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ATP 3-92

Army Techniques Publication

No. 3-92

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 7 April 2016

Corps Operations

Contents

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1: The Corps

Section I – The Four Roles of the Corps Headquarters

Joint Task Force Headquarters

Land Component Command Headquarters

ARFOR in Campaigns and Major Operations

Tactical Echelon in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Section II – Subordinate Forces

Divisions

Field Artillery Brigade

Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade

Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

Other Supporting Commands and Forces

Section III – Internal Organization of the Corps Headquarters

Command Group

The Corps Staff

Command Post Cells and Other Command Post Organizations

Early-Entry Command Post

Center

Section IV – Corps Main Command Post

Coordinating, Special, and Personal Staff Officers

Main Command Post Functional Cells

Main Command Post Integrating Cells

Section V – Tactical Command Post

Section VI – USAF, DA Civilians, and Other Augmentation

USAF Support to the Corps

DA Civilians

Contractors

Unified Action

Home Station Mission Command Center

Section VII – Corps Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion

Battalion Command Group and Staff

Headquarters Support Company

Signal, Intelligence, and Sustainment Company

Long-Range Surveillance Company

Corps Reserve Component Operations Detachment

Chapter 2: Corps Headquarters Operations

Support to Corps Headquarters

Command and Support Relationships

Mission Command

Battle Rhythm

Creating and Maintaining Shared Understanding

Command Programs

Chapter 3: Corps as a JTF

Section I – Forming the Joint Task Force Headquarters

Joint Staff Organization

Staff Augmentation

Integration and Training

Section II – Planning Joint Operations

Operational Art and Operational Design

Army Design Methodology

Key JTF Planning Practices

Joint Planning Techniques

Section III – Deployment or Redeployment

Deployment and Redeployment Responsibilities

Deployment and Redeployment Planning

Predeployment and Pre-redeployment Activities

Movement

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

Coordinate Host-Nation Support

Section IV – Employ

Command and Control

Intelligence

Fires

Sustainment

Protection

Section V – Transition

Section VI – Redeploy

Chapter 4: Land Component Command Operations

Section I – Corps Headquarters as an LLC Headquarters

Command Relationships with the CJTF

Support Relationship with JTF Functional components

Options for Organizing an LCC Headquarters

Forming the LCC Headquarters

Section II – Operational Movement and Maneuver

Conduct Operational Movement

Conduct Operational Maneuver and Force Positioning

Provide Operational Mobility

Provide Operational Countermobility

Control Operationally Significant Areas

Section III – Operational Intelligence

Section IV – Operational Fires

Synchronizing Joint Fires

Conducting Operational Targeting

Attacking Operational Targets

Countering Air and Missile Threats

Interdict Enemy Capabilities

Assessing the Results of Employing Joint Fires

Section V – Operational Sustainment

Common User Logistics

Logistics Planning

Boards and Centers

Functions of the J-1 and J-4

Section VI – Operational Command and Control

Operational Command and Control Overview

Integrate Information

Prepare Plans and Orders

Command Subordinate Forces

Coordinate Information Operations

Section VII – Operational Protection

Chapter 5: The Corps Headquarters as an ARFOR Headquarters

Introduction to ARFOR

Corps Functions as the ARFOR

Chapter 6: The Corps as a Tactical Headquarters

Section I –Planning

Command and Staff Actions

Phasing a Corps Operation

Coordination and Control

Scope of the Corps Operations Plan or Order

Section II – Corps Operations in an Established Theater

Organization

Command Relationship

Operational Considerations

Section III – Corps Contingency Operations

Organization of a Corps Contingency Force

Operational Considerations

Section IV – Corps Offensive-Focused Tasks

Offensive Tasks

Forms of Maneuver

Corps Reserve

Section V – Corps Defensive-Focused Tasks

Defensive Tasks

Defensive Planning

Section VI – The Corps in Stability Focused Operations

Chapter 7: Special Topics

Section I – Corps Signal Operations

Communications Capabilities

Communications Responsibilities

Section II – Corps Cyberspace Operations

Section III – Corps Airspace Control

Airspace Control Application

Corps Future Operations and Plans Integrating Cells

Corps Fires Cell

Corps Aviation Section

Section IV – The Corps in Information Collection

Plan Requirements and Assess Collection

Task and Direct Collection

National Requests

Deconfliction, Synchronization, and Prioritization

Information Collection Assets by Echelon

Section V – Corps Fires

Fire Support

Field Artillery Brigade

Section VI – United States Air Force Interface in Corps Operations

Section VII – Corps Sustainment

Sustainment Warfighting Function Tasks

Principles of Sustainment

Corps Sustainment Organizations

Corps Sustainment

Section VIII – Corps Security

Section IX – Corps Special Technical Operations

STO Plans

STO Related Working Groups and Boards

GLOSSARY

REFERENCES

INDEX

Figures

Figure 1-1. Army forces available to support a corps

Figure 1-2. Corps headquarters organization

Figure 1-3. Main command post internal organization

Figure 1-4. Main command post integrating and functional cells

Figure 1-5. Internal organization of the corps tactical command post

Figure 1-6. Corps headquarters and headquarters battalion

Figure 1-7. Corps aligned reserve component operations detachment

Figure 2-1. Corps command and support relationships

Figure 2-2. Corps communications

Figure 2-3. Example of a graphic battle rhythm

Figure 3-1. Augmenting the corps staff

Figure 3-2. Joint Adaptive Planning and Execution System users

Figure 7-1. The corps SIS company

Figure 7-2. Corps main command post G-6 section

Figure 7-3. Field artillery brigade

Figure 7-4. Major components of the sustainment structure

Figure 7-5. Components of movement control

Tables

Table 1-1. Personal and special staff officers

Table 2-1. Example of a single day of the corps battle rhythm

Table 3-1. Common joint terms

Table 4-1. Initial and exploitation force examples

Table 7-1. Decide targeting process tasks

Table 7-2 STO Working Groups and Board Representation

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Preface

ATP 3-92 provides the Army and joint community with guidance on the conduct of operational and tactical tasks performed by the corps echelon. (Defense support of civil authorities tasks are discussed in ADP 3-28 and ADRP 3-28.) ATP 3-92 describes tactics and techniques tested in the conduct of actual operations. It expounds on the doctrinal fundamentals established in ADRP 3-0, ADRP 3-07, and ADRP 3-90, which establish doctrine for the conduct of decisive action and describe the operational art and the art and science of tactics. These ADRPs must be read before reading ATP 3-92 to gain a better understanding of the tactics and techniques discussed in ATP 3-92. It is necessary to study ADRP 1-02, ADRP 5-0, and ADRP 6-0 to understand the Army’s operational terms and military symbols that form the basis of the language of land operations, the Army operations process, and Army mission command. These ADRPs provide the foundation for ATP 3-92. It is also necessary to study ADRP 1, ADRP 2-0, ADRP 3-05, ADRP 3-09, ADRP 3-37, ADRP 4-0, ADRP 6-22, and ADRP 7-0 that provide basic

information on the profession of arms, other elements of combat power, and how to conduct effective training. It is recommended that FM 3-13, FM 3-53, and FM 3-57 be reviewed in order to obtain a greater understanding of how the corps commander’s exercise of mission command is supported by information related capabilities and the information element of combat power. It is recommended to study applicable joint doctrine, such as JP 1 and JP 3-0, to become familiar with the operational environment existing in the region where they will conduct operations.

The principal audience for ATP 3-92 is corps commanders and staffs, and subordinate commanders and their staffs. These audiences should have a working knowledge of FMs and ATPs that apply to their functional specialties. The focus of ATP 3-92 is the conduct of operational tasks and tactical offensive, defensive, and stability tasks by the corps. The tasks the corps headquarters performs depend on the corps’ assigned role. ATP 3-92 is also a guide for joint force, theater army, and supporting commanders regarding the employment of a United States Army corps.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

ATP 3-92 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. ATP 3-92 is not the proponent publication (the authority) for any terms. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 3-92 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent for ATP 3-92 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United Sates Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United Sates Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D (ATP 3-92), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2337; by email to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd- org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

Introduction

ATP 3-92 supports Doctrine 2015. ATP 3-92 expands on the doctrine and tactics contained in FM 3-94.

ATP 3-92 has numerous changes from the 2010 edition of FM 3-92. The most significant change is the introduction of unified land operations as the Army’s operational concept. Additional changes include a revision of the doctrinal terminology to reflect the changes that have occurred in the almost five-year period since a publication addressing this echelon was last published. These changes include recent force design changes in the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion, and recent changes in the operating concept for the corps headquarters.

Defense support of civil authorities is a Department of Defense mission executed only within the territorial limits of the United States and its territories, which is a unique area of operations. The supported combatant commander with defense support of civil authorities responsibilities—United States Northern Command, United States Southern Command, or United States Pacific Command—is likely to request a corps commander and headquarters to serve as a joint force commander and the core of the joint task force staff, required to control large-scale Title 10 United States Code (USC) forces responding to a complex catastrophe in a large defense support of civil authorities mission. The doctrine for defense support of civil authorities is contained in JP 3-28 and ADP 3-28 and ADRP 3-28.

ATP 3-92 is consistent with FM 3-94 on key topics, while adding additional information on corps tactics and techniques as necessary.

ATP 3-92 uses the term land component command in place of joint force land component command.

ATP 3-92 contains seven chapters.

Chapter 1 explains the four roles of the Army corps headquarters, the roles of subordinate forces, and the internal organization of corps headquarters, and the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion. The chapter summarizes the subordinate units found in the corps echelon. The chapter then discusses the internal organization of the corps and the various command posts available to the corps commander. It reviews the corps command group and command post cells and other command post organizations. It discusses the composition and functions of the main command post. It discusses the composition and functions of the tactical command post. It addresses the Home Station Mission Command Center. It also addresses the organization of the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion.

Chapter 2 addresses corps headquarters operations. This includes external support to the corps headquarters, command and support relations, the corps’ Army mission command system, battle rhythm, and command programs.

Chapter 3 discusses how the corps headquarters transitions into a joint task force headquarters. Topics addressed in chapter 3 include the joint force, the transition training life cycle, joint task force headquarters organization, required augmentation to the corps headquarters, and collaborative capabilities required by a joint headquarters. It also discusses where the corps can obtain required capabilities and joint land operations. Chapter 3 also addresses the operations of a joint task force.

Chapter 4 discusses the corps headquarters as the headquarters for a land component command. This chapter also addresses the corps headquarters when tasked as the nucleus of a land component command headquarters conducting the six joint operational tasks.

Chapter 5 addresses the tasks the corps headquarters performs when designated as the ARFOR headquarters.

Chapter 6 addresses the operations of a corps when it is a tactical headquarters. It addresses operational planning. It addresses corps operations in an established theater and during contingency operations. The chapter discusses a corps conducting offensive focused tasks, defensive focused tasks, and stability focused operations. The discussion of the conduct of these tasks is separate in the text. However, a corps has to conduct these three tasks simultaneously during operations, although the priority given to each task can vary according to the mission variables.

Chapter 7 addresses special topics which are not adequately address in this publication’s other chapters. These special topics include—

• Corps signal operations.

• Corps cyberspace operations.

• Corps airspace control.

• Corps information collection.

• Corps fires.

• United States Air Force interface in corps operations.

• Corps sustainment.

• Corps security.

• Special technical operations (STO).

Chapter 1

The Corps

This chapter discusses the four roles of the Army corps headquarters, the roles of subordinate forces, and the internal organization of corps headquarters, and the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion. The corps headquarters is the Army’s primary operational-level warfighting headquarters. It controls ARFOR engaged in unified land operations, and identifies requirements and establishes priorities to support ARFOR conducting sustaining operations for units within the corps area of operations. The corps headquarters can command Army divisions, brigade combat teams (BCTs), functional and multifunctional brigades, and joint and multinational forces engaged in crisis response, limited contingency operations, and during major operations and campaigns across the conflict continuum. The corps headquarters is deployable and scalable.

SECTION I – THE FOUR ROLES OF THE CORPS HEADQUARTERS

1-1. The Army corps headquarters serves the following roles:

• Joint task force (JTF) headquarters.

• Joint, multinational force, or land component command (LCC) headquarters in a campaign or major operations.

• ARFOR headquarters in a campaign or major operation.

• Tactical echelon in a large-scale ground combat operations incident to a campaign.

1-2. The effective integration of landpower across the conflict continuum requires an expeditionary, scalable, and operationally flexible headquarters able to exercise command in a variety of roles. The combatant commander (command authority) can use the corps headquarters as the nucleus for a JTF, LCC, or as an ARFOR headquarters in major operations and campaigns. Alternatively, it can serve as the headquarters for a tactical echelon during large-scale operations.

1-3. A corps commander and staff should not attempt to simultaneously perform the roles of a JTF and ARFOR headquarters during major operations. Likewise, it should not attempt to simultaneously be a JTF and LCC headquarters or a LCC headquarters and tactical headquarters during major operations. The workload associated with simultaneously conducting these two roles during major operations can overwhelm the corps commander and staff.

1-4. A corps headquarters can perform two roles simultaneously during the conduct of short duration crisis response and limited contingency operations. The total workload associated with simultaneously performing multiple roles is not normally duplicated in training exercises. Chapter 3 discusses the role of a corps headquarters as the nucleus of a JTF headquarters. Chapter 4 discusses the role of a corps headquarters as the nucleus of a LCC headquarters. Chapter 5 discusses the role of a corps headquarters as an ARFOR headquarters.

1-5. A corps headquarters can simultaneously provide the nucleus of a LCC and ARFOR headquarters during major operations if another headquarters acts as the corps commander’s executive agent for the conduct of administrative control (ADCON) tasks. Chapter 4 of this manual discusses the role of a corps headquarters as the nucleus of the LCC headquarters. A corps headquarters performing the role of a tactical echelon headquarters will not have ARFOR responsibilities because the scale of operations in this case is so large that the Army Service component command will be the ARFOR. Chapter 6 discusses the role of a corps headquarters as a tactical headquarters.

JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

1-6. The corps headquarters and headquarters battalion is the preferred Army unit to use as the core element for forming a JTF headquarters, which is accomplished by adding joint force and additional Army capabilities. The resulting JTF headquarters controls actions across the range of military operations. A corps headquarters designated as a JTF headquarters requires a separate ARFOR headquarters because of the differing roles and responsibilities inherent in each. For example, JTFs focus on the operational level of war and use joint rather than Army doctrine. The combatant commander may form a JTF on a geographic or functional basis, but the corps is normally the base organization for a geographic JTF, commanding all forces within a joint operations area. Normally, the commander, joint task force (CJTF) exercises operational control (OPCON) over most forces and other resources in the joint operations area. The JTF can include functional and Service components. A JTF headquarters—built around a corps headquarters—may be required to deploy an advanced echelon of that headquarters into the joint operations area. (See JP 3-33, JP 3-31, JP 3-18, and JP 5-0.) JTFs often contain multinational forces from allied and coalition partners in addition to U.S. forces.

LAND COMPONENT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

1-7. Joint land operations require synchronization and integration of all instruments of national power to achieve strategic and operational objectives. Joint land operations include control of assigned areas of operations. The CJTF designates the corps commander as the LCC commander when the Army provides the majority of land forces. In this circumstance, the corps headquarters functions as an operational-level headquarters. The LCC employs land forces, supported by or supporting naval and air forces when necessary, to achieve military objectives in vital areas of the operational area. Land operations achieve the campaign objectives directly through its operations or indirectly with support from other joint force components. When designated as a LCC headquarters, the corps headquarters follows joint doctrine. (See JP 3-31.)

Note. Major land operations also normally involve multinational land forces. JP 3-31 identifies a land component command which includes multinational forces as a coalition forces land component command. However, the terminology used to designate the LCC headquarters in a specific situation will reflect political as well as military factors.

1-8. As the base of a LCC headquarters, the corps headquarters commands multiple Army divisions and exercises tactical control (TACON) over United States Marine Corps (USMC) forces made available for tasking by the CJTF. As the senior Army echelon within the JTF, the corps headquarters is the ARFOR headquarters with the additional responsibility of ADCON over all attached Army forces. As required by the CJTF, the corps headquarters receives a special operations liaison element, and supports special operations forces (SOF) throughout the land area of operations. (See JP 3-31 for a discussion on the organization of a LCC headquarters.) (See chapter 4 of FM 3-94 for additional information on the roles and primary tasks performed by a LCC headquarters.)

Note. The CJTF may place a small USMC element under the OPCON of the corps. However, the CJTF normally specifies a TACON relationship if the USMC element is organized as a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF).

1-9. The LCC of a JTF is seldom purely American in composition. An associated requirement of the corps headquarters controlling U.S. land forces is for the corps headquarters to also function as a multinational LCC headquarters for multinational units operating in its area of operations. In most cases, the corps exercises TACON over multinational brigades and divisions. However, in this case, the corps becomes a multinational joint force LCC, and the corps commander becomes a multinational force LCC commander.

1-10. Command of multinational forces is complicated and politically sensitive. National caveats often exist on the use of multinational forces. The higher grades, structured into the design of the corps headquarters, facilitate working with these national caveats. Commanders and staff operating as a joint headquarters should recognize that multinational brigades do not always have the ability to communicate digitally or in the same formats as U.S. systems, making their systems incompatible. This creates a layer of complexity to planning and execution. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0). The corps also trains in multinational exercises for theater engagement, and security force assistance managed by the appropriate Army Service component command (ASCC). (See JP 3-16 and FM 3-16.)

ARFOR IN CAMPAIGNS AND MAJOR OPERATIONS

1-11. An ARFOR is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command (FM 3-94). The corps headquarters is organized, trained, and equipped to serve as the ARFOR headquarters in campaigns and major operations controlling the operations of two to five Army divisions, together with supporting theater-level organizations across the conflict continuum. As the ARFOR for the CJTF, the corps serves as an operational-level headquarters, conducting land operations as the service component headquarters. Under these circumstances, the corps has one expeditionary sustainment command (ESC) and one medical brigade (support) in general support. Other theater-level assets are attached as required. The organization of the corps headquarters allows it to adapt to operational- or tactical-level roles, depending on the combatant commander’s requirements. Chapter 5 of this ATP expands the discussion of the roles and functions of the corps headquarters as an ARFOR. (See chapter 4 of FM 3-94.)

TACTICAL ECHELON IN LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

1-12. Major combat operations may require the corps headquarters to function as a tactical headquarters under a multinational force LCC or subordinate to a field army equivalent, such as the First Republic of Korea Army. This is the original purpose of the Army corps and the role performed by Army corps in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom I. For example, a corps can serves as a tactical land headquarters if war recurred on the Korean peninsula, or if a future crisis led to a general war. In this case, the corps would operate in a mature theater of war or theater of operations as a tactical headquarters under a joint or multinational LCC.

SECTION II – SUBORDINATE FORCES

1-13. There is no standard configuration for the corps echelon. The corps does not possess a set of corps troops other than those in its headquarters battalion. Rules of allocation have the corps supported by field artillery, and maneuver enhancement, and expeditionary military intelligence brigades. It receives augmenting forces that provide it with the capability to accomplish assigned missions. The corps commander exercises command, or OPCON or TACON over a mix of Service, multinational, and division headquarters, and brigades appropriate for its mission.

1-14. The corps routinely controls multinational forces in accordance with their individual national caveats. The organization of these units varies as will their support and sustainment capabilities. The corps commander should give particular attention to the national capabilities and limitations of each multinational partner. Some limitations are tactical, while others may be political. (Refer to FM 3-16 for additional information on national caveats.)

1-15. Depending on the situation, the corps receives capabilities from the Army Service component command assets to support its operations. (See figure 1-1 on page 1-4.) In addition to the divisional units, the corps headquarters may directly control BCTs and several different types of multifunctional and functional brigades. Other units provide direct or general support. (See chapter 5 of FM 3-94 for information on task organization of the corps.)

1-16. When tailored for major operations, the corps becomes a large organization. The corps commander uses the brigades directly under the corps command to reinforce subordinate divisions and to conduct shaping operations for subordinate units. These brigades also support the corps as a whole. The corps commands a smaller force when conducting limited contingency or crisis response operations.

DIVISIONS

1-17. Divisions are the Army’s primary tactical warfighting headquarters. They have no organic structure beyond the division headquarters, and headquarters battalion and division artillery. Divisions can control a combination of up to five armored, infantry, and Stryker BCTs in major combat operations. Divisions can control more BCTs in protracted operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks. In addition to its BCTs, each division controls a tailored array of multifunctional support brigades and functional brigades. Not all types of brigades are present in an operation. In some operations, divisions control multiple brigades of the same type. They can also control functional groups, battalions, or separate companies, which are often task- organized to a brigade. The important point is that division organizations vary for each operation. The division is the primary headquarters for tactical operations and the employment of brigades. (ATP 3-91 discusses the organization of a division.)

Figure 1-1. Army forces available to support a corps

FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE

1-18. Rules of allocation provide each corps headquarters a supporting field artillery brigade. That brigade is where Soldiers assigned to the corps fires cell are documented. The field artillery brigade’s primary task for a corps is conducting strike operations. The field artillery brigade is the primary executor of Army long- range, indirect fires within corps controlled areas. The field artillery brigade gives the corps or a designated supported commander the ability to plan, prepare, execute, and with proper augmentation, assess long-range, indirect fires. The field artillery brigade provides the following:

• Force field artillery headquarters, if so designated by the commander.

• Fires, counterfire, and weapon locating radar coverage in support of subordinate divisions.

• Fires, counterfire, and weapon locating radar coverage for the combat aviation, maneuver enhancement, and sustainment brigades.

• A headquarters to control the full complement of Army fires capabilities.

See FM 3-09 and ATP 3-09.24 for additional information on field artillery brigade operations.

EXPEDITIONARY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE

1-19. Each corps is supported by an expeditionary military intelligence brigade (E-MIB) to enhance its intelligence capabilities. The E-MIB conducts multidiscipline intelligence operations in support of corps operational requirements. It is designed to conduct intelligence operations in support of decisive action. An E-MIB provides the following capabilities:

• Counterintelligence (CI) collection and activities.

• Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection.

• Signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection.

• Production, exploitation, and dissemination (PED).

1-20. The E-MIB is the corps primary information collection asset for the three intelligence disciplines listed above.

1-21. The E-MIB can augment the corps intelligence cell to assisting in the PED of SIGINT, imagery, and full-motion video provided by higher echelon and national organizations. It can also be the corps military intelligence force provider for subordinate divisions and BCTs. Thus its component battalions and companies can be task organized in multiple ways to meet requirements.

1-22. The E-MIB is comprised of a headquarters and headquarters company and two military intelligence battalions. Each battalion is composed of a headquarters and headquarters detachment, a CI and HUMINT company, and a collection and exploitation company. An E-MIB’s assets can be allocated across the corps to augment existing capabilities or cover gaps, such as the lack of CI assets in subordinate BCTs.

MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE

1-23. Under current rules of allocation each corps headquarters is supported by a maneuver enhancement brigade. The maneuver enhancement brigade is a multifunctional headquarters designed to perform maneuver support operations for the echelon it supports. Its organizational design allows it to simultaneously perform military police (MP), engineer, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) missions in addition to the doctrinal responsibilities associated with owning an area of operations.

1-24. The exact task organization of this brigade depends on the corps identified mission requirements. The headquarters is staffed and optimized to conduct combined arms operations, integrating a wide range of maneuver support-related technical branches and combat forces. The maneuver enhancement brigade organizes, provides, or employs battalion task force and company team combined arms technical experts to conduct maneuver support tasks across all operational environments. The maneuver enhancement brigade can include a mix of CBRN, civil affairs, engineer, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), MP, and, potentially, air and missile defense units in addition to a tactical combat force.

1-25. The number and type of organizations placed under this brigade depends on the mission, threat, and number and type of battalions or companies operating in the brigade’s area of operations. The maneuver enhancement brigade provides staff planning for and control of the units required to conduct decisive action in the corps support area, as well as support area operations and maneuver support operations. When assigned or attached, the commander of this brigade is normally designated as the commander of the corps support area. The reserve component operations detachment, that provides staff augmentation to the corps headquarters, is assigned to a reserve component maneuver enhancement brigade when not mobilized. (See FM 3-81 for additional information on the maneuver enhancement brigade.)

OTHER SUPPORTING COMMANDS AND FORCES

1-26. The theater army provides forces and direct and general support to the corps. The corps normally receives general support from an ESC and a medical brigade (support) when assigned the mission of being a LCC and ARFOR headquarters. Other theater commands and brigades provide general support in addition to any units attached to the corps.

1-27. Army corps receive a mix of division and other headquarters, BCTs, multifunctional brigades, and functional support brigades as well as specialized units under the Army’s rules of allocation. A corps commander normally task-organizes subordinate divisions with a mix of BCTs and multifunctional support brigades. Specialized functional units, such as a civil affairs brigade, may be attached to the corps and the corps commander may task-organize the brigade’s subordinate battalions to support one or more of the corps subordinate divisions. Chapter 4 of FM 3-94 discusses the various types of modular brigades available in the Army’s force structure.

1-28. The corps commander subordinates available multifunctional and functional support brigades (except for sustainment brigades) to a division headquarters. However, any of the brigades, with the exception of sustainment brigades, may be attached to a corps or theater-level command. The corps commander can establish a supporting relationship with or make them TACON to a component commander (for example, air defense artillery brigades to the joint force air component commander [JFACC]), to another service headquarters (for example, a Marine expeditionary force), or to a multinational headquarters. The corps commander, as the ARFOR commander, retains ADCON over all Army forces in the joint operations area to include multifunctional and functional support brigades operating under the control of a joint force, other component, or a multinational force commander.

SECTION III – INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE CORPS HEADQUARTERS

1-29. The corps commanding general (CG) has the flexibility to organize the five components of the corps Army mission command system—personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment—in the way that best supports the CG’s ability to make decisions and facilitate communication within the corps headquarters, as well as with higher, subordinate, adjacent, and supporting commanders. This includes maintaining communications with other Services, other governmental agencies, host-nation agencies (if present), and international organizations as applicable.

1-30. The composition of the corps headquarters allows the corps commander and chief of staff great flexibility to structure the organization according to the demands of the situation. It is organized around one main command post and one tactical command post. A command post is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities (FM 6-0). The corps main command post has three integrating and five functional cells, while the tactical command post forms a single integrating cell with functional components. Figure 1-2 depicts the corps headquarters organization and the organization of the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion. The corps headquarters is in the process of transforming into a multicomponent organization with a scheduled completion date of late FY17.

1-31. The corps can field an early entry command post (EECP). The EECP is formed around the corps tactical command post with augmentation from the main command post, as required. The corps commander determines who leads the early-entry command post, depending upon command and coordination requirements immediately upon arrival. One technique is to assign this task to the corps operations officer. The EECP can control the operations of subordinate corps units until the remaining portions of the headquarters complete the deployment process. It controls the conduct of some corps operations, especially reception, staging, and onward movement and defensive actions within the corps initial lodgment.

1-32. The corps main and tactical command posts normally operate in separate areas. The corps staff and headquarters and headquarters battalion staff develop plans for their security, sustainment, and communications. The commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, and the assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) and assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6) should consider factors related to transportation, endurance, security, communications, and the exercise of mission command.

1-33. Movement of the various corps command posts is a function of transportation means and capacity. The main command post, while deployable, has only a limited number of organic vehicles and requires considerable external transportation support to move. Once deployed, the main command post requires time to set up facilities, establish network communications, and correct connectivity problems. In contrast, the tactical command post is 100% mobile in its organic vehicles.

1-34. The corps headquarters and headquarters battalion provides life and network support to the corps headquarters. The corps tasks its subordinate units to provide security assets for each command post. Alternatively, multinational, host-nation, or contracted assets provide security. Regardless of its source, the corps headquarters security elements come under control of the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion commander. Staff sections and the headquarters and headquarters battalion are notified when there is a significant change to the composition or deployment of headquarters elements.

COMMAND GROUP

1-35. Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment (JP 1). Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources, and employing, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces to accomplish assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. The current Department of the Army-approved headquarters design of the corps identifies four general officer positions: the CG, deputy commanding general (DCG), chief of staff, and G-3. Paragraphs 1-35 through 1-42 discuss the duties of the two general officers with command responsibility, the CG and DCG. (See FM 6-0 for more information on the duties of the corps staff.)

Figure 1-2. Corps headquarters organization

COMMANDING GENERAL

1-36. A lieutenant general commands the corps. This CG has responsibility for the corps headquarters and the units and organizations having a command or support relationship with the corps assigned by a higher headquarters. The commander also oversees the control functions performed by the staff. Corps commanders position themselves where they can best exercise mission command over their corps.

1-37. The corps CG’s vehicle is equipped with systems that permits the CG to exercise mission command on the move. Additional corps staff accompanying the CG depends on the commander’s desires and the situation. The CG’s vehicle is accompanied by additional vehicles transporting situationally appropriate additional corps staff officers, communications equipment, and security assets. If the CG requires aerial transportation, then the corps aviation officer requests aviation assets from the theater aviation command or brigade, or tasks (through the G-3) aviation assets from a combat aviation brigade assigned to the corps.

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL

1-38. The DCG, normally a U.S. major general, serves as the CG’s primary assistant and second in command of the corps. The DCG has specific duties described in the corps standard operating procedures (SOPs) or directed by the commander. The DCG does not have a staff but controls certain staff elements based on responsibilities the CG assigns. The DCG can request staff assistance at any time.

1-39. The DCG interacts with the chief of staff and staff principal advisors based on duties the CG assigns. The DCG maintains situational understanding to assume command at any time. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking (ADP 5-0). Because of this requirement, the DCG remains at the main command post. The DCG has three general responsibilities:

• Temporarily assume the CG’s duties.

• Serve as the CG’s successor.

• Assume certain delegated authorities.

Temporarily Assume the Commanding General’s Duties

1-40. The DCG temporarily assumes command and makes decisions based on the mission and the commander’s intent when needed. The DCG assumes the CG’s duties temporarily on a routine basis during continuous operations for reasons of rest and health. A corps commander frequently leaves the main command post to meet with military and civilian superiors, government officials, and multinational partners. These meetings can take place outside the corps area of operations, making it difficult for the CG to maintain situational understanding of the corps current operations; therefore, the DCG assumes command during these events.

Serve as the Commanding General’s Successor

1-41. The corps commander may be relieved, killed, wounded, or incapacitated in some way. In these situations, the DCG assumes command as specified in the SOPs or the current order.

Assume Certain Delegated Authorities

1-42. The corps commander delegates authority to the DCG for tasks or areas to include—

• Provide control of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) activities.

• Coordinate directly with a host-nation partner.

• Provide command of multinational forces under corps control.

• Provide overall direction of sustainment activities.

• Conduct a shaping operation, such as a vertical envelopment or an amphibious operation.

• Conduct a decisive operation separated in time and space from the bulk of the corps assets.

• Serve as the chairman of any joint targeting or coordination boards established by the headquarters, if corps serves as a base for a JTF headquarters.

• Supervise troops provided by the theater army that are not subordinated to a division.

1-43. Under certain conditions, the corps commander appoints a deputy commander from another Service or nation to demonstrate solidarity or to gain expertise in an area required for the operation. Such circumstances include when the corps serves as the base for a JTF, LCC, or a multinational force. For example, a USMC general officer may serve as the DCG for a corps engaging in amphibious operations.

CORPS COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

1-44. The corps commander establishes terms of reference that outline the role and functions of the corps command sergeant major. The corps command sergeant major is the senior noncommissioned officer within the corps. That individual is normally responsible for carrying out the corps commander’s policies and enforcing corps standards for the performance of individual Soldier training and the conduct of enlisted Soldiers. The corps command sergeant major gives advice and initiates recommendations to the corps commander and staff in matters pertaining to enlisted Soldiers. The commander employs the command sergeant major throughout the corps’ area of operations to extend command influence, assess morale of the force, and assist during critical events.

THE CORPS STAFF

1-45. Staffs assist commanders in planning, coordinating, and supervising operations. A staff section is a grouping of staff members by area of expertise under a coordinating, special, or personal staff officer (FM 6-0). Not all staff sections reside in one of the functional or integrating command post cells. These staff sections maintain their distinct organizations. They operate in different command post cells as required and coordinate their activities in meetings to include working groups and boards established by the unit’s battle rhythm. The staff consists of the chief of staff, coordinating staff, special staff, personal staff, staff augmentation, and command liaison, functional liaison, and others as required.

CHIEF OF STAFF

1-46. The corps CG delegates supervisory authority of the corps staff to the chief of staff. As the key staff integrator, the chief of staff frees the corps CG from routine details of staff operations and the management of the headquarters. The chief of staff is responsible for the conduct of efficient and prompt staff actions within the corps headquarters. The corps chief of staff is assisted in managing the corps headquarters by the secretary of the general staff and the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion commander acting as headquarters commandant.

1-47. All corps principal staff officers—coordinating, special, and personal—are supervised in the conduct of their staff functions by the chief of staff. The chief of staff directs, supervises, and trains the staff. The chief of staff also serves as one of the CG’s principal advisors. An effective working relationship helps the chief of staff and the CG transmit and share information and insights. The chief of staff normally remains at the main command post. (See paragraph 2-32 of FM 6-0 for a list of the chief of staff’s responsibilities but special emphasis should be placed on the supervision of staff training and integration programs.)

COORDINATING STAFF

1-48. Corps coordinating staff officers are assistant chiefs of staff. (The duties and responsibilities of the corps primary coordinating staff officers—assistant chiefs of staff, personnel [G-1], intelligence [G-2], operations, [G-3], logistics [G-4], plans [G-5], signal [G-6], financial management [G-8], and civil affairs [G-9] are discussed in FM 6-0.) According to paragraph 2-37 of FM 6-0, the corps chief of fires, chief of protection, and chief of sustainment are also coordinating staff officers. The corps G-4 is dual-hatted as the chief of sustainment and is responsible for coordinating the efforts of the G-1, G-8, and surgeon sections. They report to the chief of staff and have functional responsibilities in addition to their roles in the functional and integrating cells in the main and tactical command posts.

1-49. Coordinating staff officers advise, plan, and coordinate actions in their areas of expertise. They also exercise planning and supervisory authority over designated special staff officers, as described in FM 6-0. (See paragraphs 2-36 through 2-72 of FM 6-0 for a discussion on coordinating staff officers.) The corps staff principals are responsible for integrating individual and small team staff augmentees into the corps’ existing staff structure to form the exact staff structure needed to support the corps mission.

SPECIAL STAFF

1-50. Special staff officers help commanders and other staff members perform their responsibilities. The number of special staff officers and their duties vary. Special staff sections are organized according to professional or technical responsibilities. The commander delegates planning and supervisory authority over each special staff function to a coordinating staff officer.

1-51. Although special staff sections are not always integral to a coordinating staff section, they usually share areas of common interest and habitual association. Special staff officers routinely work with more than one coordinating staff officer. (See paragraphs 2-73 through 2-104 of FM 6-0 for a discussion on special staff officers.) The members of the special staff can change depending on the capabilities available to the corps commander and on the situation. Table 1-1 on page 1-10 identifies the most common personal and special staff officers.

PERSONAL STAFF

1-52. The personal staff sections advise the commander, provide input to orders and plans, and interface and coordinate with entities external to the corps headquarters. They perform special assignments as directed by the commander. Army regulations and public law establish special relationships between certain staff officers and the commander. For example, AR 20-1, AR 27-1, AR 165-1, and AR 360-1 require the inspector general, staff judge advocate, chaplain, and public affairs officer to serve as members of the commander’s personal staff. Additionally, the command sergeant major and aides are part of the commander’s personal staff. (See paragraphs 2-105 through 2-114 of FM 6-0 for a discussion on these officers.)

Table 1-1. Personal and special staff officers

Personal Staff | Special Staff

• Chaplain*_

• Inspector general

• Political advisor

• Public affairs officer

• Safety officer

• Surgeon

• Staff judge advocate*

*Both a personal and special staff member

• Air and missile defense officer

• Aviation officer

• Air mobility liaison officer

• Air liaison officer

• CBRN officer

• Cyber electromagnetic activities officer

• Engineer officer

• Historian

• Information operations officer

• Knowledge management officer

• Operations research/systems analysis officer

• Provost marshal

• Red team officer

• Secretary of the general staff

• Space operations officer

• Staff weather officer

• Transportation officer

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

STAFF AUGMENTATION

1-53. Depending on the situation, teams and detachments with special expertise are used to augment the corps headquarters. Available capabilities include civil affairs operations, space support, combat camera, operational law, detention, history, public health, and safety.

COMMAND AND FUNCTIONAL LIAISON OFFICERS

1-54. Command and functional liaison officer teams vary in size and overall staffing depending on the situation. The corps and higher, lower, and subordinate headquarters exchange command liaison teams. Host- nation, joint, multinational, and nonmilitary entities may also exchange command liaison officers, such as the JFACC’s Joint Air Component Coordination Element (JACCE). Functional liaison teams work with organizations that provide services to the corps such as intelligence, signal, and sustainment. The corps headquarters selects, trains, and equips liaison teams from the corps staff. The corps headquarters receives, houses, provides life support, and trains liaison teams from outside the corps headquarters. (Chapter 13 of FM 6-0 discusses the role and responsibilities of liaison officers. It also discusses liaison considerations when the corps conducts joint, interagency, and multinational operations.)

COMMAND POST CELLS AND OTHER COMMAND POST ORGANIZATIONS

1-55. A mission command system is the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations (ADP 6-0). The primary facilities of any echelon mission command system are its command posts. Organizing the staff into command posts expands the commander’s ability to exercise mission command and makes the echelon mission command system more survivable. Organizing the command posts into functional cells and integrating cells facilitates cross-functional coordination, synchronization, and information sharing.

1-56. A command post cell is a grouping of personnel and equipment by warfighting function or planning horizon to facilitate the exercise of mission command (FM 6-0). A command post includes two types of cells: functional and integrating. Functional cells group personnel and equipment by warfighting function. (See ADRP 3-0 for a discussion on the warfighting functions.) Integrating cells group personnel and equipment to integrate functional cell activities. Integrating cells focus on different planning horizons. All staff sections and command post cells—coordinating, functional, integrating, special, and personal—integrate information and activities for mission accomplishment.

1-57. The corps headquarters design modifies the organization of the corps headquarters around the traditional special or coordinating staffs. Members of the coordinating staff serve in the functional and integrating cells. Staff members always serve in their coordinating staff section; however, during operations, staff members can serve simultaneously in a functional cell and in an integrating cell.

1-58. Within a command post, commanders organize their corps headquarters staff into five functional cells, three integrating cells, and other groupings as needed. Some corps staff members are permanently assigned to one command post cell or element for the mission. However, other staff members move between command post cells. The need for a staff officer to serve on another command post is based on the staff officer’s skill set and ability to contribute to the corps mission. This especially applies to high-value, low-density members of the corps headquarters such as chaplains, the political-military advisor, and interpreters or translators.

FUNCTIONAL CELLS

1-59. The corps headquarters is divided into five functional cells that assist the commander in controlling operations by warfighting functions. The title of each functional cell describes the cell: movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. Members of each cell specialize in activities related to that function.

1-60. Not all functional cells provide permanent representatives to all three of the corps integrating cells. They provide representation as required. The role of staff principal advisor requires focus and discipline to maintain a suitable span of control.

1-61. Personal staff officers, and some coordinating and special staff officers, do not reside in a command post functional cell. They maintain separate identities to address their areas of expertise. Nonetheless, these staff officers and their sections interact continuously with other staff sections. Officers in the knowledge management (KM) element and the G-6 staff sections maintain their distinct organization and operate in other command post cells as required. They coordinate activities in meetings (including boards and working groups), which are identified in the unit’s battle rhythm. (FM 6-0 discusses battle rhythm. Chapter 2 of FM 6-0 provides an abbreviated discussion of a corps battle rhythm).

INTEGRATING CELLS

1-62. The corps headquarters has three integrating cells: current operations, future operations, and plans. Integrating involves coordinating or unifying activities across functions. Integrating cells group Soldiers and equipment to integrate the warfighting functions by planning horizon. A planning horizon is a point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events (ADRP 5-0).

1-63. Individual members of personal and special staff sections not assigned to functional cells support the integrating cells as needed. These staff section members represent their sections in addition to supporting the integrating cells.

1-64. During operations, the lines dividing current operations, future operations, and plans cells often overlap. All members of the corps headquarters participate in planning, regardless of position or title. The flexibility required in today’s operations causes the plans, future operations, and current operations integration cells (COICs) to work in different planning horizons of the same operation. Integration also occurs in the command post functional cells that work internally and among other cells to solve problems presented during operations.

CURRENT OPERATIONS INTEGRATION CELL

1-65. The Current Operations Integration Cell (COIC) oversees day-to-day operations. It facilitates operations, to include maintaining status and conducting update briefings. The COIC is a vital part of the corps main headquarters. Paragraphs 1-108 to 1-120 discuss the internal components of the COIC.

FUTURE OPERATIONS CELL

1-66. The future operations cell performs mid-range planning, including preparation of branches to the current operation. The cell tracks and processes relevant information to create an ongoing link between current operations and plans. This cell links the current operations integrating and plans cells and augments them, as required.

PLANS CELL

1-67. The plans cell performs long-range planning. It develops complete operation plans or operation orders and sequels that the staff formally passes on to the future operations or COIC, as required, for additional planning or execution.

MEETINGS, INCLUDING BOARDS, AND WORKING GROUPS

1-68. The corps commander and chief of staff establish meetings, including boards and working groups, to further integrate the staff and enhance planning and decisionmaking. (See FM 6-0 for definitions and discussions on the terms boards and working groups.) The CG uses boards and working groups, such as the targeting board and assessment working group, as the situation requires. (Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations [JP 3-0].) Boards and working groups are established, modified, and dissolved as the situation evolves. The chief of staff manages the timings of these events through the corps battle rhythm.

1-69. The chief of staff uses the battle rhythm to sequence activities within a headquarters and throughout the force to facilitate the commander’s exercise of mission command. Some meetings convene daily at a set time, while others meet on call to address occasional requirements. The corps commander identifies staff members to participate in the higher headquarters’ boards and working groups. (JP 3-31, JP 3-33, JP 3-60, and JP 4-0 discuss boards, and working groups used by JTF and LCC staffs respectively.)

1-70. The EECP is one temporary mission command facility that may see action depending on the situation: Subordinate forces form the center, a second type of facility, to exercise control of all or part of a function. Both of these facilities require the capability to communicate with joint, interagency, and multinational organizations.

EARLY-ENTRY COMMAND POST

1-71. Occasionally, the corps commander needs to establish a command post at a remote location ahead of the other corps headquarters elements. In this circumstance, the corps creates and deploys an EECP. The EECP can control corps operations for a limited time as the mission dictates. The corps EECP functions as the advance element of the corps headquarters until the tactical command post is fully deployed and operational. Generally the corps DCG leads the EECP.

1-72. The EECP is usually organized and tailored around a nucleus of the corps tactical command post. It draws equipment and personnel from the tactical command post, main command post, and other corps communications and security elements. The commander staffs the EECP with a mix of current operations personnel who are able to coordinate the reception of the corps and plan its initial operations. The corps SOPs designate the sources of personnel and equipment. Depending on the situation, the corps commander augments the EECP with capabilities such as language and regional expertise.

1-73. Ideally, manning and equipment should allow the EECP to deploy using minimal strategic airlift. The EECP should be 100 percent mobile and have an associated en route planning and rehearsal capability that can rapidly mount (less than 18 hours) on intertheater and intratheater aircraft used by the EECP to deploy. This capability involves network specialists, drivers, and selected personnel from the COIC. One or more aircraft and support personnel from a subordinate combat aviation brigade may augment the EECP, if airlift and support facilities are available. Security for the EECP comes from co-location, with a subordinate unit’s command post already deployed to the joint operations area. Alternatively, it may co-locate with another Army command post, joint command post, interagency or multinational organization, or host-nation command facility. If the environment is benign, the EECP may deploy to a host-nation military facility.

1-74. The EECP is the eyes and ears of the corps commander during the initial deployment of the corps. It normally does not exercise TACON over the entry operation. This is the responsibility of the joint force commander, or, if an ARFOR operation, the lead division commander. During deployments, the corps commander remains at home station with the main command post until the tactical command post closes and the EECP merges with the tactical command post. The corps commander delegate’s authority to the deputy commander to adjust the corps plan as needed based upon on-the-spot coordination with committed commanders. The EECP also coordinates with military and other government organizations based on the existing situation. If the theater army deploys its contingency command post, the corps EECP may move to that location to facilitate transition from the theater army to corps command of the operation.

CENTER

1-75. A center is a control facility established for a specific purpose. Centers are similar to command posts in that they are facilities with staff members, equipment, and a leadership component. However, centers have a narrower focus and are normally formed around a subordinate unit headquarters. For example, a civil affairs unit under corps control may establish a civil-military operations center or a transportation organization supporting the corps may establish movement control centers. It could also form the nucleus of a multinational coordination center during multinational operations.

SECTION IV – CORPS MAIN COMMAND POST

1-76. The main command post is the corps’ principal command post. It contains the majority of the corps staff and is designed to monitor corps operations, allocate available resources, conduct detailed analysis, and plan future operations. The supported geographic combatant commander’s or joint force commander’s directions and expectations, and in-theater mission command requirements of the corps commander, will drive the primary location and functions of the corps main command post. Emerging changes in the role and functions of the main command post may impact the corps headquarters future operations. This concept calls for the corps main command post to no longer routinely control current operations and primarily operate from a home station mission command center (HSMCC). However, as of FY 2016, no corps garrison location has HSMCC facilities that permits this this concept to be executed. Figure 1-3 on page 1-14 shows the internal organization of the main command post.

1-77. The primary components of the main command post are the command group, the headquarters and headquarters battalion, and the functional and integrating cells. The command group consists of the coordinating staff, personal staff, special staff, and command and functional liaison officers. (The command group also includes the SOF coordinating element, if one is provided.) These assets enable the commander to exercise mission command and show command presence away from a command post. The headquarters and headquarters battalion consists of the headquarters support company; a signal, intelligence, and sustainment company, and the corps long-range surveillance company. It also has a habitually aligned reserve component operations detachment that, on activation, provides the corps with additional staff. Under the general supervision of the corps chief of staff, the staff organizes into five functionally focused cells (intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment) and three integrating cells with broad responsibilities for coordinating these warfighting functions across the corps.

Figure 1-3. Main command post internal organization

1-78. The corps main command post may operate primarily from an HSMCC, especially when the corps’ assigned forces conduct crisis response, limited contingency operations, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations. This permits the CG to reduce the deployed footprint of corps headquarters to just the situationally-adjusted tactical command post, with the majority of staff tasks executed from the HSMCC. However, sometimes the main command post relocates from the HSMCC to an alternate deployed location, such as when the corps mission involves the conduct of major combat operations or if the missions performed by the corps are prolonged (greater than 90 days). Another situation is where political pressure dictates a move to another location. As previously stated, the deployment of the main command post is a deliberate decision made in conjunction with the combatant commander or CJTF depending on what role the headquarters is assigned. In all cases, the corps tactical command post controls ongoing operations until the main command post is fully functional in its new location.

1-79. Soldiers from the main command post deploy as necessary to the corps tactical command post to increase tactical command post capabilities and capacities, even if the whole corps main command post does not deploy. Therefore, Soldiers and Department of the Army (DA) civilians assigned to the main command post must meet all deployment requirements so they are prepared to deploy to support mission requirements.

1-80. Once deployed, the corps main command post normally does not displace during operations. Ideally, the location is on a forward operating base near subordinate division command posts and the supporting commands. When possible, the main command post is located near a fixed-wing capable airstrip. Paragraphs 2-19 to 2-24 discuss command post placement.

1-81. The size and importance of the main command post can create security challenges once it’s deployed. Protection for a deployed main command post emphasizes both active and passive measures, including security, air and missile defense, access control, dispersion, and hardening of occupied facilities.

1-82. The main command post has representation from all warfighting functions and staff elements, and has the capacity to perform all tasks. It has the capability to provide a real-time or near real-time common operational picture of the mission via networked communications. A common operational picture is a single display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on common data and information share by more than one command (ADRP 6-0.) This understanding of ongoing operations facilitates the main command post’s ability to support the corps’ forward operations through all campaign plan phases. It processes and integrates information from the corps area of operations and area of interest and other sources of information as necessary to support the corps’ mission.

1-83. The corps main command post focuses on long-term (deliberate) planning and analysis for operations as well as execution of coordination and synchronization of non-combat functions. Deliberate planning and analysis includes planning for new operational phases or transitions (sequels) and the production of all supporting plans and products. This planning includes conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield and preparing supporting intelligence products. These efforts can result in a new operations plan or order, prepared in the main command post. Because of this the corps assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5) and the majority of the corps G-2 staff sections remain in the main command post during operations. Although these functions occur primarily in the main command post, the tactical command post is consulted and participates in planning groups and work groups.

1-84. In the near future, corps headquarters will have a habitual relationship with a reserve component operations company. This reserve component operations company is comprised of personnel in billets, identified as necessary to increase capacity of the main command post for simultaneous execution of missions, extended operations, or to backfill main command post personnel deployed forward to augment the tactical command post. These reserve component personnel also deploy forward as required to support operations. The habitual relationship between these entities allows training to occur between the active and reserve components in order to ensure maximum training, readiness, and integration.

COORDINATING, SPECIAL, AND PERSONAL STAFF OFFICERS

1-85. As currently designed, the coordinating, special, and personal staff officers of the corps headquarters operate in several environments simultaneously, each with slightly different responsibilities. Staffing for the tactical command post mirrors that of the main command post with the exception of grade structure. The tactical command post focuses on the conduct of current operations.

1-86. The commander and staff receive support from the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion through its subordinate companies and its battalion staff. The companies and staff provide administrative, logistic, life, and transportation support for all organic elements of the corps headquarters in the garrison and when deployed. With teams identified for the main and tactical command posts, the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion supplies unit-level control, communications, transportation, medical, food service, and maintenance support for the mission command nodes.

1-87. In accordance with FM 6-0, the corps main command post has two coordinating staff sections that are not assigned to functional cells. These staff sections are the G-6 and G-9. The following discussion assumes that the future corps reserve component operations detachment exists and its Soldiers are integrated into the corps staff.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, SIGNAL STAFF SECTION

1-88. The corps G-6 oversees all corps communications systems. The G-6—

• Advises the CG, staff, and subordinate commanders on communication and information networks.

• Directs development of network requirements and estimates.

• Oversees network planning.

• Establishes procedures for developing the common operational picture (COP) in coordination with the G-3 and chief of the KM section.

• Oversees the management of corps internal networks.

• Coordinates external network support to the corps.

• Plans, manages, and executes electromagnetic spectrum operations.

1-89. The G-6 staff section contains the following elements:

• Signal System Integration Oversight Element.

• Network Management Element.

• Information Assurance Element.

• Communications Security Element.

• Computer Network Defense Element.

• Tactical Messaging Service Element.

• Systems Support Element.

Signal System Integration Oversight Element

1-90. The signal system integration oversight element involves the following responsibilities:

• Providing technical staff support to Army and joint units allocated to the corps.

• Overseeing network certification and integration.

• Monitoring the state of network modernization, readiness, maintenance, and sustainment.

• Overseeing contractor support of the corps network.

• Coordinating commercialization of corps communication and information technology capabilities.

• Supervising the installation of corps main and tactical command posts wire and cable networks.

Network Management Element

1-91. The network management element involves the following responsibilities:

• Managing the corps network, from applications residing on corps platforms through the points at which the corps network connects to the Department of Defense information network (DODIN).

• Maintaining network connectivity to all corps forces, including deployed units, units en route to the theater of operations, and units at home station.

• Monitoring network performance and quality of service, including interoperability of the corps network with external networks not controlled by the corps.

• Managing frequency assignments for the corps.

• Deconflicting electromagnetic spectrum for all corps emitters.

• Supervising delivery of defense message system services to the main and tactical command posts.

• Coordinating with the KM section to develop and align tactical network enforceable information dissemination management policies and services.

Corps Signal Plans Element

1-92. The corps signal plans element monitors and reports the status of the corps information network. The corps signal plans element is responsible for planning and coordinating future network connectivity. It prepares Annex K of the corps operations order, and prepares, maintains, and updates information management (IM) estimates and also manages the frequency spectrum in the development of network plans.

Information Assurance Element

1-93. The information assurance element ensures the availability, integrity, reliability, authentication, and nonrepudiation of information. It has the following responsibilities:

• Coordinates mission command information systems interface with joint and multinational forces.

• Coordinates mission command information systems interface with non-military elements as necessary when such interface is properly authorized.

• Develops, promulgates, and monitors the implementation of corps cybersecurity policies.

• Oversees performance of communications security functions.

Note. DODI 8500.01 directs the use of the term cybersecurity in place of the term information assurance within Department of Defense (DOD) publications. It will take some time for this change to be documented on the table of organization and equipment (TO&E) for the corps headquarters so the terminology change was instituted in this discussion of the corps headquarters.

Communications Security Element

1-94. The communications security element provides communications security support and facilitates communications security planning for corps forces. Associated responsibilities include the following:

• Receive, transfer, account, safeguard and destroy communications security materials.

• Provide training and instructions to communications security hand receipt holders and users in the proper handling, control, storage, and disposition of communications security materials.

• Perform communications security key compromise recovery and reporting of communications security incidents.

Computer Network Defense Element

1-95. The computer network defense element—

• Establishes network defense policies (such as, accreditation, cybersecurity vulnerability assessment compliance, and access control).

• Provides staff oversight of the network defense policy implementation by corps forces.

• Ensures establishment and maintenance of security boundaries for network operations under corps control with joint, interorganizational, and multinational partner organizations.

• Manages corps headquarters intrusion detection systems.

Tactical Messaging Service Element

1-96. The tactical messaging service element provides tactical defense message system services to the main and tactical command posts. Services include access to the defense message switch global address directory and the capability to send and receive signed and encrypted record message traffic.

Systems Support Element

1-97. Signal system support teams perform the following responsibilities—

• Coordinate and supervise construction, installation, and recovery of cable and wire communications systems and auxiliary equipment within main and tactical command posts.

• Install and operate the corps information technology help desk.

• Provide voice, video teleconference, e-mail, to include Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), and other communication networks—assistance, and other help desk functions.

• Assist Army and joint forces under corps control with network installation and troubleshooting as directed by the corps G-6.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, CIVIL AFFAIR OPERATIONS

1-98. The G-9 is the principal advisor to the commander and staff on civil affairs operations and leads the staff in planning and coordinating civil-military operations (CMO). Staff planners should incorporate CMO into the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. The G-9 section can be augmented with a civil affairs planning team from a regionally aligned civil affairs command in order to integrate and synchronize CMO coordination and planning in conjunction with unified action partners. Additionally, the corps can be supported by a regionally aligned civil affairs brigade in order to establish a corps level civil-military operations center, support a joint interagency task force, or enhance the corps commanders’ ability to establish temporary military government.

1-99. The corps G-9 staff section performs the following responsibilities:

• Advises the corps commander on allocating and using civil affairs units under corps control.

• Develops the civil affairs operations annex (Annex K) to corps plans.

• Recommends civil affairs operations augmentation, including appropriate functional specialists.

• Reviews higher headquarters’ plans.

• Informs the corps main command post staff on the civil affairs operations capabilities and units.

• Supports information collection activities of the corps as they apply to civil information.

• Shares enemy information and possible indicators and warnings collected through passive observation by the G-9 staff and supporting civil affairs operations units.

• Coordinates with the fires cell for lethal and nonlethal target development, measures of effectiveness, and synchronization of nonlethal activities with lethal fires, ensuring that civilian property, public buildings, and infrastructure are protected to the maximum extent possible.

• Synchronizes corps civil affairs operations with higher headquarters’ civil affairs efforts.

• Establishes a civil-military operations center or coordinates with an existing center to perform collaborative planning and coordination with interagency, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and host-nation organizations.

• Analyzes how civilians impact military operations and how military operations impact civilians.

• Provides civil affairs analysis to meetings (including boards and working groups).

• Chairs the civil affairs operations working group, if formed.

• Supports the integrating cells.

A civil affairs planning team from the corps supporting civil affairs brigade will typically augment this staff section. (FM 3-57 explains how the corps G-9 staff section performs these responsibilities.)

MAIN COMMAND POST FUNCTIONAL CELLS

1-100. The main command post’s five functional cells coordinate and synchronize forces and activities by warfighting function. The five functional cells assign personnel in the movement and maneuver COIC to synchronize staff functions daily. These personnel are depicted in the COIC in figure 1-3 and discussed below under their respective functional discussions. These COIC support elements, from the five functional cells, are an important part of the main command post. Some COIC support members come from personal and special staff sections. These functional cells within a corps command post are—

• Intelligence.

• Movement and maneuver.

• Fires.

• Protection.

• Sustainment.

1-101. The physical arrangement of the integrating and functional cells and personal staff sections within the main command post facilitate work and security, smooth traffic flow, and take advantage of available cover and concealment. Once deployed, the corps uses available buildings, such as warehouses, schools, and office buildings, instead of standard field shelters, to increase the amount of protection from the elements and enemy action afforded to the command post’s personnel and information systems.

INTELLIGENCE CELL

1-102. The intelligence functional cell analyzes, organizes, and presents information related to the enemy and other threats, terrain and weather, civil considerations, and the status of supporting collection assets. The intelligence cell in the main command post includes the G-2, intelligence operations section, counterintelligence and human intelligence staff officer for general staff (G-2X) section, and G-2 analysis and control element.

1-103. To support corps operations, the main command post intelligence cell—

• Receives, processes, and analyzes information from all sources and disseminates intelligence.

• Provides relevant intelligence to support current and future operations activities.

• Synchronizes and integrates information collection operations.

• Participates in the targeting process.

• Conducts intelligence collection management.

• Plans, monitors, and analyzes human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence activities.

Intelligence Operations Section

1-104. The intelligence operations section assists in coordinating intelligence support to the main and tactical command posts, higher headquarters, and subordinate units. It does this by managing the input to the COP through the COIC. The intelligence operations section comprises the special security office, communications integration element, and the linguist coordination element.

G-2 Analysis Control Element

1-105. The G-2 analysis and control element is the G-2’s principal organization for KM, IM, intelligence analysis, planning requirements and assessing collection, and intelligence production. It is an all-source intelligence organization. The G-2 analysis and control element has organic analysis, management, and information technology capabilities. It includes the fusion element, target development element, collection management element, geospatial intelligence (known as GEOINT) cell, signals intelligence (SIGINT) analysis element, and staff weather office. Target development is the systematic examination of potential target systems—and their components, individual targets, and even elements of targets—to determine the necessary type and duration of the action that must be exerted on each target to create an effect that is consistent with the commander’s specific objectives (JP 3-60).

G-2X Section

1-106. The G-2X section provides technical authority, which includes operational oversight and mission coordination, to all counterintelligence and HUMINT teams assigned or attached to corps or divisions and subordinate units. The corps or division G-2X coordinates and deconflicts counterintelligence and HUMINT operations with subordinate, adjacent, and higher G-2Xs and brigade counterintelligence and HUMINT staff officers (known as S-2Xs). The G-2X functions as the requirements manager for corps counterintelligence and HUMINT teams because of the complexity, sensitivity, and legal implications of these activities. The G- 2X section includes the operations support cell, HUMINT operations cell, counterintelligence (known as CI) coordination authority, and when established, a HUMINT analysis cell.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER CELL

1-107. The movement and maneuver staff functional cell is organized further into three integrating cells: current operations, future operations, and plans. (See figure 1-3 on page 1-14.) The integrating cells include subject matter experts from across the entire staff. The movement and maneuver cell includes several specialized elements, such as airspace control. The G-3 is the chief of the movement and maneuver cell. This functional cell forms the base of the current operations, future operations, and plans integrating cells. The G- 3 exercises staff supervision over the integrating cells consistent with the guidance and oversight of the chief of staff. (ADRP 5-0 establishes the doctrine for integrating cells.)

1-108. The main command post movement and maneuver cell has the following responsibilities:

• Oversees RSOI operations.

• Conducts force positioning and maneuver.

• Prepares orders and plans, including branches and sequels.

• Monitors current operations, maintains ongoing operations, and communicates status information throughout the command.

• Integrates airspace control activities with planning and operations.

• Coordinates and synchronizes aviation operations.

• Coordinates and synchronizes space support.

• Provides terrain visualization and terrain products.

• Coordinates combat engineering, general engineering, and geospatial engineering.

• Provides liaison to and from subordinate, lateral, and higher headquarters.

Current Operations Integration Cell

1-109. The COIC is the hub of the main command post. The COIC monitors the corps’ day-to-day activities. (See paragraphs 1-109 through 1-120 for more information about the functions of the various elements within this integrating cell. Paragraphs 1-165 to 1-167 describe the operations of this cell as an integrating cell.)

Current Operations Integration Cell Support Element

1-110. The COIC support element is a movement and maneuver element that forms the core of the COIC. The chief of operations, a colonel, has responsibility for synchronizing all the COIC support element. Important functions of the COIC include conducting the tactical operations for the main command post, decisionmaking for the main command post, and conducting command post operations.

Aviation Current Operations Integration Cell Support

1-111. This section supports the coordination and synchronization of operational and tactical aviation maneuver support for the corps within the COIC. It works closely with subordinate combat aviation brigades.

Engineer Current Operations Integration Cell Support

1-112. The engineer COIC is a section within the COIC that supports the functions of all engineers assigned and attached to the corps for operations. This function requires it to coordinate with the corps aligned maneuver enhancement brigade and any assigned engineer brigades.

Airspace Control Current Operations Integration Cell Support

1-113. The airspace control COIC section supports the airspace management and deconfliction of airspace users for the corps. This section works with the Air Force, combat aviation brigade, and air defense units.

Airspace Control Section

1-114. The corps headquarters oversees airspace control policy and standardization of tactics, techniques, and procedures throughout the corps area of operations. As the airspace functional lead for the corps staff, the airspace control section develops SOPs and Appendix 10 (Airspace Control) to Annex C that help standardize airspace control operations among subordinate units. These procedures ensure consistency with joint airspace procedures, the theater airspace control plan (ACP), aeronautical information publications, and associated plans and orders. To support the corps mission, the airspace section—

• Provides airspace control expertise for the commander.

• Monitors joint airspace operations.

• Plans and updates input to the joint ACP.

• Integrates the airspace control architecture into the joint airspace control architecture.

• Develops the airspace control architecture to support plans.

• Drafts all airspace control input for operation orders, operation plans, annexes, and estimates.

• Plans and requests airspace coordinating measures (ACMs).

• Deconflicts airspace through the appropriate authority.

• Coordinates with the movement and maneuver (for aviation), intelligence (for information collection), and fires and protection (for air and missile defense) cells.

• Provides air traffic services expertise to the headquarters.

Aviation Section

1-115. The aviation section coordinates and synchronizes the execution of operational and tactical aviation maneuver and maneuver support and aviation maneuver sustainment operations. It also coordinates and synchronizes unmanned aerial reconnaissance, close combat attack, vertical envelopment, air assault, air medical evacuation, and transportation of key personnel.

Engineer Section

1-116. This section includes the corps engineer who advises the commander and staff on engineering and the use of engineering assets. The corps engineer coordinates engineer tasks related to combat, general, and geospatial engineering, facilitating the functions that assure mobility, enhance protection, enable expeditionary logistics, and enable capacity-building and protection activities. These later activities include—

• Base camp development planning.

• Construction requirements and standards associated with survivability efforts.

• Engineer capabilities available or needed to meet protection requirements.

• Environmental considerations.

1-117. The engineer section coordinates and synchronizes engineer operations within the corps and with other headquarters, between echelons, and with multinational forces, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations. (See FM 3-34 for information on engineer operations.)

Space Support Element

1-118. The corps is the principal integrator of space capabilities in support of land operations. The space support element is the commander’s primary space capabilities planner and advisor. It maintains space situational awareness and coordinates with higher headquarters space elements, the Army Space Coordination Element (known as an ASCE), the Space Coordinating Authority (known as the SCA) staff, and managers of space-based systems, including the director of space forces. The space support element serves as the corps primary coordinating element for space operations, special technical operations, and alternative or compensatory control measures. In addition to the coordination and mission responsibilities mentioned above, this element provides the following functions and capabilities:

• Provide space-based expertise, services, and training where applicable.

• Develop the space estimate.

• Recommend space-specific priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) to the G-2.

• Provide space input and develop the space portion of the military decision making process (MDMP) and mission planning assessment.

• Assist the G-6 with satellite communications capability protection.

• Integrate U.S. Strategic Command unique capabilities for missile warning, positioning, navigation, timing, environmental monitoring, and satellite communications capabilities into staff planning.

1-119. An Army space support team (known as an ARSST) can be tasked to augment this element if the corps is serving as a JTF or LCC headquarters. An ARSST provides additional capabilities, expertise, and products to assist with mission planning and situational awareness. (See chapter 7 of FM 3-14 for additional information on the capabilities of this element.)

1-120. Annex N is the primary tool for synchronization of space operations into the overall plan. It is used to describe how space operations support the concept of operations described in the base plan or order. The space operations officer develops Annex N which is used to coordinate early with the staff. Coordination includes the G-2, G-3, G-6, Deputy Fire Support Coordinator, and the special technical operations personnel to synchronize efforts and avoid duplication of information.

Special Operations Forces Section

1-121. The special operations command and control element oversees ongoing coordination between the corps and the senior SOF operating in the corps area of operations regardless of the role of the corps. A SOF liaison element also conducts special operations coordination. (See JP 3-05 and FM 3-05 for additional information on special operations.)

Information Operations

1-122. Information operations (IO) is the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decisionmaking of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13). The IO element augments the current operations integrating, future operations, and plans cells. It provides function expertise to various meetings (including boards and working groups). The IO special staff officer—

• Serves as the principal IO advisor to the corps CG and staff principal advisors.

• Advises on allocating and employing information related capabilities. An information-related capability is a tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable condition (JP 3-13).

• Integrates IO into corps operations.

• Ensures information operations related activities and products are accurate and synchronized with other corps operations and activities to include either writing or reviewing the following appendices to Annex C of corps operations orders:

◦ Appendix 12, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities.

◦ Appendix 13, Military Information Support Operations.

◦ Appendix 14, Military Deception.

◦ Appendix 15, Information Operations.

• Provides representation in the information collection operations section of the intelligence cell.

• Coordinates IO actions directly with adjacent and subordinate unit staffs.

• Chairs the corps IO working group.

• Participates in the targeting board and other boards and working groups, as required.

Engagement Section

1-123. Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the U.S. and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence (JP 3-0). A large number of activities and program foster military engagement. Some are formal programs authorized by law. Other military engagements are less formal and often in the form of planned Soldier and leader engagements and traditional commander activities.

1-124. The engagement section develops plans, programs, and policy for military engagement activities conducted by corps units. Because there are synergies between engagement activities and IO, continual coordination between the engagement section and other organizations such as foreign area officers and the IO officer and working group is essential to the effective functions of both. The corps engagement section contains a core of three elements: security cooperation, civil affairs, and military information support operations (MISO).

Security Cooperation Element

1-125. The corps security cooperation element synchronizes and integrates Army conventional forces security cooperation activities with joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners. It does this through planning using cross-functional working groups to support the theater campaign plan.

Civil Affairs Element

1-126. The civil affairs Soldiers assigned to this element provide functional expertise to intergovernmental and multinational partners. The civil affairs Soldiers assigned to this element work through the three integrating cells and support meetings (including boards, bureaus, cells, and working groups) as required.

Military Information Support Operations Element

1-127. The MISO element conducts and assesses MISO capabilities within the main command post. The tactical MISO battalion supporting the corps provides augmentation to this element. The MISO element leader advises the CG, coordinates with the IO special staff officer, and monitors the activities of the MISO battalion as it supports the operations of the corps. This element supports the G-3 with the synchronization of MISO in corps operations. It writes Appendix 13 (Military Information Support Operations) to Annex C (Operations) of corps operations orders.

Future Operations Integration Cell

1-128. The future operations integration cell is an important bridge between current operations and plans. Paragraphs 1-168 through 1-170 have more information about the future operations cell.

Plans Integration Cell

1-129. The plans integration cell conducts planning for the corps. Paragraphs 1-171 and 1-172 have more information about the plans cell.

FIRES CELL

1-130. The fires functional cell coordinates Army indirect fires, joint fires, cyber electromagnetic activities, and nonlethal effects through targeting. The cell implements the commander’s intent by destroying enemy warfighting capabilities, applying nonlethal actions, and degrading enemy command and control capabilities through cyber electromagnetic activities. The fires cell accomplishes these actions by developing, recommending, and briefing the scheme of fires, including both lethal fires and nonlethal capabilities to the commander (for example, electronic attack and computer network operations with the effects of other warfighting functions). The fires cell also performs artillery sensor management and provides input to intelligence collection. The fires cell assists the G-2 with target development, conducts targeting within the headquarters and provides representatives to the COIC. When the corps serves as the base organization for a JTF or LCC headquarters, the fires cell performs additional functions. (See JP 3-01, JP 3-03, JP 3-09, JP 3- 31, and JP 3-60.)

1-131. The fires cell works closely with the force field artillery headquarters, if one is established. The fires cell’s responsibilities are based on the situation and include coordination. The force field artillery headquarters provides the fires cell with OPCON of the corps FAB and other allocated field artillery units.

Corps Chief of Fires

1-132. The corps chief of fires is the senior field artillery officer within the corps staff. This officer advises the commander on the best use of available fire support resources, provides input to necessary orders, and develops and implements the fire support plan. The primary responsibilities of the chief of fires are listed in paragraph 2-71 of FM 6-0. The corps chief of fires plans and coordinates the fires warfighting function for the corps headquarters and leads the targeting working group in the absence of the corps FSCOORD (corps FAB commander), regardless of the role the corps is assigned. This officer works closely with the chief of staff, the G-2, the G-3, and the corps FSCOORD. Such cooperation ensures a clear understanding of all aspects of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of fire support and selected aspects of cyber electromagnetic activities for operations. The chief of fires assists the G-3 as needed to ensure plans flow smoothly during the transition to execution.

Fires Current Operations Integration Cell Support

1-133. The fires COIC support element provides personnel to support the COIC. It is responsible for the synchronization of fires in support of the corps operations.

Field Artillery Intelligence Officer

1-134. As a participant in corps and joint targeting processes, the field artillery intelligence officer coordinates with corps internal and external all-source intelligence elements. This officer assists in the development, validation, nomination, and prioritization of targets.

Air and Missile Defense Section

1-135. The air and missile defense section oversees the corps air and missile defense operations. It coordinates with air defense coordinators at the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), area air defense command, and Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC) to accomplish maintenance of airspace information and related intelligence systems, situational awareness and early warning, airspace control, and the conduct of air and missile defense aviation planning in support of the air defense artillery mission of protecting the force and selected geopolitical assets from aerial attack, missile attack, and surveillance. It coordinates these missions by—

• Coordinating air and missile defense activities with other command post cells, especially regarding airspace control and aviation operations.

• Disseminating weapons control status and the air tasking order (ATO).

• Coordinating with the area air defense commander (AADC) on all land-based and air and missile defense within the corps area of operations.

PROTECTION CELL

1-136. The protection cell contains elements concerned with preserving the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power. It coordinates, integrates, and monitors military and civilian, joint and multinational protection support for corps units and installations. Protection cell representatives provide input to the plans and the future operations cells, depending on the operational environment and commander preferences. Commanders tailor and augment this cell with functional expertise to form a protection working group.

1-137. The cell provides protection functional expertise and advises the commander in developing essential elements of friendly information and the corps’ critical asset list. The critical asset list provides vulnerability mitigation measures to reduce risks associated with different courses of action. That critical asset list incorporates subordinate division and brigade developed critical asset lists. Once approved by the corps commander, the corps critical asset list is forwarded to the appropriate joint force headquarters for consideration in developing the joint force critical asset and defended asset lists.

1-138. The protection functional cell coordinates with the G-6 concerning information protection tasks. The cell also coordinates with the surgeon concerning preventive medicine, and with the fires cell concerning integrated fires protection (formerly called counter-rocket, -artillery, and -mortar), including planning and coverage areas.

1-139. The protection cell has the following responsibilities:

• Monitor operational area security.

• Oversee the employment of safety techniques (including fratricide avoidance).

• Oversee the implementation of operations security.

• Coordinate with G-2 for intelligence support to protection.

• Oversee the implementation of physical security procedures.

• Coordinate the application of antiterrorism measures.

• Oversees law and order operations.

• Coordinate survivability operations.

• Coordinate force health protection.

• Coordinate chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear activities, including planning, information dissemination, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capabilities.

• Coordinate explosive ordnance disposal and protection support.

• Coordinate personnel recovery operations.

• Coordinate internment and resettlement.

Operations Security

1-140. The operations security section coordinates operations security activities within the corps headquarters and command posts. It also conducts vulnerability analysis, assesses the corps’ operations security risks, and monitors implementation of operations security control measures by corps forces.

1-141. The operations security section coordinates with the corps counterintelligence coordinating authority. Counterintelligence support to operations security entails identifying adversary and enemy intelligence; tactics, techniques, and procedures; collection methods; analysis, and exploitation capabilities that target our essential elements of friendly information; and developing countermeasures.

Provost Marshal Office

1-142. The provost marshal is the principal advisor to the CG on MP operations. This officer plans, analyzes, coordinates, and monitors MP operations within corps forces. MP operations include police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support. (See FM 3-39 for more information on provost marshal responsibilities and MP operations.)

Current Operations Integration Cell Support

1-143. The protection COIC support section provides personnel who work in the COIC to synchronize protection operations for the corps.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Section

1-144. The CBRN section—

• Advises the CG and staff on CBRN and EOD operations.

• Plans for and conducts operations to help prevent enemy CBRN actions before they occur.

• Plans and provides oversight for weapons of mass destruction (known as WMD) elimination operations (coordinates for disposal of WMD and their associated material and programs).

• Plans for site assessments operations, tracks site exploitation operations, and provides technical reachback support.

• Performs information superiority analysis (tracks key indicators).

• Conducts CBRN hazard predications.

• Report to higher using the CBRN warning and reporting system.

• Conducts CBRN and EOD response analysis.

• Provides CBRN passive defense, obscuration, and flame input to estimates, orders, and plans.

• Provides CBRN consequence management planning, support, and analysis.

• Plans support for joint operations.

• Provides support to Army organizations, as required.

• Identifies EOD requirements and recommends and implements EOD unique protection skills.

• Tracks, prioritizes, and reinforces support to counter unexploded explosive ordnance, improvised explosive devices, and WMD.

Personnel Recovery Section

1-145. The personnel recovery section serves as the focal point for all Army corps personnel recovery activities. Additionally, it coordinates corps personnel recovery operations activities with joint, multinational, and host-nation partners as required. (See JP 3-50 and FM 3-50.) Personnel recovery tasks include—

• Developing and maintaining the corps personnel recovery program, including procedures, planning, preparation, execution, and assessment.

• Coordinating personnel recovery issues with higher, lower, and adjacent organizations.

• Establishing a joint personnel recovery center, if directed.

Safety Element

1-146. Safety, although not a part of the corps TO&E, is an important augmentation to the corps staff. The safety officer is part of the commander’s personal staff. A safety element works within the protection cell to assist the commander and staff with integrating risk management for training and operations. (See paragraph 2-112 of FM 6-0 for the duties of the corps safety officer and safety element.) AR 385-10 addresses the conduct of the Army Safety Program. (See ATP 5-19 for a discussion on risk management.)

SUSTAINMENT CELL

1-147. The sustainment functional cell contains sections that monitor the sustainment status of the corps subordinate formations, plan and coordinate sustainment support and services to ensure the corps’ freedom of action, extend its operational reach, and prolong its endurance. Four staff sections contribute sections to the sustainment cell: G-1, G-4, G-8, and surgeon. The majority of sustainment personnel operate from the main command post. Sustainment personnel at the main command post respond to requirements communicated by their staff counter parts in the tactical command post where sustainment has limited representation. Examples of tasks best performed by the main command post include awards preparation, orders preparation, and sustainment coordination. The G-4 serves as both the chief of sustainment cell and the logistic section chief. Chapter 7 addresses corps sustainment as a special topic.

1-148. The sustainment functional cell performs the following tasks to support corps operations:

• Develop and implement human resources policies and procedures.

• Coordinate personnel support.

• Monitor the human resources situation and provide input to COP.

• Coordinate medical operations.

• Synchronize and integrate logistics operations to include maintenance, supply and services, transportation, general engineering, and mortuary affairs.

• Provide logistics input to the COP.

• Provide contract support integration.

• Coordinate resource and financial management operations.

• Synchronize and integrate Army health system operations.

Human Resources Section

1-149. The G-1 is the corps CG’s principal human resources advisor and the chief of the human resources section. The corps G-1/Adjutant General staff section is a multi-functional organization with a responsibility to ensure human resources support is properly planned, resourced, coordinated, monitored, synchronized, and executed for assigned or attached organizations. This section establishes human resources policies and ensures human resources support is properly planned, resourced, and executed for corps forces. In addition, this section has the responsibility to accomplish the following tasks—

• Strength reporting.

• Personnel readiness management.

• Personnel information management.

• Casualty operations.

• Essential personnel services.

• Family and morale, welfare, and recreation.

• Human resources planning and staff operations

FM 1-0 provides, defines and explains what is involved in accomplishing these tasks.

Human Resources Operations Section

1-150. The HR Operations section of the Corps G1/AG has a vast array of responsibilities to include, but not limited to: monitoring subordinate units for reconstitution or regeneration, develop casualty estimation and ensure casualty reporting is integrated in current operations tracking, produce annexes and commander’s estimates and coordinate HR support requirements with supporting ESC and sustainment brigades to say the least. (See FM 1-0 for a complete list of HR Operations Section responsibilities.)

Human Resources Current Operations Integration Cell Support

1-151. The G-1 COIC support element provides personnel who work in the COIC. These Soldiers synchronize corps human resources operations.

Human Resources Policy

1-152. Human resources policy responsibility involves developing, coordinating, and managing current, mid-range, and long-term human resources personnel policies for the corps. It also provides oversight for executing human resources activities for corps units. See FM 1-0 for complete list of the human resources policy responsibilities.

Casualty Operations

1-153. Casualty operations include collecting casualty information for preparing estimates, reporting casualties, and conducting notification and assistance programs. Casualty information is provided by casualty liaison teams, medical treatment facilities, mortuary affairs, and reports from corps forces. See FM 1-0 for complete list of Casualty Operations responsibilities.

Essential Personnel Services

1-154. This element establishes and monitors all essential personnel services policies, programs and procedures, process all actions, awards and decorations requiring the commanding general’s signature to include congressional inquiries, and monitors evaluations, promotions reductions and other essential personnel service programs.

Personnel Information Management

1-155. Personnel IM involves collecting, processing, storing, displaying, and disseminating human resources information about corps Soldiers, units, and civilians. Personnel IM monitors the human resources database to ensure proper task organization of all corps subordinate units. This section also maintains the human resources information system and advises subordinate elements on new and changing human resources automated system requirements. This section coordinates with the corps G-6 section as necessary to establish these automation links.

Personnel Readiness Management

1-156. Personnel readiness management involves analyzing personnel strength data to determine current combat capabilities, projecting future requirements, and assessing conditions of unit individual readiness. Personnel readiness management directly interrelates and depends on the functions of personnel accountability, strength reporting, and personnel IM. Strength reporting reflects the combat power of a unit using numerical data. See FM 1-0 for complete list of section responsibilities.

Logistics Section

1-157. The G-4 oversees the corps logistic elements. This section oversees—

• Logistic operations.

• Maintenance.

• Supply and services.

• Transportation.

• Sustainment information systems support.

Logistics Current Operations Integration Cell Support

1-158. The G-4 COIC support element provides personnel to work in the COIC. The support provided helps synchronize corps logistic operations.

Maintenance

1-159. The logistic element performs the following maintenance-related functions:

• Formulating policy, procedures, and directives related to materiel readiness.

• Providing oversight of equipment and ordnance maintenance, recovery, and salvage operations.

• Participating in joint, inter-Service and host-nation agreements to provide resources to support corps operations.

• Monitoring and analyzing maintenance functions and equipment readiness status.

Supply and Services

1-160. The logistic element performs the following supply and services-related functions:

• Formulating and implementing policy and procedures for the classes of supply (excluding Class VIII) and related services.

• Monitoring corps logistic operations regarding—

◦ Supply systems.

◦ Transportation networks.

◦ General engineering.

◦ Maintenance.

◦ Miscellaneous services (mortuary affairs, food service, billeting, clothing exchange, and laundry and shower).

Transportation

1-161. Transportation operations involve advising the corps commander on the following items to support deployment and redeployment of forces and distribution of materiel:

• Transportation policy.

• Transportations systems.

• Movement control.

• In-transit visibility.

• Automated systems.

The logistic element coordinates with internal and external entities regarding mobility operations. The supporting Air Force air mobility liaison officer is located with this element.

Sustainment Information Systems

1-162. The sustainment information systems element monitors and reports the status of corps sustainment information systems. It works closely with the corps G-6.

Financial Management Section

1-163. The G-8 is the corps CG’s principal advisor on financial management and chief of the financial management section. The G-8 staff section obtains guidance on policy, appropriations, and funding levels and provides guidance to tactical financial managers. It tracks and reports costs for operations to support requests to Congress as required. This element establishes the aggregate levels of fiscal support to allocate and imposes directed resource constraints. It provides input to the program objective memorandum, prepares budget schedules, and adjusts budgets based on program budget decisions. In addition, the G-8 is responsible for plans and operations, budget execution, and special programs.

Surgeon

1-164. The surgeon is charged with planning and executing the Army Health System mission within the corps. The surgeon advises the corps commander on the health status of the command; monitors, prioritizes, synchronizes, and assesses Army Health System support; serves as medical contact officer for the corps; and provides an analysis of the health threat. Chapter 7 contains additional information on this section.

MAIN COMMAND POST INTEGRATING CELLS

1-165. All cells, staff sections, and elements of the corps command posts are responsible for integrating information. The three integrating cells of the main command post apply information from the functional cells, staff sections, and elements to the corps’ operations with regards to time. Figure 1-4 on page 1-30 shows these integrating cells coordinating across the artificial boundaries often created by functional designations. The planning horizons addressed by each of these integrating cells vary based on the tempo of the corps operations and the existing operational and the mission variables. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADRP 3-0).

CURRENT OPERATIONS INTEGRATION CELL

1-166. The main command post COIC monitors the operational environment and directs and synchronizes those operations not controlled by the tactical command post according to the concept of operations and commander’s intent. Current operations focus on what is, and rapidly progress through the decision cycle through executing battle drills. Current operations produce a larger volume of orders including administrative fragmentary orders and tactical and operational fragmentary orders. The COIC is the element that synchronizes all staff actions in the main command post. Members of functional, special, and personal staffs who provide their support to ongoing operations augment the COIC as necessary. The cell is led by the chief of operations, a colonel, a lieutenant colonel deputy, and an operations noncommissioned officer. The cell’s planning horizon is normally hours and days. Primary tasks include—

• Implement and maintain the current operations cell SOPs.

• Assess the situation.

• Recommend and maintain the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). A commander’s critical information requirement is an information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decisionmaking (JP 3-0).

• Maintain the COP.

• Update supporting joint air support mission requirements and target nominations.

• By exception, control operations by issuing operation and fragmentary orders.

• Serve as central clearinghouse for messages, orders, requests for information, and taskings.

• Synchronize actions among the other main command post cells, elements, meetings (including boards and working groups), and other entities, such as personal and special staff sections that operate independently.

• Establish and conduct liaison operations to and from corps units and other organizations.

• Provide the current situation to the future operations and plans cell to support their operations.

• Perform near-term task assessment.

1-167. The COIC staffs the following positions for 24-hour coverage:

• Operations officers.

• Battle staff noncommissioned officers.

• Request for information (RFI) and orders managers.

Figure 1-4. Main command post integrating and functional cells.

• RFI and orders noncommissioned officers.

• Operations sergeants.

1-168. If possible, the noncommissioned officers in the COIC are graduates of the battle staff noncommissioned officer course. The CG augments the COIC as necessary. Augmentees may include representatives from other main command post integrating cells, Services, government agencies, and multinational partners to include the host-nation.

FUTURE OPERATIONS CELL

1-169. The future operations cell plans and assesses operations for the mid-range planning horizon. Future operations focus on what if and move relatively slowly, with more deliberate assessment and planning activities. For a corps, this planning horizon is days and weeks. The cell’s primary tasks include—

• Serving as the link between the COIC and plans cell.

• Monitoring current operations.

• Contributing to the COP.

• Turning command guidance into executable orders.

• Modifying plans to support current operations.

• Assisting in or producing fragmentary orders to support current operations.

• Developing branches to current operations.

• Recommending CCIRs.

• Conducting short- to mid-range planning to support current operations.

• Participating in the targeting process to include generating, merging, prioritizing, approving or denying, checking for duplication and errors, and sending planned air support requests to the BCD in accordance with the joint air tasking cycle battle rhythm.

• Performing mid-term operations assessment.

(Depending on the planning horizon either the future operations or the plans cell develops air apportionment recommendation for JFC considerations and documents close air support [CAS] distribution guidance and intent.)

1-170. The cell is staffed with a mix of officers and noncommissioned officers led by a graduate from the School of Advanced Military Studies. As with the COIC and plans cell, the future operations cell is augmented whenever a skill set, such as special operations, is required.

1-171. During ongoing operations, several plans undergo refinement simultaneously with associated working groups and joint planning teams. This work occasionally overlaps, and it is important that one individual or agency is appointed to maintain situational awareness of all planning efforts.

PLANS CELL

1-172. The plans cell is responsible for mid- to long-range planning. It focuses on what’s next, and interacts with the higher headquarters planning efforts. Using the MDMP, it develops complete operation plans, branches, and sequels. The cell monitors the COP for situational awareness. It stays abreast of current operations by coordinating with the COIC. It is staffed by specialists, including a planner who is a graduate from the School of Advanced Military Studies, a strategic plans officer, and an officer certified in the joint Adaptive Planning and Execution system (APEX). Individuals with expertise from elsewhere in the main command post and from entities external to the corps augment the plans cell as required. The plans cell’s primary tasks include—

• Monitoring current operations.

• Conducting tactical planning in support of major operations and battles.

• Conducting operational-level planning, to include developing supporting plans to higher headquarters plans.

• Coordinating with the current operations integrating and future operations cells to understand the current situation and planned short-term activities.

• Supervising and coordinating the preparations for all operation plans and some branches.

• Participation in the joint operations planning process, including input and review of the time- phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). (See JP 5-0 and JP 4-05.)

• Coordinating and managing current and future force structure.

• Planning corps force management to include Army Reserve and National Guard capabilities.

• Coordinating with respective theater army plans activities on all aspects of planning within their respective combatant commander’s areas of responsibility.

• Conducting military deception planning.

• Analyzing assigned or adjacent multinational force capabilities and making recommendations for the employment of multinational forces and capabilities in corps operations.

1-173. The G-5 leads the plans cell. The cell has two elements: the plans element and the force integration element. The deputy plans officer leads the plans element which contains the following functional areas:

• Ground maneuver.

• Sustainment.

• Intelligence.

• Military deception.

• Civil affairs operations.

• Space.

• Special technical operations.

• IO.

• MISO.

• Fires.

• Protection.

• Engineer.

• Aviation (augmentation).

• Airspace control.

The force integration element deals with the functions and processes employed in raising, provisioning, sustaining, maintaining, training, and resourcing corps forces in garrison and when deployed.

SECTION V – TACTICAL COMMAND POST

1-174. The corps tactical command post is organized as a COIC. (See figure 1-5.) It includes representatives from all five functional cells, the G-6, G-9, the public affairs officer, chaplain, KM, cyber electromagnetic activities, staff judge advocate, and various liaison officers. It also has an engagement element that contains civil affairs, security cooperation, and military information support operations staff officers. It is capable of 24-hour operations and scalable in size and composition to reflect operational and mission variables and manpower caps within the corps’ area of operations.

Figure 1-5. Internal organization of the corps tactical command post

1-175. The tactical command post as documented on the TO&E is 100 percent mobile in organic vehicles. Additional situationally-required individual augmentation from the corps main command post may require the provision of additional vehicles and support personnel to maintain that degree of mobility. The headquarters and headquarters battalion provides a task-organized company containing elements of the headquarters support and signal companies to provide communications and life support functions to the tactical command post. That task organization reflects the actual situationally-dependent size and composition of the tactical command post. The corps headquarters and headquarters battalion commander designates the commander of this company as the tactical command post’s headquarters commandant. Figure 1-5 depicts the TO&E organization of a corps tactical command post.

1-176. The size and composition of the tactical command post enables the corps CG to exercise mission command of the corps expeditionary operations. (Expeditionary operations is defined as deploying quickly to austere areas and shaping conditions to seize the initiative.) This responsibility entails the tactical command post controlling corps operations for the duration of the joint campaign rather than for the limited time associated with previous tactical command post designs. Because of this, all warfighting functions and staff sections reside in the tactical command post to provide the commander resident expertise across the range of military operations with the capacity to conduct 24-hour operations for an extended duration.

1-177. The composition of the tactical command post allows control of current operations at a deployed location, as well as planning for operations in the mid-range planning horizon by moving the future operations cell from its previous location in the main command post to the tactical command post. Because of the expanded representation, staff sections provide the increased capacity required for operations to work for extended periods. (As previously stated the corps EECP is formed around a base provided by the personnel and equipment found in the tactical command post.)

1-178. Deploying the tactical command post requires transportation assets, initially with intertheater airlift, and subsequently, with intratheater assets. The tactical command post is strategically deployable by a minimum number of C-17 aircraft. Once in theater, the tactical command post needs minimal RSOI activities before becoming functional. By adjusting the assortment of vehicles and equipment, the tactical command post can reconfigure itself for movement by C-130 aircraft to forward locations.

1-179. When deployed for operations, the tactical command post relies on the main command post for analysis, long-range planning, and coordination and synchronization of efforts across all warfighting functions. To be effective and meet the commander’s mission command requirements, communications between the forward and main command posts must be assured, continuous, and secure. In addition, the tactical command post relies on the main command post for preparation of reports required by higher headquarters and for coordination. Because of this, the tactical command post has limited representation from those functions that are performed largely by the main command post, such as personnel services. The forward elements of these staff functions communicate their requirements to the main command post for support. Examples of tasks best performed by the main command post include awards preparation, orders preparation, media production, intelligence summaries, and sustainment coordination.

1-180. The primary role of the tactical command post is directing the corps current operations. It provides a place from where the commander can exercise mission command while the main command post deploys or displaces. In a high-threat situation, the tactical command post offsets from the main command post to provide redundancy in the event of an attack on the main command post.

1-181. When the tactical command post is an alternate command post, the corps deputy commander deploys with it to supervise the operation, exercising those command authorities delegated by the corps commander. The deputy G-3 usually acts as the tactical command post’s operations officer. The deputy G-3 is responsible for establishing and coordinating the activities of the COIC and future operations cell, if manned. The G-5 may provide a dedicated planning element to the tactical command post. The cell and section chiefs for the tactical command post are deputies of the coordinating staff officers or functional cell chiefs. Sometimes, the cell and section chiefs consist of officers with special expertise required for the operation or line of effort controlled by the tactical command post. Unless employed for an extended period, the tactical command post does not manage planning or transitions from plans to operations.

1-182. The corps commander can also employ the tactical command post as—

• A task force headquarters.

• The controlling command post for a distinct operation within a phase.

• The controlling headquarters for a distinct portion of the corps area of operations.

• A forward-positioned headquarters during deployment.

• The controlling headquarters for a joint security area.

The corps commander configures the tactical command post for its mission, regardless of the duration of the mission, through augmentation from the staff of the main command post.

1-183. The corps commander can employ the tactical command post as a task force headquarters that temporarily controls a named operation. The tactical command post functions as a major subordinate command, providing staff support and command post facilities to support the task force commander. The corps deputy commander may conduct the operation. For example, the corps conducts a large military deception operation with several brigades, while the bulk of the corps displaces.

1-184. If the concept of operations envisions a significant shaping operation, such as a demonstration or retrograde, then the corps commander can employ the tactical command post as the controlling head-quarters for that distinct operation. The main command post controls the majority of the corps while the tactical command post controls forces in a named, distinct operation.

1-185. Commanders can also employ the tactical command post as the controlling command post for a portion of the area of operations where the predominant tasks or combination of forces differs sharply from the remainder of the corps. For example, a multinational division conducts stability and security tasks in its area of operations, and the corps provides supporting brigades and other U.S. capabilities. The tactical command post moves to that area of operations to employ these U.S. brigades and supporting capabilities since it provides a more extensive coordination and network capability than a liaison detachment.

