, cultural or folk, B-28

relationship, building, B-4

caution with, 3-22

interpreter and, B-1

report, 1-3

formats, 3-50

medical, E-22

monitoring of, 4-4

types, 3-45

reporting, 1-29

debriefing and, 3-45–3-53

documents for, A-1

importance of, 3-64

information sharing, 3-53

methods of, 3-49, 3-56

research, cultural understanding, 2-12

risk, mitigation in, 2-54–2-57

risk management, pre-deployment, 2-11

rules of engagement, 2-51–2-53

operation order and, 2-53

running estimate, civil affairs and, E-8

S-2, responsibility of, 1-30, 2-46, 3-46–3-49, 3-51–3-52, 3-54–3-58, 4-4, 4-6, C-5, E-1, E-52

S-3, coordination with, 2-46

monitoring, 4-4–4-6

responsibility of, 2-31, 4-4, 4-6, C-6

S

safeguard, detainee, 3-36

scout, patrol, E-46

scout platoon, information from, E-44

search, detainee, 3-33

segregate, detainee, 3-35

sensor, feedback and, 4-23

patrol, 2-32

Soldiers versus, 1-13

silence, detainee, 3-34

site exploitation, execution and, 3-24–3-29

hasty, 2-43

locations of, 3-24

outputs of, 3-26

preparation for, 2-42–2-43

tactical, 3-25

situational awareness, mitigation risk, 2-56

situational understanding, 1-7

slang, Soldiers and, B-25

sniper, information from, E-47

Soldier and leader engagement, 1-16–1-17

debriefing and, 1-32

defined, 1-16

execution and, 3-18–3-23

guidance for, 1-9

information and, 4-15

limits, 2-41

measure of performance, 4-14

police engagement and, E-28

preparation for, 2-40–2-41

purpose, 2-40, 3-18

Soldier sensor mission, 1-13, 2-6

Soldier surveillance and reconnaissance, planning, 2-2

Soldiers, activities, 2-33

considerations by, 3-5, B-21, E-1

interpreters and, B-22

language of, B-24

observations by, 3-7

relationships of, B-19

responsibility of, B-3

sensors versus, 1-13

tasks, 1-7

special operations command and control element, mission, E-50

special operations forces, information from, E-48 E-50

specialized elements, handling of, 2-42

spot report, 3-46, A-5

patrols and, 3-51

staff. See also S-2 and S-3.

considerations of, 4-21

responsibility of, 1-9

standing rules of engagement, 2-52

structure, civil considerations and, D-4

surveillance and reconnaissance, 1-1

leverage, 1-2

plan for, 2-5

survey, samples, A-6 A-7

T

tactical questioning, 1-12, 1-26–1-27, 3-40–3-43

Geneva Conventions and, 3-43

guidance of, 3-42

legal considerations of, 1-34

tactical site exploitation, 1-18–1-22, 3-24–3-39

preparation for, 2-42–2-43

tag, detainee, 3-38, A-2

materiel, 3-28, A-3

targeting, patrol and, 2-23

task-organize, elements, 2-24–2-25

tasks, information collection, 1-8, 2-28

preparation, 2-10

site exploitation and, 3-25

training and, 2-4

team, civil affairs, E-10

topographic, E-13

teamwork, interpreter and, B-1

technical sensor, 4-23

threat techniques, recognizing, 3-25

topographic team, E-13

tracking, 2-19–2-20

training, initial, B-20

interpreters for, B-9 B-10

medical observations, E-25

pre-deployment, 2-6

preparation, 2-10

tactical questioning, 1-27

translator, interpreter versus, B-2

transportation, information from, E-51 E-52

U

urban, products for, E-13

urban areas, intergovernmental organizations and, E-17

nongovernmental organizations and, E-33

W

walk-in, preparation for, 2-44

ATP 3-55.4

5 April 2016

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

MARK A. MILLEY

General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE

Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

1609101

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media only (EMO).