1-186. Commanders employ the tactical command post as a forward-positioned headquarters when the corps is deploying. In this role, the corps tactical command post locates where it best supports the RSOI of the corps deploying units, or control the initial actions of corps units that are committed to operations, until the corps main command post can complete its RSOI.

1-187. Lastly, commanders can also employ the tactical command post as the controlling headquarters for a joint security area. An appropriate action when the control requirements in the joint security area exceed the span of control of a maneuver enhancement brigade.

1-188. In a protracted campaign, where operations are decentralized and divisions focus on lines of effort rather than maneuver, the tactical command post physically co-locates with the main command post. In this case, the tactical command post’s personnel reinforce the main command post staff, but are still identified as members of the tactical command post. At all times, the tactical command post’s staff, equipment, and procedures are retained to facilitate rapid displacement and functioning as an alternate corps command post or as any of the functions listed in paragraph 1-166.

SECTION VI – USAF, DA CIVILIANS, AND OTHER AUGMENTATION

1-189. The corps headquarters contains the United States Air Force (USAF), DA Civilian and contractor personnel, and joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners. Their number will likely increase as the Army moves toward deploying only the corps tactical command post to a joint operations area for crisis response and short-term contingency operations, with the main command post remaining at home station operating from a home station mission command center. The job descriptions and performance work statements, associated with non-uniformed personnel, should accurately reflect the corps operational and tactical requirements.

USAF SUPPORT TO THE CORPS

1-190. In garrison, the United States Air Force (USAF) aligns an air support operations group (ASOG) with each corps headquarters in a supporting relationship. The ASOG commander is also designated the corps air liaison officer and is normally the senior USAF officer aligned with the corps headquarters. However, once the corps headquarters deploys, USAF support to the corps varies based on the corps’ role and assigned mission. For instance, the ASOG will provide the joint air component coordination element (JACCE) when the corps headquarters is serving as an operational level headquarters, such as a JTF or LCC headquarters. The JACCE is a tailorable liaison element that serves as the joint force air component commander’s primary representatives to the CJTF or LCC commander and staff to facilitate integration by exchanging intelligence, operational data, and projecting future air support requirements for the supported ground force’s operations. When the corps headquarters is conducting tactical operations, the JACCE capability is usually not required.

1-191. When the corps is tasked to provide a tactical headquarters, the USAF will provide an Air Support Operations Squadron (ASOS) in support of the corps headquarters through the Global Force Management Process. The provided ASOS includes the tactical air control party (TACP) and Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) capability. The ASOC enables the establishment of the joint air ground integration center in the COIC and integrates TACP operations personnel in the main and tactical command posts. The ASOS support to the corps is normally tailored based on mission requirements. As a tactical unit, ASOSs are aligned to division headquarters and are not aligned with corps headquarters. However, each installation with a corps headquarters also has an ASOS that is normally available to train with the corps headquarters, depending on support required for the aligned division headquarters.

1-192. The ASOC is the principle air control agency within the USAF’s Theater Air Control System responsible for controlling joint air operations that directly support tactical ground forces. The ASOC, as a tactical level element, will collocate with the corps fires cell when the corps headquarters executes missions as a tactical echelon headquarters. (JP 3-09.3 discusses the ASOC in more detail.)

DA CIVILIANS

1-193. DA Civilians are integral to the Army team by filling key leadership and support positions. Augmentation for a typical corps includes DA Civilians in almost every part of the organization. Many of DA Civilian positions require continuity, such as historian, protocol, safety office, training division, special security office, budget office, and transportation.

1-194. DA Civilians with critical skills often deploy. The corps headquarters plans for DA Civilian deployment regardless of the projected or actual corps mission. The headquarters identifies emergency essential DA Civilians during deployment planning. Emergency essential positions meet two criteria: They cannot be converted to uniformed positions without a loss of continuity of performance, and they are required to ensure success of combat operations or to support combat-essential systems. In unforeseen situations, DA Civilians in positions not previously identified as essential can be required to deploy.

1-195. During military operations and once medically cleared, DA Civilians fall under the military chain of command. DA civilians perform their specialty tasks just as they did before deployment, with regards to evaluations, assignments, discipline, and recognition. The corps is responsible for predeployment training, life, and other support for deployed DA Civilians, including physical security. (See DA PAM 690-47 for more information.)

CONTRACTORS

1-196. Contractors are often utilized to augment corps headquarters staff. While the scope and scale of this contracted staff support varies, it can include support services such as interpreters, intelligence analysis, and various administrative services. It is important to note these staff augmentation contracts are not personal services contracts, they provide service in support of a designated staff section per the terms and conditions of the individual contract. As such, these contractor employees remain under the supervision of their contract company management and do not report directly to the military or government civilian staff lead. They also have no authority to supervise military or government civilian staff members or to direct staff operations. Also of importance, the corps staff must be prepared to serve the requiring activity for these contracts to include developing contract support requirements packages and providing assistance in the contract execution oversight process. ATP 4-10 provides guidance on requiring activity functions.

1-197. The corps identifies and provides qualified personnel to serve as contracting officer representatives, as required by supporting contracting units and organizations. These representatives familiarize themselves with the goods and services of the contracts, and are trained, appointed, and managed by the contracting officer to whom they report. Contracting officer representatives ensure contractors provide the goods and services as specified in the supported unit’s statement of work, thereby ensuring the supported unit receives the support necessary to accomplish its mission.

UNIFIED ACTION

1-198. Within the U.S. Government, Army and other government agencies perform in both supported and supporting roles with other commands and agencies. However, this support differs from the command relationships described in joint doctrine. Relationships between the Army and other government agencies and organizations do not equal command in military operations. Whether supported or supporting roles, close coordination between the military and other agencies is key.

1-199. Coordination and integration among the joint force and other civil and military, joint and multinational organizations also does not equal support relationships in military operations. Military operations depend on a command structure that differs from civilian organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to coordination efforts. The various government agencies’ different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decisionmaking techniques make unity of effort a challenge. Still more difficult, some intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the U.S., and particularly U.S. forces. (See JP 3-08 for additional information on interagency operations.)

HOME STATION MISSION COMMAND CENTER

1-200. Each corps in the future will have a HSMCC which (when combined with the integrated training environment) allows the corps to effectively control the operations of deployed, deploying, and non-deployed subordinate units from its home station for a broad array of missions requiring continuous oversight. These missions include garrison operations, support to U.S. Army Pacific or Forces Command as the Army’s force providers, regionally aligned force, homeland defense, military support to civil authorities, and support to forward deployed operations. The HSMCC will be a permanent facility located at each corps home station. The HSMCC facilitates the corps commander’s uninterrupted mission command through all operational phases including deployment, distributed training, and field training. The HSMCC leverages a single protected network spanning multiple network classification levels, and fully leverages common operating environment-compliant capabilities in terms of hardware and software. Because of this, the corps staff has a common user experience regardless of the facility from which they are operating. They are able to have a high quality interaction across dispersed command post elements. These capabilities are supported by a network that maximizes the connectivity and capacity of the corps headquarters in order to control operations across the home station, en route, and while deployed.

SECTION VII – CORPS HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

1-201. The corps’ only organic troops are located in its headquarters and headquarters battalion. This battalion provides communications, transportation, and medical support to the corps headquarters. Its personnel and equipment support the corps main command post and corps tactical command post. The battalion provides administrative and life support to additional enablers assigned or attached to the corps headquarters, such as a music performance unit, security assets, and joint or interagency augmentation. It consists of the battalion command group, battalion headquarters staff, and three companies. (See figure 1-6.)

BATTALION COMMAND GROUP AND STAFF

1-202. The corps headquarters and headquarters battalion is commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The battalion command group provides supervision and exercises administrative command functions over personnel assigned to the corps headquarters. It consists of the battalion commander, battalion executive officer, and battalion command sergeant major. The battalion commander also serves as the headquarters commandant for the corps headquarters.

1-203. The corps headquarters and headquarters battalion staff consists of five staff sections. They provide administrative, human resources, logistics, religious, and life support to corps headquarters elements at the garrison and in the field. When deployed, the battalion staff sections are responsible for unit-level communications support, property accountability, transportation, and medical, food service, and maintenance support for the corps main and tactical command posts.

Figure 1-6. Corps headquarters and headquarters battalion

HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT COMPANY

1-204. The headquarters support company contains all members of the headquarters battalion staff in addition to the company headquarters. The headquarters support company provides company-level administrative and logistics support to Soldiers in the corps headquarters command group, G-9, special staff, and the movement and maneuver and protection functional staff sections. It has two command post support sections. One section supports Soldiers at the main command post and one section supports the tactical command post. Both sections provide maintenance and field feeding support. This company can split support between the corps tactical command post and the corps EECP, if required. The medical treatment section provides medical care for the corps main command post personnel, as well as emergency and advanced trauma management to main and tactical command post personnel. It also provides sick-call services, medical surveillance and preventive medicine, and unit-level ground and en route patient care.

SIGNAL, INTELLIGENCE, AND SUSTAINMENT COMPANY

1-205. This company installs, operates, and maintains the corps network enterprise (communication and computer systems) in support of 24 hour a day operations for corps level functions. It also contains the Soldiers assigned to the corps headquarters intelligence and sustainment functional cells. The company headquarters provides company-level administrative and logistics support to Soldiers in the corps headquarters intelligence and sustainment functional cells, the corps G-6 staff section, and the two signal platoons that support the corps main and tactical command posts. The company receives its ground vehicle and generator maintenance support from the battalion’s headquarters support company. It includes two signal platoons that directly support each corps command post. The corps headquarters and headquarters battalion commander normally employs this company’s headquarters element as the base around which a task organized life support organization is formed to support the corps tactical command post when that command node deploys.

LONG-RANGE SURVEILLANCE COMPANY

1-206. This unit is typically assigned to the corps HHB but is not organic to the HHB. The company consists of a headquarters section, a communications platoon, two target interdiction (sniper) teams, a transportation section, and three long-range surveillance (LRS) detachments with five teams each for a total of 15 teams. Its mission is to collect combat information in support of the corps operations. Providing security to the corps headquarters is outside the range of the company’s doctrinal or organizationally supported missions. LRSTs are lightly armed and lack organic heavy automatic weapons necessary for defense and escort missions. Chapter 7 contains additional information on the corps use of these long-range surveillance teams. (LRSTs). (FM 3-55.93 is the echelon publication for this company.)

CORPS RESERVE COMPONENT OPERATIONS DETACHMENT

1-207. Figure 1-7 depicts the internal organization of the corps habitually aligned reserve component operations detachment. It has very little equipment authorized by its TO&E. This equipment is primarily individual staff workstations or laptop computers and routers that are necessary to conduct inactive duty training and individual weapons and protective gear. Most Army mission command system equipment used by its Soldiers when activated is documented on the TO&E of the headquarters and headquarters battalion. The Soldiers in this unit use this equipment during training periods or when activated to a Title 10 status.

Figure 1-7. Corps aligned reserve component operations detachment

Chapter 2

Corps Headquarters Operations

This chapter describes corps headquarters operations and highlights the importance of support to the corps headquarters and its command and support relationship. This chapter also discusses placement of the corps headquarters for control during operations, and how the corps uses its Army mission command systems throughout the conduct of operations.

SUPPORT TO CORPS HEADQUARTERS

2-1. Supporting the commander’s exercise of mission command is the first priority of the corps headquarters. The corps is capable of carrying out this mission alone, but is often augmented with personnel to assist the commander and staff in accomplishing their assigned tasks and missions. Types and quantity of augmentation depend on the situation and arrive from theater army assets or from the available Army force pool. The augmentation timeframe is either temporary or lasts the entire operation. For example, the plans cell and the movement element of the movement and maneuver cell may receive the greatest command attention and resources during the predeployment phase. Augmentation to the corps headquarters can have a limited amount of time and scope to support the successful deployment of the corps headquarters. While deployed and engaged in sustained major combat land operations in an area of operations, the current operations integration cell (COIC) may receive the most attention and the majority of augmentation

2-2. In its role as an intermediate tactical headquarters, the corps headquarters assists the corps commander exercise mission command of a combination of brigades and divisions, as well as joint or multinational forces supported by theater assets. The corps headquarters serves as a hierarchical organization combining the commanding general (CG), staff cells, and associated liaison elements into an integrated whole. As such, the corps headquarters is organized to control a wide array of assets. The corps commander relies on staff performance and optimizing available components of the Army mission command system within the corps headquarters. Staff performance through functional and integrating cells, to include personal and special staff coordination, enables the commander to control assets.

2-3. Corps headquarters augmentation happens during all phases of predeployment, deployment, and redeployment. Assets not available in theater are requested from the force generating base, and from Army commands and direct reporting units during major operations. Representative generating force organizations include—

• Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) (provides capabilities to help transition the corps to a joint task force [JTF] headquarters).

• Headquarters, Department of the Army.

• Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command.

• U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

• U.S. Army Reserve Command.

• U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

• U.S. Army Materiel Command.

• U.S. Army Medical Command.

• U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/U.S. Army Forces Strategic Command.

• U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Signal Command (Army).

• U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).

• Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command.

• Headquarters, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command.

• U.S. Army Installation Management Command.

• U.S. Army Cadet Command.

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

2-4. Available brigade and lower echelon units are generally part of theater-level commands tailored to work in smaller components to meet the corps’ mission requirements. For example, the requirements for a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) passive defense operation may not require an entire CBRN brigade, only a small component, such as a biological platoon or company.

2-5. The corps headquarters task-organizes the divisions, brigade combat teams (BCTs), and functional and support brigades, provided by the Army, theater army, and other force generators, for employment during land operations in an area of operations.

COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

2-6. The command relationship of units providing support to the corps headquarters varies depending on the situation. Forces available to the corps headquarters for land operations are assigned, attached, or placed under corps operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON). (See FM 6-0 for a discussion of command and support relationships.)

2-7. The Army has the capability to rapidly tailor and task-organize expeditionary forces. Each expeditionary force is a flexible, modular organization. The theater army is the Army Service component command (ASCC) of the geographic combatant command. In this role, the theater army exercises administrative control (ADCON) over all Army forces in the combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR). The theater army tailors available forces to support the corps headquarters. Each corps can control a combination of divisions, BCTs, and functional and multifunctional support brigades as an intermediate land force headquarters or a JTF. Figure 2-1 portrays the command and support relationships, including OPCON, associated with a corps headquarters serving as an intermediate tactical headquarters.

2-8. The corps headquarters helps the commander exercise mission command of land forces at the brigade and division levels. Maneuver, sustainment, and other forces are attached, OPCON, in support, and occasionally under the TACON of the corps headquarters.

MISSION COMMAND

2-9. Exercising mission command is a dynamic process in which the corps staff supports the corps commander throughout the operations process. The speed and accuracy in the way the staff plans, prepares, executes, and assesses contributes to the corps commander’s situational understanding. Commanders use several planning methodologies to solve problems: the Army design methodology, the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), and troop leading procedures. The CG and staff integrates risk management throughout these methodologies. (See ADRP 5-0 for a discussion on planning methodologies.)

2-10. The corps relies on information, knowledge, and its Army mission command system to support the execution and assessment of operations. The corps has three goals for execution during decisive action: it extends the operational reach of its forces, synchronizes operations, and prioritizes and allocates resources. The corps commander and staff balance these goals only with adequate information. They receive information from several knowledge and information management (IM) systems. Through knowledge management (KM), the corps headquarters provides relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate situational understanding and decisionmaking.

2-11. Effective mission command of the corps attached, OPCON, TACON, and supporting units also relies on the effective placement of the corps main command post. Its placement must maximize the full capabilities of the systems comprising the corps’ Army mission command systems. The corps gains execution support from the Army mission command system, battle rhythm, operations synchronization meetings, and battle update briefings.

Figure 2-1. Corps command and support relationships

COMMAND POST PLACEMENT

2-12. The corps’ placement of its main command post is vital to mission success. The location of the main command post depends on factors such as communication reliability, security, concealment, and accessibility. The corps commander’s location depends on the situation. A routine mission on the less violent end of the conflict continuum, such as a joint or multinational training exercise, may place less of a demand on the corps commander for rapid decisions and necessary situational understanding. Conversely, a major combat operation against a near-peer enemy may demand frequent guidance and ever-changing decisions. The level of trust the CG has in the staff and their level of training influences this decision. Well-trusted senior leaders on a well-trained staff allow the commander more freedom of action.

2-13. The location of the corps’ main command post also affects how the corps commander commands the operation. The corps command post is located in a variety of places:

• As a joint headquarters collocated with the geographic combatant command.

• Co-located with the ASCC’s command post.

• Located in a sanctuary or staging base remote from the area of operations, to include from a home station operations center.

• Located within the corps area of operations with noncontiguous subordinate command areas of operations.

• Positioned within the corps area of operations with contiguous subordinate units.

• Co-located with a division headquarters or other subordinate command post in a contiguous area of operations.

• Co-located with a subordinate command post in an area of operations with noncontiguous subordinate unit areas of operations.

2-14. Each command post location has its own distinct communications, travel, security, and time requirements. Secure satellite communications can reduce the impact of the distance from the corps commander’s location to the superior or subordinate commanders, but it cannot eliminate the distance requirement. Travel from a sanctuary or a corps main command post location separated hours from its subordinates adds to the time the commander is away from the main command post. Travel also adds to integrating and synchronizing the operation, reviewing plans and orders, and contributing to non-routine decisionmaking. In addition, the CG does not travel alone, and the staff, no matter how small, requires long- haul vehicles, aircraft, and en route security precautions that can make it inconvenient to travel long distances, especially if the enemy situation is uncertain. The corps commander and senior leaders and staffs weigh the benefit gained by command presence visits by the CG at remote subordinate command post locations with the loss of communication, the time the corps commander is away from the activities at the main command post, and the chance of capture, or worse.

2-15. Regardless of the location selected by the corps commander, there must be a plan for continuity of command. Command continuity has two requirements. The first is to have a properly designated commander, including a predesignated succession of command. The second is to organize the corps’ available Army mission command system so the CG can exercise continuous authority. Continuity depends on alternate and redundant facilities, time for transitions, and mitigating the effects of sleep deprivation.

2-16. The corps tactical command post is not designed to replace the main command post for extended periods. However, it must be trained and ready to assume control of operations for short periods of time or special concurrent missions. The tactical command post is co-located with the main command post and is operational at all times. The tactical command post becomes the corps mission command hub when the main command post is unavailable or when the corps forms a separate mission command entity for a specific operation. The latter might be running a distinct mission such as foreign humanitarian assistance. As discussed in chapter 1, the corps tactical command post is organized as a joint current operations cell capable of 24-hour operations. Unless employed for an extended period, the tactical command post does not deal with planning or the transitions from plans to operations.

2-17. The corps tactical command post maintains the same level of situational awareness as the COIC and other elements of the main command post. To do so, the tactical command post establishes a transfer standard operating procedure (SOP). This SOP ensures the tactical command post replicates all the information systems of the support corps mission command. Each of the five tactical command post cells coordinates with its main command post counterpart. Depending on the current situation, capabilities not programmed for the tactical command post but required to conduct current operations may deploy with the tactical command post to support the corps mission. The corps commander aims to lead and control the corps and the staff. Maintaining the common operational picture (COP) and other situational awareness activities at the main command post when it is not in control, reduces the time the main command post requires to achieve full readiness and effectively reassume its responsibilities.

2-18. Transferring and maintaining information is crucial during any handover of control between the main and tactical command posts. The corps automated information systems allow users to enter information from several points at once into a central processing system. This electronic collaboration simplifies handover of information and provides a level of cybersecurity to protect all information systems when the tactical command post controls operations. Each tactical command post functional cell ensures that digital and other information systems databases, appropriate to their area of expertise, are maintained while the tactical command post controls operations.

2-19. Dynamic and fast-paced operations require the corps staff to keep abreast of operations. Depending on the time the tactical command post is expected to control operations in the absence of a fully-operational main command post, portions of the plans and future operations cells deploy with the tactical command post to sustain continuity of the planning effort. Cell members may deploy as individuals to become a part of the tactical command post movement and maneuver cell or form a provisional plans cell in the tactical command post. When the tactical command post controls operations, the corps headquarters and supporting headquarters battalion elements are tailored to support this augmentation from the plans cell, liaison sections, and other capabilities that accompany the command post to the new location. As with digitization, sustainment and security are integrated into the separated deployment of the tactical command post.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

2-20. The Army mission command system enables the commander to arrange personnel, IM, procedures, equipment, and facilities essential for the commander to conduct operations. Success of the corps headquarters relies on commanders effectively using available subordinate systems within the Army mission command system. By using the Army information system family of systems, Army mission command system, and other communications support to the corps headquarters, the commander, staff, and subordinate commands can share a common operating picture during the conduct of operations.

Army Information System Family of Systems

2-21. The Army’s information family of systems is a collection of systems that support the corps and the operations process. The Project Manager Mission Command, within the Army Materiel Command, has the following product offices:

• Command Post Computing Environment.

• Joint Battle Command-Platform

• Tactical Mission Command.

• Fire Support Command and Control.

• Strategic Mission Command.

2-22. The goal of these product offices is to consolidate current product lines by collapsing a disparate system. They also converge with intelligence systems through definition and implementation of the operational environment and the command post computing environment. The following key attributes culminate through this consolidated approach:

• Reduce unique tactical systems, such as mission command, sustainment, and intelligence by converging and reusing capabilities.

• Consolidate back office infrastructure consistent with the Army global network enterprise construct and joint command and control architecture strategies.

• Leverage a common web framework to external information access and collaboration reach.

• Significantly enhanced commander and staff ability to effectively conduct collaborate mission planning and execution across the conflict continuum.

• Use a common government-owned and managed foundation architecture.

• Provide a unified approach to data handing and infrastructure procurement.

2-23. The Army’s family of information systems provide the corps commander, corps staff, and subordinate units a common operating picture using a common map set and database to present a visual display of the corps area of operations. Additionally, this family of systems provide users a suite of common service tools. These collaboration tools include:

• Video teleconferencing.

• Interactive whiteboards.

• File transfer services.

• Calendar and schedule applications.

• Task management tools.

• Internet browsers.

• Database query tools.

2-24. When deployed, travel limitations, distance, physical security concerns, and other factors frequently limit face-to-face contact throughout the corps’ area of operations and beyond. Therefore, collaboration occurs virtually through interactive tools available to the corps headquarters. This system of systems facilitates near real-time collaboration and enables a commander to have effective mission command at multiple echelons within a deployed corps. These systems allow Army commanders at all echelons to provide a common operating picture to higher and subordinate echelon commanders and their staffs. However, face-to-face is the preferred method for collaboration and is often required to build commander-to-commander and staff officer-to-staff officer personal relationships.

2-25. The Army’s family of information systems requires trained and skilled operators. The corps uses these systems in its garrison functions, so that the transition to deployed operations causes minimal friction in the corps headquarters’ ability to effectively support the commander’s exercise of mission command.

Army Mission Command System

2-26. The corps’ Army mission command system provides situational awareness that allows the commander and staff to apply their judgment to obtain situational understanding. This collaborative system is commonly used and provides additional capability for the commander to continuously exercise mission command control throughout the area of operations. Key capabilities are—

• Second and third dimension information visualization.

• The ability to drag-and-drop information analysis across visualization products.

• Visibility of evolving understanding among distributed subordinates and team members.

2-27. Commanders often use their subordinate systems within the Army mission command system to conduct battle updates, track enemy and friendly actions, and share a common operating picture. Efficient use of these subordinate systems rely on trained and skilled operators. Commanders are recommended to use the Army mission command system regularly in the garrison environment to ensure operators maintain skill proficiency.

Communications Support to Mission Command

2-28. Effective communications systems provide the commander with relevant information to adjust operations rapidly in response to changing situations. It informs staff members of the status of the operation, so they can communicate the information internally and externally to all echelons. This timely flow of information ensures all levels share a common understanding of the situation. The communications support to the corps’ Army mission command systems plays an important role. Commanders need reliable and survivable communications if they are to exercise mission command during operations.

2-29. Effectively integrating communication networks with information systems that support mission command enables the corps main and tactical command posts to manage, disseminate, and protect information throughout the corps area of operations. This maturing capability unifies function-unique networks, interdependent information systems, and key network services that enable commanders, staffs, and subordinate units to collect, process, store, retrieve, disseminate, and protect information. The Army’s portion of the Department of Defense information network (DODIN) connects all components and echelons of the generating force and the operating forces, giving corps operating in a joint environment access to global information resources and support services.

2-30. A corps also requires the capability to integrate its communications systems and information networks with other government agencies, joint forces, multinational governmental and military forces, and nongovernmental agencies. This requirement occurs when the corps provides systems—with or without operators—to these outside agencies and forces, when the corps obtains and uses systems from these outside agencies and forces, or when systems are developed to interoperate with the systems of these outside agencies and forces. It is often most effective and cost efficient to provide systems with operators if the scope and capabilities of the outside agencies and forces is comparatively small.

2-31. The corps fields the best high speed, high bandwidth line of sight, and beyond line of sight communications systems, as the Army procures and makes them available. This means that the CG and staff have access to a suite of communications systems as a part of the Warfighter information Network-Tactical (WIN-T). WIN-T provides the corps headquarters with high-speed and high-capacity communications transport network (satellite and terrestrial) and services that provide voice, video, and data communications tools designed to meet corps, division, and brigade mission command requirements. Communication links are provided by several satellite systems—Kurtz-under band (known as Ku) and Kurtz-above band (known as Ka) terminals, standard tactical entry point terminal, and extremely high-frequency band terminals. High- capacity, line-of-sight communications systems are also available for use where appropriate. Figure 2-2 identifies standard corps systems. (See Cyber Center of Excellence publications for details on these systems.)

• Phoenix multi-band supper high frequency satellite communication terminal.

• Warfighter Information Network–Tactical Increment 1 a/b (known as WIN–T Inc 1a/b).

• Satellite transportable terminal.

• High-capacity line of sight system.

• Secure, mobile, anti-jam, reliable tactical terminal (known as SMART–T).

• Wideband satellite terminals.

Figure 2-2. Corps communications

2-32. Warfighter Information Network–Tactical, Increment 1 a/b refers to the communication equipment that provides switching for voice, video, and data communications. It also provides cybersecurity equipment for securing data and provides interoperability with legacy systems such as mobile subscriber equipment. It is a satellite communication and switching package that enables corps, division, and brigade command posts to operate independently within the DODIN or directly with a joint headquarters. Warfighter Information Network–Tactical Increment 1 a/b works with military or commercial satellites and ground systems.

2-33. The satellite transportable terminal uses a satellite transportable trailer equipped with a 2.4 meter Kurtz-above band/Kurtz-under band satellite dish. The network works with existing terrestrial transport (high-capacity line-of-sight and line-of-sight communications systems) and satellite communications systems such as ground mobile forces (AN/TSC-93), tropospheric scatter (AN/TRC-170), and secure, mobile, anti-jam, reliable tactical terminal (AN/TSC-154).

2-34. The high-capacity line-of-sight system is a terrestrial microwave radio system. This provides high bandwidth line-of-sight capability.

2-35. The secure, mobile, anti-jam, reliant tactical terminal is a tactical military strategic satellite communication terminal that provides a satellite interface to permit protected uninterrupted voice and data communication as forces move beyond the line-of-sight capability of terrestrial communications systems fielded to corps, division, and brigade signal companies.

2-36. Wideband satellite terminals consist of older tactical satellite systems (AN/TSC-93D) used by theater- level expeditionary signal battalions to support corps and below operations.

2-37. DODIN and other Army networked subsystems directly impact the corps’ ability to communicate throughout its area of operations. Efficient and effective execution of communication is supported by the voice, text, and imagery components that provide commanders and staffs accurate and timely information. Transferring relevant information by these three modes of communication aims for concise, yet complete communication that is clear enough to preclude misunderstanding. A command operating picture designed to display information in a format that is understandable by the corps commander enables rapid adjustments to maintain an accurate portrayal of the situation in the area of operations. (See FM 6-02 for a discussion of signal support to operations, ATP 6-02.72 for information on the use of tactical radios, ATP 6-02.73 for information on internet tactical chat, and ATP 6-02.90 for information on military satellite communications.)

BATTLE RHYTHM

2-38. The corps headquarters’ battle rhythm supports the commander’s effective exercise of mission command. The corps knowledge management officer maintains the corps battle rhythm for the corps chief of staff. The corps’ battle rhythm supports the corps commander’s style of decisionmaking. Different battle rhythms occur in the different staff sections and cells of the headquarters to accomplish simultaneous activities, but they all support the corps commander’s overall battle rhythm. For example, the corps conducts a daily synchronization meeting and a battle update briefing to the commander or a designated officer to share the COP and receive guidance.

2-39. The battle rhythm refers to both a process and the various forums within the process. When the battle rhythms of all the headquarters in the chain of command are nested with one another, they work more effectively. For example, unit activities are scheduled so that the information output in one activity is available as input to higher or lower headquarters. Inputs and outputs of various battle rhythm events should logically support each other and decision requirements.

2-40. Battle rhythms nested by echelon let the corps’ subordinate commands offset their events to provide information needed by the corps headquarters. In addition, nested battle rhythms enable the corps command posts to supply necessary information to higher headquarters and provide timely inputs to other joint force supporting components’ decision cycles. For example, the joint force air component commander’s (JFACC’s) joint air tasking cycle dictates timely submission of Army preplanned air support requests and target nominations for resourcing on the air tasking order (ATO), and requires Army airspace control means requests for deconfliction of airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) on the daily airspace control order (ACO).

2-41. Maintaining awareness of critical staff positions is recommended for those that are in high demand for working groups and operational planning teams (OPTs). High demand but low density staff officers, such as judge advocates and joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners, are not always able to support multiple events at the same time. Identifying manpower limitations of these key individuals can help ensure they are used effectively.

2-42. The battle rhythm is frequently portrayed on a daily basis, but can extend over weeks or months. An effective battle rhythm helps the corps commander and staff synchronize various IM processes, briefing updates, shift changes, and conference calls. A corps battle rhythm provides anchor points that help the command general and staff with planning. Chronological by nature, battle rhythm depends on inputs from earlier events and provides outputs needed for later events. Individual elements within the battle rhythm may be progressive, for example, a daily meeting, followed by a working group every three days, leading up to a board meeting every sixth day.

2-43. The battle rhythm operates best when the officer in charge directs changes to fit the situation. As a guide to time management, the battle rhythm is flexible enough to accommodate changes in which tasks are the focus of operations, availability of key individuals, and other interruptions in the routine. Failing to adhere to a disciplined battle rhythm results in everyone working harder, longer, and less effectively. Establishing and maintaining a battle rhythm provides a disciplining mechanism to support rest and sleep plans. This practice has the added benefit of training the second- and third-level leadership in the conduct of command post operations when the principals are not present.

2-44. A corps headquarters may have several types of battle rhythms: a live assembly of key individuals at a central location, a virtual meeting through use of the common operating picture and the Army mission command system, or a combination of the two when the command group, primary, and selected others meet in a central location while others participate by video teleconference, tactical chat, web camera, or other systems. A battle rhythm is not a rigid tool to take away the corps commander’s opportunity to seize the initiative. The corps commander and staff need time to think. With the advent of the mission command family of systems and other tools, the commander can receive the current operating picture at any time, in any of the corps command posts, and while in transit. A battle rhythm can be graphically depicted in a table, line, or circle. Table 2-1 illustrates a single day in a tabular battle rhythm. (See ADRP 5-0 for further discussion on battle rhythm.)

Table 2-1. Example of a single day of the corps battle rhythm

Time | Event | Location | Chair
0700 | Battle update briefing. | COIC | CG/DCG
0730 | Shift change briefing and shift change in accordance with command post cell standard operating procedures. | COIC | Chief of Staff/G-3
0800 | Operations synchronization meeting. | COIC | Chief of Staff/G-3
0900 | Teleconference with higher headquarters. | COIC | CG/DCG/Chief of Staff
Common operational picture synchronization drill and virtual command post huddle. | COIC | G-3
0930 | Plans update. | SIPRNET VTC Conference Room | G-5
1000 | Working groups, boards, bureaus, centers, and cells (on call of officer in charge). | Conference Rooms 1, 2, and 3 | officers in charge
1100 | Running estimate updates. | COIC/ tactical chat | cell officers in charge
1300 | Common operational picture synchronization drill and virtual command post huddle. | COIC | G-3
1400 | Interaction and coordination with higher headquarters working groups, boards, bureaus, centers, and cells (on call of higher headquarters officer in charge). | Conference Rooms 1, 2, and 3 | officers in charge
1700 | Common operational picture synchronization drill and virtual command post huddle. | COIC | G-3
1900 | Battle update briefing. | COIC | CG/DCG
1930 | Shift change briefing and shift change as per cell standard operating procedures. | COIC | Chief of staff/G-3
2100 | Teleconference with higher headquarters. | COIC | CG/DCG/Chief of Staff
Common operational picture synchronization drill and virtual command post huddle. | COIC | G-3
2130 | Running estimate updates. | COIC/ tactical chat | cell officers in charge
2200 | Working groups, boards, bureaus, centers, and cells (on call of officer in charge). | Conference Rooms 1, 2, and 3 | officers in charge
0100 | Common operational picture synchronization drill and virtual command post huddle. | COIC | G-3
0500 | Running estimate updates. | COIC/ tactical chat | cell officers in charge
0500 | Targeting meeting (target nominations to the joint targeting coordination authority—joint targeting working group—for validation and inclusion in the joint integrated prioritized target list. | Conference Room 1/ tactical chat | Chief of Fires
0600 | Send preplanned air support request list to higher headquarters or battlefield coordination detachment as directed. | COIC | Chief of Fires/G-3
0600 | Common operational picture synchronization drill and virtual command post huddle. | COIC | G-3
CG commanding general CP command post COIC current operations integration cell | G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations G-5 assistant chief of staff, plans

2-45. The battle rhythm can also be depicted in a circular fashion with internal activities inside the circle and external events on the outside. Figure 2-3 shows an abbreviated example of a circular or graphic battle rhythm chart. It assumes that the updated information disseminated at briefings enables the higher headquarters to receive the latest information when the corps commander communicates with the higher commanders and staff.

Figure 2-3. Example of a graphic battle rhythm

OPERATIONS SYNCHRONIZATION MEETING

2-46. Chaired by the corps chief of staff or assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3), the operations synchronization meeting is attended by senior leaders and is a key event in the corps headquarters’ battle rhythm. The meeting provides information on the current operation. Principal members of the functional and integrating cells, separate staff sections, standing working groups and boards attend. They brief the status of ongoing projects and tasks with a focus on the corps commander’s priorities. The meeting’s purpose is to synchronize warfighting functions for the short-term planning horizon and provide guidance that drives the operations of other components of the battle rhythm.

BATTLE UPDATE BRIEFING

2-47. The corps headquarters daily battle update briefing is an integral part of the corps headquarters ability to synchronize the conduct of operations. Because of the modern digital communications systems and databases available, the corps commander and staff can receive a battle update at any time. The CG is briefed in person, over a voice communications system, or by visual display. Typically part of the corps main command post battle rhythm, the battle update briefing provides analyzed information so the commander can make decisions and synchronize the staff’s actions. Based on the updated COP, this briefing is intended to be short, informative, and selective. It provides the corps commander with limited information that addresses the current operation and activities planned for the near future. The corps tactical SOP, command guidance, and operational requirements determine the information briefed. The CG reviews the status charts and displays before the battle update briefing to become familiar with the current situation of the corps, which enables the battle update briefing to focus on by-exception issues that require the corps commander’s attention and guidance.

CREATING AND MAINTAINING SHARED UNDERSTANDING

2-48. Regardless of how well trained in tasks associated with situation and target development, the corps staff can only effectively support operations if it receives and distributes relevant information and knowledge, throughout the operations process. The most important activities associated with creating and maintaining shared understanding are KM, and maintaining communications with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

2-49. Knowledge management (KM) is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decisionmaking (ADRP 6-0). KM—

• Enables the all warfighting functions to aid decisionmaking throughout the operations process.

• Facilitates the transfer of knowledge between staffs, commanders, and forces.

• Aligns people, processes, and tools within an organization to distribute knowledge and promote understanding.

2-50. The corps staff section develop knowledge about operational and mission variables that apply to their respective functions. For example, the corps assistant chiefs of staff, intelligence (G-2), develops knowledge specific to the enemy and other threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. The commander uses this knowledge to facilitate decisionmaking; therefore, the knowledge must be current, organized, easily accessible at all times, and understandable by all users. Each corps functional or integrating cell uses its collaboration portal as the construct to organize and transfer this knowledge, and collaborates to promote understanding. (See ADRP 6-0 and ATP 6-01.1 for more information on KM.)

2-51. The operations element in each cell maintains the internal battle rhythm for that cell. That internal battle rhythm displays all regular cell activities in time and space that must occur to support activities comprising the main command post battle rhythm.

MAINTAINING COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIGHER, ADJACENT, AND SUBORDINATE UNITS

2-52. Maintaining communication with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units is vital because the corps’ Army mission command system is communications network-enabled. Staff cells and sections at all echelons, within and external to the corps, should understand the importance of establishing effective communications architectures. Adequate communications and access to other partners are critical enablers to the corps commander’s ability to conduct mission command. All warfighting functional planners have to work closely with assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6) planners to articulate their bandwidth and other system requirements before and during operations.

COMMAND PROGRAMS

2-53. Command programs are programs required by U.S. Code and Army Regulations. In some cases, doctrine also addresses aspects of these programs. Command programs include the following tasks:

• Support commander’s leadership responsibilities for morale, welfare, and discipline.

• Preserve historical documentation and artifacts.

• Train subordinates and units.

• Develop a command environmental program.

2-54. These programs are discussed in ATP 3-91 at the division echelon. The corps commander and staff make situationally appropriate adjustments according to the information contained in this publication while implementing these programs at the corps echelon.

Chapter 3

Corps as a Joint Task Force

A joint task force (JTF) is established when the scope, complexity, or other factors require the capabilities of services from at least two military departments operating under a single joint force commander. There are three types of JTF headquarters: standing, rotational, or crisis. JTFs are functionally or geographically oriented. The corps headquarters is the preferred Army headquarters for joint augmentation and employment as a JTF headquarters. JTFs often deploy with little to no warning and operate under a time constraint in which to prepare for conducting their assigned mission.

An establishing authority, such as the Secretary of Defense, combatant commander, subunified commander, or another commander, joint task force (CJTF), can designate the corps commander as a CJTF. Once this occurs, the corps commander considers not only the corps military resources but also the joint, interorganizational, and multinational partner resources available to accomplish the JTF’s assigned missions. This includes working with ambassadors from countries in the JTF’s joint operations area.

The CJTF considers many factors to include strategic environment, U.S. policies, treaty commitments, status of forces agreements (known as SOFAs), and the interests of those partner organizations. These factors affect the JTF’s execution of strategic plans to accomplish operational objectives via its campaign plan. This chapter discusses the corps as a JTF; it is organized by the six-stage life cycle of a JTF: form, plan, deploy, employ, transition, and redeploy.

SECTION I – FORMING THE JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

3-1. The establishing authority determines the appropriate echelon of command around which to form the JTF, based on the scope and scale of the operation and nature of the mission. This task often involves coordination with the National Command Authorities, the joint staff, and the various service department staffs. The establishing authority designates the CJTF, assigns the missions, prescribes the broad concept of operations, allocates the forces, and defines the command relationships. The establishing authority can designate a headquarters as JTF-capable only when it meets manning, equipping, and training requirements.

3-2. The establishing authority designates the CJTF from within the establishing authority’s headquarters or from the preponderant service within the JTF. The establishing authority may direct formation of the JTF staff from the establishing authority’s staff. The establishing authority can also direct the CJTF to form the JTF staff from the designated CJTF’s resources (corps headquarters) and augment the staff as necessary from other service or component headquarters within the designated JTF. An establishing authority typically designates a corps commander as the CJTF when a contingency is predominately a land operation.

3-3. The preferred joint approach to forming a JTF headquarters is to develop one around an existing headquarters. The corps headquarters is the Army’s preferred organization around which to form a JTF headquarters. Once the corps headquarters is designated as a JTF headquarters, the corps commander, as the CJTF, is subordinated to a combatant commander or another higher joint force commander. The CJTF looks to the combatant commander for guidance, strategic direction, and missions for the force. The CJTF exercises operational control (OPCON) over assigned forces, and OPCON or tactical control (TACON) over attached forces through designated component, major subordinate command, or subordinate task force commanders. (The establishing authority also establishes the command relationships between the CJTF and other subordinate commanders.) The CJTF also has the responsibility of training the joint force, if the JTF was developed during a deliberate planning process to support existing operations plans. The CJTF and staff—

• Plan JTF operations in accordance with operational direction from the establishing authority.

• Direct, control, and coordinate operations of assigned forces.

• Coordinate planning activities of subordinate forces.

• Establish boards, bureaus, cells, centers, and working groups to plan, control, and coordinate the use of joint assets in specific functional areas.

• Coordinate with other joint and multinational forces, the United Nations, other government agencies not assigned, and nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations. (These groups are referred to collectively as unified actions partners.)

• Coordinate with other national forces and foreign governments when required by the establishing authority.

• Coordinate signal support.

The CJTF may also be a supported or supporting commander.

3-4. The Army corps headquarters uses joint doctrine and procedures when serving as the nucleus of a JTF headquarters. As a JTF headquarters, it operates in an environment with its own lexicon, as described in JP 3-33. Army commanders should know and understand both joint terms and Army terms. Table 3-1 lists several terms the corps encounters when transitioning to a JTF headquarters. Some of these terms describe the process of establishing a JTF headquarters.

Table 3-1. Common joint terms.

Term | Definition
Service component headquarters | A combat force that is organized, manned, equipped, and trained to perform Service and functional roles.
Designated Service component headquarters | A Service headquarters selected by the geographic combatant commander to be trained and serve as a joint capable headquarters.
Joint task force-capable headquarters | A designated Service headquarters that is certified and reports its readiness to perform as a joint headquarters.
Joint task force headquarters | A headquarters designated by the Secretary of Defense, geographic combatant commander, subunified commander, or an existing commander, joint task force to conduct military operations or support to a specific situation.

3-5. Upon establishment of the JTF headquarters, it takes time to receive, train, and integrate new members before it can function as a cohesive headquarters with common processes, standards, and procedures. The newly designated CJTF and staff should allot time to integrate new personnel and capabilities and to accommodate potential joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners involved with operations in their plans. Mission requirements can limit the time available for the corps headquarters to reorganize itself and become proficient in its JTF headquarters role before its deployment and employment in a joint operations area.

3-6. A CJTF exercises command and control. (Joint doctrine uses the term command and control in place of mission command.) Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1). The commander exercises authority and direction over assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission. The CJTF assesses the situation, makes decisions, and directs action. The JTF staff performs functions that help the CJTF exercise command and control responsibilities. These responsibilities include providing information, performing analysis, preparing plans and orders, and providing assessments on the progress of operations.

3-7. The corps headquarters transforms into a joint staff if it is designated to serve as the core of a JTF headquarters. The corps headquarters Army table of organization and equipment (TO&E) organizes the corps staff into functional integrating cells. The headquarters staff is transitioned into a joint staff with a similar, but more complex functional and integrating elements. The final joint staff structure reflects mission analysis performed to determine required joint staff capabilities for the JTF’s mission. Documenting and manning the JTF’s supporting joint manning document (JMD), determined by mission analysis, begins once the analysis is completed. During this process, the force integration section (once found within the corps assistant chief of staff, plans [G-5] cell, but is now within the plans directorate of a joint staff [J-5]) coordinates with other headquarters staff sections to maintain visibility over the process while the staff transitions from an Army functional cellular organization to the required joint structure. The force integration section prepares the JTF headquarters as it grows in size and receives new capabilities, and becomes a truly joint organization. To facilitate this process, the corps staff, with augmentation, uses joint doctrine for staff functions and activities, referring to joint publications, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff directives, and materials found in the Joint Electronic Library for direction and guidance. Organizational considerations for a JTF headquarters include joint staff organization, staff augmentation, and integration and training of new staff members. (JP 3-33 provides the doctrinal basis for the organization of a JTF headquarters.)

Note. A multinational force is different from a JTF. See JP 3-16 and FM 3-16 for additional information and considerations for forming a multinational force.

JOINT STAFF ORGANIZATION

3-8. A corps headquarters is the preferred Army headquarters to provide the nucleus of a JTF, because it can respond to short notice crisis situations. These crisis situations can be as small as a no-notice permissive noncombatant evacuation operation during unstable peace, or as broad as a general war involving a large multinational coalition or alliance. The corps headquarters requires joint augmentation when tasked to serve as a JTF headquarters based on the directed mission. JP 3-33, chapter II, paragraph 3g provides links to notional JTF headquarters templates that contain JMDs and command and control architectures, systems, software, telecommunications, and video requirements, common JTF headquarters standard operating procedures (SOPs) and learning resources for JTF staff positions.

3-9. No two joint headquarters are the same. Operational mission requirements drive required capabilities, which drive organization, manning, and processes. Commander’s guidance is important on the desired headquarters organizational structure and functions. A clear delineation is established of who is responsible for the necessary headquarters functions supporting commander decisionmaking, particularly with regard to functional versus J-code staffs and their associated meetings; broader operational environment understanding beyond the military threat (including identification of the problem); who conducts assessments; and who plans, conducts, and oversees engagement activities.

3-10. Headquarters staffs have a tendency to increase in size over time. Large headquarters, by their very nature, often take on unnecessary functions, require more internal coordination, and have the potential to overwhelm mission partners with demands and information. All of these factors slow and sometimes reduce focus on providing agile and optimal support to commander decision requirements. A headquarters that is appropriately sized in terms of personnel is more effective. The JTF mission should drive the size and organization of the JTF headquarters.

3-11. The JTF command group is similar to an Army organization with a commander, one or more deputies, a senior enlisted advisor, and several aides and personal assistants. The command group is assisted by personal staff group. Typical members of the CJTF’s personal staff group includes a public affairs officer, staff judge advocate, chaplain, inspector general, command surgeon, provost marshal, safety advisor, and political advisor. The group expands to fit the circumstances, for example, commander’s initiative group, personal interpreters or translators, a cultural advisor, and special liaison officers from joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners.

3-12. The JTF staff is led by the chief of staff who supervises staff actions and serves as the principal integrator. Established and managed staff processes and procedures support the command’s decisionmaking process. The chief of staff oversees organizational integration, efficiency, and effectiveness. Corps primary staff officers assume the roles of joint primary staff officers. Preparation for these roles requires an awareness of joint staff processes for the staff officers’ areas of expertise and an understanding of centers, boards, and working groups under their responsibility upon transition to a JTF headquarters. (See JP 3-33 for additional information on the organization and function of the joint staff.) Figure II-5 in JP 3-33 shows a typical joint task force staff organization.

TRADITIONAL STAFF VERSUS FUNCTIONAL STAFF STRUCTURE

3-13. The traditional J-code structure is the preferred staff structure even though a CJTF often tailors the structure to specific requirements. This structure provides the JTF headquarters with effective and efficient control, accountability, and administration characteristics less evident in other types of organizations. This vertical J-code structure promotes unity of command, speeds hierarchical information flow, and ensures the major directorate principals remain accountable through the chief of staff to the commander for the major functions of the headquarters.

3-14. In addition to clear accountability and authority lines, the J-code structure also adds significant interoperability benefits when compared to other staff structures. It provides all staff members with a position that is readily recognizable within the staff, across the Services and other headquarters, and with multinational and interagency partners. The J-code structure facilitates the rapid integration of staff augments, and enhances communication with outside mission partners. Appendix A of JP 3-33, with its subordinate appendices, contains checklists for the primary joint staff directorates. Appendix C of JP 3-33, with its subordinate appendices, contains checklists for joint task force personal and special staffs.

3-15. As an organizing model, the J-code structure provides a common reference point for broad functional expertise, staff oversight, and accountability, such as logistics and intelligence. The drawback of a purely J- code structure is the tendency, especially in large staffs, to stovepipe information and knowledge within the directorates. This challenge is overcome through staff integration using different types of meetings and operational planning teams (OPTs).

MEETINGS

3-16. The operations directorate (J-3) of a joint staff leads the JTF’s various meetings through its integrating cells: COIC and future operations in cooperation with the plans directorate (J-5). The JTF knowledge management officer (KMO) manages the timing of these meetings via the battle rhythm on behalf of the chief of staff. A JTF uses these meetings to mitigate the concentration of knowledge and expertise in a single staff section and help the staff accomplish mission requirements. The cross-functional expertise of the staff uses these meetings for planning and executing problems presented by the commander. Horizontal, cross- functional meetings built on the vertical J-code structure provide a method of staff integration, successfully used in many joint headquarters.

3-17. A corps headquarters that has transitioned into a joint task force headquarters cannot support an unlimited number of meetings because of its limited number of subject matter experts. There is a higher demand than supply of trained and experienced planners. Low density staff sections, such as staff judge advocates or interagency partners, cannot support unlimited planning efforts. Some of the JTF boards, bureaus, and centers that may be established include:

• Joint personnel reception center. (See JP 1-0.)

• Joint visitors bureau. (See paragraph 3-19.)

• Joint document exploitation center. (See JP 2-01.).

• Joint intelligence support element. (See JP 2-01.)

• Joint interrogation and debriefing center. (See JP 2-01.2.)

• Joint personnel recovery center. (See JP 3-50.)

• Joint fires element. (See JP 3-60)

• Joint targeting coordination board. (See JP 3-60.)

• Media operations center. (see JP 3-61)

• Joint logistics operations center. (See JP 4-0.)

• Joint medical operations center. (See JP 4-02.)

• Joint deployment and distribution operations center. (See JP 4-09.)

• Joint network operations control center. (See JP 6-0.)

3-18. For new staff members, the concept of boards, bureaus, centers, and other working groups and their interaction in support of commander decisionmaking is often confusing. The chief of staff continually reinforces the value and necessity of this horizontal, cross-functional approach to include mandatory participation and support by J-code directorates. Established timelines are kept for each group to ensure meetings do not extend beyond their prescribed time, which can result in scheduled meetings conducted without all the necessary attendees.

3-19. Joint doctrine no longer contains joint visitors’ bureau guidance that was in the rescinded JP 5-00.2. The CJTF establishes this bureau when the influx of visitors to the JTF’s joint operations area exceeds the JTF secretary of the general staff’s ability to handle those visitors as an additional duty. The bureau has a full-time responsibility of assisting the CJTF in handling all visitors, especially distinguished visitors. The CJTF assigns a senior officer as the director of the bureau. Individual staff officers assigned to the bureau should have a protocol background check to ensure proper handling of distinguished visitors. The joint visitors’ bureau is a separate entity on the JTF staff and not a part of a joint information bureau or public affairs office. It can work directly for the CJTF, deputy CJTF, or chief of staff. The individuals assigned to the bureau represent all of the JTF component services. The bureau requires sufficient communications capability to securely coordinate the itineraries of the JTF’s distinguished visitors. Personnel assigned to the bureau may require additional security training in the areas of executive protection and antiterrorism. The bureau director works with the JTF headquarters commandant to arrange suitable mess and quarters for distinguished visitors. The director coordinates with the J-3 and the future operations cell for the transportation and security support necessary to move approved visitors in the joint operations area to accomplish the objectives of their visits.

Boards

3-20. A board is an organized group of individuals within a headquarters appointed by the commander (or other authority) that meets for the purpose of gaining guidance or making decisions. The board’s responsibilities and authority are governed by the authority that established the board. Command boards are chaired by the commander. Functional boards are chaired by another senior staff member to whom the commander delegates authority. A commander uses functional boards to synchronize assets, prioritize plans, or allocate resources.

Bureaus

3-21. Bureaus are no longer defined in joint or Army doctrine because the common English language definition is sufficient. A bureau is a long-standing functional organization with a supporting staff designed to perform a specific function or activity within a joint headquarters.

Cells

3-22. A cell is a subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization of a joint force commander’s headquarters (JP 3-33). Within the JTF headquarters, cells are organized by function or planning horizon.

Centers

3-23. Centers are permanent, cross-functional staff integrating organizations. The joint operations center (JOC) is the most familiar center found in a JTF headquarters. Every JTF headquarters uses a JOC with dedicated manning and facilities to integrate the staff within the current operations’ planning horizon. The JOC focuses on supporting the direct, monitor, assess, and plan functions for the commander within a 72- to 96-hour time horizon.

3-24. The JOC requires significant support from the entire staff and liaison officers (known as LNOs) of subordinate units and other mission partners. Cross-functional representation is necessary from all critical functions affecting the mission. Placement of the functions on the JOC floor is a deliberate process that facilitates cross-functional coordination and synergy. Collocating functions, such as public affairs and information operations (IO) in the JOC, provides added value and speed of coordination.

Working Groups

3-25. Working groups also play an important role in supporting decisionmaking. A working group is an enduring or ad hoc cross-functional organization formed to develop, maintain, and leverage expertise from within and external to the headquarters to provide analysis to users across the three planning horizons. Working groups are manned by the J-codes and other sources of expertise pertaining to the working group’s function. Information flows in both directions between the working groups and the J-code directorates. For example, the logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) representative to a working group is expected to provide subject matter expertise and recommendations regarding the logistics supportability of courses of action, while keeping the J-4 director and staff informed of working group actions and receiving director guidance.

3-26. Proper functioning of the headquarters staff requires consistency of subject matter expertise and directorate-level running estimates among different working groups. At times, the same individual is not able to attend all working groups. Therefore, consistency and knowledge of the running estimates is essential. Each working group simultaneously supports several OPTs.

Operational Planning Teams

3-27. The CJTF, chief of staff, and joint staff directors establish OPTs to solve a single problem related to a task or requirement on a single planning horizon. In most cases, OPTs are not enduring and dissolve upon completion of the assigned task. The CJTF, chief of staff, and joint staff directors can also establish one or more enduring OPTs to work on a closely related group of problems, such as strategy and campaign plans. OPT membership is determined by the staff officer responsible for the planning horizon in which the OPT is working, for example, the J-5 for future plans, the future operations cell, and the current operations cell. As the OPT progresses through the planning process, it interacts with the working groups that can provide expertise related to the specific planning problem. The structure of each OPT is based on the planning task assigned. The structure includes a minimum of a maneuver planner, an intelligence planner, and a logistics officer as the core of an OPT.

EQUIPMENT

3-28. Joint headquarters formation also involves acquisition and distribution of joint mission-essential equipment. Equipping a JTF headquarters, formed around an Army corps headquarters, is closely associated with augmentation. No single Service possesses all the command and control information systems and equipment required by a JTF headquarters, unless the mission is limited in scope and duration. This especially applies to establishing links with joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners. (For example, a United States Air Force (USAF) C-40C can act as an airborne JOC. The U.S. Navy’s LCC-19, USS Blue Ridge, and LCC-20, USS Mount Whitney, can provide a JTF headquarters with the necessary command and control information systems and equipment to act as a JTF headquarters. However, space limitations on each ship restrict the size of the JTF headquarters to a size of roughly 350 individuals.) An Army corps headquarters, allocated to the geographic combatant commander, plans on being employed as the nucleus of a JTF headquarters. The Army corps headquarters develops a list of the required joint equipment for this role through mission analysis and identifies equipment shortfalls. Most of the items on this list are electronic communications equipment. This equipment list contains information on the required equipment available in theater and is identified as a shortfall. A corps headquarters designated to form the nucleus of a JTF headquarters works with the Army Service component command (ASCC) and the joint community to meet shortfalls through requisitions and redistribution. The joint enabling capabilities command can supply, either permanently or on a temporary basis, shortfalls in equipment. Most equipment necessary to give a corps headquarters full JTF capabilities is acquired from other sources to include commercial sources.

3-29. The joint mission-essential equipment list consists of equipment and capabilities required to build on the base. Equipment is added in blocks; each block is incrementally added to the JTF headquarters to meet the projected mission demands. For a corps headquarters, the foundation block consists of its organic Service- provided capabilities, followed by equipment received from the theater army and the theater signal command or brigade. Usually these capabilities are internal systems that consist of computers with software applications, operating systems, office applications and security, associated peripherals, and servers. To fill the gaps, units identify any continuing shortfall between needs and capability, refine a joint mission-essential equipment list, and submit a request through joint or Army channels.

3-30. For the Army-based JTF headquarters and associated Army units, equipping a transitioning corps headquarters involves the ASCC for the supported combatant commander within whose area of responsibility the JTF will be operating. The equipment available in theater comes from three sources: theater property, Army pre-positioned stocks (with Secretary of Defense-level authorizations in those locations where they exist), and theater sustainment stocks. The ASCC, geographic combatant commander, and the joint enablers cannot always provide the necessary equipment. Some equipment is not commercially available. In these cases, units can follow the chain of command to the joint staff to process an operational needs statement. Often, needed equipment includes technical systems related to worldwide communications, additional bandwidth, and video, voice, and data services from military and commercial sources. Deployable joint enablers such as the joint communications support element and the deployable joint command and control system element are the first line of support for outside assistance. Chapter 7 provides additional information on communication support.

3-31. Coordination for the logistical sustainment of the JTF is the responsibility of the CJTF, exercised through the JTF J-4. The JTF J-4, in coordination with the combatant command J-4, ensures common-user logistics are planned and monitored throughout operations. The Military Departments’ contributing forces to the JTF are responsible for the sustainment of their forces within the JTF. Therefore, the ASCC has Title 10 responsibilities for Army forces within the JTF. JTF J-4 logisticians should understand how each of the Services conducts logistics at the operational level. (See JP 4-0 for further joint logistics information and requirements.)

3-32. The corps headquarters often uses its own information systems when designated as the base for a JTF headquarters. However, situationally dependent, it may fall in on or receive new systems. The corps assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6) needs to consider numerous joint, interorganizational, and multinational partner information systems and their associated databases. Integrating these systems and establishing interoperability or workarounds with the corps’ currently fielded information systems presents training, technical, and operations security challenges for the corps headquarters as it continues to effectively support the commander’s exercise of mission command. A significant part of the predeployment preparation in the corps’ command posts involves training in using these systems. JP 6-0 discusses the joint communications system and provides planning and operations considerations associated with joint communications.

3-33. Often, the technical integration of differing information systems presents a greater challenge because forces do not share databases and operating systems across technical boundaries. With hundreds of potential applications and thousands of potential users, the staff establishes and monitors the corps and joint network infrastructure architectures for reliability. Many commercial business and military information systems compete for the same bandwidth. This occurrence is often true when the JTF deploys into an operational environment and a joint operations area in phase 0 or I of a campaign. An overreliance on an untrustworthy system can lead to communications and information transfer problems if the system fails, hampering a commander’s ability to lead the force. Likewise, operations security is an important consideration for systems using an air gap to transfer voice and data from one control node to another. Commanders and staffs understand the levels of security and security classifications of all the systems resident in the corps command posts.

STAFF AUGMENTATION

3-34. The corps commander and staff may not have the required expertise to fill all JTF positions based on the mission. The JTF mission dictates the required skill set of the staff. Some skill sets are readily available from the combatant commander and Army sources, but others require lead time and must be formally requested, especially one-of-a-kind, national-level assets such as the joint communications support element. (JP 3-33 addresses staff augmentation in some detail.) Figure 3-1 on page 3-8 portrays some enablers available that augment the corps headquarters, forming it into a joint headquarters.

Figure 3-1. Augmenting the corps staff

3-35. The CJTF determines the augmentation requirements needed for the task and coordinates support through the establishing headquarters. Augmentation of the corps staff is essential in transitioning the corps to a JTF structure. Augmentation is organized using a modular concept to address the various staff entities such as—

• Command and staff.

• Headquarters support and sustainment (life support functions).

• Signal support.

• Security support for the JTF headquarters.

• Augmentation in technical areas, such as civil affairs and military information support operations (MISO).

3-36. Although augmentation is tailored for the mission, some augmentation is required in—

• Intelligence collection.

• Joint planning procedures.

• Logistics planning.

• Signal support, especially Global Command and Control System–Army (known as GCCS–A) access.

• Medical planning.

Augmentation in these areas ensure linkage between the JTF staff and the combatant command staff concerning access to information and capabilities available at the combatant command level.

3-37. Mission analysis conducted during predeployment or during deployment identifies personnel requirements. These requirements are documented on JMDs. Identified personnel requirements are filled if the JTF has a high enough priority. The Joint Force Headquarters Training Website provides JMD with a variety of situations to include:

• Joint Force Headquarters Phase IV (Stabilize).

• JTF Disaster Relief.

• JTF Detainee.

• JTF-Counter Terrorism (Horn of Africa).

• JTF-Noncombatant Evacuation Operation for both the Navy and the United States Marine Corps (USMC).

• JTF-Inauguration.

• JTF-Humanitarian Assistance for the USAF.

• JTF Olympics.

Additional resources include joint command and control equipment and training. The development, validation, and fill process for the JMD is often tedious and slow. The corps prepares to handle the situation without assistance, at least initially, with key support by individual augmentation from within theater.

3-38. A newly-designated JTF headquarters requires additional resources not organic to the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion. A notional JMD for small-scale contingency operations requires roughly 650 personnel. The corps headquarters can fill roughly 480 of these positions. U.S. Army Forces Command and other Army resources provide other required resources, such as regional language and cultural experts, in addition to public affairs, civil affairs, and operational contract support expertise. However, there are roughly 35 positions that must be filled by subject matter experts from the other services. There is also a need to receive augmentation from other governmental agencies operating within the joint operations area.

3-39. Individual and unit augmentation to the JTF is crucial to operational readiness. Based on mission analysis, the corps commander fills key billets with the right people. Examples of these are: deputy commanders, the chief of staff, political advisors, principal staff officers, cultural advisors, knowledge management (KM) officer, and key multinational and interagency embedded staff officers. By-name requests from the commander are not uncommon. Existing personal relationships and trust and confidence building are factors when developing an emerging JTF staff.

3-40. Augmentation for each JTF staff section is available from agencies and organizations that support the joint community, including the ASCC, theater-level commands, other geographic combatant commander service commands, and national agencies. Each staff section has two key tasks for mission analysis. The first task is to forecast the required fill of its authorized positions. The second task is to identify the vacancies to be filled by external sources. Effective augmentation requires filling JMD slots quickly. Team building and a thorough understanding of the mission and associated tasks are accomplished when the team members work together from the start and train together in all preparation activities. These joint augmentees are often familiar with traditional staff organizations and require deliberate orientation when operating with a corps staff organized along functional lines.

INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION

3-41. Newly-formed JTF headquarters receives individual augmentees, to include Army personnel identified and requested by the corps commander and principal staff or plugs to fill slots in the JMD. Identifying suitable individual augmentees is an early task of the corps staff. Determining the number, skill set, type, and availability of augmentees occurs while the JTF is still in the forming stages, which enables the headquarters to request military, DA Civilians, representatives from other government agencies, and contractors. Once individual augmentees have been identified and joined the corps staff, they may require additional training or certification before allowed to deploy or execute their duties on the J-staff. Frequently, individual augmentees are functional experts who chair, provide guidance, or serve on meetings (to include working groups and boards), centers, cells, and planning teams associated with joint operations. As with other augmentation, individual augmentees may not remain until mission accomplishment. (See CJCSI 1301.01F for additional information on joint individual augmentation procedures.)

JOINT ORGANIZATIONAL AUGMENTATION

3-42. Several joint organizations exist to augment the joint community in the execution of military operations. In addition to deployment support, many of these organizations support service training exercises as resources allow. They also support other training exercises that were forecasted early enough to include in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise program. Some joint enabling capability entities are self- supporting, while others require support from the supported headquarters. The entities listed in JP 3-33 are valuable assets to a newly-designated JTF headquarters.

Joint Enabling Capabilities Command

3-43. The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) is a subordinate command of the U.S. Transportation Command. It provides mission-tailored, ready, joint capability packages to combatant commanders to facilitate rapid establishment of joint force headquarters and, as available, provides support to other validated combatant commander requirements. This command provides the commander of a JTF with short-duration (less than 120 days) support to rapidly establish, organize, and operate a JTF headquarters. The command consists of three alert-postured subordinate elements: Joint Communications Support Element, Joint Public Affairs Support Element, and Joint Planning Support Element. The U.S. Transportation Command deploys forces from this command in the form of a joint enabling capability package. By design, this package is modular, scalable, and tailored to the mission. It consists of active and reserve component forces and includes elements from one or more of the command’s subordinate elements.

3-44. The JECC combines the capabilities of seven unique functional areas to deliver tailored, mission- specific support: operations, plans, logistics, intelligence support, KM, communications, and public affairs. These capabilities are embedded in the JECC’s three subordinate joint commands. While a standard ready package can include up to 74 personnel (a combination of active, reserve, and civilian personnel), the joint force commander can tailor the package to meet specific needs.

Joint Communications Support Element

3-45. The Joint Communications Support Element consists of a headquarters support squadron and communications support detachment, three active squadrons, two Air National Guard squadrons, and one Army Reserve squadron. This element provides rapid, reliable, and interoperable communications that link the CJTF and staff to the President of the U.S. and the Secretary of Defense, geographic combatant commanders, their component headquarters, joint special operations task forces, and multinational partners. This element’s tactical communication packages vary in capability from small initial-entry and early-entry teams that enable rapid formation of a JTF headquarters to a significantly larger deployable joint command and control systems. They can provide en route communications support. These packages support missions across the globe as well as missions in support of homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). As a low-density, high-value asset, the joint communications support element may not remain in support of a JTF headquarters for the duration of its mission.

Joint Public Affairs Support Element

3-46. A joint public affairs support element provides a geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, such as a CJTF, with a rapidly-deployable and scalable team that is trained and equipped, and has knowledge of joint public affairs, media operations, and Service and joint policies. They provide a standing, rapidly-deployable, turnkey joint public affairs capability to support operational requirements. This element has an early-entry capability that enables the supported CJTF to gain and maintain initiative in the information environment. Training teams from the joint public affairs support element provide joint public affairs training to enable joint force commanders and their staffs to meet evolving information environment challenges in their respective operational areas. Each training team forms the core of a scalable public affairs response capability, and a ready, mission-tailored force package to support exercises and to deploy in support of the combatant commands for operations and contingencies.

Joint Planning Support Element

3-47. The Joint Planning Support element provides rapidly-deployable, tailored joint planners who bring expertise to accelerate formation and increase the effectiveness of a new joint force headquarters. Composed of personnel experienced in joint operations, understand joint doctrine, and are trained in the joint operation planning process (JOPP), this element provides expertise in operations, planning, logistics, intelligence support, and knowledge sharing. Operations and plans personnel can integrate into a joint force J-3 or J-5 staff or help form the core of newly-formed operations or plans battle staff. Logistics personnel can integrate into the J-4 staff to help integrate, coordinate, and implement joint logistics planning and operations in various logistics and personnel areas. Intelligence specialists can integrate into the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) and assist with various aspects of intelligence support to help the joint force effectively neutralize enemy forces. Knowledge sharing specialists can integrate into the J-3 staff to collect, process, and share information and create an environment of shared understanding.

Requesting Joint Enabling Capabilities Command Support

3-48. Joint force commanders, through their combatant commands, have various options for requesting JECC capabilities. Joint force commanders can determine the option that best suits their requirements.

Global Response Force

3-49. The Secretary of Defense delegated to the commander of the U.S. Transportation Command the authority to deploy JECC capabilities in accordance with the Global Response Force Execute Order. Under this order, the commander, U.S. Transportation Command deploys portions or all JECC capabilities based on a request from a combatant commander. The Secretary of Defense must be notified within 24 hours of authorizing a JECC Global Response Force deployment. Combatant commanders request JECC support under Global Response Force authorities for an impending operational requirement, such as an imminent crisis or natural disaster. In a Global Response Force deployment, JECC forces can deploy within hours. However, Global Response Force deployments are limited to 120 days.

Request for Forces Process

3-50. The JECC also provides capabilities through the traditional Request for Forces process. Under this process, a combatant command submits a formal Request for Forces to the joint staff, which validates the request for the Secretary of Defense’s approval. Once the Secretary of Defense signs the request, in accordance with the Global Force Management Allocation Plan, JECC forces can deploy. This process allows JECC forces to arrive within weeks; it is traditionally used for emergent requirements as directed by the Global Force Management Allocation Plan. Although the process to obtain capabilities is significantly longer, Request for Forces deployments allow forces to deploy for more than the 120-day limit set forth in Global Response Force deployments.

Joint Exercise Program

3-51. Each JECC subordinate command participates in priority combatant command exercises. JECC support for joint exercise program events are requested through the Joint Training Information Management System process. Requests for JECC exercise support are approved on a case-by-case basis by the commander,

U.S. Transportation Command in accordance with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise priorities. JECC participation in combatant command joint exercise events are continually assessed based on exercise schedule, combatant command demand, and operational constraints.

3-52. JECC forces are sometimes requested for other joint operational requirements via routine temporary duty travel orders. These requests are approved on a not-to-interfere basis with JECC primary mission requirements. The requesting combatant command may use informal channels for this type of support. The J-3 of the U.S. Transportation Command requests and approves temporary duty support on a case-by-case basis.

National Intelligence Support Team

3-53. A national intelligence support team (known as NIST) provides a rapidly-deployable and mission- tailored national intelligence reach back capability to provide a national-level, deployable, all-source intelligence team to meet a JTF’s intelligence requirements. National intelligence support teams are nationally sourced and composed of expert intelligence and communications analysts, communicators, and managers from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and other agencies. Request for this national asset is coordinated with the Director of National Intelligence in cooperation with the supported geographic combatant commander.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

3-54. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is a DOD agency providing subject matter expert augmentees to counter weapons of mass destruction (known as WMD) (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives). This agency provides capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat, and mitigate its effects. It supports combatant commanders and JTF staffs with specialists on developing necessary offensive and defensive tools, and equipping Soldiers for chemical or biological attacks.

Joint Communications Security Monitoring Activity

3-55. The Joint Communications Security Monitoring Activity provides information security monitoring and analysis support to a JTF. This activity is a Joint Chiefs of Staff-sponsored organization operating under the auspices of the National Security Agency. Its mission is to conduct communications security monitoring (collection, analysis, and reporting) of DOD-encrypted and unencrypted telecommunications signals and automated information systems and monitoring of related non-communications signals. The purpose is to identify vulnerabilities exploitable by potential adversaries and to recommend countermeasures and corrective actions.

Joint Personnel Recovery Agency

3-56. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency is a chairman controlled activity, aligned under the Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development. The agency provides joint guidance, develops and conducts joint training, provides support to deployed forces, collects joint lessons learned, and supports joint policy and doctrine development. The agency provides exercise support to joint force commanders and staff as requested, and supports operational implementation of joint personnel recovery policy.

Joint Warfare Analysis Center

3-57. The Joint Warfare Analysis Center assists in preparation and analysis of joint operations plans and service chiefs’ analysis of weapons effectiveness. It supports both crisis operations and contingency planning. The center provides this support to JTFs through the supported combatant command. It is a functional component of the U.S. Strategic Command.

Defense Logistics Agency

3-58. The Defense Logistics Agency supports the JTF using various capabilities, to include Defense Logistics Agency contingency support teams and other experts imbedded physically or virtually with the JTF. These teams provide liaison officers and functional experts with logistic planning experience, logistic surge, and sustainment expertise to the agency. Team capabilities include logistics assistance teams to address supply management issues, disposal remediation teams to manage disposal of hazardous waste, distribution operations teams to provide expertise in distribution management, and fuel support teams to serve as a liaison in bulk fuel operations.

U.S. Cyber Command

3-59. U.S. Cyber Command is a subunified command under U.S. Strategic Command. U.S. Cyber Command plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities to direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks (DODINs) and conducts, when directed, full- spectrum military cyberspace operations to enable actions in the operational environment, and to facilitate U.S. and multinational partner freedom of action in cyberspace while denying the same to our adversaries.

Deployable Joint Command and Control System

3-60. The deployable joint command and control system is a command and control element providing the geographic combatant commander and subordinate JTF headquarters with a full range of interoperable, robust, standardized, and scalable systems and tools for planning, executing, and assessing joint operations. This system provides the integrated hardware and software suites that allow commanders to exercise command and control over widely-dispersed forces using multiple data sources and communications alternatives.

POSSIBLE ARMY AUGMENTATION FROM THEATER ASSETS

3-61. Wherever deployed, the corps headquarters serving as a JTF headquarters falls under the administrative control (ADCON) of an ASCC. Depending on the type and duration of the mission, the supported geographic combatant command may direct certain Army organizations. These Army organizations, in the combatant command’s AOR, provide individual or unit augmentation to enable the JTF headquarters to accomplish its mission. These Army organizations include—

• Theater sustainment command (TSC).

• Signal command (theater).

• Military intelligence brigade (theater).

• Civil affairs brigade or command.

• Medical command (deployment support).

• Theater aviation command.

3-62. Other potential augmenting organizations include a battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC) or air defense artillery brigade, and other functional organizations. These organizations often work with contracting; CBRN, ordnance disposal; engineering; military police (MP); information tasks; aviation; and space support.

OTHER SERVICES AND LIAISON OFFICERS

3-63. The JTF headquarters provides trained and knowledgeable liaison teams in addition to receiving liaison teams. Both the composition of the teams and the number required are maintained throughout the mission. Liaison detachments have four functions: monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist. Each team sent to superior, subordinate, adjacent, or supporting organizations has enough staff to provide 24-hour coverage and sufficient rank structure to gain access to the appropriate level at the receiving command. Each liaison team received from a sending unit is integrated into the staff and accommodated with work space, communications, protection, life support, and sufficient access to the commander and appropriate staff to accomplish its mission. Each corps liaison team experiences challenges when assigned to distant locations. Often, the teams have limited transportation assets needed to receive guidance, supplies, mail, and morale support.

3-64. Upon designation as a JTF headquarters, during either a short- or no-notice contingency or upon activation in support of a planned, deliberate operation, the corps commander deploys liaison teams to the supported combatant commander. The primary tasks of the liaison team are to coordinate operational plans and orders, determine joint communications requirements and gaps, and coordinate joint staff augmentation to the corps headquarters. The CJTF may also deploy liaison teams to supporting or subordinate service commands assigned to the JTF.

3-65. The JTF needs to establish liaison with any theater special operations command or task force currently or projected to have forces operating within the JTF’s joint operations area. (The theater special operations command has a support relationship with its geographic combatant commander but is assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command. It does not have a command relationship with the supported combatant commander.) This liaison is in the form of the JTF headquarters receiving a liaison team for the special operations command or task force. In some rare situations, the JTF sends a liaison team to the special operations command or task forces headquarters.

3-66. Current doctrine identifies the chief of staff as the central point of contact for liaison operations. However, the number of liaison teams in joint operations with a large military, intergovernmental, and multinational force may make this requirement impractical. An alternative solution is to establish a liaison office in the main command post associated with the movement and maneuver cell. This office contains a director and a small staff to control liaison operations, sent from and received by the corps headquarters. An individual of sufficient rank directs and staffs the office to control the operation who has ready access to corps senior leaders to facilitate information exchange. Liaison office functions include maintaining liaison rosters, managing status reporting and accountability, serving as an information clearinghouse, and providing communications systems. The liaison office also acts as the point of contact for life support and other liaison support operations, such as protection, medical assistance, and security.

3-67. Digital liaison detachments augment corps headquarters, especially when serving as a JTF or land component command (LCC). Each detachment of 30 personnel can establish a liaison with a multinational division or higher headquarters and provide digital connectivity with subordinate maneuver, fires, intelligence, sustainment, and air and missile defense systems within the Army mission command system. Alternatively, these detachments can divide into two or more teams to provide connectivity to two or more brigade-sized elements. (These are limited assets that are not always available to the JTF.)

3-68. Adequate liaison is most important to a corps headquarters transitioning to a joint headquarters during critical situations that determine success or failure. Examples include situations during predeployment academic and training exercises; during reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI); before new equipment training; and during the first few weeks as a joint headquarters. (Annex C to appendix A of JP 3-33 contains a checklist for JTF liaison personnel.)

OTHER AUGMENTATION OR COLLABORATIVE CAPABILITIES

3-69. Modern operational environments contain more than just military organizations, especially if the JTF is engaged in the conduct of stability or DSCA tasks. These organizations provide the JTF with capabilities not found in the military. Capabilities are augmented or collaborative. The joint enabling capabilities are a type of augmentation. Interagency enabling capabilities, such as linguistic, interpreter, and cultural support, do not augment the JTF staff. Rather, they are collaborators focusing on the same objectives. They often join a corps headquarters serving as a JTF headquarters after it arrives in the joint operational area.

3-70. Reaching out to joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners during the initial formation of the JTF headquarters is important so those partners have the time they need to provide these collaborative capabilities. The corps leverages pre-existing relationships where possible to expedite the inclusion of these partners. When working with these partner organizations the commander influences their personnel selection processes when and where necessary. Maintenance of current and accurate billet descriptions helps ensure that the personnel provided by those joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners have the right qualifications.

Interagency Enabling Capabilities

3-71. Interagency enabling capabilities provide skills that military forces lack in sufficient quantities to support mission accomplishment. Inadequate staffing and training of required interagency personnel can inhibit this process. Other U.S. government departments are not manned, trained, or equipped to provide this support. The interagency representative provided by non-DOD activities of the U.S. Government may come with a skill set not fully ready for the mission. JTF leadership must identify knowledge shortfalls and provide orientation and training to JTF members. This orientation and training may involve providing equipment to facilitate access to the common operational picture (COP) and JTF databases.

3-72. An Army corps headquarters designated as a JTF headquarters can expect to interact with and perhaps receive and provide direct support to other government agencies. These agencies include the American embassy country team, the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, and Department of Transportation. Likewise, independent agencies of the U.S. government are often involved in military operations, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and, the U.S. Agency for International Development. The list expands considerably when state and local government entities are included.

3-73. Overseas, the JTF headquarters comes in contact with representatives of international organizations, such as the United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and the hundreds of nongovernmental organizations. While many of these organizations try to remain neutral by not associating directly with the JTF, many interact with it as they pursue their specialized missions. Host-nation governments, whether they welcome the U.S. presence or not, do interact with the JTF headquarters, and, therefore, need accommodations. (See JP 3-08 for further information on interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental coordination.)

Linguist, Interpreter, and Cultural Support

3-74. Linguists and interpreters (to include translators) are often critical to JTF operations. The corps coordinates with the ASCC G-2 or combatant command J-2 for appropriate linguist support. Interpreters transfer the meaning of one spoken language into another spoken language. Translators render the meaning of one written language into another written language. Foreign deployments often require language proficiency—especially for local dialects—that require language skills beyond those typically resident in the geographic combatant commander or JTF staffs. Linguists can provide valuable training to the JTF staff and key personnel for a specific joint operations area. Early in the planning and forming stages of the JTF’s lifecycle, staff identify and resource the requirements for linguists, interpreters, and translators.

3-75. Integrating interpreters and translators into the JTF occurs as soon as possible to obtain security clearance and finalize contractual agreements. In-place procedures are required to identify the interpreter chain of command and the scope of interpreter duties. The corps headquarters develops procedures to vet interpreters and translators to uncover biases. The staff considers the possibility that they may not have the best interests of the JTF foremost in their minds. Other positions are sourced through vetted, contracted interpreters. In the event of a shortage of human linguists, translators, and interpreters, JTFs have considered and used machine foreign language translation devices as a stop-gap measure for translation needs.

3-76. Cultural support goes beyond the use of local interpreters and local hires to perform life support tasks. Inserting U.S. forces into a different culture creates a dynamic for the Army to address. Each JTF requires cultural intelligence to successfully deal with the local population. Knowledge of the local culture in terms of the social, political, economic, and demographic factors contributes to understanding a people’s culture or a nation’s history, institutions, psychology, religious beliefs, and behaviors. Increasing cultural awareness using Department of State regional experts, assigned civil affairs forces and staff sections, special operations forces (SOF) with regional expertise, or civilian academics with language and cultural understanding facilitates the planning, preparation, and execution of military operations. Additionally, foreign area officers from the security cooperation division of the ASCC headquarters or internal staff personnel from the corps G-9 may serve as political or cultural advisors to the corps or subordinate commanders.

INTEGRATION AND TRAINING

3-77. A nonunit augmentee or deploying joint enabling capability member can join a JTF deploying to an area of operations outside the continental U.S. for an exercise or an operational deployment, which usually occurs within 30 days of the headquarters deploying or only after the headquarters deploys. In either case, all military, DOD civilians, and contractors authorized to accompany the force complete predeployment processing for overseas movement and required training at a home station, continental replacement center, or at an individual deployment site. The supported geographic combatant commander may waive the requirement for an individual to participate in this training on a by-exception basis. (See DA PAM 600-81.)

3-78. Integration and training occur once the JTF is formed and begins work. The integration occurs in two environments: when the augmentee arrives at the JTF location, and when the augmentee is assigned to a staff section or other staff element. Integrating individuals and small teams into the JTF staff is challenging. Whether during the initial organizational phase or during the training and replacement of individuals and capabilities while deployed, and particularly for individuals from outside the Army assigned to the JTF in leadership and other positions, such as a Marine as the JTF J-5. The JTF headquarters commandant, normally the corps headquarters battalion commander, is identified as the integration point of contact. This commandant controls reception, administrative processing, and life support resources that are initial concerns, such as billeting, messing, and transportation. With oversight by the corps chief of staff, the JTF staff assists the headquarters commandant’s staff with establishing procedures for reception, initial orientation, personnel accountability, and strength reporting, training, and security.

3-79. The appropriate number of augmentees in the correct slots may not contribute fully to mission accomplishment without proper reception, integration, and training. The Joint Force Headquarters Training website (see references) provides guidance for joint training policy, joint force headquarters operating procedures, and joint training tasks and references to guide principles in training their joint staff directorates and established meetings. See CJCSM 3500.03E for more information.) The joint training system stems from these guiding principles:

• Use joint doctrine. It provides the basis for education and training as well as describes the employment means of U.S. forces in support of national ends.

• Use commanders as primary trainers. Commanders are responsible for preparing their commands to accomplish assigned missions.

• Focus on the mission. Training focuses on mission-essential tasks of the command in support of assigned missions.

• Train the way you intend to fight. As much as possible, make conditions and standards resemble those expected during a deployment or other mission thorough live, virtual, or constructive training.

• Centralize planning and decentralize execution. With overarching training objectives always in mind, the training and exercise program of the command trains every echelon from the commander to the Soldier.

• Link training assessment to readiness assessment. The command is fit to fight and all aspects of the training and exercise program is measured to determine organizational readiness.

3-80. Establishing a joint reception center facilitates the reception, initial processing, accountability, onward movement, and integration of replacements, augmentees, contractors authorized to accompany the force, and others. The responsibility of the manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1), the joint reception center coordinates with the J-4 for billeting, transportation, food service, medical support, and other requirements for new personnel. In one location or dispersed, the joint reception center accounts for multiple entry and exit points into the joint operations area. It provides orientations, briefings, religious support, initial billeting, joint training, onward movement of units or personnel, and accountability of all personnel joining the JTF. Briefings cover rules of engagement, rules for the use of force, cultural concerns, safety, operations security, and familiarization with JTF headquarters, dining areas, and other facilities. (See JP 3-33 and JP 1-0 for additional information on the joint reception center.)

3-81. For strength accountability, the joint reception center is equally important as an out-processing center. The JTF J-1 is responsible for reporting the total number of personnel (such as military, DOD Civilian, and contractors authorized to accompany the force) physically present in the JTF joint operations area to the combatant command’s J-1. (See CJCSM 3150.13C for additional information on the joint personnel reporting structure.)

3-82. The staff principal, with the help of the JTF joint reception center, has responsibility of orienting and training staff elements. For ease of integration, JTF personnel from all the Services staff the joint reception center to handle Service-specific requirements.

3-83. Assuming the mission profile is known at the time of activation, the joint mission-essential task list and comprehensive joint training plan, developed in accordance with CJCSM 3500.03E and refined for the mission at hand, drives training. The joint mission-essential task list is directed by the combatant commander and derived from doctrinal sources. The corps headquarters staff and designated augmentees have integration and training opportunities to master the tasks identified in the CJCSM 3500.04F and JP 3-33. The joint force command’s knowledge development and distribution capability uses Internet-based distance learning. This learning prepares staff and augmentees for joint duty before and during deployment, exercise participation, and collective training. Its courses serve to orient those with limited knowledge of joint operations and reinforce previous training. This self-study combines with the periodic augmentee training provided by the geographic combatant commanders and others to ground the staff in joint doctrine and practice. Individual training efforts expose students to joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as subject matter experts. These efforts enable students to develop a knowledge base so they can more quickly interact with joint staff colleagues.

3-84. The foundation built during individual training is further enhanced with a series of collective training events. Some events are previously scheduled or part of a predeployment readiness program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsors command post exercises, mission readiness exercises, mission rehearsals, and staff assistance visits from the joint staff, combatant commanders, and others. This training reinforces learning, builds cohesion, and generates lessons learned. The corps headquarters designated as a potential JTF headquarters can expect to execute these collective training exercises in a combination of training environments, such as—

• Live (real people in real locations using real equipment).

• Virtual simulation (real people in a simulation-driven situation).

• Constructive simulation (wholly simulated).

The combination of each of these environments creates a more realistic training environment for the corps headquarters. In most cases, these training exercises are the first time augmenting personnel are available to perform their new responsibilities. These exercises are most likely the first time the new JTF headquarters is able to learn the capabilities and limitations of the new equipment provided.

3-85. The acceptable readiness standard for a JTF capable headquarters is established by the gaining combatant commander. The gaining combatant commander should promulgate JTF headquarters readiness guidance that identifies the criteria and process by which the corps commander prepares, matures, and verifies the corps headquarters readiness to perform the envisioned missions. CJCSI 3401.02B and supporting publications provide guidance in how the corps reports its readiness against combatant commander approved JTF headquarters mission. (See Appendix B of JP 3-33 for additional information on readiness.)

SECTION II – PLANNING JOINT OPERATIONS

3-86. Joint operation planning consists of planning activities associated with joint military operations by combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders, such as the corps commander when designated as a CJTF. This planning is done in response to the deliberate or crisis action planning processes. Planning transforms national strategic objectives into activities by development of operational products that include planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. (JP 5-0 discusses joint operation planning.) CJCSM 3122.01A, CJSCM 3122.02D, and CJCSM 3130.03 build on the joint doctrine contained in JP 5-0 by providing specific planning execution policies, procedures, and formats.

3-87. Prioritization and resourcing of planning efforts is an important function to retain staff focus on actions important to the commander. Typically, the corps G-5 (JTF J-5) is the commander’s executive agent for deliberate planning. This planning process develops base operations and contingency plans that the corps staff can modify for execution during contingencies. The corps assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) (JTF J-3) is the commander’s executive agent during crisis action planning.

3-88. Commander-led understanding of the JTF operational environment allows the staff to better focus their planning efforts. The commander needs to be involved in identifying the problems and challenges facing the JTF, and developing an operational approach to solve those problems. Gaining an understanding of the environment and identifying the problem requires significant dialogue with senior leaders, mission partners, and stakeholders (those individuals and organizations having a vested interested in the successful accomp- lishment of the JTF mission).

3-89. The corps commander, as the CJTF, strives to achieve a comprehensive approach with mission partners through continuous dialogue with the geographic combatant commander and possibly the National Command Authorities. The commander translates this dialogue into military tasks, subsequent development of desired conditions and favorable outcomes, and issuance of guidance and intent to subordinates to achieve unity of effort with joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners in accomplishing the mission.

OPERATIONAL ART AND OPERATIONAL DESIGN

3-90. The CJTF and staff develop plans (and orders) through the application of operational art and operational design and by using APEX. Operational art is the use of creative thinking by commanders and staffs to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces (JP 3- 0). They combine art and science to develop products that describe how (ways) the JTF will employ its capabilities (means) to achieve the military end state (ends). The interaction of operational art and operational design provides a bridge between strategy and tactics, linking national strategic aims to tactical combat and noncombat operations that must be executed to accomplish those aims.

3-91. The commander is the central figure in operational art, due not only to education and experience, but also because the commander’s judgment and decisions are required to guide the staff through the process. Operational design requires the commander to encourage discourse and leverage dialogue and collaboration to identify and solve complex, ill-defined problems.

3-92. The operational approach is a commander’s description of the broad actions the force must take to achieve the desired military end state. The operational approach is based largely on an understanding of the operational environment and the problem facing the CJTF. Three distinct aspects of a methodology collectively assist with producing an operational approach:

• Understand the strategic direction.

• Understand the operational environment.

• Define the problem.

3-93. Operational design employs various elements to develop and refine the CJTF’s operational approach. These conceptual tools helps the CJTF and the JTF staff think through the challenges of understanding the operational environment, defining the problem, and developing this approach, which guides planning and shapes the concept of operations. These elements are:

• Termination.

• Military end state.

• Objectives.

• Effects.

• Center of gravity.

• Decisive points.

• Lines of operations and lines of effort.

• Direct and indirect approach.

• Anticipation.

• Operational reach.

• Culmination.

• Arranging operations.

• Forces and functions.

See JP 5-0 for additional information on operational art and operational design.

ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY

3-94. A CJTF can adapt the Army design methodology (as one tool of many possible methods) for use by the JTF headquarters to help understand, visualize, and describe problems that hinder mission accomplishment and identify approaches to solve those problems. Design is useful to this process in complex and ill-defined situations. Identifying the problem is critical to finding solutions. Design actions generally involve more dialogue, questioning, and critical and artful thinking when compared with other planning methodologies because of its more deliberate, analytical thinking and the detailed production of plans and orders. The new CJTF must recognize the value of the differences between design and planning procedures, and how they relate, interact, and respond with each other. Proper design is important to ensuring successful planning. See ATP 5-0.1 for additional information on the Army design methodology.

3-95. Recent JTFs have approached design in many ways, often reflecting which of the three types of JTF headquarters they are—standing, rotational, or crisis—and whether they are functionally or geographically oriented. The mission of each JTF headquarters affects the respective challenges in approaching design. Standing JTF headquarters have some advantages, in that relationships required in applying a comprehensive approach are formed and cultivated over longer periods of time.

3-96. Rotational JTF headquarters, have the benefit of time to monitor, assess, and identify a change to the environment and problem, and as necessary change the operational approach. However, these JTF headquarters also face a challenge in the tendency to revisit design activities each time a new nucleus headquarters deploys due to the large personnel turnover and the new CJTF opting to develop their own individualized operational approach rather than continuing with the current approach. This can be disruptive, not only to subordinate units, but also for coordination with other mission partners and overall progress. A best practice in this situation is to share design products and thoughts with subordinate units and external stakeholders as early and often as possible during design activities. Another best practice is to ensure design product classification is a level promoting sharing to the greatest extent possible.

KEY JTF PLANNING PRACTICES

3-97. Key planning practices for the JTF include—

• The JTF should leverage up-front design work to guide its planning efforts.

• The JTF headquarters should organize itself to operate in three planning horizons—current, future, and plans—to maintain a balanced perspective in setting conditions and facilitate the large number of planning efforts.

• The JTF’s planners stay in constant contact with the CJTF through focused meetings, staff huddles, and decision boards to gain the commander’s guidance or direction.

• The CJTF uses commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and individual personal assessments to inform and assist the planners’ situational understanding. (These CCIRs can drive branch and sequel decisions, and even cause the JTF to revisit design activities looking at the environment, the problem, and the command’s operational approach. Paragraphs 3-145 and 3-146 discuss CCIR in more detail.)

• The large number of planning efforts within the JTF requires the JTF chief of staff or the J-3 to manage these efforts by use of a plans management board.

• The JTF staff integrates cyberspace operations into all JTF activities across the range of military operations. (The importance of JTF cyberspace operations support grows in tandem with the JTF’s reliance on cyberspace, especially for command and control, but also for critical logistics functions that often rely on non-DOD networks. See JP 3-12 and chapter 7 for additional information on cyberspace operations.)

3-98. Operational art links written and unwritten policy and strategy into key actions in the operational environment. Even in the absence of a clear strategic-level end state or all necessary resources, the commander ultimately remains responsible for the success of the mission, regardless of earlier higher direction or support by others.

3-99. The outcome of joint operational planning process is a decision. The staff briefs the commander on the status of the plan, seeking guidance or decisions at specified intervals, normally at a board, as it works through the joint operation planning process (JOPP). A common technique associated with decision boards is to bring multiple requirements for decisions to a single, regularly-scheduled venue. This type of logical and coordinated scheduling uses the commander’s time in the most efficient manner, helping to maximize the amount of time available in the battle rhythm for the staff sections and associated meetings. The interaction between these various types of meetings, J-code staff sections, and OPTs is important to the efficient and effective functioning of the staff in supporting commanders’ decisionmaking and effective staff integration.

3-100. J-code staff principals are actively involved in the joint operational planning process. They provide manpower and expertise to working groups and OPTs, and receive feedback from each. Each staff director ensures a common running estimate is shared with the OPTs and working groups. They fully vet courses of action brought to the commander. Staffs that struggle with producing quality decisionmaking material to the commander have often had a breakdown in the interaction between the J-codes, working groups, and OPTs. The running estimate process is a valuable part of ensuring that the courses of action briefed to the commander are suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.

JOINT PLANNING TECHNIQUES

3-101. There are several methods for prioritizing and resourcing planning efforts. The chief of staff prioritizes the planning efforts of the J-code staff, meetings, and OPTs in accordance with the commander’s priorities. The use of a plans management board or other venue with the appropriate decisionmaking authority is a technique for ensuring that the highest priority problems receive the most planning attention and resources. A plans management board directs, prioritizes, coordinates, and synchronizes activities between staff directorates, allowing more efficient use of time and prioritization of resources. This board typically meets on a weekly basis.

3-102. Another technique of staff synchronization that complements the plans management board prioritization process is to conduct a synchronization board meeting on a daily basis. The synchronization board is also referred to as a council of colonels. This board, led by the J-3 or J-5, is useful for ensuring missions and tasks are coordinated across the planning horizons. The board meeting ensures joint directorate- level, cross-functional synchronization by reviewing the events of the past 24 hours and prioritizing tasks for the next day.

SECTION III – DEPLOYMENT OR REDEPLOYMENT

3-103. The deployment and redeployment of U.S. forces in support of combatant commander requirements are a series of operational events enabled by logistics. These activities are planned and executed by both supported and supporting commanders. The joint deployment and redeployment processes consist of four phases: planning, predeployment or pre-redeployment activities, movement, and RSOI. Operational commanders assess the peacetime stationing requirements of their assigned and allocated forces in light of potential warfighting needs and availability of forward deployed forces. Rapid reinforcement of forward- deployed forces is accomplished from the continental U.S. or other theaters of operation. An evident mobilization, strategic deployment capability, and the clear determination to respond effectively can have significant deterrent value during a crisis. (JP 3-35 provides joint doctrine on deployment.)

3-104. For a corps acting as a JTF, its force employment plans and schedules inform higher headquarters deployment planning and execution preparation requirements and movement timelines. Deployment operations provide forces ready to execute the supported commander’s orders. Deployment plans and schedules align with the operation plans or orders, and support the associated force movement requirements. These actions allow predeployment preparations required by the Service component. The global force management sourcing processes (preferred forces, contingency sourcing, or execution sourcing) link the requirements to the forces that are ultimately ordered to deploy.

3-105. Force visibility provides the CJTF current and accurate status of subordinate forces, their current mission, future missions, location, mission priority, and readiness status. Force visibility provides information on the location, tempo, assets, and sustainment requirements of a force. Force visibility enhances the CJTF’s situational awareness and is required to support force sourcing, allocation, and assignment of forces; force position; sustainment forecasting and delivery; and forecasting for future force requirements. Sustainment is ongoing throughout the JTF’s entire campaign and, similar to deployment and redeployment, should be aligned with the mission and mission priorities of each phase.

DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

3-106. The CJTF and staff need to understand the doctrinal responsibilities of different organizations when it comes to deployment. The Secretary of Defense assigns and allocates all forces and resources to the combatant commands to perform their assigned missions. In addition, the Secretary of Defense is responsible for transportation planning and operations within the DOD. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s responsibilities most directly related to deployment operations include—

• Prepares joint logistic and mobility plans to support strategic plans and recommends the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Services in accordance with those plans.

• Prepares joint logistic and mobility plans to support joint operation plans, recommends the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans, and ascertains the logistic support available to execute the combatant commander’s general war and joint operations plans.

• Performs as the global force manager to integrate the force management processes which includes the assignment, apportionment, and allocation of joint forces.

• Assigns movement priorities in support of DOD components based on capabilities reported by U.S. Transportation Command.

3-107. Supported combatant commanders are responsible for deployment and redeployment operations planned and executed during joint force missions. This responsibility includes the identification of the movement, timing, and sequence of deploying and redeploying forces in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), reception and integration of units and materiel arriving in theater, and assisting these units as required.

3-108. Supporting missions during deployment of the JTF can include the deployment or redeployment of forces from or to a supporting combatant command, sponsorship of en route basing or in-transit staging areas, or provision of sustainment from theater stocks. Regardless of the supporting mission, the primary task for supporting combatant commands is to ensure the supported combatant commander receives the timely and complete support needed to accomplish the mission.

3-109. Three functional combatant commands are involved in deployment of the JTF: U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and the U.S. Transportation Command. The U.S. Special Operations Command assigned assets deploy or redeploy because of SOF mission taskings. Alternatively, U.S. Special Operations Command provides a special operations functional component to the JTF. U.S. Strategic Command provides advisors to the JTF upon request by the supported combatant commander, who designates when and where they report. The advisor coordinates with the mission-planning facilities of U.S. Strategic Command for the utilization of nuclear weapons; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); space; and cyberspace forces. U.S. Transportation Command responsibilities include—

• As the distribution process owner, it oversees the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of DOD-wide distribution activities, including force projection, sustainment, redeployment, and retrograde operations, and establishes the concept of operations framework relating to the planning and execution of the DOD transportation operations. U.S. Transportation Command also serves as the joint force provider for mobility forces.

• Provide, through its service component commands, air, land, and sea transportation and common- user port management at air and sea port of embarkation (POE) and port of debarkation (POD) for the DOD across the conflict continuum.

• Exercise responsibility for global air, land, and sea transportation planning.

• Act as the DOD focal point for items in the transportation pipeline.

3-110. Formation of a JTF complicates deployment planning and execution because of the diverse elements that come together to form the JTF. A significant challenge in JTF deployment operations is in building the force requirements and subordinate TPFDD. The JTF J-5 directorate contains a deployment support element responsible for coordinating intertheater and intratheater deployment planning in support of the selected course of action. This element ensures that the forces requirements are entered in the global command and control system Joint Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX) application for phasing and movement. It also ensures that force requirements are entered in the joint capability requirements manager requirements module for joint force provider sourcing and Secretary of Defense allocations. The deployment support element ensures that force movement requirements assigned to the JTF headquarters are built into the TPFDD or the request for forces and submitted to the supporting combatant commander. This element also coordinates and reviews subordinate TPFDD inputs to ensure the force flow requirements are accurately entered and support the JTF concept of operations.

3-111. The services and DOD agencies retain the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing administrative and logistics support (including service organic transportation) for their respective forces. These forces and other DOD agencies depend on common user military transportation or commercial services for unit and individual deployment and redeployment operations between POEs and PODs. Each Service is responsible for administrative support and performance of transportation operations assigned by the supported combatant commander at either its local shipping installations or throughout the supported combatant commander’s AOR. Other government departments, such as the Departments of Homeland Security and Transportation, and the commercial transportation industry perform a multitude of services during deployment operations.

DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING

3-112. Deployment planning is operational planning directed toward the movement of the JTF’s forces and sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific joint operational area to accomplish the JTF’s assigned mission. Medical evacuation and retrograde cargo movement requirements are included in the JTF’s deployment requirements. (The JTF’s redeployment planning is operational planning directed toward the transfer of forces and materiel from the CJTF to support another joint force commander’s operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home or demobilization stations from the JTF’s joint operations area for reintegration or demobilization.)

3-113. Joint Publication 5-0 describes the seven steps of the JOPP and outlines the information that the commander needs from the deployment or redeployment planners to ensure that the courses of action presented are feasible from the force and transportation resource standpoint. Specific deployment considerations are first highlighted in step 2, mission analysis, and the deployment concept as a planning product is first mentioned in step 3, course of action development. Refined TPFDD feasibility estimates are included in step 4, course of action analysis under wargaming, and are among the key inputs to step 5, course of action comparison, step 6, course of action approval, and step 7, plan or order development.

3-114. While deployment and redeployment were critical considerations in the previous steps of the JOPP, it is in step 7 that the preponderance of the deployment and redeployment planning takes place. During this step, the supported combatant commander and staff, in collaboration with the JTF and other subordinate and supporting components and organizations, expand the approved course of action into a detailed joint operations or concept plan or operation order by first developing an executable concept of operations. While conducting deployment planning in the JOPP, the following operational requirements are considered: training, protection, communications systems supporting visibility of deployment operations, infrastructure assessment, host-nation support (HNS), and contract support.

PREDEPLOYMENT AND PRE-REDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

3-115. Predeployment and pre-redeployment activities is the second phase in the joint deployment and redeployment process. The activities are functions deploying and redeploying planners and unit commanders must accomplish to successfully complete their movement to the POE.

3-116. Select forces may deploy within hours or days from receipt of a deployment order while other units may deploy on a timeline of days to several weeks. The time frame is even longer for forces supporting established rotational JTFs. The following deployment timelines dictate available time to conduct prepare the force activities:

• Activate deployment and joint command and control support organizations.

• Conduct movement coordination and support meetings.

• Develop deployment equipment list and identify shipping and handling requirements.

• Conduct required training.

• Manage Service members’ deployment requirements.

3-117. Deployment planners should account for concurrent sustainment activities in their overall plans. Activities in the planning phase may capture the requirements for the movement of sustainment, but planners finalize sustainment movement plans as part of their predeployment activities.

Note. A successful redeployment requires the planning and execution of prepare the force activities used in deployments. The execution of these pre-redeployment activities are not identical to deployment activities due to differences in the operational environment, available resources, and the force structure of the redeploying units. Procedures and unit-level activities vary from those performed during a deployment. However, these activities require detailed planning for a successful redeployment operation. Redeployment force activities also have a unique sixth activity, complete equipment disposition actions.

3-118. Movement scheduling is an iterative process done at every level of supported and supporting commands to transport, move, or deploy the right forces (unit-related personnel and equipment) and sustainment (non-unit-related personnel, supplies, and equipment) at the right place and time. Supported and supporting combatant commanders receive strategic movement schedules as they are scheduled and registered in APEX and the Web Scheduling and Movement application. Movement instructions are published based on APEX strategic lift schedules and the supported commanders’ movement priority. The JTF’s J-5 has access to these movement schedules.

Note. Redeployment TPFDDs are developed as part of the redeployment plan and updated and refined during redeployment preparations. It is an ARFOR and unit-level responsibility to update unit movement data to reflect changes to the deployable equipment list. ARFOR and subordinate organizations verify unit movement data as part of their redeployment TPFDD validation. U.S. Transportation Command develops the redeployment movement schedule after receiving the validated TPFDD from the supported combatant commander. The JTF monitors this process.

3-119. Assembly and marshalling involve bringing together personnel, supplies, and equipment in preparation for final movement to the POD. It is comprised of four activities to include assemble personnel and cargo; conduct unit inspection, load equipment, and prepare; sequence loads; and establish support organization at the POE.

3-120. A successful redeployment also requires the planning and execution for assembling and marshalling forces activities. These redeployment activities are the same as the activities performed during a deployment and may require additional time and locations. There is also an additional redeployment activity—prepare and conduct customs and agricultural inspections.

MOVEMENT

3-121. During the movement phase, validated TPFDD movement requirements, developed during the planning phase and scheduled for movement during the predeployment activities phase, require transport from origin to the designated aerial or sea PODs. The movement phase of the joint deployment and redeployment process includes self-deploying forces and forces requiring lift support.

MOVEMENT CONTROL DURING DEPLOYMENT

3-122. Movement control provides commanders a mechanism to synchronize movements for deployment and redeployment operations and provides them situational understanding to effectively influence the movement in their area of responsibility. The movement control process is what assures the availability of military, host nation, and commercial common user transportation assets to support the onward movement of forces. Additionally, movement control ensures the various lines of communications are deconflicted between the movement of joint and multinational forces as well as civilian traffic to include displaced civilians on main supply routes.

MOVEMENT PHASE

3-123. The movement phase of the deployment or redeployment process has three segments: movement from origin to POE, POE operations, and movement from POE to POD. Equipment of deploying forces either self-deploy or are transported to the POE by commercial rail, truck, or barge. From the air or sea POE, deploying forces move to the air or sea POD. While all services have the organic capability to execute theater opening functions, the U.S. Transportation Command’s JTF port opening capability facilitates crisis response in austere environments to the supported geographic combatant commander.

3-124. During the movement phase, the JTF deployment element determines to resolve identified transportation shortfalls organically or to elevate them to superior commanders for resolution. The JTF deployment element is involved in the validation of daily deployment increments. This element works with the J-5 to identify replacement units for force structure shortfalls and monitors the deployment status of reserve units.

FORCE VISIBILITY DURING DEPLOYMENT

3-125. The integrated use of joint command and control systems and innovative information technology makes force tracking through the deployment and redeployment processes possible. Visibility of deploying forces and materiel is established through the logistics management construct of asset visibility and the Global Combat Support System-Joint COP.

REDEPLOYMENT

3-126. Movement, in support of redeployment, moves forces to support a new mission in another joint force commander’s joint operations area, or returns forces their home or demobilization station. Unit integrity is maintained, to the extent possible, and commanders need the capability to determine the exact location of unit personnel, equipment, and materiel in the event the redeploying force is diverted en route for another mission. Redeployment movements are governed by the supported combatant commander’s redeployment plan and policies and the theater movement control plan.

RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

3-127. RSOI is an essential process that transitions deploying or redeploying forces—consisting of personnel, equipment, and materiel—into forces capable of meeting the combatant commander’s operational requirements. RSOI can also return forces to their parent organization or service. RSOI consist of the following four segments:

• Reception operations include the functions required to receive and clear personnel, equipment, and materiel through the POD.

• Staging assembles, temporarily holds, and organizes arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces and capabilities and prepares them for onward movement, tactical operations, or service reintegration.

• Onward movement is the process of moving forces, capabilities, and accompanying materiel from reception facilities, marshalling areas, and staging areas to tactical assembly areas or areas of operation or onward from the POD or other reception areas to the home or demobilization station.

• Integration is the synchronized transfer of capabilities into an operational commander’s force before mission execution or back to the component or service.

The appropriate ASCC is responsible for reception, staging, and onward movement. The JTF is responsible for integrating new organizations into ongoing operations.

3-128. Part of staging and integration is ensuring that multinational unit training, in accordance with established standards, is completed before employing that unit. The fact that training is a national responsibility can complicate this process. The CJTF and staff, and the leaders of subordinate and supporting units, need to know and understand the capabilities and limitations of all JTF units, especially those of multinational partners. They should also have a mutual understanding of the capabilities and limitations—or national caveats—on employment of all units to minimize differences in capabilities that an enemy or adversary can exploit. Mutual understanding is also necessary to optimize the overall effectiveness of the joint and multinational force because multinational and interagency partners may have expertise and capabilities not found in Army organizations. Command levels within the JTF conduct training to ensure they are ready to accomplish the assigned missions. The JTF training concepts specified by content (basic tasks), scope (condition), and objectives (standard), are an essential basis for effective training. They reflect the combatant commander’s or higher authority’s ideas and desired outcomes. The CJTF and staff, and the leaders should coordinate and integrated training where feasible.

3-129. Coordination is required among respective participants to ensure they have mutual understanding and compliance. Although the J-3 monitors and evaluates the training status of units, the actual evaluation of the training status and operational readiness of the respective units remains a national responsibility. The standards and criteria used for evaluation are posted and understood by all parties. Ideally, all parties have these standards and criteria available during the conduct of mobilization and predeployment training.

COORDINATE HOST-NATION SUPPORT

3-130. Host-nation support is civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations (JP 4-0). HNS is theater and situation dependent. Available support depends on the geographical area and prior agreements of the nations in the area and the nations’ willingness and ability to provide support. In some potential areas of operation, agreements may exist between the U.S. and the host nation; in others, nations may not be friendly to the U.S., in which case, HNS is not available, at least, not initially.

3-131. The President and Secretary of Defense, or their representatives, are responsible for establishing treaties and agreements for HNS. HNS includes all civil and military support a nation provides to multinational forces located on its sovereign territory. The LCC commander provides the LCC’s HNS requirements to the combatant commander or CJTF for inclusion in these high-level negotiations.

3-132. Potential HNS agreements address joint security area security, labor support arrangements for port and terminal operations, use of available transportation assets in country, use of water and petroleum production, distribution, and storage facilities, possible supply of Class III (bulk) and Class IV, and developing and using field services. HNS agreements also consider warehouse space, office space, billets, waste disposal, electric power supplies, and telecommunications assets availability. After agreements with multinational allies or coalition nations are initiated, they are continually evaluated for improvement, or specifically spelled out to enable planners to adjust for specified requirements. HNS planners consider the impacts of local laws, customs, holidays, labor unions, and any other condition affecting the availability of HNS. (See ADRP 4-0 for more information on HNS.)

3-133. HNS is not the same as contractor support. Although, multinational forces contractors may affect the ability of a host nation to provide HNS. HNS is support in-kind provided to U.S. forces to further the mutual goals of the host nation and the United States. Contracted support is the materials and services for which the U.S. compensates the host nation, or other entity, through acquisition channels. HNS and contracted support are deconflicted during the process of planning for the sustainment of LCC forces, especially in areas of limited resources.

SECTION IV – EMPLOY

3-134. The employment stage begins when the advanced echelon of the corps headquarters deploys to the joint operations area. A corps headquarters serving as a JTF headquarters exercises joint command and control over operations within a joint operations area—established by a higher joint commander—using joint doctrine. The CJTF during this stage of the JTF lifecycle is responsible for joint and unified action coordination. Subordinate Army combat force commanders, such as division and brigade combat team (BCT) commanders, concentrate on tactical operations while the JTF conducts a large portion of the joint, interagency, and multinational coordination tasks (internal and external). The employment phase ends when the mission is accomplished and residual operations are passed to a follow-on joint, multinational, or host- nation forces.

3-135. The mission, not the size of the force, determines the level of war—tactical or operational—at which the JTF functions. Usually, a corps headquarters designated as a JTF operates at the operational level of war. Once fully engaged at one level, the corps cannot assume the additional functions and command responsibilities that correspond to the other, except during small-scale, short-term (less than 30 days) contingency operations. The corps commander needs to fully understand both tactical- and operational-level environments to ensure a supportive relationship exists between the corps’ (as a JTF) plans and operations and the plans and operations of subordinate and higher headquarters.

3-136. The corps inherently executes civil-military operations (CMO) when operating as a JTF and engaging in unified operations. The commander achieves unified action primarily through the corps’ CMO efforts. CMO are normally planned by civil affairs personnel, but implemented by all elements of the JTF that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. During all military operations, CMO are essential to coordinate the integration of military and civilian instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency, and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.

3-137. JP 1 and JP 3-0 establish the doctrinal foundations for the unified action employment of a JTF. Chapter 4 discusses the conduct of operational tasks when the corps headquarters is acting as the nucleus of an LCC. Specific JTF topics further discussed in this section include:

• Command and control.

• Intelligence.

• Fires.

• Sustainment.

• Protection.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-138. In the context of JTF operations, operational command and control involves the CJTF providing operational guidance, direction, and vision to the JTF’s assigned forces. The CJTF has significant responsibility for operational command and control in that the CJTF is the single focal point to integrate and synchronize joint force operations. The CJTF exercises specified authority and direction over JTF forces in the accomplishment of JTF missions.

Note. This chapter uses joint terminology when discussing the corps headquarters assigned the role of a JTF headquarters. Therefore, the joint term command and control is used in this chapter rather than the Army term mission command. This does not apply when referring to specific systems.

JTF COMMAND AND CONTROL OVERVIEW

3-139. A corps commander, when designated as a CJTF, uses the corps’ Army mission command system— personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment—in addition to those joint command and control systems and organizations previously discussed to command and control JTF operations. Techniques and considerations for forming the JTF headquarters are addressed in Section I of this chapter.

3-140. The CJTF accesses and applies judgment to the COP to gain situational understanding. Situational understanding enhances decision-making by identifying opportunities, threats to the force or mission accomplishment, and information gaps, and, therefore, aids the CJTF in accessing, visualizing, describing, and directing operations. Situational understanding helps the CJTF and subordinate functional or service component and tactical commanders identify enemy options and likely future actions, the probable consequences of proposed friendly actions, and the effects of the natural environment on both. It enables commanders within the JTF at all echelons make informed decisions throughout the operations process. As decisions are made, the CJTF commander and staff provide execution information—information that communicates a decision and directs, initiates, or governs action, conduct, or procedure—to subordinate commanders to accomplish assigned missions.

3-141. Situational understanding based on a COP fosters initiative in subordinate commanders by reducing, although not eliminating, uncertainty. Situational understanding has limits. It is imperfect, particularly with respect to the enemy situation. It requires constant verification. It can reduce the friction caused by the fog of war. However, achieving accurate situational understanding depends at least as much on human judgment as on machine-processed information particularly when assessing enemy intent and combat power.

3-142. Operational command and control includes the following tasks:

• Integrate information.

• Assess operational situation.

• Prepare plans and orders.

• Command subordinate forces.

• Form JTF headquarters (discussed in Section I of this chapter).

• Communicate information.

• Integrate joint, interorganizational and multinational partner support.

• Conduct public affairs.

INTEGRATE INFORMATION

3-143. The acquisition of operational-level information includes obtaining information on the LCC’s area of operations to include the physical, political, social, and economic environments of that area; military objectives; enemy forces and their operations; enemy strategic and operations centers of gravity and their associated critical vulnerabilities; and friendly forces. (The CCIR drives information collection priorities. See the CCIR discussion in paragraph 3-332.) This task includes assisting the CJTF in comprehending the strategic guidance provided by duly constituted authorities and understanding how national and multinational policy interests and objectives interact with the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to set theater-strategic objectives. The integration of operational information requires communicating with friendly and enemy (in occupied territory) civilian governmental authorities and nongovernmental organizations. The acquired information is then communicated to higher and subordinate headquarters and their staffs in an understandable format and maintained for later reference as necessary.

Note: This task is closely associated with the intelligence task of collection and share information discussed in paragraphs 3-332 to 3-334. The primary difference between these two tasks is that this task includes the analysis of activities within an external to the LCC area of operations to forecast probable future events and outcomes.

3-144. Other tasks associated with the integration of information include—

• Determine CCIRs.

• Maintain and share operational information and force status.

• Monitor strategic situation.

• Preserve historical documentation of operations or campaigns.

Paragraphs 3-145 to 3-161 below address each of these five information integration tasks.

Determine Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

3-145. A CCIR is either a friendly force information requirement or a priority intelligence requirement (PIR) directed against enemy forces. The CJTF uses CCIRs to focus available information collection assets on the relevant information about friendly, adversary, and enemy forces and the environmental conditions in the joint operations area needed to support CJTF visualization and make decisions. This list is both situationally dependent and time sensitive. It changes as the decisions the CJTF makes change. The JTF staff and subordinate component and tactical commanders identify, analyze, and submit nominations to the CJTF for approval. The JTF staff assists the CJTF in linking CCIRs to decision points to drive the making of adjustment decisions during execution.

3-146. The CCIRs set information management (IM) and resource allocation priorities for the JTF staff. They set IM priorities by establishing the information most important to the CJTF, to include establishing the friendly force information requirements (known as FFIRs). CCIRs also establish priorities for allocating information collection resources. Commanders at all echelons use their CCIRs to transform information and data into understanding. (See ADRP 5-0 for additional information.)

Maintain and Share Operational Information and Forces Status

3-147. The CJTF and subordinate component and tactical commander need to know friendly force dispositions and situations. The JTF staff screens, processes, circulates, stores, and displays operational data in a form that supports the CJTF’s individual decisionmaking process. They provide that COP to subordinates. When forming and training the JTF staff, the corps commander, as the CJTF, needs to emphasize how the JTF headquarters collects, analyzes, and vertically and horizontally shares information. Information sharing applies within the JTF and with interorganizational and multinational partners. It supports the commander’s ability to make decisions and conduct operations. IM and KM is a challenge for all JTFs. IM and KM involves people, processes, and technology unique to each JTF and can vary during the life cycle of the JTF.

3-148. The commander’s guidance and CCIRs focus the staff and resources to provide information to support decisionmaking. CCIRs serve as control measures for KM. They establish collecting, processing, analysis, and disseminating priorities. The CJTF uses CCIRs to prioritize flow of information.

3-149. The CJTF leads the JTF’s KM process. Gaining and sharing information and knowledge is everyone’s responsibility. Although technology enables the KM process, the people involved are key. Commanders and staff toned to connect with stakeholders, internal and external to the JTF headquarters, to gain knowledge to make decisions. Delineating authority and responsibility for the different aspects of KM, IM, and associated tools and JTF command and control systems allows the CJTF to standardize and improve information and knowledge flow.

3-150. The CJTF should task the chief of staff with KM. The CJTF should also designate an operationally- focused KM officer to work for the chief of staff as a surrogate to oversee and manage the KM processes. The chief of staff can appoint the assistant chief of staff the executive agent who supervises KM in subordinate commands, disciplining the JTF’s different types of meetings, and battle rhythm.

3-151. The CJTF clearly defines the headquarters’ decisionmaking processes, particularly the KM process. The style of the decisionmaking process determines the means of IM and tools. The JTF considers physical and virtual collaboration means to conduct battle rhythm events. Battle rhythm events include physical meetings and phone calls and virtual means, such as secure video teleconferencing, chat rooms, and other collaborative tool suites. The JTF should retain the use of a scribe to record key information and decisions and then post these summaries on the JTF portal.

3-152. The JTF develops and uses an operator-friendly web page or portal as the primary digital means to share JTF information. The JTF web page or portal, combined with simple information protocols, can automatically push information to staff officers who need the information. The KM plan addresses the fact that simply posting information does not guarantee reception of that information. A KM plan ensures that information is easily inserted, found, and retrieved on the JTF web page or portal. The KM officer collaborates with others to enhance assessment, planning, and execution.

3-153. The KM officer works with the various joint staff directorates to identify required communications networks based on information sharing requirements, such as the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), SIPRNET, or Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) as the primary network. The KM officer develops processes to share information with interagency and multinational partners not certified to work on the JTF’s communication network.

3-154. The JTF staff, under the direction of the chief of staff, needs to share information with nontraditional partners, such as other governmental agencies and multinational partners. Sharing of information better supports the CJTF’s decisionmaking. However, the CJTF takes into account the potential of compromising information on the networks.

3-155. The KM officer works with the chief of staff and joint staff directors to develop situationally- appropriate procedures for the management of requests for information and foreign disclosure within the JTF. Procedures should enable foreign disclosure and information sharing with partner organizations to include ensuring that the JTF staff has enough trained foreign disclosure officers to meet operational requirements. The KM officer works with the chief of staff and staff directors to ensure key information sharing procedures are understood by the staff.

3-156. The KM officer carefully selects user friendly tools that recognize the impact of continuous personnel turnover and training requirements. An adequate information technology platform or application that is well understood and used by the staff is more effective than a perfect, continually changing information technology tool that is too complex for JTF users to understand.

3-157. The chief of staff and KM officer apply the five-step KM process. (See ATP 6-01.1 for more information on the KM process.) They use an integrated KM working group, led by the JTF KM officer and comprised of J-code knowledge management representatives. This KM working group is responsible for maintaining a current understanding of the JTF’s KM requirements and assets. This working group reports to a KM decision board chaired by the JTF chief of staff.

3-158. The JTF’s approved KM plan is disseminated to the staff and subordinate and supporting organizations. This plan defines the responsibilities of the KM organization, and provides guidance on how to gain and maintain situational awareness, share information, and collaborate with higher, lower, and adjacent organizations throughout the decision cycle. The KM working group periodically revises the KM plan to reflect improvements to the command’s processes as they are developed. This plan should change in response to changing conditions. The commander and chief of staff update and maintain the JTF’s KM plan along with the JTF’s evolving decisionmaking processes.

Monitor Strategic Situation

3-159. National political objectives always guide military action. The CJTF needs to understand how the combatant commander’s guidance reflects the national and multinational objectives, policies, and goals to include the parts played by the other elements of national power—diplomatic, economic, and informational. This understanding helps the CJTF establish supporting military objectives and develop plans to achieve those objectives.

3-160. Military plans and operations support the attainment of the political objectives that result in military involvement. Objectives change as operations unfold. (For example, the political decision to end Operation Desert Storm in 1991 before the destruction of the Iraqi Republication Guard was complete.) The CJTF needs to adapt to unforeseen events and to the evolution of political objectives as the situation develops. A CJTF who has time to adjust branches and sequels and move between different operational phases in response to changing operational variables, is more synchronized when the branches and sequels are executed. The CJTF commander uses a political advisor, if available, to assist in this process.

Preserve Historical Documentation

3-161. Once the corps is assigned a mission, a command historian is assigned to document the JTF’s history. During operations that command historian may be augmented by one or more military history detachments. The focus of a military history detachment is on field collection. These detachments are pooled at theater level and allocated on a temporary basis as necessary to a headquarters to ensure comprehensive historical coverage of current operations when insufficient numbers of them are available. Members of this detachment attend key briefings and meetings, and interview key personnel to gather first-hand observations, facts, and impressions. The detachment keeps a daily journal of observations and key events. It packages and forwards collected information to appropriate agencies. The detachment prepares and submits contingency historical reports. (See AR 870-5.)

ASSESS OPERATIONAL SITUATION

3-162. Assessment takes place throughout a unit’s operations process. It involves the evaluation of information received through reports or the personal observations of the commander on the general situation in the JTF joint operations area. The CJTF and JTF staff base their assessments on their situational understanding based on the COP and personal observations. They achieve and maintain situational understanding to identify opportunities for more effective mission accomplishment, threats to the joint force, and gaps in information.

3-163. Situational understanding forms the basis for the CJTF’s visualization. The CJTF has situational understanding of the general situation before beginning the operations process. Receipt of a mission focuses attention on achieving a specific purpose. During preparation and execution, situational understanding allows the CJTF to assess the progress of operations, continuously update their visualization, and make decisions. The CJTF continuously updates CCIRs and sets IM priorities. CCIRs focus the CJTF’s situational understanding toward expected decisions. Intelligence provides situation development and battlefield damage assessment (BDA) supporting assessment and decision-making throughout all operations.

3-164. The assessment process includes, but is not limited to monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information; evaluating progress toward end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks; and recommending or directing action for improvement. These activities take different forms during planning, preparation, and execution. Together, they allow the CJTF to assess the situation in terms of expectations and the progress of the JTF campaign plan. (ADRP 5-0 contains a detailed discussion of these three activities.)

PREPARE PLANS AND ORDERS

3-165. Planning is a problem-solving tool. Within the JTF headquarters, planning is procedural, following the joint operation planning process (JOPP); it produces the requisite plans and orders to direct action. While not prescriptive, the JOPP provides a common framework for joint planning. It also provides interagency and

multinational partners with an outline of the U.S. elements of the JTF plan, giving interagency and multinational partners an idea of where to provide their input as stakeholders.

3-166. Planning is the means by which the CJTF envisions a desired outcome, lays out effective ways of achieving it, and communicates that vision, intent, and decisions to subordinates, focusing on the expected results. Plans are frameworks from which to adapt as required, and not scripts to precisely follow. An effective plan is not one that transpires as designed, but one that facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events.

3-167. The CJTF makes detailed plans, running estimates, and decisions related to implementing theater strategy and anticipated campaigns or major operations. The directions and expectations of the President, Secretary of Defense, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in addition to the combatant commander, drives the JTF’s planning template. JTF plans and orders address operational center of gravity, branches, sequels, culminating points, and phasing. Planning includes tailoring, task organizing, and cross- leveling or balancing functional or service components, considering the capabilities and limitations of joint, interorganizational and multinational partners. JTF campaign plans address specific missions and tasks for subordinate components, to include supporting DOD combat support agencies. The plan specifies the CJTF’s chosen operational framework, such as decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations, in addition to the JTF’s main and supporting efforts by phase. It specifies supporting and supported relationships. Planning also addresses the rules of engagement. These plans and orders are used by the CJTF and communicated to higher, lower, supported, and supporting headquarters. JTF campaign plans and orders involve synchronizing joint operational capabilities while simultaneously minimizing the risk to the force. The CJTF’s plans address the forces of all JTF services.

3-168. All planning takes time. Planning is a dynamic and continuous process of interrelated activities rather than a single action. Combatant commanders develop theater campaign plans to accomplish multinational, national-, and theater- strategic objectives. Subordinate CJTFs typically develop subordinate campaign plans or operation plans that accomplish theater-strategic objectives if the mission requires military operations of sufficient scope, size, complexity, and duration. Collaborative planning works best between experienced staffs that have previously had the opportunity to plan together.

3-169. Collaborative and parallel planning help optimize available planning time. Since several echelons develop their plans simultaneously, parallel planning can significantly shorten planning time. The JTF headquarters continuously shares information concerning future operations with subordinate component commands through warning orders and other means. Frequent communication between different echelon commanders and staffs and sharing of information (such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield products) help subordinate headquarters plan. Parallel planning requires significant interaction among echelon headquarters. During parallel planning, subordinate units do not wait for their higher headquarters to publish an order to begin developing their own plans and orders.

Joint Operation Planning

3-170. Interoperable planning and execution systems are essential to effective planning for joint operations. The activities of the entire planning community are integrated through an interoperable joint system that provides for uniform policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by modern communications and computer systems. The system designed to provide interoperability is the joint operation planning process (JOPP). JOPP is a coordinated process used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing the mission. It is also sequential because it is performed simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. JOPP is directed toward employment of military forces in the context of a military strategy to attain specified objectives for possible contingencies. It includes the preparation of operations plans, operations plans in concept format, functional plans, campaign plans, and operations orders by combatant commanders and CJTFs.

3-171. In non-crisis situations, the process is called contingency planning and is highly structured to support the thorough and fully coordinated development of deliberate plans. In crisis situations, it is called crisis action planning and the process is shortened, as necessary, to support the dynamic requirements of changing events. Execution of a contingency plan is accomplished through crisis action procedures. Joint planning is conducted under APEX policy and procedures. Key publications related to JOPP include—

• JP 3-0.

• JP 5-0.

• CJCSI 3100.01C.

• CJCSM 3122.01A.

• CJCSM 3122.02D.

• CJCSM 3122.05.

• CJCSM 3130.01A.

• CJCSM 3130.03.

The Adaptive Planning and Execution system provides the format for campaign plans.

3-172. The corps staff conducts the JOPP when serving as a JTF staff. (See JP 5-0.) It is imperative that Army corps commanders and planners have a complete understanding of the JOPP to include APEX, operational art and the elements of operational design, and contingency, crisis action, and campaign planning. This understanding assists corps commanders and planners in developing effective campaign support plans.

Joint Adaptive Planning and Execution System

3-173. APEX is the integrated joint command and control system used to develop situation awareness, and to support military operation planning, execution, and monitoring activities. APEX incorporates policies, procedures, personnel, and facilities and interfaces with automated data processing and reporting systems. The Global Command and Control System provides the primary automated data processing support for APEX and provides senior-level decision makers and their staffs with an enhanced capability to plan and conduct joint military operations.

3-174. APEX provides support to and is used by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Services and their major commands. It is also used by the combatant commands and their component commands, sub-unified commands and subordinate components, joint task forces and subordinate components and the combat support agencies for joint planning and execution. (See Figure 3-2 on page 3-32.)

3-175. The APEX process applies to the development and implementation of operation plans and operation orders prepared in response to the President of the U.S., the Secretary of Defense, or the Chairman. It specifies the policies, procedures, and formats used to develop and execute plans. APEX includes sub processes for mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization. APEX is supported by a networked suite of automated data processing applications, tools, and databases, which reside on the Global Command and Control System.

3-176. While the planning activity of the APEX process is comprehensive, addressing the situation, mission, plan execution, service support, and command and signal in great detail, the execution activity is limited to the deployment and redeployment of forces and their equipment and specified issues during the sustainment phase. APEX begins with the awareness of a situation, consumes all aspects of planning, and culminates with redeployment following successful execution and conflict resolution.

3-177. APEX supports the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the joint planning and execution process during wartime, peacetime operations, exercises, and hostilities across the conflict continuum. APEX procedures provide for various levels of decisionmaking during contingency and crisis action planning situations. APEX includes the three operational activities of situation awareness, planning, and execution, and four planning functions of strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment governing both the contingency and crisis action planning processes. Together, with the two APEX supporting activities, simulation and analysis, and monitoring, they form the APEX methodology.

Operational Art and the Elements of Operational Design

3-178. A key to effective planning at the operational level is to understand operational art and the elements of operational design introduced in paragraphs 3-90 to 3-96. Operational art considers the employment of joint military forces and the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. It determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces are employed, and when, where, and how they employ effects to influence the enemy before combat. It governs the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Figure 3-2. Joint Adaptive Planning and Execution System users

3-179. Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the questions:

• What military (or related political and social) conditions are produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal (ends)?

• What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition (Ways)?

• How are the resources of the joint force applied to accomplish that sequence of actions (Means)?

• What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?

3-180. An example of operational art would be the decision by the CJTF to employ land component (Army or Marine Corps) rotary wing aviation and artillery assets, special operations forces, and air component fixed- wing assets to attack one or more enemy mobile missile launch complexes beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL) to prevent a conflict from further increasing in scale and scope. Such an operation is typically a high risk, high payoff event. The CJTF has to decide if the payoff is worth the prudent risk.

3-181. In this example, the JTF headquarters is responsible for developing general plans employing the various elements of the joint force to achieve the desired effects. Subordinate component command planners, in cooperation with their respective tactical subordinate headquarters, perform the detailed planning that synchronize the employment of aviation maneuver and fires (including USAF support) to include airspace control over the targeted complexes. Preparations for this event include the conduct of suppression of enemy air defenses as necessary and long-range information collection activities directed against the target area of interest and the terrain around the target area and under projected flight routes. Those preparations also include cyber-electromagnetic activities, other protection tasks, and necessary logistics support, such as the establishment and security of forward arm and refuel points.

Contingency, Crisis Action, and Campaign Planning

3-182. Joint plans are proposed under different processes depending on the focus of a specific plan. The processes are labeled as deliberate, crisis action, or campaign planning; however, they are interrelated. JP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0 and ADRP 6-0 provide the doctrinal basis for joint planning and the Army’s operations process respectively. Both apply to the conduct of LCC planning efforts. (The Army’s MDMP has utility when adapted to the greater scope, scale, and complexity of operations at the JTF level.)

3-183. Contingency planning prepares for a possible contingency based on the best available information and using forces and resources apportioned for deliberate planning by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that exist when the plan is implemented. Contingency planning is conducted principally during peacetime to develop joint operation plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents.

3-184. Crisis action planning is based on current events and conducted in time-sensitive situations and emergencies using assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources. Planners performing crisis action planning base their plan on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. They follow prescribed procedures that parallel deliberate planning, but are more flexible and responsive to changing events. The crisis action planning process consists of six phases:

• Situation development.

• Crisis assessment.

• Course of action development.

• Course of action selection.

• Execution planning.

• Execution.

3-185. Crisis action planning is based on actual events. As the crisis unfolds, assumptions and projections are replaced by facts and actual conditions. Deliberate planning supports crisis action planning by anticipating potential crises and developing joint operations plans that facilitate rapid development and selection of a course of action. If the actual crisis conditions closely match the assumptions in a deliberate plan, then the decisionmaking cycle of crisis action planning is accelerated. Crisis action planning is often conducted in a time-constrained environment, so the process is intentionally flexible. The procedures provide for the timely flow of information and intelligence; rapid communication of decisions from the President of the U.S. and Secretary of Defense to combatant commanders, subordinate JTFs, and component commanders; and expeditious execution planning. Crisis action planning places a premium on efficient commander and staff planning dynamics and on parallel and collaborative planning by multiple levels of command.

3-186. Campaigns orient on the enemy’s centers of gravity; achieve simultaneous and synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, space-based assets, and SOF; clearly define an end state that constitutes success, failure, mission termination, or exit strategy; and serve as the basis for subordinate planning. (Campaign planning is not routinely performed by a corps or an LCC unless the corps is designated as a base for a JTF headquarters; it is only included here to complete the planning discussion.)

3-187. Campaign planning encompasses and is performed in both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, therefore, unifying both planning processes. Preparation of a campaign plan is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation.

3-188. Campaign plans developed by the JTF are the operational extension of a combatant commander’s theater strategy. They translate strategic concepts into unified plans for military action by specifying how operations, logistics, and time are used to attain theater-strategic objectives. Campaign planning is a primary means by which combatant commanders arrange for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations in their theater. In addition, by means of a campaign plan, combatant commanders give the President of the U.S., Secretary of Defense, and the CJCS the information needed for intertheater coordination at the national level.

3-189. Campaign plans guide the development of supporting plans and orders, and facilitate national-level coordination of strategic priorities and resource allocations. Tasking for strategic requirements or major contingencies require the preparation of several alternative plans for the same requirement using different sets of forces and resources to preserve flexibility. For these reasons, campaign plans are based on reasonable assumptions and are not completed until after the President of the U.S. and Secretary of Defense select the course of action during crisis action planning. Contingency plans can include elements of campaign planning; however, these elements need updating, as in any deliberate plan used at execution.

Insights Gained in Planning

3-190. Commander involvement up front in design, and, subsequently, in the planning process, enhances and focuses the JTF’s planning efforts across the planning horizons. The commander’s guidance and intent— informed by formal or informal assessments—focus and guide the JTF’s planning efforts.

3-191. Before developing solutions to achieve JTF mission success, JTF planners recognize the complex environment facing the JTF and determine desired outcomes and conditions. The JTF uses political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure as a means to gain and maintain a broad perspective and understanding of the operational environment. The commander and JTF staff, together with stakeholders, deepen their understanding of the operational environment through traditional and nontraditional collection means, such as polls, analysis, and subjective and objective assessment venues to better guide the JTF’s planning and operations.

3-192. Aligning words and actions is not an intuitive process. Many headquarters use targeting methodology to align words and actions. Though each situation requires a different mix of violence and restraint, words and actions used together complement each other and create dilemmas for opponents.

3-193. Planning guidance, commander’s intent, and a targeting methodology provide coherent development of effective lethal and nonlethal efforts at the operational level, while leaving detailed synchronization to subordinate tactical units. There is a requirement for near-term synchronization of JTF actions through operational-level targeting. This requirement ensures certain actions match words to avoid destructive feedback caused by the JTF’s operations interfering with each other. However, a JTF headquarters cannot fully synchronize every word and action within subordinate commands because of the complexity of the operations environment and the speed of actions (the reason mission command is valuable as a command philosophy).

Joint Task Force Planning Techniques

3-194. Bringing subordinate service commands and other stakeholders into JTF planning early in the process enriches the process from mission analysis through course of action development, and analysis to orders development. Commanders need to understand that extensive consultation with stakeholders in visualizing the environment, developing guidance and intent, determining broader analysis criteria to analyze courses of action, and making decisions are beneficial in arriving at optimal plans and subsequent success in achieving objectives. Commanders should establish and maintain a command climate and organizational capability in the JTF that actively seeks out and integrates stakeholder input into phases of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment.

3-195. The J-5 must manage staff wide planning efforts to ensure the limited staff resources are properly focused on important tasks. The JTF chief of staff intervenes only when necessary to resolve conflicts between the J-5 and other staff directors. Limited manpower and functional expertise forces prioritization of branch and sequel planning, and corresponding OPTs. Joint lessons learned suggest the use of a plans management board that provides direction and prioritization, and coordinates, synchronizes, and resources planning activities throughout the headquarters.

3-196. Activities conducted before assembling the plans management board include:

• Prioritization of planning efforts within the three planning horizons—current operations, future operations, and plans.

• Deciding on a venue to prioritize planning efforts between meetings of the board. For example, the J-3 gathers representatives from current operations, future operations, and plans to prioritize planning efforts. These gatherings can occur as informal weekly or twice weekly huddles.

• Prioritized planning efforts are briefed to the JTF chief of staff at board meetings. The chief of staff then provides direction and prioritization to planning activities so the staff can coordinate, synchronize, and resource planning activities.

3-197. The use of OPTs is central to integrating staff efforts in planning. Integral to the J-3 and J-5, OPTs inform and are informed by functional working groups, such as IO, rules of engagement, and logistics. The OPTs provide coherent, fully-coordinated staff recommendations to the commander at regular intervals during the planning process for guidance and decisionmaking. The directors of the various joint staff directorates and sections are important players in OPT and working group interaction. Directors monitor OPT and working group actions, and provide the functional running estimate with input, providing much of the basis for the OPT and working group analysis and recommendations.

COMMAND SUBORDINATE FORCES

3-198. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling joint military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. Clear delineation of responsibility among commanders up, down, and laterally ensures unity of command, which is a foundation for the trust, coordination, and teamwork necessary for unified action. The CJTF requires subordinate functional or service component commanders to understand their mission, their contribution to achievement of the JTF concept of operations and the CJTF’s intent, and their relationship to attainment of the combatant or supported commander’s operational objectives. This understanding facilitates maximum decentralized conduct of major operations and battles using mission orders and detailed plans, and the operational variables. (See ADRP 6-0 for a discussion of the philosophy of mission command.)

Commander’s Decision Cycle

3-199. The decision cycle is a model that describes how an operational commander, such as the CJTF, makes decisions. It provides a means to focus the JTF staff on how to support the CJTF’s decisionmaking. These cycles include:

• An assessment of how the JTF is doing.

• Design and planning based on this assessment.

• Directing of tasks to subordinates.

• Requesting or recommending actions to mission partners

• Monitoring operations and the environment to support subsequent assessment.

3-200. The staff communicate throughout the cycle, within the JTF headquarters and with higher, supporting, and subordinate commands. The inclusion of mission partners and stakeholders in this decision cycle is critical for achieving unity of effort.

Three Planning Horizons

3-201. A joint headquarters, similar to the corps headquarters in a tactical role, orients on three general planning horizons: short, mid, and long (generally associated with current operations, future operations, and future plans). Each horizon moves at different rates through the key aspects of the decision cycle. Each horizon requires battle rhythm events that support its planning, execution, and assessment.

3-202. The current operations cell planning horizon focuses on what is, and can rapidly progress through the decision cycle, sometimes in minutes for quick-breaking events. Current operations produce a large volume of orders, including fragmentary orders. These activities generally do not require detailed full-staff integration involving the full joint headquarters. They do, however, require limited planning capability within the JOC. The expertise for this planning capability already resides in the JTF’s JOC because that center already contains representation from the joint staff directorates and many of the personal staff sections.

3-203. The future operations planning horizon focuses on branch planning, the what ifs, and normally moves slower with more deliberate assessment and planning activities resulting in products, such as major fragmentary orders directing major tactical actions (named operations) and troop movements within theater. These troop movements include the movement of a unit from one area of operations to another. These branch plans generally require full staff integration.

3-204. The future plans (J-5) planning horizon is focused on sequel planning and interacts heavily with higher headquarters and other mission partner planning efforts. The J-5 moves more deliberately through the decision cycle than the current operations and future operations staffs. The J-5 focuses on activities such as development of operations plans and fragmentary orders to the overall campaign plan and on policy directives or major troop rotations. These activities also require full staff integration.

3-205. The JTF decision cycle nests with other echelon headquarters’ decision cycles across the three planning horizons. It continually interfaces with the higher headquarters’ decision cycle (more deliberate and slower moving), with adjacent units, and with subordinate unit decision cycles (moving more rapidly).

Approve Plans and Orders

3-206. Commanding is directing. Directing converts the CJTF’s decisions into effective action by JTF forces. JTF commanders generate effective action through directing forces and synchronizing the operational operating systems. The CJTF directs the outcome of major operations, battles, and engagements by—

• Guiding and motivating the command toward mission accomplishment.

• Assigning missions.

• Prioritizing and allocating resources.

• Assessing and taking risks.

• Deciding when and how to make adjustments.

• Committing reserves.

• Seeing, hearing, and understanding the needs of subordinates and superiors.

Militarily, the means of directing include plans and orders, especially the commander’s intent, concept of operations, the synchronization matrix, the decision support template, and other supporting plans.

3-207. A tempo advantageous to joint forces can place the enemy under the pressures of uncertainty and time. An operational-level commander making and communicating decisions faster than the enemy produces a tempo with which the enemy cannot compete. Commanders’ decisions include determining the information the commander requires for anticipated decisions—the CCIRs; assigning missions; prioritizing, allocating, and organizing forces and resources; and selecting the critical times and places to act. Decisionmaking during operations includes knowing how and when to adjust previous decisions. (FM 6-0 discusses adjustment and execution decisions.) The speed and accuracy of the CJTF’s actions to address changing situations is a key contributor to the agility of joint forces. The CJTF needs to also anticipate the activities and effects that occur because of decisions, including unintended second-order effects, effects caused by the enemy’s reaction to friendly actions, and effects on future operations. (ADRP 6-22 discusses second- and third-order effects.)

3-208. Not only the CJTF, but also subordinate commanders at all echelon use mission command techniques to make timely decisions and to take actions that create and exploit advantages. Effective commanders—

• Take enemy plans, capabilities, and reaction times into account when making decisions.

• Make decisions quickly—even with incomplete information. Commanders who can make and implement decisions faster than the enemy, even to a small degree, gain an accruing advantage that becomes significant over time.

• Do not delay a decision in hopes of finding a perfect solution to a battlefield problem. Commanders adopt a satisfactory course of action with acceptable risk as quickly as possible.

• Delegate decisionmaking authority as low as possible to obtain faster decisions. Decisionmaking at lower echelons is faster and more direct. Commanders at all echelons support decentralized execution by frequently communicating with subordinates and adjacent commanders.

Issue Plans and Orders

3-209. The JTF staff transmits CJTF-approved plans and orders to subordinate functional or service component command for execution. These plans are transmitted to the combat commander and theater service component commands for coordination in accordance with the JTF headquarters’ SOP. They are distributed to supporting DOD and Army agencies. The CJTF can provide additional instructions to JTF functional or service component commands.

Provide Rules of Engagement

3-210. The establishment of rules of engagement are the means by which the President of the U.S. and Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders regulate the use of force in the context of applicable political and military policy, and domestic and international law. Rules of engagement are the rules that govern when, where, against whom, and how force is used. The CJTF reviews the existing rules of engagement and adds further restrictions necessary to ensure joint forces employ lethal force in a manner consistent with the overall military objective and their inherent right of self-defense. The CJTF does not have the authority to remove restrictions imposed by higher authority. The CJTF can request the combatant commander or National Command Authorities remove restrictions judged detrimental to the protection of JTF forces and overall mission accomplishment.

3-211. Many factors influence rules of engagement. Properly developed rules of engagement are clear, tailored to the situation, reviewed for legal sufficiency, and included in training. Well-crafted rules of engagement contribute to morale and fighting spirit while meeting the political, military, and legal requirements.

Synchronize and Integrate Operations

3-212. The CJTF arrange land, air, sea, space, special operating, and cyber force and systems in time, location, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at decisive points. This activity includes the vertical and the horizontal integration of tasks in time and place to maximize the effects of combat power. Integration was refined throughout course of action development. They ensure that all elements of the force, including joint, interorganizational and multinational partner forces and capabilities, are efficiently and safely employed to maximize their combined effects beyond the sum of their individual capabilities. Synch- ronization and integration are continuous throughout operations.

3-213. The CJTF commander and JTF staff constantly assesses where the operation is in relation to the end state and estimate how best to adjust that operation to accomplish the mission and posture the joint force for future operations. The CJTF’s visualization and the staff’s running estimates are maintained continuously and are primary assessment tools. (See FM 6-0.) The J-3 is in charge of maintaining the JTF COP. Maintaining current running estimates is key to keeping the CJTF aware of feasible options. The JTF staff uses newly collected data to replace outdated facts and assumptions. The staff performs analysis and evaluation based on the information, and forms new or revised conclusions and recommendations. The CJTF’s visualization focuses the staff’s running estimates. The CJTF’s visualization identifies decisions the CJTF expects to make. Running estimates focus on determining recommendations concerning these decisions. The CJTF to have options that enable joint forces to dominate the enemy within their respective domains. Current running estimates based on the CJTF’s visualization allow the joint staff to provide recommendations that the CJTF and subordinate functional or service component commanders need to make timely decisions during execution.

3-214. The JTF staff continually works to resynchronize operations to mass the maximum effects of combat power at decisive points and seize, retain, and exploit the initiative once the CJTF makes a decision, which involves synchronizing the operational functions in time, space, and purpose across all planning horizons— current, future, and plans. Individual staff sections in the JTF headquarters and subordinate and supporting headquarters keep each other informed and integrate their actions to reduce duplication, confusion, and quickly resolve problems once they are identified.

Decisionmaking During Execution

3-215. Plans never unfold in the way they were envisioned. Enemy actions, friendly mistakes, unforeseen environmental conditions, and other factors—the fog and friction of war—conspire to disrupt plans and synchronized application of combat power. The CJTF needs a clear, simple, and flexible, yet sophisticated methodology to supplement the JOPP. The commander needs to react quickly and effectively to unforeseen situations and identify opportunities and threats and maximize the application of combat power to account for minor variances in the situation. Intelligent planning based on daily battle updates provides the commander with more flexibility.

3-216. The concept for executing decisionmaking is to maintain a tempo the enemy or adversary cannot match by acting or reacting faster than the enemy or adversary can adapt. To achieve this type of flexibility, the CJTF uses mission command to focus subordinate functional or service component commander initiative. While subordinate component commanders exercising their initiative inside the CJTF’s intent has a significant impact on JTF tempo; it also has potential to de-synchronize the JTF’s operational functions. The overall effect lessens the integration of friendly combat power but can allow the CJTF to better exploit an unforeseen opportunity that results in overwhelming success.

3-217. The JTF J-3’s JOC strives to re-synchronize the operational and warfighting functions to achieve combat power integration in response to ever changing situations. To achieve coherent combat power integration the JOC focuses on—

• The mission.

• The CJTF’s intent and concept of the operation.

• Joint and combined arms integration.

• Responsiveness—both proactive and reactive.

Directing and Monitoring

3-218. The JTF establishes a JOC with dedicated manning focused on developing and maintaining situational awareness for the commander and broader staff in the current operations’ planning horizon. JOCs have robust communication, information display, and management resources. JOCs have representation from across the staff, components, and other stakeholders, and assume responsibility for directing and monitoring operations for the commander. A corps forms its JOC around its current operations integrating cell (COIC).

Techniques for Directing:

3-219. The CJTF provides guidance, intent, and direction to subordinates through the use of mission-type orders. The orders section within the JOC requires experience and authorities to release orders in a timely manner. The orders section ensures the transmittal of orders via standard message channels to proper addressees and verifies the receipt of the orders. The use of standardized control and dissemination of incoming and outgoing orders is essential to the performance of the orders section.

3-220. Verbal Orders of the Commanding Officer is another means of directing operations. The JTF staff and subordinate staffs can struggle with verbal orders given by the commander at venues, such as the daily update brief, without written direction. Uncertainty can exist regarding whether a commander’s comment is guidance, intent, or authoritative direction. A well-functioning orders section in the JOC used by staffs reduces uncertainty and rapidly provides authoritative direction to subordinates via fragmentary orders that confirm the CJTF’s verbal orders. The CJTF’s use of an accompanying note taker helps the orders section capture the commander’s guidance and direction.

3-221. There is value in having a resident planning capacity in the JOC to solve emergent challenges in the current operations planning horizon. In the absence of a planning capacity, the future operations cell is given this task, pulling its focus away from the future operations’ planning function into current operations. The headquarters’ ability to set conditions for subordinate success through proactive planning is thereby directly reduced.

3-222. Having defined mission approval authorities (who can say yes or no for the commander) in advance is a technique that is vital to the joint operation center’s success, especially during crisis or time sensitive operations. Decentralized authorities, defined and rehearsed in advance, allow the CJTF’s decision cycle to spin quicker and build trust and confidence in the organization.

3-223. The JOC should have codified SOPs for most the common actions. Not having a SOP results in reduced efficiency, reduced effectiveness, and confusion among watch standers regarding their duties and responsibilities. The center’s performance is enhanced when its SOP defines responsibilities by billet and addresses reporting requirements, authorities, order formats, story board templates, and displays. The center’s chief of operations needs to train all watch standers to ensure they understand the SOP.

3-224. JOC staff battle drills, based on likely contingencies, are developed and rehearsed to minimize confusion. These staff battle drills facilitate simultaneous action across sections and enable the directing function to proceed rapidly during crises. Understanding and rehearsing the flow of information with some sense of urgency is critical to successful operations. Battle drill execution involves everyone at the JOC.

3-225. Within the current operations planning horizon, the staff benefits from developing and building tools to assist the commander in the decisionmaking process. These tools take the form of a decision support matrix or template. A decision support matrix prioritizes and evaluates a list of options for the commander. Further, it provides the implications of each decision. For example, the commander may not understand each of the measures within a particular force protection level when the staff brings forward a decision requesting the commander to change the force protection condition level for the joint security area. The commander makes a timely, better informed decision, while avoiding unintended impacts when the staff provides an easily understood matrix. While some matrices only require specific functional expertise, such as a force protection change, other decision support matrices, such as those designed for operational decisionmaking, require broader staff input to ensure an overall situational understanding by the commander.

3-226. Synchronization briefings are used in the JOC to rapidly build situational awareness throughout the center. These briefings may be part of a formal shift change brief or a separate event. The key elements of successful synchronization include a review of resources and priorities, an update by center section of items working and priorities, as well as guidance and priorities of the chief of operations. This synchronization identifies potential conflicts in operations and resources that occur within the current operations planning horizon.

3-227. The CJTF should receive a daily update brief. This event has different names depending on the command, such as commander’s or battle update assessment. The commander is briefed and receives guidance. Knowing the information and guidance the commander requires is a part of the daily update brief. The JOC has the responsibility of collating the elements of this brief, ensuring standardization and timeliness during presentation. An important technique is ensuring the briefers address the so what of their brief instead of reciting recent history. This type of briefing contributes to the CJTF’s situational awareness and facilitates movement of the decision cycle, rather than only presenting information.

Monitoring

3-228. The JTF headquarters monitors the environment in its joint operations area, emphasizing friendly, enemy, adversary, and other elements of the operational environment. The JOC is often the focal point for monitoring and reporting relevant information to the commander and sharing information across the broader staff, higher and subordinate headquarters, and joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners.

3-229. Planners develop the CCIRs during the planning process. CCIRs are essential for the JOC personnel and other staff to focus limited resources in support of the commander’s decisionmaking. CCIRs are prominently displayed in the JOC to promote awareness and attention to the commander’s information requirements (IRs). Current CCIRs are also posted on the current operations section of the JTF portal to facilitate component awareness of CCIRs.

3-230. The JTF’s COP and other JOC displays are important in building situational awareness. A simple method for assessing the effectiveness of the displays is to ask the CJTF whether an understanding of the current situation is gained a short time after reviewing them. The JOC tailors its displays to the CJTF’s needs and preferences and, if possible, shares them electronically with the broader staff, components, mission partners, and higher headquarters. Having a standardized COP display with the correct decisionmaking products, to include ramifications of making the decision, enhances the CJTF’s decisionmaking.

3-231. Liaison elements can assist in situational understanding, but should not be the conduit for subordinate unit reporting. These liaison elements assist in monitoring operations primarily by addressing their commanders’ issues. They spend most of their time in the planning area providing their respective components’ perspectives and ideas to enhance planning. Liaison elements should know the capabilities of their parent unit. Specific JOC watch officers maintain communications and report to subordinate and adjacent commands.

3-232. A JOC can struggle with notifying and determining what constitutes a reportable event, other than one triggered by a CCIR. A JOC can use a notification criteria matrix to explain who to notify of various events outside the rhythm of the scheduled update brief. Center personnel need to understand notification criteria and the reporting chain to prevent stove piping of information or inadvertent failures in notification.

3-233. The JOC watch standers define, track, report and monitor significant events until the required staff action is completed. What constitutes a significant event is situation dependent. Examples of a significant event include local or national elections, religious holidays, troops in contact, or the closing of a forward operating base. The JOC cannot preemptively remove a significant event from a constantly updated list of tracked actions before required follow-on actions are accomplished. Each significant event is archived for documentation purposes and to assist the intelligence and assessment functions once required actions associated with that event are completed.

3-234. A formal hand-off of plans from the JTF future operations cell to the JTF current operations cell is required. A future operations planner can brief the entire JOC on plans entering the current operations planning horizon. This practice mitigates the natural seam between the future and the current operations cell, resulting in improved execution of the plan as monitoring and directing occur in the JOC.

3-235. The JTF staff requires at least two request for information (RFI) managers on each shift. One in the J-2, managing intelligence RFIs, and the other on the JOC floor, managing other RFIs. The JOC RFI manager can provide visibility on the questions, answers, and identification of those providing answers to the broader organization through the use of a SharePoint portal page. This information sharing function is more important than merely allowing requestors to obtain information. RFIs are not to take the place of routine staff coordination. A priority is affixed to each RFI submitted. Tracking subordinate commanders’ RFIs through this same system is an effective way of obtaining necessary information for those commanders.

Types of Decisions

3-236. An important aspect of executing decisionmaking is the type of decision required. Commanders make two types of decisions during execution: execution decisions and adjustment decisions. The type of decision required affects who makes the decision. It also indicates who participates in decisionmaking. (See ADRP 5-0 for a doctrinal discussion of adjustment and execution decisions.)

Other Synchronization and Integration Considerations

3-237. No operational plan extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main body of the enemy. It is not the plan; it is the planning process that is important. That planning process establishes a COP and shared situational understanding between CJTF and subordinate functional or service component commanders and staffs.

3-238. Military theorists expound that war is an extension of policy by other means. JTF planners know the policy that drives the military and other actions of the JTF. These same planners should understand how civilian oversight, coming from the Office of the President of the U.S. and Secretary of Defense, impact the ways and means available to the JTF to accomplish the assigned mission.

3-239. JTF planners consider the various interactions among tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war as they develop plans to accomplish the JTF’s assigned mission. Input into JTF campaign and major operations plans, to include development of tasks and mission, are broad in scope, while precise in detail.

Conduct Operational Rehearsals

3-240. A rehearsal is a session in which a unit or staff practices expected actions to improve performance during execution (ADRP 5-0). Rehearsals are one of the CJTF’s primarily tools to ensure that the JTF staff and subordinate components understand the CJTF’s intent and concept of operations. They occur as part of preparation. The CJTF is in charge of the rehearsal and need discipline to ensure that critical events are addressed. There is never enough time to address all issues that arise. The CJTF has to pick the critical tasks to address. Rehearsals are a method for educating the JTF staff and subordinate component commanders on how the CJTF’s thought process and preferred responses to various contingencies that occur during the course of the operation. The CJTF is present during the rehearsal to discuss possible actions at decision points. (See FM 6-0, chapter 12 for additional information on rehearsal types, techniques, responsibilities, and execution. The tactical information contained in this chapter can be scaled up and adapted to encompass JTF operations.)

Assessment

3-241. Assessment drives both design and planning, and assists the CJTF in prioritizing and allocating resources. It is an important best practice reinforced by the lessons learned from other operational headquarters. A JTF headquarters needs both quantitative and qualitative analysis to deepen its understanding of the operational environment and its enemies and adversaries. The JTF needs to recognize that it cannot precisely model the behavior of the operational environment or predict the results.

3-242. Assessments inform the CJTF on the progress of the force and adjustment decisions, and informs staff planning across the three planning horizons. A strong assessment framework involves joint staff wide integration to provide staff assessments to the CJTF. The CJTF then compares staff assessments with the CJTF’s own assessment developed through that individual’s personal observations. The CJTF uses various techniques, such as the observations of those trusted individuals acting as the CJTF’s surrogates, interaction with the JTF’s functional or service component commanders, and key leader engagement to inform those personal observations.

Over-Engineering and Over-Structuring Assessment

3-243. Assessing the operational environment and the campaign is difficult, and, in many cases, subjective. Balance is needed between a quantitative and qualitative approach to assessment. Staffs often over-engineer assessment, building massive quantifiable briefings and overwhelming subordinates with information reporting requirements, while attempting to measure and document progress on attainment of operational or strategic objectives. These briefings do not always logically or clearly support the CJTF’s assessment requirements, or assist the CJTF in developing guidance and intent. Some assessments incorrectly focus on assessing activity versus assessing progress toward objectives. Quantitative indicators only serve as a potential starting point for the CJTF’s and the JTF staff’s subjective assessments, based on their observations and experience.

3-244. The CJTF balances the staff’s tendency toward providing quantitative input by limiting the amount of time and effort the staff applies to quantifying assessments. The CJTF needs to apply experience, intuition, and observations in an art of war approach to assessment. The CJTF needs to realize that activity does not necessarily equal progress.

Recommendations Based on Assessment

3-245. Another staff challenge is developing and making recommendations to the CJTF concerning what needs to be done based on these assessments. The JTF staff and subordinate functional or service component commanders should remain focused on the most important aspect of assessment—recommending adjustment decisions to the CJTF.

Focus of Assessments

3-246. Different levels of headquarters have different assessment focus. A division or BCT headquarters assessment focuses on how well they perform assigned or implied tasks to improve future actions, such as making adjustments in tactics, techniques, and procedures. They also assess tactical mission accomplishment. An operational-level headquarters, such as the JTF, focuses its assessment on whether it is achieving the necessary conditions that enable the success of the larger mission. The geographic combat command headquarters looks broadly across its AOR to assess if the command is achieving theater-strategic or campaign objectives.

Frequency and Venues for Assessment

3-247. Assessment is continuous and there are numerous venues for commanders and staff to inform each other. Tactical- and operational-level headquarters frequently conduct task assessments using friendly measures of performance, ensuring the headquarters and its forces conduct assigned and implied tasks to doctrinal standards. These task-level assessments occur within the current operations’ planning horizon, in the context of after action revues. Venues for assessment at the JTF headquarters are formal (as part of the battle rhythm and scheduled daily and weekly update assessments), or informal (based on the commander’s battlefield circulation, crosstalk, and other informal venues, such as discussions with interagency and other stakeholders).

3-248. Most JTFs assess the operational environment, specifically the achievement of conditions (or desired outcomes), to determine if the JTF is doing the right things. These assessment occur weekly or monthly to drive future operations and planning. Venues for this level of assessment also range from formal to informal, with formal assessments presented by the staff.

Stakeholder Involvement

3-249. Every CJTF reaches out to stakeholders to arrive at its assessments. Without exception, stakeholders’ perspectives enrich the assessments. In many cases, the stakeholders have not conducted assessments, do not understand the benefits, and are leery to commit to a position. The CJTF recognizes that assessment efforts support the efforts of outside stakeholders. For example, in a foreign humanitarian assistance operation, the JTF’s primary goal is to serve in support of Department of State diplomatic efforts. Therefore, the measure of mission progression is minimizing military assistance to aid the crisis response. Transitioning to other instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, and economic—gives a holistic approach to the coordination of outside stakeholders with military efforts.

Periodic Validation of the Basis of Assessments

3-250. The CJTF and staff cannot predict all possible outcomes in a complex operational environment. The combatant commander and staff need to recognize that the JTF’s actions change the operational environment, often requiring the combatant commander and planners to reassess problems, and subsequent designs and plans. The JTF headquarters needs to periodically validate the force’s understanding of the problem, paradigms, and developed objectives and actions based on the analysis.

3-251. This type of assessment often necessitates a change to the plan. Similar to an assessment, validation is conducted at different levels and with different frequencies. Revalidation of objectives occurs at the level at which they were developed. Review of the attainment of necessary conditions or desired outcomes occurs at the operational level by the JTF, while review of operational and tactical tasks conducted by the JTF and subordinate divisions and brigades occur at those echelons.

Assessment Insights and Best Practices

3-252. When developing a course of action, the collection plan supports the development and management of assessments. The collection plan includes data from the JTF functional or service component commands, their respective subordinate units, and outside stakeholders. The data is collected through surveys and polls completed by civilian inhabitants of the joint operations area. Balancing quantitative and qualitative aspects to assessment reduces the likelihood of skewed conclusions and decisions. The CJTF uses numerous venues, such as battlefield circulation and discussion with subordinate commanders and stakeholders, to obtain a personal assessment. Human judgment is key to success. Other assessment considerations include—

• Whether the JTF’s assessment goes beyond the “what-happened” stage to the “why-it-happened” stage; to explain the meaning of the event to the JTF and to establish the tasks of the JTF.

• Cause and effect conclusions, particularly in human perceptions and behavior.

• Recommendations provided to the CJTF during all assessment venues (daily, weekly, monthly, or other).

• Establishment of an assessment cell, either as a separate staff directorate or as an element in the J- 5 to oversee the overall assessment process.

• Assigning staff ownership of the various measures of effectiveness or lines of effort most closely associated with staff responsibilities; rather than restricting the assessment function to one staff directorate or section. (A deeper assessment is provided and ensures the staff wide inclusion in the assessment process.)

• Attempts by JTF headquarters, regardless of the venue or frequency, to minimize unnecessary assessment reporting workloads on subordinate headquarters.

• Interagency and multinational involvement in the assessment process; sharing of their perspectives enriches and influences the process.

• Keeping the JTF and its subordinates on course by taking into account higher level direction, enemy and adversary actions, and other changes in the security environment.

COMMUNICATING INFORMATION

3-253. The words and actions of the joint force, mission partners, neutral parties, strategic competitors, enemies, and potential adversaries intentionally or unintentionally affect many local, regional, and global audiences. The CJTF and staff should align the actions of the JTF and subordinate units with the words of official joint, interorganizational, and multinational partner sources about the JTF’s operations and perceptions of the general public and target audiences. One technique is synchronizing the JTF’s messaging through targeting methodology as a subset of planning. This alignment is part of a larger planning and targeting synchronization of both words and actions. (JP 3-13 addresses joint IO and strategic communications.)

Battle of the Narrative

3-254. Staffs have used the term “battle of the narrative” to describe a contest among nations, entities, and ideologies to gain support from key audiences to accomplish missions and objectives. This contest takes place in the cognitive dimension of the information environment and seeks to gain superiority over the enemy or adversary’s narrative. The goal is to diminish the appeal of the adversary’s narrative and to make it irrelevant and obsolete.

3-255. A CJTF often faces enemies and adversaries that rapidly project their perspectives to local, regional, and global audiences. Because these enemies and adversaries are not always truthful or accurate, the commander needs to counter their actions by proactively disseminating information with accuracy, credibility, and speed to the appropriate audiences. A battle of the narrative is commander driven, and reflects alignment efforts from the strategic to the tactical level. The commander sets the standards in the contest to communicate perspectives.

3-256. A JTF’s actions or inactions are more important than words when establishing creditability with a target audience. Actions taken or not taken by the JTF communicate to target audiences inside and external to the joint operations area. The action communicated needs to deliver an intended message rather than an unplanned or counterproductive message. The CJTF and staff should align its actions with its words. The 1968 Tet Offensive in South Vietnam is an example. The end result of this offense was the destruction of most local Viet Cong military units and infrastructure across South Vietnam. However, it was regarded as a defeat by the American civilian populace and contributed greatly to the loss of political support for U.S. operations in that country.

The Joint Task Force’s Contribution to Strategic Communication

3-257. Strategic communication is an interorganizational effort that spans across the U.S. Government. The CJTF and the subordinate units of the JTF make contributions to U.S. strategic communication efforts. The CJTF’s messaging supports strategic communication by nesting with higher headquarters’ and U.S. government strategy and providing guidance to subordinate units. The JTF’s communication plan is part of the commander’s overall plan. It is coordinated across the staff and synchronized with subordinates. This deliberate and conscious effort to communicate ensures the JTF does what it claims to do, strengthens the JTF’s credibility, and improves the JTF’s ability to appropriately influence selected audiences.

3-258. During operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks, small units, such as platoons and companies, conducting tactical tasks can benefit from strategic communication awareness training. This training is conducted during the preparation phase of the operations cycle. Another technique for enforcing strategic communication awareness is having the JTF develop tactical messages based on feedback from the field and then incorporate these updates into its tactical briefings.

The Environment

3-259. One challenge facing the CJTF is understanding the disparate audiences in and beyond the joint operating area. Each audience has its own set of beliefs and perspectives that influence how they perceive JTF’s actions and words. These perceptions are often not anticipated by the CJTF. The perceptions and outlooks of audiences can also change based on JTF actions or external influences. Therefore, the pursuit of understanding is constant.

3-260. The J-2 is tasked with understanding the enemy or adversary’s beliefs, perceptions, and likely reactions as part of the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process. While the intelligence community spends a significant amount of time studying enemies and adversaries, JTF and subordinate commanders are challenged with understanding how other non-enemy or adversary audiences perceive the JTF’s actions. All joint staff directorates assist in helping the CJTF and the other elements of joint staff improve the understanding of non-enemy or adversary audiences. For example, one of the core missions of civil affairs forces, civil information management encompasses the process of identifying, collecting, collating, processing, analyzing, producing, and disseminating information related to the political, economic, and social infrastructure and other human aspects of the joint operations area that impact or are affected by military operations. The end result of these efforts allows the JTF to improve its plans so as to better influence key audiences and decisionmakers.

Synchronize Information Related Capabilities

3-261. The purpose of synchronizing information related capabilities is to ensure that the strategic communications narrative matches the JTF’s actions to achieve as many objectives as possible. Influencing the key foreign audiences’ perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and actions is critical for successful operations in the JTF’s joint operations area and across the global environment. The CJTF also has the responsibility of informing domestic and friendly audiences that are aware of their presence. With print, radio, television, and cyber communications tools available, these audiences—foreign and domestic—are critical to mission success regardless of where the JTF is operating.

3-262. The JTF synchronizes every possible means to disseminate messages in their words and actions. Aligning information related capabilities, such as public affairs, IO, and MISO, with force employment, civil affairs, engagements, and other actions aligns what the JTF says to its actions. This alignment allows the CJTF to achieve its goals and end states.

3-263. An effective plan for information related capabilities is developed through a targeting process. This targeting process is part of the overall planning process for aligning activities with the JTF’s operational actions in support of the JTF’s overall mission objectives, strategy, and intent. The incorporation of well- conceived, commander’s strategic communication objectives and themes, as part of the CJTF’s guidance, directly supports mission-type orders. A framework is provided by subordinates for empowered and distributed messaging to dominate the information domain. Use of a targeting method in the JTF headquarters and across components allows the CJTF to focus on desired goals and objectives, identify priorities, allocate resources, and develop broad communication guidance. This targeting method is:

• Nested with higher actions.

• Commander driven.

• Fully integrated from design, through planning and execution, to assessment.

• Proactive.

3-264. A JTF can form small organizations within the headquarters that are led by a senior staff member to help manage strategic communications and engagement. These small organizations do not encroach on the normal staff oversight responsibilities for specific functions. The J-3 retains responsibility for IO and the public affairs officer remains as a personal staff officer to the CJTF. However, these organizations enable a dedicated focus on the operational environment, associated planning efforts, oversight of any strategic communications and engagement working groups established, and provide direction to quickly coordinate strategic communications and engagement related actions empowered by the CJTF. The organizations are directly linked with the JOC, future operations cell, J-5, and targeting cell. They remain in contact with subordinates and other stakeholders.

3-265. The efficient use of meetings within the JTF’s established battle rhythm facilitates effective crosstalk and coordination with OPTs, targeting organizations, and information related teams. A JTF headquarters can use a communication-related working group to integrate and guide functional-level working groups, such as the IO, public affairs, and engagement working groups. This communication-related working group supports planning and targeting across the JTF’s three planning horizons, and supports and is supported by higher headquarters, subordinate units, and joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners. This technique enables better coordination of messaging to all audiences in the information environment whether they are friendly, neutral, enemy, or adversarial.

3-266. The JTF needs to establish separate staff organizations for the different aspects of information related capabilities to guard against the perception of prohibited activities. One cell may focus on supporting inform functions with friendly audiences, such as congressional delegation visits, international organizations, and the media. Another cell may focus on operations to influence enemies, adversaries, and potential adversaries. The separate cells cross-talk to coordinate actions.

Engagement

3-267. Engagement is recognized as a key supporting capability to help achieve the CJTF’s desired goals and objectives. It is also an effective means of gaining insight into key audiences beliefs and perceptions. Interactions with key military, political, and social leaders ensures that the JTF and interorganizational and multinational partners are developing the right message for the right audience, and the messages are delivered by the right agents using appropriate means. Engagement is ideally an iterative process with each engagement building on previous engagements and setting the conditions for the next engagement. Engagements include senior leader engagements, soldier engagements, civil-military operations, media operations, and activities of subordinate commands that interact with key audiences.

3-268. Alignment of the JTF’s engagement efforts is important because agents can engage key audiences. The JTF receives direction from the combatant commander and interorganizational partners. When the JTF’s engagement plans are approved, they are integrated with the combatant commander’s plan. The JTF headquarters is often an appropriate coordinator for engagements. The JTF ensures proper frequency of engagement and ensures engagement objectives are aligned vertically and horizontally with combatant command, and adjacent and subordinate commands’ actions. Simple matrices are used as a reference mechanism for leaders to determine alignment and general synchronization of engagement efforts across the joint operations area. However, in a fast-paced environment, attempts to fully control or synchronize engagement efforts often fail. A more effective technique is the use of the commander’s intent, with generally defined spheres of influence and crosstalk. Engagement cells or working groups in the JTF and subordinate headquarters ensure aspects of an engagement are planned to include background or biographical information of the audience, the results of past engagements (from post-engagement debriefings or summaries), recent activities of concern to different target audiences, and current observations, activities, and intelligence reporting on the target audiences. Also, the conduct of a post-engagement debrief ensures results are recorded for the next engagement iteration.

3-269. There are cases when the JTF headquarters needs to restrict messaging directed toward a designated audience or when addressing one or more themes due to the sensitivity of the message to prevent information fratricide or target saturation and overload. Action agents engaging key audiences can overload the audience, which has a negative impact.

Information Assessment

3-270. Effective communication requires quality assessment. The JTF does not always see the immediate effects of its efforts of using information related capabilities, because these capabilities focus on affecting cognitive or human aspects of the environment. Perceptions, thoughts, and feelings are difficult to assess. Perceptions and feelings change slowly. Establishing a link between specific actions and changes in perceptions and beliefs are also difficult. The JTF staff needs to employ nontraditional tools and methods, including social media, polling data, and engagement meetings to help gauge adversary and the civilian population’s reaction to words and actions. Information legally obtained from enemy individuals, such as detained unlawful combatants, criminals, and enemy prisoners of war, help the staff gauge enemy reactions to JTF operations (in addition to the CJTF’s personal assessment). This broader assessment of progress towards JTF campaign objectives enriches the understanding of audiences and shows how to better communicate with them.

INTEGRATE UNIFIED ACTION SUPPORT

3-271. Unified action is the joint doctrinal term that describes the broad scope of activities taking place in joint commands under the overall direction of the commanders of unified commands to achieve unity of effort in mission accomplishment. Unified action requires the integration of effort across the unified command to include joint, single-Service, special, and supporting operations; as well as multinational, interagency, and nongovernmental organizations participants into a unified effort in the theater or joint operations area. Military support of unified action is facilitated by operations under a single commander, in execution of a single plan, that encompass all assigned and supporting military and nonmilitary elements. Unified action in the military instrument of national power supports the national strategic unity of effort through close coordination with the other instruments of national power. The CJTF and staff contribute to the unified actions of the JTF.

3-272. The process for obtaining unified action support is more of an art than a science, while military operations tend to depend on established and well understood structure and doctrine. However, some military command techniques, procedures, and systems can assist in obtaining unity of effort if they are adjusted to the dynamic world of joint, interorganizational and multinational partners. Unity of effort is achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations. The LCC J-9 staff has the primary responsibility for achieving liaison with interagency, host nation, and other civilian organizations. The CJTF can find that liaison and the use of a political advisor (known as POLAD) is of great assistance in multinational partner coordination. In summary, action follows understanding.

3-273. Conducting joint operations across all domains requires the CJTF integrate JTF activities with those of a wide range of other organizations. These include—

• The supported combatant commander.

• Other JTF’s within the supported combatant commander’s area of responsibility.

• Subordinate functional or service component commands.

• DOD combat support agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency.

• Multinational partners.

• Other governmental agencies.

• Civilian agencies of host and third nations.

• Nongovernmental organizations.

3-274. This integration with joint, interorganizational and multinational partners ensures cooperation and mutual support, consistent effort, and a mutual understanding of the CJTF’s priorities, support requirements, concept of operations, commander’s intent, and objectives. It includes coordinating with the U.S. ambassador and country teams of the country or countries in which the JTF operates. Integration includes, but is not limited to, coordinating concept development, sustainment support, and supporting subordinate functional or service component operation plans. Coordination of air, land, sea, space, special operations, and cyber support begins early in planning. JP 1 and JP 3-0 discuss unified action. JP 3-08 provides joint doctrine on interagency operations. JP 3-16 provides joint doctrine on multinational operations.

Unified Action Considerations

3-275. The integration of joint, interorganizational and multinational partner considerations requires the CJTF commander take the following actions—

• Ascertain the agendas of supporting agencies and partner nations.

• Determine the limitations of supporting agencies, multinational partners, and the JTF’s functional or service component commands.

• Develop a multi-service, multinational, and interagency intelligence- and information- sharing structure.

• Coordinate plans with the combatant commander, service component commands within supported combatant commander’s area of responsibility, other governmental agencies, and multinational agencies.

• Coordinate support to and from other governmental agencies, host nation and multinational governments, and nongovernmental agencies.

• Coordinate media management—media may be a major source of operational and tactical information.

• Establish common, minimal training standards for the JTF.

• Coordinate rules of engagement.

• Coordinate consequence management.

Taking these actions helps to ensure cooperation and mutual support among all organizations involved. The CJTF needs to expend personal effort to establish trust between partnership organizations. Each operation is a unique experience and each partner needs to be treated appropriately.

Interorganizational and Multinational Partner Agendas

3-276. The CJTF uses the JTF and other available staff to discover or bring out the unstated agendas of each participant in a unified action effort. Each participating organization has core values that it cannot compromise. These values form the foundation upon which all other functions of the agency grow. In any interaction, all participants need to be constantly aware that each agency continuously cultivates and creates external sources of support and maneuver to protect its core values. Domestic politics are usually the single most important driver of other U.S. governmental agencies and multinational partners. The agenda of these multinational organizations may or may not coincide with U.S. international security positions.

3-277. Private agendas can significantly affect the process of obtaining consensus between different groups. The goals of an institution can conflict with the private, usually short-term, agendas of its members. Personal agendas can be significant, often creating an informal hierarchy of the department or agency because personality plays such a large part in unified action operations. Once these agendas are identified, it is possible for the CJTF and staff to take actions to adjust to the perceptions and respond to the needs of each participant.

3-278. All organizations have formal and informal hierarchy, which results in a distribution of power, income, and prestige among the members of the organization. These informal structures are created to serve the personal needs of the organization’s members and tend to modify the organization’s overall behavior pattern. Informal structures inherent in every organization contribute significantly to its ability to perform formal functions. Thus, developing an understanding of an organization and of the personalities involved in its informal structure can provide insight to how the organization performs.

Determine Capabilities and Limitations of Interorganizational and Multinational Partners

3-279. The CJTF and staff take action to determine the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of the JTF’s interorganizational and multinational partners. The CJTF does this to match missions with capabilities and exploit special or unique capabilities of partner forces or agencies.

3-280. The CJTF needs to remember that the heads of each multinational contingent in the JTF has a direct line to the head of their national government. Their individual governments determine if their national contingents conduct their designate activities in the JTF concept of operations. The CJTF listens and responds appropriately when those national component heads inform the CJTF or J-3 that their national policy preclude them from conducting operations as currently planned. The CJTF ties to understand the length of time and level of support that each member of the multinational alliance or coalition is capable of supporting. Domestic politics can cause a multinational partner to renege from its initial commitments.

3-281. Most other U.S. government agencies do not have contingency positions. Therefore, every individual supporting the JTF means that there is an empty full-time position somewhere in that agency unless the individual is a contractor. Most other government agencies—exempting federal law enforcement and some Department of Homeland Security and intelligence community organizations—do not operate in an environment where life and limb are routinely in danger; therefore, the risk tolerance of these individuals and their parent organizations is normally low.

Develop Intelligence and Information-Sharing Structure During Unified Action

3-282. The CJTF and staff try to optimize each interorganizational and multinational partner intelligence and information capabilities as they contribute toward mission accomplishment. The CJTF wants to incorporate and exploit these capabilities as much as possible, which requires the JTF staff to help the CJTF determine what information can be shared with which partners. The CJTF provides each interorganizational and multinational partner a COP tailored to their requirements and consistent with disclosure policies of member nations.

3-283. The CJTF facilitates the exchange of operational information among and between the JTF’s functional or service component commands and interorganizational and multinational partners to help ensure coordination of operations among and between those partners. The CJTF first coordinates plans within the JTF forces to gain consensus before coordinating with interorganizational and multinational partners. The CJTF and the functional or service component commanders need to agree to the ends, ways, and means of an operation before trying to integrate their actions with other governmental agencies and multinational partner organizations.

3-284. One technique that is used to coordinate plans is for the CJTF and chief of staff to provide a forum where routine issues are resolved informally among interorganizational and multinational partners. Establishing robust liaison facilities accomplishment of this task. The JTF needs to involve each partner in the development of JTF plans as much as is possible before its approval and publication to obtain feedback from partners that can be incorporated into the final plans. Procedures, such as control of attacking aircraft, fire support coordination measures (FSCMs), and requests for supporting fires are standardized as part of the plan to prevent fratricide.

Coordinate CBRN Consequence Management and Foreign Disaster Relief

3-285. CBRN consequence management is described as the overarching U.S. government capability and the strategic national direction, to prepare for, respond to, and recover from the effects of a CBRN incident at home or abroad. JP 3-41 provides joint doctrine on this subject. Foreign humanitarian assistance are Department of Defense activities conducted outside the U.S. and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation (JP 3-29). Foreign humanitarian assistance include foreign disaster relief. Foreign disaster relief involves the provision of emergency relief assistance provided by the

U.S. Government. JP 3-29 provides joint doctrine on these subjects. An Army corps can be tasked by an establishing authority to provide the base for a JTF headquarters to manage subordinate units conducting these tasks.

CONDUCT PUBLIC AFFAIRS

3-286. The CJTF is accountable and responsible to the public for JTF operations. The news media is the principal means of communicating information about the JTF to the general public, and military journalists are the principal source of communication with military personnel, civilian employees, and family members. Currently, the speed of military operations and advances in communications technology complicate the challenges of supporting news media efforts to keep the internal and external public informed. The CJTF needs to recognize these facts. Successful relations between the JTF and the news media are best established by regular interaction, and are based upon credibility and trust. All JTF individuals working with media should make an effort to educate those media individuals accompanying them on the doctrine, organization, training, and material associated with their individual service and unit and its assigned missions. Doing so aids in the dissemination of accurate and timely information and helps media personnel more clearly understand their roles and responsibilities in accomplishing their overall missions.

3-287. There are no casual conversations with the press. Commanders can never lose their tempers with the press. Misstatements can cost commanders their jobs. The CJTF should establish ground rules up front for what will be deep background, on the record, and other pertinent information. Each commander within the JTF should make the media conduct live interviews, if it is believed the media will only use soundbites of the interview. If there are issues, the CJTF makes efforts to resolve them.

3-288. The CJTF commander needs to realize that there are many different audiences for what is said, such as the American people, civilian political leadership, other governmental agencies, the combatant commander, other commanders, troops in subordinate units, and international audiences. The media is only one of these audiences. The CJTF and each commander within the JTF prepares for each interview to include a rehearsal with an individual who has studied the individual reporter conducting the interview to determine any prejudices and likely questions. Each commander, regardless of echelon, has two or three messages or themes prepared for the interviews. Difficulties in communicating include—

• Form of the interview versus the substance of the interview.

• Different frames of reference for the different audiences.

• Same message targeted to different audiences.

• Simplicity of responses versus comprehensiveness of responses.

• Repetition of themes versus refinement of themes.

In all cases, the JTF public affairs officer provides the CJTF an after action review of the CJTF's press interviews.

3-289. News media representatives and military journalists conduct first-hand and after-the-fact reporting of operations. The information they are given is made consistent with national and operations security. Public affairs operations explain the JTF and component command’s concept for employing forces and applying resources to accomplish the mission assigned by the combatant commander or CJTF. They clarify the link between strategic goals and operational objectives. The almost universal availability of email is a dynamic that is taken into account. The public affairs officer explains the necessity of operations security to the media. Those individuals who refuse to adhere to previously established common-sense security guidelines need to know that their access to the JTF component forces can be severed in response to their misconduct. Simultaneously, the JTF public affairs officer supports the CJTF’s requirement to provide command information to the soldiers, marines, airmen, sailors, DOD civilians, and family members to create an awareness of military goals during JTF operations. The JTF public affairs office also plays a critical role in facilitating media efforts to cover JTF operations.

3-290. The mission of public affairs is to expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about the activities of U.S. forces to the public and internal audiences. Managing public affairs is an important part of the CJTF’s job. The JTF’s strategic communications plan takes advantage of different available media means—print, television, and internet. It accounts for the different environments in which the target audiences exist. It involves those audiences in an interactive manner to better educate them on the various themes and messages that the CJTF wants communicated. The CJTF and JTF public affairs officer is consistent when working with the media; small tactical events can have strategic results. The CJTF and public affairs officer should realize that the media representatives have deadlines they need to meet. The CJTF and public affairs officer need to shield subordinate commanders when possible from media attention because subordinate commanders have less time and resources available to deal properly with media representatives.

3-291. Public affairs doctrine accommodates the mission of the Armed Forces of the United States with that of the news media. Both institutions must communicate with the public; however, the military observes operations security to protect national security and the lives of forces. The doctrinal principles of public affairs apply across the conflict continuum. They include—

• Information that is timely and accurate.

• Requests for information are answered in a timely manner.

• Information that is made fully available, unless it is under security classification or endangers the lives of soldiers.

• Information that is not classified to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.

3-292. Embedded media is effective for the U.S. and the JTF even at the risk of operations security violations because it informs the American people on what the force is doing. There is an impact on the tactical level units that have to support embedded media. Their commanders need to understand the equipment that media are carrying so they can make intelligent rules for what they can carry as they accompany U.S. tactical forces. Non-embedded media is kept engaged to show the military’s side of the story. Established American media figures are generally responsible individuals who listen to the military's story. American nationals trying to make their media reputations try to push the limits of established ground rules. Most international media are similar to the later American nationals in that most public affairs officers do not know their background and, therefore, treat them as unknown quantities. Internet search engines can provide the relevant background records of media figures that publish using the English language.

3-293. The JTF commander needs the right individuals as command spokesman and public affairs officer. A commander designates a senior military or DOD civilian from the J-3 as the command’s official spokesmen. The ability of the news media to transmit instantaneous and often live reports is considered when planning an operation. Failure to adequately plan does not stop the media from reporting. It can create situations that endanger news media representatives and the operation itself. Furthermore, over the last two decades, the number of journalists accompanying U.S. operations is increasing. Therefore, commanders should support news media coverage of almost every aspect of their operation.

3-294. The JTF public affair office needs to anticipate media requests about the Army and USMC forces and operations, and the presence, capabilities, and operations of the JTF’s joint, interorganizational and multinational partners. The JTF headquarters can request a Joint Public Affairs Team from the combatant commander to handle this increased public affairs related work load. (See JP 3-61 and FM 3-61.)

INTELLIGENCE

3-295. Operational intelligence is that intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters of operations areas (JP 2-0). It is the link between strategic and tactical intelligence. Operational intelligence is primarily used by combatant commander and subordinate CJTFs and their component commanders, such as the LCC commander. JTF operational intelligence involves two primary subtasks:

• Establish the intelligence enterprise.

• Conduct intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) directorate operations.

3-296. Operational intelligence is vital to successful operational design. A tactical commander can react quickly to unanticipated shifts in the flow of battle with forces reserved for that purpose. In comparison, a CJTF (or LCC) commander needs to determine the line of operations far in advance. A commitment of major forces to an operation is not easy to alter without major penalties in time, resources, and unexploited opportunities. Projection of enemy dispositions and probable reactions are essential during the conduct of decisive action. Early diagnosis of the enemy’s objectives and the way the enemy conducts operations to obtain objectives is similarly necessary. In all cases, an analysis of the terrain and weather and their probable impact on operations are vital to success. Likewise, the CJTF (or LCC) commander needs to understand the relevant civil considerations that apply to the unique set of circumstances that exists within the joint operations area.

3-297. The intelligence cycle process described and depicted in figure I-3 of JP 2-0 provides a simplified model for conducting operational intelligence. It establishes a base from which an Army corps G-2, involved in the conduct of joint and multinational intelligence operations at the operational level, can develop common terminology, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

3-298. During counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, operational intelligence is increasingly concerned with the conduct of stability tasks and has a greater focus on the operational variables. It also assists commanders in assessing and evaluating actions and possible implications associated with noncombat operations, such as foreign humanitarian assistance.

ESTABLISH THE INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE

3-299. The intelligence enterprise is the sum total of the intelligence efforts of the entire U.S. intelligence community, including those of national and joint intelligence organizations. It is comprised of all U.S. intelligence professionals, sensors, systems, federated organizations, information, and processes that are supported by a network-enabled architecture. The most important element of the intelligence enterprise is the people that make it work. Established secure communications networks enable these military and civilian professionals. JP 2-0 and FM 2-0 describe this intelligence architectures, the federated approach— intelligence reach, collaboration between echelons, and maximization of processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) enablers—used to conduct intelligence analysis, and fusion centers where information collection and sharing across multiple participants occurs.

3-300. The corps G-2 organizes the nucleus of a JTF J-2 section from the corps organic assets once a higher commander designates the corps headquarters as the base for a JTF headquarters. The JTF J-2 intelligence directorate establishes those intelligence related boards and centers and functional intelligence organizations required to synchronize and execute intelligence operations and meet mission intelligence requirements. Determining which intelligence boards, centers, elements, offices, and OPTs are formed is mission dependent and, therefore, tailored to meet the JTF’s intelligence needs. Typical intelligence-related functional organizations established can include, but are not limited to:

• Joint captured materiel exploitation center.

• Joint document exploitation center.

• Joint interrogation and debriefing center (or facility).

• Joint collection management board.

• Joint imagery processing center.

• Joint targeting coordination board.

• Intelligence synchronization board.

3-301. Intelligence produced by these boards, centers, and organizations is incorporated into the JTF’s three planning horizons and made available to higher, adjacent, supported, supporting, and subordinate commands. JP 2-01.3 addresses intelligence preparation of the operational environment, which provides many of the intelligence products that support JTF planning and intelligence related meetings. (See JP 2-01 for additional information on how joint intelligence supports military operations.) Some of these centers are established and supervised by a joint intelligence support element (JISE).

3-302. The new J-2 incorporates other service augmentation and establishes a JISE or joint intelligence operations center (JIOC) based on the scope, duration, and mission of the JTF. (JIOCs are found at the combatant command echelon.) These two organizations integrate the Director of National Intelligence, service intelligence agencies, combat support agency, and combatant command intelligence assets to coordinate intelligence production, collection management, analysis, and support.

3-303. The JISE is composed of subject matter experts and functional teams; it provides intelligence services and products required by the CJTF, JTF staff, and components. By design, the JISE is scalable to meet the needs of the JTF and is tailored to fit the operational environment based on identified commander's mission requirements. The JISE is designed with the appropriate intelligence personnel, functions, processes, and architecture to execute and integrate the intelligence process with the commander's decisionmaking and execution cycles.

3-304. The JTF JISE is the primary intelligence organization supporting the CJTF and the JTF subordinate service component commanders. The JISE facilitates efficient access to the entire DOD intelligence system. The composition and focus of each JISE varies according to the commander’s needs, but each is capable of performing warnings and producing, exploiting, and disseminating current intelligence. Through the JISE, the J-2 coordinates intelligence support provided by all members of the national intelligence community and from available multinational sources.

3-305. The combatant commander coordinates the acquisition of national intelligence for the JTF. The combatant commander deploys special intelligence teams to the JTF’s joint operations area. These teams have a support relationship to the CJTF, and are under staff supervision of the JTF J-2. These intelligence teams include the Defense Intelligence Agency, the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), or National Security Agency representatives. USAF staff weather augmentation, as required, is also under staff supervision of the JTF J-2.

3-306. Clear guidance and intentions from the CJTF can significantly help the J-2 provide intelligence in the preferred format and level of detail, and at the required frequency necessary to support a commander’s decision process. The J-2 manages the analysis and development of products beyond the military threat in order to support the CJTF’s understanding the operational environment.

3-307. The JTF J-2 has three objectives. These objectives exist regardless of differences among the different JTFs and their associated intelligence enterprise’s functional structure, manning, support requirements, and production efforts. These three common objectives are:

• Gaining a holistic understanding of the complex environment.

• Tailoring and balancing intelligence support to the JTF’s mission.

• Focusing JTF intelligence operations, such as collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination through the use of priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).

Understanding

3-308. A JTF headquarters has to expand its analysis beyond a military-centric view to gain a greater understanding of the operational environment. One technique the commander and staff use to better understand and frame the operational environment in support of the commander’s decisionmaking requirements is the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). JIPOE incorporates information pertaining to all relevant aspects of the operational environment (i.e., political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure data). The J-2 manages the JIPOE process with input from intelligence planners and other staff directorates and elements. The J-2 synchronizes the required cross-staff, cross-functional, interorganizational, and multi-national approach to gain the respective expertise of the collective group.

Tailoring and Balancing

3-309. The J-2 needs to provide agile and focused intelligence support to tactical level activities. The CJTF can decentralized not only collection, but also the processing and exploitation assets to support tactical engagements. This decentralization can improve the agility and flexibility of the joint force to rapidly collect, process, and share critical information. The CJTF assists the J-2 in optimizing the employment of intelligence resources when necessary.

3-310. Much of the existing echelon above brigade intelligence architecture supports national- and strategic-level requirements. Significant intelligence capabilities are at the strategic and operational levels. However, a JTF focused on the conduct of irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, humanitarian, and even field operations often require additional intelligence capabilities, such as human intelligence (HUMINT). The J-2 needs to take full advantage of existing national intelligence support plans to overcome organic resource limitations within the JTF. Several unified commands, for example U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and Korea decentralized their intelligence architecture and increased their federation in order for intelligence support to be more effective and timely at tactical levels. The J-2 has to tailor the organization while recognizing that processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) is often the limiting factor in gaining and providing intelligence.

3-311. A philosophy of mission command with its attributes of trust, and shared understanding and intent can overcome a more traditional centralized mentality. It can lead to more timely and relevant tactical or mission-level support and shared understanding among echelon staffs. Structure allows for an increased degree of synergy achieved among command echelons.

3-312. Federated agreements with adjacent commands and the members of the national intelligence community are often required to overcome resource limitations. The J-2 has to leverage forward, decentralized information collection, analysis, and PED with federated reach back. U.S. Strategic Command,

U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Pacific Command have incorporated federation agreements to address complex threats. Embedded liaison and agency representatives are vital to the process. Commands have implemented overarching, deliberately-written national intelligence support plans that synchronize Defense Intelligence Agencies, service intelligence agencies and activities, and other members of the national intelligence community with the specified combatant command and JTF’s priorities and operations.

3-313. A JTF often adjusts its intelligence structures and functions. It then decides where to assume risk when shortfalls exist in response to changes in the mission and a lack of resources. The JTF sometimes mitigates shortfalls through federation agreements among subordinate, adjacent, and higher commands, or integrates nontraditional resources, such as information from outside normal J-2 channels (host nation interaction, field operation debriefs, key leader engagement, nongovernmental organizations, public sector, and social media). A JTF needs to ensure that its intelligence organizational structure retains a balance between the resources that collect the data and the resources required for PED intelligence products. This balance requires a communications infrastructure that supports the JTF information collection concepts and PED. The JTF J-2 ensures that personnel with the appropriate skill sets and authority are properly obtained and placed within the intelligence enterprise, providing support as it evolves during the conduct of operations. A J-2 staff directorate structures the JTF intelligence enterprise to support decisions at all levels of war in support of the joint force commander’s planning and decision horizons. A staff is required to concurrently understand the complex operational environment while supporting or empowering low level tactical action.

3-314. However, a JTF J-2 cannot solely focus on supporting tactical operations with their organic staff capabilities. The JTF J-2 needs to develop and balance the means to provide the CJTF with operational-level understanding with the need to support subordinate tactical actions. The use of a mission command philosophy within the JTF intelligence community is a valuable means to distribute and balance capability between subordinates. The J-2 postures collection and analysis assets in various forward locations to better support lower echelon requirements. As necessary, the J-2 employs reach back to share resources across multiple commands and echelons. Reach back is extended at the national level, which has been successfully achieved by federation agreements. For example, in Afghanistan and Korea, collection capacity was pushed down to various subordinate commands spread throughout the theater due to tactical-level requirements.

Focusing

3-315. A deliberate mechanism, such as CCIRs, ensure the CJTF’s IRs are understood by the JTF staff, with supporting organization from adjacent, subordinate, and higher commands. PIRs are key components of the CCIRs. Commanders have the opportunity to use PIRs to drive intelligence for supporting decisions, planning, and operations. PIRs shape the intelligence enterprise. They extend well beyond collection as they are used to prioritize intelligence reporting, analysis, and production. Prioritizing involves organizational structure, manning, and the joint command and control system architecture. The JTF needs to use PIRs to focus the intelligence enterprise, not just collection requirements. PIRs used by the commander should support the operational planning horizons.

3-316. During a major crisis, PIRs can leverage national assets and personnel to directly support the commander. They provide priority, clarity, and relevancy to external organizations that support the commander, especially at the national level. The JTF needs to adjust its PIRs as the conditions change, and consequently, as planning and operations evolve. Intelligence is only relevant if it maintains pace with the commander’s changing needs. Clear and routine guidance on PIRs from the commander is essential. The CJTF’s personal involvement effectively transmits these information needs inside and outside of the JTF. The JTF needs to implement a PIR management process that deliberately obtains the CJTF’s approval on how and when to update PIRs. The JTF should maintain PIRs dynamically to ensure their relevancy in the face of changing situations. The JTF needs to aggressively disseminate and clearly post changing PIRs to ensure a wide range of visibility and awareness while highlighting the changes.

3-317. A useful technique when deeply involved in operations inside another country, especially with aspects of its society, is for commanders to collect information to allow them to better support the country, integrate key partners, and better understand the environment, especially during counterinsurgency, stability, and humanitarian operations. For example, in Afghanistan, one joint force commander pursued and obtained requisite information, which was used to better interact and support the government and its populace. The JTF headquarters staff, subordinate commands, and interorganizational resources were used to help gain this information.

CONDUCT J-2 DIRECTORATE FUNCTIONS

3-318. The JTF J-2 and the members of that staff accomplish the following activities when providing operational intelligence to the CJTF and the JTF staff, in addition to higher, subordinate, and supported or supporting headquarters:

• Direct operational intelligence activities.

• Collect and share operational information.

• Process and exploit collected operational information.

• Produce operational intelligence and prepare intelligence products.

• Disseminate and integrate operational intelligence.

• Evaluate intelligence activities in the JTF joint operations area.

A corps headquarters G-2 staff providing the base for the JTF headquarters J-2 directorate is assisted in the performance of these tasks by the theater military intelligence brigade.

Direct Operational Intelligence Activities

3-319. While at home station, a corps G-2 cell oversees and directs operational intelligence activities directed against possible overseas contingencies, which allows a rapid response to possible overseas crisis situations. The most likely threat scenarios are used as the core of these planning efforts. These planning efforts include determining the personnel, equipment, and intelligence architecture essential for generic support to the corps’ deployment.

3-320. When a particular crisis situation unfolds, crisis action planners develop an actual operation plan using the joint Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX) and the MDMP. Intelligence input to the operations plan includes an adjusted and updated threat scenario and an intelligence annex that tailors intelligence support to the joint operations area, nature of the threat, scope of operations, and assigned forces. Feedback from deployed intelligence personnel to both crisis-action and deliberate planners ensures benefits of lessons learned are incorporated as soon as possible into planning for subsequent operations.

3-321. The corps commander focuses the organization’s intelligence efforts by providing the J-2, if designated as the LCC commander) with a clear mission statement, commander’s intent, and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). (Paragraphs 3-145 and 3-146 discuss CCIR in more detail.) CCIRs assist the J-2 in determining their intelligence requirements, planning operational collection efforts, and issuing the necessary orders and requests to supporting organizations. The JTF J-2 reviews, validates, and prioritizes intelligence requirements and taskings to provide intelligence products for Army (and USMC) units and multinational forces and other interorganizational and multinational partners participating in the operation as part of the JTF.

Determine and Prioritize the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

3-322. A limit is placed on the CJTF’s total number of CCIRs for any operations (or any phase of an operation). As a general rule, there is no more than 10 CCIRs per phase to focus intelligence operations and information collection and analysis. Excessive CCIRs result in unfocused information collection and intelligence production. The CJTF identifies the information that makes the difference in the JTF’s ability to accomplish the mission, preventing the distraction of unimportant information. For complex, phased operations, separate CCIRs are identified for each phase. Changes in the situation can rule out some CCIRs or demand the development of new CCIRs as operations progress. The CJTF commander makes changes to the list of CCIRs to address new requirements or concerns as operations develop. Some CCIRs are answered or made irrelevant. CCIRs are ranked and disseminated in priority of importance. The methodology used to build CCIRs focuses on the level of operations to be conducted, mission, the time frame of expected operations, and requirement priority.

Determine and Rank Priority Intelligence Requirements and Information Requirements

3-323. In addition to focusing on the CJTF’s CCIRs, the J-2 directorate focuses on the PIRs of higher, supported, supporting, and subordinate elements. Subordinate force intelligence-related information requirements (IRs) are also addressed and prioritized during planning. Conflicts for resources are resolved and unnecessary redundancies eliminated. Conflicting intelligence requirements can result in the J-2 directorate diverting subordinate tactical intelligence resources to answer JTF or higher echelon strategic needs.

3-324. The J-2 staff proposes IRs using the list of JTF PIRs as the base. IRs not designated as PIRs become IRs. IRs help identify specific indicators that fill gaps in the CJTF’s and subordinate commanders and staffs’ knowledge and understanding of the joint operations area and enemy, adversary, and neutral activities. These IRs, in turn, reduce the uncertainties associated with JTF operations. PIRs and IRs that cannot be answered through the request for information (RFI) process require the allocation of information collection assets against them. Collecting against CCIRs, PIRs, and IRs helps the J-2 staff identify indicators of enemy and adversary actions or intent.

3-325. The prioritization of PIRs and IRs is as important as their identification. There is never enough intelligence and information collection assets to collect against all requirements simultaneously. This prioritization is coordinated with the JTF operations staff because they have tasking authority over most operational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Significant changes, such as execution of a branch or sequel to the current operation, usually leads to changes in the CCIRs, PIRs, and IRs and their respective prioritization.

Prepare Operational Intelligence Synchronization Plan

3-326. Information collection synchronization planning and requirement management are major activities when directing the conduct of operational intelligence for the JTF. The goal is to develop an information collection synchronization plan that satisfies the CJTF’s intelligence and counterintelligence requirements. J-2 intelligence directorate personnel review existing intelligence databases, searching for answers to the requirements once their echelon’s PIRs and IRs are determined and prioritized. They issue requests for information and initiate the development of an information collection synchronization plan, if the intelligence does not already exist. This plan identifies gaps in intelligence holdings and incorporates all available information collection assets.

3-327. Information collection synchronization planning—

• Assigns the appropriate collection capabilities to fulfill specific IRs.

• Matches requests for information (known as RFIs) with the appropriate collection capabilities.

• Synchronizes the timing of collection, allowing for the time required for the other phases of the intelligence cycle, with the operational scheme of maneuver.

• Registers, validates, and prioritizes all collection, exploitation, and dissemination requirements regarding all received requests for information.

• Considers enemy and adversary countermeasures designed to deceive or degrade the accuracy of friendly information collection systems and addresses methods to counter enemy and adversary countermeasures.

• Culminates in preparation and revision of the JTF’s information collection synchronization plan, which tasks or submits intelligence requirements to the appropriate internal and external supporting intelligence organizations and agencies.

3-328. During information collection synchronization planning, the J-2 staff coordinates closely with the JTF’s operations staff across the different planning horizons. Collection managers ensure the information collection synchronization plan is synchronized with operations plans so collection efforts focus the right collection asset and capabilities at critical times. The J-2 integrates JTF reconnaissance and surveillance efforts with other forms of information collection operations and makes sure that these efforts are coordinated with counterintelligence activities.

3-329. J-2 personnel plan the collection effort and provides guidance, direction, and requests to intelligence organizations after they assist their consumers in determining their intelligence requirements. Intelligence plans are prepared. Personnel and systems are allocated. Planning and directing include reviewing, validating, and prioritizing requirements and taskings. Requirements include providing intelligence for U.S. forces and multinational forces engaged in a range of activities. (Information collection synchronization planning is addressed in detail in JP 2-01 and FM 2-0.)

Allocate Available Information Collection Resources

3-330. The JTF staff allocates available operational information collection resources according to the CJTF’s guidance. Simultaneously, they request support from the supported combatant commander, national agencies, other combatant commands, multinational partners, and other interorganizational partners based on the identification and prioritization of the JTF’s intelligence requirements.

3-331. JP 2-01 and ATP 2-01 detail collection requirements, operations, and management, which is the way the J-2 staff allocates available intelligence and information collection resources. These publications—

• Explain the relationship between intelligence synchronization and operations.

• Detail the flow of requests for information from the subordinate tactical unit, service or functional component, or JTF requester to the Defense Intelligence Agency or National Military Joint Intelligence Center at the national level, and the response to the requester.

• Describe the collection manager’s functions for collection requirements management and collection operations management.

Collect and Share Operational Information

3-332. The collection and sharing of operational information involves the gathering of information from operational and tactical sources on operational and tactical enemy or adversary forces and their decisive points. These operational and tactical sources include high-payoff targets (HPTs), such as CBRN weapons production, infrastructure, and delivery systems. This task also includes the collection of information on the nature and characteristics of the CJTF’s joint operations area and area of interest. The location and reporting of captured or isolated friendly personnel is also operational information, which involves the collection of data to support assessment. (See FM 6-0.) Intelligence collection tasks at the JTF level are distinguished from those at the tactical level by their increased shelf life and their inability to immediately influence the outcomes of operational missions.

3-333. Collected information is shared among the joint service intelligence communities, interorgan- izational and multinational partners to consolidate the return of information, promote fusion, and to prevent retasking scarce assets. However, classification restrictions between interorganizational and multinational partners will continue to cause problems in the future. Separate briefings to these organizations is a technique that provides only an interim solution because they use a lot of manpower to prepare separate briefings without additional benefits. The CJTF needs to develop methods to share information with interorganizational and multinational partners without violating legal and regulatory guidance on the release of classified information. The JTF can inform and employ multiple foreign disclosure officers throughout the staff. Another technique is to provide interorganizational and multinational partners with liaison officers who possess the appropriate secure information systems that can provide necessary information to the partners without disclosing means and methods.

3-334. Information is collected from civilians, to include internees, displaced civilians, and defectors. The information gained can include the general attitudes of civilians toward their own government, as well as U.S. or friendly forces. Information can also include potential terrorist or enemy special operating force threats to U.S. or friendly forces, facilities, and activities and supporting installations. Information gained from civilians is carefully evaluated for reliability and then reported expeditiously to ensure the information is usable. Collected information is provided through secured means to appropriate processing and exploitation elements.

Process and Exploit Collected Operational Information

3-335. Processing and exploitation activities include initial imagery interpretation, data conversion and correlation, document translation, and decryption, as well as reporting the results of these actions to production elements. These activities are the same at the JTF, functional component command, and tactical levels. What differs is the scale and scope of these activities. Other examples include converting electronic data into a standardized report, that is analyzed by a system operator and correlating dissimilar or jumbled information by assembling similar elements before the information is forwarded for analysis.

3-336. The asset that collected the information can also process and exploit the information. Alternatively, an analysis element can perform the processing during production. The former allows the unit controlling the collection assets to determine the relevance and quality of information collected. The unit that controls a collection asset also controls any sensor-unique processing equipment.

3-337. During processing, the J-2 staff, supported by the JTF JISE and other intelligence community organizations, such as the theater intelligence brigade, extracts pertinent data from reporting and transforms it into information that is used in the analysis and production of intelligence. Processing also includes sorting through large amounts of collected information and intelligence—multidiscipline reports from JTF subordinate unit information collection assets, and higher-echelon units and organizations, and non-military intelligence elements located within the JTF’s joint operations area—to obtain only relevant information. Relevant information is information of importance to a commander in the exercise of command and control and important for staffs in the conduct of the operations process. For the J-2 directorate, relevant information includes information needed to answer an intelligence requirement.

3-338. Processing is a continuous operation. J-2 intelligence analysts process new information as it is received without waiting for additional information. Intelligence derived from fragmentary information is sometimes essential, particularly during fast-moving operations or when the information concerns an HPT. There is often a time lag between the time a target presents itself and the time the element can react to information that becomes available. Complete information about a target or a situation is seldom available. JTF analysts continuously identify information gaps and acquire information to complete, confirm, or refute existing fragmentary information as necessary to answer the CCIRs.

3-339. Information requires different degrees of processing before it is exploited. SIGINT processing and exploitation are increasingly performed by collection systems due to improvements in hardware and software. Overhead imagery can clearly indicate an operational target. Captured documents can only require translating before analysts are able to use them. Conversion of computer databases into another operating system or decryption is necessary before the information is exploited. The technical exploitation of enemy equipment can take months of intensive effort before its full capabilities are determined.

3-340. Each military intelligence collection system has its own reporting and processing systems. Some reconnaissance and surveillance assets, particularly an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) and strategic reconnaissance patrols, can report relevant information that is immediately usable for targeting and other purposes by the CJTF and subordinate component and tactical commanders. However, the personnel in the reporting chain still process these reports by evaluating their relevancy and accuracy.

3-341. Processing and exploiting collected operational information includes the collating and correlating of information to identify and group related items of information for comparison. When possible, individual elements of information are associated and combined with related information from several sources and means on a single subject to improve the reliability or credibility of the information.

Produce Operational Intelligence and Prepare Intelligence Products

3-342. The analysis and production phase of the intelligence process results in operational intelligence and the preparation of intelligence products. The result of this phase is the conversion of all available processed and exploited information into intelligence and intelligence products that satisfy the CJTF’s CCIRs and other intelligence requirements through integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation. Intelligence products are presented in many forms, such as oral presentations, hard-copy publications, or electronic media.

3-343. The JTF J-2 staff integrates evaluated, analyzed, and interpreted information from single or multiple sources and disciplines into finished intelligence products during the analysis and production phase as part of a collaborative process. The use of collaborative analysis techniques and procedures leverage the intelligence production capabilities of all available organizations to meet the CJTF’s intelligence requirements. The J-2 and supporting intelligence unit commanders ensure that the prioritization and synchronization of the JTF J-2 staff’s information processing, and intelligence production efforts answer the CJTF’s CCIRs in a similar manner to collection operations with clearly defined goals and criteria.

3-344. Subordinate components and organizations at every echelon in the JTF accomplish intelligence production and intelligence product preparation. Collaborative analysis and production effort in which information is rapidly and fully shared among geographically-dispersed organizations facilitates intelligence production. It involves dividing the analysis and production effort among intelligence facilities within and external to the JTF as appropriate to meet the force’s intelligence needs. Proficiency in the use of collaborate analysis techniques and procedures enables the J-2 to answer the CJTF’s requirements regardless of the mission, operational environment, and situation. Intelligence produced comes from the information gathered by information collection capabilities assigned or attached to the JTF JISE and theater intelligence brigade. Alternatively, it can come from the refinement and compilation of intelligence received from subordinate units and external organizations, such as an expeditionary military intelligence brigade or the Defense Intelligence Agency. The information used comes from both sources.

3-345. A key tool for conducting operational intelligence production is the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). The JIPOE is a systematic approach used by intelligence personnel to analyze information about the operational environment, the enemy, and adversaries. The JIPOE —

• Defines the total operational environment and describes the environment’s effects on friendly, enemy, and adversary courses of action.

• Evaluates the capabilities of enemy and adversary forces operating the LCC’s area of operations.

• Determines and describes potential enemy and adversary threat courses of action.

• Integrates the full spectrum of joint, interorganizational and multinational partners, to include national assets, into the JIPOE process.

(See JP 2-01.3 for additional information about JIPOE. ATP 2-01.3 addresses a similar process at the tactical level.)

3-346. Analysts use the JIPOE process to analyze, correlate, and fuse information pertaining to all aspects of the JTF joint operations area and area of interest. The process is also used to determine enemy and adversary capabilities to operate. Analysts can apply the process across the range of military operations. Collection and processing and exploitation phase functions are primarily performed by intelligence discipline specialists within the J-2. Analysis and production is done by all-source intelligence analysts.

Prepare Intelligence for the JTF Joint Operations Area

3-347. Activities during the analysis and production phase of the intelligence process result in intelligence products presented to users, including other intelligence personnel, in a finished state. Effective intelligence products are timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and usable. The accuracy and detail of intelligence products has a direct effect on how well the supported commander, staff, and subordinate units can—

• Assess, plan, and prepare for JTF operations that effectively employ subordinate service or functional component forces and capabilities.

• Recognize potential and identify probable friendly, enemy, and neutral courses of action.

• Take appropriate operational protection measures.

• Maintain effective JTF command and control.

• Continue to provide effective operational sustainment.

• Focus future intelligence taskings.

Differing unit missions, environments, and situations impose numerous and varied production requirements on the J-2 staff.

3-348. Intelligence products are generally placed in one of six categories: indicators and warnings; current; general military; target; scientific and technical; and counterintelligence. The categories are distinguished from each other according to the purpose for which the intelligence was produced. The categories can and do overlap, and the same intelligence can be used in each of the categories. (See JP 2-0 and ADP/ADRP/FM 2-0 for additional information on these six categories.)

Disseminate and Integrate Operational Intelligence

3-349. The CJTF and JTF staff, as well as subordinate functional and service component commanders and staffs, need to have operational intelligence disseminated to them. Operational intelligence allows them to integrate it into the Adaptive Planning and Execution (known as APEX) system and the operations process. JTF leaders can synchronize effects using the COP and successful accomplish assigned missions. Intelligence and control systems continue to evolve in their sophistication, application of technology, and accessibility to the commander. Because of this, these systems are creating an unprecedented amount of information for the commanders of all service or functional components and echelons. Therefore, all commanders and staffs need an understanding of these systems to know how to handle overwhelming amounts of information these systems can provide.

3-350. The timely and accurate dissemination of intelligence is key to all successful operations, not just joint operations. Sharing information and intelligence between service and functional components and echelons is essential for commanders to maintain a current COP from which they can apply their judgment to obtain accurate situational understanding. In fact, obtaining the most current all-source information is vital to creating and maintaining an accurate COP. Commanders need to receive combat information and intelligence products in time to support their decisionmaking and need to receive products in the right format. An information management (IM) plan and digital staff battle drills are crucial to ensuring that all information, to include intelligence, flows to the correct destination, in the correct format, in a timely manner. The JTF’s subordinate commanders require easy access to JTF intelligence products.

Evaluate Intelligence Activities in the JTF Joint Operations Area

3-351. Effective use of intelligence involves assessing the intelligence product and its relevance to the situation and applying this intelligence in decisionmaking during planning, preparation, and execution. Intelligence has no inherent value; its value is realized through its support to JTF operations. The CJTF, as the decisionmaker, is responsible for effectively using intelligence and ensuring that decisions are based on the foundation provided by intelligence. Decisionmaking occurs not only at the CJTF’s level but also at any level where staff and leaders need to make decisions.

3-352. JTF collection managers monitor the results of the other phases of the intelligence process to determine if CCIRs, PIRs, and IRs are being satisfied. JTF collection managers should continuously assess the information collection synchronization plan to ensure that it meets the CJTF’s requirements, to include assessing the effectiveness of friendly intelligence countermeasures and adjusting the information collection synchronization plan as needed.

FIRES

3-353. Joint fires are fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective (JP 3-09). (Operational fires employed by a JTF are the joint fires discussed in JP 3-09.) Movement and maneuver and fires are complementary functions. A CJTF employs joint fires using joint platforms to create desired operational effects on key portions of the enemy’s center of gravity, regardless of their location within the joint operations area. A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0).

3-354. Key portions of the enemy’s center of gravity are critical capabilities and critical vulnerabilities. Critical capabilities are crucial enablers that allow the enemy’s center of gravity to function. Therefore, they are factors essential for the enemy to achieve their objective. A critical vulnerability is either the enemy’s critical strength or weakness. However, a critical vulnerability is, by nature, open to attack by friendly forces.

3-355. Joint fires are a major contributor to the CJTF’s ability to execute the joint force’s campaign plan because they are a fully-integrated component of the plan. They are designed with the intent of achieving a specified, high impact, operationally-significant result through focused intelligence and targeting, and through the effective use of precision fires.

3-356. Joint fires are not fire support, and operational maneuver is not necessarily dependent on joint fires. Still, operational maneuver can be affected by such fires and can exploit opportunities created or developed by the LCC commander’s use of joint fires. Joint fires effects are categorized as lethal or nonlethal in nature and are articulated using words such as destroy, deny, disrupt, neutralize, suppress, or influence. Military- specific definitions of these effects are—

• Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (FM 3- 90-1). Destroy is usually associated with producing 30 percent casualties or materiel damage.

• Disrupt is a tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause enemy forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion (FM 3-90-1).

• Neutralize is a tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation (FM 3-90-1). Neutralize is associated with producing at least 10% casualties or materiel damage.

• Suppress is a tactical mission task that results in temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapons system below the level needed to accomplish the mission. (FM 3-90-1) Suppressive fires temporarily limit the ability of enemy personnel in the target area to perform their assigned tasks.

3-357. A CJTF whose headquarters is formed around the nucleus of an Army corps headquarters, and focused on the conduct of land operations, integrates joint fire support from Navy and USMC platforms when they are available. In the recent past, a JTF typically relied on joint fires provided by the USAF, in addition to the Army’s long-range rockets and missiles, to impose desired operational effects on the enemy. (The Army and the USAF are presently developing responsive reconnaissance and surveillance systems to facilitate target acquisition at the operational level.) The USAF fields multirole aircraft and employment procedures that allow aircraft platforms to survive. The USAF provides strike or air interdiction attacks directed against enemy air defense systems, while attempting to gain or retain air superiority, thus allowing the provision of close air and air interdiction in support of land operations. Target acquisition and control systems for operational targeting continues to improve in both these Services.

3-358. Joint fire support is joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters (JP 3-09). The foundation of joint fire support is based on generating and maintaining combat power throughout an operation. Commanders plan to create desired effects through the use of joint fires, while considering the requirements and costs to project and sustain the units that produce the desired effects. The principles of joint operations, found in JP 3-0, provide a set of time-tested guidelines for employing joint fire support. Effective integration, synchronization, and employment of joint fire support and joint targeting is essential to creating conditions that provide the supported commander freedom of action.

3-359. The scheme of fires is an integral part of the commander’s concept of operations. It describes how to coordinate and synchronize the use of tactical, operational, and strategic fires capabilities to create the CJTF’s desired lethal and nonlethal effects and achieve the desired objectives. The commander may use joint fire support separately from, or in combination with, maneuver and non-lethal effects to destroy, neutralize, degrade, or suppress enemy forces and disrupt enemy maneuver, therefore, influencing the enemy to enable friendly force operations.

3-360. Joint targeting is a fundamental task of the fires function that encompasses many disciplines and requires participation from joint force staff elements and components. Joint targeting and joint fire support are fundamental tasks of the fires function. The purpose of joint targeting is to integrate and synchronize joint fires into joint operations by utilizing available capabilities to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. JP 3-60 provides joint targeting doctrine. The CJTF’s primary targeting responsibility is to establish objectives, priorities, and desired effects for component commanders. The JTF’s subordinate component commanders create desired effects through the application of joint force capabilities.

3-361. Operational-level fires are planned from the top down, starting with CJTF guidance. The primary targeting responsibility of the CJTF is to establish the objectives that component commanders achieve with air, land, sea, space, and SOF capabilities. The functional or service component commanders then establish objectives appropriate for their domain and identify and nominate targets that are nested in CJTF guidance, joint targeting lists, and the JTF campaign plan. Once approved, these targets are passed to subordinate or multinational units for action. Subordinate target nominations contribute to the top-down, and bottom-up refinement approach. The CJTF—

• Synchronizes joint fires.

• Conducts operational targeting.

• Attacks (or engages) operational targets.

• Counter air and missile threats.

• Assesses the results of employing joint fires.

By doing this the CJTF uses the different capabilities available in joint fires to divert, disrupt, delay, damage, or destroy the enemy’s air, land, maritime, space, and cyber military potential.

JOINT TASK FORCE JOINT FIRES ORGANIZATIONS

3-362. The JTF’s J-3 is the CJTF’s principal staff advisor to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize joint fire support with other joint functions, such as command and control, intelligence, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. A joint fires element is an optional staff element established as required by the CJTF. The corps fires cell provides a base around which a joint fires element can form. The joint fires element is composed of representatives from the J-3, the service or functional components of the JTF, multinational components with organic fire support assets, and other elements of the JTF’s staff, to include the J-code staff directorates—J-2, J-4, and J-5. The JTF’s fires element can be organized in three operational-level targeting areas: deliberate targeting, dynamic targeting, and operational planning.

3-363. Each service component of the JTF has its own fire support agency. The JTF clearly establishes the supported and supporting command relationships that define the roles and responsibilities for joint fire support planning, executing, and assessment. This is especially true of the corps’ assigned active component field artillery brigade and its battalions. One technique would be to attach this brigade to the land component command (LCC). Another technique would be to place this brigade in direct support of the joint force air component. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles (M39, M39A1, M48, and M57) or guided rockets (M30, M31, or M31A1) fired by the brigade are included on the air component’s air tasking order (ATO) regardless of the assigned roles and responsibilities. (The trajectory of these rockets go above the various coordinating altitudes.) JP 3-09 provides a general discussion of agencies for each service component and the technical fire support systems, such as the advanced field artillery tactical data system, that support the service component fire support agencies.

3-364. The CJTF establishes a joint targeting coordination board to accomplish targeting coordination. Targeting is selecting and prioritizing targets and matching appropriate response to those targets, while considering operational requirements and capabilities to create desired effects that achieve the CJTF’s stated objectives. The joint targeting cycle is a six-phase, iterative process that analyzes, prioritizes, and assigns assets against targets to create effects that contribute to the achievement of the CJTF’s objectives. The six phases are:

• End state and commander’s objectives.

• Target development and prioritization.

• Capabilities analysis.

• Commander’s decision and force assignment.

• Mission planning and force execution.

• Assessment.

The deputy CJTF or a subordinate component commander chairs the board providing experience and focus. In a multinational environment, the joint targeting coordination board may be subordinate to a multinational targeting coordination board. Additional communications systems may be needed to enable interoperability among the contributing nations.

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

3-365. The purpose of the JTF’s fire support planning is to optimize fires by integrating and synchronizing joint fire support with the CJTF’s operations plan. The JTF’s fire support planners advise the commander on the best use of available joint fires support, develop joint fire support plans, issue necessary orders in the name of appropriate commanders, and implement approved joint fire support plans for the component or joint force. Joint fire support planning within the JTF is a continual and cyclical process that synchronizes, executes, and assesses joint fires at tactical and operational levels with joint fire support communications systems and architectures. The JTF’s fires element initiates the joint fires planning process during mission analysis, and continues the process through post-execution assessment. Joint fire support requirements are considered throughout the JTF’s planning and decisionmaking processes and during all campaign phases.

3-366. The CJTF develops a concept of operations during the planning process. As part of that concept of operations the CJTF provides a scheme of fires. The CJTF may provide guidance in the scheme of fires as follows:

• Objectives.

• Priorities, to include time constraints and acceptable levels of risk to forces.

• Effects, such as destroy, disrupt, influence, neutralize, and suppress.

• Munitions, such as what munitions can be used and any restrictions on the use of available munitions to include collateral damage and collateral effects restrictions.

• No-strike list and restricted target list.

• Fire support coordination measures. (See JP 3-09 and FM 3-09 and paragraphs 4-172 to 4-176 for additional information on the employment of these measures.

The JTF scheme of fires reflects the involvement of not only the JTF staff but each JTF service or functional component commander and staff and selected non-military organizations.

3-367. The CJTF determines and designates (by percentage and priority) the expected effort each joint fires system produces against competing requirements (for example, the assets required by each functional component for land, sea, air, and space operations or by a specific geographic area for a given period) as part of joint fire support planning. This is called apportionment. Apportionment is one of the starting points for joint fires and fire support planning. These determinations are made by consulting subordinate service or functional component commanders and staff, specifically, the joint targeting, apportionment, and targeting team. Generally, Army attack helicopters and USMC aviation assets are not included in the CJTF’s apportionment decisions. Aircraft, other joint fires capabilities, or forces not apportioned for tasking, but included in the joint air tasking order (ATO) for coordination, are redirected only with the approval of their respective component commander or designated representative. Apportionment of firepower resources ensures the weight of the joint firepower effort is consistent with CJTF campaign phases and objectives.

3-368. The JTF’s joint fire support plan is the product of joint and subordinate service or functional component fire support planning and reflects the CJTF’s apportionment decision mentioned in the previous paragraph. It provides guidance to supporting commanders regarding the current or expected enemy, friendly, and environmental situation; the joint fire support mission, describes how joint fires are used to support the JTF concept of operations. It establishes joint fire support priorities and the objectives for using air, land, maritime, and SOF in a joint fire support role.

3-369. Joint fire support is built on four fire support tasks:

• Support forces in contact.

• Support the JTF’s concept of operations.

• Integrate and synchronize the employ of joint fire support assets.

• Sustain joint fire support operations.

The CJTF defines the joint fire support requirements using the joint targeting cycle, while considering the four joint fire support tasks. During the joint targeting cycle, the CJTF identifies and validates joint fire support requirements. (See JP 3-09 for a discussion on these four tasks.)

3-370. The CJTF plans, integrates, and synchronizes joint fire support across the joint operational functions in coordination with subordinate service or functional commanders. Subordinate commanders select and control fires based on the CJTF’s requirements. If planning and execution are concurrent, the J-3 staff coordinates integration and synchronization of joint fire support.

3-371. Fire support coordination in multinational operations requires special arrangements with multi- national forces and local authorities. Special arrangements include implementation of communications and language standards, exchange of liaison personnel, and adoption of interoperability procedures.

JOINT TARGETING

3-372. Operational-level targeting involves the positive identification and selection of targets that decisively influence the conduct and outcome of campaigns and major operations. Targeting occurs at all levels of command within a joint force and is applied by service and functional component-level forces capable of attacking targets with lethal and nonlethal means to achieve the desired effects. Effective targeting is distinguished by the ability to generate the type and extent of effects necessary to facilitate the realization of the commander’s objectives. Accurate identification of comparative centers of gravity and decisive points is essential to achieving the operational-level and tactical objectives that are in accordance with CJTF guidance and intent.

3-373. Joint forces typically need to attack centers of gravity throughout the JTF joint operations area. Joint forces detect and attack targets or target sets to achieve specific effects. Unintended collateral damage resulting from target attacks are considered when targeting. Effective coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization maximize the strategic, operational-level, and tactical effects of joint targeting.

3-374. Joint targeting cuts across traditional functional and organizational boundaries. Operations, plans, and intelligence are primary functions, but logistics, weather, law, and communications also support joint targeting. Close coordination, cooperation, and communication are essential. (See JP 3-60 for information on joint force targeting.) There are three major components of operational-level targeting: development of operational-level targets, targeting, and assessment. (Assessment is discussed in paragraphs 4-251 to 4-255.)

Develop Operational Targets

3-375. The JTF staff evaluates and chooses targets for attack to achieve optimum effects in support of CJTF’s intent. They also match these targets to appropriate joint or multinational systems targeting. (The term target is used in its broadest sense to include foreign individuals and groups targeted by MISO, electronic warfare, and cyber operations.)

3-376. A high-value target is a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission (JP 3-60). The loss of high-value targets (HVTs) seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander’s area of interest. High-payoff targets are compiled into a high-payoff target list (HPTL) with guidance on what HPTs to attack, when to attack each HPT, and the assets used for each attack.

3-377. Planning for JTF shaping operations and target prioritization is based on the CJTF's visualization of decisive action and identification of HPTs when the JTF campaign plan establishes ground operations as the JTF’s decisive operation. Effective targeting generates the type and extent of effects necessary to facilitate the commander’s objectives. Identifying centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, and decisive points is essential to achieving CJTF objectives and intent by applying the effects of joint forces. The development of HPTs and HVTs is an important part of the identification of centers of gravity, with associated critical vulnerabilities, and decisive points. The enemy will attempt to degrade or neutralize the ability of friendly forces to compile an HPTL with active and passive means, such as counter-reconnaissance and strict observance of operations security.

3-378. Targets fall into two general categories: planned and targets of opportunity. Planned targets are those known to exist in an operational-level area with actions scheduled against them to generate the effects desired to achieve the commander’s objectives. Planned targets are either scheduled or on call. Targets of opportunity are those that are identified too late to include in the normal targeting process, and, therefore, are not scheduled. Targets of opportunity have two subcategories: unplanned and unanticipated.

3-379. The CJTF needs to establish a risk tolerance for the JTF’s subordinate functional or service component commanders and their subordinate tactical commanders when immediate targets require accelerated coordination. Coordinated procedures that meet the same requirements in preplanned targeting (for example, the law of war and rules of engagement) are put in place to successfully attack immediate targets.

Targeting

3-380. Targeting detects, selects, and prioritizes targets; matches the appropriate action (weapon system); and assesses the effects based on the commander’s objective, guidance, and intent. Joint targeting is proactive and enables the CJTF to identify those targets most critical to the success of the JTF’s future and current operations. The JTF scheme of fires focuses sensors and shooters to find and attack critical targets before they can be committed to the battle, or at a time when attack will be most disruptive to enemy courses of action. The payoff of proactive targeting is having the ability to seize the initiative from an enemy and establish the conditions for success. Although the process is proactive, the ability to rapidly react to unforeseen action by the enemy requires courses of action and plans allowing adequate flexibility and freedom of action.

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION

3-381. Target engagement is when forces engage targets with fires. Forces engaging targets carefully analyze CJTF objectives and strictly adhere to JTF or higher headquarters restrictions. The JTF’s supporting commands conduct combat identification before and during target engagement. Engaging forces need to maintain vigilance on the location and movement of friendly forces throughout the engagement. Friendly force tracking is inextricably linked to combat identification and paramount to mitigating the risk of friendly fire incidents.

3-382. During execution, control of joint fire support forces is normally exercised through the JTF J-3. The JTF J-3 is responsible for integrating and synchronizing joint fires with other major elements of the operation, such as maneuver, information-related capabilities, special operations, and logistics. The J-3 delegates daily joint fires support coordination responsibilities to the JTF’s joint fires element. The joint fires element is a useful coordination and synchronization tool for the J-3 because it contains representatives from the JTF’s three planning horizons (current operations, future operations, and the J-5), the joint targeting board, the J-2, and each subordinate and supporting commander.

3-383. The JTF subordinate commanders allocate resources based on the JTF’s joint fire support requirements. JTF staffs and command and control agencies then coordinate to synchronize joint fire support to optimize effects and mitigate risks to friendly forces and civilians in the JTF’s joint operations area. The JTF JOC and joint fires element employs battle tracking to increase the probability that joint fires will be applied at the proper time and place. The JTF’s battle tracking efforts take advantage of digital information systems, using multiple sources to generate a coherent picture of the operational environment.

3-384. Joint fire support coordination during execution includes all efforts to integrate and synchronize attacks, avoid friendly fire incidents, reduce duplication of effort, and shape the operational environment. The development of the air tasking order (ATO) is a major part of JTF joint fire support coordination. (JP 3-60 and paragraphs 4-186 to 4-189 further discuss the ATO.) Effective coordination procedures are flexible and responsive to the ever-changing dynamics of warfighting. Streamlined arrangements are established for approval or concurrence to joint fires. Coordination identifies measures to prevent potential friendly fire incidents.

3-385. The authority and responsibility for the expenditure of lethal or nonlethal weapons rests with the supported commander. The CJTF communicates engagement criteria to the joint force through rules of engagement and the use of special instructions specific to a particular operational area. Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. Forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-04). The supported commander may delegate target engagement authority to the lowest level of command of the supported forces.

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT ASSESSMENT

3-386. The JTF assesses the conduct of its joint fire support efforts to evaluate how well the joint fire support system supports elements of its components in unified action. Assessment of joint fire support requires the development of an assessment plan, which includes, but is not limited to, metrics monitored during execution, evaluation of joint fire support activities, and recommended adjustments to future fire support activities. Assessment determines if the JTF’s joint fire support efforts have sustained the JTF’s concept of operations. The assessment also addresses the synchronization and sustainment of joint fire support. JP 3-09 address joint fire support assessment in greater detail.

SUSTAINMENT

3-387. Sustainment is one of the six joint functions common to joint operations and includes the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. Sustainment is not always clearly understood. Sustainment encompasses all of the core logistics capabilities, including supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, health services support, logistics services, engineering, and operational contract support as well as personnel services, including human resources support, religious ministry support, financial management, and legal support.

3-388. Each service component of the JTF is responsible for the logistics support of its respective forces, except when the CJTF designates a single-service responsibility for a particular logistics function. The CJTF establishes logistics priorities for the force, assigns terrain and facilities for use as support bases, and designates and maintains lines of communications.

3-389. The corps G-4 organizes the nucleus of the JTF J-4 section from the corps’ organic assets once a higher commander designates the corps headquarters as the base for a JTF headquarters. The new J-4 incorporates other service augmentation into the JTF J-4 directorate as it becomes available. The J-4 supervises the activities of any logistics-related coordinating centers and boards that may be required. These required sustainment-related organizations include—

• A joint movement center that coordinates strategic movement with the U.S. Transportation Command and ensures effective use of transportation assets.

• A subarea petroleum office formed around elements from the combatant command’s joint petroleum office to augment the JTF in managing petroleum-related logistics.

• A joint facilities utilization board to manage real estate requirements (unless the JTF engineer is designated a special staff officer and assigned these duties).

• A joint civil-military engineering board to provide overall direction for civil-military construction efforts and development of a civil engineering support plan (the JTF engineer may manage this activity).

• A joint medical regulating office to coordinate the movement of patients in and out of the assigned joint operations area.

• A joint military blood program office to coordinate whole blood distribution.

• A joint central graves registration office to handle mortuary affairs (normally tasked to ARFOR).

The JP series 4-0 publications provide joint doctrine for logistics and other sustainment functions.

JOINT LOGISTICS ENTERPRISE

3-390. Supporting joint forces in an increasingly complex, uncertain, competitive, rapidly-changing, transparent operational environment is an increasingly common feature of the current security landscape. Sustainment demands in complex emergencies require an enterprise approach because they often transcend the ability of a single nation, government, or organization. Commanders and sustainment staff officers assigned to a JTF should take advantage of training opportunities to establish personal relationships and build trust among potential joint logistics enterprise partners. If a JTF is activated, it can involve situationally- appropriate partners early in the planning process.

3-391. Stakeholders, both military and civilian, make up what the U.S. military refers to as the joint logistics enterprise. This enterprise is a multi-tiered matrix of key global logistics providers working cooperatively to achieve a common purpose without jeopardizing their mission and goals. The CJTF and staff must understand the authorities, goals, and limitations of other joint logistics enterprise partners early in the process. The enterprise partners have the potential of extending or restricting the JTF’s.

3-392. Understanding the players and how they can help a JTF conduct operations ensures rapid and precise response. These players can include supporting combatant commands, such as U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Strategic Command. They also include DOD combat support agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Contract Management Agency, other U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, and Department of Energy, the national support elements of multinational partners, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and industry partners. The capabilities and resources of these other stakeholders are capitalized on and leveraged; U.S. government agencies and nongovernmental organizations play a key role in providing logistics support during operations focused on the conduct of foreign humanitarian assistance, as well as relief and reconstruction operations. JTF sustainers should make preparations to support partners during their operations considering that the DOD usually has assets and resources.

CONCEPT OF SUPPORT

3-393. The essence of joint sustainment is integrating strategic and service core logistics capabilities and personnel support at the operational level to achieve unity of effort and mission effectiveness at the tactical level. The combatant commander has a logistics support concept for the combatant commander’s AOR with provisions to help set conditions in the AOR for subordinate success. The CJTF’s concept of support needs to capitalize on the resources and capabilities of these service components and other joint logistics enterprise partners supporting operations in the AOR.

3-394. The CJTF’s concept of support includes the core logistics capabilities as well as joint personnel support functions. The support concept nests within the combatant commander’s AOR support concept. The JTF sustainment staff members identify known shortfalls for global critical munitions and intra-theater lift and develop techniques to compensate for the shortfalls. Techniques can include involving the joint or combatant command staffs to adjudicate competing demands. Access and permissions for staging, basing, overflight, and transit can impact deployment and distribution, which require key leader engagement early in an operation. The JTF’s sustainment staff identifies for the commander the timing and sequencing of key sustainment enablers in the force flow to ensure they have proper combination of combat power and long- term sustainment. The JTF balances the force flow of combat power with sustainment key enablers as a function of risk.

3-395. The JTF’s sustainment planners anticipate the circumstances that threaten the JTF’s sustainment capabilities. They plan alternative courses of action for when external and internal circumstances threaten the JTF’s sustainment capabilities. The courses of action include plans for operational replenishment to protect or regenerate combat power dissipated in the conduct of operations as circumstances warrant.

3-396. The JTF identifies infrastructure requirements early during campaign development, particularly for new construction or extensive renovations. Sustainment planning needs to link JTF engineering efforts with the JTF’s civil-military operations. Planning minimizes the procurement and transportation of construction material and laborers from outside the joint operations area and saves resources while achieving operational objectives. Likewise, the JTF leverages medical soft power and health diplomacy where and when possible to deliver themes and messages that support the CJTF’s communication strategy.

3-397. The CJTF and sustainment staff strive to gain efficiencies and share resources in the joint operations area by capitalizing on established DOD executive agency relationships, existing inter-service support agreements, and acquisition and cross-service agreements with other countries. The proper type of sustainment units deploy early to support port opening; reception, staging, and onward movement of incoming units; to support initially arriving forces; and to prepare lodgments for rapid force buildup. The JTF uses contract support to minimize the JTF’s organic footprint and, where feasible, supplement or replace military support capabilities. The sustainment staff integrate and synchronize service component and other joint logistics enterprise capabilities in support of JTF requirements. They consider options, such as area support and sea basing where appropriate. A combatant commander also has the option of using Directive Authority for Logistics to reallocate service resources within the AOR according to operational needs. These strategies are not implemented at the expense of effective support to the force or detrimental to the long-term objectives of the combatant commander’s theater security cooperation plan.

3-398. Force accountability begins with successful joint RSOI. Accurate force accountability and casualty tracking is essential to allow the CJTF to make decisions concerning force allocation and capabilities.

SUSTAINMENT TEAM

3-399. A sustainment team approach within the JTF is beneficial in the promotion of planning and coordination across the various sustainment staff sections, such as the J-1, J-4, J-8, engineer, surgeon, legal, and chaplain. Synchronization and coordination of staff efforts is important across all sustainment functions. Operating as a sustainment team can promote comprehensive planning and development of the JTF’s concept of support. Fostering unity of effort and maximizing information sharing is important while having as small of a staff as possible. Sustainment staff coordination synchronizes cross-functional, personal, and coordinating of directorate requirements while the JTF staff is involved in a contingency operation. Coordination also involves coping with staff disruptions resulting from personnel rotations schedules for different services, mid-tour leaves, RSOI, and delays in resourcing certain positions.

3-400. At the combatant command level, the engineering and operational contract support integration staffs are often consolidated in the J-4. The staff judge advocate, chaplain, and surgeon are personal staffs to the combatant commander. At the service component and JTF level, these staff sections are more segregated. The JTF’s sustainment team is organized formally, by designating a deputy commanding general (DCG) for support, or informally, ensuring a deliberate, internal staff synchronization meeting occurs among the J-code directorates. The JTF sustainment team’s internal organization is tailored to best support the JTF’s mission. The JTF can build a joint sustainment operations center (sometimes called a joint logistics operations center) to facilitate daily action officer level coordination of sustainment efforts. The JTF can leverage its joint logistics coordination board and its J-1, J-4, J-8, engineer, surgeon, and chaplain’s staff section representative to facilitate senior level synchronization of sustainment efforts. The key takeaway is, at some level, the various staff sections should meet on a regular basis to synchronize sustainment efforts in support of the mission. This meeting allows the JTF sustainment staff to provide comprehensive picture of sustainment efforts to the CJTF. One technique for providing an effective visualization of the sustainment picture is through the use of a dedicated portal, electronic dashboard, or an integrated sustainment common operating picture used for briefing the CJTF and to increase the staff’s situational awareness

SUPPORTING THE COMMANDER’S DECISION CYCLE

3-401. The JTF sustainment team should provide advice and recommendations to the CJTF concerning prioritization and allocation of support in the joint operations area. Because of this, the sustainment team needs a clear understanding of the commander’s intent and concept of operations to anticipate requirements in an increasingly complex, uncertain, competitive, rapidly-changing, transparent operational environment. The sustainment team best supports the commander’s decision process through active integration in the command’s battle rhythm across the three planning horizons. The JTF sustainment team should synchronize the JTF’s integrating functions—plan, prepare, execute, and assess—for sustainment with the phases of the commander’s decision cycle. Sustainment support, particularly when operating in remote or austere locations, often requires significant lead time. Including sustainment team representatives and considerations early in the JTF’s overall design and planning phase enables the sustainment team to anticipate requirements and set conditions for mission success. Sustainment planners and functional subject matter experts stay engaged as plans and planning products are developed and refined.

3-402. The JTF’s sustainment operations center (and Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, if established) is the fusion center for logistics execution efforts of the staff. The operations center stays closely connected to the JOC and other external operations centers as plans transition to order. The sustainment staff sections establish and participate in other JTF’s meetings as required by the situation. The sustainment team must send the representatives with the right skills sets to boards, bureaus, cells, centers, and working groups to ensure that staff products and analysis incorporate sustainment considerations.

3-403. The JTF sustainment staff has to work with sustainment organizations established at the combatant command level. The primary logistics board for overall AOR logistics synchronization is the joint logistics coordination board. Other supporting boards include the theater-joint transportation board responsible for theater lift prioritization and allocation. The JTF should include a J-3 representative on both boards to ensure the JTF’s operational priorities are communicated and understood by the sustainment team. The supported combatant command’s Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board coordinates civil-military construction projects, including those of the JTF, and obtains resources for projects within the AOR. The combatant commander Logistics Procurement Support Board is responsible for overarching contract support coordination guidance while the combatant command level Operational Contract Support Integration Cell leads the day-to-day contract support planning and integration effort. A Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center is also established to manage intra-theater patient movement.

3-404. Campaign and operational assessment informs future design and planning. The JTF sustainment team needs to integrate into the command’s assessment process. These sustainment subject matter experts develop measures of effectiveness in coordination with the J-3 and J-5 directorates and subordinate components of the JTF. In order to monitor the progress or effectiveness of plans in execution, sustainment planners and functional subject matter experts identify expected outcomes from the concept of support to use in progress assessment. The JTF’s logistics assessment needs to inform the JTF’s assessment process.

PROTECTION

3-405. The joint protection function focuses on preserving the JTF’s fighting potential in four primary ways. One way uses active defensive measures that protect JTF’s elements, information, bases, necessary infrastructure, and lines of communications from an enemy attack. Another way uses passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. Equally important is the application of technology and procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide. Finally, emergency management and response reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and natural disasters. The protection function also extends beyond force protection to encompass protection of

U.S. noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and interorganizational partners when required by the mission. Protection capabilities apply domestically in the context of homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities, and emergency preparedness.

3-406. JP 3-0 states that the joint protection function encompasses a number of tasks. Those enumerated tasks, along with the associated joint doctrinal publications are:

• Providing air, space, and missile defense (JP 3-01). (A joint protection task considered by the Army to be part of the fires warfighting function and discussed in this chapter as part of operational fires.)

• Protecting U.S. civilians (JP 3-27).

• Providing physical security for forces and means (JP 3-15).

• Conducting defensive countermeasure operations, including counterdeception (JP 3-13.4) and counterpropaganda operations (JP 3-13.2), and operations to counter-improvised explosive devices (JP 3-15.1).

• Providing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense (JP 3-11).

• Conducting operations security, computer network defense, information assurance, defensive electronic attack, and electronic protection activities.

• Securing and protecting forces, bases, joint security areas, and lines of communications (JP 3-10).

• Conducting personnel recovery operations (JP 3-50).

• Mitigating the effects of CBRN threats and hazards through weapons of mass destruction consequence management (JP 3-40 and JP 3-41).

• Establishing antiterrorism programs (JP 3-26).

• Establishing capabilities and measures to prevent fratricide.

• Providing emergency management and response capabilities and services (JP 3-08).

3-407. Protection considerations affect planning in every joint operation. JTF operations typically require the conduct of all the joint protection tasks, which complicates planning and execution. Continuous research and access to accurate, detailed information about the operational environment within and influencing the JTF’s joint operational area when combined with realistic training can enhance the effectiveness of JTF protection activities.

3-408. Force protection includes preventive measures taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions preserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate integrated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures that enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the adversary. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Force health protection complements force protection efforts by promoting, improving, preserving, or restoring the mental or physical well-being of Service members. Force protection is achieved through the tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive measures commensurate with the level of risk. Intelligence sources provide information regarding an adversary’s capabilities against personnel and resources, as well as information regarding force protection considerations. Military police and foreign and domestic law enforcement agencies can contribute to force protection through the prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crime, and by sharing information on criminal and terrorist organizations.

3-409. The CJTF normally designates a subordinate commander or member of the JTF staff as a joint security coordinator (known as JSC) to preclude disjointed efforts among the services and organizations involved in force protection functions. The joint security coordinator is responsible to the CJTF for coordinating and maintaining the overall security of the joint security area and the protection tasks listed above. The joint security coordinator is normally a flag officer. The CJTF must empower the joint security coordinator with requisite responsibility and authority in the establishing directive. The joint security coordinator is a critical link in coordinating security, establishing reliable intelligence and counterintelligence support, and securing communications to all forces operating in the joint security area. The joint security coordinator may form a joint security coordination center using elements of the JTF staff and representatives from the components operating in the joint security area. The joint security coordinator’s overall coordination responsibility for security does not lessen the responsibility that component elements have for their own security. The CJTF assigns subordinate component commanders the responsibility for operations in a joint security area in coordination with the JSC in accordance with mission requirements, force capabilities, the strategic environment, and the threat. The joint security coordinator serves as the service or functional component commander with the requisite capabilities to conduct joint security operations, usually the LCC or ARFOR commander. (See JP 3-10.)

3-410. According to JP 3-10, operations with the joint security area focus on securing broad categories of activities to protect the joint security area and assure freedom of maneuver, or to support the joint force and ensure continuity of operations. These activities include but are not limited to—

• Force projection.

• Movement control.

• Security of joint command and control, sustainment, airfields, seaports, and detention facilities.

Joint security area operations are interrelated. Synchronizing and protecting these activities in the joint security area (known as JSA) is the joint security coordination center’s responsibility.

3-411. Frequently, the CJTF assigns the LCC, ARFOR, or Marine Force (known as MARFOR) commander the responsibility for the joint security area subject to applicable host-nation laws and agreements. In this case, the joint security coordination center should be co-located with the protection cell in the appropriate headquarters. Depending on the size and complexity of the joint security area, the LCC, ARFOR, or Marine Force commander may further delegate the joint security coordinator responsibilities to a deputy. This deputy is usually their DCG for Support. A DCG for Support, assigned the duties as the deputy joint security coordinator, is assigned OPCON over selected theater protection forces, such as MP and CBRN defense units. (This permits sustainment commanders to focus on providing operational logistical, personnel, and health support.).

3-412. In a multinational operation, the joint security coordinator may designate a multinational (combined or coalition) security operations center. The director of this center is from the host nation with staff representation and liaisons from multinational members to include the U.S.

3-413. Services having forces located in the joint security area provide liaisons to the appropriate joint security coordination center. The duties of this center are to coordinate ground defensive operations and procedures. Liaison elements depend on the Army elements in the joint security area for logistical support on an area basis. Each Service element provides appropriate communications between its liaison officers and joint security coordination center representatives.

3-414. In addition to the tactical air control parties provided for maneuver elements, the joint force air component commander (JFACC) provides air liaison elements to land headquarters in accordance with joint force guidance and directives. The USAF provides an air support coordination element (known as ASCE) to the joint security coordination center. The air support coordination element’s primary duties are to assist and advise in the planning of CAS in the joint security area and to coordinate for the use of HNS in airbase security. Additionally, the USAF may employ a security force group to supervise air base security forces. Liaison members monitor the communications nets for subordinate sustainment brigade command posts and selected bases and unit to—

• Assist unit commanders in understanding CAS capabilities, limitations, and procedures.

• Assist in preparation of the fire support annexes in operations plans of the senior logistics headquarters and subordinate logistics headquarters command posts.

• Train senior logistics headquarters and subordinate logistics headquarters command post personnel to implement the provision of this concept.

3-415. A naval coastal warfare commander (known as NCWC) is responsible for the security of territorial seas contiguous to the joint security area up to the high water mark. In conjunction with the Coast Guard, the naval coastal warfare commander also has responsibility for the security of ports and harbors (but not the urban areas surrounding and adjacent to them.) The naval coastal warfare commander provides a liaison team to the joint security coordination center and sustainment brigade headquarters command post or the highest land component headquarters located in the harbor. The team provides naval expertise, intelligence, and liaison capability with naval assets to support joint security operations and to prepare naval fire support plans. Navy security forces provide point security for naval facilities ashore as well as for naval ships or aircraft conducting replenishment activities.

3-416. The Marine Force establishes a Marine Rear Area Operations Group under the Marine Force component commander for rear area or security operations behind a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). In some situations, the joint security coordinator tasks a USMC asset to provide fire support for joint security area operations. The USMC element then provides a liaison team or an air-naval gunfire liaison company element to the senior or subordinate logistics headquarters rear operations center. A Marine Rear Area Operations Center is established to coordinate security within the MAGTF’s rear area.

3-417. Contributing to the conservation of the fighting potential of the joint force is one of the CJTF’s most important responsibilities. Establishing an operational protection working group, chaired by the JTF chief of staff or the joint security coordinator, is a useful technique to identify and focus resources on significant threats. This working group meets regularly with representation from all coordinating and special staff elements and major subordinate commands.

SECTION V – TRANSITION

3-418. Planning for the JTF’s transition out of its assigned mission and the redeployment of the JTF’s constituent elements and demobilization (if required) of corps units begins as early as possible. The duration of the mission is determined by the requirements, which are determined by the establishing authority (combatant commander or another CJTF). There is not a predetermined timetable for ending a mission. Achieving the desired end state depends on numerous factors not under the control of the CJTF.

3-419. Transition involves the transfer of responsibilities and functions from the JTF to other organizations. Transition occurs between units, between the JTF and U.S. civil authorities, between the JTF and international civil authorities, or between the JTF and local or host-nation agencies. The JTF’s establishing authority initiates transition and mission termination for the JTF.

3-420. Transition requirements follow standard military handover procedures if the JTF is transitioning the mission from one military unit to another. The mechanics of the transition reflect other operational procedures and existing agreements if the transition involves the transfer of JTF functions or areas to civil authorities or local or host-nation agencies.

3-421. A transition plan helps the JTF staff identify transition issues in relation to the desired or projected end state. Parties or agencies that receive functional responsibilities from the CJTF are identified. Considerations are made as to which staff sections will write annexes based on what the transitioning organization will do. The transition plan needs to identify organization, operating procedures, and transition recommendations and considerations. When implementing the transition plan, the transitioning parties discuss criteria for transferring operations. The plan is unclassified, clear, and concise, using terminology appropriate for all parties. Annex A to appendix A of JP 3-33 provides a checklist for transitioning the JTF to a more permanent basis. These checklists help the establishing authority and the CJTF and staff determine the best joint command and control options for the future.

SECTION VI – REDEPLOY

3-422. The redeploy stage starts when the JTF headquarters begins its redeployment to home station to recover from the operation or when it deploys to another location in response to operational needs. The redeploy phase focuses on the rehabilitation of Soldiers, families, and equipment. The phase ends when the corps headquarters again joins the train-and-ready pool. JP 3-35 further discusses joint redeployment operations.

Chapter 4

Land Component Command Operations

A land component command (LCC) is a type of functional subordinate command of a joint force. Combatant commanders and commanders of subordinate unified commands and joint task forces (JTFs) have the authority to establish subordinate functional component commands to control military operations. Functional component commands are established to perform operational missions of short or extended duration. A commander, joint task force (CJTF) has the authority to establish and designate an LCC. Functional component commands do not constitute a joint force with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force as described in the United Action Armed Forces. Normally, the Service component commander with the majority of forces, and requisite joint command and control capabilities, is designated as the LCC commander. (Joint doctrine refers to this individual as the joint force land component commander [JFLCC].) However, the CJTF considers the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the command and control capabilities in selecting the commander. This chapter addresses a corps headquarters tasked as the nucleus of an LCC headquarters conducting the six joint operational tasks—movement and maneuver, intelligence, fire, sustainment, command and control, and protection—within a joint operations area. The tactics and techniques discussed in this chapter also apply to an LCC headquarters containing subordinate multinational allied or coalition units.

SECTION I – CORPS HEADQUARTERS AS AN LLC HEADQUARTERS

4-1. When organizing joint forces, simplicity and clarity are critical. A geographic combatant commander or CJTF can enhance synchronization of operations not only between U.S. ground components, but with multinational land forces by providing a single commander for joint land operations. (This chapter refers to the LCC establishing authority as the CJTF but acknowledges that a combatant commander can also be the establishing authority for an LCC.) Forming an LCC builds unity of effort, an integrated staff, a single voice for land forces and land control operations, a single concept and focus of effort for land control operations, and a synchronized and integrated land force planning and execution.

4-2. A JTF’s land operations support the CJTF’s operation or campaign objectives, or support other components of the joint force. Joint land operations require synchronizing and integrating the instruments of national power to achieve strategic and operational objectives. The forces conducting joint land operations include the Army, United States Marine Corps (USMC), and Naval forces operating on or from land to accomplish missions and tasks. Joint land operations also involve multinational land forces. Joint land operations include land control operations. They employ land forces, supported by or supporting naval and air forces (as appropriate), to accomplish military objectives in vital areas of the operational area.

4-3. A CJTF picks an Army or USMC headquarters to provide the base around which to form an LCC headquarters. An annually updated memorandum from the Secretary of Defense assigns forces to combatant commanders. During crisis action planning, forces allocated to combatant commanders may differ from those apportioned for contingency planning. The LCC headquarters performs the staff actions necessary to translate the operational directives of the CJTF into definitive tactical actions for subordinate unit execution.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE CJTF

4-4. The LCC command reports directly to the CJTF and advises on the proper employment of land forces. A CJTF has the full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among JTF subordinate commanders. The CJTF allows Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function as designed. The intent is to meet the CJTF’s needs while maintaining tactical and operational integrity of Service organizations.

SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP WITH JTF FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS

4-5. The CJTF also establishes supporting and supported relationships between components. The commander can determine not only how to organize the joint force into components, but also how the components relate to each other. Support relationships have an effective means to weight, and ensure unity of effort for, the decisive operation. Components receive and provide support at the same time. Range and scope of the support provided is designated in the directive or order that established the support relationships. However, the personal relationships between the supporting and supported commanders is more important than the doctrinal support relationship established.

4-6. The CJTF directs support authority within the joint force. A CJTF can direct four different support relationships: general support, mutual support, close support, and direct support. Regardless of the organizational and command arrangements within joint commands, the ARFOR commander is responsible for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting Army forces, including internal administration, training, logistics, and Service intelligence operations.

OPTIONS FOR ORGANIZING AN LCC HEADQUARTERS

4-7. There are four primary options available to the CJTF for organizing land forces from two or more components. The four options are—

• Functional subordinate JTF.

• One service component under the tactical control (TACON) of another service component.

• Maintain service components.

• Formation of an LCC.

Each option has advantages and disadvantages that the CJTF and staff consider before a decision to organize under a particular option. The advantages and disadvantages discussed are not all inclusive but highlight some of the more important issues.

4-8. Advantages of a functional subordinate JTF are unity of command and effort, joint staff, the authority of a CJTF, and the authority to organize subordinate functional components. Disadvantages of a functional subordinate JTF are its requirement to have a separate JTF commander and staff, and the lead time required to establish headquarters before execution.

4-9. Advantages of placing one service component TACON to another are simplified command and control and efficient staff action. The disadvantages of placing one service component TACON to another are not integrating staff (liaison only) and the potential for ineffective use of assigned forces.

4-10. Advantages of maintaining service component organization are requiring no change in structure, and the CJTF’s ability to integrate land control operations with other operations. The disadvantages of maintaining service component organization are the CJTF’s need to focus on the land battle, the potential for the CJTF to lose focus on the operational-to-strategic interface, the lack of a single focus for land forces, and lack of an effective relationship between land forces and joint force components.

4-11. Advantages of using an LCC command structure are unity of effort, existence of an integrated staff, single voice for land forces (consolidated picture of land force capabilities to the CJTF, staff, and board, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups, and operational planning teams [OPTs]), single battle concept and focus of effort for land operations (an aspect of the plan rather than a function of coordination either horizontally or vertically), and synchronized and integrated conduct of land force planning and execution (prioritization and, therefore, deconfliction of competing land force requirements). The disadvantages of using an LCC command structure are the headquarters selected to provide the LCC headquarters nucleus generally retains service component responsibilities requiring the staff to split its focus, the challenge of integrating Army and USMC staffs, lead time required to establish and train headquarters before execution of the plan, and the problems associated with sourcing the staffs.

FORMING THE LCC HEADQUARTERS

4-12. Whichever Army or USMC headquarters is picked to provide a base for the LCC, headquarters retains its service Title 10 responsibilities as the senior service headquarters for all Army or USMC forces assigned to the JTF. In rare cases, the LCC is resourced with a separate senior Army or USMC commander, and headquarters is responsible for the administrative control (ADCON) of the respective Army or USMC forces in the LCC. If this does not occur, the LCC maintains responsibility over its parent service component functions (ARFOR in the case of a corps headquarters), which requires the corps staff to split its focus. This arrangement has the potential to over task the LCC’s staff as it performs a dual role. An LCC commander (who is also the corps commander) can delegate as many ARFOR duties as practical to a subordinate Army headquarters so that headquarters can act as the ARFOR commander’s executive agent.

4-13. Within the LCC headquarters, the corps commander, deputy corps commander, chief of staff, and key members of the staff fully integrate with representation from the forces and capabilities made available to the LCC. The LCC staff includes the manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1) through the communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6) in addition to personal and special staff sections and the standing and on-call meetings and OPTs required by the situation. A corps commander, when designated as the LCC commander, provides the core elements of the corps staff to assist in planning, coordinating, and executing functional land component operations. (See CJCSI 3100.01C for information on the joint strategic planning system and how the DOD assigns forces.)

4-14. The corps headquarters organizes itself into an LCC headquarters in accordance with the CJTF’s implementing directive. This document establishes the roles and responsibilities of the LCC and designates the LCC mission and the forces that constitute the LCC’s battle rhythm. Normally, the LCC staff is built around the corps staff and augmented with members of other service components and interorganizational and multinational partners. The LCC commander and chief of staff allocate key staff billets so that all services are appropriately represented. Ideally, for an LCC headquarters built around an Army corps headquarters, the deputy LCC commander or chief of staff comes from the USMC. Replicating this construct throughout the LCC staff leadership ensures all leaders understand the distinct capabilities of the Army and USMC to optimize employment of the forces.

4-15. Planning, preparing, and supervising execution of the plan, and continuously assessing the conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks that achieve the CJTF’s campaign plan are the primary functions of the LCC commander and staff. In addition, the LCC commander plans large-scale operations, coordinating with the JTF’s other functional and service components to establish necessary conditions within the joint operations area. The LCC commander also directs the maneuver of subordinate forces. The LCC commander plans for offensive tasks to secure or retain the initiative, to exploit or pursue the enemy, and to prevent the enemy from regrouping and regaining the initiative. The LCC commander plans defensive tasks to gain time or space to conduct decisive offensive actions. Even in the defense, the LCC commander seizes opportunities and plans for offensive maneuver, counterattack, and other operations that enable the tactical success of subordinate commanders whenever possible. Simultaneously, the LCC conducts stability tasks to meet the immediate needs of civilians within its area of operations until responsibility for the conduct of tasks are transitioned to appropriate authorities.

4-16. The LCC commander uses the operations structure—the operations process, operational and warfighting functions, and an operational framework—to rapidly and effectively organize and employ available forces in a commonly understood manner. The operations process provides a broadly defined approach to developing and executing operations. The operational and warfighting functions provide an intellectual organization for common critical functions. The operational framework provides LCC leaders with conceptual options for visualizing and describing operations.

4-17. A corps headquarters serving as an LCC headquarters exercises responsibilities under the CJTF’s authority. An LCC commander’s responsibilities include, but are not limited to—

• Advise the CJTF on the proper employment of forces and capabilities.

• Develop joint plans and orders in support of the CJTF’s concept of operations and optimize the operations of task-organized land forces.

• Execute and assess land control operations.

• Coordinate the planning and execution of joint land operations with the other components, multinational partners, and supporting agencies, to include directing the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) at the joint air operations center (AOC).

• Synchronize and integrate all aspects of combat power in support of land operations.

• Designate the target priorities, effects, and timing for joint land operations.

• Establish a personnel recovery element to account for and report the status of isolated personnel and to coordinate and control land component personnel recovery events.

• Provide mutual support to other components by conducting operations within the operational area.

• Coordinate with other functional and service components in support of accomplishment of CJTF’s objectives.

• Integrate cyberspace operations and cyber electromagnetic activities as required into land operations.

• Provide an assistant or deputy to the area air defense commander (AADC) for land-based joint theater air and missile defense operations as determined by the combatant commander.

• Support the CJTF’s information operations (IO) by developing the IO requirements that support land control operations and synchronize land force IO assets when directed.

• Integrate the LCC’s joint command and control system and resources into the theater’s command and control system. (See CJCSI 3115.01 for information on common tactical picture reporting requirements.)

• Integrate special operations as required into overall land operations.

• Perform joint security functions.

• Supervise detainee operations.

• Establish standard operating procedures (SOPs) and other directives based on the CJTF’s guidance.

• Provide inputs to the CJTF-approved joint area air defense plan (AADP) and the airspace control plan (ACP).

• Assess and, as necessary, restore or reconstruct civilian infrastructure.

Many of the techniques addressed in Section I of chapter 3 also apply to forming the LCC headquarters.(See JP 3-31 for additional information on the organization of a LCC headquarters and forming a LCC staff. See CJCSI 1301.01F for additional information on joint individual augmentation procedures.) CJCSM 3500.01 addresses the Chairman’s current training guidance.

SECTION II – OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

4-18. Operational movement and maneuver is the disposition of joint or multinational forces to create an operational impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation to achieve operational results. The LCC commander achieves this decisive impact either by securing the operational advantages of position before battle or by exploiting tactical success to achieve operational objectives.

4-19. The CJTF campaign plan provides the framework that the LCC commander uses to develop supporting plans. The essence of the LCC commander’s plan is the operational movement and maneuver of available force in support of the CJTF’s plans. This task can produce decisive impacts on the conduct and outcome of campaigns and major operations. All other operational and warfighting functions seek to maximize the effect of movement and maneuver. The LCC commander synchronizes the efforts of subordinate forces to produce a series of operational movements and maneuvers that provide subordinate forces with the necessary leverage to gain, retain, or sustain the initiative. However, the LCC commander adjusts plans quickly as necessary when windows of opportunity appear. Such windows can open and close quickly.

4-20. Operational movement and maneuver for an LCC includes the following major subtasks:

• Conduct operational movement.

• Conduct operational maneuver and force positioning

• Provide operational mobility.

• Providing counter-mobility.

• Control operationally significant areas.

The Universal Joint Task List includes the task of conduct patient evacuation within this operational function. However this publication address this task as a sustainment task.

CONDUCT OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT

4-21. Operational movement is the conduct of actions to deploy, shift, regroup, or move joint or multinational operational formations within a joint operations area from less to more promising locations relative to enemy locations. Operational movement from the LCC commander’s perspective involves forces deploying into the LCC’s area of operations as well as the movement of LCC forces within the LCC’s area of operations. At this level, the scope and complexity of subordinate force movement usually involve a mix of joint and multinational agencies. Scale alone, however, does not make movement operational in nature. Rather, operational movement creates operational advantage, a position along a line of operations from which fires or fire potential can be delivered on an opponent to achieve operational effects.

4-22. Power projection is the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power— political, economic, informational, or military—to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. It is fundamental to U.S. warfighting concepts. The capability to conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess) operational movement as part of rapid power-projection operations ensures decisive effects at the right time to accomplish the specified mission. It provides flexibility to act swiftly and sustains operations with force projection units that can be rapidly tailored and, if necessary, fight into a denied area. The operational movement portion of power projection has three components: strategic deployments into a joint operations area; conducting intratheater deployment and redeployment of forces; and the conduct of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). Reception, staging, and onward movement are primarily logistical functions. The integration of new forces into the theater is always an operational function. Chapter 3 discusses the strategic deployment of forces. The next few paragraphs discuss an LCC’s role in intratheater deployment and RSOI.

CONDUCT INTRATHEATER DEPLOYMENT

4-23. The movement of large-sized formations over operational distances requires considerable planning and careful control during execution. Planning is done expeditiously, giving all concerned sufficient time to prepare. The ARFOR commander moves land forces allocated by the CJTF from their ports of debarkation (PODs) or current locations within the theater to locations within the LCC’s area of operations using all available means and modes of transportation. The LCC commander directs the operational movements of subordinate land forces within the LCC area of operations in accordance with CJTF campaign plans. In both cases, the primary planning consideration is to ensure that forces arrive at the proper place, at the proper time, in effective condition, and in the best formation to accomplish assigned missions.

4-24. The ARFOR assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) sets the priorities for movement and the ARFOR deputy chief of staff, logistics (G-4) coordinates with the theater sustainment command (TSC) or an expeditionary sustainment command (ESC) to obtain and manage the transportation resources to meet those priorities. The senior transportation organization assigned to the Army Service component command (ASCC) does the following tasks:

• Serves as the primary element for the planning and controlling of transportation operations at the operational level of war for the ASCC.

• Synchronizes its operations with those of U.S. Transportation Command and lower echelon movement control centers.

4-25. Detailed plans are necessary for intratheater deployments regardless of their form—administrative or tactical. The ARFOR staff considers the operational and mission variables when planning operational movements and combat operations. Those mission variables having the greatest influence on the disposition of forces are the mission, proximity of enemy ground forces, terrain, and enemy aviation. If the movement is a tactical move, the organization is organized and loaded for combat. If it is not a tactical move, planners organize to make the most efficient use of transportation assets.

4-26. ARFOR planners include contingencies for actions during the movement. Therefore, the organization for administrative movements cannot disregard combined arms considerations associated with the six warfighting functions. These considerations exist whether or not the ARFOR commander anticipates enemy contact during or after completing the movement. There are also several concerns that arise because of the size of the task. For example, moving a force consisting of three divisions with their associated supporting brigades by tactical road march involves the movement of at least 25,000 vehicles. This movement would occupy road space of 2,500 kilometers if it traveled at the normal interval of 100 meters between vehicles (10 vehicles per kilometer) without gaps between marching units and serials. Passing time at 25 kilometers per hour would take more than 4 days. Therefore, the ARFOR and LCC staffs need to analyze the transportation network thoroughly to ensure it is sufficient to accommodate the anticipated move while allowing for the continued support of ongoing operations. (See ATP 4-16 for additional information on movement control.)

4-27. ARFOR planning concerns include terrain management, airspace control, and rules of engagement. Required control measures include route designations, ground and air traffic control, and establishing timelines. Subordinate units can move by rail, water, air, or road marches (separately or in combination). Planners consider the scheme of maneuver, timing, security, deception, enemy, weather, organization of forces, transportation networks, and traffic regulation and control. The ARFOR Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (G-2) acquires and provides the necessary intelligence to support the planning and execution of the move while the ARFOR engineer staff arranges for the construction, upgrade, and repair of routes and bases. The ARFOR and LCC commander and staff constantly reassess friendly and enemy vulnerabilities throughout the deployment process to ensure that their plans reflect reality.

4-28. The ARFOR commander’s initial sustainment concerns are to provide adequate refueling and maintenance support for the move. However, the ARFOR also considers echeloning its sustainment assets from the TSC and subordinate sustainment brigades to best support follow-on operations, the extent the move will disrupt normal resupply activities, and the impact civilian vehicles and dislocated civilians will have on the move. Large-unit movements can greatly influence the operations of other formations. The diversion of assets necessary to accomplish such movements limits support to other units until completion of the move.

4-29. Huge columns of vehicles cutting across the LCC’s lines of communications and subordinate unit main supply routes can make it difficult to accomplish anything more than routine resupply for the duration of the move. Proper march discipline and traffic control need to permit infiltration traffic, such as repaired vehicles, to pass between serial and convoy gaps in the columns; however, the amount of such traffic should be limited.

4-30. A large-unit move under limited-visibility conditions, such as at night, normally requires a time- consuming incremental shifting of forces over multiple nights and multiple routes. Another major consideration during limited visibility movements is the amount of time required for formations to settle into their new assembly areas, resupply, and reorganize as needed. (See FM 4-01 for more information on transportation doctrine.)

4-31. Movement of large forces may be more economical by rail or water, but the ARFOR and LCC staff need to conduct an availability study of transportation means and consider the effects of such movements before making a decision. The lack of fuel, tires, or motor facilities can direct movement of all or a portion of the force by rail. Moving units or forces by water involves the same requirements as moving them by rail. (See ATP 4-14 for additional information on rail movements and ATP 4-15 for water movements.)

4-32. Movement by air is the most responsive means (speed and flexibility) over operational distances. However, the following factors can hinder air movements:

• Adverse weather.

• Limited aerial port of embarkation or debarkation facilities or airlift frames.

• Enemy air activity.

• Available payload. (Just because an aircraft is available for an air movement does not mean it can carry bulky or heavy items.)

Lines of Communications

4-33. Lines of communications exert a dominant influence on the conduct of LCC operations and are considered early in the planning process. Their existence or absence often determine the LCC’s lines of operations. ARFOR and LCC movement planners include as many transport modes as practicable to achieve maximum support of the operation. All routes, operating equipment, and facilities—rail, road, pipeline, water, and air—are studied and evaluated in terms of the LCC’s deployment, employment, and sustainment requirements. Priorities for movements are established and effective movement plans developed. Transportation Corps doctrinal publications address the characteristics of these different modes.

CONDUCT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

4-34. The functions of RSOI apply across the conflict continuum at all levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical. Reception is often the interface between the strategic and the operational levels. It applies to both arrival and departure from a theater of operations and an operational commander prepares to conduct simultaneous deployment and redeployment, such as what occurred during the transition between Operations Iraqi Freedom I and II. Staging and onward movement are usually within the operational level. Integration represents the interface between the operational and tactical levels. The challenge of RSOI is to ensure that the buildup of combat power proceeds according to the CJTF campaign plan. The ASCC commander is responsible for RSOI at the theater level, but the TSC is normally the ASCC commander’s executive agent for reception, staging, and onward movement. The JTF integrates incoming units and transfers authority of these units and forces to the LCC for employment. A description of these four elements are:

• Reception. Reception is the process of receiving, offloading, marshalling, and transporting of personnel, equipment, and materiel from the strategic and/or intratheater deployment phase to a sea, air, or surface transportation point of debarkation to the marshalling area (JP 3-35).

• Staging. Staging is assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel, equipment, and sustaining materiel in preparation for onward movement (JP 3-35). It includes the organizing and preparation for movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel at designated areas to build incrementally forces capable of meeting the operational commander’s requirements. It includes providing life support for the personnel until the unit becomes self-sustaining.

• Onward Movement. Onward movement does not have a military definition. Onward movement is the process of moving units and accompanying materiel from reception facilities and marshalling or staging areas to tactical assembly areas or other operating areas.

• Integration. Integration, in force protection, is the synchronized transfer of units into an operational commander’s force prior to mission execution; based on the complexity of the operation, it may take hours or days to complete (JP 1). Integration is complete when the receiving commander establishes command over the arriving unit and the unit is capable of performing its assigned mission.

4-35. The ASCC commander asks the combatant commander for the appropriate authority to conduct force reception. Clear command authority over theater reception and staging nodes, such as camps, ports, and airfields, is important. Aerial ports of debarkation are more than just air terminals and sea ports of debarkation are more than just port facilities. The ASCC commander ensures that all joint and functional or service component commanders within the supported geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR) know the chain of command for those nodes and the force reception processes used. It is almost impossible to get unity of effort otherwise.

4-36. The ASCC commander learns the LCC’s requirements early during the JTF’s force reception process to ensure the ASCC can establish the appropriate number of reception bases with the appropriate number of shelters, bedding, and other life support capabilities. Constructing or contracting these requirements takes time. The different theater service components will compete among themselves for the resources necessary to establish and operate these reception facilities if the combatant commander does not provide the ASCC commander with the appropriate authority.

4-37. The ASCC commander puts a single individual, usually a general officer, in charge of reception, staging, and onward movement. This individual normally co-locates with the joint movement center or U.S. Transportation Command’s Deployment and Distribution Operations Center to facilitate the rapid synchronization of changes in the deployment flow. This individual also integrates contractors and host- nation support (HNS) into the reception, staging, and onward movement process. This individual uses information from a variety of joint and service systems, such as the Joint Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX) and global defense support system to inform their actions.

4-38. The operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) is in charge of integrating arriving units and capabilities into the JTF’s joint operations area. However, the LCC J-3 is also heavily involved in integrating arriving ground units and capabilities into LCC current operations. This individual develops a training program for incoming units and individuals and reports the building of combat power to the LCC commander and CJTF as they progress through the program. Information systems support the LCC J-3 by providing a real-time picture of deploying units’ status to include—

• Complete visibility of units and supplies involved en route to the theater.

• Accurate knowledge of what is currently located within the theater's air or sea ports of debarkation to include when units and critical supplies are able to clear the ports.

• Accurate knowledge of what is located in the theater marshalling and staging areas.

• Having the ability to track the capacity of each location involved in the theater RSOI process against actual population density at that location as the J-3 synchronizes the movement of newly arriving units throughout the process.

• Having the ability to influence movement control activities, such as force protection and the provision of unit guides or host-nation escorts, within the theater.

4-39. Not all units of the same type progress through their training program at the same pace because of differences in their training levels, the competence and skill of their commanders and staffs, and the availability of unit equipment, training areas, and other supplies. The JTF J-3 develops and uses a synchronization matrix—updated by information systems in near real time—to displays the flow of forces into the theater and their associated support and training requirements to help the J-3 manage the process.

CONDUCT OPERATIONAL MANEUVER AND FORCE POSITIONING

4-40. Operational maneuver and force positioning involves the positioning of large forces to obtain a positional advantage or in reaction to an enemy operational maneuver. At the operational level, it includes directing the movement of subordinate forces, which ensures the positioning of the decisive and shaping forces during each phase of a major operation. This positioning enables LCC forces to perform a rapid transition to subsequent phases of the JTF’s major operation or campaign. These tasks make their maximum contribution when the CJTF synchronizes their conduct with air superiority and interdiction operations.

4-41. Operational maneuver and force positioning characterize historical mobile combat operations and will continue to characterize future operations. The LCC commander plans large-scale maneuver of assigned forces to support the CJTF’s campaign, with a view to the CJTF’s ultimate objectives. The CJTF sequences and integrates major operations by assigning the LCC its area of operations, boundaries, objectives, priorities, resources, and designating campaign or major operation phases. The LCC commander integrates resources, such as space-based systems and cyber electromagnetic activities within the LCC’s assigned area of operations. Planning responsibilities center on analyzing the assigned mission, visualizing the conduct of major operations and the associated sustainment requirements, and disseminating plans and directives. The plans generally project future operations and provide details on mission accomplishment as directed by the CJTF.

4-42. This operational task includes the following subtasks conducted by an LCC:

• Assemble forces in the joint operational area.

• Posture forces for operations.

• Coordinate the transition of forces to and from tactical battle formation.

• Conduct operations in depth.

• Conduct forcible entry.

• Conduct offensive-focused operations.

• Conduct defensive-focused operations.

• Conduct stability-focused operations.

In accordance with the expeditionary nature of future U.S. military operations, the actual accomplishment of these tasks often overlap during the conduct of operations. Also, a corps headquarters operating as an LCC headquarters can conduct large-scale defense support of civil authorities (DSCA)-focused operations. In this case, the commander and staff are guided by the doctrine contained in JP 3-28 and ADP 3-28 and ADRP 3-28. As a result, this topic is not further discussed in this ATP.

ASSEMBLE OPERATIONAL FORCES IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA

4-43. The assembly of operational forces involves the concentration of designated large forces with the necessary sustainment support into those areas where the LCC’s major operations will be launched. Operational concentration enables the LCC commander to assemble the necessary forces required to support the CJTF’s campaign plan before the initiation of actual operations.

4-44. Along with the physical grouping of forces, operations involve the assembly of any special technical means that enhances the probability of success. These technical means include the assembly of new weapons and equipment, capabilities, and organizations (for example, thermobaric warheads, offensive cyber operations, and a Stryker brigade combat team [SBCT]). The LCC commander wants to decisively employ available capabilities at the time and place necessary to gain maximum advantage and surprise during the land operations portion of the CJTF’s campaign. The LCC commander attempts to employ new capabilities in mass to gain maximum advantage over an enemy and reach the CJTF’s desired end state before the enemy’s ability to develop effective counters against new capabilities. Occasionally, a LCC commander directs using a new weapon or organization alone to produce a psychological effect intended to destroy the enemy’s will or capability to resist.

4-45. The LCC commander establishes a solid sustainment foundation in the desired concentration area early in the CJTF’s campaign. Arrangements are made for sustainment support using not only Army resources but also using available joint, multinational, host-nation, or contract facilities when the sustainment requirements of the LCC forces cannot otherwise be met. Of course, an enemy can detect such preparations if proper operational security measures are not employed.

4-46. Speed and secrecy in concentration, followed by bold, rapid execution of the plan may be a decisive factor in the defeat of the enemy. By concentrating forces, the LCC commander takes the first step in executing the CJTF’s campaign plan.

4-47. The specific locations of assembly areas and their distance from the enemy are influenced by the mission variables, which include—

• The projected employment of the forces.

• The capabilities of any enemy forces that may interfere with the concentration, to include their anti-access operations.

• Probable enemy course of action.

• Capacity of the transportation systems—air, highway, rail, pipeline, and water—located within and leading into the area. This affects the concentration, as well as logistic support. Transport capacity of any of the above means is limited by the availability of personnel, facilities, equipment, and the operable condition of transportation facilities and equipment.

• Terrain and weather.

• The time required to complete the concentration. Plans envisage coordinated action by the whole force in a decisive operation.

• The LCC’s operational protection capabilities to include the friendly force’s capabilities to protect itself from attacks by enemy theater ballistic missiles and aircraft using conventional or chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, attacks by enemy airborne and air assault forces, and attacks by enemy unconventional forces, terrorists, and organized criminal organizations.

4-48. Plans for the control of operational force assembly include—

• The early arrival of echelon tactical command posts.

• The prompt use of available information systems and the development of adequate area signal communications systems.

• Composition and duties of the each unit’s tactical command post advance party. (These advance party members are fully informed of their commander’s plans and empowered to act for their commander in coordinating the action of security forces and troop movements.)

• Early issuance of orders to subordinates allow parallel and collaborative planning to take place, allowing the development of necessary control measures and necessary additional preparations.

The LCC commander reviews the LCC task organization daily as forces flow into and throughout the theater to make sure that contingency plans reflect current available resources.

4-49. The LCC commander protects ground lines of communications, their supporting infrastructure, and critical installations, in addition to providing for the security of assembling forces. This protection is enhanced by—

• Selecting operational assembly areas that protect (wholly or in part) LCC lines of communications from ground attack with natural obstacles.

• Locating operational assembly areas between potential sources of danger and lines of communications.

• Denying an enemy time to offer serious interference through rapid assembly, followed immediately by active operations.

• Adhering strictly to camouflage discipline and electronic emission restrictions.

• Placing troop units and operational force protection assets where they can secure lines of communications and critical installations.

• Developing an integrated air and missile defense system that establishes and maintains air and missile superiority including the development of integrated air and missile defenses).

4-50. The conduct of constant and intensive information collection operations throughout the assembly process is essential to force security efforts. Accurate knowledge of enemy capabilities, dispositions, and intentions forms the basis for effective friendly security operations.

Assembly of Land Component Command Forces in the Joint Operations Area

4-51. Troop movements into assembly areas are made by marching; by rail, water, motor, or air transport; or a combination of these methods. The methods employed are determined by—

• Locations and types of forces assembled.

• Capabilities of transportation facilities.

• Time and space factors.

• Proximity of the enemy and the danger of interference with the concentration.

4-52. The mission variables govern the sequence in which LCC forces arrive in their assembly areas. Normally, each echelon’s forward or tactical command post elements arrive early in this process. Other considerations affecting the sequence of arrival are security, phasing, unit integrity, and the presence of adequate sustainment assets. Convenience, efficient use of transportation assets, and the need to provide support to arriving combat units largely govern the order of arrival of elements—other than command post elements—when assembly areas are secure and time is not pressing.

POSTURE FORCES FOR OPERATIONS

4-53. Before conducting offensive, defensive, and stability tasks, the LCC commanders, in conjunction with the CJTF, positions LCC forces to influence the enemy. A LCC commander—

• Positions LCC forces to support the CJTF’s next campaign or major operation plan before assembly of the LCC is complete.

• Visualizes the CJTF’s campaign or major operation from the beginning of the operational assembly to the completion of the mission.

• Selects the LCC’s final objectives and determines a concept of operations for the obtainment of these objectives.

• Determines the different operational and tactical tasks that LCC forces need to perform, including determination of the forms of maneuver or defense necessary to accomplish the LCC’s assigned missions.

• Arrays available forces within the operational assembly areas to support the preferred course of action, yet maintain flexibility to respond to enemy actions and changes in the operational and mission variables. In rare cases, this occurrence requires the LCC commander to designate the combat formations used by subordinate commanders.

• Postures forces for not only the initial operations but also subsequent operations based on the LCC commander’s visualization and understanding of the CJTF’s intent and operational end state.

4-54. The LCC commander’s initial force deployments need to support the CJTF’s entire campaign because it is difficult to change the lines of operation of operational forces after their establishment. The LCC commander evaluates the following factors that can impact operations either favorably or unfavorably in the planning process:

• Probable weather conditions.

• Terrain and hydrography.

• Presence or absence and the condition and carrying capacity of railroads, roads, waterways, pipelines, airfields, and communication nodes used to establish LCC lines of communications.

• Enemy situation, to include location of main enemy forces, where and how to meet the enemy, and when contact is expected.

• Complex terrain, such as mountains, major urban areas, and fortified areas.

• Capabilities of the enemy to interfere with friendly operations.

• Means for attaining and maintaining air superiority.

• Time and space to effectively employ available forces.

• Organization and employment of assigned, attached, or supporting forces including air and naval.

• Reconnaissance and security measures.

• Sustainment support and the means, methods, and routes by which it flows to support LCC combat forces.

4-55. The LCC commander and staff need to think and operate at the operational level of war. They need to know and understand the elements of operational design in addition to—

• Time-distance factors associated with both inter- and intra-theater movement.

• Joint and Army doctrine so that the LCC commander uses appropriate doctrinal terms without needlessly inventing new one when interacting with the LCC staff and subordinates.

• The advantages and disadvantages of collaborative and parallel planning and when to use each planning technique.

• Operational risk assessment and mitigation.

The LCC commander constantly updates previously conducted troop-to-task analysis since the LCC will constantly receive new tasks, which also requires the LCC commander to constantly reassess subordinate unit command and support relationships.

4-56. The assignment of appropriate tasks to multinational and interorganizational partners is an important part of force posturing. Their assignments are appropriate to their capabilities. There may be pressure from political leaders to assign certain multinational and interorganizational partners tasks that they are incapable of accomplishing to standard or time. When this occurs, the LCC commander educates higher leaders on why an assignment is not appropriate.

4-57. Force tailoring and task organization is also part of posturing forces for operations. The ARFOR supports the LCC commander by providing tailored combined arms force packages to accomplish joint missions and dominate enemies and situations on land. Trained and equipped combined arms units make up these force packages. Force tailoring occurs outside of the JTF’s joint operations area. Within these force tailored packages, the JTF, LCC, or ARFOR commander can task organize units for specific missions. (Army units based within the continental U.S. are not currently dedicated to theater contingency packages other than regional force alignment.)

4-58. Force tailoring and task organization gives Army forces the ability to rapidly shift between and among the elements of decisive action. The ability of Army forces to tailor (select forces based upon a mission) and task organize (temporarily organize units to accomplish a tactical mission) gives them extraordinary agility. USMC forces have similar capabilities but they bring Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and air elements. Because of this, the LCC commander can task organize Army and USMC units using standard command and support relationships defined in doctrine to make the best use of available resources. Subordinate commanders can also reorganize previously task-organized units to respond to changes in the mission variables at the tactical level. Task organization occurs in assembly areas. (See ADRP 3-0 for a discussion on organizing combat power.)

COORDINATE TRANSITION OF JOINT FORCES TO AND FROM TACTICAL BATTLE FORMATIONS

4-59. The LCC commander’s ability to posture forces to conduct decisive or shaping operation depends on the command’s ability to effectively move the forces from their respective assembly areas into combat formations and employ these formations in the various types of offensive and defensive tasks and forms of maneuver. A combat formation is an ordered arrangement of forces for a specific purpose and the general configuration of a unit on the ground (ADRP 3-90). Combat formations allow a unit to move on the battlefield in a posture suited to their commander’s intent and mission. There are seven combat formations—column, line, echelon (left or right), box, diamond, wedge, and vee.

4-60. The LCC commander uses these combat formations to—

• Overwhelm the enemy with one or more unexpected blows before the enemy has time to react in an organized fashion.

• Make contact with the smallest possible force in situations when and where the command’s common operating picture does not clearly show the enemy situation.

• Mass the effects of combat power against designated small portions of the enemy force—to defeat the enemy in detail—in situations where the enemy situation and capabilities are known.

4-61. The basis of the LCC commander’s ability to use combat formations is the force’s mastery of the forms of troop movement—administrative movement, tactical road march, and the approach march. Troop movement is linked with rapid transition into the situationally appropriate combat formation. The advantages and disadvantages of combat formations at the tactical level also apply at the operational level. An LCC commander initiates changes in the tactical battle formations of subordinate units only when such change is necessary to facilitate the execution of current operations, with due consideration to the impact on future operations. (ADRP 3-90 discusses combat formations and FM 3-90-2 discusses troop movement.)

CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN DEPTH

4-62. Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, and resources. The LCC commander conducts unified action throughout the LCC’s area of operations to achieve an advantage in defeating or neutralizing enemy operational forces, and, by doing so, accomplish operational or strategic objectives. Operations in depth are necessary to defeat enemies and adversaries employing asymmetrical means as well as echeloned enemy forces.

4-63. Technological advances and the evolution of warfare have continuously expanded the depth of operations. Because of this, airpower can be projected at greater distances, while surface forces are able to maneuver more rapidly and project their influence at increasing depths. The LCC commander should not allow an enemy sanctuary or respite. LCC operations conducted across the full breadth and depth of the LCC’s area of operations can create competing and simultaneous demands on enemy and adversary commanders and resources.

4-64. The LCC commander seeks to dominate the enemy—either directly or indirectly—by employing joint fires in combination with the maneuver of the command’s combined arms forces across the three dimensions of the LCC’s area of operations and across time. In accordance with the CJTF’s concept of operations and intent, the LCC attacks enemy centers of gravity and critical functions to destroy the cohesion of the enemy plan, such as the enemy’s ability to generate and sustain the combat power of their operational forces. These centers of gravity may be the worldview of key leaders or the civilian populace within a country, which may be more vulnerable to information, humanitarian, and civic assistance operations than conventional combat.

4-65. The LCC commander's fight chiefly involves the employment of joint fires in the conduct of joint shaping operations and the provision of resources to subordinates. The commander resources operational effects, shares intelligence, and employs distribution-based sustainment support. The LCC commander provides clear and simple instructions and assigns operational tasks to subordinates. Together with the LCC chief of staff, the LCC commander trains and disciplines the staff to look deep in time and space and plan LCC shaping operations that influence future events, not the current tactical operations of subordinates.

4-66. LCC forces may take part in various types of operations at different operational depths to achieve an advantage in destroying or neutralizing enemy centers of gravity. This task includes both conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) from the JTF’s special operations command or task force. Examples of operations in depth include conducting a show of force, a demonstration, unconventional warfare, raids, direct actions, as well as different offensive, defensive, and stability tasks, such as exploitations, mobile defense, and civil security.

4-67. In offensive- and defensive-focused operations, depth includes attacking enemy forces throughout the LCC area of operations—simultaneously when possible, sequentially when necessary—to deny enemy forces freedom of maneuver. This offensive depth allows subordinate commanders to sustain their momentum and press the fight. Defensive depth creates opportunities for subordinate forces to maneuver against enemy forces from multiple directions as their attacking forces are exposed or detected.

4-68. The LCC’s employment of available Army and joint aviation and fire assets is a means to deny enemy forces their freedom of maneuver. Against an echeloned enemy, the LCC shapes its area of operations by attacking the enemy second operational echelon. Such attacks seek to degrade the enemy’s combat power, command and control capabilities, and morale while changing the tempo of operations so that it favors friendly forces. These attacks accomplish this by destroying or damaging selected enemy capabilities, such as electronic warfare, air and missile defense, and sustainment installations and supplies. Simultaneously they prevent, delay, or disrupt the ability of that second echelon to move and maneuver to reinforce the enemy’s first operational echelon. Detailed planning, coordination, and synchronization across all warfighting functions by all forces involved (joint and multinational) is required for the successful execution of these attack although detailed integration with tactical ground forces is typically not required. The LCC employs similar attacks against selected portions of non-echeloned enemy force arrays to set the conditions necessary for subordinate tactical success. Determining which hybrid enemy elements to attack and the situationally appropriate means of engaging them in this environment is more difficult than attacks in depth directed against conventional enemy forces.

4-69. During stability-focused operations, depth extends influence in time, space, purpose, and resources to impact the operational environment and conditions. In stability-focused operations, information collection operations combined with the use of information related capabilities help the LCC and subordinate commanders and staffs understand factional motives, identify power centers, and shape their activities within their respective areas of operations.

4-70. Depth of resources in quantity, positioning, and mobility is critical to executing military operations. The LCC commander balances depth in resources with agility. A large sustainment tail can hinder maneuver, but inadequate sustainment assets and resources makes the force fragile and vulnerable.

4-71. The LCC and subordinate commanders use depth from multiple dimensions as they seek to overwhelm the enemy throughout their respective areas of operations. Operations extended in depth shape future conditions and disrupt the enemy’s or adversary’s decision cycle. Depth contributes to protection of LCC forces by destroying enemy potential before its capabilities are realized and employed. Simultaneous operations in depth places a premium on the LCC commander’s situational understanding.

CONDUCT OFFENSIVE-FOCUSED OPERATIONS

4-72. The purpose of an offensive task—movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit—is to impose

U.S. will on the enemy to achieve a decisive victory. The offense is the decisive form of war. The key to success in an offensive-focused operation is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force. The Army seeks to mass effects, but not necessarily forces, as it pursues offensive operations. The objectives of offensive- focused operations are to—

• Destroy the enemy force.

• Secure decisive terrain.

• Deprive the enemy of resources.

• Gain information.

• Deceive, divert, and hold the enemy in position.

• Disrupt the enemy’s attack.

• Set up conditions for future operations.

4-73. At the operational level, offensive-focused operations are directed against an operational center of gravity, such as a visible mass of enemy forces, or against something more abstract, such as the cohesion among enemy forces. Offensive-focused operations are also directed at a critical vulnerability of the enemy, such as the boundary between two of its major combat formations, a vital command and control center, a logistic base, lines of communications, or the mental and psychological balance of a key enemy commander. An LCC commander conducts offensive operations within an operational framework established by the CJTF. Both commanders synchronize their forces in time, space, resources, purpose, and action to conduct simultaneous and sequential operations throughout the depth of the joint operations area or area of operations using appropriate operational frameworks to ensure the best chance for success. An LCC commander executes envelopments, flank attacks, turning movements, penetrations, and frontal attacks—all of which require the synchronization of all operational functions. They are integrated with the JTF’s joint operations. (It is not envisioned that operational-level organizations will conduct operational-level infiltrations. It is recognized that tactical organizations will conduct infiltrations at the tactical level as part of operational-level maneuver.)

4-74. Turning movements and envelopments tend to be the preferred forms of maneuver at the operational- level because historically they achieve decisive results when successfully executed. Frontal attacks and penetrations may also be performed successfully at the operational-level of war, especially if the attacker has an overall superiority of forces across the front.

4-75. In addition to the six forms of maneuver, there are four primary offensive tasks: movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. An LCC commander directs these operations sequentially and in combination to generate maximum combat power to destroy the enemy. The LCC commander can use the complementary capabilities of the different types of Army forces as needed. While armor, infantry, and Stryker BCTs are all combined arms teams, they each have characteristics that are optimized for certain environments and missions. Their respective capabilities can be augmented through support from other BCTs and functional or multifunctional brigades. One task-organized force may be better suited as the initial attack force, while another is better suited as an exploitation force. (See table 4-1.) The tactical discussion of the offense found in ADRP 3-90 and FM 3-90-1 also applies at the operational level.

Table 4-1. Initial and exploitation force examples

Initial Attack | Exploitation
Air assault forcible entry by IBCT | Linkup with ABCT
ABCT penetration | SBCT follow-up
Airborne forcible entry by IBCT (airborne) | IBCT or SBCT air lands
Special operations forces | Airborne or air assault by IBCT (airborne)
IBCT infiltration | SBCT or ABCT follow and support
ABCT armored brigade combat team IBCT infantry brigade combat team | SBCT Stryker brigade combat team

4-76. Types of joint force maneuvers include forcible entry, sustained action at and from the sea, sustained action on land, and sustained air operations. (The following two paragraphs address forcible entry. Sustained action at and from the sea is addressed in U.S. Navy and USMC doctrine. Sustained air operations are addressed by United States Air Force [USAF] doctrine.) Chapter 6 addresses corps tactical land operations.

4-77. Forcible entry is the seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition (JP 3-18). In many situations, forcible entry is the only method of gaining access to the operational area or for introducing decisive forces into the region. Forcible entry operations are normally joint operations and may include a combination of airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations. The Army takes part in forcible entry operations with airborne and air assault forces that seize a lodgment. (The Army uses joint and USMC doctrine in the unlikely event that Army forces need to conduct an amphibious assault.) The Army also contributes protective and sustainment capabilities to support the forcible entry.

4-78. The strategic mobility of airborne forces permits rapid employment to accomplish global strategic objectives. With the requisite airlift, Army airborne units can conduct a strategic brigade airdrop to seize decisive points deep within enemy territory with little warning (for example, Operation Just Cause, 1989 and the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s assault into Northern Iraq in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom). (See JP 3-18 and FM 3-99 for additional information on forcible entry and airborne operations.)

CONDUCT DEFENSIVE-FOCUSED OPERATIONS

4-79. The conduct of defensive tasks—area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde—alone cannot achieve a decision. They create conditions for a counteroffensive that allow Army and USMC forces to regain the initiative. A defender counters the attacker’s initiative. At the operational-level, the defender attempts to disrupt the enemy attack by the use of spoiling attacks, information-related capabilities, and interdiction operations. A successful defense employs static and dynamic ground and air elements working closely together to deprive the enemy of the initiative.

4-80. A LCC conducts either a mobile or an area defense. The mobile defense defeats or neutralizes enemy attacks by employing a combination of fire and maneuver. An area defense focuses on the retention of terrain and absorbs the enemy into an interlocked series of positions from which the defending commander destroys the enemy by fires. Units smaller than corps-size do not normally conduct a mobile defense because of their inability to fight multiple engagements throughout the width, depth, and height of their area of operations, while simultaneously resourcing separate striking, fixing, and reserve forces. A defending LCC commander establishes an operational reserves capable of seizing the operational initiative. This reserve typically includes dedicated forces, designated operating forces, generated forces from reconstitution, and newly arrived forces.

4-81. A retrograde is a defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy. (See ADRP 3-90.) The three retrograde tasks are withdrawals, delays, and retirements. Retrogrades can gain time, preserve forces, avoid combat under undesirable conditions, and draw the enemy into an unfavorable position. Control of the airspace is the key to their success. The underlying reasons for conducting a retrograde are to improve an operational situation and prevent an unsuccessful operation from developing. The LCC commander can also conduct a retrograde to shorten lines of communications. The tactical discussion of the area and mobile defense and the retrograde found in ADRP 3-90 and FM 3-90-1 also applies at the operational level to LCC defensive-focused operations.

CONDUCT STABILITY-FOCUSED OPERATIONS

4-82. Understanding the need to adapt the principles of war and tenants of Army operations to the existing operational and mission variables is fundamental to successful unified action. Additionally, the LCC commander should remember that the LCC was committed in support of the other elements of national power to achieve solutions to often volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous problems. Stability-focused operations can expand into unfamiliar areas beyond established doctrinal types and forms associated with offensive- and defensive-focused combat operations, such as engaging and controlling populations, standing up national security forces, and military government. They often present the commander with challenges for which there are no doctrinal solutions. However, review of reasonably analogous historical situations, such as the Philippine Insurrection and the Iraqi occupation, can suggest potential problem areas and tactics, techniques, and procedures that can be intelligently adapted to the current situation. Regardless of historical precedent, success depends on the ability of the LCC commander, staff, and land forces to adapt existing structures and methods to accommodate existing situations. Initiative and imaginative leadership at all levels is important to success.

4-83. The possibility of combat may be remote in some types of stability-focused operations. Other largely stability-related missions may require the conduct of combat operations, such as peace enforcement, combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, support to insurgency, support to counter-drug operations, and foreign internal defense. The LCC commander and subordinate commanders should always plan to have the right mix of forces available to quickly transition to and from combat operations. Additionally, when conducting these operations, commanders must consider the feasibility and means of redeployment—possibly to another theater—to conduct other operations.

4-84. Stability-focused operations can involve a higher proportion of sustainment and functional forces than are normally used to support offensive- and defensive-focused operations. In general, these types of forces have an increased role because of their unique capabilities and mission requirements. These sustainment and functional elements provide the base force or are the only forces employed in some operations. For example, military police (MP) requirements often increase during the conduct of stability-focused operations when compared to those existing during offensive- and defensive-focused operations. The LCC commander makes preparations to accept additional multinational, international, and nongovernmental organization capabilities before local conditions warrant their acceptance because other elements of national power—diplomatic, information, and economic—play a major role in these operations.

4-85. Maneuver warfare and the applications of direct fires supporting maneuver warfare do not lend themselves for employment during types of stability-related missions, particularly during missions focused on peacekeeping and foreign humanitarian assistance. On the other hand, armored forces and attack helicopter assets can play major roles in preventive deployments and peace enforcement. These capabilities are useful in other operations for force protection, deterrence, and convoy escort; for personnel transport where threats exist; or as a mobile reserve. Combat arms units can be re-missioned or re-rolled—such as cannon artillery units performing infantry tasks—to meet situationally-specific requirements with proper preparations and training.

4-86. Identification of the funding stream is an important task during the conduct of stability-related operations. Contractors require payment for the tasks they are best able to perform during the conduct of this category of operations, such as jump-starting construction projects within the joint operations area. The LCC staff need to participate in, and possibly run (if delegated task from the CJTF), the joint requirements review board. The Corps of Engineers is also involved as appropriate. Where possible, the LCC commander pushes funding along with appropriate controls down to the battalion and possibly the company level.

4-87. Local authorities and civic leaders need to be involved in deciding the priority and nature of reconstruction projects initiated within their communities. The commander receives the maximum possible benefit of the command’s reconstruction efforts when incorporating widespread job programs. They need to also publicize the progress of the reconstruction program and the involvement of local leaders in the project. (Publicizing the program includes a robust media effort involving indigenous print and electronic (television and radio) and social media.

4-88. The LCC commander balances the maintenance of control and military authority versus the establishment of legitimacy and authority by the evolving civil authority. As the stability-focused operation progresses, there are often multiple levels of transitions and handovers between military and different civil authorities.

4-89. The LCC and subordinate unit commanders in an operation focused on the conduct stability tasks maintain adequate echelon reserves that are sufficiently armed, trained, equipped, mobile, and positioned to respond to projected requirements. A properly task-organized reserve expands each commander’s ability to respond to unexpected successes and reversals. Each echelon requires forces and resources which are earmarked and available for contingencies. Maintaining reserves in this environment is often difficult. Most policy makers and commanders at all levels reluctantly commit more than the minimum forces to their reserve when conducting stability-focused operations. Nonetheless, commanders understand that contingencies can arise requiring the use of their reserve. The maintenance of a reserve during stability-focused operations, just as during offensive- or defensive-focused operations—

• Allows the commander to plan for worst-case scenarios.

• Provides flexibility.

• Balances risk.

• Conserves the force during long-term operations.

JP 3-07 addresses the conduct of joint stability operations.

PROVIDE OPERATIONAL MOBILITY

4-90. Successful land operations depend on the freedom to maneuver. Terrain conditions, enemy tactics, integrated fires, barriers, obstacles, and minefields can limit friendly maneuver capability. Successful enemy operations use fire, existing terrain, man-made obstacles, and minefields to restrict friendly freedom of maneuver. To counter this, friendly forces need to gain positional advantage and mass combat power at a critical time and place and to overcome any natural or man-made barriers, obstacles, and minefields.

4-91. Operational mobility is the ability to move operational forces quickly from their various staging areas to the area where they will be employed within a theater of operations. Operational mobility facilitates the movement of operational land formations in a joint campaign or major operation without major delays due to operationally significant terrain or obstacles. Operational mobility is linked closely to the construct of assured mobility, which enables movement and maneuver.

4-92. Assured mobility encompasses those actions that give the force commander the ability to deploy, move, and maneuver where and when desired, without interruption or delay, to achieve the mission. The imperatives and fundamentals of assured mobility are what enable friendly forces to exploit superior situational understanding and, therefore, gain unsurpassed freedom of movement. This framework describes the processes that enable the commander to see fires, understand first, and finish decisively.

4-93. Assured mobility supports the commander’s use of the elements of combat power to achieve decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations across the conflict continuum. The framework of assured mobility entails four imperatives and six fundamentals that are linked to the elements of combat power. The imperatives of assured mobility are—

• Develop mobility input to the common operational picture (COP).

• Establish and maintain operating areas.

• Attack enemy ability to influence operating areas.

• Maintain mobility and momentum.

4-94. The fundamentals of assured mobility are—

• Predict.

• Detect.

• Prevent.

• Avoid.

• Neutralize.

• Protect.

These imperatives are proactive, not reactive, and assure mobility only when fully integrated into the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and operations. (See FM 3-34 for a discussion of the fundamentals and imperatives of assured mobility.)

PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FOR MOBILITY OPERATIONS

4-95. Operations to counter the use of natural and man-made barriers, obstacles, and minefields by enemy forces may involve the employment of conventional, airmobile, airdropped, amphibious, or special operations forces (SOF). Combat engineer forces normally support these operations. Military advisory personnel or U.S. units can assist a friendly nation to counter mines and booby traps or to enhance the mobility of host-nation forces. Specialized reduction assets include mine detection equipment; explosive devices and line charges; tank-mounted rollers, rakes, and plows; combat engineer vehicles; and rafts and bridges for dry or wet gaps.

Intelligence

4-96. Operational success in countering enemy use of barriers, obstacles, and minefields depends largely on the ability of the LCC commander to see the LCC’s area of operations. Intelligence-collection plans identify specifically-tasked priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Information about enemy barriers, obstacles, and minefields or areas expected to contain them usually become PIRs in any operation where they can interfere with friendly maneuver.

4-97. Intelligence collection by national and joint and national reconnaissance and surveillance assets becomes the foundation for developing an analysis of the enemy’s probable employment of barrier, obstacle, and minefield systems and fortifications. This information can verify enemy intentions, plans, and defensive strength and identify the mine types and fuses the enemy has employed. The timely availability of national and joint reconnaissance and surveillance assets helps the LCC and subordinate commanders determine the best mix of reduction or clearing techniques, forces, and equipment for specific situations.

4-98. Obtaining intelligence on the enemy’s use of barriers, obstacles, and minefields requires all available information collection assets, ranging from national collection assets down to tactical unit information that locates and identifies fortifications and obstacle emplacements. Intelligence products are continually verified and updated from encounters with actual barrier, obstacle, and minefield before the commencement of operations and during operations.

Military Deception

4-99. Military deception is an important element in the successful reduction or by-passing of enemy barriers, obstacles, and minefields. The use of feints and raids, manipulation of electronic signals and other cyber electromagnetic activities, use of dummy equipment, staging of engineer equipment, and the employment of other operations security measures affords a breaching forces an added measure of security and enhance the probability of surprise. However, the LCC’s military deception plans need to coincide with JTF and higher echelon military deception themes.

Logistics

4-100. Any operations to counter the enemy’s use of barriers, obstacles, and minefields can result in equipment damage or loss. Replacement of tactical bridging, combat engineer equipment, line charges and explosives, lane-marking materials, and any other materials need logistic support to conduct and maintain breaching operations. In addition, stocks of artillery-delivered and air-delivered scatterable mines are maintained against possible enemy counterattacks during friendly breaching operations. Logistic support needs to occur swiftly and not delay the continuing movement of forces or critical supplies. These conditions are thoroughly anticipated in the planning phase.

OPERATIONAL MOBILITY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

4-101. The LCC commander is concerned with identifying large-scale natural and man-made barriers, obstacles, and minefields that provide the enemy with a distinct operational advantage, because breaching major barriers, obstacles, and minefields requires long-range planning in advance of encountering the obstruction. An early decision on logistic support requirements is important to ensure availability of special equipment and material.

4-102. Major barriers, obstacles, and minefield systems can also require significant time to breach and reduce. The LCC commander allows subordinate commanders to bypass barriers, obstacles, and minefields whenever a course of action is operationally sound, which requires the LCC commander to provide bypass criteria.

4-103. LCC commanders at all subordinate echelons place continual emphasis on early detection and reporting of barriers, obstacles, and minefields. The type and quality of mines employed is determined to ensure the proper employment of suitable countermine measures.

4-104. Successful breaching operations require the conduct of special training and rehearsals. Suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault are the breaching fundamentals applied to ensure success when breaching against a defending enemy. Suppression is the focus of available fires on enemy personnel, weapons, or equipment to prevent effective fires on friendly breaching, assault, and support forces. Obscuration hampers enemy observation and target acquisition and conceals friendly activities and movement. Friendly forces secure the breaching site to prevent the enemy from interfering with the breaching and passage of the assault force through the lanes created. Reduction means creating lanes through or over the obstruction to allow the attacking force to pass. Assault is the violent attack of the enemy force covering the breech site to either kill them in place or cause them to relocate to a position where they can no longer interfere with the breech.

4-105. The LCC commander may designate the selection of breaching zones for major barriers, obstacles, and minefield systems, although subordinate tactical commanders normally select the exact locations of breaches. This designation is based upon defensibility, ability to maneuver and deploy the force, and the capability to continue the operation. Crossing obstacles on a wide front, crossing in as many places as possible, crossing by night or in poor visibility or using obscurants, and employing military deception can reduce the LCC’s operational vulnerability (limited only by the terrain and quantities of reduction assets available).

Operational Mobility Offensive Planning Considerations

4-106. Continuous information collection is required to verify and update the assessments provided by prior intelligence analysis. Early identification of enemy and natural obstructions can allow the LCC commander to devise a course of action that avoids or minimizes the number and severity of enemy barriers, obstacles, and minefield systems facing LCC forces, and one that limits the number of friendly casualties.

4-107. The LCC commander places emphasis on maintaining attack momentum through freedom of movement and maneuver. The obstruction is seldom the objective, but is an impediment to securing the LCC’s true operational objectives. Maintaining momentum requires the attacking force to quickly pass through or around barriers, obstacles, and minefields. Orders place a great deal of importance on the capture in useable condition of major roads, bridges, passes, and other terrain features essential for the force’s mobility. The capture of these features also tends to enhance the LCC’s future operations.

4-108. Advance planning is necessary to coordinate the transfer of information concerning barriers, obstacles, and minefields to follow-on engineer units as they are reduced. This planning is necessary to widen and mark assault force breaches and to clear and mark additional routes for follow-on forces. Planning also addresses clearing and reduction operations of friendly and enemy barriers, obstacles, and minefields to allow movement of functional and multifunctional support elements. The LCC logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) synchronizes the logistic support of subordinate service components to facilitate both the continuation of offense tasks and, if necessary, a transition to the conduct of defensive tasks.

4-109. Successful breaching of enemy barriers, obstacles, and minefields requires special planning and support. When possible, subordinate elements of the LCC execute breach operations as a continuation of their attacks. They use multiple lanes across a broad front to reduce congestion and vulnerability. However, the availability of reduction assets, crossing sites, and combat power can dictate crossing on a narrow front. If a deliberate breach is required, an early decision is mandatory to obtain the necessary logistic support and concentration of combat power. Plans need to anticipate the requirement to breach enemy barriers, obstacles, and minefields employed in depth. Deceptive and covering smoke provide an added measure of security while breaching by denying intelligence to the enemy concerning where the breach will occur and by impeding enemy target acquisition.

Operational Mobility Defensive Planning Considerations

4-110. In the defense, barriers and obstacles located throughout the LCC area of operations are not to impede friendly counterattacks and spoiling attacks. Planning addresses the need to maintain freedom of movement and maneuver of friendly forces.

Operational Mobility Stability Planning Considerations

4-111. During operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks, barriers, mines, and obstacles emplaced by different factions often impede the maneuver of subordinate LCC forces. Advance planning and coordination is effective if done with former warring factions to obtain detailed information on known obstacles and mines. In addition, LCC forces also need to coordinate movement and clearing operations with representatives from these factions. Planning should address the amount of time and resources involved in deliberate clearing of large mined areas and the accuracy of marking, recording, and disseminating minefield data.

4-112. Resuming normal civilian activities in a given area is an LCC objective in the CJTF’s campaign plan during stability-focused operations. Keeping major transportation networks, routes, and nodes open or restoring them for civilian use is a major indicator of success. LCC mobility efforts focuses on keeping lines of communications open and reducing the threat of mines and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) to Soldiers and civilians. The LCC’s mobility efforts in a foreign humanitarian support operation can focus on removing storm debris and restoring transportation infrastructure.

OPERATIONAL MOBILITY OPERATIONS

4-113. Any knowledge, detection, or encounter of enemy barriers, obstacles, or minefields is reported immediately through appropriate channels and incorporated in intelligence data. Spot reports provide subordinate tactical commanders the initial source of barrier, obstacle, and minefield intelligence. This information is reported to the LCC headquarters by the fastest means available.

4-114. Detailed information on enemy minefields is transmitted to the appropriate Service component or joint force headquarters as specified in the LCC operations plan. This information is maintained on file. The format used for this information is listed in appendix A of JP 3-15.

4-115. Marking is necessary to define the limits of the breached path, lane, or gap and, eventually, the boundaries of the mined area. Proper marking is critical to the safe and swift movement of units and to protect friendly forces and civilians.

4-116. Breaching a major barrier, obstacle, or minefield is a difficult and risky task. Forces execute breaching aggressively. Forces and supporting fires are synchronized to minimize losses and enhance rapid passage through the obstruction. JP 3-15 and ATP 3-90.4 describe the conduct of breaching operations in detail.

MINEFIELD CLEARING

4-117. Minefield clearing involves the total elimination or neutralization of mines from a defined area. Minefield clearing is a subset of explosive ordinance clearance and includes the investigation, detection, location, marking, reporting, and preparation of protection works for UXO. It can include the disposal in place by engineers, when authorized by the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) staff element, of UXO identified in ATP 3-90.37 and ATP 4-32 and theater specific UXO protocols, after risk analysis and positive identification.

PROVIDE OPERATIONAL COUNTERMOBILITY

4-118. Countermobility operations are the construction of obstacles and emplacement of minefields to delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy by reinforcement of the terrain (JP 3-34). The primary purpose of countermobility operations is to slow or divert the enemy, to increase time for target acquisition, and to increase weapons effectiveness. Operational countermobility delays, channels, stops, if possible, or hinders the movement of enemy operational formations to create positional advantage for LCC forces. Operational countermobility includes selecting and emplacing systems of obstacles for their operational effect. The LCC commander can employ operational countermobility efforts to expose enemy decisive points, centers of gravity, and high-payoff targets (HPTs) to destruction in compliance with the CJTF campaign plan and intent, including the use of available forces (within their capabilities) to enforce sanctions, embargoes, blockades, and no-fly zones. A high-payoff target is a target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action (JP 3-60). LCC units capable of conducting operational countermobility operations include combined arms maneuver forces, MP, air and missile defense, and engineer units.

4-119. The LCC employs countermobility to shape man-made and natural terrain inside its area of operations with obstacle systems that support the LCC commander’s concept of operations. Countermobility adds depth for the LCC in space and time by attacking the enemy’s ability to maneuver its forces. An enemy force is more vulnerable to JTF and LCC forces once its movements are disrupted, turned, fixed, or blocked, which also provides additional time for target acquisition by friendly direct and indirect fire systems. The LCC staff engineers ensure that obstacles are integrated with the LCC commander’s scheme of maneuver and fire to create a decisive battlefield effect by the exercise of control over the use of obstacle emplacement authority. These staff engineers need to have representation on the LCC targeting board to prevent destruction of key infrastructure essential to JTF and LCC future operations. They provide the commander’s guidance concerning emplacement of obstacles, barriers, and mines to the other members of the LCC staff and subordinate commanders. JP 3-15 and ATP 3-90.8 identify many operations which are used to limit or hamper the enemy’s ability to maneuver to include land mines, demolition obstacles, flame field expedients, and special munitions, such as standoff land attack missiles.

OPERATIONAL COUNTERMOBILITY EMPLOYMENT PRINCIPLES

4-120. Barriers, obstacles, and minefields within the LCC area of operations need an evaluation from both an offensive and a defensive posture. The LCC commander has a range of offensive and defensive options available. Typically, the option selected combines elements of static and dynamic types of defense or a combination of defensive actions in one area and offensive actions in another area.

4-121. The use of barriers, obstacles, and minefields in the LCC area of operations directly support the commander’s plan. The staff carefully matches their use to the terrain and with a maneuver concept that focuses on enemy forces as objectives.

4-122. Reinforcing obstacles are integrated with existing barriers and obstacles so they support the FCC commander’s intent and operational concept. These reinforcing obstacles close gaps or routes between existing barriers or obstacles when possible. Reinforcing obstacles are also employed on their own to support tactical objectives. The locations selected for these obstacles are made difficult to bypass, to delay the enemy or to require the enemy to change plans.

4-123. Barriers, obstacles, and minefields are more effective when employed in depth. A series of simple obstacles is often more effective than one large elaborate obstacle. The enemy can breach any barrier, obstacle, or minefield if the enemy is willing to expend the time, effort, and resources necessary. The cumulative effect of successive barriers, obstacles, and minefields exposes the enemy to friendly fires and disrupts the enemy’s plan of action when they are employed in depth. (See JP 3-34 and ATP 3-90.8 for additional information on countermobility employment principles.)

OFFENSIVE USE OF COUNTERMOBILITY OPERATIONS

4-124. In the offense, the LCC commander, through the LCC staff, identifies priority locations and plans and coordinates the joint emplacement of barriers, obstacles, and minefields. The LCC commander designates the systems that subordinate commanders use to conduct their countermobility operations under some circumstances, such as when a particular munition or barrier material is reserved for use elsewhere or at a different time. These barriers, obstacles, and minefields generally focus on isolating the battlefield, facilitating the use economy of force measures, enhancing overall force security, and blocking or delaying an enemy’s withdrawal. Care is taken to ensure that the mobility of the attacking force is not hindered during the planning and conduct of LCC countermobility operations. Key factors for considerations for their offensive employment are—

• Current enemy situation, capabilities, intent, and probable courses of action.

• Accurate terrain analysis to determine where friendly forces are vulnerable to enemy counterattacks.

• Preplanning, deconfliction, and coordination with other components of the JTF.

• Control of obstacle and mine emplacement.

• Information flow to inform friendly forces of friendly and enemy barrier, obstacle, and minefield locations using standard report formats.

DEFENSIVE EMPLOYMENT OF COUNTERMOBILITY OPERATIONS

4-125. Similar to the offense, the LCC commander, through the LCC staff, identifies priority locations and plans and coordinates the joint emplacement of barriers, obstacles, and minefields. The LCC commander may retain authority to execute reserve obstacles that may affect future offensive operations or have a detrimental effect on the local population. The LCC’s staff integrates the use of barriers, obstacles, and minefields to complement other aspects of LCC defensive plans. The LCC commander designates the systems that subordinate commanders use to emplace these barriers, obstacles, and minefields to preserve resources for use at other times and places. The primary intent of the LCC’s defensive countermobility operations is to degrade the enemy’s capabilities by disrupting enemy combat formations and delaying their movement, interfering with enemy command and control, and confusing enemy commanders. A secondary intent is to destroy or attrite enemy forces. Key factors for consideration in their defensive employment are—

• Current enemy situation, capabilities, intent, and probable courses of action.

• Accurate terrain analysis to determine where friendly forces are vulnerable to enemy attack.

• Preplanning, deconfliction, and coordination with other components of the JTF.

• Control of friendly obstacle and mine emplacement.

• Information flow to inform friendly forces of friendly and enemy barrier, obstacle, and minefield locations using standard report formats.

4-126. Constructed obstacles that are time or labor-intensive are emplaced before the beginning of hostilities when and where possible, reducing the exposure of Soldiers and engineer equipment to enemy fire. The time available to mass the large amount of supplies needed to construct the obstacles is also increased.

4-127. The LCC and subordinate headquarters preplan the employment of scatterable minefields throughout their respective areas of operations. The choice of scatterable systems is mission-dependent. Ground emplaced mine scattering systems are best for rapidly emplacing large minefields in friendly controlled areas. Artillery or aircraft-delivered systems are employed elsewhere. The appropriateness of using artillery or aircraft scatterable mine delivery systems varies depending on the threat conditions and other mission priorities. The LCC and subordinate headquarters need to carefully consider use of scatterable mines in the defense with respect to the self-destruct times set on these munitions and their projected dud rate. The timetable for friendly operations is upset if the self-destruct settings used does not reflect the evolving ground situation or the presence of an excessive number of duds results in an unacceptable fratricide rate.

4-128. Obscurants are used as a limited obstacle to canalize or slow advancing enemy forces. They can enhance enemy force vulnerability by limiting enemy visual, target-acquisition, and intelligence-gathering capabilities when combined with friendly barriers, obstacles, and minefields.

COUNTERMOBILITY REPORTING, RECORDING, AND MARKING REQUIREMENTS

4-129. The immediate reporting of friendly and enemy barriers, obstacles, UXO hazards, and minefield locations to higher headquarters is essential. Emplacing units are responsible for immediate reporting of each obstacle and minefield, intent, initiation, completion, and recording completion of the obstacle. Positive control and a rapid flow of information on mine emplacement are necessary. Both friendly and enemy minefields are reported and marked because of their lethality to both friendly forces and noncombatants. Records and reports are critical to the immediate conflict and are vital in facilitating post hostilities clearance. Reporting, recording, and marking of all minefields is accomplished in accordance with accepted procedures.

4-130. Three reports are required of tactical units emplacing minefields: Report of Intention, Report of Initiation, and Report of Completion. These report formats are listed in appendix A, of JP 3-15. These reports are transmitted to the authorizing headquarters. Their contents are integrated with terrain intelligence and disseminated through intelligence channels.

Records

4-131. Emplacing unit minefield records are prepared in accordance with specified formats and include all known information. The level of information can vary based on friendly versus enemy emplaced minefields and the type of emplacing systems used. These records facilitate troop safety, future operations, and clearing operations upon the conclusion of hostilities.

4-132. The emplacing unit prepares minefield records for each minefield it constructs and forwards them to the appropriate staff proponent designated to maintain the records on file. All minefields are recorded on DD Form 3007, Hasty Protective Row Minefield Record. The record of scatterable minefields is submitted as part of minefield reporting per FM 6-99.

4-133. A final repository for both friendly and enemy minefield reports is designated in the appropriate operations plan or order annex or appendix. A corps commander, once designated as the LCC commander, has the responsibility for developing a repository for all minefield reports and records within the LCC’s area of operations. Cessation of hostilities is critical, because the battlefield needs clearance. This clearance is accomplished by several means: friendly forces, belligerent forces under the auspices of the UN Security Council, contractors, or any combination of these.

Marking

4-134. The marking of minefields is accomplished using methods found in ATP 3-34.20 and any JTF established SOPs. Minefield and UXO hazard areas are marked as necessary to protect friendly forces and civilians. The fencing of minefields, both friendly and enemy, in friendly controlled areas is required. (Enemy minefields are marked and reported immediately when discovered to protect friendly troops and civilians.)

CONTROL OPERATIONALLY SIGNIFICANT AREAS

4-135. An operationally significant area is an area whose dominance or control achieves operational or strategic results or denies the same to the enemy. In stability-focused operations control of an operationally significant area also pertains to assisting a friendly country in populace and resource control. Denying access to an operationally significant area is accomplished by occupying the area with friendly forces or preventing or limiting the enemy’s use or access to the area. Conduct of this task requires the LCC to control vital areas of the land domain.

4-136. Controlling operationally significant areas requires LCC tactical units to execute support area and base security operations. ATP 3-91 provides doctrine for division support area security that is scaled up to apply to a joint security area. Area security is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a designated area (ARDP 3-90). ATP 3-37.10 discusses base site selection, base layouts, and facility design. ATP 3-91 and ATP 4-01.45 provide multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures for tactical convoy operations. Area security operations take advantage of the local security measures performed by units regardless of their location. Such actions establish local military superiority in the LCC’s area of operations. (See JP 1, JP 3-0, JP 3-07, JP 3-08, JP 3-10, JP 3-16, FM 3-16, FM 3-90-2, and

ATP 3-91 for additional information on controlling operationally significant areas and locations.)

SECTION III – OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

SECTION III – OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

4-137. Operational intelligence supports the LCC commander’s conduct of unified action within the LCC’s area of operations by focusing on:

• Describing the operational environment.

• Answering the commander’s PIRs.

• Supporting the planning and execution of LCC operations.

• Maintaining situational awareness of enemy and adversary military disposition, capabilities, and intentions, and other relevant aspects of the LCC area of operations to include when, where, and in what strength an enemy or adversary stages and conducts its own campaigns and major operations.

• Countering enemy and adversary deception efforts.

• Supporting friendly military deception efforts.

• Assessing the effectiveness of operations.

• Monitoring terrorist incidents and natural or man-made disasters and catastrophes.

Operational intelligence also helps the LCC and subordinate commanders keep abreast of events within their areas of interest.

4-138. The corps’ supporting expeditionary military intelligence brigade (E-MIB) may deploy in support of LCC operations. In this case, the processing, exploiting, and disseminating portions of the brigade support the LCC J-2. The brigade’s counterintelligence, human intelligence (HUMINT) collection, and ground-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection assets are placed in a command or support relationship with the LCC’s subordinate tactical organizations, if it is determined that is necessary to distribute low-density, high- demand collection assets most effectively while providing responsive support.

4-139. Intelligence functions at the LCC encompass a broad range of activities to include but not limited to directing, planning, orchestrating, performing, and evaluating operations. JP 2-0 and FM 2-0 discuss the following intelligence disciplines:

• Counterintelligence (known as CI), addressed in ATP 2-22.2-1.

• Geospatial intelligence (known as GEOINT), addressed in JP 2-03.

• HUMINT, addressed in ATP 2-22.2-1 and ATP 2-22.31.

• Measurement and signature intelligence (known as MASINT), addressed in ATP 2-22.8.

• SIGINT, not addressed in a doctrinal publication.

• Technical intelligence (known as TECHINT), addressed in ATP 2-22.4.

• Open-source intelligence (known as OSINT), addressed in ATP 2-22.9.

4-140. Complementary intelligence capabilities contribute to all-source intelligence analysis and facilitate the conduct of operations. The complementary intelligence capabilities are specific to the unit and circumstances at each echelon and can vary across the intelligence enterprise. These capabilities include but are not limited to –

• Biometrics-enabled intelligence (known as BEI) addressed in ATP 2-22.82.

• Cyber-enabled intelligence.

• Document and medial exploitation (known as DOMEX) addressed in ATP 2-91.8.

• Forensic-enabled intelligence (known as FEI).

The use of biometrics in support of operations, not to be confused with BEI, is addressed in ATP 2-22.85.

4-141. Intelligence functions includes special security office, foreign disclosure, language proficiency, as well as the regional expertise and cultural knowledge. These items have associated regulations and, in some cases, their own associated doctrine. For example, the provision of special security office services involves policy guidance, procedures, and assistance on personnel, information, physical, and industrial security services to the force.

4-142. Technical intelligence (known as TECHNINT) training for the intelligence enterprise is also an intelligence function. The LCC J-2 directorate maintains a technical intelligence system support capability to prevent intelligence systems failure, degraded performance, and the development of gaps in the availability and accessibility of intelligence from the JTF joint intelligence support element (JISE), which also applies to as fellow component, supporting, and subordinate intelligence organizations. The LCC intelligence system users need to receive a mix of classroom, computer-based, and on-the-job training on the system. See paragraphs 3-295 to 3-352 for additional information on J-2 functions and activities.

SECTION IV – OPERATIONAL FIRES

4-143. Operational fires are used in conjunction with operational-level movement and maneuver to defeat enemy forces and maintain freedom of movement. Operational fires are largely, but not exclusively, joint fires. Joint fires are those delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinate action to produce desired results in support of a common objective. A commander can employ joint fires to achieve operational or tactical effects.

4-144. Joint fires help the LCC commander accomplish the mission, create conditions for success, and protect the force. A LCC commander employs joint fires to help achieve both operational-level and tactical objectives while keeping the enemy’s critical functions at risk throughout the LCC’s area of operations. Joint fires can affect an enemy’s strategic or operational center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities directly or indirectly and make a decisive impact on the campaign or major operation. Joint fires include the interdiction of a major enemy force or forces to setup conditions for subsequent, decisive operations or deny enemy resources. Operational-level objectives are achieved by extending friendly operations in both space and time. The resulting disruption, delay, or other effects imposed on critical enemy functions helps these LCC commanders dictate the conflict’s terms.

4-145. Joint fires are a separate element of the LCC commander’s concept of operations (addressed separately from operational maneuver) but are closely integrated and synchronized with the concept for maneuver. Joint fires are integrated with operational land maneuver for synergistic effect, staying power, and more rapid achievement of the CJTF’s operational and strategic aims. The LCC commander and staff synchronize and integrate operational-level attacks on single or multiple operational-level targets at the decisive time and place. This integration includes lethal and nonlethal means and minimizes their effects on friendly forces, neutrals, and noncombatants.

4-146. These effects are a vital part of all LCC plans. The primary application of joint fires is through the appropriate nomination of targets during the joint targeting process and the allocation of joint and multinational air, land, and sea assets. The LCC commander uses the organic fire support assets of LCC subordinate units to impose these effects. The extended range, capabilities, and accuracy of modern Army and USMC weapons systems (direct and indirect) and target acquisition systems makes land-based firepower more effective than ever before. This greatly expands the area of influence of a LCC commander and allows that individual to impose desired effects on enemy forces and installations regardless of the enemy’s location in the area of operations.

4-147. Operational-level maneuver and joint fires occur simultaneously, but possess different objectives. In general terms, joint fires are not the same as fire support and operational-level maneuver does not necessarily depend on joint fires. However, operational-level maneuver is most effective when it is synchronized with and complements joint fires and exploits opportunities that develop a synergistic effect, staying power, and rapid achievement of CJTF strategic and operational aims. Joint fires can facilitate maneuver in depth by suppressing the enemy's deep-strike systems, disrupting enemy operational-level maneuver and tempo, and by influencing enemy actions in order to create gaps in tactical defenses that are exploitable. Firepower magnifies the effects of maneuver by destroying enemy forces and restricting the enemy’s ability to shift surviving forces to meet friendly maneuver. Just as firepower supports maneuver, maneuver creates the conditions for the effective use of firepower. Together they support the other three elements of combat power—leadership, protection, and information—to ensure mission accomplishment. However, some joint fires are independent of maneuver and orient on achieving specific operational-level and strategic effects that support CJTF objectives.

SYNCHRONIZING JOINT FIRES

4-148. In the synchronization of joint fires, the LCC commander—

• Serves as the critical link for coordination of joint support for the JTF’s land operations and, in turn, ground support for joint operations.

• Serves a key role in ensuring that ground and air operations complement and reinforce each other within the LCC area of operations.

• Begins coordination with the CJTF and other JTF functional or service component commanders in the early stages of the JTF and LCC planning processes.

• Identifies ground requirements for air support, such as reconnaissance, close air support (CAS), and air interdiction during planning in coordination with subordinate Army and USMC commanders and staff.

• Takes part in the joint targeting process by nominating targets for land and other component engagements and recommends the use of those fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) necessary to support the LCC’s operations.

TARGETING GUIDANCE

4-149. The LCC commander disseminates CJTF scheme of fires and targeting guidance to subordinate Army and USMC forces and the LCC staff based on the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations (METT-TC) to include—

• Directing target priorities, level of effort by subordinate units, and sequence of efforts.

• Providing guidance and objectives for LCC planning and targeting.

• Updating mission planning guidance, intent, and CCIRs throughout the targeting process.

• Directing the formation, composition, and specific responsibilities of the LCC joint targeting coordination board.

The LCC commander distributes all or some of the LCC’s joint allocated firepower to subordinates in that targeting guidance. See paragraphs 4-180 through 4-185 below for additional information on LCC targeting.

LAND COMPONENT COMMAND FIRES CELL ROLE IN JOINT FIRES

4-150. The LCC fire cell’s daily meetings are a pivotal part of the command’s established battle rhythm for targeting and combat assessments because the planning, preparing, executing, and assessing of joint fires should be continuous. Combat assessment is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations (JP 3-60.) (Most of the Army members of the corps fires cell are documented on the corps’ associated field artillery brigade table of organization and equipment (TO&E) with their duty positions assigned in this cell.) The LCC deputy commander for operations or chief of staff chairs the command’s targeting board meeting to ensure the commander’s targeting guidance is disseminated, the effectiveness of lethal and nonlethal targeting efforts is monitored, ground and air operations are coordinated and deconflicted, fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs) are validated, and new target nominations are approved for the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL).

4-151. To successfully accomplish their joint fires mission, the fires cell—

• Decides, detects, delivers, and assesses operational-level shaping operations.

• Integrates and displays a COP of the LCC area of operations through the use of streamlined, automated linkages.

• Ensures effective and efficient employment of critical LCC information collection, information- related activities, and fire support assets to include matching lethal and non-lethal joint fires assets and information-related activities with designated targets and the coordination of assets to create synergistic effects.

• Determines the optimal means of engaging targets based on location of LCC fire support and other attack assets, range, status, munitions available, other missions, air defense threat, and accuracy of target-acquisition data.

Fires cell members take part in the planning, coordination, and synchronization of joint fires and operational movement and maneuver in conjunction with the LCC OPTs across all planning horizons.

4-152. Joint fires planning involves all LCC staff elements. The main tasks performed by the fires cell during planning to synchronize joint fires include—

• Designation and tracking of high-payoff and high-value targets (HVTs).

• Recommend echelon targeting objectives and priorities.

• Development of effects desired for joint fires and the measures of performance or effectiveness to be used to determine if those desired effects are achieved.

• Plan for the employment of lethal and nonlethal attack means by aerial and surface friendly systems.

• Information-related capabilities input into CCIR development.

• Desired military information support operations (MISO) support of LCC operations.

• Inclusion of combatant command and JTF military deception plans.

• Consideration of operations security measures to protect the integrity of the combatant commander’s military strategy and CJTF’s campaign.

• Intelligence collection requirements for joint fires.

• Battle damage assessment (BDA) requirements.

• MDMP products as needed by various OPTs.

• Tailoring the LCC COP to highlight fires aspects.

4-153. The fires cell provides the means to coordinate operational shaping efforts within the LCC. Coordination involves the horizontal orchestration across the joint operating functions to gain maximum payoff from each function. Synchronization involves the vertical orchestration of LCC operations with JTF and combatant commander assets. The main tasks performed by the fires cell during coordination and synchronization include—

• Coordinate.

◦ Proper allocation of joint fires assets to subordinate organizations.

◦ Fires targeting across the command.

◦ Deconfliction of terrain and airspace.

◦ Nonlethal effects and supporting fires.

◦ Intelligence and contingency plans.

• Synchronize LCC shaping operations to ensure mutual support with other JTF components.

• Synchronize combat assessment and re-attack options.

• Optimize combat power effects in joint operations.

4-154. The fires cell is the focal point for centralized synchronization of joint fires effects in the LCC area of operations. With near real-time situation displays, the LCC commander or representative can modify plans, monitor the progress of an operation, direct contingency operations as required, and begin planning for follow-on operations. The main tasks performed by the fires cell during execution include—

• Assisting in the preparation, execution, and assessment of theater shaping and decisive operations to include the synchronization of LCC fires and the efforts of information-related capabilities designed to attack operational targets to include joint fire effort by other JTF service or functional components and those of major LCC subordinate commands.

• Coordinating the employment of operational firepower with the current operations cell’s integrating cell or joint operations center (JOC).

• Allocating joint and multinational operational firepower resources available within the LCC to subordinate commands.

• Advising JFC on joint fires asset allocation and fire priorities.

• Making distribution decisions of available CAS to subordinate commands. (See JP 3-09.3.)

• Employing fire support coordination measures.

• Attacking enemy aircraft and missiles (within LCC capabilities) as part of the JFACC counterair operations.

• Coordinating the attack of time-sensitive targets using joint surface and aerial fires.

• Interfacing with the JFACC AOC through a BCD to influence the air apportionment decision and allocation of airpower in accordance with operational needs.

• Consolidating and prioritizing planned air support requests as an air support list (known as the ASL) to send to the BCD at the supporting AOC to be processed during the planning stages of the joint air tasking cycle.

• Maintaining operational fires COP.

• Synchronizing and coordinating the employment of information-related capabilities across the LCC area of operations and in time.

• Providing combat assessments and determining re-attack requirements.

• Maintaining information system connectivity with the CJTF, other JTF functional or service components, and the LCC’s major subordinate commands.

• Integrating joint force staff augmentees to include receiving liaison officers and joint force augmentation as required.

• Managing the joint targeting cycle in support of the commander’s objectives.

• Participating or hosting required joint boards, centers, and cells.

4-155. The LCC submits target nominations for air interdiction with preplanned air support requests. The air support requests with targets are sent via the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) from the LCC fires cell to the BCD at the JFACC AOC. The BCD can digitally send the air support requests with targets as a candidate target list (CTL) to populate the JFACC AOC local modernized integrated database. The JFACC AOC modernized integrated database contains targeting data that is updated with joint targeting toolbox and used to develop the draft joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) when joint targeting authority is designated by the CJTF to the JFACC. Once the air component targeteers and weaponeers build aim points (desired points of impact) the LCC CTL is saved as the LCC target nomination list that is merged with other component target nomination lists in the joint targeting toolbox. Weaponeering solutions are determined for each target to achieve desired effects.

4-156. The LCC and subordinate land commanders need to clearly identify air support requests priorities to the JFACC AOC. The desired effects and rationale portions of the air support request clearly identify the priority of each air support request in the air support list. Each air support request meets validation criteria that is resourced by joint force assets or joint air missions. A technique is to identify the appropriate prioritized tactical tasks found in the air operations directive and match the tactical tasks to each air support request with targets that are prosecuted with interdiction operations. Identifying the appropriate tactical tasks enables the JTF targeting oversight authority to validate and prioritize each target for consideration and inclusion on the CJTF approved JIPTL. Division or corps is the most appropriate level of command to apply the tactical task to each air support request rationale and desired effects as it is approved. As a technique, each air support request includes the appropriate tactical task used to validate and prioritize target nominations for air interdiction. All target nomination list targets and desired points of impact are prioritized by tactical tasks before the drafting of the JIPTL and the CJTF’s approval. The LCC fires cell (targeting officers) should clearly identify the target nominations priority, desired effects, timing and rationale to the BCD plans (targeting officer), regardless of the techniques used, in order to compete in the validation and prioritization of target nominations and the drafting of the JIPTL process.

ROLE OF OTHER LAND COMPONENT COMMAND STAFF IN JOINT FIRES

4-157. The LCC fires cell is supported by other J-code staff directorates—the J-2, J-3, J-4, and plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5)—within the LCC headquarters. Several special and personal staff officers within the headquarters and subordinate units also support the conduct of joint fires. The other groups include MISO, civil-military operations, engagement, and space operations special staff officers in addition to the public affairs officer and the office of the staff judge advocate.

4-158. The LCC J-2—

• Provides intelligence support to targeting.

• Provides coordination of information collection resources, reporting, products, and services to support the LCC commander’s targeting requirements.

• Recommends collection priorities for joint force, theater, and national tasking and work with the LCC J-3 to support information collection requirements across all three planning horizons.

• Conduct BDA and evaluate effectiveness of the employment of nonlethal assets when providing combat assessment to the LCC current operations staff.

4-159. The LCC J-3—

• Ensures the J-2 has the required information and priorities for target development, target acquisition, and combat assessment.

• Coordinates with the J-2 in regards to the LCC information collection efforts.

• Develops effects assessments with support from the staff, subordinate, and other JTF functional or service components.

• Provides the results of the LCC joint target coordination board meetings to subordinate units and supporting forces.

• Provides the commander’s targeting-related decisions based on joint target coordination board recommendations to the echelon staff, higher and adjacent commands, and subordinate units.

4-160. The LCC J-4—

• Identifies critical or key logistics issues unique to echelon operations.

• Recommends logistics priorities for echelon taskings and identify logistics shortfalls.

• Identifies enemy logistics targets the attack of which would negatively affect the enemy’s capability to conduct operations. (This includes such things as fuel storage depots and pipelines, distribution infrastructure, airport and seaport hubs.)

• Reviews target selections for unnecessary adverse environmental impacts, such as dams and oil fields. (This requires the involvement of the LCC engineer or Corps of Engineer civil engineering experts.)

4-161. The LCC J-5, in conjunction with the future operations cell fusion cell—

• Review joint targeting guidance and apportionment.

• Advise the LCC commander on plans to achieve overall combatant command and JTF plans and objectives.

• Assist subordinate units in translating the CJTF’s and LCC commander’s objectives and guidance into coordinated subordinate operations and plans.

• Provide courses of action in the form of broad targeting guidance based on major operations plans and priorities.

• Review major echelon operations plans in advance and advise the echelon commander on future operations, targeting information consistent with commander’s guidance, targeting guidance and priorities, desired effects of joint targeting, supplemental rules of engagement, and changes to the CJTF restricted and no-strike target lists, to include joint special operations areas.

• Compile subordinate targeting nominations and requirements and prioritize targets based on the LCC commander’s guidance.

• Develop the CTL for the LCC commander’s approval.

4-162. The LCC J-9 staff section—

• Synchronizes and coordinates civil information activities with other LCC targeting objectives.

• Monitors civil-military operations-related measures of effectiveness and provide input to the fires cell.

• Monitors stabilization tasks performed by U.S. military and multinational forces, other governmental and host-nation agencies, and nongovernmental organizations as part of the overall joint target coordination board’s targeting effort.

• Integrates population and resource control plans with the JTF and echelon public information and MISO campaign plans.

• Determines the civil-military implications associated with the employment of lethal and non-lethal means within the LCC areas of influence and interest.

4-163. The LCC engagement staff—

• Coordinates engagement concepts and establish priorities to accomplish engagement objectives that support the LCC commander’s intent, concept of operations, targeting objectives, and the LCC scheme of fires.

• Manages the engagement working group within the context of the LCC joint target coordination board.

• Determines the availability of resources to carry out the engagement plan and coordinate intelligence and assessment support for engagement efforts.

• Serves as the primary advocate for engagement targets nominated for attack during target nomination and review.

4-164. The LCC space operations officer or representative from the supporting Army Space Support Team works with the LCC electronic warfare officer to establish, prioritize, and nominate space control targets (lethal and nonlethal) that support the LCC commander’s intent and concept of operations.

4-165. The LCC public affairs staff—

• Determines the implications of joint fires and engagement efforts on the LCC public affairs program to include international public opinion.

• Refines public affairs communications objectives, messages, and talking points within joint targeting guidance and objectives.

4-166. The LCC office of the staff judge advocate—

• Reviews the CTL to ensure targets are lawful under the rules of engagement and laws of armed conflict.

• Reviews targets to determine the potential implications under core legal disciplines such as international and operational law, contract and fiscal law, and claims as well as U.S. domestic laws.

4-167. Subordinate units—

• Identify requirements and nominate targets.

• Provide a liaison officer team for the effects board meetings.

• Recommend priorities for combat assessment collection requirements to the echelon intelligence staff.

THEATER AIR-GROUND SYSTEM

4-168. The LCC commander, as a major planner of joint fires and fire support, takes part in the management of scarce resources, especially air assets, through the theater air-ground system (TAGS). The TAGS consists of an overarching joint command and control architecture and service coordination links, which facilitate the integration, synchronization, planning, and execution of joint air-ground operations. The TAGS is a system of systems, a synergy of the various component air-ground systems, orchestrating the planning and execution of air-ground operations. TAGS refers to organizations, personnel, equipment, and procedures that participate in the planning and execution of all air-ground operations. Key to the TAGS is an understanding of the systems and how to maximize each component to achieve quick and decisive results in combat. ATP 3-52.2 provides multiservice tactics, techniques and procedures for the TAGS. Figure 14 in ATP 3-52.2 provides a TAGS diagram. Figure 4 in ATP 3-52.2 provides a graphic representation of the Army Air-Ground System (known as AAGS).

BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION DETACHMENT

4-169. The primary LCC liaison to the JFACC is the BCD when an Army corps headquarters forms the base around which a LCC headquarters forms. The BCD is collocated with the JFACC’s senior air operations control agency, designated as the joint AOC. It is responsible to the LCC commander and coordinates with, and receives, objectives, guidance, and priorities from the J-3. Guidance and priorities must be sufficiently clear to permit the BCD to adjudicate LCC needs for air support. The BCD is organized into a headquarters element and six subsections: plans, operations, intelligence, air defense artillery, airspace management, and airlift. See ATP 3-09.13 for the functions and responsibilities of these sections.

Note: When an Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC) is deployed in theater, the AAMDC liaison team at the location of the JFACC (who is also the AADC) location is the senior Army air defense element and the primary interface at the AOC for all land-based active air defense force operations. The BCD air defense section coordinates its activities with the AAMDC liaison team and can augment the AAMDC liaison team as needed.

4-170. Airspace control is the joint approach that the LCC uses to deconflict the use of airspace over the LCC area of operations. Airspace control—

• Synchronizes the command and control of all joint forces using airspace.

• Maximizes the combat effectiveness of all airspace users by reducing unnecessary restrictions and adverse impacts on their capabilities.

• Involves staff elements at each command echelon above the BCT.

• Includes the LCC’s base corps headquarters organic air and missile defense, Army air traffic service, fire support coordination, and intelligence staff sections. It includes personnel conducting liaison with the airspace control authority (ACA). These elements support the corps and subordinate commanders and, in coordination with the ACA, links the Army Air-Ground System to the TAGS. In a similar manner, it links the Marine Air Command and Control System with TAGS for USMC units with a command or support relationship to the LCC.

4-171. Commanders and staff need to understand the COP to successfully execute airspace control. For commanders to achieve situational understanding, they need to ensure that assets, systems, and personnel provide timely, relevant, and accurate information and intelligence. The LCC airspace control element is the principal organization responsible for airspace control in the LCC area of operations. Representatives of this element are found within the LCC’s main and tactical command posts. These airspace control representatives are part of the JOC and fall under the staff responsibility of the current operations cell and are supervised by the LCC airspace control officer. These elements consist of representatives from, but not limited to air defense, aviation, fires cell, J-2, J-4, and the air traffic services company supporting the headquarters. It also contains USAF representatives. As necessary, it contains USMC air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company and multinational representatives. For airspace control elements supported by the Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System and Tactical Airspace Integration System, unique data link capabilities permit a rapid transfer of airspace control information and near-real time update of the air picture. (See FM 3-52 for additional information on airspace control. ATP 3-09.13 is the doctrinal publication addressing BCD detachments.)

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES

4-172. A fire support coordination line is a fire support coordination measure established by the land or amphibious force commander to support common objectives within an area of operations; beyond which all fires must be coordinated with affected commanders before engagement, and short of the line, all fires must be coordinated with the establishing commander before engagement (JP 3-09). A LCC commander employs FSCMs, such as the fire support coordination line (FSCL), and airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) to facilitate effective operations; enhance target attacks; protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and culturally significant sites; and set the stage for future operations. Many maneuver control measures have fire coordination implications. The integration of joint fires from artillery cannon and rocket systems, naval surface fires, CAS, air interdiction, and information-related capabilities requires common maneuver techniques and an understanding of the permissions and limitations associated with the use of fire support and ACMs. All U.S. services and multinational elements need to understand and adhere to these measures during the conduct of the operations process, especially during execution. FM 3-09 provides information on permissive and restrictive FSCMs. FM 3-52 discusses the eight types of ACMs: air corridor or route, air defense area, air defense operations area, air traffic control, procedural control, reference point, restricted operations zone, and special use airspace.

4-173. Typically, functional component commanders, such as the LCC and the JFACC provide the CJTF a coordinated position on the FSCL’s location. This location supports the CJTF’s concept of operations. An FSCL is not a boundary, but instead enables an operational-level command, its subordinates, and supporting elements (for example, JFACC) to attack targets-of-opportunity. Adjusting the FSCL and attack assets is coordinated between fire support representatives in the LCC fires cell and affected commanders in time to avoid friendly casualties and wasted resources through duplication of efforts. Moving the FSCL takes a minimum of six hours to fully coordinate; therefore, it is commonly done in conjunction with phases of the operations and air tasking cycles (ATO periods).

4-174. The location and shape of the FSCL should complement the LCC commander’s concept for shaping operations and optimize LCC maneuver and fires. Supported and supporting commanders have clearly defined responsibilities, selective targeting, and coordinated operations. As the supported commander, the LCC commander provides the necessary guidance, such as target restrictions and weapons constraints, for those portions of the LCC area of operations beyond the FSCL because the effects the JFACC wants to impose beyond the FSCL are not necessarily what the LCC wants. The LCC staff and supporting commanders ensure the LCC commander’s intent and guidance for activities in this area are followed.

4-175. The LCC commander understands that there are cultural differences between the Army and the USMC as to the preferred location of the FSCL. Army commanders prefer to locate the FSCL at a significant distance from their forces because Army divisions have significant numbers of long-range artillery and rocket systems available to them. The USMC commander normally wants the FSCL located closer to USMC forces than Army counterpart, largely because this frees USMC organic aviation assets to accomplish the effects desired above that possible with the limited capabilities of USMC supporting organic artillery systems.

4-176. The LCC commander may use other FSCMs (for example, restrictive fire areas, no-fire areas, and kill boxes) to facilitate or restrict the use of joint fires, protect friendly elements on either side of the FSCL, or preserve other protected targets. If rules of engagement permit, commanders consider the use of free-fire areas or common reference systems (for example, kill boxes) to expedite fires or jettison ordnance in specific areas. (See FM 3-09 for additional information on fire support coordinating measures.)

CONDUCTING OPERATIONAL TARGETING

4-177. The LCC uses joint targeting procedures that ensure—

• Compliance with CJTF objectives, guidance, and intent.

• Coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction of attacks.

• Rapid response to time-sensitive targets (known as TSTs).

• Minimal duplication of effort.

• Expeditious effects assessment.

• Common perspective of all targeting efforts.

• Minimal fratricide, collateral damage, and modification of the environment.

4-178. The LCC commander and staff conduct targeting within established joint organizational frameworks. A primary consideration in organizing this framework is the force’s ability to coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize targeting operations. The structure established facilitates the joint targeting process. The LCC commander bases the headquarters targeting structure and procedures on combatant or CJTF requirements and the operational and mission variables. The resulting organization reacts to rapidly changing events. Likewise, it executes all phases of the joint targeting process efficiently and continuously.

DEVELOP OPERATIONAL TARGETS

4-179. LCC targeting focuses on creating specific effects to achieve CJTF objectives or appropriate Army or USMC commander’s supporting objectives. Targeting proceeds from the definition of the problem to an assessment of the results achieved by the executed course of action. The process allows for testing multiple- solution paths, a thorough understanding of the problem, and the refinement of proposed solutions.

TARGETING

4-180. Army targeting is based on the decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology performed by commanders and staffs in planning and executing targeting. The decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology enables commanders to respond rapidly with synchronized operations to events vital to establishing favorable conditions for mission accomplishment. This methodology helps a commander structure the attack of critical targets and creates a favorable battle tempo for friendly forces, particularly at decisive points and times during the operation.

4-181. This methodology requires extensive lateral and horizontal coordination, which the operational-level staff accomplishes in accordance with the commander’s intent. In planning joint fires, both ground and air component commanders consider the effects that all fires, especially scatterable mines and cluster-type munitions, have on future ground operations. Targeting by the LCC staff follows the same targeting procedures used at subordinate echelons. LCC target nomination begins with deliberate targeting, once guidance is received from the JTF or higher headquarters, which can include—

• Long-term planning guidance, the commander’s intent for fires, and other component guidance for COP coordination and maintenance.

• Receipt of commander’s guidance (to include target selection standards) and intent from LCC major subordinate commands for incorporation into LCC targeting guidance.

• The LCC commander’s intent as provided in operations orders and plans, OPT information, and direct guidance.

4-182. The LCC fires cell presents guidance, objectives, and tasks (three days out) to the daily joint target coordination board (known as JTCB) for approval or modification by the LCC deputy CG or chief of staff. Approved guidance, objectives, and tasks are provided to subordinate commanders and their staffs for review, comment, and use in determining target nominations and CTL development.

4-183. The LCC fire cell receives target nominations from subordinate units in accordance with target objectives from the joint target coordination board to create the CTL. Nominations are—

• Combined with the echelon’s planned targets to form the echelon’s prioritized list of targets.

• Checked for combat assessment and projected locations (mobile targets).

• Reviewed by objective and task to ensure consistency with the approved guidance.

• Submitted to a CTL review board.

4-184. Members of the review board include the LCC chief of fires, fires cell targeting and operations representatives, staff judge advocate representative, subordinate unit liaison officers, and other staff elements as needed. The board gives subordinate units visibility on nominated targets and allows the staff judge advocate representative an opportunity to ensure contemplated targets comply with the law of war and rules of engagement and does not conflict with the no-strike list.

4-185. The LCC approved CTL is forwarded to the BCD, which is located in the AOC. The BCD coordinates the LCC CTL with the JAOC plans and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance divisions to complete target folders, validate targets, and add selected targets into the merged/prioritized target nomination list to develop the draft JIPTL. The JFC approved JIPTL is used to prioritize the tasking of joint air assets on the ATO. Targets from the JIPTL are normally tasked as scheduled air interdiction or attack missions on the ATO. Those preplanned air support requests without targets are sourced based on the air apportionment and air allocation guidance and result in airborne and ground alert on-call sorties on the ATO. (See JP 3-60 for additional information on joint targeting and ATP 3-60 for additional information on the Army targeting process.)

Air Tasking Order

4-186. Within a LCC headquarters, the focus of the targeting effort is on planning and coordination, rather than execution of joint fires. LCC target planning is based on the joint targeting cycle, ATO timeline, and battle rhythm of joint targeting because an LCC commander regularly uses aircraft to attack targets. The ATO is not the targeting cycle. All aviation assets and long-range rocket engagements should be included on the ATO. This includes Army tactical and general support aviation conducting operations within the LCC commander’s area of operations.

4-187. The ATO notifies supported land and sea forces of expected missions and assigns missions and taskings (for example, CAS and air interdiction operations) for each JTF subordinate functional or service command that uses air assets in the JTF’s airspace control area. Missions and taskings are—

• Developed and published by the JFACC AOC in the form of the daily ATO and special instructions. The doctrinal 12 hours (not always realized in practice) between the publication of the ATO and the time it is executed is planning and preparation time for the assets and units tasked on the ATO.

• Disseminated to appropriate units and headquarters on a daily basis.

• Specific to each projected mission and provide general instructions and notifications to the appropriate joint forces.

A continuous cycle, the JFACC AOC works five ATOs at one time. (See JP 3-60, figure C-3.)

4-188. The LCC fires cell receives each day’s ATO from the BCD. The BCD transmits the ATO to the LCC each day using AFATDS or other systems in accordance with LCC SOPs. Additionally, the ATO is available on the AOC’s secure website through the common distributed collaborative environment. Once the ATO is received the Fires Cell eliminated from the ATO those target nominations that are no longer required. Other tasks performed by the fires cell at this point include—

• Deconflicts plans for LCC shaping operations.

• Notifies the JFACC through the theater BCD or echelon USMC liaison officers of any planned targets that would adversely impact LCC operation.

• Highlights LCC targets from the CTL and targets nominated by subordinates.

• Prepares the unsourced list to cover essential targets and air support requests that did not get supported on the initial ATO in coordination with the BCD.

• Prepares an ATO book containing critical information about the next day’s ATO, such as the supported target list, unsourced list, CTL, shaping operations matrix, and special instructions.

4-189. The fires cell conducts an ATO hand-over briefing for the next day’s ATO with subordinate unit fires cells to ensure information is transferred correctly. The briefing provides the following information:

• Situation update, to include friendly allocation-of-effort to meet ATO requirements, high-payoff target list (HPTL), FSCL changes, and weather.

• Target guidance and objectives.

• CTL overview to include the number of targets nominated and target overlays.

• ATO overview to include the number of CTL targets supported or unsupported, divert sheet, guidance and directives, and CAS distribution.

4-190. A space tasking order is used for assigned, attached, or supporting space forces and is similar to an ATO that is issued for air forces within a joint operations area. The space tasking order assigns missions and taskings for each subordinate command using space assets. (Requests for support are submitted by the LCC through the ASCC space support team to the United States Strategic Command.)

Target Acquisition

4-191. The goal of target acquisition is to provide timely and accurate information to enhance the attack of specified targets. Target acquisition systems and equipment perform the key tasks of target detection, location, tracking, identification, classification, and BDA. Army forces have a variety of organic and attached acquisition assets to assist in the target acquisition effort. Assets include combat units, intelligence and electronic warfare systems, and manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. Other aerial, subsurface, surface, space, national, and multinational systems within the CJTF’s joint operations area support LCC target acquisition efforts based on the higher headquarters priorities.

4-192. Enemy targets are detected, located, identified, prioritized, and tracked with sufficient accuracy and speed to permit effective attack. The LCC’s subordinate units have organic and attached information collection assets that can be used as target acquisition assets. The LCC also requires access to intelligence and combat information gathered by subordinate tactical systems and the assets of other services to assist with target acquisition. The LCC uses available Army and USMC fire support systems to consolidate targeting information provided by many different agencies, to include maneuver forces, reconnaissance operations, and intelligence units.

4-193. Tracking identified targets is important because the value of a given target’s location decays over the time it takes to task a weapon system to engage the target and then to deliver effects on that target. Understanding this target decay time helps both in making the decision to attack a given target and the weapons systems and munitions tasked to deliver that attack.

Information Systems

4-194. A variety of information systems contribute to a LCC’s successful development of operational targets. That development requires effective coordination and integration—both vertically and horizontally— across numerous different organization both internal and external to the LCC headquarters. This coordination is facilitated by a complete suite of digital Army and joint information systems and cyber portals that are available to fires cells at all echelons within the LCC.

ATTACKING OPERATIONAL TARGETS

4-195. The LCC commander engages operational-level targets to shape and control the tempo of major land operations with available joint fires assets. These assets may come from ground, naval, air, space, or special operating forces with conventional and special munitions directed against enemy land, air, space, and maritime targets of operational-level significance. These targets may be conventional or CBRN weapon- related and include high-value enemy command and control systems, nodes, or mobility assets, such as fixed and mobile bridging, air defense sites, and enemy long-range delivery systems. These later systems include surface-to-surface missiles, theater ballistic and cruise missiles, airfields, and aircraft.

4-196. The objective is deliberate elimination or substantial degradation of critical enemy operational-level capabilities (for example, attaining air superiority by destroying the enemy’s air force and air defense capabilities). Joint fires do not necessarily depend on other concurrent operations for success; however, they can be employed with other systems and maneuver in a simultaneous attack. Joint fires are particularly useful when and where a lack of resources precludes major ground offensive operations.

4-197. Decisions to modify LCC missions or direct attacks that deviate from previous plans and orders are based on the commander’s guidance. These decisions are made with the understanding of the perspective and target priorities of other JTF component targeting efforts throughout the CJTF’s campaign. Modifications or deviation is necessary, however, when a priority target becomes accessible outside of the original plan.

COORDINATE IMMEDIATE TARGETS

4-198. Immediate targets are those identified too late to include in the normal targeting procedures, and, therefore, are not scheduled. Immediate targets have two subcategories: unplanned and unanticipated. The LCC commander coordinates attacks on immediate targets of operational-level significance with at least one other service or functional component commander in the JTF. For example, commanders coordinate when—

• Immediate targets are identified within another component’s area of operations.

• LCC controlled assets, such as a UAS or Army indirect fires, fly through an airspace control area.

• Another component’s forces are located close enough to the target to require deconfliction.

4-199. Successful joint coordination includes identifying the tasks needed to rapidly detect and locate targets, select the appropriate weapons to engage the targets, and engaging the targets after adequate deconfliction measures are completed.

4-200. Immediate targets are often time-sensitive targets and require immediate response because they pose a clear and present danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity. The LCC staff coordinates with subordinate units for acquisition and attack of time-sensitive targets s by allocated or organic systems. (JP 3-60, chapter III provides additional information on time-sensitive target considerations.)

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT INTEGRATION

4-201. A LCC commander integrates air and space-based systems from other services (and multinational partners) in order to destroy or neutralize enemy land forces. Additionally, the commander tasks these forces using the joint targeting cycle and provides direction during execution through the Army Air-Ground System. These forces are allocated to the LCC commander during the air tasking cycle as CAS or air interdiction sorties.

4-202. The LCC commander builds on the tactical effects of CAS by combining it with other surface and air operations to produce operational-level effects. CAS delays, disrupts, destroys, or degrades enemy operational-level forces, critical tasks and facilities, and affects the enemy’s will to fight. The need for tight control in fluid situations, elimination of collateral damage when enemy forces and civilians are closely intermingled, and the proliferation of lethal ground-based air defense, make the conduct of CAS especially challenging.

4-203. CAS is not used as a substitute for the ground commander’s organic surface-to-surface fire assets because of its high value and limited availability. However, effective use of CAS enhances ground operations by providing—

• A wide range of weapons effects and massed firepower at decisive points.

• Direct support to help friendly surface forces carry out their assigned tasks.

• A surprise element against the enemy.

• Opportunities for the maneuver of friendly forces.

• Protection for flanks of friendly forces during retrograde operations.

4-204. CAS is an element of joint fires and apportioned by the CJTF. It can disrupt enemy attacks, help create breakthroughs, provide cover for withdrawals, or help guard flanks. The LCC commander uses CAS at decisive points in a battle or operation and masses the effects of CAS to concentrated combat power and saturate enemy air defenses. CAS is annotated in an ATO or coordinated in real time by the AOC to ensure deconfliction with all airspace users. The JFACC translates the CJTF CAS apportionment into an allocation of sorties to component or functional commanders. Commanders can further distribute their allocated sorties to subordinate units. (JP 3-09.3 provides joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for CAS.)

4-205. Air requests that support joint fire support are preplanned or executed as immediate strikes. Preplanned requests are submitted through JTF service or functional component channels. These requests originate at any level and are approved or disapproved and consolidated with other requests at successively higher echelons. They must be submitted in time to meet the planning suspense for the allocation of sorties in the ATO.

4-206. CAS is planned to prepare the conditions for success or reinforce successful attacks of surface forces. Preplanned CAS is further subdivided into scheduled and on-call. Scheduled CAS is specific as to target, time, and final control; on-call CAS covers a window or block of time when the requesting unit anticipates an enemy engagement or plans a movement.

4-207. Immediate requests are those requests not identified in time to meet an ATO planning suspense. However, they are filled through on-call CAS assets that are tasked in the ATO. Immediate requests are supported by diverting other joint air missions or coordinating other attack systems (for example, naval surface fire support) if they are of sufficient priority. Scheduled joint air missions are diverted only as a last resort, usually because on-call missions are unavailable.

4-208. A revision to the allocation decision requires the approval of the CJTF. However, the CJTF can give the JFACC the authority to redirect joint air operations as needed. The CJTF or affected service or functional component commanders approves requests for redirection of direct support air capabilities and forces. The JFACC also notifies LCC commanders when sorties allocated in the ATO for support of LCC operations are redirected. The joint AOC is the central agency for revising the tasking of joint air capabilities and forces during execution. (See JP 3-09.3 for more information about preplanned and immediate CAS.)

4-209. Army attack aviation provides a maneuver advantage for the LCC to overcome the constraints of limiting terrain and extended distances. They are ideally suited to provide support when rapid reaction is important or where terrain hinders the free movement of ground forces. Army attack helicopter units perform a variety of combat missions. They conduct operations through the conduct of attacks in cooperation with ground maneuver units. Army attack aviation assets are consolidated into combat aviation brigades. As part of a joint force, these brigades can provide liaison to other components and execute mission-type orders in support of the joint force under the direction of the CJTF. (FM 3-04 provides Army aviation doctrine.)

COUNTERING AIR AND MISSILE THREATS

4-210. A combatant or joint force commander normally designates the JFACC commander as the supported commander—the AADC—for theater or joint operations area-wide counterair operations. In doing so, the CJTF grants the AADC the necessary command authority to deconflict and control engagements and to exercise real-time battle management. The JFACC commander is the service component commander having the preponderance of air assets and the capability to plan, prepare, execute, and assess joint air operations. The other service or functional components provide representation, as appropriate, to the AADC headquarters. Regardless of the command relationships established, all active defense forces made available for defensive counterair (DCA) are subject to the rules of engagement, airspace and weapons control measures, and fire control orders established by the AADC and approved by the CJTF. Primary responsibilities of the AADC include—

• Integrating active duty forces and operations to defend the joint force against enemy air and missile attack.

• Coordinating with other combatant commands and JTFs to reduce vulnerabilities at seams and boundaries which may arise between theaters, between theater and global missions, joint operations areas, and between offensive and defensive actions.

• Developing, integrating, and distributing a combatant or joint force commander approved joint AADP.

• Developing and executing—in coordination with the JTF J-3 and J-6—a detailed plan to disseminate timely air and missile warning and cueing information to service or functional component forces and interorganizational and multinational partners as appropriate.

• Developing and implementing identification and engagement procedures appropriate to the air and missile threat.

• Ensuring timely and accurate track reporting among participating units to provide a consistently common operational-level picture.

• Establishing sectors or regions, as appropriate, to enhance decentralized execution of DCA operations.

The AADC generally uses a combination of centralized control and decentralized execution as the optimum arrangement to respond to air and missile threats. (See JP 3-01, JP 3-30, and JP 3-33.)

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY UNITS

4-211. Army air and missile defense units capable of providing active defense for an LCC consist of at least one air defense artillery brigade that controls one or more air defense artillery battalions as part of an air and missile defense task force (AMDTF). These battalions are comprised of a mix of Patriot and Avenger firing batteries. An AMDTF is organized to include Terminal High Altitude Air Defense fire units, along with Patriot and Avenger equipped firing batteries, based on consideration of the operational and mission variables. Air defense artillery firing batteries receive missions from the AAMDC to defend the force and critical assets prioritized on the CJTF’s defended asset list. (FM 3-01 outlines the process of developing a defended asset list.) These forces, in certain cases, need to support global missile defense surveillance and tracking.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE SECTION

4-212. The air and missile defense section in the LCC headquarters manages air and missile defense. It provides air defense early warning and third dimension COP to the LCC commander and staff. To accomplish these tasks, the air and missile defense section connects to a network of sensors, communications, computers, and information collection assets. The section tracks the current fight and plans for the future fight while simultaneously keeping the LCC commander and staff appraised of the friendly and enemy air situations. It assesses the air, missile, and aviation situation and determines if the LCC has enough air defense or aviation assets to handle the current and future threat.

AIRSPACE CONTROL

4-213. The primary goal of airspace control is to enhance the effectiveness of the JTF’s functional components—air, land, maritime, and special operating forces—in accomplishing their objectives. Airspace control maximizes the effectiveness of JTF operations without adding undue restrictions and with minimal adverse impact on the capabilities of the LCC. All joint force components share the same airspace. Airspace control can become complex because of this fact. The timely exchange of information over reliable, secure, interoperable means of communication is needed to coordinate and deconflict joint counterair operations. (Airspace control is discussed in chapter 7.)

Positive and Procedural Control Measures

4-214. ACMs afford the JFACC ACA the means to procedurally control all airspace users. Positive control measures establish direct controls that minimize mutual interference between operational-level air and missile defense and other operations.

4-215. Procedural control measures establish means to easily identify aircraft—to include helicopters— based on their routing, altitude, blind radio calls, or other actions, in the event positive control measures fail. Procedural identification is advantageous for some missions and scenarios, in limited airspace areas. (See JP 3-01 for more information on procedural control.)

4-216. ACMs afford commanders the means to control airspace use, protect ground operations or facilities, and control other users of the airspace. High-density airspace control zones and restricted operations zones are examples of supplemental fire control measures. Other important control measures include the locations of the FSCL, coordinated fire lines, engagement or kill boxes, restrictive fire areas, and no-fire areas. The targeting plan and the assignment of targeting numbers play a role in ACMs, as are HPTs, target selection standards, target location errors, and attack guidance for preemptive strikes. (See JP 3-52 and FM 3-52 for a detailed discussion of positive and procedural control measures and ACMs.)

Identification

4-217. Identification is an important function of airspace control in LCC operations including air and missile defense operations. Hostile and friendly identification ensures timely engagement of targets and reduces the potential for fratricide. The tactical situation, electronic interference, or equipment malfunction precludes positive friendly identification, but ACMs provide a procedural backup. From an air and missile defense perspective, many ACMs provide a means of probable friendly identification and default hostile identification. These measures allow friendly forces optimum use of airspace while minimizing the risk of engagement by friendly air defense. Examples of these measures are minimum risk routes and standard-use Army aircraft flight routes and air corridors.

PLANNING AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

4-218. The LCC commander plans, prepares, executes, and assesses the conduct of air and missile defense operations as directed by the combatant commander or CJTF in accordance with weapon control procedures and measures established by the AADC. The LCC commander is responsible for planning and executing operations and for jointly coordinating and prioritizing LCC operations and needs with the CJTF and other service or functional component commanders. A LCC commander is designated as the supported commander for those air and missile defense operations conducted within the LCC area of operations, if the AADC is not so designated. The LCC commander supports the JFACC for offensive and defensive counterair (DCA) operations conducted beyond the limits of the LCC area of operations. The LCC commander is also responsible for providing warning to assigned and attached forces in areas vulnerable to aerial attack.

4-219. Close coordination among Service or functional component commanders, the CJTF, and the AADC—if designated—is necessary to employ the most appropriate resources and measures to execute air and missile defense operations and to ensure a synergistic effort. Component-to-component coordination is required in some situations because of the compressed time lines and short reaction times inherent in air and missile defense operations.

4-220. Planning air and missile defense operations for the LCC commander involves analyzing the mission, performing a defense lay down, assigning missions to subordinate divisions and brigades, and performing follow up coordination to ensure that forces and selected geopolitical assets remain adequately protected. The CJTF issues targeting guidance and priorities to establish how air- and surface-delivered fires accomplish JTF-level DCA objectives. When established, the joint target coordination board assists the CJTF in providing targeting guidance and priorities to subordinate service or functional commands for the campaign. The AAMDC commander is a member of, or has senior representation on the joint target coordination board to provide a theater air and missile defense focus to the process. The JFACC staff at the AOC is heavily involved in the joint force commander’s campaign through the production and execution of the ATO. The ATO ultimately assigns aircraft and weapons against targets and runs for a theater-specific period, usually 24 hours. The length of the joint air tasking cycle is also theater-specific, but usually ranges between 48 and 96 hours. ATO call signs and mode codes are randomly and constantly changed throughout all phases of the campaign to deter predictability and an enemy’s ability to identify specific unit and aircraft types.

4-221. The AAMDC supporting the CJTF can establish or participate in re-prioritization boards to recommend changes to air and missile defense priorities on the defended assets list and defense adjustments during the course of operations as required by the operational and mission variables. The board uses an objective process that quantifies the level of importance of each asset based on selected criteria. Criteria are weighted based on consideration of the combatant or joint force commander’s guidance and intent and center- of-gravity concerns. Board recommendations are forwarded to the respective service or functional component commanders and the AADC, and are ultimately approved by the joint force commander. The AADC designates the AAMDC commander (as the deputy AADC) to chair the joint re-prioritization board.

Air and Missile Defense Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

4-222. The AAMDC has a supporting role in intelligence preparation of the battlefield, attack strategy, and target development for the air and missile defense. The AAMDC attack operations cell—in coordination with AAMDC intelligence personnel—provides detailed target intelligence to the LCC fires cell and recommends offense counterair attack strategy and plans. AAMDC intelligence personnel assist the LCC J-2 in the air and missile portion of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield effort by providing dedicated analysts and subject matter experts.

4-223. The LCC fires cell is responsible for coordinating LCC shaping operations and targeting outside the LCC area of operations with the ATO planners at the JFACC AOC. Targets identified for attack by the AAMDC G-2 and attack operations section are nominated to the LCC fires cell for prosecution, either as preplanned targets or immediate targets.

Air and Missile Defense Mission Analysis

4-224. Theater air and missile defense planners first review the assigned mission and support the echelon planning staff in the identification of the critical assets to be protected from the CJTF’s critical asset list. The CJTF identifies these assets in the defended asset list. This list varies by phase within the joint campaign or major operation and is included in LCC operation plans. The enemy air situation is appraised by reviewing the intelligence running estimate and recent information to confirm or deny enemy courses of action and determine the types and numbers of missiles and aircraft the enemy is likely to employ, the locations of launch sites, and their distance from defended assets.

4-225. After analyzing the mission, the AAMDC operations staff performs a defense lay down to determine if available air and missile defense resources can adequately protect critical assets. This includes integrating contributions of available joint and multinational air and missile defense forces—aircraft, surface to air missiles, and air defense guns—into the plan. The AAMDC operations staff does this by the use of available automated planning tools. The staff uses these tools to plot the locations of enemy launch sites, protected assets, and air and missile defense unit locations to determine degree of achievement of the required surveillance and engagement coverage and levels of protection. An air defense artillery brigade staff performs this analysis in the absence of an AAMDC. (Air and missile defense planning does not include the assessment and repair of the effects or damage delivered from enemy aerial platforms.)

4-226. The LCC commander requests additional resources from the combatant commander or CJTF if the required coverage or levels of protection cannot be achieved with the available air and missile defense resources. These higher echelon commander and LCC subordinate commanders are advised of specific risks to LCC forces or assets if additional air and missile defense resources are not provided.

4-227. LCC planners do the analysis of how to best task-organize the available air and missile defense headquarters, sensors, and firing elements to accomplish the air and missile defense mission. The LCC commander directs the assignment of the fires and protection mission and air and missile defense assets to the available air and missile defense headquarters. This headquarters then performs more detailed planning to determine which air and missile defense assets cover which defended asset list asset. Throughout LCC operations, active air defense planners coordinate with the air and missile defense headquarters to ensure the availability of sufficient air and missile defense resources to accomplish the mission and weighted coverage in accordance with the CJTF’s defended asset list.

4-228. The supporting air and missile defense headquarters conducts intelligence preparation of the battlefield focused on the applicable air and missile threats to LCC forces. This analysis refines target areas and focuses information collection assets so that short dwell or immediate targets can be identified and engaged.

Air and Missile Defense Warning and Attack Assessment

4-229. The AAMDC G-2 deploys a liaison team to the LCC J-2 or to the intelligence center best capable of supporting AMD operations, or the JFACC AOC. These AAMDC liaison team is equipped with the necessary equipment to establish connectivity to national intelligence resources. If deployed, this AAMDC liaison team collects information for the AAMDC and passes IRs to the LCC J-2 collection manager. Recommendations for collection support for air and missile defense intelligence preparation of the battlefield are made to the LCC J-2 for incorporation into LCC information collection plans. The LCC J-2 supports the AAMDC’s attack operations cell by analyzing launch events, conducting counter-mobility analyses, refining and validating its intelligence preparation of the battlefield products, nominating as deliberate targets enemy launch systems 72 to 96 hours before they are expected to launch, analyzing post-launch events, building tracking profiles, and disseminating intelligence products and reports for the LCC and subordinate commanders.

4-230. The AAMDC G-2 leverages intelligence sources to develop a comprehensive air and missile intelligence picture. AAMDC G-2 personnel establish intelligence collaboration efforts with their intelligence counterparts at the AOC through digital and voice means or the AAMDC liaison team deployed to support the DAADC and AADC. Analysts in the AAMDC G-2 section and the joint AOC collaborate in the development of the air and missile defense portion of the JIPOE process and share near-real time target intelligence. Intelligence collaboration between JTF service and functional component air and missile defense nodes ensures that all available air and missile defense information is fused, limited information collection resources are efficiently used, and JTF decision makers have the best analysis available.

PREPARING FOR AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

4-231. Commanders at all levels ensure their units take the appropriate active and passive defense measures to execute force protection as part of the preparation process. (JP 3-01, figure V-1 shows the various available passive and active air and missile defense measures.) The establishment of an integrated joint air and missile defense command and control system is necessary to integrate all the elements of joint air, space, and missile defense at the JTF and subordinate service and functional command level. (The inclusion of multinational air and missile defense efforts complicates this integration effort greatly due to the need to mesh incompatible information systems together.) Army air and missile defense elements contribute towards a cohesive joint DCA force with the other JTF components that are synchronized and integrated to provide protection of JTF forces and critical assets.

EXECUTION OF AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

4-232. To execute air and missile defense, the CJTF integrates the capabilities of each service or functional components to conduct offensive and DCA operations. The goal of DCA operations, in concert with offensive counterair (OCA) operations, is to provide a secure area from which the JTF can operate. Joint DCA operations employ weapon and sensor systems from all JTF components. How the CJTF commander organizes available forces directly influences the ability of joint forces to meet the threat. Unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are key considerations when executing air and missile defense.

4-233. The CJTF establishes and the AADC implements JTF defended asset list through promulgation of the AADP. The defense criteria are to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy the threat. Since DCA operations employ weapons and sensor systems in the same airspace, these operations are subject to AADC weapons control procedures and measures and integrated with the JFACC plan for the conduct of air operations.

4-234. Army forces within the joint operations area have a large role in the conduct of DCA operations. Army information collection, along with national, combatant command, and JTF ISR assets detect and track the movement of enemy aerial threats, such as missile launch platforms, cue active joint air and missile defense and attack operation forces for engagements, and warn friendly forces of missile launches. Army aviation and fire support units provide the JFACC (supported commander for OCA attack operations) with responsive attack operations capabilities to complement friendly offensive aircraft and cruise missiles. Conventional Army forces do not normally participate in OCA operations. Conventional forces capture or destroy enemy aircraft, missiles, and associated supporting infrastructure when they are encountered on the battlefield. Army Special Forces conducting one or more of their seven primary missions—unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, IO, counter-proliferation, direct action, special reconnaissance, and combating terrorism—conduct activities that impact on the conduct of OCA by the joint force.

4-235. The CJTF provides operational-level capabilities to the JFACC or AADC for counterair missions. The CJTF determines the most appropriate command authority over forces made available in this case. For example, Army attack helicopters, UAS, and other Army aviation systems are under the TACON of the JFACC when conducting DCA missions. Army surface-based active defense forces, such as Army Patriot and short-range air defense units, are provided in direct support.

Active Air Defense

4-236. Active air defense is direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. These actions protect friendly forces and facilities by negating the threat while in flight. Active air defense measures include layered defense-in-depth against air and missile threats through multiple engagement opportunities. Integrated detection, identification, assessment, interception, and engagement systems for air and missile threats are necessary to protect friendly forces and vital interests. This integrated air defense system includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, electronic warfare, and other available weapons. Integration of these weapon systems allows for multiple engagements of an aerial threat, thus providing a defense in depth.

4-237. Active air defense measures include area defense, which uses a combination of weapon systems to defend broad areas; point defense to protect limited areas (normally critical assets or installations); and self- defense, where friendly forces use organic weapons and systems. Active measures also include high-value airborne asset (known as HVAA) protection. High-value airborne asset protection uses fighter aircraft to protect critical airborne platforms, such as the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

Passive Air Defense

4-238. Passive air defense provides individual and collective protection of friendly forces and critical assets. Passive air defense is the responsibility of commanders at all levels of the joint force. Passive defense measures include camouflage, concealment, deception, hardening, reconstruction, CBRN defensive equipment and facilities, redundancy, detection and warning systems, mobility, and dispersal.

Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment

4-239. Early warning of hostile air and missile attacks is vital for a layered defense. DCA operations attempt interception of intruding enemy aircraft and missiles as early as possible. Although DCA operations are reactive in nature, they are conducted as far from the friendly force locations as feasible. To maximize destruction of enemy air and missile threats, the engagement process continues throughout the threat’s approach to, entry into, and departure from friendly force locations to ensure freedom of action for campaigns and major operations and the protection of critical assets.

4-240. The AADC is responsible for providing timely attack warning of aerial or ballistic missile attacks to JTF service or functional component headquarters. General warnings indicate that attacks are imminent or have occurred. Warnings signify that specific units or areas are in danger of attack. (See JP 3-01 and FM 3- 01 for additional information on this topic.)

Process and Allocate Aerospace Targets

4-241. The LCC commander uses the AAMDC or air defense artillery brigade liaison team to help process and allocate LCC air and missile targets for attack within the LCC joint target coordination board. The LCC fires cell matches these targets to friendly systems for attack or exploitation. This action is taken to ensure LCC freedom of action during the conduct of the CJTF’s campaigns or major operation and the protection of critical assets. (See FM 3-01 for additional information.)

Counter Enemy Air and Missile Attack

4-242. Army surface-to-air weapon systems offer high firepower and rapid responsiveness. The AAMDC conducts operations to destroy attacking enemy air and missile systems to defend friendly airspace and protect friendly forces, material and infrastructure. Its operations are conducted near or over friendly territory and generally are a reaction to the initiative of the enemy air forces. (See FM 3-01 and FM 3-01.94.)

INTERDICT ENEMY CAPABILITIES

4-243. Interdiction contributes substantially to joint fires and can have tactical, operational, and even strategic impacts. Interdiction is an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives (JP 3-03). Although interdiction can have tactical effects, it generally applies forward of or beyond units in contact or imminent contact. Its effects must be synchronized in time, space, and purpose with other supporting or supported operations of the joint force.

4-244. Interdiction operations, whether conducted by land, air, naval, or special operating forces, complement overall maneuver to help destroy the enemy’s strategic and operations centers of gravity or critical vulnerabilities. Critical vulnerabilities include associated command and control nodes, information networks, and logistical infrastructure. Interdiction contributes to joint fires with tactical and strategic effects. Interdiction affecting the land battle requires coordination between JTF components. Its effects are also synchronized in time, space, and purpose with other supporting or supported operations of the joint force. Interdiction-capable forces include, but are not limited to, the following elements:

• Fighter or attack aircraft and bombers.

• Ships and submarines.

• Conventional airborne, air assault, or ground maneuver forces.

• Special operating forces.

• Surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions, and mines.

• Artillery and naval surface fire support.

• Attack helicopters.

• Cyber and electromagnetic systems.

• Anti-satellite weapons.

• Space-based satellite systems or sensors.

4-245. While interdiction can destroy enemy forces, its primary contribution is in curtailing the enemy’s freedom of movement and information flow and influencing their tempo through delay or disruption. Interdiction can slow the action of enemy reserves and obstruct the redeployment or movement of forces.

4-246. Synchronizing interdiction and maneuver is critical to the successful execution of the campaign or major operation. Interdiction and maneuver are not considered as separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the CJTF’s campaign objectives. Moreover, interdiction as a maneuver itself can gain positional advantage over an enemy.

4-247. CJTF assignment of an area of operations to the LCC and other service of functional commanders facilitates the coordination of maneuver and interdiction, and ultimately, mission accomplishment. Synchronization of efforts within these boundaries is of particular importance. The LCC commander is the supported commander for joint interdiction operations when they are conducted within the LCC’s area of operations. The LCC commander specifies the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations conducted within that area. Likewise, the LCC commander is required to support interdiction operations conducted in the area of operations of another service or functional component commander, such as an amphibious objective area.

4-248. The preferred method is for the LCC commander to specify desired effects, target priorities, date, and time according to the operational and mission variables. This same construct is also used when assigning an area of operations and establishing boundaries for subordinate units. Theater and other intelligence elements help achieve desired operational-level effects by confirming the locations of enemy activities.

4-249. Interdiction planning and execution requires both air and ground expertise. The CJTF ensures the LCC commander’s assets are used properly by assigning priorities that influence joint air interdiction operations to attack the appropriate target nominations. To integrate interdiction and maneuver, the LCC commander must—

• Define Army air interdiction objectives and priorities and provide them to the JFACC.

• Establish the allocation of CAS between subordinate Army forces.

• Establish the FSCL within the boundaries of the area of operations in coordination with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected ground forces commanders.

• Ensure the fires cell identifies HPTs and consolidated target nominations reflect operational-level priorities.

• Facilitate notification of subordinate unit commanders when the CJTF determines a change in circumstances and priorities.

4-250. There are three types of interdiction operations: air, surface, and special. These operations destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s military potential. They are conducted far enough away from friendly forces that detailed integration of each mission with the firepower and movement of friendly forces is not required. The JFACC is the supported commander for air interdiction operations and uses CJTF priorities to plan and execute the joint operations area-wide interdiction effort. Surface interdiction (land or sea) and special operations (authorized throughout the joint operations area) are conducted as part of the CJTF’s campaign or major operation. (See JP 3-03 for more information on interdiction operations.)

ASSESSING THE RESULTS OF EMPLOYING JOINT FIRES

4-251. An LCC assesses the results of employing joint fires to determine if the overall effectiveness of forces and means employed in the LCC area of operations achieved the desired effects. This assessment, known as combat assessment, also includes the results of major operations and battles conducted by other LCC forces and how the results apply to the CJTF and LCC commander’s operational-level and strategic objectives. Combat assessment is composed of three interrelated components:

• BDA.

• Munitions effectiveness assessment.

• Re-attack recommendation.

4-252. The establishment of an assessment board within the LCC headquarters as an action-officer forum is a techniques that used by the LCC commander to determine the overall effectiveness of forces, fires, and maneuver in obtaining the commander’s objectives. The personality of the LCC commander determines which of a number of possible individuals, such as the J-3, J-5, or chief of fires, to which the chairman of the assessment board works. The chairman of this board reports to the LCC deputy CG or chief of staff. The assessment board answers the following questions:

• Are combat operations (lethal and nonlethal) achieving mission objectives?

• Do objectives require modification?

• How effective was targeting against the enemy’s war-fighting capabilities?

• What changes in combat operations can improve friendly efforts to degrade the enemy’s will and capability to conduct operations?

• Has an enemy target system increased or decreased in importance based on future operations?

• Were there unanticipated operational-level effects?

4-253. The objective of the assessment board is to identify and measure the effectiveness of joint actions and recommend courses of action. Areas of interest determined by the board include—

• Current COP and future (24-, 48-, and 72-hour) projections of friendly and enemy unit dispositions to ensure targeting is tied to current mission effectiveness.

• Spot reports, mission reports, and combat assessment by target objective.

• Recommended targets for re-attack.

• Recommended changes to targeting objectives and guidance.

4-254. Representatives from the following elements make up the assessment board:

• LCC chief of fires (chairs the board).

• Fires cell target management element (hosts the board)

• Fires cell joint fires element.

• LCC MISO, public affairs, and electronic warfare representatives.

• J-2 (operations and plans for intelligence production, combat assessment, and collection management).

• Current operations and future operations representatives.

• J-4 operations.

• J-5.

• J-3 engagements special staff officer to coordinate—

◦ The overall engagement effort for the LCC.

◦ Information-related capabilities.

◦ Liaison with outside organizations.

• J-9 representative.

• AAMDC or air defense artillery brigade supporting the JTF.

• Joint Warfare Analysis Center.

• 1st IO Command (Land).

• LCC engineers.

• Liaison officers from subordinate units.

• JFACC’s JACCE.

Battle Damage Assessment

4-255. BDAs are made timely and accurate to be useful to the commander. BDA complements assessment and target development in three phases: examining outcomes of the targeted elements; estimating functional consequences of target system components; and projecting results of the overall target system and changes in the enemy’s behavior. (See JP 3-60, chapter II for more details.)

Munitions Effectiveness Assessment

4-256. Munitions effectiveness assessment is the corresponding activity to BDA that conducts after-the- fact studies of how capabilities were performed and the method in which they were applied. It complements the estimative analyses of capability assessment by examining the forensic evidence after attacks to determine whether weapons and weapon systems performed as expected.

4-257. The purpose of munitions effectiveness assessment is to compare the actual effectiveness of the means employed to their anticipated effectiveness calculated during the capability assessment phase of the joint targeting process. The results of munitions effectiveness assessment support both near-term improvement in force employment tactics and techniques and long-term improvements in lethal and nonlethal capabilities. Consequently, a critical ingredient for effective munitions effectiveness assessment is detailed familiarity with the calculations that determined the weapon system selection.

4-258. A cell within the AOC—consisting primarily of USAF weaponeering and JACE collection management and imagery staff—is responsible for evaluating the damage done to targets by aircraft and other systems and the effectiveness of munitions used against each target. This cell determines if more effective munitions or attack methodologies are required against particular types of targets after receiving the appropriate data from the intelligence community. The results of this analysis is provided to the LCC fires cell.

Re-attack Assessment

4-259. Future target nominations and re-attack recommendations merge the picture of what was done (such as BDAs) with how it was done (such as a munitions effectiveness assessment) and compares the result with predetermined measures of effectiveness that were developed at the beginning of the joint targeting process. The re-attack recommendation is a combined operations and intelligence function that determines—

• Objectives achievement.

• Targets.

• Aim-point selection.

• Attack timing.

• Tactics.

• Weapon system.

• Munitions selection.

• Recommended follow-up actions.

• Readiness to move on to new tasks in support of CJTF objectives.

SECTION V – OPERATIONAL SUSTAINMENT

4-260. In joint operations, the CJTF, through the JTF’s subordinate service components and DOD combat support agencies (primarily the Defense Logistics Agency), ensures that the execution of joint administrative and logistics services functions are consistent with the overall campaign plan. These joint functions are:

• Personnel management.

• Manpower management.

• Personnel augmentation.

• Joint personnel training and tracking activities.

• Personnel accountability and strength reporting.

• Rotation policies.

• DA Civilians.

• Pay and entitlements.

• Postal operations.

• Morale, welfare, and recreation.

• Casualty operations and casualty reporting.

• Awards and decorations.

• Deployment and distribution.

• Supply

• Maintenance.

• Logistics services.

• Operational contract support.

• Engineering.

• Health services.

The JP 1-0 series addresses joint administrative functions. The JP 4-0 series addresses joint logistics services and health service support functions. The JTF and LCC commanders have some policy formulation responsibilities for these functions. Chapter 5discusses these functions. The execution of these functions is largely a service (ARFOR) responsibility.

4-261. The exercise of directive authority for logistics by a combatant commander includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate sub-unified commands or JTFs, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the execution of approved operations plans, the effectiveness and economy of operation, and the prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping functions among the combatant command’s service component commands. A combatant commander’s limited directive authority for logistics is not intended to—

• Usurp service responsibility for logistics support.

• Discourage coordination by consultation and agreement.

• Disrupt effective procedures, efficient use of facilities, or organization.

COMMON USER LOGISTICS

4-262. The CJTF develops the overarching campaign plan in concert with the higher commander’s guidance and with input from the JTF’s subordinate commands and DOD combat support agencies supporting the JTF. In concert with the CJTF planning effort, the LCC develops the land operations portion of the campaign plan. The LCC commander provides the land operations plan to the CJTF for consideration in developing and coordinating deployment and employment of forces and support of the overall campaign plan. The individual service component commands, however, have overall responsibility for providing administrative and logistics support to their own forces unless otherwise directed. (See JP 4-0 for additional information on common user logistics.)

4-263. JTF service component forces, especially the ARFOR, are often required to provide significant levels of joint operations area-wide common user logistics support to the JTF’s other service components and interorganizational and multinational partners. (These partners include multinational military forces and civil agencies as well as other organizations such as other governmental agencies, and nongovernmental organizations.) Army joint operations area-wide common user logistics support requirements are provided by the TSC, but these requirements are carried out under the auspices of the corps commander’s responsibilities as an ARFOR commander and are not an LCC responsibility. USMC forces provide limited common user logistics support to other JTF service component forces based on the JTF plan.

4-264. In some cases, the LCC commander can direct selected common user logistics support within the LCC area of operations. However, the authority to direct logistics is not resident in the LCC commander’s operational control (OPCON) or TACON. (See JP 1, chapter V for a discussion of these joint command relationships and other command and support authorities.) When required, the LCC commander’s authority to direct the provision of common user logistics derives from one of two sources: combatant commander delegation of land-operation-focused common user logistics authority or through short-term interservice support agreements between the ARFOR and Marine Force.

4-265. With this limited common user logistics authority, the LCC commander can provide common user logistics between JTF service component units. This land operations-focused common user logistics can include temporary task organization or support relationships of selected LCC sustainment units. (Land operations-focused common user logistics support is separate and distinct from joint operations area-wide common user logistics requirements.) The LCC J-4 staff ensures the LCC commander-directed common user logistics requirements do not conflict or interfere with CJTF-directed joint operations area-wide common user logistics requirements. (Chapter 5 of this publication and ADP 4-0, ADRP 4-0, and FM 4-95 contain additional information on this subject.)

LOGISTICS PLANNING

4-266. LCC logistics plans are integrated with CJTF, of JTF service component, and multinational partner logistics plans. LCC J-4 personnel need to involve themselves early in the staff planning and undertake an analysis of the logistics support capabilities of each course of action considered. LCC common user logistics requirements are properly planned and coordinated with overall combatant commander and CJTF-directed common user logistics requirements. LCC J-4 personnel determine location and accessibility of key supply points. The LCC J-4 planners also identify those issues unique to the land operations not already identified by the JTF J-4 reports.

BOARDS AND CENTERS

4-267. The LCC is not routinely the lead for JTF-level logistics boards and centers. The LCC J-4 participates in selected JTF standing and on-call meetings of critical importance to the successful execution of LCC operations. The joint transportation board and the joint movement center are transportation-related boards and centers that can have significant impact on LCC operations and are examples of higher-level JTF joint logistics boards that require LCC representation. The joint material priorities and allocation board and the joint petroleum office are also of significant importance to the LCC. To ensure proper focus, LCC participation in these boards is treated as separate and distinct from the corps participation in these same boards and centers as the ARFOR service component participation in these same boards and centers.

4-268. The LCC does not convene separate joint logistics boards and centers except when needed to coordinate critical common user logistics support within the LCC area of operations. Possible LCC- established boards and centers include a movement center and materials priorities allocation board. The movement center facilitates coordination and prioritization of movement within the LCC’s area of operations. The movement center is subordinate to the JTF joint movement center and ensures LCC movement requirements do not conflict with CJTF-directed movements. The LCC-level joint movement center is built on the lead Service movement control agency and includes staff members from the other Services. An LCC materials priorities allocation board performs similar functions for critical supply items. (The LCC commander can combine these two centers and boards into one distribution management center that can perform both transportation and supply management functions.) The LCC commander ensures that the LCC has the capability to adequately control movement and cross-level critical logistics resources when necessary for execution of land operations.

FUNCTIONS OF THE J-1 AND J-4

4-269. The LCC J-1 and J-4 provide critical functional expertise to the commander in the areas of personnel and logistics. These primary staff officers focus on key personnel and logistics issues that have an adverse effect on the land portion of the joint campaign. Generally, they manage by exception only. Routine administrative or personnel and logistics management is the responsibility of the CJTF and the JTF’s subordinate service component commands. (See JP 3-31 for more information on LCC J-1 and J-4 organization and responsibilities.)

SECTION VI – OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

4-270. In the context of LCC operations, operational command and control involves the LCC commander providing operational guidance, direction, and vision to the LCC’s assigned forces. The LCC commander has significant responsibility for operational command and control in that the LCC commander is the single focal point to integrate and synchronize land force operations for the CJTF. Upon approval of the land force plan, the LCC commander exercises specified authority and direction over the land forces in the accomplishment of land force missions. LCC commander responsibility is to control land operations to ensure they accomplish the CJTF’s campaign and major operations objectives.

Note. This chapter uses joint terminology when discussing the corps conducting LCC operations at the operational level of war. Therefore, the joint term command and control is used in the discussion rather than the Army term mission command. This does not apply when referring to specific systems.

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL OVERVIEW

4-271. A corps commander, when designated as a LCC commander, uses the corps’ Army mission command system—personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment—to conduct the LCC operations process. The operations process is the major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operations (ADP 5-0). The staff collects, processes, displays, stores, and shares relevant information to build an operational picture tailored to supports the commander’s requirements. The discussion of operational command and control in paragraphs 3-139 to 3-142 also applies to LCC operations with appropriate modifications.

4-272. The LCC commander avoids taking issue with other service or functional component commanders to the CJTF. The CJTF expects subordinates to provide solutions, not problems. Usually, the JTF J-3 can be the honest broker when legitimate differences exist between JTF component commanders.

4-273. The LCC commander gives the commander’s best military judgment without involving LCC staff, possibly involving only selected members of the staff, when dealing with CJTF questions and timelines that do not allow full LCC staff involvement. This type of decisionmaking is acceptable. However, the LCC commander informs the entire staff on the decisions made by the CJTF. Continued staff awareness and integration of those decisions is necessary for continuity in LCC staff planning.

4-274. The LCC commander has, not only the authority, but also the responsibility to pick the best people for their staffs. The commander seeks to put the right people in the right places, balancing their strengths and weaknesses. The LCC commander molds the LCC staff to develop concise, unbiased information and build networks across organizational lines. The LCC commander makes several wide-ranged, interrelated decisions; therefore, the LCC headquarters needs imaginative staff members who know the environment, can foresee consequences, and identify crucial information accordingly.

4-275. The LCC commander seeks to build and train a staff. The members of this staff can compensate for identified weaknesses of individuals, reinforce the commander’s vision, and ensure institutional success with their understanding of the operational environment and the commander’s vision for the future. The commander is the principal decision maker within the operational headquarters, and the relationship with the LCC staff is one of loyalty, trust, and respect. It must encourage exercising initiative within the scope of the commander’s intent. However, loyalty and respect must not detract from stating hard truths in staff assessments. Before the commander makes a decision, LCC staff members give honest, independent thoughts and recommendations to the commander so that the commander can confirm or restructure their visualization. The commander encourages the staff to participate in a dialogue with the commander, discussing alternative point of view, and exploring all facts, assumptions, and implications. Such dialogue assists the LCC commander in fully assessing all aspects of an issue and helps clarify the commander’s intent and guidance. After an operation begins, staff members provide an accurate COP and separate running estimates (including recommendations), if necessary. Staff members base recommendations on solid analysis and present them to the LCC commander, even if the analysis conflicts with the commander’s decision. Independent thought and timely actions by the staff are vital.

4-276. The conduct of operational command and control by the LCC commander is different from the conduct of mission command at the tactical level. It is far more art than science. The LCC commander constantly thinks about the impacts of the LCC’s operations on the back end of the CJTF’s campaign. LCC operations are conducted with the need to understand the CJTF’s intent. Communicating clarity of purpose is more important at the LCC level than at the brigade or battalion level because of the time lag in perceiving destructive variances and instituting corrective actions. The LCC commander deliberately considers how to provide guidance to subordinates and how they will respond to that guidance. The LCC commander is responsive in providing guidance to the staff and keep options open. Personal relationships between the LCC commander and staffs are more important at this level than at the tactical level.

4-277. The LCC staff require the following skills and attributes:

• Quick personal grasp of organizational and system capabilities.

• Prompt, clear, and decisive articulation of requirements and concepts.

• Sense of personal involvement. Who else needs to see this?

• Sense of teamwork and evidence of cooperation.

• Trust, confidence, and desire for mutual support.

• Understanding the needs of others and a willingness to respond to those needs.

• Consistent high performance.

• Loyalty and commitment to the unit, commander, and mission.

4-278. Operational command and OPCON consists of the following tasks:

• Integrate information.

• Assess operational situation.

• Prepare plans and orders.

• Command subordinate forces.

• Form LCC headquarters (discussed in Section I of this chapter).

• Coordinate IO.

• Integrate joint, interorganizational and multinational partner support.

• Conduct public affairs.

These tasks were largely addressed in chapter 3. These tasks also apply to the LCC and the discussion of those tasks in paragraphs 3-143 to 3-294 in that chapter applies to LCC operations with appropriate modification. The text below adds a few additional considerations relating to these tasks as they apply to the LCC instead of a JTF.

INTEGRATE INFORMATION

4-279. The LCC is only able to integrate information because of the core competencies of the Signal Corps. These core competencies are network operations, network transport and information services, spectrum management operations, and visual IO. The Signal Corps core competencies and the essential capability of communications security enable the LCC to conduct operational and warfighting functions. This occurs through the transport, security, storage, display, IM, integration, and maintenance of the network. FM 6-02 provides the doctrine for each of these Signal Corps core competencies and also describes the different responsibilities for signal organizations from the BCT to the Army chief information officer. The Plans, Policies, and Procedures Team within the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command provides guidance on communications security operations.

PREPARE PLANS AND ORDERS

4-280. Planning includes tailoring and task organizing LCC ground forces, considering the capabilities and limitations of joint, interorganizational and multinational partners, and cross-leveling or balancing of land service component, joint, and national assets. LCC plans address missions and tasks assigned to major subordinate commands, to include supporting commands and agencies. It specifies supporting and supported relationships. These plans and orders are used by the LCC and communicated to higher, lower, supported, and supporting headquarters. LCC plans and orders involve synchronizing joint operational capabilities while simultaneously minimizing the risk to the force.

4-281. LCC plans balance competing demands and are constantly updated in coordination with the JTF’s other components. Each plan retains options throughout the operation to include finding the right balance between controls versus effects. Plans try to synchronize the synergy of different effects in the same areas. They ensure constant pressure on the enemy and not just by ground maneuver forces. They focus on the enemy operational center of gravity. The LCC reserve remains postured to exploit operational success. The plan devotes effort to the other four phases of a joint notional operations plan—shape, deter, seize initiative, stabilize, and enable civil authority—as it does to the dominate phase.

4-282. The sustainment plans of the various service and national components of the LCC need to support the depth and tempo of the LCC’s operations. The concept of sustainment in plans addresses a general description of sustainment tasks. This concept of sustainment synchronizes with the LCC's concept of operations to include the schemes of movement and maneuver, mobility and countermobility, battlefield obscuration, information collection, intelligence, fires, and protection. It also supports the conduct of LCC cyber electromagnetic activities and stability tasks. The concept recognizes that the schemes can change and are not to focus on one course of action. It designates the critical tasks to perform and who performs these tasks. Workarounds are possible. The organization structure conducting sustainment are simple and clear in stating who performs the support task and where the task is performed. The support plan is also rehearsed.

4-283. Time allocated to planning LCC operations cannot detract from the force generating or maintaining the tempo the commander desires. All planning requires the skillful use of available time to optimize planning and preparation throughout the unit whether that planning was done deliberately or rapidly. Deliberate planning involves a detailed, systematic analysis and evaluation of all factors affecting an anticipated operation. It provides insight into what can occur and takes the time needed to produce an optimal course of action. Deliberate planning anticipates future conditions and expects possible execution later. Rapid planning occurs under time-constrained conditions. It considers only critical aspects of the situation. Hasty planning reaches an acceptable course of action quickly. Staffs are usually responding to existing conditions when a quick plan is needed for immediate or near-term execution. Both deliberate and rapid planning follow the one-third, two-thirds rule as a guide to allocate available time.

4-284. The LCC commander develops plans for major operations that support the CJTF campaign plan. The LCC commander chooses to accept or decline battle, decides how to use tactical successes and failures, and advises the CJTF on the long-term needs and prospects of the operation’s land aspect. Since campaign plans set a series of long-term objectives, they often require phases. They provide a general concept of operations for the entire campaign and an operation order for the campaign’s initial phase. Planning for major operations mirrors planning for the overall JTF campaign but is reduced in scope. Even if a major operation is not the campaign’s initial phase, planning for a branch or a sequel begins before actual execution.

4-285. The LCC’s operational- and tactical-level planning complement each other but have different aims. LCC planning prepares the way for subordinate tactical actions on favorable terms. The LCC continually seeks to foster and exploit subordinate tactical successes. Major operations depend on creatively using the tactical actions of subordinates to accomplish operational or strategic purposes against adaptive opponents. Tactical-level planning emphasizes flexibility and options. Planning horizons for tactical actions are relatively short. Comprehensive planning is feasible only for the first engagement or phase of a battle; succeeding actions depend on enemy responses and circumstances.

4-286. A LCC commander and staff formed around a corps headquarters use the MDMP, an analytical technique to the planning process. (See ADRP 5-0.) However, the commander alters the MDMP to fit time- constrained circumstances and produce a satisfactory plan. In time-constrained conditions, commanders assess the situation, update their visualization, and direct their staffs to perform those MDMP activities needed to support the required decisions. Streamlined processes permit the LCC commander and staff to shorten the time needed to issue orders when the situation changes. In time-constrained environments, many MDMP steps are conducted concurrently. To an outsider, it may appear that experienced commanders and staffs omit key steps. In reality, they use existing products or perform steps mentally instead of physically. They also use many shorthand procedures and implicit communication. The use of fragmentary and warning orders is essential in this environment.

COMMAND SUBORDINATE FORCES

4-287. The art of command is the creative and skillful exercise of authority through timely decisionmaking and leadership (ADP 6-0). Art, as opposed to science, requires expert performance of a specific skill using intuitive faculties that cannot be solely learned by study or education. The true measure of the art of command is not whether a commander uses certain techniques or procedures, but if the techniques and procedures used were appropriate to the situation. Expert performance in the art of command leads to mission accomplishment with fewest friendly casualties. Proficiency in the art of command stems from years of schooling and training, self-development, and operational and training experiences. The discussion of mission command in FM 6-0 applies to the conduct of LCC operations.

4-288. The LCC commander’s physical presence trumps e-mail and voice communications when it comes to commanding subordinate forces. However, there are situations when verbal, face-to-face, video teleconferences, and e-mail are appropriate. An important part of the art of command is arriving at the right place at the right time. The LCC commander fights for the time to conduct battlefield circulation over extended distances. Battlefield circulation is important. The commander’s battlefield circulation includes visiting joint, interorganizational and multinational partners and staff elements. The LCC commander leads by how and to what is listened. This helps to create and build trust and confidence within the command. The commander avoids dog and pony shows as much as possible, seeks to obtain true situational understanding, and knows that their actions are always being observed.

4-289. During these visits the LCC commander has an assistant acting as a scribe, taking notes on information received or on guidance and any taskings issued. This assistant allows the commander to review and revise these notes, if necessary, before issuing official guidance or requests. The commander leads by what is heard and how it is said. This assistant can also act as the commander’s counterpart, as needed, to attend meetings that the commander cannot, such as when two important meetings taking place simultaneously.

4-290. The LCC commander and headquarters receive representatives from other organizations. These representatives are military staffers from higher echelons, DOD civilian leaders, or politicians. These individuals are treated appropriate to their rank and position. The LCC staff determines the purpose of their visit to the headquarters if possible before their arrival. The LCC commander wants to make them supporters of the LCC mission, LCC ambassadors, and agents within their parent organizations, if possible. It is important to tailor briefings that these individuals receive. These briefings should provide these individuals with the information they are seeking, and are pitched at the level of experience and knowledge level of the representatives. The LCC commander and staff answer their questions when seeking support for their own agendas.

4-291. The LCC commander makes the hard calls early. This includes—

• Relieving subordinate commanders and staff officers if they are not suitable for the situation.

• Making the LCC’s plans your own; and not your predecessor’s plans (especially important in long-standing revolving missions).

• Recognizing the need for additional resources—there is never enough (for example, artillery support, bandwidth, supplies).

4-292. A key part of LCC command is the establishment of the battle rhythm of the LCC headquarters. The chief of staff establishes the battle rhythm for the headquarters in support of the commander. The LCC knowledge management officer normally manages the battle rhythm for the chief of staff. However, the LCC battle rhythm should meet the needs of the CJTF and joint, interorganizational and multinational partner leadership. Shift changes in the battle rhythm are staggered to prevent losing institutional knowledge of ongoing events.

APPROVE PLANS AND ORDERS

4-293. If possible, the LCC commander and staff brief the orders to subordinate commanders face to face. In turn, subordinate commanders conduct confirmation briefings to the LCC commander and staff. Several subordinate commanders can collaboratively conduct their confirmation briefings at the same time. These briefings are sometimes performed using video teleconferencing facilities. (FM 6-0 provides doctrine on the conduct of a confirmation briefing.)

ISSUE PLANS AND ORDERS

4-294. The LCC staff transmits LCC commander-approved plans and order to subordinate, supporting, and attached units for execution, and to adjacent and higher units for coordination in accordance with the headquarters’ SOP. Plans and orders are distributed internally in the LCC to all major subordinate Army commands, and to USMC and multinational units as appropriate. They are distributed externally to the combatant commander or CJTF and other Service or functional component commands for information. If they describe a branch or sequel to the current plan, they are distributed externally to the combatant commander or CJTF for approval and to the Service and functional component commands and land force subordinate commands for information. They are distributed to supporting DOD and Army agencies. Once approved, the CJTF can provide additional instructions to the land force.

COORDINATE INFORMATION OPERATIONS

4-295. IO is about affecting adversary or potential adversary decisionmaking and protecting our own. Commanders do not make decisions in a vacuum. They employ information systems, processes, content, and protocols, as well as formal and informal advisors to assist them make their decisions. In order to affect and protect simultaneously, commanders must achieve decisive advantage in the information environment. To achieve decisive advantage, they employ information-related capabilities, in synchronized fashion, to achieve effects in the IE and shape it to their advantage.

4-296. FM 3-13 states that information-related capabilities typically include, but are not limited to, public affairs operations, MISO, combat camera, Soldier and leader engagement, civil affairs operations, civil and cultural considerations, operations security, and military deception. Other capabilities the commander can allocate to IO include the components of cyber electromagnetic activities, special technical operations, presence, posture and profile, physical attack, and physical security. (See JP 3-13 and FM 3-13 for additional information on the conduct of IO as information-related capabilities.)

SECTION VII – OPERATIONAL PROTECTION

4-297. The joint protection tasks and their associated joint doctrinal publications were discussed in chapter 3. Protection is a continuing LCC activity. The LCC commander is responsible for integrating protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces. Air and missile defense staff officers from the LCC fires cell participate in the LCC protection working group to ensure maintenance of the LCC critical asset list and the defended asset list and associated resourcing of fixed sites and forces against air and indirect fire threats. The composition of protection warfighting function tasks is slightly different from the composition of the joint protection function task. The warfighting function includes the following tasks along with their associated Army doctrinal publication:

• Conduct operational area security (ADRP 3-37). (Also see the discussion in Section II of this chapter addressing the control of operationally significant areas.)

• Employ safety techniques (including fratricide avoidance) (ATP 5-19).

• Implement operations security (FM 3-13).

• Implement physical security procedures (ATP 3-39.32).

• Provide intelligence support to protection (FM 2-0).

• Implement information protection (FM 3-13).

• Apply antiterrorism measures (ATP 3-37.2).

• Conduct police operations (FM 3-39).

• Conduct survivability operations (FM 3-05.70 and ATP 3-37.34).

• Provide force health protection (FM 4-02 and ATP 4-02.8).

• Conduct CBRN operations (FM 3-11 and related publications).

• Provide EOD and protection support (FM 4-30).

• Coordinate air and missile defense (FM 3-01).

• Conduct personnel recovery operations (FM 3-50).

• Conduct detention (FM 3-39).

• Conduct dislocated civilian operations (ATP 3-39.30).

4-298. Almost all joint protection and Army warfighting protection tasks have one or more associated doctrinal publication. JP 3-10 addresses operations in the joint security area where the majority of LCC sustainment operations take place. The one protection task not addressed doctrinally is fratricide prevention.

4-299. The LCC commander establishes positive identification measures early in the planning cycle. These measures are particularly important in peace operations and other operations not focused on the conduct of offensive tasks in uncertain or hostile environments. These measures are made consistent with the rules of engagement and do not interfere unduly with subordinate unit and individual rights and responsibilities to engage hostile forces. Positive identification among multinational forces is important because of potential negative impacts on multinational unity and trust among member forces.

4-300. The commander assesses fratricide risks during course of action analysis. (See ADRP 5-0.) The commander exercises risk management to minimize the fratricide potential through a combination of tactics, techniques, and procedures and available technology. Examples of risk management are placing multinational forces using similar equipment adjacent to one another, using restrictive fire support coordinating measures, establishing contact points along multinational force boundaries, and establishing liaison in multinational command posts to expedite the clearance of fires. Normally, electronic methods provide the most rapid and reliable means of identification and should be used if available. (ATP 5-19 provides details associated with risk management.)

4-301. Paragraph 3k(7) of the operations order contains specific fratricide avoidance measures, which also has LCC guidance on combat identification means and methods provided to the force and the basis for combat identification within the LCC area of operations. Supporting and subordinate unit orders, or plans, and SOPs provide the additional detail needed to ensure implementation of a robust combat identification program. Tactical level combat identification tactics, techniques, and procedures have utility at the operational level.

Chapter 5

The Corps Headquarters as an ARFOR Headquarters

This chapter discusses the functions of the ARFOR. Senior Army leaders, using an operational level perspective, task-organize the Army to maximize its capabilities in a supported joint force commander’s joint operations area. The organization of the ARFOR provides the means to facilitate joint operations.

INTRODUCTION TO ARFOR

5-1. FM 3-94, chapter 1, explains how echelons above brigade exercise operational control (OPCON) and administrative control (ADCON) over subordinate forces. Army doctrine distinguishes between the Army component of a combatant command—the Army Service component command (ASCC)—and that of a subordinate joint force formed by the combatant commander—the ARFOR.

5-2. When a combatant commander detaches Army forces from the ASCC and attaches them to a joint task force (JTF), the ARFOR in the JTF exercises OPCON over Army forces attached to the JTF until the commander, joint task force (CJTF) otherwise directs. The CJTF specifies command relationships (OPCON or tactical control [TACON]) or support relationships—general, mutual, direct, or close support—between the JTF’s attached forces. (See JP 1 for a discussion of these command and support relationships.) The ARFOR commander is responsible for all aspects of planning and executing operations as tasked by the CJTF. In addition to controlling Army forces, the ARFOR coordinates Army support to other services (known as ASOS). Army support to other services includes provision of common-user logistics and executive agent support to the JTF as required by the JTF establishing authority. (See FM 3-94, chapter 1 for additional information on Army support to other services.)

5-3. Acting as an ARFOR is one of the four doctrinal roles assigned to a corps headquarters. The ARFOR is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command (FM 3- 94). The ARFOR provides administrative and logistics support to all Army forces assigned to these organizations. It retains OPCON over Army units not subordinate to another component of the JTF, such as a joint special operations command or task force.

5-4. When the corps is an ARFOR, the ARFOR consists of the corps commander, the corps headquarters, and all Army forces attached to a JTF. The corps commander is the ARFOR commander because this individual is the assigned senior Army officer who is not in a joint duty assignment, such as the CJTF or the JTF staff.

5-5. As discussed in chapter 1, a corps headquarters cannot simultaneously provide the nucleus of a JTF headquarters and act as an ARFOR headquarters. The exception is for crisis response and contingency operations of limited scope and duration where ARFOR requirements are relatively small.

5-6. Likewise, discussed in chapter 1, a corps headquarters can simultaneously provide the nucleus of a land component command (LCC) headquarters and function as the ARFOR headquarters. The corps commander retains ARFOR responsibilities through the ASCC, back to the DA, which can overload a corps headquarters dually designated as an LCC headquarters with associated operational responsibilities, unless the commander delegates authority for Army service-specific matters—usually ADCON to another commander as the deputy ARFOR commander. The workload associated with acting as an ARFOR is significant and not normally replicated during training exercises. The subordinate commander designated depends on the currently existing operational and mission variables. The corps commander will designate a deputy ARFOR commander. This can be either the corps deputy commander, a subordinate division commander, or another available general officer. (See JP 1, JP 3-31, and JP 3-33.)

5-7. The ASCC commander specifies the ADCON responsibilities of the ARFOR, with the ASCC retaining control of reception, staging, and onward movement; logistics support of the deployed force; personnel support; and medical support. Administrative responsibilities retained by the ARFOR include internal administration and discipline, training within the joint operations area, and Service-specific reporting. The ASCC retains OPCON of Army sustainment and medical commands operating in the joint operations area. The ASCC commander establishes an Army support relationship between the ARFOR and these units. (See FM 3-94, chapter 2 for further details.)

Note. Attachment has different purposes in joint and Army doctrine. The combatant commander attaches forces to a JTF in order to transfer OPCON. The Army attaches forces to transfer both OPCON and ADCON. Therefore, when the combatant commander attaches an Army unit to a JTF, it is automatically attached to the ARFOR unless the CJTF specifies otherwise. The ARFOR then exercises OPCON and ADCON over the Army unit. The exercise of OPCON is a delegation of joint command authority and not a function of ADCON.

CORPS FUNCTIONS AS THE ARFOR

5-8. A corps, acting as an ARFOR, organizes the assigned force to accomplish three operational-level tasks in support of the CJTF:

• Establish linkages among joint, interagency, and multinational linkages.

• Conduct sustainment operations.

• Conduct operations in support of the joint campaign, when designated as an operational commander.

While subordinate Army commanders can perform all or part of these three tasks within the joint operations area, they remain the responsibility of the ARFOR commander.

5-9. This relationship relieves the corps headquarters (as ARFOR within the joint operations area) of responsibility for directly exercising ADCON and sustaining tasks for Army forces and providing Army support to other services, common user logistics, and Army executive agent responsibilities. The sustainment concept splits the responsibilities between the ARFOR in the joint operations area or the joint force command (division or corps) and the ASCC. The ASCC provides sustainment to Army forces stationed in, transiting through, or operating within the supported combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR). It also provides most Army support to other services, common-user logistics, and Army executive agent support to joint, interorganizational and multinational partners located within the same area. The ASCC executes these sustainment responsibilities through its assigned theater sustainment command (TSC) with ESCs and tailored sustainment brigades provided from the Army pool of Service-retained rotational forces. The ASCC provides medical services to support the force through its assigned medical command (deployment support) and forward deployed medical brigades. (See FM 4-02.)

ESTABLISH JOINT, INTERAGENCY, AND MULTINATIONAL LINKAGES

5-10. The first task of the ARFOR commander in a joint operations area is to establish linkages to joint, interagency, and multinational organizations operating within that area. The ARFOR commander takes advantage of existing links with joint, interagency, and multinational partners established by the ASCC commander.

5-11. The ARFOR commander’s guidance includes subordinate commander’s missions and tasks expected to contribute to the joint force commander’s plan. The guidance includes the assignment of forces and sequencing of subordinate’s assigned missions and tasks. The guidance also includes any delegated authority, other information pertinent to the situation, and any changes that modify subordinate missions and tasks.

5-12. The ARFOR commander advises the joint force commander on the employment of Army organizations and their capabilities. The ARFOR commander ensures that subordinate commanders and staffs are trained, agile, and versatile to meet this requirement. The joint force commander looks to the ARFOR commander for the nomination and selection of Army-apportioned or assigned units for assignment to subordinate joint commands.

5-13. The Army conducts liaison with joint, interagency, and multinational organizations located within the joint operations area. This liaison can also include organizations located outside the joint operations area that have the capability to influence activities within the ARFOR’s area of operations, which includes establishing lateral liaison with other services, as well as higher and lower liaison with the appropriate joint or multinational force staff and any subordinate joint or multinational organizations as required. The ARFOR commander needs to understand the capabilities that the other organizations can provide and any support they require from the ARFOR to enable their operations. This understanding enhances the opportunity for synergy within the force.

5-14. Similar to the exchange of liaison teams, is the requirement for the ARFOR to augment a joint force staff or receive augmentation from joint forces when the Army forms the core of a joint staff headquarters. The ARFOR interfaces with joint command and control systems. These systems require specific hardware that are unique to the joint force headquarters and require special Army efforts for effective joint coordination.

5-15. Army intelligence elements closely coordinate with joint, interagency, and multinational organizations to establish the mutual supporting intelligence structure required to support the joint force commander’s operations. The intelligence structure assigns collection capabilities consistent with available assets, conduct timely all-source analysis, and provide rapid dissemination of available intelligence information.

CONDUCT SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS

5-16. The second task of the ARFOR commander is to execute Title 10 responsibility by supporting operations. The preponderance of operational considerations are logistical but can include significant engineer efforts, depending on existing infrastructure. In the force-projection mode, decisions made early are highly significant as the time for combat operations approaches. Decisions such as the sequencing of arriving forces and equipment are often not reversible.

5-17. A corps headquarters, serving as the ARFOR for a JTF, includes the headquarters controlling multiple subordinate tactical formations and the Army forces placed under a joint or multinational headquarters. The Army commander is responsible to the CJTF for these operational requirements. However, the CJTF is not responsible for Service-specific matters involving administration and support of Army forces. The Army forces commander answers to the Secretary of the Army through the ASCC for Service-specific matters, whether it is a theater army or functional command (for example, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command of the U.S. Transportation Command). A theater army provides ADCON or Title 10 authorities and responsibilities for all Army units in the JTF, including those not under OPCON of the headquarters. In certain circumstances, such as geographic separation between the ADCON headquarters and the intermediate tactical headquarters, the ASCC commander can delegate authority to execute specified administrative tasks to Army component commanders under OPCON of different CJTFs operating in joint operations areas within the supported combatant commander’s AOR.

5-18. Under the authority of the Secretary of Defense and Title 10, U.S. Code, the Army is designated as the executive agent by the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense for foundational activities that are not necessarily landpower equities, but functions necessary to the entire joint force. These functions include, but are not limited to—

• DOD Detainee Operations Policy.

• Armed Services Blood Program Office.

• Chemical and Biological Defense Program.

• Chemical Demilitarization.

• DOD Combat Feeding research and Engineering Program.

• Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center.

• DOD Level III Corrections.

• Explosives Safety Management.

5-19. The ARFOR, within a joint operations area, exercises OPCON over all Army maneuver, fires, and maneuver support forces (such as military police [MP], air and missile defense, engineer, and civil affairs), except for Army forces providing sustainment (including medical support). The ARFOR in a joint operations area identifies requirements, establishes priorities of support for Army forces, and coordinates with the theater army for providing sustainment. The ASCC can itself function as an ARFOR, unless the combatant commander exercises command and control through the subordinate joint force commander. In this case, each of these subordinate commanders potentially has subordinate Army forces, while the ASCC exercises ADCON of all Army forces across the AOR. The ASCC provides Army support to other services, common- user logistics, assignment eligibility and availability, and sustainment to interagency elements and Army, joint, and multinational forces in a joint operations area.

5-20. Answering the question of what is needed first—construction engineers or infantrymen, tanks or trucks—can establish success or failure. The commander and staff analyze these questions, taking care to not eliminate options before the need for a decision is clear.

5-21. Analyses require a full assessment of the operational and mission variables and an understanding of where and how risks are taken. Army commanders retain responsibilities to support Army units through the service chain of command, regardless of the joint and multinational arrangements. The ground transportation system, common classes of supply, and construction of the infrastructure are examples of the Army’s contribution to the overall theater effort.

5-22. Each joint or multinational organization with Army forces has an ARFOR commander who ensures Army support requirements are met. These support requirements, which include logistics, personnel services, and health services, are Service-specific and flow through the service chain of command. Support functions at the operational level are addressed in ADP 4-0, ADRP 4-0, and ATP 4-94. Chapter 7 also discusses the conduct of sustainment operations.

CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF JOINT CAMPAIGN

5-23. The third task of the ASCC in theater is to conduct operations in support of the joint campaign. When designated by the combatant commander as an operational commander, the ARFOR commander in this role serves in the chain of command, planning and executing major operations that support the joint campaign. The ARFOR commander designates, sustains, and shifts priorities of subordinate ground forces to support the joint or multinational plan. The commander’s understanding of operational art is essential to the performance of this role. (See ADRP 3-0.)

Chapter 6

The Corps as a Tactical Headquarters

This chapter addresses factors with regard to the corps echelon conduct of decisive action when the corps headquarters is the senior tactical echelon. Often, the corps is the highest echelon that commands and controls Army, joint, and multinational forces in offense or defense against an enemy or in a situation requiring stability or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) operations. Meeting these challenges requires a corps headquarters to assign missions to its subordinate formations, extend its operational reach, synchronize actions, and apply the elements of combat power. Other publications containing applicable information are ADRP 3-90, FM 3-90-1, FM 3-90- 2, and ATP 3-91.

SECTION I – PLANNING

6-1. Missions assigned to the corps should be of such a nature as to permit the corps commander wide latitude in accomplishment. When operations have a strategic impact and are a projection of national policy or objectives, the corps commander can receive a mission that leaves little latitude for interpretation and execution.

6-2. The corps receives its current mission and tactical direction in an unspecified form, such as a letter of instructions, operations plan, or some other format. The basis for long-range planning by the corps is the geographic combatant or joint force commander’s campaign plan. The letter of instructions or operations plan provides some measure of detail and tactical direction necessary for the corps to execute the first phase, and prepare to execute succeeding phases of a single tactical action of the theater campaign plan. The corps commander translates the strategic objective of the tactical action into tactical objectives and phases for accomplishment.

6-3. The assignment of tactical missions and areas of operations to subordinates, along with the task organization of the corps available resources to subordinate divisions, is one of the primary means by which the commander enables the operations of those subordinate divisions across the conflict continuum. Normally the first phase of the corps operation is passed to the divisions for execution, and succeeding phases for planning. Divisions plan and execute the tasks specified and implied in the corps first phase. The corps concurrently prepares its long-range plans in support of the phase or phases of the joint campaign.

COMMAND AND STAFF ACTIONS

6-4. The corps commander and staff analyze the mission to identify the tasks, both specified and implied, essential to the successful accomplishment of the overall mission. On completion of this analysis, the corps commander provides the staff with initial planning guidance. The corps commander’s planning guidance varies with the mission, the volume and validity of information available, the situation, the experience level of the corps staff, and the capabilities and limitations of the corps as a whole. At a minimum, the commander’s initial guidance should include the commander’s restated mission. The commander’s guidance also includes course of action considerations, the reserve, sustainment, essential elements of information, military information support operations (MISO), military deception, cyber electromagnetic activities, and other matters the commander wishes the staff to consider during their estimates. The staff then prepares their running estimate, which serve as a basis for their recommendations to the commander. After considering the staff recommendations, the commanding general (CG) completes the commander’s own estimate of the situation, makes decisions, and provides the staff with an overall concept of the operation. The corps commander’s decision and concept of the operation provide the basis for the development of the corps operations plan or order.

6-5. During the development and execution of operations plans and orders, the commander and staff are cognizant of the requirement for operations security. Operations security involves those measures necessary to deny the enemy information concerning planned, current, and completed operations.

6-6. The corps commander’s mission and concept of operation serve as the basis for the assignment of tasks to divisions and other subordinate commands. Tasks assigned to the divisions are normally more specific than the mission assigned to the corps and can require the divisions to secure specific terrain, destroy specific enemy forces, or both.

6-7. Once execution of the plan begins and corps units are committed, radical changes in the scheme of maneuver are avoided. However, the plan or order allows for sufficient flexibility to allow the commander to take advantage of the situations that arise during execution. Changes in fire support priorities are normally made with little difficulty, but major changes affecting the planned movement of corps maneuver forces and their sustainment assets require adequate consideration of time and space factors.

PHASING A CORPS OPERATION

6-8. A phase is a distinct period or subdivision of an operation at the conclusion of which the nature and characteristics of the action usually change and another action is initiated. A corps phases its operation because of the scope, duration, and complexity of the corps mission. Phasing is also necessary when the corps commander is unable to visualize the details of an operation through to completion. Phasing aids the corps commander and subordinate commanders by segmenting an operation into manageable parts, which facilitates planning and execution, and exercises the principle of simplicity.

6-9. A corps phases its operation when—

• The form of maneuver or nature of the operation changes.

• A major regrouping of forces occurs.

• The commander is unable to visualize the details of the operation through to its completion.

The friendly and enemy situations, terrain, sustainment capabilities, time, and distance are factors that influence phasing.

COORDINATION AND CONTROL

6-10. Effective and efficient application of combat power requires full coordination of effort to ensure maximum advantage is derived from forces available. The corps prescribes only the necessary coordination and control measures to ensure unity of effort. These measures include, as appropriate—

• Areas of operation.

• Boundaries.

• Objectives.

• Limit of advance.

• Phase lines.

• Lines of departure.

• Time or times of attack.

• Axis of advance.

• Link-up and contact points.

6-11. Fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) are important to the coordination and control of corps operations. The fire support coordination line (FSCL) is routinely established beyond the farthest point to which the corps intends to employ forces on the ground, permitting supporting fires not under the control of the corps commander to attack targets beyond the FSCL without danger to or coordination with the corps. These attacks, however, must be coordinated with affected commanders. Supporting forces outside the corps’ battle rhythm must coordinate with the corps before engaging targets short of the FSCL. JP 3-09 contains additional details on the establishment of the FSCL and other FSCM.

SCOPE OF THE CORPS OPERATIONS PLAN OR ORDER

6-12. The corps operations plan or order provides the concept of operation after establishing the corps task organization, situation, and mission. The concept of operation portion of the execution paragraph clarifies the purpose of the operation (desired end state), develops the phasing of the operation, and establishes the commander’s desired operational framework. The corps operations plan or order expands on the concept of operations in paragraph 3 and describes the corps scheme of movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, protection, cyber electromagnetic activities, stability tasks, assessment, and tasks to subordinate units. It identifies the corps decisive operation or main effort, describes the combat formation used by the corps, and identifies the corps reserve. Paragraph 3 also contains necessary coordinating instructions. Paragraphs 4 and 5 contain the corps concept of sustainment and any specific command and signal items not part of the corps standard operating procedures (SOPs).

6-13. The corps operations plan or order contains the details of execution for the first phase of the operation (if the operation is phased) and outlines instructions for succeeding phases. Additional plans are developed and published as required to execute succeeding phases. The corps commander issues the detailed operations plan for the next phase as required. Fragmentary orders are issued to initiate the next phase of the operation if only minor changes to the current operations order are required. (See FM 6-0 for a discussion of the format for an operations plan or order.)

6-14. The corps operations plan or order addresses ways to extend the operational reach of the corps and the depth of the corps’ area of influence. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose, including deep-close-security operations, to achieve definitive results. The corps commander strikes enemy forces throughout the depth of the corps area operations, which prevents the enemy’s effective employment of reserves, logistics, and other capabilities not in direct contact with the corps divisions and brigades. Operations in depth can disrupt the enemy’s decision cycle and control nodes. These operations contribute to protecting corps units by destroying enemy capabilities before the enemy is able to use them. The corps commander balances the tempo and momentum of corps operations to produce the desired results.

SECTION II – CORPS OPERATIONS IN AN ESTABLISHED THEATER

6-15. Operations in an established theater are characterized by forward deployed forces maintained in a high state of readiness and having relatively well-established sustainment facilities, firm missions, defined areas of operations, and areas of interest. There are established command relationships, host country agreements, and planned reinforcing forces that apply to only Europe (NATO) and the Western Pacific (Korea and Japan) areas.

6-16. A corps operating in Europe or the Western Pacific is part of an alliance force structure that has evolved over a period of time. Initially, operations will be defensive in nature, pending the arrival of reinforcing forces deployed to the theater by strategic airlift and sealift. Military deception is difficult to achieve in these developed environments, because enemy and adversary intelligence capabilities and open-sources are pervasive. A disciplined force with skilled and forceful leadership is required to cope with the defensive nature of early operations against enemy forces that are numerically superior.

ORGANIZATION

6-17. A corps headquarters deploying from the continental U.S. into either Eastern Europe or the Western Pacific can fall in on forward deployed forces largely structured to fill an economy of force roles. The exact structure of these forward deployed forces reflects their mission, operational environment, and forces available. They are flexibly structured to optimize fighting capability to provide credible in-theater deterrence and a U.S. presence and physical commitment. In peacetime, these forward deployed forces are augmented with an indigenous civilian workforce to economize on personnel and operating costs. Peacetime planning includes provisions for establishing a civilian workforce during wartime.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

6-18. The command relationships between the corps and its next higher echelon depends on the Secretary of Defense’s Guidance for Employment of the Force. This document forms the basis for strategic policy guidance, campaign plans, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. International agreements also impact the corps exact command relationship. The peacetime command structure for a geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR) is described in JP 1 and JP 3-0. In wartime, the corps is part of a larger multinational allied or coalition force and reports to a multinational headquarters. The standard command relationships between the Service components and the joint task force (JTF) headquarters are outlined in JP 3-0. The joint task force’s establishing authority can further define these relationships.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

6-19. JP 3-0, ADRP 3-0, and ADRP 5-0 describe operational art and operational design. FM 3-94 establishes the doctrine for Army operations at echelons above the brigade combat team (BCT). Operational considerations exist for each warfighting function and are specific to the corps echelon in both nuclear and nonnuclear environments.

MISSION COMMAND

6-20. Command relationships in the corps are the prerogative of the corps commander. The corps commander establishes command relationships based on the commander’s visualized employment of the forces for the operation. Corps contingency force operations can require a departure from the traditional command relationships. Some of the factors affecting command relationships are:

• Physical disposition of the subordinate elements.

• Span of control capabilities within echelons of command.

• Mission requirements.

6-21. Multiple corps and Marine Expeditionary Forces can be employed within a combatant commander’s AOR. In this case, operational considerations will normally require wide dispersal of these forces. The nature and type of operations varies between the corps and Marine Expeditionary Forces, even though they are both directed toward the same or supporting strategic objectives. The conduct of such divergent operations may require the joint force commander to alter standard command relationships in and external to the corps.

6-22. Judge advocate personnel support the commanders’ exercise of mission command, specifically the art of command, through the practice of military justice and operational law. Judge advocates support commanders’ authority by advising commanders on military justice matters. In decisive action, judge advocates support the commanders’ decisionmaking by advising on operational law matters such as the law of war, rules of engagement, and other applicable international laws.

Cyber Electromagnetic Activities

6-23. The corps operates in an increasingly network-based world. The proliferation of information technologies is changing the way humans interact with each other and the environment, including interactions before and during military operations and post-combat stabilization and transition. This broad and rapidly changing part of the operational environment requires the corps to operate in cyberspace and leverage an electromagnetic spectrum that is increasingly competitive, congested, and contested. The corps implements cyber electromagnetic activities via the integration and synchronization of cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and spectrum management operations within the limitations and policies established by national or combatant command authorities.

6-24. Cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum provide commanders at all echelons the ability to share information, communicate, integrate, and synchronize operations across warfighting functions and echelons, and provide additional offensive and defensive capabilities to augment traditional lethal and nonlethal effects. Conversely, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum provide adversaries and enemies with an effective, inexpensive, and anonymous means for recruitment, information activities, training, and command and control. Cyber electromagnetic activities provide commanders with the ability to gain and maintain an advantage in cyberspace and across the electromagnetic spectrum. (See JP 3-12, and FM 3-38 for additional information on this subject.)

Military Information Support Operations

6-25. Psychological factors are an integral part of all operations. MISO include words and actions specifically planned to reduce the combat effectiveness of enemy armed forces and to influence hostile, neutral, and friendly groups to support U.S. operations. The corps commander is responsible for integrating MISO into the corps overall military planning. Corps plans and operations are evaluated on their psychological impact according to the guidance provided from higher headquarters. The corps is primarily concerned with MISO designed to produce short-term results. However, some tactical MISO objectives are altered to achieve longer-range goals. The corps commander allocates supporting MISO companies or teams to subordinate commands as required. FM 3-53 and the supporting ATPs provide additional information on the use of MISO.

Military Deception

6-26. Properly conceived and employed, a commander uses military deception to deceive the enemy of the true disposition, capabilities, and intentions of friendly forces. A corps can employ military deception measures assigned by a higher headquarters. A corps can also develop a military deception plan to support its own concept of operations. However, military deception operations initiated by the corps need approval by the next higher commander.

6-27. Military deception plans are developed concurrently with the operations plan they support. Deception measures are initiated in sufficient time to allow the enemy to acquire false or misleading information, analyze the activity or inactivity, and react to the intended deception in the desired manner. These operations require strict security measures; therefore, minimal essential distribution of the military deception appendix to the operations annex is made. FM 3-13 provides additional information on military deception.

Civil Affairs Operations

6-28. Commanders conduct civil affairs operations when performing their CMO responsibilities. Civil affairs operations is the subset of CMO that involves the synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

6-29. The corps is supported by an Army Reserve civil affairs brigade. The headquarters of this brigade contains a command section, one civil affairs planning team, a civil-military operations center containing two civil liaison teams, a functional specialty cell, an operations and intelligence cell, a communications cell, and a sustainment cell all supported by the brigade’s headquarters and headquarters company. Functional teams vary in size and capability. Teams are made up of individuals who are technically qualified to either supervise or advise in each of the civil affairs functional areas of governmental, economic, public facilities and special functions.

6-30. Civil affairs operations consist of the following core tasks:

• Populace and resource control.

• Foreign humanitarian assistance.

• Civil information management.

• Nation assistance.

• Support to civil administration.

6-31. Subordinate civil affairs battalions and companies are attached or placed to support subordinate divisions and BCTs, and maneuver enhancement brigades. Additional civil affairs units may support other corps units. During operations focused on the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks, civil affairs units’ areas of operations mirror the areas of operations of the unit they support. A transition to political boundaries is accomplished as soon as practicable once the focus of corps operations becomes the conduct of stability tasks. FM 3-57 provides the information necessary for the integration of civil affairs operations in support of corps operations.

Install, Operate, and Maintain the Network

6-32. Corps operations are increasingly dependent on net-enabled capabilities to collect, process, store, and disseminate information. Net-enabled capabilities are supported by the Army portion of the Department of Defense Information Network which encompasses all Army information management (IM) systems and information systems that collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect information worldwide. It provides commanders the information they need, when they need it, in any environment to facilitate decisive action with joint, interorganizational and multinational partners. Once established, the network must be operated in a way that allows it to be shaped and preserved to meet dynamic mission requirements, which is achieved through the management of network configurations, performance, resource allocations, faults, and security aligned with the commander’s intent and priorities across the full conflict continuum.

6-33. The network in the corps headquarters is installed and operated by the corps signal company organic to the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion. The network is designed to provide communications between corps headquarters main and tactical command posts. It also connects with higher headquarters, adjacent and supporting units and organizations, and major subordinate and other selected commands. The corps signal company provides network operations and management facilities to include a network command element and cybersecurity communications network defense. It also manages the corps communications security account.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

6-34. Peacetime dispositions of forward forces may not be ideal for their wartime employment. Forward deployed forces in Europe and the Western Pacific are scattered within those areas of responsibility in locations made available by their respective host countries. Movement to wartime locations may be hampered by urbanization and civilian traffic congestion. The movement of forward deployed forces from garrison locations to the area of employment is coordinated with host country officials.

Army Aviation

6-35. Combat aviation brigades provide the corps commander with a maneuver advantage that can overcome the constraints of limiting terrain and extended distances. The high cost and complexity of Army aviation systems require centralized control and sustainment. The corps provides Army aviation support to subordinate divisions and brigades by placing aviation units under the operational control (OPCON), assigning a direct support or general support mission to the aviation unit, or attaching the unit for the duration of an operation or for a finite period of time.

6-36. In direct support of corps, divisions, and brigades, Army aviation conducts reconnaissance and surveillance to produce actionable combat information. Aviation supports ground maneuver units through the employment of air-to-ground fires to destroy, neutralize, or impose other effects on targeted enemy forces. The corps commander employs Army aviation as an integral part of the corps’ combined arms shaping and decisive operations. Army aviation conducts air assault of maneuver forces and equipment to positions of advantage in relation to the enemy. Army aviation provides air movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies to points of need. It also conducts medical evacuation by air of combat casualties.

6-37. Additionally, Army aviation provides general support to the joint force through specific capabilities to improve the effectiveness of unified land operations. When required, aviation units establish and operate joint and Army airfields in support of deployment operations, facilitating the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. Army fixed-wing aircraft provide movement of time-sensitive, critical equipment and key personnel within the joint operations area. Finally, aviation personnel, integrated in all echelons from the BCTs to the corps, provide the planning and liaison capabilities that allow the force to capitalize on the integrated applications of joint air and land power throughout the corps area of operations. (See FM 3-04 for additional information on Army aviation.)

Engineer

6-38. Corps engineer headquarters provide the command and staff elements necessary to plan and coordinate corps wide engineer support. Inherent to a BCT is the brigade engineer battalion. However, by design, this battalion provides approximately 25 percent of a BCT's required engineer capability. Engineer battalions assigned to an engineer brigade or maneuver enhancement brigade contain the remainder of the engineer assets that divisions and BCTs need to complete the mission. The corps engineer identifies shortages and recommends engineer force allocations to the commander. (See FM 3-34 for additional information on engineer operations.)

INTELLIGENCE

6-39. Forward deployed forces have the advantage of focusing their intelligence activities toward known adversaries and potential enemies and specific operational environments. This allows them to develop detailed knowledge of adversary and potential enemy doctrine, weapon systems, and leadership as well as the terrain. Constant updates of intelligence products allow these forces to keep current on adversary and enemy capabilities and dispositions.

6-40. The corps commander requires adequate and timely intelligence concerning the enemy to plan the employment of forces. Information collection agencies assigned, attached, or supporting the corps develop intelligence products addressing not only the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations within the corps’ area of operations, but also the corps’ area of interest. Subordinate units’ actions further develop the enemy situation. Major subordinate commanders are kept abreast of the current enemy situation by all available means.

6-41. The corps is supported by an expeditionary military intelligence brigade (E-MIB). These brigades are designed to conduct intelligence operations in support of the corps. The brigades provide the following capabilities:

• Counterintelligence collection and activities.

• Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection.

• Signals intelligence collection (SIGINT).

• Processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED).

6-42. The E-MIB can also augment corps, deployed division, and BCT intelligence cells, specifically aiding in the PED of SIGINT, imagery, and full-motion video provided by higher echelon and national organizations. The E-MIB is the primary information collection asset assigned or attached to corps and division commands. The E-MIB conducts multidiscipline intelligence operations in support of corps and the corps’ subordinate divisions’ operational requirements, to include the role of the military intelligence force provider for deployed BCTs in the corps. The E-MIB is designed to perform in a variety of situations and is task-organized in multiple ways. (See FM 2-0 for additional information on intelligence operations.)

FIRES

6-43. The fires means available to the corps include the fires of the field artillery cannon, rocket, and missile systems found in the corps’ field artillery brigade and the corps’ BCTs. Air support is normally provided to the corps by the United States Air Force (USAF). United States Marine Corps (USMC) and naval aviation assets can also support. When the topography allows, naval surface fire support may also be available. During combat operations, the corps primarily uses fires, especially joint fires, to shape events that enable the success of subordinate divisions. The corps employs these fires primarily in that portion of the corps area of operations beyond the forward boundary of subordinate divisions.

Field Artillery

6-44. The field artillery brigade provides depth to the battlefield, augments the fires of the divisions, acts as a counterfire headquarters, and performs corps-wide target acquisition functions. Support relationships assigned to the corps field artillery brigade’s subordinate units are general support, reinforcing, and general support-reinforcing. The corps commander assigns support relationships to the field artillery battalion of any BCT currently in corps reserve at the recommendation of the corps fires cell chief. In the offense, the corps decisive operation is given priority of field artillery support. If the operation is phased, priority for fires can vary from unit to unit. For example, the corps provides additional fire support assets to BCTs exploiting a breakthrough by directing changes in the support or command relationships of subordinate field artillery units. The same applies to the defense.

6-45. When acting in a tactical role, the corps retains OPCON of the attached field artillery brigade and places that brigade’s subordinate multiple launcher rocket system battalions with Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) pods in general support of the corps. Cannon field artillery battalions in the field artillery brigade are frequently detached from the brigade and given a command or support relationship with one or more of the corps subordinate divisions because of range limitations.

Naval Surface Fire Support

6-46. Naval surface fire support is normally only available during amphibious operations or when elements of the corps are operating in coastal areas. When naval surface fire support is available, naval liaison officers at all echelons, from battalion through theater level, advise and assist the commander in the employment of this support. The Navy designates ships to provide direct support to specific battalions. These ships also furnish general support to brigades, divisions, or higher echelons. Commonly, a team from a USMC Air- Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (known as ANGLICO) is attached to each supported Army unit. The attached Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company team includes U.S. Navy and USMC personnel who advise on the employment of naval surface fire support and provide the communications necessary to request, direct, and control this support.

Air Support

6-47. As previously stated in paragraphs 1-190 to 1-192, the USAF support to the corps, outside of garrison, is based on the role and mission assigned to the corps. In garrison, the corps is supported by a USAF air support operations group (ASOG). This group is a USAF organization and remains under USAF command at all times. The wartime function of the ASOG is to serve as the joint air component coordination element (JACCE). As such, when the corps is assigned the role and mission of a JTF or LCC headquarters, the ASOG will support the corps be performing the JACCED functions within that headquarters. The JACCE function is most similar to the Army’s battlefield coordination detachment (BCD). (See ATP 3-09.13 for a discussion of the BCD.) However, if the corps is assigned the role and mission of a tactical headquarters, then as air support operations squadron (ASOS) will provide the required tactical air control party and air support operations center functionality.

6-48. USAF support provided to the corps includes the following air operations functions:

• Counterair.

• Counterland.

• Airlift.

• Surveillance and reconnaissance.

• Weather services.

Planning for tactical air support is closely integrated with corps operational planning and is projected as far into the future as possible to influence the commander, joint task force’s (CJTF’s) air apportionment decision so that air assets and forces are adequately programed and resourced for tasking during the joint air tasking cycle. Air component assets and forces tasked to support Army operations are published on the air tasking order (ATO).

6-49. The joint force air component commander (JFACC), through consultation with other component commanders in the JTF, is responsible for providing air apportionment recommendation to the joint force commander. The corps commander, if also an ARFOR or land component command (LCC) commander, consults with the JFACC in this process. Subsequently, the CJTF makes decisions on apportionment and disseminates guidance and objectives to components providing support to the JTF. (See JP 3-30 for more information about air apportionment.)

6-50. Following the CJTF’s air apportionment decision, the JFACC allocates air assets and forces made available for tasking to accomplish objectives and tasks during the joint air tasking cycle. The senior ground forces commander makes a distribution decision to provide guidance on the use of close air support (CAS) sorties. The corps receives a distribution based on the senior ground force commander’s distribution decision and can then further distribute those assets to subordinate echelons. The corps commander’s decision affects the use of CAS sorties on the ATO. The decision clarifies which air assets are designated to support subordinate divisions. Likewise, the distribution decision provides guidance to supporting USAF TACS elements charged with managing joint air assets, and provides responsive air support for the division commanders.

Processing Army Air Support Requests

6-51. Requests for air support are either preplanned or immediate. Preplanned requests are forwarded through Army operational channels. Each headquarters assigns priorities to approved requests. Immediate requests are for CAS or tactical air reconnaissance, and are forwarded by the initiating unit's USAF tactical air control party (TACP) directly to the USAF AOC using the USAF-operated air request net. If any intermediate commander disapproves the request or substitutes another support means, the USAF TACP at that headquarters notifies their higher air support operations center and the originating TACP then notifies the requester. (See ATP 3-52.2 for more detail on the theater air-ground system [TAGS] and Army Air- Ground System.)

6-52. Once planners have analyzed the mission and are familiar with external air support requirements, preplanned air support requests are drafted and submitted. Further refinements to these initial requests are forwarded as details become available. Adherence to time constraints of the joint air tasking cycle is critical. Preplanned air support requests, in support of Army operations, are submitted through the Army Air-Ground System. (See JP 3-09, JP 3-09.3, FM 3-94 and ATP 3-52.2 for more details.)

6-53. As a technique, the corps can provide targeting guidance using the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). AFATDS is an integrated fire support asset manager that operates as part of a networked tactical data processing system. It provides decision aids and an information system for the control, coordination, and synchronization of all types of fire support means. It uses common hardware and software from the Army mission command system and is used from the Army Service component command (ASCC) to the platoon echelon. AFATDS interfaces with all of the other Army Battle Command Systems (known as ABCS) via a common operational environment using a combination of database transfer, various message formats, or an ability to print data for distribution. AFATDS supports current doctrinal processes and procedures for fire support planning and processing of air support requests. There are sets of guidance in AFATDS that can be configured to assist in targeting, such as target selection standards, high-payoff targets (HPTs), target decay time, and target prioritization. The targeting guidance feature in AFATDS enables the commander to set the conditions to conduct target analysis and provide engagement options. When properly configured in AFATDS, the commander’s guidance can be factored into each fire mission at each echelon.

6-54. The corps fire cell can use the concept of operations and the scheme of fires to input the commander’s guidance into the AFATDS guidance section located on the AFATDS current bar. Then, the commander’s approved guidance information is disseminated to subordinate echelons using AFATDS. Each subordinate echelon can tailor the higher headquarters guidance for its particular mission. Once the guidance is saved, AFATDS provides options and recommendations for each fire mission processed based on the commander’s guidance and scheme of fires. AFATDS automates screening and filtering of potential targets and mission requests, to include target clearance and coordination in accordance with the commander’s targeting guidance and attack criteria.

6-55. AFATDS prioritizes fire missions based on target value analysis and ensures that fire missions comply with FSCMs and unit areas of operations. AFATDS is designed to consider many weapons systems and, with the appropriate guidance, AFATDS pairs these weapons systems to targets, minimizing the time used for the sensor-to-shooter process. AFATDS selects optimum weapons and munitions based on target parameters established in the guidance section.

Air and Missile Defense

6-56. A JTF is provided with air and missile defense capabilities as required by the air threat. The area air defense commander (AADC) has full authority and responsibility for air defense of the area where the corps is deployed. The corps coordinates with the Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC) or an air defense brigade for air and missile defense assets to include air defense radars, weapons systems, and appropriate communications links. Air and missile defense assets may be designated to provide direct or general support to the corps to protect forces or facilities located within the corps’ area of operations. The corps staff integrates the provided air and missile defense assets into corps plans and orders. The corps air and missile defense element plans, provides early warning, and works with other main command post cells to coordinate the use airspace over the corps area of operations. The senior officer in the corps air and missile defense section advises the corps commander on how the corps can best counter air and missile threats. (See FM 3-01 for more detail on air and missile defense planning and operations.)

PROTECTION

6-57. The presence of forward deployed U.S. forces in an oversea area is in furtherance of a common defense effort by the U.S. and the host nation. To the extent of host-nation civil and military forces’ reliability, their capabilities are integrated with U.S. forces in planning area and local protection measures and countering identified security threats.

6-58. Military police (MP) enable the corps commander to achieve objectives assigned by the joint force commander by providing a unique set of capabilities that support joint functions and the Army warfighting functions through the MP disciplines of police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support. Corps MP support is performed on a command, area, functional, or mission basis. Based on the support to be rendered, a determination is made as to whether the MP unit is attached to or placed in direct support or general support of the supported unit. (FM 3-39 provides additional information regarding MP operations. ATP 3-39.30 addresses security and mobility support. FM 3-63 addresses Army detainee operations.)

6-59. The corps headquarters, subordinate division headquarters, and the maneuver enhancement brigade headquarters contain organic provost marshal sections. MP headquarters units found in a corps include the MP brigade and battalion headquarters. Baseline MP forces consist of MP companies, MP detention companies, and MP guard companies. The MP corps also contains specialized forces to include modules for military working dog support, detention camp liaison, detainee reporting center functions, police operations, and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command support.

SUSTAINMENT

6-60. As with all operations, the key to effective sustainment support to a corps deploying to combat operations is deliberate and detailed planning. The modular sustainment structure at echelons above the brigade allows flexibility and the ability to align support adequately to support the mission. However, the modular structure can also lead to confusion if support units are not identified, support relationships established, and priorities set.

6-61. From the outset, the corps sustainment staff, integrated by the chief of sustainment, requires a firm understanding of the corps mission to include a complete list of the corps battle rhythm. Coordination with the senior sustainment headquarters within the corps area of operations is critical and can entail coordination with a theater sustainment command (TSC), expeditionary sustainment command (ESC), or sustainment brigade. The corps staff collaborates with the sustainment headquarters to communicate corps priorities and desired support relationships. The sustainment headquarters verifies the sustainment units available and the support relationships. In annex F of the operations order, identification is needed for the supporting organizations providing sustainment functions. A clear support relationship is established between these supporting organizations and each corps subordinate organization, which is critical to ensure these subordinate units understand which sustainment organization responsible for providing their support. Organizations conducting the corps decisive and shaping operations are identified and priorities are set for each sustainment function. These support relationships are associated with an effective beginning and ending time or operational phase with clear indication of which units are to assume support at the end of the specified time period. The corps staff issues fragmentary orders when required as conditions, support relationships, and priorities change. The senior sustainment headquarters publishes an order for sustainment units under its control. This order mirrors the corps order in terms of support relationships and priorities. ATP 3-93 discusses the operations of a TSC.

6-62. The corps sustainment staff establishes sustainment status reporting parameters to maintain a current readiness status of the corps formation. Using this procedure, the staff is able to identify readiness shortfalls, functional problems, and trends.

SECTION III – CORPS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

6-63. Corps forces also deploy for short-duration, limited objective, or contingency operations. These are operations in which U.S. forces are deployed to an area where there is no existing U.S. base of operations. The corps headquarters and attached units are employed as part of a JTF. It may conduct operations as part of a multinational response. Corps contingency operations are likely to be conducted with short to no notice in a non-nuclear environment and are characterized by constrained deployments of both personnel and equipment during austere early phases of the operation. The corps requires a rapid buildup of combat forces during the critical early stage of the conflict (if that is the nature of the contingency). Corps forces deploy from their garrison locations the continental U.S., and rely heavily on strategic airlift for rapid deployment and resupply. Early achievement of air superiority, continuous tactical air support, and logistic resupply by air lines of communication are essential to the success of this type of operation. Sealift of outsized equipment, armored units, and bulk supplies are sometimes necessary. The employment of naval surface fire support, tactical air support, air and missile defense and early warning systems, cyber electromagnetic capabilities, and USMC amphibious units from naval operating forces are often critical to the success of the operation, particularly during the initial stages of deployment. A corps conducting contingency operations is structured for the mission, operates as part of a JTF and uses economy of means and skillful execution to accomplish its objective in a short period of time. JP 3-0, JP 3-18, and JP 3-35 describe these operations, forcible entry, and deployment and redeployment.

ORGANIZATION OF A CORPS CONTINGENCY FORCE

6-64. The corps is carefully structured on the principles of simplicity, austerity, flexibility, and realism. It is structured to support Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs) and infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs). If the situation favors employment of armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs), consideration is given to the adverse effect this can have on requirements for the rapid deployment and introduction of those forces. Specific Army force requirements are determined by careful analysis of the mission, enemy, environment, estimated duration of the operation, and availability of forces. Force requirements consider the common-, joint-, and cross-servicing agreements or assignments with other Service components of the JTF. The Army component is required to provide certain sustainment commodities to the forces of other Service components of the task force as part of Army support to other services.

6-65. Selective, incremental force structuring permits the achievement of austerity, not only for the corps Army forces, but also for the entire JTF. In the constraints of mission essential requirements and availability of forces, the planner reviews the force structure and eliminates personnel or types of units and equipment that are not critical to mission accomplishment.

6-66. Successful operations require skillful execution by disciplined, well-trained units to achieve decisive results with a minimum of forces. These professional attributes and the implementation of the following procedures contribute to the achievement of truly austere forces:

• Austere base development.

• Minimal standards of living.

• Stringent maneuver and sustainment support.

• Reliance on strategic airlift and sealift not only for the rapid deployment of forces, but also for their continued sustainment.

• Emphasis on the USAF for CAS, tactical air reconnaissance, and tactical airlift within the area of operations.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

6-67. The limited scope and austere nature of corps contingency force operations influence not only the organization of corps forces, but also the operational employment of those forces. This is not intended to imply changes to decisive action tasks or the principles of war. The tactics and techniques of conducting corps operations previously described remain applicable. However, greater emphasis is placed on the application of certain principles and techniques such as economy of force, mobility, surprise, and the bold and aggressive employment of decisive offensive actions. Operations are characterized by flexibility, imaginative leadership, intuitive planning, skillful and decentralized execution, and continual coordination and liaison with supported headquarters and agencies, and supporting joint forces and governmental agencies. The joint and unified action nature of these operations dictates that other U.S. and multinational governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations interact with the corps headquarters and subordinate forces during the conduct of all phases of operations.

INTRODUCTION OF FORCES

6-68. Contingency plans for rapid force deployment currently exist at the appropriate levels of command; however, modification of these plans is often required to adjust to existing conditions at the time of deployment. The introduction of corps combat forces can be facilitated by effectively using other U.S. government agencies and special operations forces (SOF) that may be present in the area of operations. These agencies and units can establish initial liaison with the host-nation government and armed forces. These agencies can also contribute to early information collection to answer the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and other intelligence requirements to allow the corps staff to make informed decisions and estimates on how existing conditions influence the corps future operations.

6-69. As part of corps contingency operations, a corps headquarters is capable of planning and executing an entry operation employing any combination of division headquarters, BCTs, and supporting units from multiple ports of embarkation. Entry operations range from small-scale, short-duration operations such as noncombatant evacuation operation or foreign humanitarian assistance, to the establishment of an area of operations in preparation for subsequent long-duration operations in support of unified action. A corps headquarters participates in the planning and supervising the preparation and execution of a joint forcible entry operation employing assault and support forces from the Army, other services, and special operations commands to establish a lodgment on foreign territory. In order to respond rapidly to a wide range of contingencies globally, the corps headquarters is placed at a heightened readiness and deployable posture and prepares to echelon its tactical command post into the area of operations, starting with the early entry command post (EECP) portion of the tactical command post.

6-70. This mission command element of the corps headquarters—the EECP—can control operations until remaining headquarters echelons deploy. Critical tasks for the EECP include establishing contact and coordination with forces already in the area of operations, coordination and assistance with reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) tasks, and initiating and controlling the conduct of defensive or offensive tasks. Depending on EECP tasks anticipated upon arrival, the EECP may be led by the deputy corps commander or the corps assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3).

COMMUNICATIONS

6-71. Early establishment of joint communications is essential to corps mission accomplishment. The corps assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6) oversees and directs the planning, operations, and coordination of matters concerning network operations, network transport, information services, and spectrum management operations for the corps headquarters and assigned units. The G-6 is the senior signal officer in the corps and coordinates with lower, adjacent, and higher echelons of command to ensure adequate network support. When the corps headquarters serves as the headquarters for a JTF, the corps G-6 becomes the JTF director, command, control, communications, and communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6) unless superseded by a more senior signal officer. (See FM 6-02 for additional information.)

6-72. Contingency operations require the corps to use mobile packaged communication facilities, such as the joint communications support element. JP 6-0 outlines the joint communications systems that support the corps during contingency operations.

COMBAT ACTIONS

6-73. Lack of adequate intelligence can initially hamper the initiation of corps contingency force operations. Limited knowledge of the enemy can dictate that initial combat actions consist of movement to contact or reconnaissance in force operations. The bulk of the combat power of the force remains uncommitted to allow maximum flexibility of employment once the enemy situation is developed.

6-74. It is desirable that the relative mobility of forces in these operations be superior to that of the enemy. This is accomplished by including ABCTs and combat aviation brigades in the corps force list. Their deployment requires more strategic lift assets and, therefore, tends to be slower than that of IBCTs and SBCTs. The impact of the time required for their deployment over more strategically deployable assets is considered during the military decision making process (MDMP). Their sustainment requirements are also higher. However, the combat mobility, once deployed, enhances the corps commander's ability to employ the principles of maneuver, mass, economy of force, and surprise in offensive combat focused operations.

STABILITY ACTIONS

6-75. Stability actions conducted by corps units in support of short-term operations are minimal and focus on the immediate relief of human suffering, unless the conduct of stability tasks is the focus of the operation. Corps planners are primarily concerned with identifying and isolating potential problems that directly impact the corps’ ability to accomplish its assigned mission. The corps headquarters sets the conditions that enable its subordinate and supporting divisions and brigades to accomplish assigned tasks. The extent of corps directed stability actions depends on U.S. policy, international law, or agreements with the host nation. Section VI of this chapter discusses the corps and stability tasks in more detail.

CORPS SUPPORT AREA SECURITY

6-76. The corps commander assigns protection responsibility for the corps support area to a maneuver enhancement brigade commander. However, in a corps contingency force operation, ill-defined or nonexistent boundaries and areas of operations can occur. Echelon above corps sustainment forces can operate from within divisional areas of operations, from ports of debarkation and bases in the joint security area, and from the corps support area. These conditions, associated with the wide dispersal of a sustainment unit, can reduce self-defense capabilities of sustainment forces through the placing of bases and base clusters beyond supporting distance of each other. ATP 3-91 discusses the use of bases and base clusters.

6-77. The corps commander can direct maneuver forces to reinforce the maneuver enhancement brigade to perform the support area security mission as a tactical combat force. If there is a Level III threat in the corps support area that needs more than a single battalion-sized tactical combat force to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level, then the corps commander should allocate a BCT to this mission. The provision of a BCT headquarters with its associated USAF TACP enables the rapid employment of joint fires within the corps support area.

CORPS SUSTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS

6-78. Current sustainment doctrine is applicable to all types of operations. The nature and short duration of corps contingency force operations require detailed evaluation and flexible adaptations to achieve both austerity and adequacy in sustainment. The principles of flexible unit structuring, direct support and general support, centralized control couple with decentralized execution, and throughput distribution all contribute to an austere sustainment organization capable of providing the required support.

6-79. Sustainment is a major consideration when planning tactical operations. This support must be adequate, yet provided in the most economical manner possible. Each sustainment function must be examined and supervised to avoid excesses in quantities, capabilities, and standards. These actions will reduce the proliferation of unnecessary supplies and equipment, which foster greater support demands in the form of manpower, construction, maintenance, and transportation.

6-80. The ESC with its subordinate sustainment brigades is the corps sustainment operator. The ESC and its subordinate sustainment brigades are structured by the theater army and the TSC to support the corps task organization. This sustainment structure changes as the corps task organization changes. The corps headquarters makes broad plans for the sustainment of anticipated tactical operations in consonance with the guidance received from joint force commander and the theater army. The ESC develops detailed plans, policies, and directives for sustainment in conformance with corps policies, directives, and guidance.

6-81. In support of corps plans and orders, the ESC headquarters conducts estimates and analysis and develops supporting plans. It determines overall sustainment requirements for the corps, manages the corps reserve stocks, coordinates movements with elements of the TSC, develops and manages the maintenance support plan, and balances resources. In addition, it coordinates personnel services of corps units. The ESC accomplishes centralized control, evaluation, and management in three functional areas of material management, movement control, and personnel. For more information on the sustainment brigade and the ESC refer to ATP 4-93 and ATP 4-94 respectively.

Logistics

6-82. Each of the elements of logistics support requires careful analysis to determine the most effective means of providing the support including, but not limited to, Army and joint sustainment forces and capabilities, host nation support (HNS), Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), and other forms of operational contract support. FM 4-95 provides the doctrine for all logistics operations.

Personnel Services

6-83. Centralized human resources, financial management, religious, and music support that is responsive to the corps is the goal. However, short-duration operations tend to favor personnel services units and functions remaining at home station in the continental U.S. and providing any necessary support via the internet. Exceptions occur in the areas of postal support, religious support, financial management support to the theater support contracting process, and casualty operations. (See FM 1-0 for additional information on personnel services.)

Army Health System Support

6-84. The principles of Army Health System Support apply during the conduct of contingency operations as they apply during all other operations. They apply across all medical functions and are synchronized through medical mission command and close coordination and synchronization of all deployed medical assets through medical technical channels. These principles are conformity, proximity, flexibility, mobility, continuity, and control. (See ADRP 4-0 and FM 4-02 for a further discussion of these principles and considerations for providing health service support to the corps during the conduct of contingency operations.)

SECTION IV – CORPS OFFENSIVE-FOCUSED TASKS

6-85. The corps conducts offensive tasks in conjunction with operational considerations. Offensive tasks seek to destroy the enemy. They are characterized by retention of the initiative, therefore, permitting the commander to impose the commander’s will on the enemy at the time and place of the commander’s choosing. Whereas the conduct of offensive tasks is traditionally associated with a favorable combat power ratio and a deteriorating enemy situation, these are not necessarily preconditions for offensive action. Mobility, surprise, and aggressive execution are the most effective means of success in the offense. Increased risk is involved with bold, hard-hitting tactics; however, greater gains often require greater risks. The initiative is gained and retained by a numerically inferior force capable of bold and aggressive action. Accordingly, a numerical superiority is not necessarily a precondition for offensive operations; rather, commanders continuously seek opportunities to seize the initiative through offensive action, even when the force as a whole is on the defensive.

OFFENSIVE TASKS

6-86. The divisions are the tactical units of execution for a corps. A corps’ conduct of offensive tasks is a series of coordinated and integrated division operations that involve one or all of the four doctrinal offensive tasks. (See FM 3-90-1 for a non-echelon specific discussion of the conduct of these offensive tasks.)

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

6-87. A corps conducts a movement to contact to establish or regain contact with the enemy. Movement to contact rarely occurs at the corps level because information collection systems (including national systems) can detect the presence of enemy forces in sufficient strength to pose a significant threat to the corps as a whole. Movement to contact can occur because of enemy-initiated cyber electromagnetic events, such as through the use of nuclear weapons, electromagnetic pulse generators, and cyber activities, that destroy or severely disrupt the corps mission command and information collection systems. The operation is characterized by centralized planning by the corps and decentralized and aggressive execution.

6-88. The corps is organized with a covering force, a main body, and advance, flank, and rear guards. The size and composition of the covering force varies depending on the mission variable of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations (METT-TC). The purpose of the covering force is to provide for the uninterrupted forward movement of the main body, protect the main body from surprise, locate the major enemy forces, and develop the enemy situation. The covering force commander operates under the control of the corps commander. Flank and rear guards protect the main body from ground observation and surprise attack and operate under corps control or under the control of their parent unit. The bulk of the corps forces constitute the main body. Divisions in the main body are organized for combat, moving in tactical formations. An advance guard, provided by the main body, maintains contact with the covering force, provides security to the front, and expedites movement of the main body. The advance to contact terminates when determined enemy resistance requires a coordinated effort of the main body.

6-89. A meeting engagement occurs when a force is moving, not completely deployed for combat, and with limited knowledge of the enemy situation while making contact with major enemy forces. The organization of the corps for an advance to contact guards against the likelihood of an engagement by the corps as a whole. Security forces protect the main body from surprise, develop the enemy situation, and provide the time necessary for deployment and execution of planned action by the main body.

ATTACK

6-90. A corps conducts an attack when it is opposed by a well-organized enemy force occupying defensive belts in depth. The attack employs forces attacking in a fixed relationship to each other to destroy the continuity of the enemy defenses. Attack is an offensive task that a corps conducts most frequently from initial contact with major enemy forces until conditions are created that favor the conduct of exploitation or pursuit.

EXPLOITATION

6-91. The JTF commander or LCC commander can direct a corps to conduct an exploitation or the corps commander can initiate one to exploit tactical successes. Exploitation is designed to destroy the enemy's ability to reconstitute an organized defense or conduct an orderly withdrawal in the face of threatened destruction or capture. The opportunity to conduct an exploitation is indicated when—

• The enemy’s command and control is seriously degraded.

• The enemy is having difficulty maintaining its position.

• Friendly forces are making decisive gains.

• Enemy resistance, particularly supporting fires, is lessening.

• Prisoners and equipment are captured in increasing numbers.

6-92. When conducting exploitation at the direction of the joint force or LCC commander, a corps commander is assigned the mission of—

• Securing objectives deep in the enemy rear.

• Cutting major lines of communication.

• Containing major enemy forces.

• Destroying major enemy reserves.

6-93. When directed to conduct exploitation, the corps must be provided with sufficient forces to destroy organized enemy resistance bypassed by the exploiting forces. In addition to the follow and support force, the corps retains under corps control only those reserves necessary to ensure flexibility of operations, continued momentum of the advance, and minimum essential security.

6-94. The normal tasks assigned to the follow and support force are to—

• Hold and widen the shoulders of a penetration.

• Secure lines of communication behind the exploiting force.

• Relieve elements of the exploiting force left behind to contain bypassed enemy.

• Assist in destruction of bypassed enemy forces.

• Block movement of enemy reinforcements.

6-95. Elements assigned to follow and support missions are fully committed and are not considered part of the reserve. The exploitation force and the follow and support force commanders maintain direct communication and coordination; however, the corps commander maintains command over both forces. The corps commander coordinates and ensures the forward echelonment of sustainment elements to support the corps operation.

PURSUIT

6-96. The purpose of the pursuit is to destroy a hostile force attempting to escape. As the continuity of enemy forces begins to disintegrate under relentless pressure, an exploitation can develop into a pursuit. A pursuit can also occur when the enemy attempts to disengage and retire. Although terrain objectives are sometimes designated, the destruction of the enemy force is the primary objective of the corps. During the pursuit, the corps advances on a broad front with maximum combat power forward, maintaining only the reserves necessary to provide flexibility of action and continued momentum.

6-97. The pursuit usually consists of direct pressure and enveloping forces. The mission of the direct pressure force is to prevent enemy disengagement and reconstitution of enemy defenses, and to inflict maximum casualties. The mission of the enveloping force is to block the enemy’s escape so that the enemy can be destroyed between the direct pressure and enveloping forces. If the enveloping force cannot outdistance the enemy, it attacks the enemy’s main body on its flanks.

6-98. As in the exploitation, pursuit is normally conducted in conjunction with a follow and support force. Normal tasks assigned to the follow and support force, and the command relationship between the follow and support force and the pursuit force are the same as discussed in paragraphs 6-93 and 6-95.

FORMS OF MANEUVER

6-99. A corps employs a combination of the six forms of maneuver—envelopment, flank attack, frontal attack, infiltration, penetration, and turning movement—in its conduct of the four offensive tasks. The selection of which forms of maneuver to use and how they are best combined is based on an analysis of the mission variables of METT-TC. (Only parts of subordinate BCTs conduct infiltration as part of a corps offensive action and then only in specific circumstances; therefore, this form of maneuver is not discussed.) The distinction in the form of maneuver adopted by corps exists primarily in the intent of the corps commander, because the subordinate elements can use other forms of maneuver. The corps commander typically does not specify the form of maneuver to be adopted by subordinate divisions. However, the assignment of missions and tasks, areas of operations, and the allocation of combat power can impose limitations on subordinate divisions that their commanders have little choice on the form of maneuver used.

ENVELOPMENT

6-100. Envelopment form of maneuver is adopted when the disposition, nature of terrain, and inherent capabilities of the attacking force afford the corps to adopt a scheme of maneuver to avoid the principal enemy defenses. A shaping operation strikes the principal enemy defenses, deceiving the enemy of the location and intent of the corps’ decisive operations. Because of this, the corps can fix the enemy force in its present position, prevent the enemy’s escape, reduce the enemy’s capability of reacting against the decisive operation, and cause the enemy commander to commit available reserves prematurely or indecisively.

6-101. The corps decisive operation is the enveloping force. This force passes around or over the enemy’s principal defenses to secure objectives that cut enemy escape routes, force the enemy to fight simultaneously in two or more directions, and destroy the enemy in position.

6-102. Equal or superior mobility, surprise, and avoidance of the enemy’s principal defenses by the decisive operation are essential to the success of envelopment. Supporting fires or other forces can bypass and reduce enemy resistance that can interfere with rapid movement. Security forces protect the enveloping force’s exposed flanks. Vertical envelopments are also conducted to occupy objectives on key terrain. When the situation permits, envelopment is preferred to penetration because it offers a greater opportunity for exploitation and avoids the enemy's main positions.

6-103. The double envelopment is a variation of the envelopment. Shaping operations are employed to fix enemy forces in their current position, while both flanks of the enemy are bypassed to secure deep objectives from two directions. Detailed planning and execution, as well as superior inability and combat power, are paramount to success. Double envelopment involves a greater degree of risk, but it affords the attacking force an opportunity to trap and destroy enemy forces.

FLANK ATTACK

6-104. A flank attack is a form of offensive maneuver directed at the flank of an enemy (FM 3-90-1). The corps directs its main effort at an assailable flank of an enemy. The assailable flank may be created by fires, terrain, and enemy dispositions. A flank attack is similar to an envelopment but is conducted on a shallower axis and is less decisive and less risky than an envelopment. A flank attack seeks to strike the enemy’s main force while avoiding the frontal orientation of the enemy’s main weapon systems. Flank attacks are used extensively when the corps widens an area of penetration.

FRONTAL ATTACK

6-105. The purpose of the frontal attack is to overrun and destroy or capture the enemy force in its present positions or to fix the enemy in position. Frontal attack is employed as a shaping operation by a fixing force in an envelopment. It is conducted to develop the situation and determine the enemy's strengths and weaknesses or intent. The frontal attack is decisive when conducted against an overextended or disorganized enemy, or when the attacking force possesses overwhelming combat power against a defending force.

PENETRATION

6-106. A penetration attacks the enemy’s principal defensive positions to rupture and destroy the continuity of that defense, divide the enemy’s forces, and defeat those enemy forces in detail. The corps conduct of penetration is appropriate when strong fire support and adequate maneuver forces provide a favorable combat power ratio or when the enemy force is overextended and its flanks are unassailable. Alternatively a corps employs this maneuver when the inherent limitations of the mission variables on the attacking forces preclude the adoption of another scheme of maneuver which avoids the enemy’s principal defenses.

6-107. A penetration employ a combination of shaping operations in addition to the decisive operation. The corps’ shaping operations require sufficient combat power to deceive the enemy of the location and intent of the main attack, fix the enemy force in its present positions, and reduce the enemy’s freedom of action to react against the main attack, which delays the enemy commander in committing available reserves or committing that reserve prematurely and indecisively. The decisive operation breaches the initial defensive positions, widens the gap, destroys enemy forces in the area of the penetration, then exploits success in the area of the penetration to secure vital objectives in the enemy rear area.

6-108. Priority of fire support is employed to assist the decisive operation to break the initial defenses, while only the minimum amount of necessary fire support and other combat multipliers are provided in support of shaping operations. After the penetration is made, the corps reserve is passed through the penetration area to exploit tactical success if the assault BCTs need to be relieved.

TURNING MOVEMENT

6-109. In the turning movement, the attacking force seeks to avoid the main enemy force, pass around the principal defenses, and secure an objective in the enemy rear, making the enemy’s present position untenable. The purpose of this maneuver is to force the enemy to divert major forces to meet the threat or to abandon its position altogether, enabling the attacking force to engage the enemy in a situation of its own choosing. A shaping operation is required to fix the enemy, as in an envelopment; however, a turning movement is not always accompanied by shaping operations. Because of the great distance between forces, if a shaping operation is employed, each force needs sufficient strength and mobility to operate independently. (See FM 3-90-1 for a more detailed discussion of each of these forms of maneuver.)

CORPS RESERVE

6-110. The corps commander establishes a reserve for employment at the decisive time and place. The commander follows the progress of the battle and adjusts or modifies missions assigned to the subordinate units to include relief of forces that have become exhausted or attrited during combat. At the decisive moment, the commander commits the reserve to exploit success and immediately reconstitutes another reserve. The size of the corps reserve varies depending on the forces available and the strength and disposition of the enemy force.

6-111. The maneuver elements of the corps reserve is a division, a BCT, a combat aviation brigade, or a combination of these. Unity of command of the reserve is critical. On occasion, the corps reserve is the reserve of one or more of the divisions, with specific restrictions imposed by the corps commander on its employment. The reserve is positioned to facilitate its anticipated employment. The corps reserve is usually committed directly under corps control.

SECTION V – CORPS DEFENSIVE-FOCUSED TASKS

6-112. Corps defensive-focused tasks are considered in conjunction with the considerations discussed in section IV. The corps conducts defensive tasks when national interests are best served by limiting thrusts deep into enemy-held territory or when insufficient forces are available for offensive actions. The principle of the offensive is exercised to seize the initiative and keep the enemy off balance. The counterattack is the means by which the fundamental of maximum use of offensive action is achieved in defensive operations.

DEFENSIVE TASKS

6-113. The area defense, the mobile defense, and the retrograde are the three defensive tasks. These three tasks have significantly different concepts and pose significantly different problems. Therefore, each defensive task is dealt with differently when planning and executing the defense. Although the names of these defensive tasks convey the overall aim of a selected operation, each contains elements of the other and combines static and mobile elements. The form of defense adopted by the corps depends on the intent of the corps commander and is determined by the mission, forces available, nature of the terrain, relative combat power to include mobility, nuclear situation, and air situation. Operations of the corps’ subordinate elements can encompass combinations and variations of all three defensive tasks.

6-114. Although on the defense, the corps commander remains alert for opportunities to attack the enemy whenever resources permit. In a defensive posture, the corps commander can conduct a spoiling attack or a counterattack, if permitted to do so by the mission variables of METT-TC. (See FM 3-90-1 for a nonechelon- specific discussion of these three tasks.)

AREA DEFENSE

6-115. Assignment of a mission that requires the corps to retain specific terrain can dictate the adoption of an area defense. The desirability of conducting an area defense also may be indicated by—

• Terrain that restricts the movement of the corps reserve.

• Superior tactical mobility of the enemy.

• Local air superiority by the enemy

6-116. When conducting an area defense, the corps commander has the option of defending forward or defending in depth. When the commander defends forward in the corps area of operations, the corps organizes so the most available combat power is committed early in the defensive effort. To accomplish this effort, the corps commander deploys forces forward or plans counterattacks well forward in the main battle area (MBA) or beyond the MBA. If the corps commander has the option of conducting a defense in depth, security forces and forward MBA elements are used to identify, define, and control the depth of the enemy’s main effort while holding off secondary thrusts, allowing the corps commander to conserve combat power, strengthen the reserve, and better resource the counterattack. The commander organizes the defending corps to accomplish information collection, security, MBA, reserve, and sustainment missions. FM 3-90-1 generically addresses these missions.

SECURITY

6-117. The corps security element occupies the area forward of the MBA and establishes contact with the enemy. It is used to deceive, delay, disorganize, and canalize the enemy. The corps security element is highly mobile and representative of the force as a whole. The corps security element can include a covering force, flank security, and aerial information collection systems.

6-118. A primary mission of a corps covering force is to achieve maximum delay to provide time for the organization and occupation of the forward defensive area. Time is gained by—

• Aggressive offensive action and skillful retrograde operations.

• Imaginative use of natural and man-made obstacles.

• Deceiving the enemy to the location of the MBA.

• Forcing the enemy to deploy their force prematurely.

• Inflicting maximum casualties as the enemy advances.

• Providing early warning of enemy movement.

The corps commander prescribes the time the covering force has to delay the enemy forward of the MBA.

MAIN BATTLE AREA

6-119. The corps MBA is the area extending from the forward edge of the battle area rearward to include the area occupied by the reserve of the MBA divisions. The corps commander organizes the corps MBA by assigning areas of operations for MBA units and designating forward, lateral, and rear boundaries for units and other control measures as necessary. Normally, a corps employs division-sized forces in the MBA, but limitations on available forces or extended frontages can require the employment of separate BCTs in economy of force roles.

6-120. Division areas of operations are assigned based on the mission variables of METT-TC with special consideration of the capability of the division’s attached brigades, terrain, and the mission assigned the division. Usually, each division is assigned an area of operations astride a major avenue of approach. A major avenue of approach from the corps viewpoint is one that permits the unrestricted maneuver of at least one deployed enemy division.

6-121. Blocking positions are designated by the corps to add depth to the defense and to slow, canalize, or contain enemy penetrations. They are located to protect key terrain and support counterattack plans. Corps engineers, reserve units, and other corps troops are tasked to construct corps blocking positions as time and materiel permit.

RESERVE

6-122. The corps reserve, composed of uncommitted forces under corps control, occupies positions as directed and adds depth to the defense. The primary mission of the corps reserve in an area defense is to regain control over the forward defense area, because retention of specific terrain was the original intent. Terrain permitting, the corps reserve is positioned farther forward in an area defense than in the mobile defense. The reserve is dispersed laterally to facilitate its intended employment. It is often positioned outside of subordinate division areas of operations, but can also occupy portions of division areas of operations behind the division’s committed BCTs. The corps reserve is employed to execute counterattack plans, reinforce forward units, or execute blocking missions. The discussion in paragraphs 6-110 and 6-111, relative to the composition of the reserve in the offensive, also applies to the defense.

MOBILE DEFENSE

6-123. A corps conducting a mobile defense has a mission that permits the defense to organize and fight in depth. Adoption of this defensive task, however, requires the corps to have mobility comparable to the enemy and local friendly air superiority. The availability of ABCTs and SBCTs and a combat aviation brigade is a major consideration for adopting the mobile defense. The dispersion and mobility required to decrease the vulnerability when weapons of massed destruction are employed, favor the mobile defense with the striking force’s counterattack, which is the corps’ decisive operation. The ability of the corps information collection system to provide targeting information in near real-time to long-range weapon systems using precision munitions permits the conduct of a mobile defense across wider frontages than would otherwise be possible.

6-124. In the conduct of a mobile defense, the corps employs security forces forward to warn of an impending attack to canalize the enemy into less favorable terrain, and to harass, impede, deceive, and disorganize the enemy. In the mobile defense, at least one maneuver unit of the corps in the forward defensive area is given the role of a fixing force that maneuvers the enemy into an area favorable for the counterattack. The corps striking force engages the enemy using decisive offensive action. The corps reserve is used to either assist the fixing force or to exploit the success of the striking force to include the reduction of encircled enemy forces as necessary. A successful execution of the mobile defense can lend to the resumption of the offense by capitalizing on the destruction of the enemy force and regaining of the initiative.

6-125. The corps achieves the increased depth required in a mobile defense by—

• Locating BCTs, multifunctional support brigades, and sustainment units in depth.

• Locating sustainment units farther to the rear.

• Requiring divisions to prepare blocking positions in depth.

• Designating and constructing blocking positions located in division rear areas (normally occupied only on corps order).

RETROGRADE

6-126. During a retrograde, forces move to the rear or away from the enemy for the purpose of preserving integrity for future operations, repositioning forces on more favorable terrain, or reducing vulnerability. A corps’ retrograde is usually a combination of the withdrawal, delay, and retirement.

Corps Retrograde Planning

6-127. Corps planning for a retrograde begins with the preparation of the plan for the next mission. The corps plans for a retrograde only after developing and undertaking its plans for the mission after the conclusion of the retrograde. The corps retrograde plan includes—

• Location, composition, and mission of the corps covering force.

• Organization of the corps for combat.

• Employment of information related capabilities and cyber electromagnetic activities when and where appropriate.

• Control measures, including traffic control.

• Delay times.

• Sustainment.

The corps also plans and conducts cyber electromagnetic and military deception in support of the retrograde. It also directs the construction of obstacle belts and can direct the conduct of denial operations in support of a retrograde. The corps commander can retain emplacement or execution authority for selected obstacles or denial targets based on the future concept of maneuver.

Corps Covering Force

6-128. A corps conducts a retrograde to preserve the integrity of the command. The requirement for a strong covering force is indicated when the enemy forces the corps to conduct retrograde movements. The corps commander prescribes the mission, composition, and initial location of the covering force. The capabilities of the ABCTs and SBCTs make them the most suitable units for the nucleus of the corps covering force under the control of a division headquarters. The division constituting the corps covering force is reinforced by attachment of additional combat aviation, field artillery, air and missile defense, and engineer units.

6-129. The covering force delays the enemy for a specified period of time, disorganizes the attacking enemy forces as much as possible, and deceives the enemy from the location and the corps’ future operations. The covering force accomplishes its mission by delay on successive positions, on alternate positions, or by a combination of the two delay techniques. (See FM 3-90-2 for a discussion of covering force operations.) The corps commander may designate either a disengagement line or disengagement criteria for the covering force to preserve the covering force for subsequent operations.

Organization of the Corps for a Retrograde

6-130. The corps commander determines the composition of the corps’ covering and other security forces and organizes the corps for the retrograde. The main body of the corps disengages; it may or may not need to move through the covering force, and continues its rearward movement. After disengaging, the corps commander relies on the covering force and the organic and supporting information collection means to maintain contact with the enemy forces during the retrograde.

6-131. The retrograde is conducted through decentralized execution. To facilitate coordination of the retrograde movement, the majority of the corps’ available BCTs, as well as its functional and multifunctional support brigade, are normally attached to the divisions. The corps retains a small reserve.

6-132. During the initial phase of a retrograde operation, units in the MBA, except for delaying or security elements, disengage from the enemy force. When operating on an extended front, the corps commander attaches corps cannon artillery units to the divisions.

6-133. Centralized OPCON of most air and missile defense units rests with the AADC. However, the corps commander ensures that the covering force remains under the protection of the JTF’s air defense umbrella.

6-134. Corps engineer units have two missions in retrograde operations:

• Assist the movement of the corps.

• Impede the advance of the enemy by construction of obstacles and planned destruction of installations, supplies, and structures.

Engineer units prepare demolitions, emplace obstacles, and conduct other engineer tasks in accordance with the corps plans and priorities.

Control of the Retrograde Movement

6-135. The corps retrograde plan includes the control measures necessary to insure a coordinated operation. The corps establishes lateral boundaries between the divisions, phases the operation, and indicates the amount of delay desired between positions. Phase lines are used for control as appropriate.

6-136. Retrograde movement requires increased traffic control measures that provide priorities of movement and preclude congestion on all retrograde routes. Detailed traffic control plans are made at all echelons; their execution is decentralized to the lowest levels.

6-137. As the forward units move through other units, traffic control becomes the corps’ responsibility in moving to the new defensive position. The corps establishes holding areas at critical points on retrograde routes where congestion is likely to occur so that convoys can be routed to these areas and dispersed when necessary. When congestion on the retrograde route is reduced, convoys resume their retrograde movement.

DEFENSIVE PLANNING

MISSION ANALYSIS AND PLANNING GUIDANCE

6-138. The corps commander identifies specified and implied tasks essential to the accomplishment of the mission during the commander’s mission analysis. Once mission analysis is completed, the corps commander restates the mission and issues planning guidance to the staff. This guidance includes the corps commander’s concept of operations and sufficient other information to guide the staff in their estimates.

6-139. After a detailed analysis of the weather and terrain, friendly and enemy situations, relative combat power, and probable enemy courses of action, the corps G-3 develops feasible defensive courses of action. Formulation of a corps defensive course of action takes the following sequence:

• Determine the mission (defend or delay) on each major avenue of approach into the corps area of operations.

• Assign areas of operations to major subordinate elements.

• Allocate available combat power in accordance with the commander’s concept of operations.

• Adjust as necessary.

(See FM 6-0 for additional information on the operations process.)

MISSIONS TO UNITS IN THE FORWARD DEFENSE AREA

6-140. The corps does not prescribe the defensive tasks used by subordinate divisions or other subordinate units in the MBA. Divisions are assigned areas of operations, and the execution of the defense is left to the division commanders. The size of the area of operations assigned to a division, the terrain, the type of combat forces allocated to or placed in support of the division, the air situation, the time available for organizing the defense, and the capabilities of the enemy forces largely determine the defensive scheme of maneuver adopted by the division commander. In the corps mobile defense, at least one division is assigned the mission of delaying the enemy to contain the enemy in the planned area of penetration as part of the fixing force.

ALLOCATION OF COMBAT POWER

6-141. The corps allocates combat power to forces in the corps security and MBA and to the corps reserve to accomplish assigned missions. In determining the allocation of combat power to the divisions in the MBA, the corps commander visualizes how each division can defend its assigned area of operation. The corps commander’s visualization of the employment of the combat power is essential to the soundness of the planned allocation. The actual disposition of the divisions and their attachments, and the planned employment of other support allocated to the divisions are the division commander’s responsibilities. The division assigned the responsibility of conducting the corps decisive operation receives priority in the allocation of combat power. In this manner, the corps commander weights the defense of the most critical areas.

6-142. In determining the allocation of combat power to the reserve, the corps commander considers the mission of the reserve in relation to the defensive scheme of maneuver adopted. The appropriate allocation of combat power among the units in the corps security area, the MBA, the corps support area, and the reserve establishes a balanced defense that enables the corps commander to retain the freedom of action to influence the conduct of the battle.

CORPS COUNTERATTACK PLANNING

6-143. A corps counterattack is an offensive action conducted by the corps reserve or the striking force (in a mobile defense). The counterattack plan is developed by the corps staff to support the adopted scheme of maneuver. Subordinate units’ assigned missions in support of the corps counterattack plan have detailed implementing plans.

6-144. Depending on the situation and time available, the corps develops counterattack plans for a visualized penetration on each major enemy avenue of approach into the corps area of operations. Each counterattack plan is based on a particular set of assumptions. These assumptions include—

• The size and location of the penetration. The width of the assumed penetration is determined primarily by the terrain and enemy doctrine. The depth of the penetration is determined by terrain, the corps’ defense plans, and the assumed size of the enemy force within the penetration. This assumed penetration is the maximum allowable penetration. It reflects the visualized configuration of the penetration at the time the counterattack or striking force crosses the line of departure.

• The size of the enemy force within the penetration. This force is of a size that exceeds the capabilities of the divisions in the MBA to destroy or eject from the penetration. However, the assumed size of the force in the penetration must be within the corps’ capability to destroy or eject.

• The ability to stop or slow the penetration. An assumption relating to the corps’ ability to control the penetration is essential to the counterattack plan. The counterattack plan is based on an assumption that the corps has stopped or slowed the penetration at the time the counterattack force crosses its line of departure.

• The status of the reserve or striking force. The plan is based on the maneuver reserve or striking force being available and combat effective. This assumption is particularly necessary when the reserve is initially committed as a corps covering force.

• The air situation. An assumption about the status of the local air situation at the time the plan is ordered into execution is necessary. In the mobile defense, the ability to maneuver the striking force without unacceptable losses is essential to the success of the counterattack.

CONDUCT OF THE COUNTERATTACK

6-145. The corps commander counterattacks when the enemy attack slows, stops, or becomes disorganized, preferably before the enemy force can consolidate its gains and the enemy commander can reorganize or regroup forces. The determination of the proper time to order execution of the counterattack plan is considerably more difficult at corps than at division, primarily because of the time and space factors involved in moving the counterattacking force from its assembly areas to the line of departure. The corps commander and staff continuously evaluate the tactical situation against the assumptions on which the plan is based to ensure the timely commitment of the counterattack force. The counterattacking force commander employs the force in accordance with corps approved plans, which are modified as required by the situation or the order implementing the counterattack plan.

SECTION VI – THE CORPS IN STABILITY FOCUSED OPERATIONS

6-146. The operational reach of the corps is enhanced by its ability to engage in all elements of decisive action. The corps’ mission determines the relative weight of effort given to the conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks. The corps continuously and simultaneously prepares to control forces engaged across the conflict continuum. The corps conducts operations to leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of its force by using the appropriate combination of defeat and stability mechanisms that best accomplish the mission. The corps headquarters contributes to establishing conditions that facilitate future success.

6-147. The importance and resources devoted to accomplishing the elements of decisive action vary with the mission variables of METT-TC. As the corps conducts stability tasks, it uses the stability doctrine found in ADRP 3-07 and other DA approved publications. The corps commander and staff need to temper doctrine with judgment appropriate for the specific situation. They use the mission variables of METT-TC during the command estimate process to appropriately task-organize and plan for the conduct of stability tasks appropriate for the specific conditions currently existing or projected to exist within the corps area of operations. Therefore, the corps does not conduct the five primary stability tasks and their associated subtasks simultaneously in all parts of the corps area of operations, but picks which primary tasks and subtasks to perform. (ATP 3-91, chapter 7, provides a detailed example of how this applies at the division echelon.) The resulting corps plan recognizes that the conduct of stability tasks is a unified effort with other services; governmental agencies; civil, military, and police agencies of the host nation; and international organizations.

6-148. Early identification of situations that require the commitment of corps assets to conduct stability tasks is essential. Early identification provides additional time to conduct planning and specialized training required by the mission variables of METT-TC and political conditions of specific stability tasks. SOF already deployed to the corps’ projected area of operations are used to conduct early assessments because of their interpersonal communications skills, area orientation, and language capabilities.

6-149. Stability doctrine emphasizes the overriding requirement to provide security for corps elements, and, when appropriate, the population in the operational area. The threat is human, nature, or both. Establishing an effective intelligence network and the continued use of available information collection means to identify situational threats is essential.

6-150. Corps planning includes the possibility that subordinate elements focused on the conduct of stability tasks can become engaged in combat operations. In a parallel planning process in the corps’ overall stability line of effort, the commander and staff develop contingency plans to address the need for increased security, possible evacuation, or possible combat operations. This planning process can involve the use of all or some of the corps reserve to reinforce efforts to ensure civil security and civil control. (See ADRP 3-07, FM 3-07, and ATP 3-07.5 for additional information on stability tasks.)

Chapter 7

Special Topics

The special topics discussed in this chapter are aspects of corps operations not adequately addressed in the previous chapters. These special topics include—

• Corps signal operations.

• Corps cyberspace operations.

• Corps airspace control

• Corps information collection.

• Corps fires.

• United States Air Force (USAF) interface in corps operations

• Corps sustainment.

• Corps security

These topics are based on observations of various Mission Command Training Program-supported exercises.

SECTION I – CORPS SIGNAL OPERATIONS

7-1. Effective and reliable communications allow the corps’ Army mission command system to receive and disseminate information throughout the corps’ area of operations. The system also allows the corps to communicate with joint, interorganizational and multinational partners located within and external to the corps’ area of operations.

COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES

7-2. The Army corps is a networked entity. The network links decisions to actions. The corps headquarters and its assigned organizations network with higher, lower, and adjacent military and nonmilitary formations via organic and external network capabilities.

ORGANIC NETWORK CAPABILITIES

7-3. The corps organic network capabilities consist of the Army’s portion of the Department of Defense information network (DODIN), tactical network support, company headquarters, and two command post platoons.

Army Portion of the DODIN

7-4. The Army’s portion of the DODIN consists of globally-interconnected, end-to-end Army information capabilities that encompasses all Army information management (IM) systems and information systems that collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect information worldwide. This includes Army networks that move information to facilitate joint warfighting and supporting operations, from the operational base to tactical formations and the individual Soldier.

Tactical Network Support

7-5. The corps headquarters connects, interfaces with, and draws information from Army and joint networks in garrison and when deployed. When deployed, the corps headquarters interfaces with the Army Service component command (ASCC) or joint task force (JTF) to gain access to required information for mission accomplishment. The Global Command and Control System, and its Army component, Global Command and Control System–Army, are the components of the Army mission command system employed for this purpose.

7-6. The corps headquarters tactical communications systems are mobile, deployable, quick to install, secure, and durable. The corps headquarters network requirements include:

• Extending services from home station to the corps’ area of operations.

• Connecting the corps’ command posts (home station and forward) to higher headquarters, all Service component command headquarters, the ARFOR headquarters (if the corps is not the ARFOR), and special operations forces (SOF).

• Establishing communications with forces assigned, attached, under the operational control (OPCON), or under tactical control (TACON) of the corps headquarters.

7-7. In addition, the corps assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6):

• Coordinates for resources to meet the communication needs of lower echelon organizations without organic communications support that are attached, OPCON, or TACON to the corps headquarters.

• Provides spectrum management operations and deconfliction.

• Coordinates services for remote or nonstandard users, such as multinational forces, host nations, nonstate actors, nongovernmental organizations, and others with unique communications needs.

• As required, coordinates network support for joint enablers without adequate communications.

• Supports liaison operations at corps headquarters and coordinates support for corps liaison personnel at remote locations.

7-8. The corps headquarters is supported by the corps signal, intelligence, and sustainment (SIS) company. (See figure 7-1.) The corps SIS company, as part of the headquarters and headquarters battalion, is configured to provide support to the corps’ main and tactical command posts. The tables of organization and equipment also include the corps G-6 coordinating staff structure. The corps SIS company commander receives technical oversight from the corps G-6

Figure 7-1. The corps SIS company

Company Headquarters

7-9. The corps headquarters and headquarters battalion SIS company provides 24-hour support to the corps headquarters. The company consists of the company headquarters, the corps intelligence cell’s Soldiers, the corps sustainment cell’s Soldiers, two command post signal support platoons, and a cable section. The signal support platoons install, operate, maintain, and defend the communications links connecting the corps main and tactical command posts with higher, lower, and adjacent echelons. (Since this section discusses corps signal operations the SIS company’s intelligence and sustainment cells are not further discussed here.)

7-10. The SIS company headquarters is where the company commander is documented on the table of organization and equipment (TO&E). The company commander supervises the signal elements assigned or attached to the company. The company headquarters also contains personnel and equipment that support the company’s operational mission in garrison or when deployed. The personnel in this section are responsible for company administrative and logistics support. In addition to the company commander, the SIS company headquarters contains the company executive officer, first sergeant, vehicle drivers, and logistics support personnel (supply noncommissioned officer, armorer, and CBRN noncommissioned officer).

Command Post Signal Platoons

7-11. The main and tactical command post signal platoons provide sections to install, operate, and maintain communications and connectivity to the Army and joint networks for the corps’ two command posts. The main command post platoon has a platoon headquarters; a joint network node (JNN) section with two JNN teams and two secure, mobile, anti-jam, reliable tactical terminal (known as SMART-T) teams; and a high- capacity line-of-sight section with two high-capacity line-of-sight teams. The tactical command post platoon has a platoon headquarters; a JNN section with one JNN team and one secure, mobile, anti-jam, reliable tactical terminal team; a high-capacity line-of-sight section with one high-capacity line-of-sight team; and two wireless network extension teams. The cable section supports the main and tactical command posts as required.

Joint Network Node Section

7-12. The JNN section includes JNN teams (Warfighter Information Network–Tactical Increment 1a/b) and secure, mobile, anti-jam, reliable tactical terminal teams. This section installs and operates beyond line-of- sight links, secure voice (tactical and Defense Switched Network), Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (known as NIPRNET), SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), Defense Red Switch Network, and video teleconferencing capabilities. The teams are capable of supporting forcible entry operations.

High-Capacity Line-of-Sight Section

7-13. The high-capacity line-of-sight section provides high-capacity multichannel radio links to augment or replace satellite links where feasible.

Wireless Network Extension Teams

7-14. Wireless network extension teams provide wireless network retransmission, early entry, and en route communications. It also supports unique communications systems such as Land Mobile Radio and Wideband Harris Radio.

Cable and Wire Section (Main Command Post Platoon Only)

7-15. The cable and wire section provides cable and wire teams to the main and tactical command posts as required to install, troubleshoot, repair, and evacuate cable and wire equipment. Cable and wire teams are capable of performing outside plant cable functions once the corps cable infrastructure is established.

EXTERNAL NETWORK CAPABILITIES

7-16. Army corps headquarters can operate at any point across the conflict continuum, and may require access to signal assets from theater level and above. When needed, the corps’ organic communications equipment is augmented by systems from a theater signal command or by a national or strategic asset such as the Joint Communications Support Element. The ASCC’s signal organization—either a signal command (theater) or signal brigade—provides communications and information systems support to the ASCC headquarters, to ASCC subordinate units, and, as required, to joint and multinational organizations throughout the supported geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR). The signal command (theater) commander can assume the roles and responsibilities as the senior signal officer in the theater to include acting as the JTF communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6) or G-6 of the senior Army command.

7-17. The signal command (theater) or signal brigade exercises mission command over signal organizations allocated to the theater. These organizations include theater tactical signal brigades, subordinate expeditionary signal battalions, theater and subordinate strategic signal battalions, the theater network operations and security center, combat camera teams, and a tactical installation and networking company. (Cyber Center of Excellence publications address the operations of these organizations.) The theater signal organizations install, operate, and defend the Army portion of the joint interdependent theater network, including the theater network service center. The theater network service center provides connection, information services, and network operations capabilities. These capabilities enable the corps headquarters and units allocated to the corps to interface with both senior and subordinate units and DODIN. Currently, the corps headquarters and units allocated to the corps can connect to the network through a deployed division tactical hub node.

7-18. Units allocated to the corps that have no organic signal organization can receive dedicated support from an expeditionary signal battalion. They can also locate at a site that permits sharing of existing network support. Exact support requirements and allocations of pooled network resources are determined during the deployment planning process. Following deployment, requests for additional signal support are coordinated by the G-6 through the corps assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3). JP 6-0 and FM 6-02 describe techniques used to provide signal support within a geographic combatant commander’s AOR.

COMMUNICATIONS RESPONSIBILITIES

7-19. Responsibility for communications falls to the corps G-6 and corps headquarters G-6 section. The latter consists of the main command post G-6 section and tactical command post signal systems.

CORPS G-6

7-20. The G-6 oversees and directs the planning, operations, and coordination of information systems and communications to the corps headquarters and attached, OPCON, and TACON units. The G-6 is the senior signal officer in the corps and coordinates with peer counterparts at lower, adjacent, and higher echelons of command to ensure adequate network support. If the corps headquarters serves as the core element for a joint task force (JTF), then the corps G-6 becomes the JTF J-6, unless superseded by a more senior signal officer.

7-21. The corps headquarters G-6 section manages the extension of Defense Switched Network and Army and joint networks services throughout the corps area of operations. It also integrates Army and joint networks assets, including strategic and tactical signal and network operations organizations in support of corps operations. The corps G-6 coordinates with the G-3 to obtain theater resources when network missions exceed the capability of the organic signal units.

7-22. The corps G-6 section is responsible for network operations and IM functions within the corps area of operations. The section provides advice, direction, and guidance concerning network operations. The G-6 develops the corps network architecture and is responsible for Army and joint networks operations within the corps area of operations to include support of subordinate elements, if required. The G-6 section consists of elements to support the main and tactical command posts. These elements are not static and are tailored to the situation.

MAIN COMMAND POST G-6 SECTION

7-23. The main command post is the corps’ primary mission command facility, and, as such, has the largest signal representation. The G-6 section manages connectivity to audio, video, and data systems supporting corps staff elements operating in the main command post. Signal Soldiers are assigned to the corps signal company of the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion, with duty in the main command post. The main command post G-6 section—

• Monitors, manages, and controls organic communications systems that interface with the DODIN.

• Plans signal support for current and future operations.

• Manages installation and operation of the main and tactical command posts local area networks and operates the corps help desk.

• Assists units allocated to the corps with network installation and troubleshooting.

• Serves as the corps information service support office.

The subordinate elements of the G-6 section are organized as shown in figure 7-2.

Figure 7-2. Corps main command post G-6 section

TACTICAL COMMAND POST SIGNAL SYSTEM SUPPORT ELEMENT

7-24. The tactical command post signal systems support element performs functions in the tactical command post similar to functions performed by the G-6 element in the main command post. This element is tailored (augmented or reduced) by the G-6 to meet specific mission requirements. When the tactical command post deploys, the tactical command post signal systems support element manages local equipment and facilities that collect, protect, process, store, display, and disseminate information in the tactical command post. These Soldiers monitor, manage, and control organic communications systems that interface with the DODIN, and manage a set of integrated applications, processes, and services that provide the capability for corps tactical command post staff elements to locate, retrieve, send, and receive information. Network operations functions supporting the tactical command post are performed by the corps network operations and security center located at the main command post.

SECTION II – CORPS CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS

7-25. The corps commander and staff integrate and synchronize cyberspace operations through the conduct of cyber electromagnetic activities regardless of the corps’ assigned role. The corps conducts these activities in accordance with appropriate authorities and legal guidance. It conducts activities to gain and maintain freedom of action in cyberspace, and, as required, achieve periods of cyberspace superiority. Cyberspace superiority is the degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable conduct of operations by that force, and its related land, air, maritime, and space forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by an adversary (JP 3-12). This interference is possible because large portions of cyberspace are not under the control of the corps or other friendly forces and agencies to include joint, interorganizational and multinational partners. Cyberspace superiority establishes conditions that allow corps forces to have freedom of action in cyberspace while denying this same freedom of action to enemies and adversaries. This superiority is usually a temporary condition. The corps, supported by Army and joint cyber teams, conducts cyberspace operations to create and achieve effects in support of the joint force commander’s objectives and desired end state. The corps may or may not have a command relationship with these teams.

7-26. Corps cyberspace operations involve the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Cyberspace operations are categorized into three functions: offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and DODIN operations. These functions are described in joint doctrine as missions that require specific actions in cyberspace.

7-27. Networked information systems exhibit inherent security vulnerabilities. The corps establishes and implements cost-effective, timely, and proactive cybersecurity measures and other corrective actions to mitigate risks before an enemy or adversary can exploit identified vulnerabilities.

7-28. The Army and joint networks that support the corps’ Army mission command systems faces a range of cyberspace threats, including advanced and persistent threats that evade commercially available security tools and defeat generic security best practices. In this dynamic environment, individuals responsible for building, operating, defending, maintaining, and ensuring the continuity of these information networks need to maintain a unified and resilient capability to minimize the impact of threats on mission operations. This capability adapts to changes in the threat environment. The threat from adversaries to Army and joint networks degrades the corps’ ability to maintain current and future warfighting capabilities. While threats are difficult to completely eliminate and are likely to evolve over time, a proactive, progressive, and coordinated approach is important to detecting and responding to cyber events and incidents that can adversely affect corps operations and Army and joint networks.

7-29. The corps employs organic capabilities and coordinates for nonorganic capabilities inside and outside of DODIN to accomplish various network operations functions and tasks in support of cyberspace operations. The corps commander and staff are responsible for certain activities in support of cyberspace operations occurring primarily outside of the DODIN when the corps is operating as a tactical echelon. The key staff members involved in these activities includes the corps G-2, G-3, chief of fires, and cyber electromagnetic activities element. The following activities are performed by the corps commander and staff:

• Plan, coordinate, integrate, prepare for and conduct (as required) cyberspace operations functions including offensive cyber operations and defensive cyber operations-response actions. (See joint doctrine for additional information on cyberspace operations.)

• Request, plan for, employ, and allocate (as appropriate) joint cyberspace operations capabilities to subordinate forces.

• Receive OPCON or similar supporting relationship of cyberspace support element to facilitate cyberspace operations in support of the corps mission.

• Coordinate for employment of cyber mission force and other enablers as directed by higher headquarters in support of corps cyberspace operations.

• Coordinate with intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) to integrate and synchronize Army information collection efforts with joint cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) efforts in support of cyberspace operations.

• Coordinate with JTF staff to integrate reinforcing and complementary effects in conjunction with corps cyberspace operations.

• Prepare and submit cyber effects request forms through corps cyber electromagnetic activities element to JTF as required.

7-30. The corps commander and staff are responsible for certain activities in support of cyberspace operations occurring primarily inside of the DODIN. The key staff members involved in these activities include the corps G-2, G-3, G-6 (supported by the corps network operations support center and corps signal company) and cyber electromagnetic activities element. The following activities are performed by the corps commander and staff (this list is not all inclusive):

• Plan, coordinate, integrate, prepare for and conduct cyberspace operations functions including DODIN operations and defensive cyber operations internal defensive measures and response actions. (See joint doctrine for additional information on cyberspace operations.)

• Oversee and direct the planning, operations, and coordination of all matters concerning network operations, network transport, information services, and spectrum management operations for the corps headquarters and assigned units.

• Establish the corps information network (DODIN inclusive of Army and joint networks) and provide operational and technical support to subordinate signal elements.

• Engineer, install, operate, maintain, and defend the corps network enterprise systems.

• Provide network operations and management facilities to include a network command element, cybersecurity communications network defense, and communications security account.

• Establish and implement procedures for relevant information and information systems to develop and disseminate the common operational picture (COP).

• Coordinate, plan, and direct cybersecurity activities.

• Monitor the health of the network and direct the management of network faults, configurations, resource allocation, performance, and security.

• Coordinate with the regional cyber center for matters concerning event and incident management, networthiness violations, network operations tools, and cybersecurity tools.

• Prepare and submit cyber effects request forms to JTF.

7-31. The presence of multinational forces in the corps’ battle rhythm complicates its ability to conduct cyberspace operations because of potential differences in national caveats, rules of engagement, and approval authorities, in addition to any differences in hardware and software. (See JP 3-12 for joint cyberspace operations. FM 3-38 provides additional details of Army cyber electromagnetic activities.)

SECTION III – CORPS AIRSPACE CONTROL

7-32. The application of airspace control and its elements apply to the four roles of the corps headquarters during operations. JP 3-30 establishes joint doctrine for the corps as a JTF, land component command (LCC), and ARFOR headquarters, while FM 3-52 establishes Army airspace control doctrine for corps as the Army’s senior tactical headquarters. (For clarity, the airspace responsibilities for each role—JTF, LCC, ARFOR, and tactical headquarters—are discussed separately.) During operations, a headquarters formed around the core of the corps headquarters can serve as both the LCC and the ARFOR headquarters. However, the preferred approach is not to combine roles. If a corps is assigned multiple roles, the corps is responsible for the airspace control tasks for each role. (See chapter 1 for a discussion on the four roles of a corps headquarters.)

AIRSPACE CONTROL APPLICATION

7-33. Each operational area has unique airspace control requirements for its various airspace users to include joint, multinational, intergovernmental, civil, and Army (air and missile defense, Army aviation, unmanned aircraft, and field artillery). Airspace control includes coordinating, integrating, and regulating airspace to increase operational effectiveness. Depending on the nature of the operation, airspace control in the corps’ area of operations can range from the host nation having control over the airspace, where the joint force commander has limited authority, to the joint force commander having full responsibility of airspace control over the joint operations area for all military and civil airspace users. The roles of a JTF, LCC, or the Army’s senior tactical echelon affects how the corps commander and staff conduct airspace control within its assigned airspace.

JOINT TASK FORCE-LEVEL AIRSPACE CONTROL (CORPS AS A JOINT TASK FORCE)

7-34. When functioning as a JTF, an Army corps is supported by the combatant commander’s airspace control authority (ACA). The ACA is assigned to the JFACC and operates from the joint air operations center (JAOC). The ACA is responsible for providing the JTF with effective airspace control in the joint operations area. The JTF provides the ACA with airspace use priorities and acceptable risk guidance, approves relevant portions of the airspace control plan (ACP), and, when necessary, adjudicates the ACA’s unresolved conflicts in airspace use between JTF components that are not resolvable by the ACA. The JTF is not involved with the production of the airspace control order (ACO), air tasking order (ATO), or immediate changes to these documents unless to resolve conflicts among the components. Depending on need, the JFACC can establish a joint air component coordination element (JACCE) to better integrate joint air operations with other JTF operations.

LAND COMPONENT COMMAND-LEVEL AIRSPACE CONTROL (CORPS AS A LAND COMPONENT COMMAND)

7-35. The commander, joint task force (CJTF) and other services have tasks and responsibilities in support of airspace control when an Army corps headquarters forms the base of an LCC headquarters. LCC airspace control requirements are discussed in detail in JP 3-31.

7-36. As discussed in JP 3-31, the corps airspace responsibilities as a LCC headquarters are in the developing of plans and orders and exercising staff supervision or cognizance over the airspace control within a designated area of operations according to guidance provided by the ACP, the ACO, the area air defense plan (AADP), and the special instructions located in the ATO. Airspace control assures deconfliction, minimizes the risk of friendly fire incidents, and optimizes joint force capabilities in support of the CJTF’s objectives.

7-37. The LCC commander, chief of staff, and J-3 are responsible for training the LCC headquarters airspace element to establish LCC airspace management procedures and its relation with the combatant commander’s ACA. Additionally, the LCC headquarters airspace element submits airspace control requests, coordinating altitudes, and other ACMs to the ACA for approval.

7-38. The LCC staff identifies and understands the airspace requirements and capabilities of joint, interorganizational and multinational partners to develop an airspace control system that enables the strengths of some resources while identifying possible risks associated with utilizing other resources. For example, the LCC commander can have TACON of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). MAGTF integration with the LCC airspace element depends on the size and capabilities of the MAGTF. The MAGTF’s aviation combat element includes Marine air command and control system capabilities tailored for the size of the aviation combat element. Smaller regimental-based MAGTFs (with their UAS and helicopters) can integrate in a similar manner with brigade combat teams (BCTs). Large MAGTFs bring the full joint capability to control airspace over the MAGTF area of operations. Large MAGTFs often include a division-based Marine expeditionary force with both Marine rotary and fixed wing aviation, as well as a robust Marine air command and control system. In this case, the LCC commander authorizes the MAGTF to coordinate directly (direct liaison authorized [known as DIRLAUTH]) with the joint air operations center and airspace control authority (ACA) for MAGTF airspace and air operations.

Planning

7-39. The LCC is responsible for ensuring the airspace requirements of the LCC are properly addressed during the development of the CJTF’s ACP and CJTF airspace priorities and risk guidance. To optimize airspace use, the LCC provides inputs into the CJTF-approved joint operational AADP and the ACP.

7-40. The LCC staff analyzes the ACP and the initial ACO once published to determine the constraints placed on the LCC as a result of the ACO. The LCC is responsible for ensuring that an integrated set of ACMs is provided to the ACA for use in developing daily ACOs, which is based on the composition of the LCC. A robust MAGTAF is allowed to submit its airspace requirements directly to the ACA while the LCC integrates airspace requests from formations with lesser capabilities. Conversely, failure to take into account airspace planning guidance published in the ACO, the ATO and AADP can cause unnecessary friction between the LCC and other service components.

7-41. The CJTF can designate the LCC commander as the joint security area coordinator to ensure the surface area requirements and priorities for the joint security area (known as JSA) are integrated in the JTF’s overall security requirements. The joint security area air defense concerns are also coordinated with the area air defense commander (AADC) who is responsible for defending the airspace over the entire joint operations area.

Execution

7-42. The LCC delegates the control of airspace to the lowest level of command capable of controlling it, such as the MAGTAF with direct air support centers (known as DASCs) and tactical air operations center (known as TAOCs) and an Army division joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC). (See ATP 3-91.1.) (See MCWP 3-25.5 for information about tactical air operations centers.) Direct liaison authorized between airspace control agencies such as a JAGIC and a JFACC control and reporting center (CRC) are used. The LCC is not involved in changes to the ACO during execution unless a subordinate unit requires assistance. For immediate changes, the JFACC airspace control element can directly access the AOC air operations database manager without going through the supporting battlefield coordination detachment (BCD). The technology that allows this to happen is fielded, but the business rules that allow this to happened are currently different in each combatant commander’s AOR. An agreement between the JAGIC and the CRC to adjust a Gray Eagle should not need AOC and BCD approval.

Coordination With Other Services

7-43. When the corps is an LCC, a BCD facilitates communication of the LCC priorities with the JFACC’s JAOC. Colocation of a JACCE or an air component coordination element with the LCC command post facilitates redundancy of communication, ensuring the LCC requirements are clearly relayed to the JFACC.

CORPS-LEVEL AIRSPACE CONTROL (CORPS AS ARFOR)

7-44. As the ARFOR, the corps does not usually have airspace control responsibilities within a joint operations area. If the corps has Army airspace users under ASCC control operating in the corps area of operations, such as theater aviation, theater medical, and ASCC airfield units, the ARFOR is responsible for airspace control for these units and has the responsibility of integrating their airspace requirements.

CORPS-LEVEL AIRSPACE CONTROL AS A SENIOR TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS

7-45. When the corps is a designated tactical headquarters, it has more complex airspace challenges than a division. The corps’ area of operations is larger than a division’s area of operations. The airspace users over the corps are more complex in the type of airspace use, with most airspace users belonging to joint, interorganizational and multinational partner and not under corps control. A division with a JAGIC can use procedural control to control airspace use over the division’s area of operations, but the size and complexity of the corps area of operations requires an airspace control element trained and certified to provide positive control for Army and joint, interorganizational and multinational partner aircraft, which is beyond the capability of a JAGIC to control.

7-46. The corps headquarters decentralizes airspace control to subordinate elements within their respective areas of operations for the execution of operations when developing the corps airspace control appendix. The corps authorizes direct liaison authorized between subordinate elements and other theater air-ground system (TAGS) airspace control nodes provided by other Services to minimize risk and maximize effectiveness. These entities include USAF CRCs and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), United States Marine Corps (USMC) direct air support center and tactical AOC, and other airspace control entities for rapid resolution of airspace issues. However, even when authorizing direct liaison authorized to subordinate units, the corps retains responsibility for policies and for the development of future airspace use. The corps airspace element processes airspace requests and unit airspace plans for future ACOs while allowing subordinate elements to make airspace changes during execution directly with the appropriate controlling agency. (For additional information see ATP 3-52.2.)

7-47. The corps understands airspace control guidance published in the ACO, ATO, AADP, and LCC orders. The corps takes into account placement of the fire support coordination line (FSCL) and its impact on the operations of other components. Failure to understand these requirements can cause delays in clearing airspace or impact the operations of another component. During planning, the corps plans airspace use for Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) fires and Army aviation.

7-48. The corps airspace element also manages the airspace control working group. For airspace control, the airspace control working group facilitates and synchronizes contributions from all the elements that perform the airspace collective tasks. The airspace control working group typically consists of an air liaison officer and representatives from the airspace element, aviation element, fires cell (field artillery and air and missile defense), tactical air control party (TACP), and UAS element (if attached).

7-49. The corps headquarters provides airspace control resources to support multinational forces under the OPCON of the corps. Corps airspace control planners support multinational forces with the same resources support as the Army functional brigades working directly for the corps. (See FM 3-52 for additional information on Army airspace control.)

CORPS FUTURE OPERATIONS AND PLANS INTEGRATING CELLS

7-50. The corps planning cells, future operations for short-term planning, and plans for long-range planning coordinate with the airspace control section to ensure the integration of air maneuver, fires, and protection airspace requirements. This input is forwarded to the BCD in the joint AOC for input into the theater’s ACO and the daily ATO.

7-51. During operations, the corps’ three integrating cells in the main command post—current operations, future operations, and plans cells—rely on the airspace control element for input to operation orders, operation plans, branches, and sequels. These inputs include analyzing the course of action during planning, appropriate ACMs to support current and future operations, and recommended changes to the theater ACP.

CORPS FIRES CELL

7-52. The corps airspace control element coordinates with the fires cell to ensure that the corps ACP is coordinated with fire support coordination measures (FSCMs). Although the airspace control element reviews and integrates the fire support overlay with other airspace requirements, FSCMs are sent to higher headquarters through fires communications systems. The airspace control element and the fire cell ensure the corps standard operating procedures (SOPs) and the respective appendices to annexes address the procedures for requesting FSCMs and ACMs. This coordination also applies to control measures such as joint fires areas, counterfire, restricted operations zones, and airspace coordination areas. If a conflict exists between the fires plan and the ACO, the airspace control element coordinates with the higher headquarters airspace elements to correct or modify the appropriate airspace coordinating measure.

7-53. The air and missile defense section in the main command post fires cell is the primary staff element for the coordination of air and missile defense activities in the corps. This section is responsible for integrating into the joint tactical digital information link network and for the production of the corps airspace common operating picture. The airspace control element coordinates with this section to ensure that the corps has the necessary resources to provide a complete and timely airspace picture. It plans the employment of air defense radars and air and missile defense weapon systems in support of corps operations along with the provision of the appropriate communications links. The airspace control element ensures that air and missile defense airspace requirements integrate with the corps and division ACPs. They process ACMs requests or forward them to higher headquarters as required. The tactical airspace integration system interfaces with Army and joint command and control systems and provides a direct link to the TAGS through an interface with the theater battle management core system.

CORPS AVIATION SECTION

7-54. Army aviation depends on the effective use of airspace to accomplish missions. Rotary and fixed wing assets are conducted close to the ground and used to shape ground maneuver operations. Army aviation provides manned and unmanned aircraft mission data to the airspace control element. The airspace control element ensures that aviation airspace requirements are integrated into the corps ACP.

7-55. Most aviation mission planning is conducted by the combat aviation brigade staff. However, the corps aviation section in the current operations integrating cell can perform some aviation mission planning. The airspace control element supports the aviation element by taking aviation mission planning data and building the appropriate ACMs necessary to facilitate the mission. The airspace control element, with air traffic service officers and noncommissioned officers, provide the aviation section with air traffic service expertise to assist with planning the use of air traffic service assets.

SECTION IV – THE CORPS IN INFORMATION COLLECTION

7-56. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). Information collection involves the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements to include:

• Planning requirements and assess collection

• Task and direct collection.

• Execute collection.

The corps’ responsibility for information depends on which of the four roles the corps headquarters performs. (The four roles of the corps are discussed in chapter 1.)

PLAN REQUIREMENTS AND ASSESS COLLECTION

7-57. Plan requirements and assess collection is the task of analyzing requirements, evaluating available assets (internal and external), recommending to the operations staff taskings for information collection assets, submitting requests for information for adjacent and higher collection support, and assessing the effectiveness of the information collection plan (ATP 2-01). It is a commander-driven, coordinated staff effort led by the corps assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2). The continuous functions of planning requirements and assessing collection identify the best way to satisfy the requirements of the corps commander and staff.

7-58. The corps intelligence cell collaborates with the three integrating cells—current operations, future operations, and plans—and the rest of the corps staff, regardless of the corps role, to receive and validate requirements for collection, prepare the requirements planning tools, recommend collection assets and capabilities to the three integrating cells, and maintain synchronization as an operations progress. The corps commander directs information collection activities by:

• Asking the right questions to focus the efforts of the staff.

• Knowing the enemy. (Personal involvement and knowledge have no substitutes.)

• Stating the commander’s intent clearly and decisively when designating the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).

• Understanding the information collection assets and resources to exploit the asset’s full effectiveness.

The success of information collection is measured by its contribution to the commander’s understanding, visualization, and decisionmaking.

WHEN THE CORPS IS A TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS

7-59. The corps commander depends on information collection assets to assist in developing the situation and identifying exploitable opportunities by collecting and reporting information. The corps supporting expeditionary military intelligence brigade (E-MIB) and subordinate divisions and brigades contains both ground and air assets. Additionally, the corps commander relies on national and theater resources to fill information collection gaps as necessary.

7-60. The corps G-2 is the chief of the intelligence warfighting function for the corps. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations (ADRP 3-0). The G-2 is the principal staff officer responsible for providing intelligence to support current and future operations and plans. The G-2 gathers and analyzes information on enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations for the corps commander. The G-2 is responsible for the preparation of annex B (Intelligence) and assists the corps G-3 in the preparation of annex L (Information Collection).

7-61. The G-2 advises the corps commander on the use of organic (E-MIB) and attached intelligence assets. The G-2 assists the G-3 in planning and executing information collection operations to include synchronizing intelligence operations. To ensure effective synchronization, the G-2 and the E-MIB commander coordinate requirements with the G-3. (See ATP 2-19.3 for additional information on G-2 duties and responsibilities).

7-62. The G-2 with the G-3 helps the commander coordinate, integrate, and supervise the execution of information collection plans and operations. The G-2 helps the commander focus and integrate these assets and resources to satisfy the corps intelligence requirements. FM 6-0 states the specific responsibilities of the G-2, which include, but are not limited to—

• Overseeing the intelligence functional cell, specifically situation development, target development, support to lethal and nonlethal targeting, support to indications and warnings, support to assessment, and support to protection.

• Providing the commander and staff with assessments of threat capabilities, intentions, and courses of action as they relate to the division or corps and its mission.

• Identifying gaps in intelligence and developing collection strategies.

• Disseminating intelligence products throughout the unit (battalion through corps) as well as to higher and subordinate headquarters.

• Answering requests for information from subordinate commanders, staffs, and higher and adjacent units.

• Coordinating the units’ intelligence requirements with supporting higher, lateral, and subordinate echelons.

• Overseeing intelligence contributions to planning requirements and assessing collection.

• Participating with staff in performing intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

• Monitoring intelligence operations.

• Ensuring ongoing intelligence operations are collecting information needed for anticipated decisions or other priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).

• Ensuring information concerning the PIRs is processed and analyzed first.

• Recommending changes to the information collection plan based on changes in the situation and weather.

• Counterintelligence responsibilities including, but are not limited to—

◦ Coordinating counterintelligence activities.

◦ Identifying enemy intelligence collection capabilities, such as efforts targeted against the unit.

◦ Evaluating enemy intelligence capabilities as they affect operations security, signals security, countersurveillance, security operations, military deception planning, MISO, and protection.

◦ Vetting contractors and their employees to deter subversive insurgent activities.

• Support to security programs to include—

◦ Supervising the command and personnel security programs.

◦ Supporting the G-3 and G-6 by evaluating physical security vulnerabilities.

◦ Performing staff planning and supervising the special security office.

WHEN THE CORPS IS A JOINT HEADQUARTERS

7-63. A corps headquarters in an operational role is exposed to numerous non-Army participants. Multinational formations, host-nation forces, governmental agencies, contractors, and nongovernmental organizations are located in the operational area. Each participant has distinct characteristics, vocabulary, and culture, and all can contribute to situational understanding. Commanders, Soldiers, and those who gather information benefit by working with and leveraging the capabilities of these entities.

7-64. The corps uses joint ISR doctrine if the corps is operating in the role of a JTF or LCC headquarters. In this case, the J-2 controls joint ISR’s collection systems, which are intelligence assets and resources. ISR collection systems are different from Army information collection. Joint ISR doctrine does not include reconnaissance and surveillance units. Joint usage of reconnaissance and surveillance refers to the missions conducted by airborne assets. Integration and interdependence are two key concepts that influence how the Army conducts joint ISR in the joint operations area. JP 2-0 describes doctrine for intelligence support to joint operations to include the nature and principles of joint intelligence. It also describes joint intelligence organizations and responsibilities to include joint, interagency, and multinational intelligence sharing and cooperation. A corps G-2 acting as a J-2, with the responsibility to control joint ISR collection systems, requires augmentation from USAF, E-MIB, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), and perhaps a battlefield surveillance brigade. JP 2-01 describes joint intelligence support to military operations. ATP 2-19.3, appendix A contains a checklist for the corps G-2 for planning information collection. ATP 2- 01, appendix B addresses planning considerations for joint, national, and multinational information collection.

7-65. The responsibilities and authorities of a J-2 versus a G-2 are similar in nature. However, the J-2 has a larger scope in which to employ responsibilities. These responsibilities include the integration of national level and INSCOM support, understanding joint special operational task force collection priorities, and managing additional national and multinational assets. Therefore, J-2 has correspondingly greater authorities. The J-2 inherits the responsibility to coordinate, integrate, synchronize and deconflict national, theater and subordinate collection operations. Furthermore, the J-2 also determines the need for a joint fusion cell, if required, for specific mission support. (See JP 2-0 for additional information on the operations of a joint fusion cell.) While the G-2 can liaison with these entities, the primary responsibility lies with the J-2. The G-2 and a JTF or LCC J-2 conducts all-source, multidiscipline intelligence operations and ensures full access to an uninhibited flow of information from all sources in accordance with DOD and Director of National Intelligence approved procedures.

Note. A full understanding of the operational environment typically requires cross-functional participation by other joint force staff elements and collaboration with various intelligence organizations, other interagency organizations, nongovernmental organizations, intergovern- mental organizations, and centers of excellence.

7-66. The roles and functions of a J-2 generally include additional authorities not provided to the G-2 that vary based on the scope of the joint force’s mission and required support relationships. The J-2 develops and recommends PIRs based on the joint force commander’s guidance, identifies shortfalls in intelligence capabilities, submits requests for additional augmentation, and ensures the intelligence needs of the joint force commander and joint staff are satisfied in a timely manner. Additionally, at the discretion of the joint force commander, the J-2 provides administrative support to augmentation forces and the joint intelligence support element (JISE) or joint intelligence operations center (JIOC). Administrative support includes personnel, information, and physical security. Generally, a J-2 is required to conduct the following activities:

• Plan and direct the overall intelligence effort on behalf of the joint force commander.

• Publish and supervise technical control channels for intelligence assets.

• Oversee the development and function of a joint fusion cell if required.

• Provide situation awareness to the joint force commander, joint staff directorates, and other staff elements, including functional and service components, if applicable.

• Integrate all-source intelligence and relevant information into the joint force specific COP.

• Manage the joint force collection plan using all assigned joint ISR capabilities and ISR assets in direct support.

• Request additional intelligence capability from the unified combatant command’s JIOC.

• Publish foreign disclosure policies and training requirements in accordance with DODD 5230.11.

• Request production of joint force joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) products by the combatant command JIOC.

• Integrate JIPOE products into joint force intelligence assessments.

• Establish an intelligence architecture that supports the commander’s decision making.

• Publish the intelligence reporting portion of the JTF SOPs, which facilitates KM, timely situational understanding, and protects the source and means of collection from unauthorized disclosure.

• Provide continuous threat warning to the joint force commander, joint staff directorates, component units, and multinational forces, as appropriate.

• Provide targeting expertise, target materials and products, battle damage assessment (BDA), and intelligence inputs for combat assessment as necessary.

• Conduct liaison and provide intelligence products and support to the following joint force entities, as applicable:

◦ Joint targeting coordination board.

◦ Joint collection management board.

◦ Joint IO cell.

◦ Joint personnel recovery team.

◦ Civil-military operations cell.

◦ Joint planning groups.

◦ Geospatial intelligence (known as GEOINT) cell.

◦ Red team cell.

◦ Joint fusion cell.

◦ JIPOE coordination cell.

◦ Joint special operations task force.

7-67. JP 2-01, appendix B provides a reference guide in the form of a checklist to assist the corps G-2 if required to function as a J-2. The ten principles of joint intelligence—perspective, synchronization, integrity, unity of effort, prioritization, excellence, prediction, agility, collaboration, and fusion—from JP 2-0 apply in this event.

WHEN THE CORPS IS A MULTINATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

7-68. The multinational force executes information collection activities. While centralized control is important to this process, it is unattainable as it applies to intelligence. Intelligence is a national responsibility. It is unlikely that all nations constituting the multinational force make all of their sources available for the corps headquarters to task due to the nature of many intelligence sources. Only limited multinational assets and intelligence are at the corps’ disposal. Most assets remain under national control. Many nations co-locate a national intelligence cell with the corps main command post. Corps tasking of multinational partner assets and support by multinational partner assets to the multinational force flow through these national cells. Additionally, national caveats on information sharing inhibit transparency or a clean intelligence architecture. The joint headquarters chief of staff advises on how the headquarters addresses national caveats, foreign disclosure, and reporting channels.

7-69. Confusing factors of language, differing tasking and request channels and formats, information classification and releasability concerns, and national sensitivities affect information collection in a multinational environment. The corps commander and staff coordinate with the Department of State to develop agreements when working with nations that are not part of an alliance with the U.S. A corps G-2, even if operating as a J-2, does not have the authority to negotiate these agreements for national intelligence sharing. The G-2 understands, publishes, and educates Soldiers on these agreements in addition to supervising the foreign disclosure program. The information sharing agreements between nations specify the conduct of information collection activities and what, if any, restrictions are placed on the sharing of intelligence developed from collection activities. This agreement specifies declassification procedures.

7-70. The capabilities and number of information collection systems available, the availability to process that information, and the means to report information by each nation vary widely. G-2 and G-3 staff officers planning multinational intelligence operations account for these considerations during the planning phase. The synchronization manager in the G-2 accordingly accounts for these considerations when making tasking recommendations to the G-3. The synchronization manager matches various sources with requirements to answer CCIRs. Sharing and mutual support are key to integrating all resources into a unified system to best meet the command’s intelligence requirements.

7-71. A corps commander provides a clear mission statement, commander’s intent, and the CCIRs to the G- 2 to exercise discipline initiative. The G-2 prioritizes intelligence requirements to meet the commander’s needs. The G-3 remains responsible for the tasking of specific information collection assets.

7-72. Operational security, national information sharing caveats, and counterintelligence operations when operating as a multinational headquarters continuously challenge trust and unity of effort between partners. The corps can use a fusion cell to address issues that damage trust or international relations. (See FM 3-16, chapter 4 for additional information concerning information collection and intelligence in multinational operations.)

TASK AND DIRECT COLLECTION

7-73. Information collection assets are typically in high demand. Requirements exceed platform capabilities and inventory. Tasking and directing these multidiscipline assets requires close coordination between the G- 2, G-3, and JFACC. If operating as a tactical headquarters, the corps G-2 develops and recommends optimized sourcing solutions for information collection unit and system capabilities. The corps G-3 (based on recommendations from the staff) tasks, directs, and, when necessary, retasks the corps available information collection assets, which occurs regardless of the role of the corps headquarters. These taskings are based on recommendations from the corps integrating and functional cells. Tasking and directing of limited information collection assets is vital to their control and effective use. The corps staff accomplishes tasking of information collection assets by issuing warning orders, fragmentary orders, and operation orders. It accomplishes the directing of information collection assets by continuously monitoring the operation. The corps G-3 conducts retasking to refine, update, or create new requirements. (See FM 3-55.)

7-74. Planning linking the information collection efforts of the corps (which are most likely to be operational in nature) with the information collection efforts of subordinate divisions and brigade planning operations is complex. For general planning considerations, corps collection managers assist the G-2 and G-3 in developing an information collection plan. The plan maximizes the use of organic information collection assets to answer CCIRs, and to direct fires and facilitate maneuver to include using attached signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), counterintelligence (known as CI), and tactical reconnaissance provided by the E-MIB. (The corps commander, through the integrating cells, tasks and dynamically retasks the corps organic information collection assets to support the operations of subordinate divisions and shape the corps area of operations before commencing branches and sequels to the current operation.) The plan judiciously uses subordinate division and brigade information collection assets, reserving their use only for critical command requirements. (Subordinate division and brigade collection assets are used to support targeting within the range of their command’s indirect fire weapons. Subordinate unit collection assets also assist in maintaining unit security and other protection efforts.) The plan also integrates theater- and national-level information collection assets based on need to build redundancy. (Corps collection managers use a mix of collection methods—cueing, mixing, redundancy, and task organization— to use limited assets most effectively and collect the most critical information with the fewest assets as quickly as possible.)

NATIONAL REQUESTS

7-75. Depending upon local procedures and systems available, the corps G-2 staff uses various means to submit a request for information (RFI). The following guidelines can help the G-2 staff access national-level resources to answer different requests for information:

• Know the PIRs and identify gaps that exist in the intelligence database and products.

• Know what collection assets are available from supporting and supported forces.

• Understand the timeline for preplanned and dynamic collection requests for particular assets.

• Identify collection assets and dissemination systems that help answer the commander’s PIRs.

• Ensure liaison and coordination elements are aware of PIRs and timelines for satisfaction.

• Ensure PIRs are tied to operational decisions.

• During planning, identify collection requirements and trained analyst augmentation required to support post-strike BDA or other analysis requirements.

• Plan for cueing to exploit collection platforms.

DECONFLICTION, SYNCHRONIZATION, AND PRIORITIZATION

7-76. Staff responsibilities for reconnaissance are clear (although different staff sections and elements have oversight over different reconnaissance means). While the corps chief of staff coordinates the efforts of the coordinating and special staff, the corps G-3 has primary responsibility for the reconnaissance supporting an operation. The G-3 has staff responsibility for ground and air maneuver units. The G-2 has responsibility for the technical collection mission assets.

7-77. Although coordinating and special staff officers have reconnaissance responsibilities, the G-2 and the G-3 deconflict and synchronize planning efforts to conduct information collection operations. The G-3, in coordination with the G-2, prioritizes the importance and priority of the CCIRs, IRs, and targeting because the information required exceeds the ability of available assets to collect against the requirements. The G-3 is also responsible for integrating information collection into the overall plan to include tasking subordinate units and systems to collect information. The G-3 is responsible for preparing annex L (Reconnaissance and Surveillance), of the plan or order. The chief of staff remains aware of the corps’ information collection activities and ensures that the G-2 and G-3 synchronize their efforts. The chief of staff intervenes when necessary, but the commander is the final authority.

INFORMATION COLLECTION ASSETS BY ECHELON

7-78. The specific assets available to the corps depend on the role assigned to the corps head-quarters. Depending on that role the corps intelligence cell receives staff augmentation.

NATIONAL INFORMATION COLLECTION ASSETS

7-79. National-level assets available to support corps information collection include the seventeen members of the national intelligence community. Both military and non-military members of the intelligence community routinely provide support to joint force commanders. Nonmilitary members include the Department of State, Department of Energy, Department of the Treasury, Department of Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Military members include the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and the four service intelligence organizations. National information collection assets are a major source of geospatial intelligence (known as GEOINT) for the corps (encompassing all aspects of imagery and geospatial information and services). In most major operations, a national intelligence support team (known as a NIST) containing representatives of some or all members of the national intelligence community deploy into the joint operations area. These representatives provide the joint force commander with reachback capabilities into the parent organizations. JP 2-0 describes the capabilities of the members of the national intelligence community.

7-80. Information collection support to the corps is enhanced by the corps’ ability to reachback to the Information Dominance Center at INSCOM through the limited capabilities of the TROJAN system. Within the Information Dominance Center, INSCOM’s intelligence operations center synchronizes multi-disciplined intelligence support to the corps with intelligence analysis and reporting, all source intelligence analysis and fusion, request for IM, synchronization and management of collection effort, answering PIRs, filling information gaps, and producing and disseminating intelligence information and products. The INSCOM intelligence operations center uniquely fuses all source intelligence information, overlaid with collaborative products, from the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and combatant commanders to support counterterrorism, counternarcotics, counterintelligence, and information related activities. The INSCOM Intelligence Operations Center supports the corps with a secure analytic exchange and collaboration network that enhances the ability to push, pull, share, discuss, and visualize key intelligence information in near real time.

ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND INFORMATION COLLECTION ASSETS

7-81. The military intelligence brigade (theater) provides regionally-focused intelligence overwatch to the corps to include support for information collection activities. This brigade consists of an operations battalion, two forward collection battalions (one for SIGINT and one for counterintelligence [known as CI] and HUMINT), a strategic SIGINT battalion, and a theater support battalion. The brigade has web-based intelligence processors connected to the joint worldwide intelligence communications system (known as JWICS), SIPRNET, Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), and the National Security Agency Network (known as NSANET). These processors allow data sharing with all members of the Army and DOD intelligence enterprise. The processors are interoperable with the corps’ Army mission command system.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE INFORMATION COLLECTION ASSETS

7-82. The corps headquarters can request USAF assets to meet the information collection requirements within the corps’ deep area, just as it depends on theater and national assets to collect information in the corps area of interest. The tactical information collection assets found in subordinate divisions and brigades are needed to answer the information collection requirements of tactical commanders. These tactical information collection assets do not normally have the capability to collect information in a timely manner at extended ranges from their current locations.

7-83. The corps headquarters has a JACCE located at the corps main command post when the corps is operating in an operational role as an LCC. The JACCE is the USAF component-level liaison that facilitates coordination between the AFFOR and functional or component headquarters. When the CJTF designates a JFACC, the JACCE serves as a direct representative of the JFACC to coordinate the senior 7-83, er’s forecasted requirements with the AOC. The JACCE is organized to coordinate ISR, plans, operations, airspace, air mobility, and other support requirements with the corps. The corps supporting the USAF air support operations group (ASOG) works with the AOC to synchronize air support missions according to the corps’ prioritized requirements that are not sourced by organic means. The JACCE, ASOG air liaison officer, and BCD cross-talk and have a close working relationship with the corps commander to understand the corps’ air support requirements.

7-84. The Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (also referred to as the AN/GSQ-272 SENTINEL weapon system) is the USAF’s primary ISR collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination system. It is the primary system used by the USAF when the corps’ approved information collection requirements are transmitted to the supporting AOC. This system employs a global communications architecture that connects multiple intelligence platforms and sensors. The system produces intelligence information from data collected by a variety of sensors on the U-2 and MC-12 aircraft, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial system (UAS), and other ISR platforms.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INFORMATION COLLECTION ASSETS

7-85. When corps conventional forces and SOF operate in the same operational area simultaneously close coordination is required. Conventional forces and SOF can complement one another in a number of areas, including information collection activities. SOF operating within the corps area of operations or area of interest possess a high degree of cultural awareness due to their extensive training, experience, and regional orientation. At least one or two members of every operational detachment or its accompanying interpreters need to know how to communicate in the local language. SOF can provide the corps’ conventional forces with special reconnaissance capabilities, positive identification of targets, target marking and terminal guidance, BDA, information on indigenous forces, and combat weather support. Conventional forces can provide SOF with robust fire support, multiple attack resource options, lethal and nonlethal effects, and other resources available to heavier forces. The corps headquarters receives a special operations command and control element to synchronize special operations with conventional operations if it operates other than as a tactical headquarters, which occurs regardless of the command or support relationship the special operations element has with the headquarters. This element is responsible for the synchronization, integration, and deconfliction of all operations of the SOF with the corps conventional forces, not just information collection operations. (See ATP 3-18.4 for additional information on Special Forces reconnaissance.)

EXPEDITIONARY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE INFORMATION COLLECTION ASSETS

7-86. As part of Intel 2020, the Army plans to establish new and separate brigade-level commands to enhance the intelligence capability in each of the Army’s three programmed corps. These commands are E-MIBs designed to conduct intelligence operations to support decisive action. An E-MIB provides the following capabilities:

• Counterintelligence collection and activities.

• HUMINT collection.

• SIGINT collection.

E-MIBs can also augment corps, division, and BCT intelligence cells, specifically aiding the PED of national and theater SIGINT and geospatial intelligence (known as GEOINT).

7-87. E-MIBs, along with reconnaissance and surveillance brigades programmed as part of the Army 2020 force, are the primary information collection assets assigned or attached to corps and division commands. The E-MIB conducts multidiscipline intelligence operations to support corps and division operational requirements to include serving as the military intelligence force provider for BCTs. When directed, the E- MIB commander provides mission command and coordination of military intelligence forces in theater. An E-MIB includes the following assets allocated across the corps to augment existing capabilities:

• Six PED platoons.

• Two multifunctional platoons.

• Four counterintelligence operations management teams.

• Twelve HUMINT collection teams.

(See ATP 2-19.3 for more information on the E-MIB.)

7-88. Instead of deploying the E-MIB as a unit to conduct independent intelligence operations to support the corps, the corps commander, as part of force tailoring during planning, task-organizes the E-MIB to best support operations. The corps G-2 advises the commander on E-MIB capabilities and recommends how best to task-organize its assets. The E-MIB commander coordinates the attachment of assets to other commands and mission commands those assets that remain under E-MIB control and in general support to the corps.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM INFORMATION COLLECTION ASSETS

7-89. The BCT is the Army’s largest defined combined arms organization and the Army’s primary close combat force. A corps commander using a BCT to conduct integrated reconnaissance and security operations for the corps as a whole is probably acting as a senior tactical commander and not an operational commander. The three types of BCTs—armored, SBCTs, and infantry—contain an organic cavalry squadron. The military intelligence company in the BCT contains a short-range unmanned aerial system (UAS) platoon (whose sole purpose is to support BCT information collection activities) in addition to HUMINT and SIGINT collection assets. Most combat arms companies and some functional companies within each BCT also have short range, hand launched UAS (RQ-11 Ravens and RQ-20 Pumas) that can be used for information collection. Combat arms companies in addition conduct reconnaissance patrols. (A BCT does not contain organic counterintelligence assets with the exception of a single junior counterintelligence agent advising the BCT intelligence officer.) The BCT commander gains situational understanding by conducting integrated reconnaissance and security tasks within a BCT area of operations. A BCT commander assigns short-term information collection and security tasks to the cavalry squadron; sustained missions require participation from the entire BCT.

COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE INFORMATION COLLECTION ASSETS

7-90. The combat aviation brigade employs its attack reconnaissance helicopters and UAS to collect information. The range of these systems means that they are normally employed tactically. The combat aviation brigade commander and staff are the primary integrators of manned aircraft and UAS operations. The combat aviation brigade deploys a ground control station to other types of brigades as required for mission planning and execution. Based on higher echelon requirements, that brigade controls unmanned aircraft conducting information collection. The combat aviation brigade launches the aircraft and turns control over to a ground control station operator. The ground control station is located where it can best control the aircraft and disseminate collected information.

CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS INFORMATION COLLECTION ASSETS

7-91. Civil affairs elements conduct civil reconnaissance and perform civil information management. They collect civil information on all aspects of the civil component within the operational environment. They collect from and share civil information through collaboration with relevant indigenous populations and institutions, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations and the interagency. Civil information is vital to understanding the operational environment and is used to integrate with information collected by other entities to establish the common operating picture and achieve unified action.

7-92. MISO units obtain information about the motivation and cultural values of individuals and populations. In addition, MISO units routinely develop detailed analyses of the psychological and cultural attributes of friendly and hostile elements in the AO. This analysis promotes greater understanding of attitudes, values, and perceptions of indigenous populations. Concurrently, MISO units develop collection requirements to determine local attitudes and the effectiveness of influence efforts. The capability of these two types of units to interact with indigenous populations makes them valuable information collection assets during the conduct of stability tasks and vital to achieving unified action.

CORPS AND THE LONG-RANGE SURVEILLANCE COMPANY

7-93. The long range-surveillance team (LRST) is organized and equipped to address the specific information needs of the commander. It is typically lightly armed, and operates in squad-sized or smaller elements. These elements are foot mobile, but can conduct mobile reconnaissance. The company requires additional security support from an outside organization to secure its base of operations. The LRST is deployed and employed as a separate unit when supplemented with additional medical, rigging, logistics, fires, and operations planning support. Its leaders and Soldiers have special qualifications such as Airborne, Ranger, sniper, joint fires observer, military freefall, or Pathfinder. The information gathered by this unit is critical to successful operations by the corps and performs the following four primary missions:

• Surveillance.

• Zone and area reconnaissance.

• Target Acquisition.

• Target interdiction.

Combat assessment, and its subcomponent BDA, is not a stand-alone mission for this company. It is an inherent capability of all LRST missions. In addition to these primary missions, a LRST can perform the following secondary missions, if given time, training resources, and additional personnel and equipment:

• Route reconnaissance.

• Emplacement and recovery of sensors.

• Pathfinder operations.

• Personnel recovery.

• Chemical and radiological surveillance and monitoring operations.

7-94. Providing security for other units is outside the range of a doctrinal or organizationally-supported LRST mission. The corps’ long-range surveillance (LRST) teams are limited in number, are lightly armed, and lack organic automatic weapons necessary for defense and escort missions. These teams are only used for the purpose of combat information-gathering.

7-95. As a separate company, the corps’ supporting LRST is normally assigned to the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion but can be assigned to another unit within the corps. The LRST commander and headquarters section routinely liaisons with or is located in close proximity to the corps G-2 in the corps’ tactical command post. The corps G-2 assists the LRST commander in conducting the coordination required to provide LRST with the appropriate missions, planning details, and support.

CORPS PLANNING RELATED TO THE LONG-RANGE SURVEILLANCE COMPANY

7-96. The LRST has limited organic resources. Employment of the corps LRST is a corps operations planned and executed by the corps staff. The corps staff, specifically the G-3 and G-2, need to understand the training focus, capabilities, short-comings, and training short-falls in the LRST supporting the corps. Routinely, Soldiers fall out of tolerance for high altitude, high opening; high altitude, low opening; water-borne; or special patrol insertion and extraction system training due to normal Soldier turn-over, shift in training focus, weather issues, and short comings in training opportunities. The corps planning team understands the current limitations of the Soldiers in this organization before planning any missions.

7-97. The LRST receives target information from the corps G-2 fusion element as it becomes available. This information allows the LRST commander to issue warning orders and identify assets required to conduct anticipated missions.

7-98. The LRST company headquarters section, communications platoon leader, LRS detachment leaders, a LRST liaison officer, and the operations section of the units tasked to insert and extract the team form a planning cell to assist the LRST commander in the conduct of troop leading procedures. The commander ensures the operations order provides detailed information on the friendly and enemy situation, communications, and sustainment. The commander writes the company mission statement and the intent, task, and purpose for each LRST with the assistance of their detachment leaders. This information is essential to answer why the individual LRST is deploying to a particular target to collect specific information for the supported unit commander.

7-99. The result of the company planning efforts is an operations order and individual LRST mission planning folders, which are provided to the current operations integrating cell (COIC) in the main command post. The mission planning folder is mission order based. It does not dictate how the mission performs. It does provide the who, what, when, where, and why of the mission. LRSTs generally require 24 to 48 hours for deliberate planning. Planning time is reduced by well-written, understood, and rehearsed unit SOPs. (See FM 3-55.93 for a detailed discussion of LRS planning.)

7-100. Although LRSTs are not held in reserve, the corps G-3 considers the need to conduct continuous operations. LRSTs need to recover from missions, and staffs need to anticipate needs for future operations. General guidelines for tempo are one-third of the teams conducting missions, one-third of the teams preparing for a new mission, and one-third of the teams recovering and conducting training.

7-101. As information is collected and reported from deployed teams, the corps G-2 analysis and control element analyzes the information to determine if it meets any intelligence requirements. This activity allows the corps G-3 to make an initial determination if it can task new LRSTs, reallocate other assets to collect required information, extend or shorten the current team’s operations, or publish a fragmentary order to the team to begin collection on other priorities.

Long-Range Surveillance Insertion and Extraction

7-102. The LRST prepares to insert and extract, by various means, to accomplish its mission. The team can insert and extract by water, air, land (vehicle or on foot), or stay behind. Proficiency at inserting and extracting improves the team’s likelihood of accomplishing—and surviving—the mission. The corps staff is primarily responsible for coordinating the insertion and extraction of these teams regardless of their command and support relationship with a subordinate unit. The LRST commander does not have the staff or capabilities to coordinate for air, water, or long-distance ground movements. The insertion and extraction plan is clearly understood by the corps staff and those subordinate units whose area of operations the LRSTs traverse. Delegating this responsibility to a subordinate headquarters is not responsive to the timely nature of LRS employment requirements. The corps fire support coordinator assigns and disseminates restrictive fire control measures to protect LRS elements during their initial insertion and any subsequent relocations. FM 3-55.93, chapter 5 discusses LRS insertion and extraction methods.

Long-Range Surveillance Communications

7-103. The LRST uses several communications networks simultaneously. The LRST uses frequencies in the high, very high, and ultra-high frequency spectrums. Current communications systems operate in the three spectrums. The LRST needs multiple channel assignments for automatic link establishment radios. Complex communications require extensive frequency management. The LRST signal platoon leader submits frequency requests to the corps G-6 to ensure the unit is allocated a sufficient amount and type of frequencies to accomplish the mission. The corps G-6 frequency manager understands the importance of the LRST mission, priority of their operation, and impacts on mission accomplishment if the element is unable to communicate quickly and efficiently. FM 3-55.93, chapter 6, discusses LRS communications.

Long-Range Surveillance Sustainment

7-104. Common sustainment support for the LRST is provided by the unit to which the LRST is attached for ADCON. The LRST depends on a quartermaster rigger company for parachute rigging, the theater aviation command, a combat aviation brigade, or USAF aircraft for aerial insertion, sustainment, and extraction. The LRST also depends on transportation boats units, the U.S. Navy, or multinational forces for insertion, sustainment, and extraction using water routes.

7-105. The LRST relies on the corps G-3 aviation and airspace elements or supporting combat aviation brigade to deconflict airspace and support the air medical evacuation and aerial resupply to deployed LRSTs. The headquarters assigned ADCON of the LRST is responsible for coordinating resupply and other required support for committed teams. The headquarters is also responsible for the coordination of emergency extractions of deployed LRSTs and medical evacuations of LRST casualties.

SECTION V – CORPS FIRES

7-106. The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process (ADRP 3-0). It includes the use of cyber electromagnetic activities.

FIRE SUPPORT

7-107. The corps headquarters has no organic fires units, but it has access to the field artillery battalions of its attached and OPCON BCTs. Fires from Army field artillery brigades, combat aviation brigades, and other Service air and naval surface fire support assets enable the corps to accomplish its mission.

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT

7-108. Synchronization of joint lethal fires and nonlethal fire support actions with the supported maneuver force is essential. The joint force commander provides guidance on objectives, priorities, and desired effects. These fires assets are augmented with fires from land-based USMC cannon and rocket artillery and rotary- and fixed-wing assets, USAF and U.S. Navy fixed-wing aircraft, and land- and sea-based and airborne electronic warfare systems from all Services.

ARMY FIRES

7-109. Army fires are an integral part of joint fires. When deployed in support of decisive action, the corps is always part of a joint force. Thoroughly understanding all aspects of joint planning and joint operations facilitates mission accomplishment. The corps commander and staff understand how to plan, develop, employ, and assess the effectiveness of joint fires.

7-110. Assets for lethal and nonlethal effects are available to the corps headquarters from the ASCC. The corps headquarters synchronizes the use of Army and joint fires in support of the commander’s intent by physically destroying selected enemy combat capabilities and selectively degrading or paralyzing an enemy’s command and control systems through cyber electromagnetic warfare and other nonlethal actions. The corps commander task-organizes lethal and nonlethal assets and makes them available to the divisions and BCTs assigned, attached, OPCON, or under the TACON to the corps headquarters.

7-111. The process of delivering lethal fires and nonlethal effects requires the two activities of integration and synchronization. Integration is the combining of fires and their effects with the other warfighting functions. Synchronization is causing something to happen at the same time or in a specific time sequence. Commanders use fires to enable movement and maneuver; however, they can use fires separately to be decisive in an operation or to shape the fight for a follow-on decisive maneuver.

7-112. The categories of Army fires are mortars, cannon, rockets and missiles, attack helicopters, and ground and airborne electronic warfare systems. Fires assets that are organic to BCTs are supported by Army fires, joint fires and Service augmentation. Augmentation includes assets from the USMC, U.S. Navy, and USAF. Detachments from USMC and U.S. Navy liaison teams provide terminal guidance and observation for USMC and U.S. Navy seaborne and airborne weapons systems. The USAF TACP provides terminal attack control for close air support (CAS) and air-based electronic warfare missions.

TARGETING

7-113. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). The selection of targets and determination of appropriate responses to them depends on the situation. The targeting process is an integral part of how Army headquarters uses the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) to solve problems. (ADRP 5-0 discusses the MDMP.) As the corps commander and the main command post plans cell conduct the early steps of the MDMP, they combine the intelligence derived from the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and the running estimates to identify tasks in the targeting process, as portrayed in table 7-1, on page 7-22. FM 3-09 describes how the fires warfighting function incorporates information collection to find and then employ the effects of fires to kill or degrade the enemy

Table 7-1. Decide targeting process tasks

Targeting | Task

Decide

Mission analysis

• Perform target value analysis to develop fire support (including cyber electromagnetic and information operations) high-value targets.

• Provide fire support, information operations, and cyber electromagnetic activities input to the commander’s targeting guidance and desired effects.

Course of action analysis

• Refine the high-payoff target list.

• Refine target selection standards.

• Refine the attack guidance matrix.

• Refine fire support tasks.

• Refine associated measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.

• Develop the target synchronization matrix.

• Draft airspace control means requests.

Order production

• Finalize high-payoff target list.

• Finalize target selection standards.

• Finalize attack guidance matrix.

• Finalize the targeting synchronization matrix.

• Finalize fire support tasks.

• Finalize associated measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.

• Submit information requirements and requests for information to assistant chief of staff, intelligence.

FIRE SUPPORT LIAISON AND COORDINATION

7-114. The corps commander is supported in the use of lethal and nonlethal effects by many organizations and activities providing specialized services to the fires warfighting function. These organizations include the corps fires cell, joint targeting coordination board, and the BCD. Joint force elements directly facilitate liaison and coordination in regards to fires. Liaison elements—such as the Naval and amphibious liaison element and the special operations liaison element—provide component planning and systems expertise enabling corps commanders to integrate their respective fires into the concept of operations.

7-115. Effective liaison is as important in the conduct of stability tasks as it is in the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks, especially in fire support when commanders have to communicate lethal and nonlethal effects on the target area to entities outside of the fire support system. Host nations, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations need an understanding and awareness of the impact of fire support toward their operations.

LAND COMPONENT COMMAND FIRES CELL

7-116. The land component command fires cell plans, coordinates, synchronizes, and executes operational joint fire support for the land component command. This cell works with the Army BCD to identify the requirements for air support, and the joint fires element for maritime, and special operations fire support from the appropriate joint headquarters. Coordination aims to provide optimum lethal and nonlethal effects to support the land component command operations.

JOINT TARGETING COORDINATION BOARD

7-117. The corps can serve as an LCC or a JTF headquarters. When serving in either of these roles, the commander organizes a joint targeting coordination board. The joint targeting coordination board’s focus is to develop broad targeting priorities and other guidance in accordance with the commander’s operational objectives. The joint targeting coordination board can exist as an integrating center for targeting oversight efforts or a mechanism for a joint force commander review. The joint targeting coordination board is a joint activity comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and, if deemed necessary, other agencies, multinational partners, and subordinate units. The joint targeting coordination board facilitates and coordinates joint force targeting activities with the components’ schemes of maneuver to ensure activities meet the joint force commander’s priorities. Generally, direct coordination between elements of the joint force resolves targeting issues below the level of the joint targeting coordination board, but the joint targeting coordination board or joint force commander can address specific target issues not previously resolved. It addresses broad targeting oversight, coordinates targeting information, provides targeting guidance, and refines the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) for the commander’s review. JP 3-09 discusses the joint targeting coordination board.

BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION DETACHMENT

7-118. Each BCD is assigned to a geographic combatant command through an Army Service component command (ASCC). The ASCC provides the detachment as an Army liaison to the geographic combatant commander’s Air Force component commander’s geographic AOC for planning and controlling air operations inside the combatant commander’s AOR. The detachment supports the senior Army commander deployed to a joint operations area in support of a joint force commander. The BCD is an Army liaison at the supporting AOC that is the ARFOR’s representative during joint command and control processes and provides the digital interface between Army and AOC digital systems. The BCD facilitates joint air-ground integration by coordinating joint air support, ACMs, and exchanging operational and intelligence information between the supporting AOC and the Army’s senior deployed headquarters (ARFOR) command post. The detachment processes preplanned air support requests and airspace control means requests (known as ACMREQ) and other ARFOR requirements throughout the joint air tasking cycle. The BCD enhances the ARFOR and air component commander’s ability to visualize the fight from the perspective of the supported and supporting components’ perspectives to contribute to their situational understanding.

FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE

7-119. The primary Army fires organization available to the theater, corps, and division commanders is the field artillery brigade. Field artillery brigades are task-organized to accomplish assigned tasks. A field artillery brigade gives the corps commander a headquarters with which to plan, synchronize, and execute fires. The field artillery brigade mission provides organic and joint fires of close support and precision strike capabilities for Army and joint forces. As depicted in figure 7-3, on page 7-24, the brigade has organic elements to control its fires, acquire targets, transmit information, and provide sustainment to its organic and allocated units.

7-120. The field artillery brigade is a supported or supporting unit and provides and coordinates lethal fires and nonlethal effects. Field artillery brigades also have the necessary fire support and targeting structure to effectively execute the detect-decide-deliver-, and with augmentation, assess steps of targeting for its mission. The field artillery brigade can serve as a force field artillery headquarters capable of coordinating, synchronizing, and employing multiple Army and joint assets in support of the force commander’s concept of operation. Its capabilities include strike, counterfire, reinforcing the fires for a BCT’s organic field artillery battalion, suppression of enemy air defenses, and support to other brigades. Strike is an optimal task for a field artillery brigade. Additionally, the field artillery brigade provides technical oversight of all field artillery-specific training in the corps and its assigned, attached, OPCON, and TACON, and supporting units. ATP 3-09.23 and ATP 3-09.70 discuss field artillery battalion operations. Additional information on joint fire support coordination is found in JP 3-09. (See Fires Center of Excellence publications for additional information on the techniques for fire support at echelons above brigade.)

Figure 7-3. Field artillery brigade

SECTION VI – UNITED STATES AIR FORCE INTERFACE IN CORPS OPERATIONS

7-121. Air support is vital to the conduct of successful corps operations regardless of the corps’ assigned role. The corps depends on joint fires and maneuver provided by fixed-wing aircraft to support many of the corps’ decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to include the USAF air functions of ISR; CAS; air interdiction; cyber electromagnetic activities, and airlift missions. The USAF interface with a corps will depend on the corps’ role. A corps headquarters will have a JACCE as its USAF interface if it is operating as a JTF or LCC headquarters. That USAF interface will be a TACP and ASOC capabilities if the corps headquarters is acting as a tactical headquarters. FM 3-94, chapter 5 discusses USAF support to the corps.

SECTION VII – CORPS SUSTAINMENT

7-122. Sustainment is the provision of logistics, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion (ADP 4-0). Sustainment requires the integration of national and global resources to ensure corps units are physically available and properly equipped. The Army sustainment concept is for centralized control with decentralized execution and leverages host-nation and multinational support, operational contract support, and other available capabilities.

SUSTAINMENT WARFIGHTING FUNCTION TASKS

7-123. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADRP 3-0). A primary function of sustainment is to increase the endurance of Army forces. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. Sustainment provides the support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment. The sustainment warfighting function conducts logistics, provides personnel services (including financial management), and provides health service support. ADRP 3-0, chapter 3 further defines the subordinate functions or elements of each of those tasks.

7-124. The three primary sustainment tasks do not change as the corps headquarters assumes different roles. However, the staffing of the corps headquarters does change to reflect the role assigned to the headquarters— LCC, JTF, ARFOR, or tactical headquarters. For example, transitioning the Army corps headquarters to a joint headquarters requires significant augmentation, including Army augmentation to the corps headquarters. The level and type of augmentation depends on the joint force commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations. For example, elements of a theater sustainment command (TSC) is often required to augment a corps headquarters to assist in managing common-user logistics.

7-125. The corps sustainment cell monitors the three major sustainment elements with a different staff principal taking the lead:

• The corps assistant chief of staff, personnel (G-1) leads the function of personnel services.

• The corps assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4) leads logistics. The G-4 serves as both the chief of sustainment and the logistics section chief.

• The corps surgeon leads Army Health System support.

These staff principals are assisted in the performance of the major sustainment elements by other corps coordinating, special, and personal staff officers. For example, in the major sustainment element of personnel services, the corps assistant chief of staff, financial management (G-8) is responsible for financial management, the corps chaplain is responsible for religious support, and the corps staff judge advocate is responsible for legal support.

PRINCIPLES OF SUSTAINMENT

7-126. The principles of sustainment are essential to maintaining the corps combat power, enabling the corps reach, and ensuring the endurance of corps forces. While these principles are independent, they are also interrelated. (See ADRP 4-0, chapter 1, and FM 4-95 for an expanded discussion of the eight principles of integration, anticipation, responsiveness, simplicity, economy, survivability, continuity, and improvisation.)

CORPS SUSTAINMENT ORGANIZATIONS

7-127. The force structure required to execute effective and efficient sustainment operations for a corps is never static. Figure 7-4 shows the major components of that structure. The sustainment structure supporting the corps changes as operational requirements change. A sustainment organization is assigned, under the OPCON, or has a support relationship to units at every echelon from company to the corps. Sustainment forces not organic or assigned to brigades, operating within a geographic combatant commander’s AOR, are assigned to the ASCC. The ASCC further attaches or places sustainment forces under the OPCON of the TSC (except medical organizations).

Figure 7-4. Major components of the sustainment structure

7-128. The corps and its assigned, attached, OPCON, or TACON units receive their support from a number of sustainment units. Units in BCTs and most other brigades receive support from the brigade’s organic support battalion or forward support company.

7-129. Integral to the corps’ ability to successfully sustain subordinate forces is the ability of the corps supporting sustainment organizations from the TSC and other organizations to leverage and synchronize support from joint and national or strategic partners. These partners can include the Defense Logistics Agency; U.S. Transportation Command, and its subordinate service component commands—Air Mobility Command, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, and Military Sealift Command; and the U.S. Army Materiel Command. These partners deploy units and teams into a joint operations area that remain under the command of their parent organization.

7-130. Requisitions and requests for assistance in the corps are initiated at the user level and processed through the appropriate support chain from a forward support company, brigade support battalion, to a functional or multifunctional battalion in a supporting sustainment brigade or functional support organization in the TSC or medical command (deployment support). The necessary items or support are provided directly from depots from the continental U.S. or from commercial manufacturers. The corps main command post sustainment cell monitors the process of requisitions and requests flow from subordinate divisions and brigades to the TSC or the expeditionary sustainment command (ESC).

THEATER HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT STRUCTURE

7-131. The theater health service support structure facilitates the mission command of medical organizations providing health service support within the supported geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility.

Medical Command (Deployment Support)

7-132. The MEDCOM (DS) provides mission command, administrative assistance, and technical supervision of assigned and attached units. These units provide Army Health System (AHS) support within the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational framework of unified land operations. The MEDCOM (DS) is the medical force provider for all echelons above brigade medical units. The MEDCOM [DS] task-organizes AHS support packages to support both division and corps headquarters and provides units in direct support or general support of the BCTs. For an in-depth discussion of the MEDCOM (DS) and AHS mission command organizations refer to FM 4-02.

Medical Brigade (Support)

7-133. The mission of this brigade is to organize, resource, train, sustain, deploy, and provide mission command to assigned and attached AHS support units in order to provide flexible, responsive, and effective health service support and force health protection to supported forces conducting unified land operations. The medical brigade (support) may have organizations and elements under its control operating in a BCT’s area of operations. However, this brigade’s AHS support elements under its command (such as combat support hospitals, forward surgical teams, medical company [dental services], and other hospital augmentation teams), operate in support of BCT (and other organizations) operations.

Medical Battalion (Multifunctional)

7-134. The mission of the medical battalion (multifunctional) is to provide scalable, flexible, technical supervision, and modular mission command for assigned and attached medical functional organizations; task- organized for support of BCTs and echelons above brigade organizations; and attached elements. Task- organizing echelons above brigade health care assets enables the AHS support system to meet requirements for providing AHS support for the projected patient workload. Examples of additive capabilities provided by the medical battalion (multifunctional), may include additional medical logistics, preventative medicine resources, and enhanced medical planning capabilities. A partial list of additional capabilities in the way of organizational units include—

• Medical company (ground ambulance).

• Medical detachment (blood support).

• Medical logistics (medical logistics) company.

• Medical team (optometry).

• Medical detachment (veterinary service support).

• Medical detachment (preventative medicine).

• Medical detachment (COSC).

• Medical company (area support).

Other AHS support organizations/elements may be task-organized to this battalion dependent upon mission requirements and the operational and mission variables.

Medical Augmentation

7-135. Medical augmentation allows the Army Health System to address unique requirements based on the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations (METT-TC), such as being parachute qualified. Medical augmentation is either by task organized team or as an individual augmentee. Individual professional fillers also augment units. The professional filler system provides augmentees with low-density, high-demand medical qualifications. FM 4-02 provides doctrine for the Army Health System.

Note. When necessary, Army Health System support organizations and elements can be task- organized based on operational and mission variables.

THEATER LOGISTICS STRUCTURE

7-136. The theater logistics structure facilitates centralized control by logistics commanders. It also allows for the decentralized execution of logistics functions by subordinate logistics organizations.

Theater Sustainment Command

7-137. The TSC is assigned to the ASCC and provides general support to Army and other forces operating within the supported geographic combatant commander’s AOR. The headquarters of this command serves as the senior Army sustainment headquarters (less medical) for the ASCC. The TSC provides mission command of units assigned, attached, or OPCON. It is capable of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing logistics and human resources support for Army forces in theater. The TSC leverages strategic partnerships and joint capabilities to establish an integrated theater-level distribution system that is responsive to ASCC requirements as the distribution coordinator in theater. It employs sustainment brigades to execute theater opening, theater sustainment, and theater distribution operations. The command’s assigned units provide supply, maintenance, transportation, petroleum, and port and terminal operations. Other specialized capabilities, such as mortuary affairs, aerial delivery, human resources, and financial management, are available from the force pool.

7-138. In most instances, the TSC and its subordinate organizations maintain a general support relationship with the corps. The actual command or support relationship is specified by an operation order issued by the geographic combatant commander or ASCC commander. Collaborative planning and coordination among the TSC, the ESC, sustainment brigade, and the corps main command post sustainment cell provides the situational understanding necessary for synchronizing and integrating sustainment operations with the corps battle rhythm. Paragraphs 7-145 through 7-192 describe the sustainment warfighting function in the context of corps operations.

Expeditionary Sustainment Command

7-139. The role of the ESC is to deploy to an area of operations or joint operations area and provide mission command capabilities when multiple sustainment brigades are employed or when the TSC determines that a forward command is required. The ESC is employed directly under the mission command of the TSC. An appropriate order may place the ESC under the mission command of a corps commander depending on existing or future operational or mission variables. The TSC maintains oversight of sustainment operations within the area of operations or joint operations area with direct coordination with the ESC and its sustainment information systems. This capability provides the commander of the TSC with the regional focus necessary to provide effective operational-level support to Army or JTF missions. The TSC can employ multiple ESCs within the AOR of the supported geographic combatant commander. See ATP 3-93 for additional information on the ESC.

Sustainment Brigade

7-140. The sustainment brigade is a fixed headquarters organization comprised of a command group, staff, and special troops battalion. The support capability of the sustainment brigade comes from the attachment of various organizations based on the specific mission. Its higher headquarters, either a TSC or ESC, provides mission command for a sustainment brigade. Attachments include combat sustainment support battalions, functional logistics battalions, and functional logistics companies, platoons, and detachments. The sustainment brigade usually has human resources and financial management units attached. Under normal circumstances, the sustainment brigade does not have medical organizations attached.

Combat Sustainment Support Battalion

7-141. The role of the combat sustainment support battalion is to provide logistics support on an area basis to Army forces at echelons above brigade, or, if required by its higher headquarters, to joint and multifunctional forces. The role of the combat sustainment support battalion also includes providing support to BCTs, and functional and multifunctional support brigades operating within the battalion’s area.

7-142. When supporting BCTs and functional brigades, the combat sustainment support battalion is specifically organized with a composite quartermaster supply company and a composite truck company. These companies provide water purification, petroleum storage, and troop transport (IBCTs only) to the BCT. When supporting multifunctional or functional support brigades performing corps missions, such as a maneuver enhancement brigade or engineer brigade, the combat sustainment support battalion is also specifically organized with the same multi-capable quartermaster supply company and composite truck company to augment the support brigade logistics capability. Other combat sustainment support battalions are organized with functional logistics units based on mission requirements.

MOVEMENT CONTROL BATTALION

7-143. The movement control battalion (MCB) is a functional transportation battalion that executes movement control in its assigned area of operation. It provides mission command over four to ten movement control teams spread throughout its area of operation. The MCB oversees the committing of Army theater common user transportation and is responsible for regulating Army movement on theater controlled main and alternate supply routes. The MCB is directly subordinate to the TSC or ESC and is a vital component in assisting in the planning and execution of deployment, redeployment, and distribution operations. Given that movement control is not vested in a single organization, the MCB is the principal organization positioned to coordinate and synchronize the execution of movement control to ensure effective and efficient movements to support military operations. The MCB and its subordinate movement control teams provide area support for all units in its operational area. The MCB can provide in transit visibility of units during the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) phase of a deployment and of cargo in the distribution pipeline. To decentralize execution of movement control functions, the TSC or ESC may divide the operational area into transportation movement regions each with an MCB.

BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION

7-144. Brigade support battalions are organic to BCTs and multifunctional support brigades (except for the battlefield surveillance brigade). The battlefield surveillance brigade is supported by a brigade support company. Their capabilities are tailored to the specific type of brigade they support. For example, the brigade support battalion of an armored BCT has more fuel distribution and maintenance capabilities than a field artillery brigade. Brigade support battalion capabilities include supply, maintenance, motor transport, and medical support. They plan, coordinate, synchronize, and execute logistic operations in support of brigade operations. (See ATP 4-90 for a detailed discussion of the brigade support battalion and its operations.)

CORPS SUSTAINMENT

7-145. Sustainment involves military art and science. Knowing when and how to accept risk, prioritizing a myriad of requirements, and balancing limited resources all require military art while understanding sustainment capabilities. Corps sustainment operations integrate strategic, operational, and tactical support of deployed forces across the three primary sustainment tasks, while arranging for the mobilization and deployment of additional forces and materiel as required by the mission variables of METT-TC.

7-146. Effective sustainment from a corps commander’s perspective ensures freedom of action, extends operational reach, and prolongs endurance. Effective sustainment provides responsive, agile, adequate, and timely support. Regardless of the perspective, successful sustainment operations depend on commanders at all echelons to understand requirements, capabilities, priorities, and the operational environment.

PERSONNEL SERVICES

7-147. Personnel services include human resources and financial management support. It also includes legal, religious, and music support functions related to Soldiers’ welfare, readiness, and quality of life.

Human Resources Support

7-148. Human resources support to corps units is provided by sustainment brigades that provide support on an area basis within a specified area. Depending on the function a sustainment brigade performs—theater opening, theater distribution, or sustainment—the brigade commander controls a mix of human resources companies, military mail terminal teams, and theater gateway personnel accountability teams. A human resources sustainment center, functioning as a staff element of the TSC, provides technical guidance and ensures execution of human resources support as defined by the policies and priorities established by the ASCC G-1. A human resources branch in the sustainment brigade headquarters plans, coordinates, integrates, and manages human resources support within the sustainment brigade’s specified support area.

7-149. Human resources unit capabilities include personnel accounting, casualty operations, and postal operations. Each capability is fully integrated and synchronized with other facets of the sustainment function. This integration effectively and efficiently sustains units in or passing through the sustainment brigade’s specified area of operations. Beginning in FY 2017 the corps G-1 staff section will be supported by a Human Resources Operations Center. This center provides operational training, technical oversight, and analysis capability in support of unit and Soldier lifecycle management activities in the G-1. (See FM 1-0 for information on human resources support.)

Financial Management Support

7-150. The sustainment brigade can also provide financial management operations support to corps units. This support is provided on an area basis. The TSC headquarters contains a financial management center that provides technical oversight of financial management operations.

7-151. Subordinate financial management company and detachment capabilities include determining currency requirements and replenishment, receiving collections, and making payments on certified vouchers (commercial vendor services and payments). Other capabilities include conducting enemy prisoner of war and civilian internee support; safeguarding funds and protecting funds from fraud, waste, and abuse; and providing pay support. (See FM 1-06 for information on financial management operations.)

Legal Support

7-152. Legal support in the current operational environment applies to all warfighting functions. The corps staff judge advocate section provides operational law support to the corps operations. Military lawyers in this section advise commanders on various operational legal issues, including the law of war, rules of engagement, lethal and nonlethal targeting, treatment of detainees and noncombatants. Typically, staff judge advocate personnel assist in mission command, fires, and sustainment warfighting functions. However, judge advocates and paralegal Soldiers assist in planning, preparing, conducting, and assessing all corps operations regardless of where they fall on the conflict continuum. This section supports the efforts of their counterparts at the division and brigade echelon. The corps staff judge advocate section provides analysis and advice regarding lower-echelon legal actions that require broader oversight due to law, regulation, or policy.

7-153. In accordance with Article 6 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, at all times the CG and the staff judge advocate communicate directly on matters relating to the administration of military justice, including, but not limited to, all legal matters affecting the command’s morale, good order and discipline. In addition, judge advocates advise the CG on the law of war including legal obligations concerning the local population, treatment of detainees, noncombatants, displaced persons, and lethal and nonlethal targeting. In addition, judge advocates advise on other matters including operational contract support, fiscal law, processing claims arising in an operational environment, and environmental law. Legal personnel frequently serve in support of stabilization efforts led by other entities, such as a civil affairs section or other U.S. government agencies.

7-154. Judge advocates serve at all levels providing legal support to the command across the judge advocate general corps’ six core legal disciplines: military justice, international and operational law, administrative and civil law, contract and fiscal law, claims, and legal assistance. (See FM 1-04 for additional information.)

7-155. The office of the staff judge advocate supports sustainment through personnel and command legal support. Personnel legal support encompasses those areas of the law in which the support is primarily to individual Soldiers in their personal capacity, namely, legal assistance, claims, and trial defense. The office of the staff judge advocate provides legal assistance services (including Soldier readiness processing and claims) consistent with all applicable laws, regulations, rules of professional responsibility. Command legal support encompasses those areas in which the support is primarily to the command and staff in their official capacity. Command legal support includes administrative and civil law, contract and fiscal law, and international law.

Religious Support

7-156. Religious support involves supporting commanders at all echelons in an operational environment with two required capabilities, provide and advise. Chaplain and chaplain assistants —at all echelons— provide religious support to authorized personnel, and advise the command on the impact of religion, morals, ethics, and morale in an operational environment. Advisement involves synchronization across all warfighting functions with focus on ethical, moral, and religious dimensions of operations in accord with chaplains’ noncombatant status.

7-157. Corps chaplain sections include multiple chaplains and chaplain assistants who are typically located at both the main command post and forward command post. A world religions chaplain serves in corps chaplain sections, providing subject matter expert advisement on influences of culture and religion for potential impact on current and future operations. When a forward command post is deployed and operational, chaplain detachment teams consisting of a Reserve Component chaplain and chaplain assistant are routinely mobilized to augment the corps chaplain section. A chaplain and assistant are also assigned to the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion and advise the battalion commander and provide direct religious support to authorized personnel and family members of the battalion.

7-158. As a member of the personal staff of the corps commanding general (CG), the corps chaplain has direct access to the corps CG in order to provide advisement on all operational matters of religion, ethics, morals, and morale. Such advisement to corps commanders or staff on operational matters may be provided individually on a confidential and privileged basis when discussing ethical, religious, or moral issues as matters of conscience. FM 1-05 provides detailed information regarding how the corps chaplain section functions to support the full corps, to include:

• Giving guidance from the CG in coordination with other staff.

• Establishing links with representatives of joint, multinational, interagency, faith-based organizations and religious leaders of the host nation.

• Planning and executing religious support for corps operations.

• Monitoring religious support in major subordinate commands.

• Executing religious support operations to sustain subordinate Army forces.

• Directing and implementing religious support policy, and managing personnel, monitoring and reporting to DA (Chief of Chaplains) on relevant aspects of religious support in the joint operations area.

• Synchronizing all religious support operations and activities with higher and adjacent headquarters and joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partners in in the joint operations area.

• Monitoring the tactical situation and religious support operations in major subordinate commands.

• Providing interface and liaison between Corps and local religious leaders and faith-based nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations forward.

• In coordination with the ASCC chaplain, establishing liaison with religious support teams to ensure appropriate religious support to Army authorized personnel as well as service members of other services.

• Coordinating religious support planning with higher, lower, and adjacent commands to ensure balanced faith group access throughout the forward deployed force.

Army Music Support

7-159. Army music’s roles is to provide music supporting the resilience, morale, and esprit de corps of Soldiers, Department of Defense civilians, and other personnel authorized to accompany the force during unified land operations. The corps CG determines what musical assets are necessary in the corps area of operations. Army music tables of organization and equipment are designed with the flexibility to employ different musical performance teams in support of military operations. The corps assistant chief of staff for sustainment is the coordinating staff element responsible for Army music operations. ATP 1-19 provides additional information on the structure and functions of Army music performance units.

LOGISTICS

7-160. Logistics is the military art and science of carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. Logistics includes maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution, operational contract support, and general engineering support.

7-161. The corps main command post sustainment cell provides oversight for corps logistic operations. Major responsibilities include—

• Developing the corps operation plan service support annex.

• Coordinating external logistic support.

• Formulating policy, procedures, and directives related to materiel readiness.

• Formulating and implementing policy and procedures for classes of supply and related services.

• Monitoring and reporting the status of corps logistic automated information systems.

• Coordinating with internal and external activities and agencies regarding mobility operations.

• Monitoring corps logistic operations.

Maintenance

7-162. The Army uses a two-level maintenance system consisting of field maintenance and sustainment maintenance. Field maintenance is repair and return to user. Field maintenance relies on line replaceable unit and component replacement, BDA and repair, recovery, and services to return end items to a serviceable condition. Sustainment maintenance is repair and return to supply system.

7-163. TSC field maintenance activities involve collecting and analyzing maintenance data and reports. The ESC maintenance managers collect and analyze maintenance report when deployed as the TSC’s forward command post. When an ESC is employed, the TSC leverages strategic partnerships, host nation support (HNS), and joint capabilities to ensure maintenance operations are responsive and integrated with ASCC requirements. These activities enable the TSC to enforce ASCC priorities relating to the repair of specific types of equipment or support of specific units. These activities also provide the means to identify significant trends and deviations from established standards. Therefore, TSC maintenance managers can take action to ensure the maximum number of combat systems remain fully mission capable. These actions include disseminating technical information and allocating or reallocating resources and capabilities to support maintenance requirements. ATP 4-33 discusses Army maintenance operations.

Transportation

7-164. Corps transportation requirements beyond organic lift capabilities are supported by the TSC. Collaborative planning enables units to use transportation assets efficiently and to move supplies, personnel, equipment, and units in support of corps operations. Movement throughout the theater is controlled by the TSC’s movement control battalion and its subordinate movement control teams.

7-165. Movement control teams process movement requests and arrange transport for moving personnel, equipment, and supplies. They process convoy clearance requests and special hauling permits. Movement control teams coordinate with the movement control battalion for the optimal mode (air, rail, inland waterway, or highway) for unprogrammed moves. These teams commit mode operators from the sustainment brigade, the logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP), multinational elements, and the host nation.

7-166. Movement control is the dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating movements according to command priorities to synchronize the distribution flow over lines of communications to sustain land forces (ADRP 4-0). Movement control includes planning, coordinating, and executing movements internal and external to the corps, such as other U.S. forces and the host nation. The three components of movement control include dual process, principles, and functions. Figure 7-5 depicts these three components. The outside ring illustrates the five dual processes. The middle ring illustrates the four principles of movement control. The innermost ring illustrates the two functions of movement control. ATP 4-16 describes these three components in detail.

Figure 7-5. Components of movement control

7-167. Movement control, as a transportation function, provides the corps commander with a mechanism to synchronize the movements of subordinate units during deployment, operations, and redeployment. It allows the synchronization of distribution operations that support the corps conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. Movement control provides the corps commander with situational understanding to effectively influence movements of both units and sustainment assets within the corps area of operations.

7-168. Movement control at the corps echelon is inherently joint. USAF, U.S. Navy, and USMC elements operating within the corps area of operations have access to Army common user transportation assets. Movement control is the medium that allows the corps to use joint transportation assets to enhance its operations. Not vested in a singular unit, movement control responsibilities are embedded in a network that relies on coordination for the planning and execution while ensuring the effective and efficient use of all transportation assets and modes. It ensures the deconfliction of lines of communications within the corps area of operations to support the corps decisive operation.

7-169. A corps and its subordinate units conduct numerous types of movements. The two principal movement types are unit movements and sustainment. Movements within the corps area of operations are coordinated to ensure a continuous flow of available transportation assets and the effective use of available infrastructure and available lines of communications. Effective movement control requires advanced identification of movement requirements.

7-170. The corps conducts movement control in U.S. channels at the corps’ main command post and with host-nation movement planners. In addition to planning and controlling movements of U.S. forces, the sustainment cell coordinates with the corps provost marshal and appropriate host-nation authorities to establish adequate U.S. straggler and host-nation population control measures. Within the corps sustainment cell, the corps transportation officer is the primary special staff officer that advises the corps commander and the rest of the corps staff, as appropriate, on theater transportation policy, mode operations, movement planning, in-transit visibility, and transportation automation systems. The corps transportation officer also advises on what resources are available to support of reception and onward movement of corps forces, replacement operations, and retrograde. The corps transportation officer assesses the overall effectiveness of the TSC or ESC movement programs supporting the corps operations for the corps. Additional tasks of the corps transportation officer are:

• Coordinate transportation planning with the TSC, ESC, division, and brigade transportation officers to determine requirements.

• In accordance with the corps G-3, establishes procedures for movements that cross the boundaries of the corps major subordinate commands.

• Plan transportation support, develops policies, provides guidance, and recommends movement priorities and procedures for movement control and route synchronization.

• Assist in planning and coordinating the deployment and redeployment of corps forces in coordination with the corps G-3 and assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5).

• Plan, coordinate, and oversee large or special movements in conjunction with the TSC or ESC.

• Assist major subordinate commands and units transiting the corps area of operations.

• Prepare, in coordination with the TSC or ESC, the transportation portion of corps plans and orders (tab C to annex F).

• Recommend road repair priorities and improvements for the road network in the corps area of operations in coordination with the corps G-3 and the corps engineer.

• Coordinate with the G-3, TSC, ESC, and the military police (MP) on the distribution network design (see ATP 4-16, appendix G) and route synchronization plans (see ATP 4-16, chapter 6).

• Coordinate with the assistant chief of staff, civil affairs (G-9), TSC, ESC, corps provost marshal, and maneuver enhancement brigade for the movement of displaced civilians.

• Assesses and recommend requirements for HNS.

• Coordinate policy and procedures with the joint movement center when the corps is the ARFOR of a joint force or the joint deployment and distribution operations center as appropriate.

7-171. The corps transportation officer also coordinates with the corps G-3 during unit movements, force tracking, and maneuver planning. The G-3 plans and directs movement and maneuver of combat units through or within the corps area of operations, which can require rapidly projecting forces over extended distances on main supply routes. The G-3, coordinating with the G-4, establishes priorities for using main supply routes for movements and maneuver. Maneuver has priority over movements. However, maneuver should coordinate with movements to prevent route congestion, enforce movement priorities, and provide continuous logistical support. The G-4 establishes sustainment support plans. The G-4, using the recommendations of the corps transportation officer, establishes plans and implements sustainment priorities for movement. These priorities become the basis of the TSC or ESCs distribution plan. The corps transportation officer is also involved in the conduct of military deception operations. Most military deception operations require movements within some or all of the corps’ area of operations as an integral part of the plan.

7-172. The corps main command post deals with three elements of the transportation and distribution system: mode operations (how it gets there), terminal operations (how it is received and processed), and movement control (how it moves about the corps area of operations). While monitoring all three elements, the corps is most concerned with the latter. Movement control is the planning, routing, scheduling, controlling, and coordinating personnel, units, equipment, and supplies moving over multiple lines of communications. It involves synchronizing and integrating logistics efforts with other elements that span the conflict continuum. The corps can facilitate mission accomplishment by ensuring controlled movement of all elements. Several elements of the corps main command post focus on movement. In the main command post, the G-4’s transportation element plans and monitors movement in the corps area of operations. The movement and maneuver cell executes terrain management for the CG. FM 4-01 discusses Army transportation operations.

Supply

7-173. Supply operations in the corps are conducted in accordance with the corps operation plan sustainment annex and related polices and directives. TSC directed supply and resupply actions are executed in accordance with priorities of support established by the ASCC. Collaboration and coordination between corps and TSC planners provides seamless integration and synchronization with corps operations.

7-174. Typically, during the early stages of a major operation, the TSC pushes certain classes of supplies (Classes I, IIIB, and V) to subordinate sustainment brigades and supported units. The supplies pushed stem from an analysis of the applicable supported operation plan, supported commander’s priorities, and planning factors. The TSC can rely on Army prepositioned stocks to meet initial surge requirements for sustainment. As distribution capabilities expand, a pull system is implemented to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiencies.

7-175. The TSC provides all classes of supply (excluding Class VIII) and related services necessary to sustain Army forces throughout a major operation in the quantities and at the time and place needed. This capability includes requesting, receiving, producing, procuring, storing, protecting, relocating, and issuing the necessary supplies and services. It also includes building the necessary stockage levels in staging areas for conducting the operation and collecting, providing, and processing in-transit visibility data.

7-176. Based on parameter settings established by the TSC, the corps and theater automatic data processing service center determines if the requested item is available in theater and directs a materiel release order to the sustainment brigade capable of satisfying the requirement. In most instances, the processing service center automatically performs these actions in accordance with TSC-controlled parameter settings that include referral tables. This centralized control and decentralized execution enables responsive and agile support throughout the theater, effectively minimizing customer wait time. ATP 4-42 discusses general supply operations in theaters of operations. ATP 4-42.2 discusses supply support activity operations.

Field Services

7-177. The TSC plans, resources, monitors, and analyzes field services support to the corps deployed forces. Field services operations include field laundry, showers, force provider, mortuary affairs, and aerial delivery support. FM 4-40 discusses field services support. (ATP 4-41 addresses Army field feeding.)

Distribution

7-178. The Army distribution system is designed to optimize available infrastructure, reduce response time, maximize throughput, and support time-definite delivery. Effective distribution management synchronizes and optimizes the various sub-elements of the distribution system. Methods include, but are not limited to—

• Maximizing containerization.

• Increasing standardized transportation and materials handling equipment.

• Integrating aerial resupply as a routine method of delivery.

• Synchronizing and integrating retrograde operations across all available transportation modes.

• Reducing storage.

• Reducing transportation mode transfer handling requirements.

• Increasing in-transit visibility in an area of operations or joint operations area.

7-179. The TSC is the distribution manager of the intra-theater segment of the global distribution system. If an ESC is deployed, it performs the role of distribution manager for its specified area. The ESC and sustainment brigades monitor, track, and execute distribution operations according to TSC guidance. TSC distribution managers conduct parallel and collaborative planning with the corps headquarters to help effectively execute distribution operations within the corps area of operations.

7-180. TSC distribution managers—

• Synchronize materiel and movement management operations by maintaining logistics situational understanding through a COP.

• Ensure visibility of theater distribution assets, including international organization for standardization shipping containers, aerial delivery platforms, and palletized loading system flat racks.

• Enforce established theater priorities established by the TSC or the ASCC.

• Maintain continuous liaison with the corps to ensure the uninterrupted flow of materiel, units, personnel, mail, and other goods.

• Synchronize retrograde support operations with an established return priority of international organization for standardization shipping containers, aerial delivery platforms, and flat racks to the distribution system.

• Coordinate directly with the theater aviation command G-3 or designated theater aviation brigades operations staff officer to move commodities via rotary- or fixed-wing aircraft.

• Advise the commander on the use of air movement to support distribution operations.

ATP 4-0.1 discusses Army theater distribution operations.

Operational Contract Support

7-181. Operational contract support is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and minor construction from commercial sources in support of combatant commander directed operations. Contracted support is used in all corps operations, but can vary greatly in scope and scale depending on specific mission requirements. In some operations, contract support can be the primary source of support due to various METT-TC factors, especially restrictive force management limits. When strict military force management limits are imposed, contracted support allows commanders to maximize the number of combat Soldiers by replacing military support units with contractor support. This force-multiplier effect lets the combatant commander provide sufficient support in the theater of operations while strengthening the deployed force’s fighting capability.

7-182. In the initial stages of an operation, supplies and services, procured locally or regionally, improve response time and free strategic airlift and sealift for other priorities. Contractor support, drawn from resources in the theater of operations, augments existing support capabilities to provide a new source of critically needed supplies and services. At the conclusion of operations, contractors also facilitate early redeployment of forces. Currently, the three broad categories of contracted support are theater support, external support, and system support.

7-183. Theater support contracts are prearranged contracts, or contracts awarded from the mission area, by contracting officers under the control of the contracting support brigade or joint theater support contracting command. Contracting officers use these contracts to acquire goods, services, and minor construction support, usually from local commercial sources, to meet the immediate needs of commanders. Typically, commanders associate theater support contracts with contingency contracting. The corps headquarters can be the requiring activity (the unit requesting the support) for theater support contract actions related to corps missions, such as staff augmentation contracts, but most requiring activity tasks are performed by the subordinate sustainment units and other support units.

7-184. External support contracts provide various support to deployed forces. These contracts are prearranged contracts or contracts awarded during the contingency itself to support the mission. Often, these contracts include U.S. citizens, third-country nationals, and local national subcontractor employees. The largest and most commonly used external support contract is LOGCAP. This Army program commonly provides base operating support, transportation support, and other support functions to deployed Army forces and other elements of the joint force. Depending on the situation, the corps headquarters can serve as the requiring activity for major LOGCAP support requirements such as base operating support. LOGCAP is not a source of supplies and does not provide personal services type contracts.

7-185. System support contracts are prearranged contracts by the U.S. Army Materiel Command lifecycle management commands in support of Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) program executive and project management office programs. System contractors, consisting mostly of U.S. citizens, provide support in garrison and can deploy with the force to both training and real- world operations. They can provide either temporary support during the initial fielding of a system (interim contracted support) or long-term support for selected materiel systems (contractor logistic support). In large, complex operations, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) may deploy a forward team to assist the corps staff plan and coordinate new equipment fieldings and system support contract related actions. The Army field support brigade, normally in direct support to the TSC and general support to the corps, also plays a role in coordinating and supporting system support contract actions. See ATP 4-70 and ATP 4-91 for more information.

7-186. The Army Contracting Command’s deployable elements, such as contracting support brigades, contracting battalions, and contracting teams, plan and provide operational contract support for Army echelons of command from ASCC through brigade. Contracting support brigades plan and provide theater support contracting services in support of deployed Army forces normally with a direct support relationship to the corps headquarters. The contracting support brigade contracting support operations staff also assists the corps headquarters staff in the overall operational contract support planning and execution process. See ATP 4-92 for more information on contracting support brigade operations.

7-187. For the corps headquarters, commanders ensure theater support and external contract support (primarily LOGCAP-related support) actions are properly integrated and synchronized with the overall corps sustainment effort. The corps intelligence cell and the assistant chief of staff for sustainment need to work closely with the supporting sustainment command support operations, the contracting support brigade, and the supporting team LOGCAP forward. Routine corps headquarters operational contract support staff tasks include—

• Boards, cells and working groups. The contract support integration effort within the corps headquarters is normally led by the sustainment cell. In operations where the corps is a JTF or where OCS is a primary means of support, the corps may need to establish of full time OCS cell. The OCS cell, when formed, would report directly to the G-4 or in some cases the deputy commander. The corps may also be required to establish and run a requirements review board that meets on an established battle rhythm as well as various as needed OCS working groups. See JP 4-10 for more information on operational contract support cells and working groups.

• Planning. The corps staff, with the supporting sustainment command and supporting contracting support brigade, develops the operational contract support plan to the operations plan (annex W). This plan covers contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management. Operational contract support planning continues through the end of the mission and can require special attention during drawdown of major operations.

• Oversee the Development of in theater requirements. With the exception of staff augmentation support discussed in Chapter 1, corps headquarters normally do not perform major requiring activity functions. These functions are generally performed by subordinate sustainment and other support units such as the ESC, signal brigade and engineer brigades. However, the corps G-4 staff or separate OCS cell (if formed) need to provide command emphasis and oversight on these units to include providing guidance on specific requirement activity responsibilities along with validating, approving, and prioritizing contract support requirements packages via a requirement review board process.

• Contractor Personnel Vetting. To mitigate insider threats, local national and third country national contractor employees are vetted. The guidance for hiring these contractors is provided by host-nation and partner-nation policies, as well as the current Federal Information Processing Standard.

• Assistance to the contract administration and related contractor management processes In support of corps operations, the corps staff assists the contracting support brigade and team LOGCAP forward by ensuring subordinate units nominate and track technically qualified and process trained contracting officer representatives. These representatives are required for every service contract and LOGCAP task order. The corps must also ensure subordinate commands provide receiving officials for supply contracts. Contracting officer representatives and receiving officials ensure that contractors provide the contracted service or item in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract. Additionally these unit contracting officer representatives assist the quality surveillance of contractor personnel and equipment matters per guidance from the contracting officer.

See JP 4-10, ATP 4-10, and ATP 4-92 for additional doctrinal information on operational contract support.

7-188. Use of construction contracting and contingency funding can play an important role in support of corps operations. Civilian construction contractors and host-nation engineering support provide a significant engineering capability that becomes a force multiplier when combined with military engineering units. Construction agents often enable harnessing and directing this means of support. United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) support provides for technical and contract engineering support, integrating its capabilities with other Services and other sources of engineering-related reachback support. USACE integrates assets into the corps or theater headquarters, or makes them available through a senior engineer headquarters. Whether providing construction contract and design support in the area of operations or outside the contingency area, USACE can obtain necessary data, research, and specialized expertise absent in theater through tele-engineering and other reachback capabilities. (See ATP 4-92 for additional doctrinal information on contingency contracting and the role of contractors on the battlefield.

General Engineering Support

7-189. General engineering requirements are coordinated with the corps movement and maneuver cell. The movement and maneuver cell recommends the allocation and employment of corps engineer assets. However, the movement and maneuver cell coordinates with the protection cell concerning general engineering support requirements related to base camp planning, development, and maintenance. General engineering support requirements beyond corps capabilities are supported by a theater-level engineer brigade providing general support, host nation support (HNS), or LOGCAP.

ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM SUPPORT

7-190. Army Health System support is provided across the conflict continuum. Various types of mission support (traditional support to a deployed force, operations predominantly characterized by stability tasks, and defense support of civil authorities [DSCA]) are provided simultaneously in various locations throughout the corps area of operations. Army Health System planners anticipate the types of support required and develop flexible plans that are rapidly adjusted to changes in the level of violence and tempo, as well as to transition from one type of task to the next.

Health Service Support

7-191. Health service support pertains to the treatment and medical evacuation of patients from the battlefield and the required Class VIII supplies, equipment, and services to necessary to sustain these operations. Health service support encompasses the three components of casualty care, medical evacuation, and medical logistics. Actions of the corps surgeon and others in the sustainment cell in the main command post oversee casualty care and medical evacuation. ATP 4-02.3 discusses Army health system support to maneuver force. ATP 4-02.1 discusses Army medical logistics. ATP 4-02.2 discusses medical evacuation.

Force Health Protection

7-192. Force health protection encompasses preventive medicine, veterinary services, area medical laboratory services and support, and the preventive aspects of dental services and combat and operational stress control. Although nutrition plays a significant role in maintaining a healthy and fit force, nutrition is discussed under the casualty care aspects of health service support as an integral part of the hospitalization function. ATP 4-02.8 discusses force health protection.

SECTION VIII – CORPS SECURITY

7-193. For the Army, security operations are those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force (ADRP 3-90). Army security operations encompass five tasks: screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security. ADRP 3-90 defines all five tasks.

7-194. The ultimate goal of the corps security operations is to protect corps forces from surprise and reduce unknowns in any situation. The corps commander conducts security operations to the front, flanks, or security of the corps. The main difference between security operations and reconnaissance operations is that security operations orient on the protected force or facility, while reconnaissance is enemy and terrain oriented. Security operations are shaping operations.

7-195. The doctrine, tactics, and techniques used by the corps to provide security depend on whether or not the corps is an operational or a tactical headquarters. The corps uses joint doctrine and tactics pertaining to the conduct of joint security operations when it is acting as an operational headquarters, such as a JTF, multinational force, or LCC. JP 3-10 documents the doctrine and tactics associated with the conduct of joint security operations.

7-196. Key joint security area-related functions and nodes specifically mentioned in JP 3-10 include the functions of force projection, movement control, sustainment, and command and control. Nodes associated with these functions are airbases, airfields, forward arming and refueling points, seaports, and seabases. The size and configuration of the joint security area can vary considerably. The joint security area is highly dependent on the size of the joint operations area, mission essential assets, logistic support requirements, threat, and scope of the joint operations. Various geographical locations with the joint security area are contiguous or noncontiguous with each other. The geographical extent and configuration of the joint security area largely overlap the corps support area. Joint security operations doctrine and tactics are designed to defend against adversary Level I, II, and III threats.

7-197. The corps uses the doctrine and tactics established in FM 3-90-2 when it conducts security tasks as a tactical headquarters. The establishment of a corps-controlled offensive or defensive, covering or guarding a force, requires the establishment of a security area as an area of operations for the corps controlled force. The corps-controlled security force is a task-organized reconnaissance and security BCT formed around the nucleus of an armor or SBCTs. That security area is located between the forward boundary of its major subordinate divisions and the corps forward boundary. (Forward in this case being defined as the closest to the enemy.)

7-198. Area security tactics and techniques found in ATP 3-91 are scaled up to the corps echelon when the corps performs this role. Area security doctrine, tactics, and techniques are also designed to defend against enemy Level I, II, and III threats. Local security tactics and techniques are established in small unit Army techniques publications.

SECTION IX – CORPS SPECIAL TECHNICAL OPERATIONS

7-199. Special Technical Operations (STO—otherwise known as Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations [IJSTO])—is a joint staff program by which combatant commands and their components plan, task and employ special access program protected systems and capabilities. The goal of STO is to enhance operations through the provision of extremely sensitive capabilities to fill gaps and seams in all operational phases in training and combat operations. STO extends from the joint staff through the combatant commands and their components to JTFs and approved multinational partners. All processes and procedures to conduct STO are found in CJCSI 3120.08D and CJCSI 3110.15C.

7-200. STO represents a collection of specific capabilities; a security architecture and information network to securely plan, coordinate and execute these capabilities; and, a review and approval process to obtain authorities for execution of STO capabilities.

7-201. The STO Chief is responsible for STO program execution within the corps. That individual is typically assigned to the Movement and Maneuver Cell. The STO Chief has a deputy or a noncommissioned officer to assist in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing STO programs.

7-202. The corps commander, deputy corps commander, the majority of the corps principle coordinating staff officers (specifically the G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, and G-6), the corps chief of fires, and selected individuals within their respective staff sections and cells are accessed into the STO program. In some cases select multinational exchange officers filling these positions are also accessed into the STO program. The number of personnel indoctrinated into this special access program within each coordinating staff section or cell depends on their functions, security clearance and any unique organization or structure the commander may establish.

STO PLANS

7-203. The corps STO are documented in Annex S of the corps operations order. Support plans should be developed by the corps to support any alignment assignments. These plans will be prepared and coordinated on the STP Planning and Decision Aid System (known as PDAS). Authority for STP employment will be achieved through STP channels from the STP execution authority.

STO RELATED WORKING GROUPS AND BOARDS

7-204. The STO element actively participants in corps boards and working groups potentially impacted by the STO program. Table 7-2 shows these boards and working groups. Typically the STO Chief is the individual attending these meeting for the STO element.

Table 7-2 STO Working Groups and Board Representation

Boards | Working Groups

Collection Management Board

Inform and Influence Activities Board

Plans Update and Synchronization

Board Targeting Board

Assessment Working Group

Cyber Electromagnetic Activity Working Group

Collection Management Working Group

Inform and Influence Activities Working Group

Special Technical Operations Working Group

Targeting Working Group

7-205. The STO Working Group is led by the corps STO Chief. STO planners from primary and supporting corps staff sections, as well as STO representatives of assigned or attached divisions should participate in this working group. The purpose of the STO Working Group is to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize STO across the command. The working group supports planning, integration, and employment during exercises and operations of STO special access program capabilities. For those STO capabilities requiring a review and approval process, the STO Working Group develops the command’s input for that review and approval process. The working group participates in and represents the command in the STO approval process led by the combatant command and the Joint Staff J-39. During execution, the STO Working group provides integration of timing and effects for the command through coordination with external agencies and STO special access program providers.

7-206. STO Working Group outputs and products include:

• Prioritized target list for STO input to the Targeting Working Group.

• Identification of STO capabilities to fill gaps or seams with special capabilities.

• Classified Evaluation Request Messages (known in the STO community as EReqM) to identify capabilities outside the command and review Evaluation Results Messages (known in the STO community as EResM) responses for applicability and usage.

• STO considerations for input into the intelligence preparation of the battlefield/operational environment process.

• Effects based products for integration with operations at the secret or higher classification level

7-207. The STO Working Group requires inputs from across the staff to identify gaps or issues that cannot be satisfied using conventional resources. The STO Chief attends corps working groups to identify STO capabilities and address issues and concerns raised where the other staff officers are not aware of the possibility of STO solutions. The STO Chief must work with the STO providers to obtain system capability input to STO Working Group in accordance with the battle rhythm established by the corps.

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent manual for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AADC | area air defense commander
AADP | area air defense plan
AAMDC | Army air and missile defense command
ACA | airspace control authority
ACO | airspace control order
ACP | airspace control plan
ADCON | administrative control
ADP | Army doctrine publication
ADRP | Army doctrine reference publication
AFATDS | Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
AHS | Army Health System
AMDTF | air and missile defense task force
AOC | air operations center
AOR | area of responsibility
APEX | Adaptive Planning and Execution
AR | Army regulation
ASCC | Army Service component command
ASOG | air support operations group
ATACMS | Army Tactical Missile System
ATO | air tasking order
ATP | Army techniques publication
AWACS | Airborne Warning and Control System
BCD | battlefield coordination detachment
BCT | brigade combat team
BDA | battle damage assessment
CAS | close air support
CBRN | chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCIR | commander’s critical information requirement
CI | counterintelligence
CJCSM | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJCSI | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJTF | commander, joint task force
CG | commanding general
CMO | civil-military operations
COIC | current operations integration cell
COP | common operational picture
CRC | control and reporting center
CTL | candidate target list
DA | Department of the Army
DA PAM | Department of the Army pamphlet
DCA | defensive counterair
DCG | deputy commanding general
DOD | Department of Defense
DODIN | Department of Defense information network
DSCA | defense support of civil authorities
EECP | early entry command post
E-MIB | expeditionary military intelligence brigade
EOD | explosive ordnance disposal
ESC | expeditionary sustainment command
FM | field manual
FSCL | fire support coordination line
FSCM | fire support coordination measure
G-1 | assistant chief of staff, personnel
G-2 | assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-2X | counterintelligence and human intelligence staff officer for a general staff
G-3 | assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4 | assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-5 | assistant chief of staff, plans
G-6 | assistant chief of staff, signal
G-8 | assistant chief of staff, financial management
G-9 | assistant chief of staff, civil affairs
HNS | host nation support
HUMINT | human intelligence
HPT | high-payoff target
HPTL | high-payoff target list
HSMCC | home station mission command center
HVT | high-value target
IM | information management
INSCOM | United States Army Intelligence and Security Command
IO | information operations
ISR | intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J-1 | manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-2 | intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3 | operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4 | logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5 | plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6 | communications system directorate of a joint staff
JACCE | joint air component coordination element
JAGIC | joint air-ground integration center
JECC | Joint Enabling Capabilities Command
JFACC | joint force air component commander
JIOC | joint intelligence operations center
JIPOE | joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JIPTL | joint integrated prioritized target list
JISE | joint intelligence support element
JMD | joint manning document
JNN | joint network node
JOPP | joint operation planning process
JP | joint publication
JTF | joint task force
KM | knowledge management
LCC | land component command
LOGCAP | logistics civil augmentation program
LRS | long-range surveillance
LRST | long-range surveillance team
MAGTF | Marine air-ground task force
MBA | main battle area
MCB | movement control battalion
MDMP | military decisionmaking process
METT-TC | mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations
MISO | military information support operations
MP | military police
NIPRNET | Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network
OCA | offensive counterair
OPCON | operational control
OPT | operational planning team
PED | processing, exploitation, and dissemination
POD | port of debarkation
POE | port of embarkation
PIR | priority intelligence requirement
RFI | request for information
RSOI | reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SIGINT | signals intelligence
SIPRNET | SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SIS | signal, intelligence, and sustainment
SOP | standard operating procedure
STO | special technical operations
TACON | tactical control
TACP | tactical air control party
TAGS | theater air-ground system
TO&E | table of organization and equipment
TPFDD | time-phased force deployment data
TSC | theater sustainment command
UAS | unmanned aircraft system
U.S. | United States
USACE | United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAF | United States Air Force
USMC | United States Marine Corps
UXO | unexploded ordnance

SECTION II – TERMS

area security

A security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area. (ARDP 3-90)

ARFOR

The Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. (FM 3-94)

art of command

The creative and skillful exercise of authority through timely decisionmaking and leadership. (ADP 6-0)

assessment

A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. (JP 3-0)

campaign

A series of related major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

cell

A subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization of a joint force commander’s headquarters. (JP 3-33)

center of gravity

The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (JP 5-0)

close air support

Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (JP 3-0)

combat assessment

The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. (JP 3- 60)

combat formation

An ordered arrangement of forces for a specific purpose and the general configuration of a unit on the ground. (ADRP 3-90)

command

The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. (JP 1)

command and control

The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and

attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1)

commander’s critical information requirement

An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making. (JP 3-0)

commander’s intent

A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. (JP 3-0)

command post

A unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities. (FM 6-0)

command post cell

A grouping of personnel and equipment by warfighting function or planning horizon to facilitate the exercise of mission command. (FM 6-0)

common operational picture

A single display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on common data and information share by more than one command. (ADRP 6-0)

countermobility operations

The construction of obstacles and emplacement of minefields to delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy by reinforcement of the terrain. (JP 3-34)

cyberspace superiority

The degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable conduct of operations by that force, and it related land, air, maritime, and space forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by an adversary. (JP 3-12)

defensive task

A task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks. (ADRP 3-0)

destroy

A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (FM 3-90-1)

disrupt

A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause enemy forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion. (FM 3-90-1)

flank attack

A form of offensive maneuver directed at the flank of an enemy. (FM 3-90-1)

fire support coordination line

A fire support coordination measure established by the land or amphibious force commander to support common objectives within an area of operations; beyond which all fires must be coordinated with affected commanders before engagement, and short of the line, all fires must be coordinated with the establishing commander before engagement. (JP 3-09)

fires warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process. (ADRP 3-0)

forcible entry

The seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. (JP 3-18)

foreign humanitarian assistance

Department of Defense activities conducted outside the U.S. and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. (JP 3-29)

host-nation support

Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 4-0)

high-payoff target

A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. (JP 3-60)

high-value target

A target the enemy commander requires for the successful complete the mission. (JP 3-60)

information collection

The activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of current and future operations. (FM 3-55)

information operations

The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. (JP 3-13)

information-related capability

A tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions. (JP 3-13)

intelligence warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations.(ADRP 3-0)

interdiction

An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. (JP 3-03)

integration

In force protection, the synchronization transfer of units into an operational commander’s force prior to mission execution.. (JP 1)

joint fires

Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objectives. (JP 3-0)

joint fire support

Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. (JP 3-0)

knowledge management

The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decisionmaking. (ADRP 6-0)

military engagement

The routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. (JP 3-0)

mission command system

The arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations. (ADP 6-0)

movement control

The dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating movements according to command priorities to synchronize distribution flow over lines of communications to sustain land forces. (ADRP 4-0)

neutralize

A tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation. (FM 3-90-1)

offensive task

A task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. (ADRP 3-0)

operational intelligence

That intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters of operations areas. (JP 2-0)

operational reach

The distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 3-0)

planning

The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about. (ADP 5-0)

planning horizon

A point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events. (ADRP 5-0)

plan requirements and assess collection

The task of analyzing requirements, evaluating available assets (internal and external), recommending to the operations staff taskings for information collection assets, submitting requests for information for adjacent and higher collection support, and assessing the effectiveness of the information collection plan. (ATP 2-01)

reception

The process of receiving, offloading, marshalling, and transporting of personnel, equipment, and materiel from the strategic and/or intratheater deployment phase to a sea, air, or surface transportation point of debarkation to the marshalling area. (JP 3-35)

rehearsal

A session in which a unit or staff practices expected actions to improve performance during execution. (ADRP 5-0)

retrograde

A defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy. (ADRP 3-90)

rules of engagement

Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-04)

security operations

Those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force. (ADRP 3-90)

situational understanding

The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking. (ADP 5-0)

staff section

A grouping of staff members by area of expertise under a coordinating, special, or personal staff officer. (FM 6-0)

staging

Assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel, equipment, and sustaining materiel in preparation for onward movement. (JP 3-35)

sustainment

The provision of logistics, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion. (ADP 4-0)

suppress

A tactical mission task that results in temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapons system below the level needed to accomplish the mission. (FM 3-90-1)

suppression

In the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires, renders a target ineffective for a short period of time producing at least 3-percent casualties or materiel damage. (FM 3-09)

sustainment warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. (ADRP 3-0)

target development

The systematic examination of potential target systems—and their components, individual targets, and even elements of targets—to determine the necessary type and duration of the action that must be exerted on each target to create an effect that is consistent with the commander’s specific objectives. (JP 3-60)

targeting

The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0)

tempo

The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. (ADRP 3-0)

REFERENCES

All URLs accessed on 7 March 2016.

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 7 December 2015.

JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm CJCSI 1301.01F.

Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures. 17 November 2014.

CJCSI 3100.01C. Joint Strategic Planning System. 20 November 2015.

CJCSI 3115.01. Common Tactical Picture Reporting Requirements. 30 May 2012

CJCSI 3110.15C. Supplement Instruction to JSCP FY06: IJSTO. 20 June 2008. (Restricted Distribution)

CJCSI 3120.08D. Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations. 28 January 2013. (Restricted Distribution)

CJCSI 3401.02B. Force Readiness Reporting. 31 May 2011.

CJCSM 3122.01A. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures). 29 September 2006. This publication may be found at this website: https://ca.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cjcs/manuals.htm.

CJCSM 3122.02D. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III (Time- Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution). 1 April 2011. This publication may be found at this website: https://ca.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cjcs/manuals.htm.

CJCSM 3122.05. Operating Procedures for Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)- Information Systems (IS) Governance. 15 December 2011.

CJCSM 3130.01A. Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities. 25 November 2014.

CJCSM 3130.03. Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance. 18 October 2012. This publication may be found at this website: https://ca.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cjcs/manuals.htm.

CJCSM 3150.13C. Joint Reporting Structure-Personnel Manual. 10 March 2010.

CJCSM 3500.01. 2014-2017 Chairman’s Joint Training Guidance. 10 October 2013.

CJCSM 3500.03E. Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States. 20 April 2015.

CJCSM 3500.04F. Universal Joint Task Manual. 1 June 2011.

DODD 5230.11. Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations. 16 June 1992.

DODI 8500.01. Cybersecurity. 14 March 2014

JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013.

JP 1-0. Joint Personnel Support. 24 October 2011.

JP 1-04. Legal Support to Military Operations. 17 August 2011.

JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013.

JP 2-01. Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 5 January 2012.

JP 2-01.2. Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations. 7 October 2014. This classified publication is available online at the DOD Issuances Web page (SIPRNET): www.https//jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=2.

JP 2-01.3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 21 May 2014.

JP 2-03. Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations. 31 October 2012.

JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011.

JP 3-01. Countering Air and Missile Threats. 23 March 2012.

JP 3-03. Joint Interdiction. 14 October 2011.

JP 3-05. Special Operations. 16 July 2014.

JP 3-07. Stability Operations. 29 September 2011.

JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011.

JP 3-09. Joint Fire Support. 12 December 2014.

JP 3-09.3. Close Air Support. 25 November 2014.

JP 3-10. Joint Security Operations in Theater. 13 November 2014.

JP 3-11. Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments. 4 October 2013.

JP 3-12. Cyberspace Operations. 5 February 2013. This classified publication is available online at the DOD Issuances Web page (SIPRNET): www.https//jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=2

JP 3-13. Information Operations incorporating Change 1. 27 November 2012.

JP 3-13.2. Military Information Support Operations. 21 November 2014.

JP 3-13.4. Military Deception. 26 January 2012

JP 3-15. Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 17 June 2011.

JP 3-15.1. Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations. 9 January 2012.

JP 3-16. Multinational Operations. 16 July 2013.

JP 3-18. Joint Forcible Entry Operations. 27 November 2012.

JP 3-26. Counterterrorism. 24 October 2014.

JP 3-27. Homeland Defense. 29 July 2013.

JP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 31 July 2013.

JP 3-29. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 3 January 2014.

JP 3-30. Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 10 February 2014.

JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. 24 February 2014.

JP 3-33. Joint Task Force Headquarters. 30 July 2012.

JP 3-34. Joint Engineer Operations. 6 January 2016.

JP 3-35. Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 31 January 2013.

JP 3-40. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. 31 October 2014.

JP 3-41. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management. 21 June 2012.

JP 3-50. Personnel Recovery. 2 October 2015.

JP 3-52. Joint Airspace Control. 13 November 2014.

JP 3-60. Joint Targeting. 31 January 2013.

JP 3-61. Public Affairs. 17 November 2015.

JP 4-0. Joint Logistics. 16 October 2013.

JP 4-02. Health Service Support. 26 July 2012.

JP 4-05. Joint Mobilization Planning. 21 February 2014.

JP 4-09. Distribution Operations. 19 December 2013.

JP 4-10. Operational Contract Support. 16 July 2014.

JP 5-0. Joint Operation Planning. 11 August 2011.

JP 6-0. Joint Communications System. 10 June 2015.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: http://www.apd.army.mil/

ADP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 26 July 2012.

ADP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2012.

ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.

ADP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 1. The Army Profession. 14 June 2015.

ADRP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.

ADRP 3-05. Special Operations. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-09. Fires. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 14 June 2013.

ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2012.

ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-22. Army Leadership. 01 August 2012.

ADRP 7-0. Training Units and Developing Leaders. 23 August 2012.

AR 20-1. Inspector General Activities and Procedures. 29 November 2010.

AR 27-1. Legal Services, Judge Advocate Legal Services. 30 September 1996.

AR 165-1. Army Chaplain Corps Activities. 23 June 2015.

AR 360-1. The Army Public Affairs Program. 25 May 2011.

AR 385-10. The Army Safety Program. 27 November 2013

AR 870-5. Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures. 21 September 2007.

ATP 1-19, Army Music. 13 February 2015.

ATP 2-01. Plan Requirements and Assess Collection. 19 August 2014.

ATP 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 10 November 2014.

ATP 2-19.3. Corps and Division Intelligence Techniques. 26 March 2015

ATP 2-22.2-1. Counterintelligence Volume I: Investigations, Analysis, and Production, and Technical Services and Support Activities. 11 December 2015.

ATP 2-22.4. Technical Intelligence. 4 November 2013.

ATP 2-22.8. (U) Measurement and Signature Intelligence (S/NF). 30 May 2014.

ATP 2-22.9. Open-Source Intelligence. 10 July 2012.

ATP 2-22.31. (U) Human Intelligence Military Source Operations Techniques (S/NF). 17 April 2015.

ATP 2-22.82. Biometrics-Enabled Intelligence. 2 November 2015.

ATP 2-22.85. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of Biometrics in Support of Operations. 1 April 2014.

ATP 2-91.8. Techniques for Document and Media Exploitation. 5 May 2015.

ATP 3-07.5. Stability Techniques. 31 August 2012.

ATP 3-09.13. The Battlefield Coordination Detachment. 24 July 2015

ATP 3-09.23. Field Artillery Cannon Battalion. 24 September 2015.

ATP 3-09.24. Techniques for the Fires Brigade. 21 November 2012.

ATP 3-09.70. Paladin Operations. 25 September 2015.

ATP 3-18.4. Special Forces Special Reconnaissance. 18 August 2015.

ATP 3-34.20. Countering Explosive Hazards. 21 January 2016.

ATP 3-37.2. Antiterrorism. 3 June 2014.

ATP 3-37.10. Base Camps. 26 April 2013.

ATP 3-37.34. Survivability Operations. 28 June 2013.

ATP 3-39.30. Security and Mobility Support. 30 October 2014.

ATP 3-39.32. Physical Security. 30 April 2014.

ATP 3-52.2. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for The Theater Air-Ground System. 30 June 2014.

ATP 3-60. Targeting. 7 May 2015

ATP 3-90.8. Combined Arms Countermobility Operations. 17 September 2014.

ATP 3-90.37. Countering Improvised Explosive Devices. 29 August 2014.

ATP 3-91. Division Operations. 17 October 2014.

ATP 3-91.1. The Joint Air-Ground Integration Center. 18 June 2014.

ATP 3-93. Theater Army Operations. 26 November 2014.

ATP 4-0.1. Army Theater Distribution. 29 October 2014.

ATP 4-01.45. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations. 18 April 2014.

ATP 4-02.1. Army Medical Logistics. 29 October 2015.

ATP 4-02.2. Medical Evacuation. 12 August 2014.

ATP 4-02.3. Army Health System Support to Maneuver Forces. 9 June 2014.

ATP 4-02.8. Force Health Protection. 9 March 2016

ATP 4-10. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operational Contract Support. 18 February 2016.

ATP 4-14. Expeditionary Railway Center Operations. 29 May 2014.

ATP 4-15. Army Watercraft Operations. 3 April 2015.

ATP 4-16. Movement Control. 5 April 2013.

ATP 4-32. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operations. 30 September 2013.

ATP 4-33. Maintenance Operations. 14 April 2014.

ATP 4-41. Army Field Feeding and Class I Operations. 31 December 2015.

ATP 4-42. General Supply and Field Services Operations. 14 July 2014.

ATP 4-42.2. Supply Support Activities Operations. 9 June 2014.

ATP 4-70. Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology Forward Support to Unified Land Operations. 12 May 2014.

ATP 4-90. Brigade Support Battalion. 2 April 2014.

ATP 4-91. Army Field Support Brigade. 15 December 2011.

ATP 4-92. Contracting Support to Unified Land Operations. 15 October 2014.

ATP 4-93. Sustainment Brigade. 9 August 2013.

ATP 4-94. Theater Sustainment Command. 28 June 2013.

ATP 5-0.1. Army Design Methodology. 1 July 2015.

ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014.

ATP 6-01.1. Techniques for Effective Knowledge Management. 6 March 2015.

ATP 6-02.72. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Radios. 5 November 2013.

ATP 6-02.73. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Internet Tactical Chat in Support of Operations. 24 January 2014.

ATP 6-02.90. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Ultrahigh Frequency Military Satellite Communications. 9 August 2013.

ATP 3-90.4. Combined Arms Mobility. 8 March 2016.

DA PAM 600-81. Information Handbook for Operating Continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Centers and Individual Deployment Sites. 15 July 2001.

DA PAM 690-47. DA Civilian Employee Deployment Guide. 1 November 1995.

FM 1-0. Human Resources Support. 1 April 2014.

FM 1-04. Legal Support to the Operational Army. 18 March 2013.

FM 1-05. Religious Support. 5 October 2012.

FM 1-06. Financial Management Operations. 15 April 2014.

FM 2-0. Intelligence. 15 April 2014.

FM 3-01. U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. 2 November 2015.

FM 3-01.94. Army Air and Missile Defense Command Operations. 8 April 2005.

FM 3-04. Army Aviation. 29 July 2015.

FM 3-05. Army Special Operations. 9 January 2014.

FM 3-05.70. Survival. 17 May 2002.

FM 3-07. Stability. 2 June 2014.

FM 3-09. Field Artillery Operations and Fire Support. 4 April 2014.

FM 3-11. Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations. 1 July 2011.

FM 3-13. Inform and Influence Activities. 25 January 2013.

FM 3-14. Army Space Operations. 19 August 2014.

FM 3-16. The Army in Multinational Operations. 8 April 2014.

FM 3-34. Engineer Operations. 2 April 2014.

FM 3-38. Cyber Electromagnetic Activities. 12 February 2014.

FM 3-39. Military Police Operations. 26 August 2013.

FM 3-50. Army Personnel Recovery. 2 September 2014.

FM 3-52. Airspace Control. 08 February 2013

FM 3-53. Military Information Support Operations. 4 January 2013.

FM 3-55. Information Collection. 3 May 2013.

FM 3-55.93. Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations. 23 June 2009.

FM 3-57. Civil Affairs Operations. 31 October 2011.

FM 3-61. Public Affairs Operations. 1 April 2014.

FM 3-63. Detainee Operations. 28 April 2014.

FM 3-81. Maneuver Enhancement Brigade. 21 April 2014.

FM 3-90-1. Offense and Defense Volume I. 22 March 2013.

FM 3-90-2. Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks Volume 2. 22 March 2013.

FM 3-94. Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations. 21 April 2014.

FM 3-99. Airborne and Air Assault Operations. 6 March 2015.

FM 4-01. Army Transportation Operations. 3 April 2014.

FM 4-02. Army Health System. 26 August 2013.

FM 4-30. Ordnance Operations. 1 April 2014.

FM 4-40. Quartermaster Operations. 22 October 2013.

FM 4-95. Logistics Operations. 1 April 2014.

FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.

FM 6-02. Signal Support to Operations. 22 January 2014.

FM 6-99. U.S. Army Report and Message Formats. 19 August 2013.

FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.

UNITED STATES LAW

U.S. Code Title 10 - Armed Forces. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS PUBLICATIONS

MCWP 3-25.5. Direct Air Support Center Handbook. 17 February 2009

http://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/ELECTRONICLIBRARY/ElectronicLibraryDisplay/tabid/13082/Article/126893/mcwp-3-255.aspx.

WEB SITES

Joint Force Headquarters Training Website. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jtfguide/JFHQT_Mainpage.html.

PRESCRIBED FORMS

No forms entries.

REFERENCED FORMS

Except where otherwise indicated below, the following DA Forms are available on the APD website: www.apd.army.mil.

DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

DD Forms are available on the OSD website: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/formsprogram.htm

DD Form 3007. Hasty Protective Row Minefield Record.

Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

A

ACO, 2-40, 7-34, 7-36, 7-40, 7-42, 7-47, 7-50, 7-52

Air and Missile Defense Section, 1-135

air and missile threats, 3-361, 4-210, 4-228, 4-236, 4-239, 6-56

airspace control, 1-107—1-108, 1-113—1-114, 1-135, 1-173, 2-40, 3-181, 4-27, 4-170—4-171, 4-187, 4-198, 4-123, 4-216—4-217, 7-32—7-38, 7-42, 7-44—7-55, 7-118

Airspace Control Current Operations Integration Cell Support, 1-113

Airspace Control Section, 1-114, 7-50

Analysis Control Element, 1-105

ARFOR, in campaigns, 1-1—1-6, 1-8, 1-11, 1-26, 1-28, 1-74, 3-118, 3-389, 3-409, 3-411, 4-6, 4-12, 4-23—4-28, 4-31, 4-33, 4-57, 4-260, 4-263—4-264, 4-267, 5-1—5-14, 5-16—5-17, 5-19, 5-22—5-23, 6-49, 7-6, 7-32, 7-44, 7-118, 7-124, 7-170

Army Design Methodology, 2-9, 3-94—3-96

Army Design Methodology, 2-9, 3-94—3-96

Army Information System Family of Systems, 2-20, 2-21—2-25

assessment, 1-68, 1-95, 1-118, 1-132, 1-144—1-145, 1-166, 1-169, 2-10, 3-6, 3-9, 3-79, 3-97, 3-114, 3-152, 3-162—3-164, 3-177, 3-184, 3-190—3-191, 3-194, 3-199, 3-201, 3-203, 3-213, 3-227, 3-233, 3-241—3-252, 3-263, 3-270, 3-332, 3-363—3-365, 3-374, 3-386, 3-404, 4-55, 4-106, 4-150, 4-152—4-154, 4-158—4-159, 4-163, 4-167, 4-177, 4-179, 4-183, 4-225, 4-236, 4-251—4-257, 4-259—4-275, 5-21, 6-12, 6-148, 7-62, 7-66, 7-93

Aviation Current Operations Integration Cell Support, 1-111

Aviation Section, 1-115, 7-54—7-55

B

Battalion Command Group, 1-202—1-203

battle rhythm, 1-45, 1-61, 1-68—1-169, 2-11, 2-38—2-40, 2-42—2-47, 2-51, 3-16, 3-99, 3-150—3-151, 3-201, 3-247, 3-265, 3-401, 4-14, 4-150, 4-186, 4-292, 6-11, 6-61, 7-31, 7-138, 7-187, 7-207

C

campaign planning, 3-172, 3-182—3-189

casualty operations, 1-149, 1-153, 4-260, 6-83, 7-149

CBRN, 1-23—1,24, 1-144, 2-4, 3-62, 3-285, 3-332, 3-406, 3-411, 4-47, 4-195, 4-238, 4-297, 7-10

CCIR, 1-166, 1-169, 3-97, 3-143—3-146, 3-148, 3-163, 3-207, 3-229, 3-232, 3-315, 3-321—3-325, 3-338, 3-342—3-343, 3-352, 4-149, 4-152, 6-68, 7-58, 7-70—7-71, 7-74, 7-77

center, 1-70, 1-75—1-76, 1-98—1-99, 1-145, 1-189, 1-191, 1-200, 2-13, 2-31, 3-17, 3-23, 3-56—3-57, 3-77, 3-80—3-82, 3-93, 3-167, 3-202, 3-222—3-223, 3-226, 3-232, 3-300, 3-302, 3-331, 3-353—3-354, 3-389, 3-400, 3-402—3-403, 3-409—3-416, 4-17, 4-37, 4-41, 4-73, 4-144, 4-154, 4-221, 4-229, 4-254, 4-267—4-268, 4-281, 5-18, 6-29, 6-47, 6-51, 6-59, 7-17, 7-24, 7-30, 7-34, 7-38, 7-42, 7-46, 7-66, 7-80, 7-117, 7-120, 7-148—7-150, 7-170, 7-176

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Section, 1-144

civil affairs, 1-24, 1-27, 1-48, 1-53, 1-75, 1-98—1-99, 1-124, 1-126, 1-173—1-174, 3-35, 3-38, 3-61, 3-76, 3260, 3-262, 4-296, 5-19, 6-28—6-31, 7-91, 7-153, 7-170

Civil Affairs Element, 1-126, 7-91

CJTF, command relationship with,

command and control, 1-121, 1-130, 2-21—2-22, 3-6, 3-8, 3-28, 3-30, 3-36—3-37, 3-45, 3-60, 3-97, 3-110, 3-116, 3-125, 3-134, 3-137—3-139, 3-142, 3-149, 3-173, 3-175, 3-315, 3-337, 3-347, 3-362, 3-383, 3-410, 3-421, 4-9, 4-17, 4-68, 4-73, 4-125, 4-168, 4-170, 4-195, 4-231, 4-244, 4-270—4-271, 4-276, 5-14, 5-19, 6-24, 6-91, 7-5, 7-38, 7-53, 7-85, 7-110, 7-118, 7-196

Command Group, 1-35, 1-77, 1-201, 1-204, 2-44, 3-11, 7-140

Command Post Cells, 1-45, 1-56—1-58, 1-61, 1-135, 1-166, 2-17, 6-56

Commander's Critical Information Requirements, 1-166, 3-97, 3-145—3-146, 3-321—3-322, 6-68, 7-58

Commander's Decision Cycle, 3-199, 3-401—3-404

Communications Security Element, 1-94

Computer Network Defense Element, 1-89, 1-95

contractors, 1-196—1-197, 3-41, 3-77, 3-80—3-81, 3-133, 4-37, 4-86, 4-133, 7-62—7-63, 7-182, 7-185, 7-187—7-188

contractors, 1-196—1-197, 3-41, 3-77, 3-80—3-81, 3-133, 4-37, 4-86, 4-133, 7-62—7-63, 7-182, 7-185, 7-187—7-188

corps, sustainment, 1-147, 1-162, 6-61—6-62, 6-76, 6-80, 7-9, 7-125, 7-145, 7-170, 7-187

Corps Chief of Fires, 1-132

Corps headquarters, roles of, 1-1—1-1, 1-4—1-12, 1-15, 1-18, 1-23, 1-25, 1-29—1-30, 1-34, 1-36, 1-46, 1-52—1-54, 1-57—1-59, 1-62, 1-64, 1-71—1-72, 1-76, 1-78, 1-84—1-86, 1-93, 1-95, 1-114, 1-132, 1-140, 1-175, 1-189—1-192, 1-194, 1-196, 1-200—1-206, 2-1—2-3, 2-5—2-8, 2-10, 2-19—2-20, 2-24—2-25, 2-31, 2-38, 2-40, 2-44, 2-46—2-47, 3-2—3-5, 3-7—3-8, 3-17, 3-28—3-30, 3-32, 3-34, 3-38, 3-61, 3-64, 3-66—3-69, 3-72, 3-75, 3-78, 3-83—3-85, 3-134—3-135, 3-137—3-138, 3-201, 3-300, 3-318, 3-357, 3-389, 3-422, 4-12, 4-14, 4-17, 4-42, 4-169—4-170, 4-286, 5-3—5-6, 5-9, 5-17, 6-17, 6-33, 6-59, 6-63, 6-67, 6-75, 6-80, 6-146, 7-2, 7-5—7-9, 7-16—7-21, 7-23, 7-30, 7-32, 7-35, 7-46, 7-49, 7-56, 7-63, 7-68, 7-73, 7-82—7-83, 7-85, 7-95, 7-107, 7-110, 7-121, 7-124, 7-132, 7-157, 7-179, 7-183—7-184, 7-186—7-187

Corps Headquarters, support to, 1-1—1-2, 1-4—1-12, 1-15, 1-18, 1-23, 1-25, 1-29—1-30, 1-34, 1-36, 1-46, 1-52—1-54, 1-57—1-59, 1-62, 1-64, 1-71, 1-76, 1-78, 1-84—1-1-86, 1-93, 1-95, 1-114, 1-132, 1-140, 1-175, 1-189—1-192, 1-194, 1-196, 1-200—1-206, 2-1—2-3, 2-5—2-8, 2-10, 2-19—2-20, 2-24—2-25, 2-31, 2-38, 2-40, 2-44, 2-46—2-47, 3-2—3-5, 3-7—3-8, 3-17, 3-28—3-30, 3-32, 3-34, 3-38, 3-61, 3-64, 3-66—3-69, 3-72, 3-75, 3-78, 3-83—3-85, 3-134—3-135, 3-137—3-138, 3-201, 3-300, 3-318, 3-357, 3-389, 3-422, 4-12, 4-14, 4-17, 4-42, 4-169—4-170, 4-286, 5-3—5-6, 5-9, 5-17, 6-17, 6-33, 6-59, 6-63, 6-67, 6-69—6-71, 6-75, 6-80, 6-146, 7-2, 7-5—7-9, 7-16—7-21, 7-23, 7-30, 7-32, 7-35, 7-46, 7-49, 7-56, 7-63, 7-68, 7-73, 7-82—7-83, 7-85, 7-95, 7-107, 7-110, 7-121, 7-124, 7-132, 7-157, 7-179, 7-183—7-184, 7-186—7-187

Corps Main Command Post, 1-30, 1-76, 1-78—1-80, 1-83, 1-87, 1-99, 1-175, 1-186, 1-201, 1-204, 2-11, 2-14, 2-47, 7-68, 7-83, 7-130, 7-138, 7-161, 7-172

corps operations, in an established theater, 1-31, 1-71, 1-76, 1-92, 1-103, 1-122, 1-127, 1-133, 1-148, 1-159, 1-165, 1-172, 1-176, 1-206, 6-4, 6-11—6-14, 6-31—6-32, 6-67, 7-21, 7-28, 7-53, 7-96, 7-121, 7-138, 7-152, 7-158, 7-164, 7-170, 7-173, 7-181, 7-187—7-188, 7-203

Corps Signal Plans Element, 1-92

Current Operations Integration Cell, 1-109—1-113, 1-133, 1-143, 1-151, 1-158, 1-166, 2-1,

Current Operations Integration Cell Support, 1-143

Current Operations Integration Cell Support Element, 1-110

D

DA Civilians, 1-189, 1-193—1-195, 3-41, 4-260

Defense Logistics Agency, 3-58, 3-273, 3-392, 4-260, 7-129

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 3-54

deployment, 1-31, 1-34, 1-74, 1-78—1-79, 1-161, 1-172, 1-182, 1-194—1-195, 1-200, 2-1, 2-3, 2-19, 3-5, 3-17, 3-37, 3-42, 3-49, 3-61, 3-77, 3-79, 3-83, 3-86, 3-103—3-117, 3-120—3-125, 3-175—3-176, 3-178, 3-319, 3-387, 3-394, 3-402, 4-22—4-23, 4-27, 4-33—4-34, 4-37, 4-260, 4-262, 5-9, 6-37, 6-64, 6-66, 6-68, 6-74, 6-89, 7-18, 7-129—7-130, 7-143, 7-145, 7-167, 7-170

E

Early-Entry Command Post, 1-31

EECP, 1-31, 1-70—1-74, 1-177, 1-204, 6-69—6-70

enemy capabilities, interdicting, 4-50, 4-68, 6-14, 6-39

Engagement Section, 1-123—1-124

Engineer Current Operations Integration Cell Support, 1-112

Engineer Section, 1-116—1-117

ESC, 1-11, 1-26, 1-150, 4-24, 6-61, 6-80—6-81, 7-130, 7-138—7-140, 7-143, 7-163, 7-170, 7-179, 7-187

essential personnel services, 1-149, 1-154

Expeditionary Military intelligence Brigade, 1-19, 3-344, 4-138, 6-41, 7-59

Expeditionary Sustainment Command, 1-11, 4-24, 6-61, 7-130, 7-139

F

Field Artillery Brigade, 1-18, 3-363, 4-150, 6-43—6-45, 7-107, 7-119—7-120, 7-144

Field Artillery Intelligence Officer, 1-134

financial management, 1-48, 1-148, 1-163, 3-387, 6-83, 7-123, 7-125, 7-137, 7-140, 7-147, 7-150—7-151

financial management section, 1-163

Fires, corps, 1-18, 1-192, 3-362, 4-150, 6-44, 7-114

, joint, 1-130, 3-17, 3-353, 3-355—3-358, 3-360—3-362, 3-365, 3-367—3-368, 3-382—3-384, 4-64—4-65, 4-143—4-148, 4-150—4-154, 4-157, 4-165, 4-168, 4-172, 4-176, 4-181, 4-186, 4-195—4-196, 4-204, 4-243—4-244, 4-251, 4-254, 6-43, 6-77, 7-52, 7-93, 7-106, 7-190—7-110, 7-112, 7-116, 7-119, 7-121

, operational, 3-353, 3-406, 4-143, 4-154

Fires Current Operations Integration Cell Support, 1-133

functional cells, 1-30, 1-55—1-56, 1-58—1-61, 1-63—1-64, 1-87, 1-100—1-101, 1-165, 1-174, 1-205, 7-73

Future Operations Integration Cell, 1-128

G

G-2X Section, 1-106

Global Response Force, 3-49—3-50

H

Headquarters Support Company, 1-77, 1-204—1-205

HNS, 3-114, 3-130—3-133, 3-414, 4-37, 6-82, 7-163, 7-170, 7-189

Home Station Mission Command Center, 1-76, 1-189

host nation support, 6-82, 7-163, 7-189

host-nation support, 3-114, 3-130, 4-37

human resources policy, 1-152

I

Information Assurance Element, 1-89, 1-93

information collection, 1-20, 1-99, 1-103, 1-114, 1-122, 3-143, 3-145—3-146, 3-181, 3-299, 3-312—3-313, 3-322, 3-324—3-331, 3-337, 3-344, 3-352, 4-50, 4-69, 4-98, 4-106, 4-151, 4-158—4-159, 4-192, 4-121, 4-228—4-230, 4-234, 4-282, 6-40, 6-42, 6-68, 6-87, 6-116—6-117, 6-123, 6-130, 6-149, 7-29, 7-56—7-62, 7-64, 7-68—7-74, 7-77, 7-79—7-82, 7-84—7-85, 7-87, 7-89—7-92, 7-113

Information Operations, 1-122, 3-24, 4-17, 4-295—4-296

Intelligence Operations Section, 1-102, 1-104

J

JIPOE, 3-260, 3-308, 3-345—3-346, 4-230, 7-66

Joint Communications Security Monitoring Activity, 3-55

Joint communications support element, 3-30, 3-34, 3-43, 3-45, 6-72, 7-16

Joint enabling capabilities command, 2-3, 3-28, 3-43, 3-48

Joint Operation Planning, 3-47, 3-86, 3-99, 3-165, 3-170—3-172

Joint Planning Support Element, 3-43, 3-47

Joint Public Affairs Support Element, 3-43, 3-46

Joint targeting, 1-42, 1-134, 3-17, 3-358, 3-360—3-361, 3-364, 3-367, 3-369, 3-373—3-374, 3-380, 3-382, 4-146, 4-148, 4-154—4-155, 4-161, 4-165, 4-177—4-178, 4-185—4-186, 4-201, 4-257, 4-259, 7-66, 7-114, 7-117

joint task force, 1-1

Joint Task Force Headquarters, 1-6, 3-1, 3-4, 3-17

Joint Task Force Headquarters, and Staff augmentation, vii, 3-17

Joint Warfare Analysis Center, 3-57, 4-254

K

KM, 1-61, 1-88, 1-91, 1-105, 1-174, 2-10, 2-48—2-50, 3-39, 3-44, 3-147—3-158, 7-66

knowledge management, 1-61, 2-10, 2-38, 2-49—2-51, 3-16, 3-39, 3-157, 4-292

knowledge management officer, 3-16

L

land component command, 1-1, 1-7, 3-67, 3-363, 4-51, 4-150, 4-157, 5-6, 6-49, 7-32, 7-35, 7-116

Land Component Command Headquarters, 1-7

LCC, headquarters, 1-1—1-5, 1-7—1-9, 1-26, 1-43, 1-69, 1-119, 1-190, 3-28, 3-67, 3-131, 3-133, 3-137, 3-143, 3-182, 3-186, 3-272, 3-295—3-296, 3-321, 3-345, 3-356, 3-363, 3-409, 3-411, 4-1, 4-3—4-4, 4-7, 4-11—4-23, 4-26—4-29, 4-31, 4-33—4-34, 4-36, 4-38, 4-40—4-47, 4-48—4-49, 4-52—4-71, 4-73, 4-75, 4-80—4-84, 4-86, 4-88—4-89, 4-96—4-97, 4-99, 4-101—4-103, 4-105—4-114, 4-118—4-121, 4-124—4-125, 4-127, 4-133, 4-35—4-139, 4-142—4-146, 4-148—4-166, 4-168—4-179, 4-181—4-186, 4-188, 4-190—4-192, 4-194—4-195, 4-198—4-202, 4-204, 4-208—4-209, 4-211—4-213, 4-217—4-218, 4-220, 4-222—4-224, 4-226—4-229, 4-241, 4-247—4-249, 4-251—4-254, 4-254, 4-258, 4-260, 4-262—4-294, 4-297—4-299, 4-301, 5-6, 6-91—6-92, 7-32—7-33, 7-35—7-43, 7-47, 7-64, 7-83, 7-117, 7-121, 7-124, 7-195,

LCC Headquarters, forming of, 1-3—1-5, 1-7—1-9, 1-119, 1-130, 1-190, 4-3, 4-11, 4-13—4-14, 4-17, 4-42, 4-113, 4-157, 4-169, 4-186, 4-194, 4-212, 4-252, 4-274, 4-278, 4-292, 5-6, 6-47, 7-35—7-37, 7-64, 7-121

Long-Range Surveillance Company, 1-77

LRST, 1-206, 7-93—7-105

M

Main Command Post Functional Cells, 1-100

Main Command Post Integrating Cells, 1-165, 1-168

maintenance, 1-86, 1-90, 1-95, 1-135, 1-148, 1-157, 1-159—1-160, 1-203—1-205, 3-70, 3-136, 3-387, 4-28, 4-88—4-89, 4-181, 4-260, 4-279, 4-297, 6-79, 6-81, 7-37, 7-144, 7-160, 7-162—7-163, 7-189

maneuver, forms of, 6-99—6-109

Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, 1-23—1-25, 1-112, 1-187, 6-31, 6-38, 6-59, 6-76—6-77, 7-142, 7-170

Medical Augmentation, 7-135

Military Information Support Operations Element, , 1-127

mission command, 1-29, 1-32, 1-36—1-37, 1-56, 1-69—1-70, 1-76—1-77, 1-86, 1-176, 1-179—1-180, 1-200, 1-207, 2-1—2-2, 2-8—2-11, 2-16—2-17, 2-21—2-22, 2-24—2-25, 2-28—2-29, 2-31, 2-38, 2-44, 2-52, 3-6, 3-32, 3-138, 3-193, 3-198, 3-208, 3-216, 3-311, 3-314, 4-270—4-271, 4-276, 4-287, 6-22, 6-53, 6-70, 6-84, 6-87, 7-1, 7-17, 7-23, 7-28, 7-87, 7-131—7-134, 7-137, 7-139—7-140, 7-143, 7-152

mission command system, 1-29, 1-55, 1-207, 2-2, 2-10—2-11, 2-15, 2-20, 2-26—2-28, 2-44, 2-52, 3-67, 3-139, 4-271, 6-53, 7-1, 7-5, 7-28, 7-81

Movement and maneuver, 1-59, 1-77, 1-100, 1-107—1-108, 1-110, 1-114, 1-204, 2-1, 2-19, 3-66, 3-353, 3-362, 4-18—4-20, 4-91, 4-107, 4-110, 4-143, 4-151, 4-282, 6-12, 7-111, 7-171—7-172, 7-189, 7-201

Movement and Maneuver Cell, 1-107—1-108, 2-1, 2-19, 3-66, 7-172, 7-189, 7-201

N

National Intelligence Support Team, 3-53, 7-79

Network Management Element, , 1-89, 1-91

O

offensive tasks, 4-15, 4-75, 4-299, 6-70, 6-85—6-86, 6-99

Operational Art, 3-90—3-93, 3-98, 3-172, 3-178—3-180, 5-23, 6-19

operational countermobility, 4-118

Operational Design, 3-90—3-93, 3-172, 3-178—3-181, 3-296, 4-55, 6-19

operational intelligence, 3-295—3-298, 3-318—3-319, 3-325—3-326, 3-342, 3-345, 3-349, 4-137

operational mobility, 4-20, 4-91

operational movement, 4-18—4-23, 4-25, 4-151

Operational Movement and Maneuver, , 4-18—4-20, 4-151

operational sustainment, 3-347

operational targeting, 3-357, 3-361

operational targets, 3-361, 4-154, 4-194

operationally significant areas, 4-20, 4-136, 4-297

Operations Security, 1-140—1-141

P

personnel information management, 1-149, 1-155

personnel readiness management, , 1-149, 1-156

planning horizons, 1-56, 1-64—1-65, 3-25, 3-97, 3-102, 3-190, 3-196, 3-201—3-205, 3-214, 3-242, 3-265, 3-301, 3-315, 3-328, 3-382, 3-401, 4-151, 4-158, 4-285

Plans Integration Cell, 1-129

predeployment, 1-195, 2-1, 2-3, 3-32, 3-37, 3-68, 3-77, 3-84, 3-103—3-104, 3-115, 3-117, 3-121, 3-129

Protection, 1-59, 1-77, 1-81, 1-100—1-101, 1-114, 1-116, 1-118, 1-136—1-139, 1-143—1-144, 1-146, 1-173, 1-204, 3-19, 3-63, 3-66, 3-72, 3-114, 3-137, 3-181, 3-210, 3-225, 3-347, 3-362, 3-405—3-409, 3-411, 3-417, 4-38, 4-47, 4-49, 4-71, 4-85, 4-117, 4-147, 4-203, 4-225—4-227, 4-231, 4-237—4-239, 4-241, 4-282, 4-297—4-298, 6-12, 6-57, 6-76, 6-133, 7-50, 7-62, 7-74, 7-133, 7-189, 7-192

Protection Cell, 1-136—1-139

Provost Marshall Office, 1-142

R

redeployment, 1-161, 2-3, 3-86, 3-103, 3-105, 3-107—3-109, 3-111—3-115, 3-117—3-118, 3-120—3-123, 3-125—3-126, 3-175—3-176, 3-418, 3-422, 4-22, 4-34, 4-83, 4-245, 6-63, 7-143, 7-167, 7-170, 7-182

rehearsals, 3-84, 3-240, 4-104

rules of engagement, 3-80, 3-167, 3-197, 3-210—3-211, 3-275, 3-379, 3-385, 4-27, 4-161, 4-166, 4-176, 4-184, 4-210, 4-299, 6-22, 7-31, 7-152

S

Security Cooperation Element, 1-125

Signal System Integration Oversight Element, 1-89—1-90

SIS, 7-8—7-10

SOF, 1-8, 1-77, 1-121, 3-76, 3-109, 3-186, 3-361, 3-368, 4-66, 4-95, 6-68, 6-148, 7-6, 7-85

Space Support Element, 1-118

Special Operations Forces Section, 1-121

special staff, 1-45, 1-49—1-51, 1-61, 1-63, 1-77, 1-100, 1-122, 1-127, 1-166, 1-204, 2-2, 3-14, 3-389, 3-417, 4-13, 4-157, 4-254, 7-76—7-77, 7-170

STO, 7-199—7-207

subordinate forces, 1-70

supply and services, 1-148, 1-157, 1-160

surgeon, 1-48, 1-138, 1-147, 1-164, 3-11, 3-399—3-400, 7-125, 7-191

sustainment, 1-14, 1-32, 1-42, 1-54, 1-59, 1-77, 1-90, 1-100, 1-147—1-148, 1-173, 1-179, 1-205, 2-8, 2-19, 2-22, 3-31, 3-35, 3-58, 3-67, 3-86, 3-105, 3-108—3-109, 3-112, 3-117—3-118, 3-133, 3-137, 3-175—3-176, 3-274, 3-362, 3-386—3-387, 3-389—3-390, 3-393—3-397, 3-399—3-404, 3-410—3-411, 3-414—3-415, 4-20, 4-28, 4-33, 4-41, 4-43, 4-45, 4-52, 4-54, 4-65, 4-68, 4-70, 4-77, 4-84, 4-265, 4-282, 4-298, 5-7—5-9, 5-19, 5-22, 6-4, 6-7, 6-9, 6-12, 6-15, 6-29, 6-35, 6-60—6-62, 6-64, 6-66, 6-74, 6-76, 6-78—6-82, 6-95, 6-116, 6-125, 6-127, 7-9, 7-98, 7-104, 7-119, 7-122—7-130, 7-137—7-142, 7-145—7-146, 7-148—7-150, 7-152, 7-155, 7-159, 7-161—7-162, 7-165, 7-167, 7-170—7-171, 7-173—7-174, 7-176, 7-179, 7-183, 7-187, 7-191, 7-196

sustainment, brigades, 1-18, 1-28, 1-150, 4-28, 5-9, 6-80, 7-137, 7-139, 7-148, 7-174, 7-179

sustainment, information systems, 1-157, 1-162, 7-139

Sustainment, operational, 3-347, 4-260

sustainment information systems, 1-162, 7-139

sustainment information systems support, 1-157

sustainment team, 3-399—3-404

Systems Support Element, 1-89, 1-97, 7-24

T

TACON, 1-8—1-9, 1-13, 1-28, 1-74, 2-6, 2-8, 2-11, 3-3, 4-7, 4-9, 4-235, 4-264, 5-2, 7-6—7-7, 7-20, 7-38, 7-110, 7-120, 7-128

Tactical Command Post, 1-30—1-33, 1-48, 1-71—1-72, 1-74, 1-78—1-79, 1-84—1-86, 1-90—1-91, 1-96—1-97, 1-104, 1-147, 1-166, 1-174—1-189, 1-191, 1-201, 1-203—1-205, 2-16—2-19, 2-29, 4-48, 4-52, 4-171, 6-33, 6-69, 7-8—7-9, 7-11, 7-15, 7-19, 7-22—7-24, 7-95

Tactical Messaging Service Element, 1-89, 1-96

target engagement, 3-381, 3-385

The Corps Staff, 1-32, 1-35, 1-46, 1-49, 1-54, 1-76, 1-87, 1-114, 1-132, 1-146, 1-196, 1-200, 2-9, 2-19, 2-48, 2-50, 3-7, 3-35, 3-41, 3-87, 3-172, 4-12—4-14, 6-4, 6-56, 6-61, 6-68, 6-143, 7-58, 7-73, 7-96, 7-102, 7-125, 7-152, 7-170, 7-185, 7-187

Theater Logistics Structure, 7-136

Theater Sustainment Command, 3-61, 4-24, 5-9, 6-61, 7-124, 7-137—7-138

Transitions, 1-74, 1-83, 1-132, 1-181, 2-3, 2-15—2-16, 2-25, 3-4, 3-7, 3-12, 3-17, 3-30, 3-35, 3-68, 3-127, 3-249, 3-402, 3-418, 4-15, 4-34, 4-40, 4-42, 4-61, 4-83, 4-88, 4-108, 6-23, 6-31, 7-124, 7-190

transportation, 1-32—1-33, 1-37, 1-75, 1-86, 1-115, 1-148, 1-157, 1-160—1-161, 1-178, 1-193, 1-201, 1-203, 1-206, 3-19, 3-43, 3-63, 3-78, 3-80, 3-106, 3-109, 3-111, 3-113, 3-118, 3-122, 3-124, 3-132, 3-389, 3-396, 3-403, 4-23—4-27, 4-30—4-31, 4-34, 4-47, 4-51—4-52, 4-112, 4-267—4-268, 5-21, 6-79, 7-104, 7-137, 7-143, 7-160, 7-164—7-172, 7-178, 7-184

TSC, 3-61, 4-24, 4-28, 4-34, 4-263, 5-9, 6-61, 6-80—6-81, 7-124, 7-127, 7-129—7-130, 7-137—7-140, 7-143, 7-148, 7-150, 7-163—7-164, 7-170—7-171, 7-173—7-177, 7-179—7-180, 7-185

U

U.S. Transportation Command, 3-43, 3-49, 3-51—3-52, 3-106, 3-109, 3-118, 3-123, 3-389, 3-392, 4-24, 4-37, 5-17, 7-129

Unified Action, 1-198—1-199, 3-3, 3-134, 3-136—3-137, 3-198

Unified Action, partners, 1-98, 1-198, 3-3, 3-134, 3-136—3-137, 3-198, 3-271—3-272, 3-274, 3-276—3-277, 3-386, 4-62, 4-82, 4-137, 6-67, 6-69, 7-91—7-92

USAF support, 1-190—1-192, 3-181, 6-47—6-48, 7-121

ATP 3-92

7 April 2016

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

MARK A. MILLEY

General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE

Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

1609102

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media only (EMO).